PHI1500:$$ Major$Issues$in$Philosophy$ - · PDF fileEpistemology:$Bertrand$Russell$$ 1 ......
Transcript of PHI1500:$$ Major$Issues$in$Philosophy$ - · PDF fileEpistemology:$Bertrand$Russell$$ 1 ......
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PHI 1500: Major Issues in Philosophy
Session 6 February 19th, 2015
Epistemology: Bertrand Russell 1
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• Some of Locke’s arguments against na,vism: – If a child does not encounter something in experience, they will not have an idea corresponding to that thing. • “Light and colours are busy at hand everywhere, when the eye is but open; sounds and some tangible qualiQes fail not to solicit their proper senses, and force an entrance to the mind;
• but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, that if a child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but black and white Qll he were a man, he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster, or a pineapple, has of those parQcular relishes.” (2, §6)
» “The mind thinks in proporQon to the maWer it gets from experience to think about.
» Follow a child from its birth, and observe the alteraQons that Qme makes, and you shall find, as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has maWer to think on.” (4, §22)
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• Another argument against na,vism: – Our ideas become more clear and disQnct by reflecQng upon them.
• “…he that contemplates the operaQons of his mind, cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them;
• yet, unless he turn his thoughts that way, and considers them aWenQvely, he will no more have clear and disQnct ideas of all the operaQons of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the parQcular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and moQons of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with aWenQon heed all the parts of it.” (3, §7)
» “And hence we see the reason why it is preWy late before most children get ideas of the operaQons of their own minds;
» and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives.
» Because, though they pass there conQnually, yet, like floaQng visions, they make not deep impressions enough to leave in their mind clear, disQnct, lasQng ideas, Qll the understanding turns inward upon itself, reflects on its own operaQons, and makes them the objects of its own contemplaQon.” (3, §8) 3
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ImplicaQons of Locke’s Empiricism • Everything we have learned, everything we ever will know, and
everything we can imagine will be the product of experience.
– “…the first capacity of human intellect is, that the mind is fiWed to receive the impressions made on it; either through the senses by outward objects, or by its own operaQons when it reflects on them. • This is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of anything, and the groundwork whereon to build all those noQons which ever he shall have naturally in this world.
• All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and fooQng here:
• in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculaQons it may seem to be elevated with,
• it sQrs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflecQon have offered for its contemplaQon.” (4-‐5, §24) 4
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ImplicaQons of Locke’s Empiricism • …so it is criQcally important to consider what experiences we are
exposed to throughout our lives.
– “In the recepQon of simple ideas, the understanding is for the most part passive … and whether or not it will have [any parQcular] materials of knowledge is not in its own power.
– For the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their parQcular ideas upon our minds whether we will or not…
» These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce.
» As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions;
» and cannot avoid the percepQon of those ideas that are annexed to them.” (5, §25)
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• Bertrand Russell (1872-‐1970): BriQsh philosopher well known for his work on logic, language, and epistemology
• His essay “Appearance & Reality” (from the book Problems of Philosophy) addresses the quesQon: – How can we be certain that we know anything?
• “Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man can doubt it?” (1)
- He takes this to be “really one of the most difficult [quesQons] that can be asked.
- When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a straighhorward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the study of philosophy -‐-‐
- for philosophy is merely the aWempt to answer such ulQmate quesQons… aier exploring all that makes such quesQons puzzling, and aier realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.” (1) 7
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• Whereas Locke was concerned with where our ideas come from, • Russell is concerned with whether our ideas really correspond with reality.
– “It seems to me that I am now sijng in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with wriQng or print.
– By turning my head I see out of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. – I believe that the sun is about ninety-‐three million miles from the earth;
that it is a hot globe many Qmes bigger than the earth; – that, owing to the earth's rotaQon, it rises every morning, and will conQnue
to do so for an indefinite Qme in the future. – I believe that, if any other normal person comes into my room, he will see
the same chairs and tables and books and papers as I see, and that the table which I see is the same as the table which I feel pressing against my arm.
– All this seems to be so evident as to be hardly worth staQng, except in answer to a man who doubts whether I know anything.
– Yet all this may be reasonably doubted, and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true.” (1) 8
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• While Locke insisted that our senses supply us with many ideas, • Russell’s concern is whether or not our senses can provide us with
knowledge about reality.
• “In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them.
• [He is affirming that at least some (if not all) of our knowledge is a posteriori, since it comes from experience.]
• …But any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong.” (1)
Ø This is because there is a disQncQon between appearance & reality:
Ø “between what things seem to be and what they are.” (2)
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• “To make our difficul,es plain, let us concentrate a@en,on on the table. • To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny; to the touch it is smooth and cool
and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound. • Any one else who sees and feels and hears the table will agree with this
descripQon, so that it might seem as if no difficulty would arise; – but as soon as we try to be more precise our troubles begin.
• Although I believe that the table is 'really' of the same color all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts, and some parts look white because of reflected light.
• I know that, if I move, the parts that reflect the light will be different, so that the apparent distribuQon of colors on the table will change.
• It follows that if several people are looking at the table at the same moment, no two of them will see exactly the same distribuQon of colors, because no two can see it from exactly the same point of view, and any change in the point of view makes some change in the way the light is reflected.” (1) 10
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• “It is evident from what we have found, that there is no color which preeminently appears to be the color of the table, or even of any one parFcular part of the table –
• it appears to be of different colors from different points of view,
• and there is no reason for regarding some of these as more really its color than others.
– And we know that even from a given point of view the color will seem different by arQficial light, or to a color-‐blind man, or to a man wearing blue spectacles, while in the dark there will be no color at all….
• This color is not something which is inherent in the table, • but something depending upon the table and the spectator and the way the
light falls on the table.” (2) – Another way of expressing this idea is that color is
– not a primary quality of an object, which is the same under any and all circumstances, independent of our percepQon,
– but rather a secondary quality, which can vary depending how we relate to the object through percepQon.
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• “In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scruQny, are found to be so full of apparent contradic,ons that only a great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may believe.” (1)
– When, in ordinary life, we speak of the color of the table, we only mean the sort of color which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual condiQons of light.
– But the other colors which appear under other condiQons have just as good a right to be considered real;
– and therefore, to avoid favoriQsm, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one parQcular color.
» So, on the one hand, • the table appears to have some parQcular color.
» But on the other hand, • it appears to have no parQcular color at all.
– This is a paradox! These two facts contradict each other, so only one of them should describe the true reality of the table.
» Which one is true? 12
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• “The same thing applies to the texture. – With the naked eye one can see the gram, but
otherwise the table looks smooth and even. – If we looked at it through a microscope, we
should see roughnesses and hills and valleys, and all sorts of differences that are impercepQble to the naked eye.
• Which of these is the 'real' table? – We are naturally tempted to say that what we
see through the microscope is more real, • but that in turn would be changed by a sQll more powerful microscope.
– If, then, we cannot trust what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we see through a microscope? • Thus, again, the confidence in our senses with which we began deserts us.” (2)
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Appearance vs. Reality • Russell concludes that:
– “the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the table.” (2)
• “…it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing.
• The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known. • In other words, we do not really know that there is a real table – but we form a belief about the table’s existence anyway.
» Hence, two very difficult ques,ons at once arise; namely, • (1) Is there a real table at all? • (2) If so, what sort of object can it be?” (3)
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• “The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known.” (3)
– “Let us give the name of 'sense-‐data' to the things that are immediately known in sensaQon: such things as colors, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on.
– We shall give the name 'sensa,on' to the experience of being immediately aware of these things.
» Thus, whenever we see a color, we have a sensaQon of the color, but the color itself is a sense-‐datum, not a sensaFon…
– …It is plain [i.e., obvious] that if we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-‐data -‐-‐ brown color, oblong shape, smoothness, etc. -‐-‐ which we associate with the table;
– but, for the reasons which have been given, we cannot say that the table is the sense-‐data, or even that the sense-‐data are directly properQes of the table [i.e., primary qualiQes].
» Thus a problem arises as to the relaFon of the sense-‐data to the real table, supposing there is such a thing.” (3)
•
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• Let’s take stock of Russell’s arguments. – [Empiricist] AssumpFon: If we can to know anything about the table,
it must be through sense-‐data.
1. If we can know anything with certainty about the real table, we need reliable evidence for its existence.
2. Our sense-‐data might not provide reliable evidence about the table. 3. Therefore, we may not be able to know anything with certainty about the
real table.
» What argument form does 1-‐3 (roughly) have?
3. We may not be able to know anything with certainty about the real table. 4. If we may not be able to anything for certain about the real table, we can
doubt whether it really exists. 5. Therefore, we can doubt whether the table really exists or not.
Ø With 3-‐5, Russell is arguing that we should be skepHcal about our belief in the existence of physical things (like tables).
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• “The real table, if it exists, we will call a 'physical object'. • Thus we have to consider the relaQon of sense-‐data to physical objects. • The collecQon of all physical objects is called 'maWer'.
– Thus our two quesQons may be re-‐stated as follows: • (1) Is there any such thing as maWer? • (2) If so, what is its nature?” (3)
• Russell explains a view held by idealists, like Bishop George Berkeley (1685-‐1753), on the nature of maIer. – Berkeley aimed “to prove that there is no such thing as maWer at all, and
that the world consists of nothing but minds and their ideas.” (Russell 3)
» Idealism is a metaphysical doctrine (about the nature and structure of the world) which challenges the widely held assumpQon that physical objects exist independently of our minds (called materialism).
» Berkeley held that there are no mind-‐independent things: instead, ‘to be is to be perceived’.
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• “[Berkeley] admits that there must be something which conQnues to exist when we go out of the room or shut our eyes…
• …but he thinks that this something cannot be radically different in nature from what we see, and cannot be independent of seeing altogether, though it must be independent of our seeing. – He is thus led to regard the 'real' table as an idea
in the mind of God. – Such an idea has the required permanence and
independence of ourselves, – without being…something quite unknowable, in
the sense that we can only infer it, and can never be directly and immediately aware of it.” (4)
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• So, the idealist view explains what we think of as ‘physical objects’ as - things that exist apart from ourselves, - yet can really be known by us, because they are mental phenomena just
like the sense-‐data that are immediately known to us.
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• Russell offers that “we might state the argument by which [idealists] support their view in some such way as this: – 'Whatever can be thought of is an idea in the mind of the person thinking of it;
– therefore nothing can be thought of except ideas in minds; – therefore anything else is inconceivable, and what is inconceivable cannot exist.’ “ (4)
Ø …But he thinks the idealist noQon “that there can be …nothing known to be real except minds and their thoughts and feelings” is fallacious.
• Basically, he thinks that the idealists don’t really believe their own conclusion,
• since they sQll think there is a real table – just not one that is wholly independent of minds.
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• Russell remarks that most philosophers conQnue to believe there is a real table, even though we do not really know that it exists: – “…they almost all agree that, however much our
sense-‐data -‐-‐ color, shape, smoothness, etc. -‐-‐ may depend upon us,
– yet their occurrence is a sign of something exisQng independently of us,
– something differing, perhaps, completely from our sense-‐data whenever we are in a suitable relaQon to the real table.” (4)
• Nevertheless, the mere fact that many philosophers (and ordinary people) believe there is a real table does not guarantee that it really exists. – “… if the reality is not what appears, have we any means
of knowing whether there is any reality at all? And if so, have we any means of finding out what it is like?” (5)
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• Russell concludes: – “Thus what we directly see and feel is merely 'appearance', which we believe to be a sign of some 'reality' behind.” (5)
» …and since appearances don’t allow us to know what reality is like,
» we ought to be skepFcal about our beliefs in the existence of real things.
– “…doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all.” (5)
• But some “bewildering” quesQons sQll remain: – “…if the reality is not what appears, have we any means of knowing
whether there is any reality at all? – And if so, have we any means of finding out what it is like?” (5)
• Russell remarks that: • “Philosophy, if it cannot answer so many quesQons as we could wish, has at least the power of asking quesQons which increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life.” (5) 21