Phase Analysis Incendiary Operations

8/8/2019 Phase Analysis Incendiary Operations

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MAJ. G [ N ( U R ! I ~ UEMAY

INCENDIARYOPERA T'IONS.- . ' - .{ . : ' .


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HEADQUARTERS XXIOFFICE OF THEAPO


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ANALYSIS OF I N C E N D I A ~ PHASEOF O P ~ ~ T I O N S AGAINSTJAPANESE URBAN AREAS

XXI BO!EEil C O ~ ~ . l A N D

9-10 March - Mission #40 - Tokyo11-12 March - Mission #41 - Nagoya I13-14 March - Mission 1142- - Osaka16-17 !Iarch - Mission 1/43 - Kobe18-19 I.larch - Mission ff44 - Nagoya II

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A - Scope end Purpose of ReportThe purpose of this report is to give an integratedpicture of a whole phase of air operations, characterized

by low level incendiary night attacks against urban targets.This type of opera tion marked a novel employment of B-29aircraf t , calling for different t a ~ t i c a l concepts from thosewhich had proved successful in the European theater and hadbecome the standard for heavy hombardment in the AmericanAir Forces.Time and perspective will be required to assess the fullimplications of the incendiary experiment. This command isnot in a position to judge whether the methods employed herewill have a lasting effect upon the future of aeriul warfare. They have proved sufficiently successful to ~ a r r a n ~furl.her stuciy and additioncl experimentation. This analysisis an attempt to ~ r e 3 e n t the lessons learned so far und to

suggest the modificatlons in technique which seem advisablein fUl.ure opera tions of this ~ i n d .It. is not intendeci to present in this report vital sta

t is t ics or any facts not relevant to the tactical considerat ions involved) \'7hich can be learned from the indiviciualConsolidated Mission Reports for e ~ c h mission. Any valuewhich this type of analyt;is may have rests in the present ~ t i o n of the entire phase of operations as a whule.B - The Problem

On 24 NOVGmber 1944 ~ h XXI Bomber Command carried outi ts f irs t l a r g e - s ~ a l e attack against the Japanese homeland.Between then and 9 March 1945 over t,lenty nissions were flownagainst Japan, representing a total of 037 sort ies. Insome of these attacks incendiary bombp were used in combination with HE bombs; on three strikes incendiaries alonewere employed. In the main, how'ever, the entire stage ofoperations prior to 9 March was patterned on the conventional~ ~ e r i c a n Air Forces doctrine o f day light high alt i tude precieion bombing in formation.

The re3ults were unsatisfactory. To the XXI SomberC o ~ ~ d were assigned nine (later raised to eleven) high~ r l 0 r l t y targets. In 2(000 sorties not one of these wasaest:oyed. One ( A k a ~ h i ) was damaged so as to stop proouctlon for a few w e ~ k s . Three others sUtitained enoughd a m ~ g e ( ~ O - 3 0 % ) to interfere with p r o d u c ~ i o n . One of the~ o s t importunt - Musdshino - suffered 4% damage as ther ~ s u l t of 835 s o r t ~ e s and '.::.]27 tons of bombs. (Theseflgures represent alrcruft airborne and tons l i f ted against357. Actually only 141 aircraft bombed the primary drop-ping 345 tons.) ,

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This was the tota l record of damage infl icted onenemy targets in four months of B-29 narrare. Thebalance sheet of r e s ~ t s obtained and losses ~ u f f e r e ~clearly showed the need for a radical change ~ tact1cS.In examining the reasons for the lack of success i t

i s apparent that Jap.s.n's best defense against our tact icshas baen the weather. Even in the so-calleo good ~ a a t h e rmonths of December, J a n ~ t r y , and ebruury only u fract ionof the attacks could be c ~ r r i e d out by v i ~ u a l bombingillethOQS. In December only 1S9 ou t of 415 sortie&, or 45%,p e r m i t t ~ d v i ~ u a l b o ~ b i n g J in J a n ~ r ~ 180 out of 473, or)C%, and in Februa.r:r 1j7 out of 7 ~ 4 J 0:11:)' a mere 19% ofthe s o r t i e ~ flOYD. BQ5eti on the f r a g m c n t ~ r y ~ e ~ t h e r 10fo1'!lb.tion aVi;iilable to tni- ... cOln;nand there '-!ere c..ppraximate1yfiVG days in each of the months of December, January, andFebrua.r;y- ',;hi,,;h would h...ve permit.tee high alt i tude visualoperations ovar the r o ~ a g o y a a r ~ a . During thesem o n t h ~ , beror,,; night tukeoff was fensib1a, turget timeover Japan '!!.Eo:, limited to the period be'tv!cen 1400


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opportunity. In many CU::.B5 'Jeather cunC1itivns p ~ l ; : ! v e n t e dlli.;.viginc (;Ui:,ul


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It Vi';':: agl,lim.t thiS bdckground t h ~ t the dl::lcioion ' l aS rei:l.chede a r l ~ ' in March, LO launch G. :;eries of 10'.1 lLwel incendiary night. J . t { . a c k ~ dgain",1. J.panese urOfln Clrc/;".s, These operations were notconceivcu as l c ~ r o r rctlds agains t the aivi l ian population. TheJu}l'ina::,e econor:!y de.pGnds heuvily on ho!ne lndu::;tries ci::l.rried olJ'.. incitie:. , or s ~ t t l e m 0 n t 8 close to mc:.jor fiictory clreas. By de3troyingtn es e feed er indu5tr ies the f lO \ i of vi ta l p


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c - The Executlo

Night Attack.TIAUNG.

The m i ~ s i o G ~ l for this series of operations is l n s e p ~ -rable frow i t execution, since modifications in the plan~ e r e ~ h d e from m i s ~ i o n to mission. The two ii11 be discu5sedtoget!1er in the fol lowing pages. In place of a chronologicalreport of the attacks i t is considered p r e f e r ~ b l e to discussthe outst.:...nding features of th e entire phase point by pointto p r e ~ e r v ~ th e essenti&l unity of these operations.

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~ " " " ,".=...2IiY.. ......e J U i ~ e , r l . . . . . . - t,.;tY.!iR'T't ' ~ ' . : "\ ~ " . . , . - : ~ { ? : : t " ' ; . ' ; ~ .. ; : ( ) " ~ ~ t " ~ The decision to strike at n . i i h f \ 1 ~ S "an essentialfeature of the plan, to afford protect ion aga inst enemyfight-.;r:;, and &ntiaircraft. The Ja.panese r:.ight fighter force

""'as kmr:m to be weak and ":as not believed to be u seriousd ~ n g e r . But los:;,es from flak ~ e r e expected to be $ubstantial.530 oltt..cl\.ing At night i t ".'las hoped to minimize t h a ~ e 105ses::.inca enell\)' r:ldar gun laying devices "!ere thought to be com}kl .r__t.lv::!'l; inefficlent c..nd h e C i ~ ' AA guns v.'051d thu!.> have tod L ~ x m d on ~ e ! i . r c h l i g h t s for effective f i r3 control .

1 e u t ~ t e r considerationf' ul:.>o :.ere in [ ....vor of night: ~ t . t . ~ e ! \ : : . . Heav:r r c . . i n , ~ 71th 10:1 vblbi l i ty nnd s'tl"ong ....inds were. ~ e g i n n i n g to bt:: cxpzrieneeCt .It. th e MariG.nas hoses ..:.nd it "NUSi m ~ r t ~ n t to ~ c c o m p l i s h L : e ~ s t the landing, dnd i f pos5iblethe t. .........aoff l:::L .... "el l , in d....j-light. Weut.lkr over th e LL..rget 1.'1&8believ=u to D s ~ i g n t l y better ~ night, ~ least during the...pring, d I.E to the j ) r e : : . ~ n c e of 1011 cloud forms of & tYl-le ,;hiehtend to d ~ c r ~ ~ s e in amount at night.

From the s t ~ n d ~ o i n t of n u . v i g ~ t i o n , nigh't flight offeredone dist inct u d v d . n t a g ~ in that Loran sky ":/l:::Lveti Cdme in ;'1e11over tho ~ n t i r 0 route to Japan una. permitted l a r ~ r i i ' a l l 5 to beplotted more hccurately. Lor&.n reception in daytime hasiJroved grdclt.ly inferior to night reception . Ib.Thcugh the deciSion had been made to attack th e t .ir gc tat nigHt there "YCitl _considerable lat i tude in choosing te.keoffand landing t i ~ e . Several f a e t o r ~ had to be c o n ~ i d e r e d .dit.n u g ~ o ~ s ; ~ i g h t of ~ r o u n d 1 ~ 7 J O O O 1bs &t t a k ~ o f f i t ~ a desirable to ~ c n e c i u l e takeoff in d ~ y l i b h t . On th e other hand J

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it 1'1;;"$ even more important. to accomplish as much of thereturn journey as :)ossible in 'dayl ight "Co void ditchings '7 tnight and to permit damag8d a l l ~ c r a f t ~ lanu i n day ligh t, 1 f, ',cather ~ l the b ~ s t 2 s should prove unfavorable. In vievl ofth9 length of the micsions (approxim1:l.tE:ly f ' tfteen hours onthe average) i t waG n ~ c e d s n r y to arrive Dot


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11135 - . . . - T " I t , - ~ / ' s 0710 - IZ'n I120/0 Wff",,,l

rtNAG'OYA Ir

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No'i


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c. Time Uver TargetIn analyzing ~ h re&ulLS of ~ ~ five i n ~ e n d i a r y ~ i s s i o n s

it D e ~ a m ~ Q ~ p a r ~ n t ~ h e t c o n c e n t r ~ t i o n of the force o v ~ r thetarget in the sr.ortust possible timo was an im,!Jortant fuetor.E j ~ .... turatl.ng the enemy aefen&e:; the ~ f f o r t s of f i re f ighters.,xe nal,lpered, r ~ < i a r directors for a n t i ~ . u r c r a . f t gun:;; and ::;earchllgnt::. L J E : ~ o m . J confused, and :;G.p&late fire:3 are merged into ;:,.ger..,3r""l conl'lagr:.:.t..Lon.

Un t.ne f i r s t mission d g c . . i n ~ ; t . Tok:\'Q thE. importan:::e of th isf


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done on th e Tokyo J ! I L , , ~ i o n . S"trngglers and weather o.:ondit.ionss.ccoillltecl for 'Lhe fact t .hat l ,he entire force of 74 snips tookthree hours and tNenty-eight minutes to cross the target , andtha t onl;y 70% reached there in th e f i r ~ t two hours.

the time the fourthconcentration in timeortance Byof

OSAKA\ -

mission (Kobe) uas run thewas better dj)}lreciated as

A2 KIl.. -.- '.--'_ .. - .. _.

immore

inforJilation on the preceeding missions Wb.S k::oming in . The formermethod of cont.rolling concentration by scheduling take off wasrealized to be ine"deqw...te. The ',;rings ',vere therefore given arequired time over the target (U400K - 0515K), instead of atake-off hour and were encouraged to work out their o ~ take-off time. This proved dif f icu l t problem to solve as only metrowinds ,/ere availb.ble to compute the f l ight time required andallovlances had to be made for wind variat ions. Nevertheless,the three wings were over the target vii th 306 a i rc ruf t in s l ight-ly over two hours, providing the best c o n c e n t r a t ~ o n of any of thefour mis sions , though/the scheduled time over the target was exceeded by forty-five minutes.

On the l a s t missioi.. (Nagoya Ii) the same method .....as used.The 'l ings ~ f e r e again giver. a ta rget time (0400K - 05l5K) but didnot achieve the concentration obtained on th e p revious str ike , asi3 ::;ho'.!n in the photo on the follo'ling page. The force of 4901)1an8':' req uired t,70 hours and forty-four ::J.inutes ovet the primaryt....rget , .11th a concentrl).tion of .!.5d Ciircraft in the f i r s t two hours.

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In analyzing these missions afterwards i t was agreed bythe wings as " e l l as by th e bomber command t h a t n e i t h e r of thetwo methods assured s a t i s fa c t o ry concentration over th e t a r g e t .No so lu ti on of th e problem has as y et been found. A suggestionwas made to prescribe take-off time as well as a controlled air-speed to assure simultaneous ~ r r i v a l over th e tar g et. In viewof the unsatisfactory c a l i br a t i on of instruments and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of flying a controlled airspeed on such a longf l i g h t th is plan i s not considered f easib le.

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Another p o ~ s i b i l i t y ~ o u l Q be to schedule departure timefrom control ~ o i n t necrer to Japan, such as I ~ Jima. Arrivalover Iwo .::ould bd control led by increa.:-.ing a i r 5 ~ e e d or f ly ing r..dogleg; on the c o m p & r ~ t i v e ~ short f l ight between Iwo bnd theJap.:ll103Se i:1::1inlQnd the f ' o r ~ e ..,ould not get stru ng out E.S it doe::,over the muco longer r o ~ t 0 3 from the Marianas. Although thismethod ~ " o u l d increi1&e fue l consumption and reduce the bomb load,i t :i11 be consiacred, along ~ i t h other poss ib i l i t ies , ~ planning future iucendi!...ry attacks. A comparison of the five raidsfroTa the ste.ndpoint of effect ive concentrution is pre;:,ented inthis chart:ITIME OYER.TAI


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4. ALII1UDErne c n ~ n g e ~ &ltitude from bet 'een ~ 5 0 0 0 ~ n 3v,UOV feet

i.O c..et. een 5UJu c...nd lO,uOU feet \'1:..5 C I"ddical aejJ&rture from~ t ..na ....rd h ~ c . . . v y bO"lbardment t . i . ; . c t i c ~ . I t proved to be the onef ~ < : t u r e ..bich holas out greater prolJise for the fu"tllI 'e thi;.n anyobber t ingle 1'...c1.or learned on the incendiury c.a.ttac\{s. The mainad\'""ntagcls vere the increo.ried bomb lOGd, greater bombing accuri::lcy, l ~ J e inten:..e 1100s, bet.ter r.:.de..r returns, less ::;;train on'the ....lirp1


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41ti tude rad ar o fte n b ~ c o m e ~ i n o ~ r u t i v e , bomb bay doors s t ick


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The axiti of attack should be determined by the locl:ltion oft.he&e points in relJ.t ion to the r4PI. At high b.lt i tude, how-ever, the axis of a t t ~ c k cannot be selected a t ~ i l l since itm u ~ t approximate the wind direct ion I and consequently infer iorIpt s or offse t Apls are often selected s imply because there areno other on the predeterrnini3d axis. A further a d v . s . ~ a g e inboobing a t l o ~ ~ r alt i tudes is the clear definition of signalson the radar scope. At high alt i tude the AN/APQ-lj often goesout of commission completely, or the returns are so ~ e a k as toJ;!&ke Idellt i f icut ion impossible. Cre"Js p a r t i c i ~ t i n g in thei n c e n ~ i a r y u t t ~ c k s ~ o m m c n t e a that these were the f i rs t mis-~ i o n , ~ on ":ihich they had beel able to rec:.d the scope a clearlyC.ci I... m:..p.

A yet ~ h & been i ~ p o 8 s l b l e to measura q u a n t i ~ & t i v e l yt.ne ~ , ! l p r o v e n e n t in bomLing < i ~ c u r a c y obtained by lo"sering the.:....lLit'uc.e. U n ~ i l c.tt.:>.ck.:. using HE bo:nb::;. (.ave been .'!lade a t 10'7

~ l ' t J . t L l Q ~ : ; ,..uo. t.hB t,o!nb h i td plot ted, an:,' co:u1)


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Qerious d ~ n g e r . Thoughmedium ~ ~ a t ~ l i e v e dto be G n ~ g l i g i b l e fac-tor a t altitudes ~ r o u n d8,OOU feet i t s effect-i v ~ n e ~ s ~ o u l d increase~ i t h th3 10TIering ofa l t i t u d ~ to clpproxi r n ~ t ~ l y 5,000 f t .On the .\"hole,the .:tltitudesflo."I1 -:1ould

.. ..1PR06ABIUT{ o HITS :V A ~ I . S ' " V . ~ S H Y WITH:T ~ CUBE OF TME ;5\..AIoJ'T" 12AI'4&E.

.................................... .:.E_rr..ige oc.lloons at. the al t i tudes pLmncd ':Iere

'..;on'::'J.(;lered, c..nd it..v".:, de:::iood 'th.t. t.hey did not const.i-~ u ~ e h : , ~ r ~ o u ~ r i ~ k . A & ~ t ~ z r of fdct, v e r ~ y f e ~ b ~ l -J . o u n ~ '1ere :.:.ightcu on ~ i : e i j C mlBDion,j. Reconnb.issE.nce.;-:-el:; repor1..eci sighting b:rrr.:i.ge b.alloons ut. ulti tudes: I h i ~ r : tliey ?btim'-J.ted to be C;.XOund 50UO feet , but in viewof the i"ucr. tnat re:::onnHi:,s.... n c shipf::i fl;r e:-..t ~ r o u n d;l,OUO fee t , the l'(;por:t0d Gltitude \"I'.i.S bl.:!lidvQQ (:xce::;sive.The nor,nG.l ':i::iXimU!:: runge for otlrr&g'1 balloons is esti:nutedto be 4UUJ feet, ~ n a l t h o ~ h ~ ~ G ~ r m i n s are b 3 1 i ~ v e d 1.0have o ... llocn;:, ',11th a r ~ n g e of b.::> much 'Ul:> 6000 r ~ e t , suchr , ~ n g ~ s .mulu hardly be fea:;;iblo in th e citrong ';linds en-c o u n t a r ~ d over Japan.

Fro:n the stcmdpoint of enemy .::ig!-n .c.... defense thechL-ng'J in a lt it ud e appears to be i n ~ i g l l i f i c a u t . The J!iPCJJ1ese hJ.ve ah/


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3.A,.other i ~ l p o r " t o u n t deviation [ralil conventional b o m ~ d r d -!:J.ent t ac t ics ' , , '[10 the decis ion to at tack individual ly :Lnstcadof in forma t ion. Once it h


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S E'CimprovelG.enr. in naviga.tion, t iS old the fact. tha t on the pra-viout> high l .l t i tude miosion::, formation::. g 8 n ~ r 8 . l 1 y brolw upafter ' lc..nd's end G.nc1 negotHl.ted the re"(,urn journ0y indivi-d ~ l l ) , often at night, thus acq iring 0 x p e r i ~ n c a in nevi-g_t..iOI1 ::i.e. night . Also clo1ntl'ibut.ing to th


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-..t-...

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TOKYO

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On the tokyo attackthe shorts paradoxi-cally contributed tothe l00d resu l t hyhi t t ing tho dockarea which had not.been part of t.Ile I ' briel"eel target area 0 pbJ:t can'ta1ned many ,.''f1ta.J. ins te lh t ions . " "".,un the aagoya attack, 0noweftr, t.be Shorts ' \,were scattered overWide area and could J ..1-be extinguished ba- rare doing much dam.- Q1a age. Ul a i l proha- , .#'b i 1 1 ~ many erews .. ' Q..aropped tne ir pay


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T h i ~ suggests the n ~ e d for a careful unalysis ofi n d l v l a u ~ l c r d ~ performuncp.. In the case of incendi&rynight ~ i s s l o n s this e be done only oy a n ~ l y ~ i n g SCOyep h o t o ~ tiud n ~ v i g a 1 j o r s I logs. The ";'d.ngs themselves sug-gested t.hu. t this a n a ~ sis be . ~ d e by th ei r s ta ffs ....no thercsul ' ts turneci over to the c o ~ d for conso1:J.dution r;:ndstudy. steps have been taken to expedite the s h i ~ a d n tof much needed scope cameras to peroi t installc.lt10ns inevery p] ane.

Another disadvantcge of tee individual attackm ~ t h o d , and one more diff icul t to correct , i3 the factthat proper concentration in time and ~ p a ~ e over the t ~ r -get is extremely di f f icu l t to achieve when c i re ruf t operateindividue.lly.

Jl.S !:lentioned earl ier , individual uttr..cks Elren e c e ~ c a r y in-night operation::., regardless of the advc:.ntRgesor ai;:,advc.nt&ges of this lllethed. But, thc;)o" hc.:..ve also broughtho:tJ la::.sons 7hich , t i l l bo:) com;idered in future mcdific.:..~ ~ o n ~ of our Lacties. Though i t m ~ not prove o e ~ i r a b l eto aL\'d':l\. b-;>' i n d i v ~ d U < . . , . i rcraft , e x ~ a p t on. nig:lt raission::;,h. m..y be: 7l::?11 'LO give wor.:: ancourageillCnt to indivlC.u:..li n i l . i ~ L ~ v e ~ r r d r e 5 0 u r c e f ~ n e ~ ~ l : : ? v ~ n en f o r m ~ t i o n a t t ~ e k s .r a i ~ could be done by senuing ~ ~ ~ l ~ r fcrees u g ~ i n ~ l . pin~ i n t targets - - s i r ~ l e ~ i n g , or I ~ r 1 j of U 3ing, aepending on t h tonnu.ge nccessu.r)' to ae::;t.re:>' the te.rget - - andr : : . ~ r v i n g muximu;j effor t s t r ~ K e s b,}' tnt::: mcle bonber comm.end for i n e e n c i ~ r y d'tt ....cks aguinst large urbun l.l.reas.

010 YOU /-Illf C ~ ~ T ~ ~ A ~ ~ ~ tJ:,-". " ' . Ii \ .-d!"" _-1'.\.?' 4 ' M ~ ' \}. , /); = " '1 ""\'-. \\ '!r- i _\;,. /. 7 ,'-t.. r / ~ , - ; ' ~ \, . '--c,-. ~ . / " ' ~ 1.:., ._ f ~ , ; ..... ,; ~ f J . . !" .,,',; "l}-v...... . . ~ . , . - . : : : r ," " , ' A ~ " " " A ~ ' ' . , t . . : " : ' i ~ : - . ; " ;.',.,r -, ,Ii ~ , '" 1 f ~ i ~ \ ~ i , . ... '-;";:: f ? : ; ' ! . ~ ; ; , ~ f a : ~ ~ :~ J'.,\: .. ~ . /y,. .. . - ' l > ~ ! : . ~ ' ; " .f .1.'

l . . f ( : ; { f , , ~ ' ; ' - . i j . ~ ' ; f : : , : ' : ; ' : : ~ .. ; } , ~ f ~ ~ ' ...i;.. , "'.t,,-,>- . ~ J ~ : : ..J " ! ; . ~ ; . . , ? . :'.l/'::.:...... ~ . ...:., , ......;..::,.. ~ . O : : : . , ' f , ;;-.';.'., ' , ~ ' F : - r ~ t l { ; ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ { i ~ : ~ .. ~ ~ ~ ~ } ~ ~ , ,..

In those smal le r u tt :l cks in './hieh the single sqw..dron.;cilld be 'tha tac t ic ...l unit , g reete r f lcx ib i li t, y ;ouldbe provided, ere "is could m o . k ~ several p a s z ~ : : . a.t thet ~ r g e ~ , ~ n d the individual c r e ~ members wcula i a ~ n t , i f yt h e J ~ e l v e s far ~ o r e with the ~ u c c a s s or f ~ ~ l u r ~ at tnemi:=".:>ion.

Af outgroNtr c r the e x p e r i ~ n c e guthcred on.... j l c i n c o m . ~ ~ ~ r y (,;,ttacktl ... ..;..;.rl;ful s'tuciy ;'11.11 ('.J mnda ofthc


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4. BO:,IDING PRODLEMS AUD RESULTSThe bombing r e s u 1 t ~ in terms o f target dreu d e ~ t r o y e d ,as 3 h o ~ n on p ~ g e 3 ~ i1lustrcte the e x t ~ n t to 'mich resul tsv-.l)(R.:J.in or :mow fa.lling en the tdr-get ei ther in the 48 hours.preceding or sh ortly af te r th eattack)

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Since u l l th..:se ib.ctors ~ e d , but fu rth e!' det&ils c::.n bo founa ii.1 a t o ~ h n i c a l study


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S Eo eRE T

- - - - - - ~- attern Density.on th is subject issued by the Operations Analysis Section,XXI Bomber C o m . ' T l ~ n d J whi:h (IUS served as source material forthe following aiscussion.

G'AOIIt'LlIST"K EXPLODESAT 2500 rT. REl.4.f//liG38 M"64J /NeE",801l.18S'Wf.JJCf..! FAL l IN ,.4'RAIVtJ/}M P A T T e - e N .Ri:SVI riNG r,tJ,TTERNOF ONE >tICf( Ak IA/ITJ.{AN INTRMlOM,fTER ::r-TI.+'6 01= So F l: COVGRS

~ ~ ~ ~ _ . 020 SQ. ""'LE'S.-- . - --. . . . . . .__ ",4'~ / " ' ~ - . . . . .

g e n e r ~ l c o n f l ~ g r a t i o n before the f ire fignters have hadtime to put them out. The bomos of a ~ i n g l e ship, whetheri t carries 10-, 15- or 20,000 lbs, must ~ r o d u c e a single f irecovering an area corresponding to the bomb load. With a ful lbomb load of 17,000 l'os of M--69 bombs, the area burned. out bya single ship should be around 16 c;.cres. Using tne M--69 bomb,a density of .3 tons p


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de.:.:redsed, bnd for t.he ~ u ( ; c e e d i n g mission:;; 'the in t ervalo::lOtel'"7.....5 :.gZli.,n ~ e t . for 50 f.: .e t, yielding .... pa ttern den sity of .Jt o n ~ per d ~ r e : i th tae ~ - 6 9 , ond .45 ~ o n s ~ i t h t.he ~ - 5 U bombs.

b. Ared Densitrn m ~ n t i o n e c before, pattern density controls the

~ p r e u d of fire f r o ~ the b o ~ b s of only a single ship_ To~ ~ ~ u r a destruction of the target these ~ t t e r n s must be spreade v e n ~ y over the entire ~ r ~ u , thus permitting the indiv idua l

f ~ r e s v t u r t ~ Q by e ~ c h . e h ~ p to merge into a general c o n f l ~ g r a -t lon . Ho'.Y tv


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An attempted method of solving i t was to d ivid e thet


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'. .GOYA CIT

l44IoIIGE ASSESSMERE'J:T ~ ' : '

",

"\ KEY


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TM tb1z


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- . ---.. . . .: J . l ~ ' ~ ~ : ~ ; ~ " '.' .. :'

. .:.... 'controllin& factors. This target was hidden by a low deck ofcloudS' which averaged 8/10 coverage. Visual "DOIDblng was moetly1II.posslble. Crews were rorced by weather conditions to releaseon ~ a d a r after performini a controlled run using the offset aimingpoint . Osaka 181, therefore, the f i r s t example of bad weatherbeing uaed to good advantage.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO 23~ I o l A G L 1 ! t KOllE CITY

~ 1 I O ~ _ STI 'l "I ([ a: 4 q; B "945. "F160R 6Not unt i l th e fourth mission (Kobe) was i t realizedthat visual distr ibution methods, which are 1n fundamentalcontradic tion to th e principles behind the selection of aimingpoints , were largely responsible for the fai lures of previousattacks. I t i s no'W recognized that a l l bombardiers must makea controlled bomb run over the AP in order to produce therequired concentration and the planned dispersion of bombs.Accordingly, .11 bombardiers on ~ h Kobe mission were instruc-ted to make a controllp.d radar bomb run over the target beforemaking visual corrections, and to apply such corrections onlyto their sightIng on the AP, and not for the purpose ofspreading the bombs visually. The resu l ts of th e Kobe missionwere inconclusive. The extent of damage accomplished, i f ex-pressed as a percentage of the target area attacked, was sat is-factory, but in terms ot ' tJl6 tons or ineendtaries carried thearea destroyed was disappointing. The Kobe raid i l lustratesthe point that the geographical shape of the target ares is oftenas important as the size in determining the positiOD of the AP' s .

The axis of attEck was selected in deference tc two considera-t ions, f i rs t , that the errors in deflection would exceed theerrors in range wbere the OAP was relat ively close to MPI's andsecond, that the most satisfsctory IP and OAP dictated an approachtram the south. Again execution rather than plan contributedto the failure to achieve complete success. The isolated firesto the sou theast and northwest of the APts testify to thedeviation from plan probably caused by navigation errors inSOllIe cases and reluctance to penetrate thermals in other cases

._... - - - - - - , - - ~


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In future incendiaIJr oper::..tions t.he uxis of attackctnc.i t h OAP ' :lUl be selected "1;.0 prof::" t lJ;}" the le ssons l e & r n ~ don Lhes; u t ' t a : : : k ~ . I t hes been proved thtlt "he u ispe rs ion o fc o m b ~ "round t.he APls i3 not ... r ~ n u o m distrlllur.ion, and t.hcit'tha o i ~ s depends u ~ o n ~ a ~ - v ~ r i a o l e 6 . Of t.hese the m o ~ ti ~ p o r ~ a n t & ~ y : t.ha d i ~ t a n c e from t.he OAP t.o 'the MPI, ther e l a ' t i o n ~ h i p bet "/een the direction of the "dna .:lnd the axisof


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,

d. ConcentrationA successful incendiary attack not only requiresconcentration in space over the t s rget (pattern density aDdarea deusltJ), but a l 80 concentration in time. 'rhe importance

ot this la t te r factor was mentioned earl ier in this report .AS pointed out, concentration on the successful TOkyo raid wasl e f t to chance. In planning for the Nagoye mission a t ac t i ca lexperiment was attempted which did not succeed but broughtho.e a valuable lesson. By spl i t t ing the force into two partsand scheduling them over the target 80 as to provide a l u l lprior to arr ival of the second torce, the t ire fighters wereable to deal . i th each of the two attacke: separately and con-sequently could bring the f i res under control more easi ly.1he fai lure of th18 mission helped to emphasize the Deed torgreater concentration and tor & corresponding change in tact ic 'on future att.a.cks.

e . Surface WindGround wind a t the target seems to be of considerableiaportance in assuring the success of an incendiary s t r ike .In the TOkyO at tack , the only one where a strong surface windwas encountered, the spread of f i re was materially ass is ted by

the wind. Tbis t s rget photo shows clearly the spread of f i rebe70nd the ta rget area in the direction of the wind. It isl ik ely tb et without a helping wind the damaged area may wellhave been a th ird les8. Yen in subsequent attacks where onlyl1cbt or no w1.Dds were present , the spread of f i re beyond thetarget area was always observed to be in the direction of thewind.


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Aside from increasing the area of d ~ m u g e , a strongsurface wind helps to speed up the ~ e r g i n g of fires into ageneral conflagration and thbs to saturate f i re-fightingequipment.In spite of clear evidence that the wind was an im-?ortant factor in the ;uccess of the Tokyo attack i t is d if f icul t to determine whether similar success could be obtainedin the future without n surface wind. other factors, such aspattern density, area density, concentration in time and spacecould p r o b a b l ~ ' produce s.n equally gooe resul t , but s:.lrfacewind can be relied upon to compensate for insufficient concent rat ion or uneven c o v e r ~ g e of the a rea . Whenever possible, i tseems desirable to 91an incendiary missions so as to get thebenefit of surface winds.

f. Precipitation.In the early stages c ; p l a ~ n i n g the incendiary attacks

i t VIas believed that rain or sno\" occuring prior to , or shortlyafter , an attack would interfere with the success of the mission.'These fears ~ e r e not borne out. Consideretle ra in or snow hadoccurred l8 hours before the Tokyo attack and must have im-pregnated the roofs with moistu re. Neverthe less , the f i res tookhold and spreed rapidly. On the f i r s t Nagoya attack no precipi tat ion had taken place for ~ 0 U r days and the ci ty had had anextensive c ~ spell . N e v e r ~ n e l e s s t he r es tl lt was extremelydisappointing.

Again, the Osake attack r.hich, next to Tokyo, was the~ o s t s ~ c c e s s f u l of the f ive incendiary missions, was followedapproximately 12 hours later ty precipitatiml, ~ i t h o u t substant i a l ~ f f e c t on the f i res ~ l r e a d y started t h ~ r e .

Contrary to expectation, thecate that normal rain or snow, ei therincendiary a t ~ a c k , has no appreciableevidence seems to indiprior to or after aneffect on i t s s ~ c c e s s .


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Bombing resul ts on the five missions are compared inChart below which also shows ftve of the six factors whichare beli6ved to have a direct bearing on th at re su lt . Thesixth, area densi ty , is one of the most importcnt but cannotbe expressed n u m ~ r i c c l l y in the absence of information as towhere ea ch Cr6TI dropped i t s bombs. A glance at the chartsuggests that no single factor can be identified as the onee l e ~ e n t responsil1c for success or failure of sn incendiaryattack. All c o n t r i ~ u t e to i t in varying defreesj t h ~ y are .mutuall)' s u p ~ o r t i n g and, to 8. certe.in extent , one can be sub-st i tuted for the other. In en ideal mission they would a llbe represp.nted, but an attack neeo not fa i l for lack of a sur-face wind i f that lack is compensated for by higher concen-tration in time and space. Conversely, a strong surface windwould compem:ate for a lov!er concentration, provided that :::uc.:hconcentration does not fal l below e certain point. Futureincendiary attecks must be p l a ~ n e d with due regard for ~ l these fectors: The right type of bomb, proper concentrationin time end space and , i f poss ib le , sur face winds.

TARGET AREA CAlCUIATEO TO 8 OAMAGEO.o TAR&ET AREA ACTiJAUY OAMAGED.NAGOYA OIAKAITOKYO KOBE #AGoYA] I..... - -- . -.. - - , ./0,000

8,0006 , 0 0 04 ,000 ,..2.,000

PATri'./i?I>i[JEflSITY 7;i.4 0.29 0.145 0.29 0.45 0.40Ajc 80M131NG -;( IIRS Z 28 /5 4 / 9 0 3 0 6 258TYPE O F 8 0MB M 69 M-69 M69 M 50 M-475 t ! R ~ A ( E W I N O S {TRONG t/611T N IL i I G H T LtGi-ITPRE CfPI TA TION IIEAVV NONE S a G - l i T H E A V Y N O N E'

32


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The ann lysis of yielded valuablelessons for future incendi&ry operations. \hut may prove morei ~ p o r t a n t s t i l l , i t has s u g ~ s t e d certain t ~ c t i c s which can beapplied against pinpoint precision targets.

On a l l five oissions a number of selected cre.s ~ e r e usedes a pathfinder force, to mark the tar(e t . On the Tokyo stiketh e f i rs t squadrQn in each ninb was provided with M-47 i n ~ e n ~diary clusters, with instantaneous nose fuze, for the purposeof illuminating the AP. In subsequent attacks six to ninePathfinder crews in each wing, elsa with M-47 ~ o m b s * , weredispatched t ~ e n t y minutes u h e ~ d of the, main force to l ight upth e target . In the f i rs t t ree missions this marking of ~ h target was thought of chiefly as a means of orientation for, th e crews following, to make sure that their bombs woulddrop in the turget area. As the necessi ty of a controlledbomb run over the AP by a l l crews gained ground, bombardierswere instructed to use the fires laid by the marker force fora p p l ) ~ n g v i s u ~ l corrections to their radar bomb run. As acorollary to that decision one ~ i r c r a f t was deta ile d to circlethe target area during the attack, to observe the targp.tmarking by the pathfinder force fmd to t rb ,nsmit over the VHFchannel i n s t r ~ c t i o n s to the main force reg&rding correctionsto be made on their bomb run. The idea. of using a "master ofccremonies ll -- pnttc.rned 0 t,le master bomber used by theRAF in connection with target marking - - was tried out in thisthea te r for the f i rs t time on the O s a k ~ strike. In order tobe most effective, the master bomber must be aele to directlast minute changes in the attack.

These tentative experiments on the last three missionssuggested a n e ~ e t h o d for a tt acking pinpoint targets at nightfrom l o altitudes. By illuminating the target \lith flaresand marking the AP with marker ~ ~ u n i t i o n or, f ai li ng that,~ i t h incendiaries, e p r c c i s i o ~ attack could be delivered ~ i t hHE bombs under visual conditions, or at least with sufficientvisibili ty to permit cor rect ions to the radar bomb run. Sincenone of our high priority targets requires a force as large asthat employed on the incendiary attacks, g r e a t ~ r f lexibi l i tycould be provided end a naster bomber or mission commander coulddirect the attack on the S"'it. This possibility vIas consideredsufficiently promising to plan a series of operations employingtarget illumination methods for HE pinpoint attacks. The resul tsof these experiments v'ill be ant::lyzed in th e next Phase Renortand will be given a treatment similar to the incendiary oper-ations covered in the present Report.

* When the supply of T-19 cluster adapters for M-L7 bombs wasexheusted, M-76 incendiary bombs h ~ to be substituted.

& .' .' ,.' ~ . " , " ' . 0; '... , . -. , ~ , : , .. ~ ; ; f ' r ' f , , , .0:';> :.: .r33


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5. ENEMY DEFENSESe.. Antiaircrr f tThe effectiveness of any bombardment str ike depends onthe ra t io of d 3 m ~ g e inflicted to damage suffered. The successof the Tokyo mission, no matter how great, might not h&ve

just i f ied continuing this type of attack i f (,. sizeable pElrtof our force had been los t . Fortunctely this ~ a not thE:: case,since the only effective defense which the c n e l ~ could offer - flak - - proved ~ e a k .

TNACE ' 91/1 Army radar gun layingequipment had proved to beinferior . In addition, byproper concentration of aircraft over the target areathe r c d ~ r controls (inadequateat best) could probnhly berendered useless. Thus i t TInsconcluded t h ~ t Jap AA, both

/0,000 '---,000' / //

It'" ,\, ', ,\ -,, , , - --HE:. J.OWEfl 7HE. At f,n,oE., THE L()IIIr:,EIZ AMA/IlCPAFT /$ WITH/iii RA"' frE


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feet promised maximum hombing accuracy and ~ l s o exploited theadvantages of ~ e a t h e r and tact ical surprise. The f i rs t raidover Tokyo proved that the Japs were unprep&red for us at th isalti tude and i t was decided to contin.e et the s ~ m e &ltitudeQ ~ t i l further developments dictated a change. Actually, thelosses were so low that a cl:. nge seemd inadvisable. In p revioushigh alti tude missions against th e Japr.ncse mainland, using atote l of 1712 sorties as a s&mple, loss end dUm&pe due toflak Dmounted to ll.L%. For the Tokyo mission the percentageof a ir cr af t l os t or damaged was estimated at 15.2,%, at NaGoya6.95%, a t Osaka 6.8% and at Kobe 3.6%. As usual most of tbeflak damage was m i ~ o r , except for the TOKJ-o mission, where thereis ~ incication that the 105s to damage rat io wes greeterthan in previous high e l t i t ~ d e attacks. Many faqtors cont ri bu ted to the unsuccess fu l Jap defense against the l o alti tude night missions. The most importcnt are weather, smokeend saturation of AA d e f e n s e ~ . I t has already been shovmthat , for a l l intents rnd pc.rposes, the eneuor flas dependentupon visua l t rack ing . The undercast oondition, which prevailedto ome extent on a l l the missions except Nagoya I , provedhighly beneficial to the attE:cking force. The same \n.s trueof sr.!oke. Both vleather and smoke acted in conjunction ':lithth e var ia ti on in alti tude and course to render enemy flak ineffective.

The importance of enemy searchlights in directing ant i aircraft guns TIes agreed upon by &11 crews. I t w ~ furthersuggested that offensive action should Le taken aglinst s e ~ r c h l ights. At an ~ l t i t u d e of around 5,000 feet the crews fe l tconfident of being able to shoot ou t searchllghts. Partly forthat reason, a m m ~ n i t i o n was carried in some of the turrets onth e later attacks. Several crews reported secrchlights beingturned off after they were attack6d by our ships even i f nohits ~ ' T e r e observed. In fu .... Te missions of this type vnriousmethods of pass ive defense ~ i l 1 be prescribed. As eountermerSlrre against r ~ d a r - c o n t r o l l e d l ighte , rope will be dropped.Aguinst sonic-controlled 5earchlights, de synchronization ofengines will be employed. Coordinated fighter sweeps againsturban areas will assist in disorg&nizing the enemy defensesalthough actually destruction of S/L and AA c m p l a c e ~ e n t s isnot expected. The use of the new je t black camcuflage paintwill add to the enemy's diff icul t ies .The fpct that enemy ant iai rcraf t depends on visual conditiQns even more than the bombers suggests the possibili ty

of turning the bad weather o v ~ r Japan into en advantage forthe attbck. By scheduling missions on days when there is &low overcast enemy flak would be I'ender6d ineffective, ~ h e r e a sbombing could b ~ d o n e through t he ove rces t, by radsI'. In thecsse of incendiary attacks ageinst urban areas this methods ~ e m s particularly promising. As shown in Section L of thisr ~ ~ o r t , urbsn attacks are made by concentrating on three or

, -. .t. . r ' . , . .. ' ~ : " ! 4 :- . f ; ', ::. . ' " 7 ; , ~ , " J r ~ ,. , : ~ 1 ..' ...... ' - ~ .


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- ...--

four aiming points, and trusting to the ra:1dom dispersion ofbombs to cover the area surrounding the aiming point. Thesepoints can be located b;y radar, by using a radar off':.>et APand bombing with the back slant-range method or throughstopwatch timing. This method would be equally effective,on daylight attacks through an overcast, and would have theadditional advantage of permitting .('ormation bombing 5. 1' thegreeter accw'scy and protection against enemy fighters r.ladepossible by formation fl;ying is found to outv'eigh the disadvantage of a r e d u c ~ d bomb land.

In studying the flak damage suffered on these missions i tbecomes clear that no definite trend can be established.The strength of enemy antiaircraft defense is not uniformlydeployed at the different targets, and h ~ not been shiftedto accomplish be tter d i st ribut ion , even w h ( ~ r e the need forsuch shiftR is obvious. ~ i t h o u t Bny other evidence, i t canonly be expected that the overa ll e ff ic iency of enemy flakdefense against low level r i i ~ 1 t attacks will improve as i tbecomes adjusted to our tactics. Frequent changes in ourt ~ c t i c s and the avoidance.of any sterotyped method of attackare therefore indicated.

So far our bombers have never been a1le to rely on hit t ingany t&rget by s ~ r p r i s e . On the incendiary raids the ci t ieswere found well blacked out and there wes every evidencethat the enemy had hsd ample \'iarning of our !}", ~ , ~ - ~ .1d1


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COMPARISON OF F I G H T ~ R REACTION AND EFFECT--DAY MISSION' AND NIQiT MISSION,MISSION NO. 2."- 26 2q 1 17** 18** 39 ~ -1:1 L:< I ~ 1.1.DAY DAY DAY DAY DAY DAY DAY NIGH'f NIGHT NIGHT NlliHT J I 1 I G H ~

Yission Date ""'7 Jan 4 Feb 10 Feb 15 Feb 19 Fe 25 Feb 4 Mar 9 r.lar 11 Me 13 Mar 16 Mar 18 Ma.Target Tokyo Kobe Ota Nagoyu Toky Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Nagoy Osaka Kobe NagoyaApprox. Average 5,500 25500 ~ 7 , 5 0 0 27,500 :n ,Q()( 26,500 27000 7,000 7,500 7,000 7,000 6,000~ o m b i n g Altitude IE/A Sighted


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Although the number of enemy fighters sighted, and the number a t-tacking, was substantially lower than on daylight missions i twas fel t after the Tokyo attack that i t might be desirable tocarry some ammunition. In th e course of time the enemy wouldhave found out thnt ve were carrying no ammunition and wouldhave pressed his fighter atte.cks more closely. Another ref.sonwas the wish of some of th e group command6rs to try shootingout enemy searchlights. I t was therefore decided to carry200 rounds of ammunition in the ta i l turret on the l'lext mission(Negoye I) . Gunners were given str ict instructions to open..fire on enemy aircrr:ft o ~ l l y v;hen fired upon.

On the third mission (Osaka) the experiment vms variedsl ightly. The middle and high wings ~ e r e again provided withto.il gun e ~ u n i t i o n only, hut the low wing was given addit i o ~ a l ammunition for the lower forward and aft turrets , ~ i t hinstructions to the side gunners to fire only at ground tar-gets or targets at lower al t i tude. This method provedsuccessful and was retained on the fourth and f if th misGions.As t he a tt acks progressed, the effec tiveness of the fighters e ~ r c h l i g h t team improved. Although losses to enernif fighterswere negligible throughout the phase, certain disturbingdevelopments were noted by our Intelligence. At Kobe, whenth e enemy fighter reaction reached i ts peak for the phase,i t was apparent that the Ja:'1anese had divided the targetarea into d ~ f e n s i v e zones. In th e flak belt no enemy aircraftwere sighted, but immediately after emerging from the zonedefended by AA our aircraf t ~ e r e SUbjected to f ig hte r atta ck.Interrogation of crew members b!'ought .put th e pE'-ralyzingeffect of S/r.. While' coned by 5/L the gu.,'1ners were blindedand consequently unable to put up any defense. FortunQtelythe delicate timing which is a prerequisite to e successfulf ifptcr searchlight teem had not been perfected by the Japanese.

Another development which threatens our future employmentof th e B-29 in 1m'; level night attacks is the increased useof nightfighters. Dfmaee to our eircraf t bj 20 nm. shells from6 0 1clock lQ.w suggests a N/F flying on course", at t, speedsynchronized with the B-29 above and in front. An examination of the angle of penetration reveals that the damagecould not be caused by Automatic rrenpon installat ions .on theground. Other tactics i : ' _tiated dur ing the night attacks included use of landing l ights to spot B-29's (This happenedat OSaka and Kobe), aircraft dragging catle 500 feet long(Kobe) and th e use of parachute flares dropped from nbOle ouraircraft . All th ese point t o w ~ r d s the dependence of theenemy on visual aiming. Throughout the ph&se the prev,lenceof attacks from the rear wes reported, except for the secondNagoya a t t a ~ k . The substantially reduced rat io of attacks00 sightings v;us logical and anticipated.


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6. THE HUMAN ELEIlENTa. Prior to Incendicry Phese

I t is t r i te to say that mechines can never be moreeff ic ient than the oe:: \,ho o p e r ~ ~ t E : ' then, re t th is cor:uocnd haspIeced the B-29 aircraft on a high pedestal of operationalperfection. I t is only lOfical that t h o s ~ concerned uith operational planning should face the issue as to whether or not ourcombat crews end ground personnel are capohIe of mcintainingan o p c r ~ t i o n a l c ~ d e n c e c o m m e ~ 5 u r a t e ~ t t h the funct iona l capabi l i t ies of ~ u assigned aircraft . f t ~ t h o u r h the question isunans\1crable a t t;.his stege of our experience, th6.re are c e r t ~ i ns ignif icant fac ts ~ n justif iable conclusions related to thehuman ~ l e m c n t s of our op:rations which can he set down a t thistime.

During the three a ~ one-helf ~ o n t h s cf ~ u operations against the Japenese prior to the MDrch i n ~ e n d i a r 3 raids,s o ~ e ver)- subtle bu t significant psycholorice1 problems developedenong our flying personnel. These trends ITere quite apparent tothe flight surgeons Qf the command f.nd were vier:ed .. i th mo1.l.tltingalarm by a ll those primari ly concerned with the human e l e m ~ n t sof our opt:'ratio!ls. As thC' combat creViS reviewed their accumulated experiences for the'months of Decemter, JunAary and February they could discern a minimum of evidence to support confidence in their eirplane. In s?ite of ~ obviously high coefficient of opcrntional ~ n combet experience among our combetpersonnel, operational losses, from mechenical failure of theB-29 nnd technical failure of per sonnel , persisted in e x ~ e e d i n glosses due to enemy action. Not without consider&tle fOLmdationon fuct, our crews ccc:t.n to fenr thc.'ir own nircrc.ft and ourfield orders more than the devices of the: enemy. S ~ a l l bombloarls 1 nd poor bombing results afforded no compensation nor~ o n s e of satisfaction commensurate with operational risks.There wore very fevi cases of lndividu:: 1 break-dovms or n&.nifest

l n d ~ c a t l o n s of person&l 1 n a d ~ u a c i e s . This lS believed to beclarion tr ibute to small unit lecdership and to the maturityof our individual combat a i r ~ e n . Very few cases of childishhysteria werE seen and ineividUGl disintegrat ion from anxiety


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was r ~ r e . A more mnture bu t nonetheless ominous phenomenadeveloped. A dull , dutiful "flying of missions" set in withthe quietness of an incipient epidemic. Most crews discernedtheir duty end set about performing i t , technically, to thebest of thei r abi l i ty , but 'with en emotional tone so hopele ssa ~ devoid of lustre thnt our operational efficiency could notbut suffer. A monotonous and determined demand rrose for arotat ion policy. A fixed number of combat missions was termed


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.N"EI.\I CASES OfFLYING P E R S O N N ~ LDISORDERS DLiETO FLYING-

Mcrch fel l off s h ~ r p l y60

VI 50'" 40

30( 20v 10

Dfter

There wes definite evidence of t h cumulptive effec of nervous f ~ t i g u e . The older crews of the ?3rd Wing, ~ h hudtwelve or more oissions prior to 9 ~ a r c h were noticeablynore fntieucd the oprF.tion and recovered nore slowlythrn the f r e s h ~ r , but less e x ~ e r i e n c e d , crews of the 313thend J14th ~ i n g s . This observation is believed to be of~ ' r ~ m o u n t signific&nce. Ground perscnnel exhibited SEverephysical exhaustion. Recovery ~ c s r c ~ i d . There ~ a no increase in sick cal l r ~ t e s during or cf tar this ten-dny per iod.,The Hwnen Element rnd Operational Planning. Conclusions Warrpnted by ~ A p e r i e n c e to Date.

(1) Our c c ~ b ~ t crews rerct moturely to fctigue endbattle ,stresses. B : : ' 6 E : { ~ on pest experiencf', C l':'linir:lu.'l'l ofh ~ s t e r i u r.nd individual d i s i n t e g r a t i Q ~ . from ~ l x i e t y mcy beanticipated.

(2) Perfor;ne:;ce of crer's to de.te indicates thatthey cen be ItfloYffi to death" und that only very small num-bers will devise llescapc behavior". This places E:: greatmoral responsibility on operBtion6l p l ~ n n i n g p ~ r s o n n c l .

(3) Air crews cnn be flown to l' state of ndve-neec o m b ~ t inefficiency v,ith c. minimum of subject c o m ~ , l : ) i n t orobjective vidence. This pla.ces great technicl.1 responsibil i ty upon the squadron commander-sqU2.dron surgeon t-enm.

(4) Physicr.l exhE..ustion of ground personnel ISl ikely to be l imiting h R ~ n element in T ~ x i w u m effortoperations p l a ~ , e d for periods of ten to fourteen days.(5) Nervous fatigue of c o m b ~ t crews with resultant 1055 of combat efficiency is l ikely to be th e lim itinghuman fuctor in r.lexlmUITI effort opprations in excess of tiourteen days.

41


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CONCLUSIONS- ~ . , _


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1. HIGH ALTITUDE PRECISION ATTACKSPrecision attacks from 25,000 feet or above agsinstpinpoint targets are unsui ted to operations i t hi s t he at er .Radr.r operstes inef f ic ient ly a t high r.l t i tude. Weatherconditions - - high wind and poor vis ib i l i ty over the ta rge t ,scattering of formations when penetrating fronts on routeinterfere with nnvig:tion, render bombing inaccur&.te andrequi re h ighly skilled c r e ~ s .

2. 10. ALTITllDE INCENDIARY NIGHT ATTACKSa. Incendiary attacks ageinst J ~ p r n e s e urban areas

have a definite mili tary as wel l as ['. psychological value,since destruction of a city destroys home industries TIhichere vitnl link in the Japanese wer economy.b. To be successf-.l., incendiary a tt acks r equ ir e nhigh concent ra ti on o f p lBhQS over the ta.rget in a short time.c. Another requirement is concentration in space.To achieve this , pattern density must be controlled throughthe intervalometer setting and h:" selection of the r i g h ~type of bornh. Area density must be accomplished by insis t ing that every crero make e controlled bomb run over a designatod AP. The ApTs should be chosen with rega rd to the probable bomb dispersion ~ n so ~ to permit accurate radarapproach. The location of the AP's end the axis of attackmust be selected with a viet> to probable "shorts".

/ d. Target area to be attackE;d should be scaled tothe size of the force) the b o ~ b Iced and the r e q u ~ r e d pattern density.

e. Advantage should be taken of sur faco v


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careful anjlysis of individual crew perforMance throughanslysis of r ~ d e r scope photos and navigetors' logs. I tmay prove advisable to make sortie creditG toward rotationdependent on s u ~ c e s s f u l pel'formence.i . Individual attacks mr.ke i t more diff icult toachieve p ~ o p e r concentretion in time and space. To offset

this i t rnny be necesscry to prescribe a departure point neererJ n ~ ~ n , such as Iwo Jime, end ~ select g r e ~ t e r number ofaiming points .. ' ithin th e tL.rget cree, ,,-1 th c carefully controlled h o m ~ run over each by a corresponding part of the force.I t also points toward the possi1ility of daylight formationincendiary attpcks from medium alti tude, p r o ~ i d e d sufficienttonnage cen be delivered on th e t ~ r g e t Eree.

j. Antiaircrpft if> the most effective forra of e : ~ e m ycefense a g e i ~ s t l o level night nttacks. Japcncse heavy p guns depend l ~ r g e l y on searchlights nd some mefin3 of dealingwith them oust be: found. Cp.mouflage paint .....111 be tested;f ighter escor t attacks agains t searchlights would be desirable;i f no fighters ~ r r.veilable, strafing or f r ~ g bomb attacks s -{;;sinst sea.rchlight emplaceruents by the 8-29' s themselves may,Jrove necesse-ry.

k. Enemy fighter reaction was limited but i3 l ikelyto incrense in the future. Nevertheless, some a n ~ i t i o nshould be carried on night attacks t ut i ts use must te carefully controlled to avoid self-inflicted dumcgc. Barrs.geballoons apparently are no t n danger a t altitudes above 5,000feet.As a protection ceainst flak, incendiary night a t-

tacks should be flown at the highest alti tude at which r n D ~ i m u mtomb loed cen to carried ,"ithout appreciuble decrease in bombing accuracy. Altitudes bet\"een 10,000 and 15,000 feet mayin general prove better than the 5,000 and 10,000 feet range,but ~ e Q t h c r considerations must dictpte the ~ c t u a l alti tudechosen.3. 101' ALTITUDE HE NIGHT A'ITACKS AGAINST PRECISION TARGET

The attempt to use Pathfinder crev/S during th e incendiary attacks to mark the AP for the ~ i force suggestsuse of ll. similar method for precision attacks with HE bombs.Experimental missions are tein g flown by this c o w ~ n d totest the possibilities of this theory and a full re'Jort vlillbe prepared upon completion. 3ucn a t t a c ; ~ b =equire cC:,.lbination Lf ~ u r g ~ t u ~ r ~ i n g ~ n ~ ~ r g c t i 1 1 u n i r ~ t l o n wh1cn in turn"i l l de":'!....nd


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4. DAYLIGHT INCEN:'T ARY BOMBING THROUGH THE O V E R C A S ~By scheduling daylight incendiary missions agains t Japan

it ~ i l l be possible to return to formation flying and thusobtain i m p r o v ~ d distribution of bombs around the aimingpoint. Because smoke and fldme soon obscures the target ,and l a te r the ent i re area, dnyl ight incendiary mis:>ions . , i l lbe b rie fed fo r r a d ~ r runs, although v ~ s u a l releases will bemade 'here possi-ble. Forffiution f lying and higher al t i tudes .. ', ' , i l l reduce th e bo:nb loud due to i nc re as ed fue l consumpt.ion -out Lhe improved area density ~ h i c h can be expected ~ i l l ~ o r et.na.n comJ,>en::..ute. Night incendiary m i s 5 i o n ~ \'Iil1 be cmtinued,eVE:n t.oough 'the d ~ . y l i g ~ t incendi ....ry technique proves morev""tbf..:ctory, flGrtly bcci::.usoa the probl:lbility o f finding b.d-v ~ . n t . a . g z o u ~ o;.c>..ther condit.ions impr

Phase Analysis Incendiary Operations

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