Pfeiffer Grosshandel GmbH v. Löwa Warenhandel GmbH (Case C-255/97)

Before the Court of Justice of the European

Communities

ECJ

(Presiding, RodrÍguez Iglesias P.; Kapteyn and Jann PP.C.; Moitinho de

Almeida, Gulmann ( Rapporteur), Murray, Ragnemalm, Sevón and Wathelet JJ.) Mr

Jean Mischo, Advocate General.

11 May 1999

H1 Reference from Austria from the Handelsgericht (Commercial Court) Wien under Article 177 of the E.C. Treaty (now Article 234 E.C.).

H2 Trade names--passing off--national law prohibiting confusing use of trade name--not precluded by Articles 30 or 52 of the E.C. Treaty--general interest in preventing confusing use of trade names. H3 Since 1969, Pfeiffer had operated a supermarket in Austria under a particular trade name. The trade name had been registered under national law since that year. Löwa operated discount stores under the same trade name elsewhere in Europe. In 1994, in order to achieve a uniform commercial identity throughout Europe, Löwa also began to trade under the same trade name in Austria. In the national court, Pfeiffer sought an order to restrain Löwa from using the trade name in question. Pfeiffer's claim was based on paragraph 9 of the Austrian Law against Unfair Competition. The national court found that Pfeiffer's name was distinctive and that use of the mark by Löwa was likely to cause consumer confusion. Accordingly, under national law, Pfeiffer was entitled to a restraining order. However, the court was concerned that the making of such an order would affect intra-Community trade. Therefore, it stayed proceedings and sought a preliminary ruling as to whether Articles 30 or 52 of the E.C. Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 28 E.C. and 43 E.C.) were to be interpreted as precluding the operation of the national law in such circumstances. *177 Held: Whether the national restraining order restricted the right of establishment under Community law

H4 (a) National laws constituted restrictions on the right of establishment if they were liable to place companies from other Member States in a less favourable factual or legal situation than companies from the State of establishment. Such restrictions, even if applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, were contrary to Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty, read together with Article 58 of the Treaty (now Article 48 E.C.), unless justified by overriding requirements in the general interest and unless they were both suitable for achieving the objective pursued and did not go beyond what was necessary for that objective. [19] Sodemare SA and Others v. Regione Lombardia (C-70/95): [1997] E.C.R. I-3395; [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 591; and Gebhard v. Consiglio Dell'Ordine degli Avvocati E Procuratori di Milano (C-55/94): [1995] E.C.R. I-4165; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, applied. H5 (b) A restraining order such as that in this case was capable of operating to the detriment of undertakings whose seat was in another Member State and who traded lawfully under a trade name in that other State. Such an order interfered with the uniformity of the undertaking's advertising within the Community. [20] H6 (c) However, where the purpose of restrictions upon the right of establishment was to safeguard trade names against the risk of confusion, they were justified by overriding requirements in the general interest pertaining to the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such a purpose corresponded to the specific subject-matter of a trade name. In this particular case, the restraining order was also suitable for, and proportionate to, this purpose because the national court had found that there was in fact a risk of consumer confusion. Accordingly, Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty did not preclude the making of such an order. [21]-[24] Deutsche Renault AG v. AUDI AG (C-317/91): [1993] E.C.R. I-6227; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 461; and Compagnie Generale pour la Diffusion de la Television (Coditel) and Others v. Cine Vog Films and Others (62/79): [1980] E.C.R. 881; [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362, applied. Whether the national restraining order constituted a quantitative restriction on imports prohibited by Article 30 of the E.C. Treaty. H7 The restraining order had been found not to contravene Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty. It was therefore only capable of conflicting with Article 30 of the E.C. Treaty to the extent that it restricted the free movement of goods other than indirectly through the restriction of the freedom of establishment. Any restriction on the free movement of goods in this case necessarily arose indirectly through a restriction of *178 the freedom of establishment. Accordingly, the making of a restraining order by the national court was not precluded by Article 30 of the E.C. Treaty. [25]-[28] Sodemare and Others, supra; and Gebhard, supra, applied. H8 Representation Johannes Hintermayr, Rechtsanwalt, Linz, for Pfeiffer Gro<<BETA>>handel GmbH. Andreas Foglar-Deinhardstein, Rechtsanwalt, Vienna, for Löwa Warenhandel

GmbH. Christine Stix-Hackl, Gesandte in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as Agent, for the Austrian Government. Berend Jan Drijber, of its Legal Service, acting as Agent, assisted by Bertrand Wägenbaur, Rechtsanwalt, Hamburg, for the E.C. Commission. H9 Cases referred to in the judgment: 1. Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard (C 267 & 268/91), 24 November 1993: [1993] E.C.R. I-6097; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101. 2. Sodemare SA and Others v. Regione Lombardia (C-70/95), 17 June 1997: [1997] E.C.R. I-3395; [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 591. 3. Gebhard v. Consiglio Dell'Ordine degli Avvocati E Procuratori di Milano (C-55/94), 30 November 1995: [1995] E.C.R. I-4165; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603. 4. Compagnie Generale pour la Diffusion de la Television (Coditel) and Others v. Cine Vog Films and Others (62/79), 18 March 1980: [1980] E.C.R. 881; [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362. 5. Deutsche Renault AG v. AUDI AG (C-317/91), 30 November 1993: [1993] E.C.R. I-6227; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 461. H10 Further cases referred to by the Advocate General: 6. Societe Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd v. Societe Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer & Co. (119/75), 22 June 1976: [1976] E.C.R. 1039; [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482. 7. Sabel BV v. Puma AG and Another (C-251/95), 11 November 1997: [1997] E.C.R. I-6191; [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445. 8. Schutzverband gegen Unwesen In der Wirtschaft eV v. Yves Rocher GmbH (C-126/91), 18 May 1993: [1993] E.C.R. I-2361. 9. Hünermund and Others v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg (C-292/92), 15 December 1993: [1993] E.C.R. I-6787. 10. Verein gegen Unwesen In Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV v. Mars GmbH (C-470/93), 6 July 1995: [1995] E.C.R. I-1923; [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 1. 11. Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco and Others (C 418-421, 460-462 & 464/93 & 9-11, 14, 15, 23, 24 & 332/94), 20 June 1996: [1996] E.C.R. I-2975; [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 648 *179 . 12. Criminal Proceedings against Pistre and Others (C 321-324/94), 7 May 1997: [1997] E.C.R. I-2343; [1997] 2 C.M.L.R. 565.

Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mischo A1 Is Article 30 or Articles 52 et seq. of the E.C. Treaty [(now, after amendment, Articles 28 E.C. and 43 E.C.)] to be interpreted as precluding the application of national provisions which require that, in the case of trade marks or designations of undertakings which are liable to be confused, the one with earlier priority is to be protected, and hence prohibit an undertaking from using, in three provinces of Austria, a trade mark or designation under which companies in the same group lawfully operate in other Member States?

A2 This question is submitted to the Court in the context of a dispute between the company Pfeiffer Gro<<BETA>>handel GmbH (hereinafter "Pfeiffer") and the company Löwa Warenhandel GmbH (hereinafter "Löwa"). A3 The applicant in the main proceedings, Pfeiffer, has operated since 1969 a supermarket in Pasching, near Linz in Austria, under the designation "Plus KAUF PARK". [FN1] Moreover, "Plus KAUF PARK" was registered with the Austrian Patent Office (Patentamt) as a text and picture mark for a number of different classes of product with priority from 5 August 1969. Pfeiffer also sells various goods, primarily in the food and drink sector, under the trade mark "Plus wir bieten mehr" (priority from 22 September 1989). The supermarket "Plus KAUF PARK" was integrated into a shopping centre, the "Plus City", opened in October 1989, which includes over 100 retail outlets of all current sectors. In the course of the construction of "Plus City", the predecessors in law of Pfeiffer granted to the various retailers who were installed there very wide rights of use over the abovementioned trade marks and other names containing the word "Plus". By virtue of the lease agreements, each operator is obliged, when making reference to "Plus City", to use the original logo of this shopping centre. FN1 Although the order for reference refers to the designation "Plus KAUF MARKT", the case file shows that in fact it is "Plus KAUF PARK". A4 The defendant in the main proceedings, Löwa, operates 139 discount shops in Austria in which it offers for sale goods of the same type as those in the Pfeiffer supermarket store. Löwa is a subsidiary of the German company Tengelmann Warenhandelsgesellschaft, which is the owner of the international trade mark "Plus", with priority from 15 November 1989. Löwa is also the sister company of "Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft", a German company, which is the owner of the text and picture mark "Plus prima leben und sparen" (priority from 18 December 1979), registered at the Austrian Patent Office. Löwa is *180 itself the owner of the text and picture mark "Pluspunkt", registered at the Austrian Patent Office from 15 April 1994. A5 The Tengelmann Warenhandelsgesellschaft and Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft operate in Germany, Italy, Spain, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the discount store sector under the trading name "Plus". Tengelmann, the parent company, aims to have a uniform appearance throughout Europe, which would allow similar advertising throughout Europe and the further development of a corporate identity. A6 For those reasons, Löwa started in 1994 to market its goods under the designation "Plus" and to change the name of 17 of the 139 supermarkets that it operates in Austria from "Zielpunkt" to "Plus prima leben und sparen", the graphical presentation of which corresponds completely to the text and picture mark of its German sister company, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft. A7 This graphic presentation differs from the designation used by Pfeiffer both by additional wording and the optical design. A8 In the context of the dispute in the main proceedings, the plaintiff seeks to prohibit the defendant from operating, in the provinces of Lower Austria, Upper

Austria and Salzburg, retail outlets for final consumers under the trade name "Plus", with or without other additions and/or from advertising for such outlets. A9 The request for a preliminary ruling informs us that paragraph 9(1) of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Law against unfair competition, hereinafter the "UWG") prohibits the use of names, trading names or specific designations of an undertaking, in a manner liable to cause confusion with names, trading names or specific designations which another person lawfully uses. According to sub-paragraph 3 of the same paragraph, registered trade marks and business symbols which are regarded in trade circles concerned as distinguishing signs of the undertaking and the other devices intended to distingish the undertaking from other undertakings, including in particular the presentation of goods, their packaging or wrapping, and business documents, are equated with the specific designation of an undertaking. A10 Austrian case law, as set out in the order for reference, interprets this provision as meaning that trade marks and specific designations of undertakings enjoy the protection of paragraph 9 of the UWG only if they have a distinctive character, that is to say they have something special and individual which makes it suitable by its very nature for distinguishing their bearer from other persons, or if they have acquired a distinctive force--independent of their originality--as a result of trade acceptance. According to settled Austrian case law, invented fantasy words or words which, although belonging to general linguistic usage, have no connection with the goods for which they are intended, thus more purely descriptive, have a distinctive character. These principles apply to word marks in the same way as to specific *181 designations of undertakings. Descriptive indications are however capable of protection, in the case of an unusual description of an undertaking which is out of the ordinary. A11 The Handelsgericht Wien thinks that, with regard to this case law, "Plus" as the name of an undertaking which sells a wide variety of goods--groceries, but also other goods for daily needs--in supermarkets, is altogether original and not merely descriptive, and hence capable of protection. Even if it were assumed that it is only a "weak" sign which equally benefits from the protection of paragraph 9 of the UWG, but in respect of which even slight differences eliminate in principle the risk of confusion, the addition of the words "prima leben und sparen" is still not capable of eliminating this risk, since they are much less conspicuous and are scarcely understood as a specific designation of an undertaking. Nor can the different optical presentation of the designations prevent confusion, since mere acoustic coincidence also suffices. A12 The referring court concludes, as a result, that "under Austrian law, use by the defendant of the designation 'Plus', with or without additions, infringes paragraph 9 of the UWG, since Pfeiffer has priority". A13 However, since the prohibitory injunction which it would be obliged to grant by virtue of paragraph 9 of the UWG would affect intra-Community trade, the Handelsgericht Wien decided to stay proceedings and to submit to the Court the abovementioned question.

The scope of the preliminary question

A14 It follows both from the request for a preliminary ruling [FN2] and the written observations of the two parties to the dispute in the main proceedings and the answers given by them to a question posed by the Court at the hearing that what is in point in this dispute is solely the possible prohibition on using a certain designation of an undertaking. The use of the word "Plus" (with or without addition) as a product trade mark is not therefore at issue in the present proceedings. Consequently, there is no need to examine the question put with regard to the First Council Directive 89/104 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks. [FN3] FN2 See above para. 8. FN3 [1989] O.J. L40/1. A15 As a result, it is sufficient, in order to provide the national court with an answer allowing it to decide the case before it, to limit myself to an interpretation of Articles 30 and 52 of the Treaty with regard to the conflict between two specific designations of undertakings. A16 Moreover, the national court does not ask this Court to determine whether there is a risk of confusion between the designations in question. It takes this risk for granted anyhow. Thus in Case 119/75, Societe Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd v. Societe Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer & Co. *182 , [FN4] the Court was confronted with the same situation and it decided that although "this finding [of the referring court] has been questioned during the oral procedure the Court does not have to rule on this point since no question has been put to it with regard to the matter". Nor does the Handelsgericht ask the Court about the same concept of "risk of confusion", in contrast to the situation for example in Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG and Another. [FN5] FN4 [1976] E.C.R. 1039; [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482, paras [3] & [4]. FN5 [1997] E.C.R. I-6191; [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445. A17 Thus, the question put by the Handelsgericht Wien is to be understood as meaning that it only seeks to ascertain whether, in a case where, in the opinion of the national court, it would be necessary, by virtue of priority and the risk of confusion, to prohibit the use of a specific designation of an undertaking, Articles 30 or 52 of the Treaty prevent the national court from ruling on, as it is obliged to do under national law, the aforementioned prohibition, by reason of the fact that the company in question lawfully uses this designation in other Member States. A18 In accordance with the national court's wishes, I will consider the problem from the point of view first of the free movement of goods (Articles 30 et seq.) and then of the right of establishment (Articles 52 et seq.).

As to Article 30 of the Treaty

A19 Löwa submits that: in the case of an unrestricted application of paragraph 9 of the UWG companies within a group would have to use different names in certain Member States in a situation such as that which is the subject of the preliminary ruling. Advertising concepts could not be uniform for the Member States of the European Community and the objective pursued by the group of companies of a corporate identity for the undertaking's names, which are the central element in presentation for advertising purposes, could not be clearly presented abroad. A20 Löwa's argument is designed essentially to establish that the prohibition within part of Austria on the use of the same business name as that used in other Member States by companies belonging to the same group would constitute a measure of equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction. This prohibition would have the result that it would be impossible for the group to use the same advertising concept in order to sell its goods. A21 In order to show that this renunciation of a global business strategy would constitute a hindrance to the free movement of goods, Löwa relies on the judgment in Case C-126/91, Schutzverband gegen Unwesen In der Wirtschaft eV v. Yves Rocher GmbH [FN6] where the Court pointed out that: national legislation which restricts or prohibits certain forms of *183 advertising or certain means of sales promotion may, although it does not directly affect imports, be such as to restrict their volume because it affects marketing opportunities for the imported products. To compel an economic operator either to adopt advertising or sales promotion schemes which differ from one Member State to another or to discontinue a scheme which he considers to be particularly effective may constitute an obstacle to imports even if the legislation in question applies to domestic products and imported products without distinction. FN6 [1993] E.C.R. I-2361. A22 According to Löwa, a hindrance to marketing opportunities would constitute, even after the decision in Joined Cases C 267 & 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard, [FN7] a restriction on the free movement of goods within the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty. For Löwa, neither the judgment in Keck and Mithouard nor that in Case C-292/92, Hünermund and Others v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg [FN8] involved a legal analysis of the compatibility with Community law of a national prohibition which impedes or renders more difficult the implementation of a uniform advertising concept on the Community level. On the contrary, Löwa goes on to say, in its judgment in Case C-470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen In Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV v. Mars GmbH [FN9] the Court stated unequivocally, referring to its decision in Keck and Mithouard, that a prohibition which, although applying to all products without distinction, relates to the marketing in a Member State of products bearing the same publicity markings as those lawfully used in other Member States, is by nature such as to hinder intra-Community trade. According to the Court, such a restriction "may compel the importer to adjust the presentation of his products

according to the place where they are to be marketed and consequently to incur additional packaging and advertising costs". [FN10] FN7 [1993] E.C.R. I-6097; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101. FN8 [1993] E.C.R. I-6787. FN9 [1995] E.C.R. I-1923; [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 1. FN10 Para. [13]. A23 From this Löwa concludes that "the same applies in the case of a prohibition in the present case under paragraph 9 of the UWG, which prevents a group of companies from appearing under a uniform name of establishment in the Member States of the European Community ...". Consequently, Article 30 of the Treaty is applicable. A24 The arguments of Pfeiffer are based essentially on the case law developed by the Court since the decision in Keck and Mithouard. Thus, paragraph 9 of the UWG: as a national measure which only concerns selling arrangements and does not affect the products, and which is indistinctly applicable to all operators exercising their activity within the country, is compatible with Article 30 of the E.C. Treaty. A25 Pfeiffer also points out that the desire of Löwa to have a uniform advertising concept for the Member States of the European Community and the attempt to create a corporate identity conflicts *184 with commercial property. According to Pfeiffer, prohibitions and restrictions on importation justified for commercial and industrial property reasons are permissible, with the express reservation that they are not to constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. A26 The Commission, for its part, thinks that Article 30 of the Treaty is not opposed to a provision such as that contained in paragraph 9 of the UWG "because, if by virtue of the Keck case law, selling arrangements are excluded from the scope of application of Article 30 of the Treaty, this should, a fortiori, apply to provisions which do not prescribe any selling arrangement, of any kind whatever". According to the Commission, in particular "local or temporal conditions and other conditions--such as a restriction on a group of retailers--under which goods may be sold and which represent the expression of national or regional socio-cultural differences fall within the framework of selling arrangements". [FN11] Thus, in the opinion of the Commission, these conditions are not contained in paragraph 9(1) of the UWG. FN11 See, for example, Joined Cases C 418-421, 460-462 & 464/93 & 9-11, 14, 15, 23, 24 & 332/94, Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco and Others: [1996] E.C.R. I-2975; [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 648, para. [25]. A27 The Commission points out, moreover, that the Court has ruled that a

national measure having no link to the importation of goods does not fall within the ambit of Articles 30 et seq. of the Treaty. [FN12] That would also be the situation in the present case given that the provision set out in paragraph 9(1) of the UWG has neither the object nor effect of regulating cross-border trade in goods. The defendant, who is already established in Austria continues, regardless of its business name, to have the opportunity of importing and selling goods in Austria. FN12 See Joined Cases C 321-324/94, Criminal Proceedings against Pistre and Others: [1997] E.C.R. I-2343; [1997] 2 C.M.L.R. 565, para. [44]. A28 For my part, I propose that the Court uphold the arguments of Pfeiffer and of the Commission. I cannot conceive that the prohibition on the use of a business name in so far as it only addresses the specific designation of the undertaking could constitute a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction. A29 The Court has held in (and since) the decision in Keck and Mithouard: That definition [of a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction] covers obstacles to the free movement of goods which, in the absence of harmonisation of legislation, are the consequence of applying to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging). This is so even if those rules apply without distinction to all products unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods. A30 By contrast: *185 the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder trade between Member States, within the meaning of that definition, so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States. Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty. A31 In the present case, we are not dealing with a national provision that lays down conditions which goods must satisfy or that seeks to regulate trade in goods between Member States. A32 The provision is one, moreover, that does not affect the marketing of products from another Member State in a different manner to that of domestic products. A33 Admittedly, the prohibition on using the specific designation of an undertaking might possibly be of a nature such as to curb the further development of the volume of sales and, as a result, of the volume of sales of

products from other Member States, to the extent that it deprives companies belonging to the same group of the possibility of using a uniform advertising concept in all the Member States where the group is present. This circumstance is not, however, such as to bring the prohibition in question within the definition of a measure having equivalent effect, since the prohibition only concerns the name of the undertaking in question and not the goods sold by it. A34 This is also the reason for which the argument Löwa seeks to derive from the Mars judgment cannot be accepted. That judgment concerns restrictions on the free movement of goods resulting from a prohibition on the use of certain advertising names on the packaging of products. However, as stated above, the subject of the dispute in the main proceedings is solely the designation of the two undertakings and not the trade mark which one or other undertaking gives its products. A35 As regards the judgment in Yves Rocher, it does not seem relevant to me for three reasons. First of all, we are not concerned here with "a national measure which restricts or prohibits certain forms of advertising". The inability of Löwa to use the forms of advertising devised by its parent company for other markets is only the indirect consequence of the provisions protecting commercial property. A36 Secondly, like R. Joliet, [FN13] I am of the opinion that the Yves Rocher judgment concerned a "selling arrangement" and that it has been overtaken by the judgment in Keck and Mithouard. FN13 Joliet, R., "La libre circulation des marchandises: l'arrêt Keck et Mithouard et les nouvelles orientations de la jurisprudence", Journal des Tribunaux--Droit européen, 20 October 1994, No. 12, pp. 145 et seq. A37 *186 Finally, a rule such as that contained in paragraph 9 of the UWG does not even constitute a selling arrangement. The a fortiori reasoning of the Commission set out above should, therefore, be accepted. A38 I thus arrive at the conclusion that the prohibition on the use of a specific designation of an undertaking does not fall within the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty. Quite superfluous though it may be, I would add that, even if a provision such as paragraph 9 of the UWG did constitute a measure of equivalent effect, it would benefit from the exemption provided for in Article 36 of the E.C. Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 30 E.C.). Since it applies without distinction to undertakings whose share capital is Austrian- owned and undertakings whose share capital is foreign-owned, it cannot be considered as a "means of arbitrary discrimination". Nor does it constitute a "disguised restriction on trade between Member States", since, as I have already pointed out, it does not affect the marketing of goods from other Member States in a different manner to that of domestic products.

As to Article 52 of the Treaty A39 The preliminary question also seeks to determine whether Article 52 of the Treaty precludes, in circumstances such as the present, an undertaking from

being prohibited to use a specific designation. A40 According to Pfeiffer, the plaintiff in the main proceedings, the fundamental freedom established by Articles 52 et seq. of the Treaty is not affected by the national provision in question. The issue of an infringement of this freedom does not even arise. A41 Pfeiffer adds that the principle of non-discrimination inherent in the freedom of establishment prohibits all discrimination on grounds of nationality in the commencement and the pursuit of a self-employed activity in another Member State. Only national rules which are formally discriminatory, that is those based on nationality and which treat nationals and foreigners openly and deliberately in a different manner on the ground of their nationality, cannot be accepted. However, Pfeiffer points out, the legal consequence of paragraph 9 of the Austrian UWG applies, without distinction, to nationals and non-nationals. A42 Again according to Pfeiffer, in so far as freedom of establishment is also--especially on the basis of the most recent case law of the Court-- construed partially as constituting a prohibition on introducing restrictions, it does not imply a general prohibition, the contrary of what is the case in relation to the free movement of goods. Restrictions on the freedom laid down in Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty in order to take into account commercial and industrial property have always been accepted. The foundations and the criteria of freedom of establishment, that is the authorisation of actual pursuit of a selfemployed *187 economic activity, in another Member State, by means of a fixed establishment for an indefinite period of time, are not restricted or prohibited by paragraph 9 of the Austrian UWG. A43 According to the defendant in the main proceedings, Löwa, "prohibiting the name of an undertaking could also restrict in an impermissible manner freedom of establishment, as contemplated by Article 52 and Article 58 of the E.C. Treaty (now Article 48 E.C.), for the parent company". In support of its argument, Löwa cites Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio Dell'Ordine degli Avvocati E Procuratori di Milano, [FN14] in which the Court stated that: It follows, however, from the Court's case law that national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. FN14 [1995] E.C.R. I-4165; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, para. [37]. A44 Transposing these principles to the circumstances of the present case, Löwa argues that where: there is a case of restriction where an undertaking (in the present case, German), which is known also by its business name in a neighbouring Member State (in the present case, Austria) as a result of advertising outside the borders and of cross-border purchases, and which, for obvious reasons, tries to standardise its

strategy on a European level, is restricted in its chances of succeeding on this neighbouring market because it has been forbidden to use a sign established elsewhere and which is not unknown on the market in question. Löwa concludes by submitting that the prohibition in question is not proportionate since there is no (serious) risk of confusion. Further, according to it, "the risk of confusion must be serious for it to be quantitatively of a weight such as to justify a restriction on the freedom of establishment". A45 The Commission, for its part, is of the opinion that Articles 52 et seq. of the Treaty does not preclude the application of a provision such as paragraph 9(1) of the Austrian UWG. National provisions relating to company names or trading names may, admittedly, affect the freedom of establishment when, for instance, the bearing of a company name is made subject to specific authorisation or when such authorisation is granted subject to specific conditions, of a linguistic or similar nature. However, the provision set out in paragraph 9(1) of the Austrian UWG does not involve such a type of regulation concerning directly the "if" and/or "how" of establishment. As a result, it has no link or, at least, no sufficient link, with freedom of establishment. A46 According to the Commission, even if Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty were to be interpreted as meaning that provisions such as *188 paragraph 9(1) of the UWG fall within the scope of freedom of establishment, the order for reference provides no grounds for concluding that this provision, the applicable case law or the practical application of the provision discriminates, directly or indirectly, between Austrian undertakings and undertakings which establish themselves in Austria. A47 Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Commission thinks, however, that the right of an undertaking to use a specific trading name for its subsidiaries does not fall within the scope of freedom of establishment. A48 The Commission points out that it is necessary, moreover, to take account of the fact that the defendant was already established in Austria when it changed the name of 17 of its subsidiaries in 1994, replacing "Zielpunkt" by "Plus prima leben und sparen". A49 In my opinion, the reasoning put forward by the Commission is convincing. A50 Here is a company established under Austrian law whose share capital is German-owned and which has been running for a number of years 139 discount shops in Austria, 122 of which operate under the name "Zielpunkt" and 17 of which changed their name to "Plus prima leben und sparen" in recent years. A51 The company has thus evidently been able to thrive without coming up against any obstacle owing to the holding of its share capital by a German parent company. The only provision of Austrian law being questioned is paragraph 9(1) of the UWG. As the Commission very rightly points out, this provision does not comprise any regulation concerning directly the "if" and/or "how" of establishment. A52 It is only when Löwa wanted to change the name of some of its shops that it met with the opposition of another firm claiming a priority right on a similar name. A53 The opposition which Löwa has to face has nothing to do with the fact that its share capital is held by a German parent company. There is nothing to

warrant the conclusion that a company with an exclusively Austrian share capital, also wanting to use the word "Plus", would not have faced the same opposition. A54 The ground put forward by Löwa in order to change the name of its shops (international development of the corporate identity, advertising campaign covering several countries) does not establish either, in my opinion, any sufficient link with the principle of freedom of establishment. This ground relates to possible ways for the company to increase its turnover by using a name well known in neighbouring countries as well as by a number of Austrian citizens who have travelled in such countries. A55 However, no provision of Community law requires Member States to do their utmost to assure the most favourable circumstances for commercial strategies judged to be the most promising by firms established there, the capital of which is held by nationals of other *189 Member States inter alia by disapplying their national legislation on intellectual property. A56 Article 52 of the Treaty provides that: Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected .... A57 The scope of the passage quoted by the defendant in the main proceedings from the Gebhard case, where reference is made to "national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty", might lead to confusion--and Löwa's arguments are evidence of this--and would for this reason benefit from clarification. A58 One must not arrive at a situation where Member States are required to justify as "imperative requirements" all kinds of provisions of their legislation, for instance rates of corporate taxation or their rates of VAT, which are higher than elsewhere, the necessity to use the national language in relationships with administrative authorities or the principle that a registered trade mark or a business name used previously has a priority, whenever an operator claims that such a provision makes its right of establishment less attractive. A59 For national legislation to require justification vis-à-vis Article 52 of the Treaty, it must have a sufficiently close link with the freedom of establishment. I agree with the Commission that such is not the case as far as paragraph 9(1) of the UWG is concerned. A60 In case the Court should nevertheless disagree, I would now like to examine the present case in light of the case law of the Court, according to which obstacles to the exercise of the right of establishment must be accepted only if the national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty fulfil four conditions. A61 First, these measures must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. This is undeniably the case as regards paragraph 9 of the UWG. This provision applies to domestic undertakings as well as to undertakings wishing to establish themselves in Austria. Furthermore, there is nothing in the documents before the Court to show that the practical application of this provision puts foreign

undertakings at a disadvantage by comparison with domestic undertakings. A62 Secondly, the said measures must be justified by overriding reasons in the general interest. However, as Case 62/79, Compagnie Generale pour la Diffusion de la Television (Coditel) and Others v. Cine Vog Films and Others [FN15] shows, the Court has upheld, for overriding reasons in the general interest, restrictions resulting from the *190 application of national legislation on the protection of intellectual property. Even though, in that judgment, the Court had expressed itself on the legitimacy of the protection of intellectual property to justify a restriction on freedom to provide services, such an interest must still be considered as an overriding reason in the general interest deserving of protection in the context of a restriction on the freedom of establishment. FN15 [1980] E.C.R. 881; [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362, para. [15]. A63 Thirdly, as to the requirement that the national measure in question must be suitable for ensuring the attainment of the objective which it pursues, it should be pointed out that the protection of the specific designation of an undertaking, with the benefit of priority, aims at preventing as between two undertakings with similar designations, a "risk of confusion" which would enable an undertaking to benefit improperly from the similarity between the two designations. Such an objective is undoubtedly attained by the prohibition on use of a name with an earlier right of priority. A64 It remains to be seen if such a prohibition fulfils the fourth condition set by the case law, namely that it must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective pursued. A65 In that regard, what is important to bear in mind is the fact that Pfeiffer limits its claim to three federal Länder of Austria. A prohibition covering the national territory may be considered as disproportionate where the undertaking benefiting from protection operates only on a regional or a local market. A66 In addition, the extent of the geographical territory for which a prohibition may be ordered constitutes a question of fact which it is for the national court to determine. A67 Löwa also contends that the prohibition sought by Pfeiffer goes beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective pursued as there is in fact no risk of confusion between the two business names. A68 This argument is at the heart of the main proceedings. However, as I mentioned above, the Handelsgericht does not ask the Court to decide on the issue whether, in the present case, there is a risk of confusion, or to clarify the scope, under Community law, of the concept of risk of confusion. It takes this risk for granted. A69 However, Löwa is not satisfied with this situation. It would like to have the Court uphold the submission that the concept of risk of confusion is not a matter for national courts and that it must, by virtue of Community law, be interpreted strictly. It is seeking in this way to force the national court to accept that there is no risk of confusion. Löwa submits that, owing to the harmonisation of trade mark law by Directive 89/104, it is necessary to take into account, at the level both of

the law laid down by the Treaty and of secondary legislation, the objective of the European legislature, which is to achieve the completion of the internal market in this area too. According to Löwa, concepts such as the possibility of confusion cannot be interpreted broadly in order to attain this objective. According to Löwa, even if the *191 Directive only governs trade marks, whereas, in the present case, the matter for determination is the conflict between two business names, it is necessary to begin with the idea of a concept of risk of confusion, one that is in principle uniform, for all signs. More specifically, Löwa draws attention to the fact that both itself and Pfeiffer always use the designations at issue with additions which, it says, are such as to reduce, if not to eradicate, any risk of confusion. A70 Pfeiffer, for its part, relies on the line of case law developed by the Court in the field of trade marks in relation to Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty. More specifically, it relies on the judgment in Case C-317/91, Deutsche Renault AG v. AUDI AG [FN16] according to which, in the field of trade marks, determination of the existence of a risk of confusion is a matter for the national court. What applies to the packaging of goods, should, argues Pfeiffer, also apply to the name of the undertaking. A name of a supermarket which is liable to be confused should be prohibited just as are product lines which are liable to be confused. FN16 [1993] E.C.R. I-6227; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 461. A71 Like Pfeiffer, I consider that the question whether the "risk of confusion" is real is a question of fact to be determined by the national court. One should in this respect proceed by analogy with the case law on trade marks, developed under Article 36 of the Treaty, and take as an example the Deutsche Renault judgment, in which the Court stated that the adoption of criteria for a finding of risk of confusion forms part of the detailed rules for trade mark protection which are a matter for national law. [FN17] Furthermore, the Court held, in reply to the question of whether the notion of risk of confusion should be interpreted strictly, that "Community law does not lay down any strict interpretative criterion for the concept of risk of confusion". [FN18] FN17 Para. [31]. FN18 Para. [32]. A72 Quoting the Advocate General, the Court justifies this conclusion in the following terms: Further ... a trade mark right as an exclusive right and protection against marks giving rise to risk of confusion are in reality ... two sides of the same coin: reducing or extending the scope of protection against the risk of confusion simply reduces or extends the scope of the right itself. Both aspects must accordingly be governed by a single homogeneous source of law-- that is, at present, by national law. [FN19] FN19 Para. [31].

A73 The Court points out, of course, that national law is subject to the limits set out in the second sentence of Article 36 of the Treaty. [FN20] Under this provision, prohibitions or restrictions on imports justified on grounds of the protection of industrial and commercial property are not to "constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination" or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. FN20 Para. [33]. A74 More specifically, the Court pointed out "that it is for the national *192 court to decide whether the use of the words 'Quattro' and 'Quadra' in composite designations such as 'AUDI Quattro' and 'Espace Quadra' is sufficient to exclude the risk of confusion, even if it is established that the designation 'Quattro' has achieved a high degree of recognition". A75 Transposing this reasoning to the case before us, it can equally be said that the detailed rules for protection of the right to a specific designation of an undertaking, which include the concept of risk or danger of confusion, are, in the absence of any harmonisation in Community law, a matter for national law. A76 Consequently, the question whether the use by Löwa of the specific designation "Plus", with or without addition, is likely to result in a risk of confusion with the designation used by Pfeiffer since 1969, should be left for determination by the national court. A77 To conclude on the argument derived by Löwa from the fourth condition laid down by the case law of the Court in the matter of imperative requirements, all I need say is that prohibiting Löwa from using the designation at issue is not disproportionate by comparison with the objective pursued assuming that the national court reaches (or maintains) the conclusion that there is an actual risk of confusion. A78 For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that Article 52 of the Treaty does not preclude a prohibition on the use of a specific designation in circumstances such as those in point in the main proceedings.

Conclusion A79 Concluding this analysis, I propose that the Court answer the question submitted by the Handelsgericht Wien as follows: Articles 30 and 52 of the E.C. Treaty, properly construed, to not preclude, in circumstances such as those in the present case, the application of national provisions requiring that, in the case of specific designations of undertakings which are liable to be confused, the one with earlier priority is to be protected, and thus prohibiting an undertaking from using, in three Länder of Austria, a specific designation of undertaking under which companies of the same group lawfully appear in other Member States. JUDGMENT

1 By order of 24 March 1997, received at the Court on 14 July 1997, the Handelsgericht (Commercial Court), Vienna, referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the E.C. Treaty (now Article 234 E.C.) a question on the interpretation of Articles 30 and 52 of the E.C. Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 28 E.C. and 43 E.C.). 2 That question arose in proceedings brought by Pfeiffer Gro<<BETA>>handel *193 GmbH (hereinafter "Pfeiffer") against Löwa Warenhandel GmbH (hereinafter "Löwa") seeking an order restraining Löwa from using a particular trade name. 3 Since 1969 Pfeiffer has operated a large supermarket at Pasching, in Austria, under the trade name "Plus KAUF PARK". The name was registered at the Austrian Patentamt (Federal Patent Office) as a text and picture mark with priority from 5 August 1969. Pfeiffer sells a range of goods, primarily in the food and drink sector, under the trade mark "Plus wir bieten mehr", which was registered in Austria with priority from 22 September 1989. 4 Löwa operates 139 discount stores in Austria, in which it offers for sale goods of the same type as those displayed in Pfeiffer's supermarket. Löwa's German parent company, Tengelmann Warenhandelsgesellschaft (hereinafter "Tengelmann"), owns the international trade mark "Plus" with priority from 15 November 1989. Another Tengelmann subsidiary, the German company Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH & Co., owns the text and picture mark "Plus prima leben und sparen", registered in Austria with priority from 18 December 1979. Löwa itself is the owner of the text and picture mark "Pluspunkt", registered in Austria with priority from 15 April 1994. 5 Tengelmann and Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft are active in the discount store sector in Germany, Italy, Spain, the Czech Republic and Hungary under the trade name "Plus". Tengelmann's aim is for all its stores throughout Europe to adopt the same style of presentation, making it possible to use the same advertising material across Europe and to go on to develop a "corporate identity". 6 Accordingly, in 1994 Löwa started to market goods under the designation "Plus". It also changed the name of 17 of its 139 Austrian supermarkets, replacing "Zielpunkt" with "Plus prima leben und sparen", the design of which echoes the text and picture mark of its sister company but differs from the trade name used by Pfeiffer in appearance and textual additions. 7 In the dispute in the main proceedings, Pfeiffer--basing itself on paragraph 9 of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Law against unfair competition; hereinafter "the UWG")--seeks an order restraining Löwa from operating retail outlets catering for final consumers in the Länder of Lower Austria, Upper Austria or Salzburg under the trade name "Plus", with or without additional text. 8 Under paragraph 9(1) of the UWG, the use of company names, trade names or specific designations of undertakings may be prohibited where they are likely to be confused with company names, trade names or specific designations lawfully used by another person. Paragraph 9(3) of the UWG provides that the reference to specific designations of undertakings encompasses any registered trade mark or business symbol which is recognised in the business sector concerned as a distinctive feature of a particular undertaking, as well as any other device

designed to distinguish that undertaking from others. 9 *194 In its order for reference, the Handelsgericht Wien points out that: --Austrian case law interprets paragraph 9 of the UWG as protecting trade marks and specific designations of undertakings only if they are distinctive --that is to say, if they are special and individual in some respect which by its very nature distinguishes the bearer from other persons-- or if they have become so well known in the business world that they have acquired a distinctive force which does not depend on originality; --according to Austrian case law, "Plus"--when used as the name of an undertaking which markets a wide range of goods (not only foodstuffs, but also other household goods) in supermarkets--is original, not merely descriptive, and as such qualifies for protection; and --consequently, Löwa's use of the trade name "Plus", with or without additional text, infringes paragraph 9 of the UWG because Pfeiffer has priority. 10 The Handelsgericht Wien, however, maintains that the restraining order which it would be obliged to make against Löwa under paragraph 9 of the UWG would affect intra-Community trade. It therefore decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice: Is Article 30 or Articles 52 et seq. of the E.C. Treaty to be interpreted as precluding the application of national provisions which require that, in the case of trade marks or designations of undertakings which are liable to be confused, the one with earlier priority is to be protected, and hence prohibit an undertaking from using, in three provinces of Austria, a trade mark or designation under which companies in the same group lawfully operate in other Member States? 11 It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that the national court finds that the risk of confusion on which the plaintiff in the main proceedings bases its application for an order, under a provision of national law concerning unfair competition, restraining the defendant from using a particular trade name has been established. Accordingly, by its question the national court is essentially asking whether Articles 30 and 52 of the Treaty preclude a provision of national law which does not allow a trade name to be used as the specific designation of an undertaking where there is a risk of confusion. 12 Pfeiffer, basing its argument primarily on the Court's case law on the protection of trade marks under Articles 30 and 36 of the E.C. Treaty (the latter provision being now, after amendment, Article 30 E.C.) submits that this question should be answered in the negative. In its submission, paragraph 9(1) of the UWG, as a provision of national law applying solely to selling arrangements, and not to products, and applicable without distinction to all commercial operators concerned, whether or not they are Austrian nationals, is compatible with Article *195 30 of the Treaty and does not impair the freedom of establishment provided for in Article 52. 13 Löwa contends essentially that an order restraining a company from using, in part of the territory of Austria, the same name as that used in other Member States by companies belonging to the same group constitutes an impairment of the free movement of goods in that it impedes the realisation by the corporate group concerned of a uniform advertising concept at Community level and

compels importers to adjust the presentation of its products according to the place where they are to be marketed. Löwa also maintains that a prohibition of the use of a trade name could also place an impermissible restriction on the freedom of establishment provided for in Article 52 of the Treaty. 14 The Austrian Government argues that the question whether the Austrian legislation is compatible with Community law falls to be assessed in the light of First Council Directive 89/104 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [FN21] and that paragraph 9(1) of the UWG, in so far as it ensures the protection of earlier trade marks, complies with the provisions of that Directive. FN21 [1989] O.J. L40/1. 15 The Commission maintains that Article 52 of the Treaty does not preclude a provision such as paragraph 9(1) of the UWG in so far as a provision of that nature does not directly concern the possibility of establishment or the rules governing it and is thus unrelated or at least not sufficiently related to freedom of establishment. The Commission adds that, in any event, there is nothing whatever in the order for reference to justify the conclusion that either paragraph 9(1) of the UWG, or its application in practice, or the relevant Austrian case law gives rise to discrimination, whether direct or indirect, between Austrian undertakings and undertakings which set up business in Austria. 16 Nor, according to the Commission, does Article 30 of the Treaty preclude a provision such as paragraph 9(1) of the UWG because, since Article 30 does not cover selling arrangements, [FN22] it cannot a fortiori cover provisions which do not lay down any selling arrangements, of whatever kind. FN22 Joined Cases C 267 & 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard: [1993] E.C.R. I-6097; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101. 17 It must first be determined whether a restraining order such as that contemplated in the main proceedings is contrary to Article 52 of the Treaty, which provides that restrictions on the freedom of establishment in the territory of the Community are to be abolished. According to the defendant in the main proceedings, the order sought against it would restrict the freedom of establishment in Austria of the group to which the defendant company belongs, because it would not be allowed to use the same name in Austria as that used in other Member States, including the State where the parent company is established. 18 *196 It is important to bear in mind that the freedom of establishment provided for in Article 52 of the Treaty, read together with Article 58 of the E.C. Treaty (now Article 48 E.C.), is conferred both on natural persons who are nationals of a Member State of the Community and on legal persons within the meaning of Article 58 of the Treaty. Subject to the exceptions and conditions specified, it includes the right to take up and pursue all types of self-employed activity in the territory of any other Member State, to set up and manage undertakings, and to

set up agencies, branches or subsidiaries. 19 National measures adopted in the Member State where companies from other Member States are established constitute a restriction on the right of establishment if they are liable to place those companies in a less favourable factual or legal situation than companies from the State of establishment. [FN23] Such a restriction, even if applied in a non-discriminatory manner, is contrary to Article 52 of the Treaty, read together with Article 58, unless it is justified by overriding requirements in the general interest, and is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. [FN24] FN23 See Case C-70/95, Sodemare SA and Others v. Regione Lombardia: [1997] E.C.R. I-3395; [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 591, para. [33]. FN24 See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio Dell'Ordine degli Avvocati E Procuratori di Milano: [1995] E.C.R. I-4165; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, para. [37]. 20 A restraining order of the type sought by the plaintiff in the main proceedings operates to the detriment of undertakings whose seat is in another Member State where they lawfully use a trade name which they would like to use beyond the boundaries of that State. Such an order is liable to constitute an impediment to the realisation by those undertakings of a uniform advertising concept at Community level since it may force them to adjust the presentation of the businesses they operate according to the place of establishment. 21 However, where such a restriction on the right of establishment is brought about by a provision of national law whose primary aim is to safeguard trade names against the risk of confusion, it is justified by overriding requirements in the general interest pertaining to the protection of industrial and commercial property. [FN25] FN25 See, to that effect, Case 62/79, Compagnie Generale pour la Diffusion de la Television (Coditel) and Others v. Cine Vog Films and Others: [1980] E.C.R. 881; [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362, para. [15]. 22 No exception can be taken under Community law to the protection granted by a national law against the risk of confusion, since it corresponds to the specific subject-matter of a trade name, that is to say, protection of the proprietor of the trade name against that risk. [FN26] FN26 See, to the same effect, on the subject of trade marks, Case C-317/91, Deutsche Renault AG v. AUDI AG: [1993] E.C.R. I-6227; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 461, para. [37]. 23 Furthermore, as the Advocate General pointed out in paragraphs 63 to 68 of his Opinion, the restraining order sought by Pfeiffer in the main proceedings is suitable for securing the attainment of the *197 objective pursued and does not

go beyond what is necessary for that purpose, since the national court has concluded on the basis of its national law that a risk of confusion does in fact exist. 24 Thus, Article 52 of the Treaty does not preclude a restraining order such as that which may be made against Löwa in the main proceedings. 25 Secondly, it must be determined whether such an order is contrary to Article 30 of the Treaty, under which quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect are prohibited between Member States. 26 As has been pointed out in paragraphs [17] to [24] above, although the restraining order which the national court is minded to grant restricts the possibilities open to undertakings established in other Member States of using identical trade names in the Member State concerned, it is not contrary to Article 52 of the Treaty because it is justified by overriding requirements. Consequently, it could conflict with Article 30 of the Treaty concerning the free movement of goods only if, and to the extent that, it restricted the free movement of goods between Member States other than indirectly through the restriction of freedom of establishment. 27 Even supposing that the measure contested in the main proceedings restricted the free movement of goods, there is nothing to suggest that such a restriction does not flow indirectly from the restriction on the freedom of establishment. 28 Accordingly, Article 30 of the Treaty likewise does not preclude a restraining order such as that which may be issued against Löwa in the main proceedings. 29 In the light of the above, the answer to the question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling must be that Articles 30 and 52 of the Treaty do not preclude a provision of national law which prohibits, where there is a risk of confusion, the use of a trade name as the specific designation of an undertaking. Costs 30 The costs incurred by the Austrian Government and the Commission, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the proceedings pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. R1 Order On those grounds, THE COURT, in answer to the question referred to it by the Handelsgericht Wien by order of 24 March 1997, HEREBY RULES Articles 30 and 52 of the E.C. Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 28 E.C. and 43 E.C.) do not preclude a provision of national law which prohibits, where there is a risk of confusion, the use of a trade name as the specific designation of an undertaking.

(c) Sweet & Maxwell Limited

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