No. IN THE SupremeCourt of theUnited States SANDRA SUE GRAZZINI-RUCKI, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER CHILDREN, N.J.R., S.V.R., G.J.R., N.G.R., AND G.P.R., AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. DAVID KNUTSON, AN INDIVIDUAL; JOHN AND MARY DOES 1-20 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARITO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI MICHELLE LOWNEY MACDONALD SHIMOTA Counsel of Record MacDonald Law Firm, LLC 1069 South Robert Street West St. Paul, MN 55118 Michelle@MacDonaldLawFirm.com Telephone: (651) 222-4400 Facsimile: (651) 222-1122 CURRY & TAYLOR ! 202-393-4141 Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comi QUESTIONS PRESENTED This case presents issues of judicial immunity for Dakota County, Minnesota Judge David Knutson under the Civil RightsActof1871,42USC1983,includingone extraordinaryissueoffirstimpressionregardingthis Courts Article III jurisdiction to construe Section 1983, andtwoadditionalissuesreflectingdivisionamongthe circuitsregardingtheappropriatetesttoapplywhen deciding questions of judicial immunity: (1)Whetheradistrictcourtmayextendimmunitytoa judgeaccusedofviolatingtheCivilRightsAct, without conducting a historical analysis of immunity forthefunctionsat 1871commonlawasinstructed under Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497 (2012).

(2) Whether a family court judge is immune under Stump v. Sparkman for the functions of(a) administratively overriding the case assignment process to assign all cases relating to a party, including family, criminal, andthirdpartycasestohimself;(b)conductinga psychologicallisteningsessionuponalitigants children, absent any motion or relevance to any issue before the judge; (c) issuing a stream of stay away andpropertycontrolcommandsandcompellinga family toundergocounseling;and (d)conducting a trialwiththeattorneyhandcuffedinawheelchair, and forced to proceed with the clients case, without files,notes,evidence,eyeglasses,pen,paperorthe litigant?Whether these behaviors, performed by a familycourtjudge,arejudicialactswithinthe jurisdictionofafamilycourtunderStumpv. Sparkman. ii (3)WhetherthisCourtpossessedjurisdictionunder ArticleIII,oftheUnitedStatesConstitutionin Pierson v. Ray to construe Section 1983 contrary to itsunambiguouslanguageandvividly-recorded congressionalintent,therebyexercisinglegislative power vested exclusively in Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution, and in excess of its judicial power. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comiii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED.............................................................. i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................. v OPINIONS BELOW......................................................................... 1 JURISDICTION............................................................................... 1 RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED......................................... 2 STATEMENT .................................................................................. 2 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION................................. 8 CONCLUSION............................................................................... 39 APPENDIX APPENDIXA: The March 31, 2015 Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Case no. 14-2569 [unpublished] ................. 1a APPENDIXB:The May 29, 2014 United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Case no. 13-cv-2477 is not reported............................................................... 5a APPENDIX C:The Grazzini-Rucki Petition for Rehearing en banc and Petition for Rehearing by the panel were denied on May 15, 2015............................. 42a APPENDIX D:The December 12, 2013 Affidavit of Attorney Facts that Defendant David Knutson Usurped Court Files, Improper Assignments, filed in response to Motion to Dismiss based on Judicial Immunity, Case no. 13-cv-2477.................................................................................... 44a iv APPENDIX E:The March 29, 2013 Order and Memorandum Sealing Listening Session held for the sole purpose of facilitating therapy; the District Court of Minnesota for Dakota County, case no. 19AVFA-11-1273. ................................................... 67a APPENDIX F:Form COL Violation Warning by Sandra Grazzini-Rucki Denial of Rights Under Color of Law, 42 USC 1983 --- to (Judge) David L. Knutson,July 23 , 2013 ....................................... 70a APPENDIXG: Rucki Children on the NationalMissing and Exploited Children list, April 19, 2013........................................................................................ 72a Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES ADAMSV. MCILHANY, 764 F.2D 294 (5TH CIR. 1985)........21, 23 ANTOINE V. BYERS & ANDERSON, INC. 508 U. S. 429 (1993) ........................................................................ PASSIM ASHELMANV. POPE, 793 F.2D 1072 (9TH CIR. 1986).............. 23 AUSTIN V. BOREL, 830 F.2D 1356, 1363 (5TH CIR. 1987) ......................................................................................... 25 BABCOCK V. TYLER, 884 F.2D 497, 502-03 (9TH CIR.1989) ................................................................................. 30 BELTRAN V. SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 514 F.3D 906, 908 (9TH CIR. 2008)................................................................. 30 BRADLEYV. FISHER 80 U.S.335 (1872) ..................................... 8 BREWERV. BLACKWELL, 692 F.2D 387, 396 (5TH CIR. 1982) ................................................................................ 23 BUCHANAN V. FORD, 638 F. SUPP. 168 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) ......................................................................................... 25 BURNS V. REED, 500 U. S. 478 (1991)..................................10, 11 BUTZ V. ECONOMOU, 438 U. S. 478, 516 (1978)........................ 14 CLEAVINGERV. SAXNER, 474 U. S. 193, 207-08 (1985)........................................................................................ 14 CONCEPCION V. CINTRON, 905 F. SUPP. 57, 61 (D. P.R. 1995) ................................................................................ 23 CTS CORP. V. WALDERBURGER, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014)........................................................................................ 32 CZIKALLAV. MALLOY, 649 F. SUPP. 1212 (D.COLO. 1986) ......................................................................................... 26 D.T.B. V. FARMER, 114 F. APP'X 446, 447 (3D CIR. 2004) ......................................................................................... 29 DOE V. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 494 F. SUPP. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) ...................................................................... 25 DOE V. LEBBOS, 348 F.3D 820 (9TH CIR. 2003), ABROGATEDIN BELTRAN V. SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 514 F.3D 906 (9TH CIR. 2008)................................ 26 DUZYNSKI V. NOSAL, 324 F.2D 924, 929 (7TH CIR. 1963) ......................................................................................... 29 vi DYKES V. HOSEMANN, 776 F.2D 942, 946 (11TH CIR. 1985) ......................................................................................... 23 FIGUEROA V. BLACKBURN, 39 F. SUPP. 2D 479, 487 (2D. CIR. 1999)......................................................................... 23 GENTILE V. STATE BAR OF NEVADA, 501 U. S. 1030, 1074 (1991) ............................................................................... 36 GREGORYV. THOMPSON, 500 F.2D 59 (9TH CIR. 1974) ......................................................................................... 20 HARPER V. MERCKLE, 638 F.2D 848, 857 (5TH CIR. 1981) ................................................................................ PASSIM HOFFMAN V. HARRIS, 511 U. S. 1060 (1994) ........................... 11 HOLLOWAY V. WALKER, 765 F.2D 517, 522 (5TH CIR. 1985) ................................................................................ 23 IMBLERV. PACHTMAN 424 U. S. 409(1976) .................. 10, 25, 26 JASPERSONV. PUROLATOR COURIER CORP., 765 F.2D 736 (1985)........................................................................ 30 JENSEN V. LANE CNTY., 222 F.3D 570, 577 (9TH CIR. 2000) ......................................................................................... 30 KALINA V. FLETCHER, 522 U. S. 118, 124, N. 11, 132 (1997)............................................................................. 10, 13, 30 KING V. STATE EDUC. DEP'T, 182 F.3D 162 (2D CIR.1999) ................................................................................. 27 LOPEZ V. VANDERWATER, 620 F. 2D 1229, 1235-36 (7TH CIR. 1980) ..................................................................15, 17 LYNCH V. JOHNSON, 420 F.2D 818, 820 (6TH CIR. 1970) ....................................................................................15, 20 MALLEY V. BRIGGS 475 U. S. 335, 339-340 (1986) ..........8, 10, 23 MARTINEZ V. ROTH, NO. 94-2206, 1995 WL 261127, AT *3 (10TH CIR. APR. 26, 1995)............................................ 29 MARTINEZ V. WINNER, 771 F. 2D 424, 434 (10TH CIR. 1985) .........................................................................6, 8, 12 MCALESTERV. BROWN, 469 F.2D 1280 (5TH CIR.1972) ..............................................................................9, 19 MCARDLE V. TRONETTI, 961 F.2D 1083, 1085 (3D CIR. 1992) ................................................................................ 29 MERCKLEV. HARPER, 454 U. S. 816 (1981) ............................ 22 MICHIGAN V. BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014)................................................................ 32 Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comvii MILLER V. GAMMIE, 335 F.3D 889, 898-900 (9TH CIR. 2003) ......................................................................................... 30 MIRELESSV. WACO, 502 U. S. 9, 13 (1991) .............................. 20 MONROE V. PAPE, 365 U. S. 167, 185-191 (1961)...................9, 33 MORSTADV. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., 147 F.3D 741, 744 (8TH CIR. 1998)................................................ 29 MOSES V. PARWATIKAR, M.D., 813 F.2D 891, 892 (8TH CIR. 1987), DISAPPROVED ONOTHER GROUNDS, BURNS V. REED, 500 U. S. 478, 496 (1991)........................................................................................ 29 MYERS V. MORRIS, 810 F.2D 1437, 1466-67 (8TH CIR. 1987) ......................................................................................... 29 OLAJIDEV. GAFFEY, 2013 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 991, *5, 2013 WL 57862 (N.D. CAL. JAN. 3, 2013) ....................... 23 P.T., A.T. & H.T. V. RICHARD HALL CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH CARE CTR., 364 N.J. SUPER. 460, 462 (N.J. SUPER. CT. APP. DIV. 2003) .......................... 29 PATTEN V. GLASER, 771 F.2D 1178, 1179 (8TH CIR. N.D. 1985)................................................................................ 23 PAVELIC & LEFLORE V. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, 493 U. S. 120, 123 (1989)........................................................................................ 32 PEOPLE UNITED FOR CHILDREN, INC. V. CITY OF NEW YORK, 108 F. SUPP. 2D 275, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ....................................................................................18, 27 PETERSONV. PETERSON, 24 HAW. 239, 246 (1918) ................ 26 PICKING V. PENNSYLVANIA R.R., 151 F.2D 240 (3RD CIR. 1945) ....................................................................... 33 PIERSON V. MEMBERSOF DELAWARE COUNTY, NO. 99-3435, 2000 WL 486608, AT *4 (E.D. PA. APRIL 25, 2000)....................................................................... 29 PIERSON V. RAY, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) ...............................8, 9, 31 RANDALL V. BRIGHAM, 74 U. S. 523 (1868)........................27, 28 REHBERG V. PAULK,, 132 S.CT. 1497, 1503-07 (2012)........10, 23 RHEUARK V. SHAW, 628 F.2D 297, 304-05 (5TH CIR.1980) ................................................................................. 14 SCHEUER V. RHODES, 416 U. S. 232, 249-50 (1974) ................ 11 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N V. CHENERY CORP., 318 U. viii S. 80, 88 (1943) ....................................................................22, 25 SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA V. CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATE 446 U. S. 719, 734-737 (1980).....................................................................................8, 13 TENNEY V. BRANDHOVE 341 U. S. 367 (1951) .....................8, 35 TENTH (LERWILL V. JOSLIN, 712 F.2D 435, 439 (10TH CIR. 1983) ..................................................................... 23 THOMASONV. SCAN VOLUNTEER SERVS., INC., 85 F.3D 1365, 1373 (8TH CIR. 1996)............................................ 25 TROXEL V. GRANVILLE, 530 US 57, 65 (2000)......................... 18 TURNEY V. O'TOOLE, 898 F.2D 1470, 1474 (10TH CIR. 1990) ................................................................................ 29 UNITED STATES V. LANIER, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (1997) (PERCURIAM).............................................................. 33 UNITED STATES V. MORRISON, 529 U. S. 598, 621 (2000)........................................................................................ 36 WILLIAM B. CASHION NEV. SPENDTHRIFT TRUST V. VANCE, 552 FED. APPX. 884, 886 (11TH CIR. 2014) ......................................................................................... 23 WILLIAMSV. CONSOVOY, 333 F. SUPP. 2D 297, 302 (D.N.J. 2004) ........................................................................... 29 WYATT V. COLE, 504 US 158, 163 (1992) ...............................9, 31 STATUTES 18 U.S.C. 242............................................................................ 33 20 U.S.C. 76cc........................................................................... 15 28 U.S.C. 1254(1)........................................................................ 1 28 U.S.C. 1291............................................................................ 1 28 U.S.C. 1331 ........................................................................... 1 42 U.S.C. 1983.................................................................... 1, 2, 9 Minn. Stat. 148.88 ....................................................................... 24 Minn. Stat. 484.1........................................................................ 5 Minn. Stat. 518............................................................................ 27 Minn. Stat. 518.17 subds.1-2..................................................... 6 The Federalist No. 78 (1788)..................................................... 32 Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comix RULES Supreme Court Rule 10(a) .................................................. 12, 16 Supreme Court Rule 10(c)......................................................... 13 OTHER AUTHORITIES J. Feinman, R. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S. C. L. Rev. 201, 243-249, 254-56 (1979)........................................................................................ 37 Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 327-328 (1969)............................................. 33 M. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not A Big Tent: The Improper Expansion Of Absolute Judicial Immunity To Non-Judges In Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L.Rev. 265, 276........................................................ 26 N. Blake, The Road To Reno, A History of Divorce in the United States 56 (1962)............................................... 26 Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com1 OPINIONS BELOW The March 31, 2015 Opinion of the United States Court ofAppealsfortheEighthCircuit,Caseno.14-2569 attachedas Appendix A, page1a is[unpublished]. The May29,2014UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,Districtof Minnesota,MemorandumOpinionandOrder,Caseno. 13-cv-2477grantingDefendantsMotiontoDismiss Grazzini-RuckiAmendedComplaintonthebasisof judicialimmunityisnotreportedandisattachedas AppendixB,page5a.TheGrazzini-RuckiPetitionsfor Rehearing en banc and for Rehearing by the panel were denied on May 15, 2015, United States Court of Appeals fortheEighthCircuit,Caseno.14-2569attachedas Appendix C, page 42a J URISDICTION ThisCourthasjurisdictionunder28U.S.C. 1254(1)forapetitionforawritofcertiorariinacivil caseafterrenditionofajudgmentordecreeofacourt ofappeal.AjudgmentoftheUnitedStatesCourtof AppealsfortheEighthCircuitwasenteredonMarch 31, 2015.Petitions for rehearing en banc and rehearing by the panel were denied on May 15, 2015. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesotahadjurisdictionunder28U.S.C.1331 (federal question) and 1343(a)(3) (civil rights) for claims under42U.S.C.1983,1985,1986,and1988.The UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheEighthcircuit hadjurisdictionoverthedistrictcourtsMay29,2014 final judgment under 28 U.S.C. 1291. 2 RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED ArticleI1oftheUnitedStatesConstitution provides: All legislative powers herein granted shallbevestedinaCongressoftheUnited States,whichshallconsistofaSenateand House of Representatives. ArticleIII1,2oftheUnitedStates Constitutionprovideinrelevantpart:The judicialpoweroftheUnitedStates,shallbe vestedinoneSupremeCourt....Thejudicial powershallextendtoallcases,inlawand equity,arisingunderthisConstitution,[and] the laws of the United States . . . . Title 42 U. S.C. 1983 provides in relevant part: Everypersonwho,undercolorofanystatute, ordinance,regulation,custom,orusage,ofany State...subjects,orcausestobesubjected, anycitizenoftheUnitedStates...tothe deprivationofanyrights,privileges,or immunitiessecuredbytheConstitutionand laws,shallbeliabletothepartyinjuredinan action at law . . . STATEMENT This petition arises from a suit in the United States DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofMinnesotaunder42 U.S.C.1983andstate-lawclaimsbroughtby Plaintiffs-Petitioners,SandraGrazzini-Rucki, individually and on behalf ofher minor children against Defendant-Respondent,DavidL.Knutson,ajudgeof theDakotaCounty,MinnesotaDistrictCourt.Judge Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com3 KnutsonpresidedovermattersinvolvingGrazzini-Rucki,subsequenttoPetitionersMay12,2011 Stipulated Judgment and Decree. App. 6a-7a.After the Decreewasentered,Petitionersex-husbandDavid Ruckichangedhismind,movingtosetasidethe Decree,alleginghewastrickedintosettling.App.7a. JudgeKnutsonthereafterassignedhimselftovacate the Decreeforcing the parties back to court.App. 9a. JudgeKnutsoninstructedJudicialDistrictDeputy AdministratorSusanJ.Reichenbachtoassignhimto allcourtproceedingsofanytypeinvolvingthe parties,evenfuturecasesinvolvingthirdparties,and even criminal matters.App. 8a, 44a-66a.He thereafter proceeded to issue over 3,400 directives to regulate this familyincludingstayawayordersseparatingthe childrenfrombothparents,kickingthemotheroutof thehome,orderingpsychologicalexaminationsof family members, and requiring custody evaluations and therapyfortheentirefamilywithoutanytrialor finding of abuse.App. 10a-15a, 22a-24a.JudgeKnutson commandthechildrentoattendwhathecalleda listeningsessionwhichheadmittedwasforthesole purposeoffacilitatingtherapy...Thissessionwasnot pursuanttoanymotionorissueunderconsiderationat the time.App. 3a, 67a-69a.At the listening session, JudgeKnutsonthreatenedthechildren.App.21a-25a. Two of the children ran away. App. 72aGrazzini-Rucki andthechildrensuedJudgeKnutsonalleging deprivation by: (a)JudgeKnutsonsbypassingstandardcase assignmentproceduretoassignallpre-existing and future hearings relating to Grazzini-Rucki to himself; 4 (b)Conductingtheillegallisteningsessionfor the sole purpose of psychotherapy; (c)Makingthestreamofillegalstay-away, property control, and therapy commands; and (d)Afterthefilingofthislawsuit,causing Petitionerscounseltobe(i)arrestedwithout probable cause during a recess in a custody trial; (ii)heldincourthousedetention(iii)returnedto thecourtroominawheelchairwhilehandcuffed to a waist belt (iv) forced to try Petitioners case insuchrestraints,andwithouteyeglasses,files, penorpaperwiththreatofdefault;and(v) without Petitioner present. App. 22a-24a, 63a,64a. 2.JudgeKnutsonmovedtodismissunderRule 12(b)(6),assertingtheaffirmativedefenseofabsolute immunity.Petitionerassertedthesewerenotjudicial actsandthatJudgeKnutsonofferedandthedistrict courtundertooknohistoricalanalysisofwhetherthe accusedfunctionswereimmuneat1871commonlaw. ThedistrictfoundKnutsontobeimmune,construing Stumpv.Sparkman,Mirelessv.Waco,Forresterv. White,andPiersonv.Ray(App.39a-40a)toextend immunity for all accused behavior, reasoning: PlaintiffcontestsJudgeKnutsonscase management,hissigningoforders,the substance of his orders, and the trial proceedings onSeptember12,2013.Alloftheseactions, however, were taken inJudge Knutsons judicial capacity. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com5 Thedistrictcourtsconclusionwasbasedonthe following findings: (a)JudgeKnutsonhasnotinteractedwith Plaintiffoutsideofhiscourtroomorhisjudicial chambers and (b) [T]he underlying familylaw case was within JudgeKnutsonsjurisdictionalauthorityunder MINN.STAT.484.1(statedistrictcourtshave originaljurisdictioninallcivilactionswithin their respective districts). App.40a.ThedistrictcourtenteredaFinalOpinion and Order on May 29, 2014. Grazzini-Ruckiappealedthefindingofimmunity, arguing (1) Judge Knutson failed to carry his burden of proving1871commonlawextendedanabsolute immunitytotheaccusedfunctions;(2)the(a) administrativecaseassignment,(b)psychotherapeutic listening session, (c) stay away and property control orders,and(d)arrestandconductingoftrialwithher attorneyinshacklescouldnotbeimmuneunderany constructionofimmunitydoctrine;and(3)Piersonv. Raywasanunconstitutionalexerciseoflegislative powers vested solely to Congress under Article I of the UnitedStatesConstitution.OpeningBrief,Sept.25, 2014,Response&ReplyBrief,March4,2015,Caseno. 14-2569. 4.Thecourtofappealsaffirmedthedismissal stating: 6 (a)JudgeKnutsonsself-assignmentof relatedmatterswasajudicialactbecauseitis stillajudicialfunctioninthesensethatit directlyconcernsthecase-decidingprocess, citingout-of-circuitauthorityofMartinezv. Winner,771F.2d424,434(10thCir.1985), vacated as moot after remand, 800 F.2d. 230 (10th Cir. 1986). (b)thepsychotherapeuticlistening session was a judicial act because: (i)Thelisteningsessionwasheldatthe courthouse;(ii)...attendedbytheparties,the attorneys,theguardianadlitem,andthetherapist;and(iii)...wasrecordedbyacourt reporter. ThecourtreasonedthatMinnesotascustodylawsare soflexiblethatthelisteningsessionwasafunction normallyperformedbyajudgeindecidingcustody disputes...App.4a.(citingMinn.Stat.518.17 subds.1-2establishingbestinterestsstandardfor determiningcustody).JudgeKnutsoninhisorder characterizeditasanon-judicialacthimself.Thecourt disregardedJudgeKnutsonsadmissionthatthe listeningsessionwasheldforthesolepurposeof facilitatingtherapypreviouslyorderedbytheCourt, concludingthatJudge Knutsonscharacterizationdoes not require the conclusion that the listening session was something other than a judicial act. App. 3a Thecourtofappealsignoredboth(c)movement andpropertycontrolordersand(d)conductingachild Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com7 custody trial without Grazzini-Rucki present, and while her attorney was in handcuffs. 5.Grazzini-Ruckipetitionedforrehearingand hearing en banc, arguing: (1)ThepanelfailedtoaddressGrazzini-Ruckis argumentthatneitherJudgeKnutsonnorthe districtcourtconductedhistoricalanalysisof immunityat1871commonlawforthefour accused functions; (2)Thepanel(a)appliedafour-factorimmunity testfromtheFifthCircuitratherthanStumps (controlling)two-factortest,(b)confusedthe withinthejurisdictionprongwiththe ordinarilyperformedbyajudgeprongfrom Stump,and(c)failedtoaddressthestay-away orders and shackling of counsel behavior; (3)Thepanelappliedmootedauthorityof MartinezinconsistentwiththisCourts precedent; and (4)Piersonv.Raywasanunconstitutional exerciseofArticleIauthoritybythisCourt,in excess of the judicial power vested under Article III. 6.TheEighthCircuitdeniedboth petitions for rehearing. 8 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION InPiersonv.Ray,386U.S.547(1967)thisCourt construedSection1983oftheCivilRightsActof1871 contrarytoitsunambiguouslanguageandvividly-recordedcongressionalintent,wronglyanalogizingthe legislativespeechanddebatelibertyfromTenneyv. Brandhove 341 U. S. 367 (1951) to the sovereign judicial function.Contradictingtheunambiguousstatuteand clearcongressionalrecord,theCourtpresumedthat congressdidnotintendSection1983toabrogate immunityofstatejudgestocommonlawtortswhich existedunder nineteenthcentury English commonlaw, asrecitedinBradleyv.Fisher80U.S.335(1872). Followingthispresumption,thisCourthasinstructed: Ourinitialinquiryiswhetheranofficialclaiming immunityunder1983canpointtoacommon-law counterparttotheprivilegeheasserts.Malleyv. Briggs 475 U. S. 335, 339-340 (1986). TheEighthCircuitfailedtoconductthisinitial inquiry,insteadconstruingthedoctrineofjudicial immunitycontraryStumpv.Sparkman475U.S.335, 339-340(1986).ThecourtextendedimmunitytoJudge Knutsonsadministrativecaseassignmentfunction underauthorityfromtheTenthCircuit,Martinezv. Winner,771F.2d424,434(10thCir.1985),whichwas mootedinMartinezv.Winner,800F.2d230,231 (10thCir.1986),thatisdirectlycontrarytoExparte Virginia100U.S.339,228(1879);SupremeCourtof Virginia v. Consumers Union of United State 446 U. S. 719,734-737(1980);andAntoinev.Byers&Anderson, Inc. 508 U. S. 429 (1993). Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com9 ItalsoextendedimmunitytoJudgeKnutsons psycho-therapeutic function under a test from the Fifth Circuit,McAlesterv.Brown,469F.2d1280(5th Cir.1972),acasethatwasabrogatedinStump.The courtrefusedtoanalyzeJudgeKnutsonsproperty controlandtherapycommandsandtheshacklingof counsel. Yetevenifproperlyconstrued,absoluteimmunity isanunconstitutionalabominationregularly deprivingmillionsofUnitedStatescitizensthe fundamentalrightofremedyforconstitutionalinjury byjudicialwrongdoing.Theincontrovertiblerecord demonstratesthatthe1871CongressenactedSection 1983specificallyto abrogatethisinsulttojustice.This CourtsdecisionresurrectingitinPiersonv.Raywas animpermissibleindeedrecklessexerciseof exclusive congressional authority. I.THELOWERCOURTSHAVEFAILEDTOREQUIRE THEOFFICIALCLAIMINGABSOLUTEIMMUNITYTO PROVE A COMMON LAW ANALOG TO ACCUSED FUNCTION Section1983unambiguouslyregulatesevery personactingundercolorofstatelaw.42U.S.C. 1983.Thevividrecordofcongressionaldebates precedingtheCivilRightsActsof1866and1871 demonstratesCongressintendedpersontoinclude judges. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 185-191 (1961);Piersonv.Ray,386U.S.547,559(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 US 158, 163 (1992).Circumventingtraditionalstatutory interpretation,thisCourtinPiersonpresumedthat despitethestatutesfacialclarityandvividrecorded debate,Congressintendedtoincorporateajudicial 10 immunity,whichChiefJusticeWarrenbelievedwas well-settled at 1871 common law. Pierson at 554-555. Followingthispresumption,thisCourthas instructed lower courts to evaluate an officials claim to animmunitybyexaminingEnglishandAmerican commonlawtodeterminewhetherasof1871an officialperformingtheaccusedfunctionenjoyed immunity.See,e.g.,Malleyv.Briggs,475U.S.335, 339-340 (1986) (Our initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts.); Imbler v. Pachtman,424U.S.409,423n.20(1976);Burnsv. Reed,500U.S.478(1991)(Scalia,J.,concurringin judgmentinpartanddissentinginpart)([w]herewe have found that a tradition of absolute immunity did not existasof1871,wehaverefusedtograntsuch immunityunder1983.).TheCourthasforthat reasonbeenquitesparinginrecognizingabsolute immunity for state actors.Burnsat 486-87. A.TheLowerCourtsFailedToMake FindingsThatTheAccusedFunctions Existed, And Were Immune, As Of 1871 ThisCourthasinstructedthatlowercourts analyzinganofficialsimmunitydefensemustexamine nineteenthcenturysocialandlegalsystemsto determinewhethertheaccusedfunctionwasthen immune.See,e.g.,Rehbergv.Paulk,,132S.Ct.1497, 1503-07(2012) (examiningnineteenthcenturycaselaw); Kalinav.Fletcher,522U.S.118,124,n.11,132(1997) (Scalia,J.,Thomas,J.,concurring)(examining17thand 18thcenturycaselaw);Antoinev.Byers&Anderson, Inc.,508U.S.429,432(1993)(examiningtreatisesand Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com11 scholarlypublicationsdescribinghistoryofcourt reporting). As noted by Justices Thomas and Scalia, dissenting from denial of certiorari in Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U. S. 1060(1994),thishistoricalinquiryisfundamental,yet ignored among the circuits: The courts that have accorded absolute immunity . . . appeartohaveoverlookedthenecessaryhistorical inquiry; none has seriously considered whether social workersenjoyedabsoluteimmunityfortheirofficial dutiesin1871.Iftheydidnot,absoluteimmunityis unavailabletosocialworkersunder1983.Thisall assumes,ofcourse,that"socialworkers"(atleastas we now understand the term) even existed in 1871. If thatassumptionisfalse,theargumentforgranting absoluteimmunitybecomes(atleast)moredifficult to maintain. Id.(slipop.at5);seealsoAntoinev.Byers& Anderson,Inc.,508U.S.429(1993)(denyingcourt reporterabsoluteimmunitybecausereportingbegan after1871).Extendinganimmunityabsentthis foundationiserror.Scheuerv.Rhodes,416U.S.232, 249-50(1974)(Thesecases,intheirpresentposture, presentnooccasionforadefinitiveexplorationofthe scopeofimmunity....).Thejudgebearstheburden of proof. Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 486487 (1991). JudgeKnutsonfailedtoproffer,andthedistrict courtandcourtofappealsfailedtoconductthis thresholdinquiryforanyofthefouraccusedfunctions. Absentthisrequiredthresholdshowing,Judge Knutson is not entitled to immunity. 12 Thewidespreadfailureamongthecircuitsto conductthethresholdinquiryofthehistorical foundationsforagovernmentalimmunityasof1871 warrantssupervisoryreviewunderSupremeCourt Rule10(a)andbothconflictanderrorreviewunder Rule 10(c). II.THECOURTOFAPPEALSMISCONSTRUEDSTUMPV. SPARKMAN,WHENITEXTENDEDABSOLUTEIMMUNITY TO FUNCTIONS THAT CANNOT BE IMMUNE A.Case-Assignment is Not J udicial InextendingimmunitytoJudgeKnutsons improperassignments,overrideofDeputy AdministratorSusanJ.Reichenbachcaseassignment function,andusurpingcasefilesinvolvingGrazzini-Rucki,orherformerhusband,thecourtofappeals cited,butfailedtoapplyStump,insteaddivertingtoa test from the Tenth Circuit case of Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985), mooted in Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986).Martinez is inconsistent with Stump. Stump held: [T]hefactorsdeterminingwhetheranactbya judgeisa"judicial"onerelatetothenatureof theactitself,i.e.,whetheritisafunction normallyperformedbyajudge,andtothe expectationsoftheparties,i.e.,whetherthey dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Stump at 362. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com13 Judges dont normally assign cases, participate in childrenstherapysessions,orcarryoncustodytrials withouttheparent,andwhiletheparentsattorneyis inhandcuffs.ThecourtofappealscitedStump,but failedtoexaminewhethercaseassignmentis(i) normallyperformedbyajudgeand(ii)withinthe expectationsoftheparties.Itinsteadasserted rationaleusedinMartinezthatJudgeKnutsonscase assignmentwasjudicialbecauseitdirectlyconcerns thecase-decidingprocess.Martinezat434;App.3a. The failure to analyze under Stump is error reviewable under Supreme Court Rule 10(c). 1.Marti nezwasMootedandis InconsistentwithGenerationsofThis Courts Precedent InextendingimmunityunderMartinez,thecourt ofappealserredunderthisCourtsprecedentsholding that judicial officers performing executive functions are notimmune.See, e.g, Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 228(1879)([a]dministrativedecisions,eventhough theymaybeessentialtotheveryfunctioningofthe courts,havenot...beenregardedasjudicialacts.); SupremeCourtofVirginiav.ConsumersUnionof United States, 446 U. S. 719, 734-737 (1980) (refusing to extendimmunitytobehaviorpromulgatingacodeof conductforattorneysbecauseitwasnotanactof adjudication but one of rulemaking.); Antoine v. Byers &Anderson,Inc.,508U.S.429,435(1993)(finding courtreporterspartofjudicialfunctionyetnot absolutelyimmune);Kalinav.Fletcher,522U.S.118 (1997)(reasoningprosecutorsinvestigationconcerns adjudication but not judicial). 14 InMartineztheTenthCircuitheldChiefJudge Winnersself-assignmentofacasewasjudicial(a)in thesensethatitdirectlyconcernsthecase-deciding processand(b)bystatuteitistheresponsibilityof thechiefjudge.Martinezat434(citingRheuarkv. Shaw,628F.2d297,304-05(5thCir.1980)).Martinez reasonedanactmaybeadministrativeorministerial forsomepurposesandstillbea"judicial"actfor purposesofimmunityfromliabilityfordamages. Martinezat434.ThoughbothMartinezandRheuark cite Stump, they construe that test incorrectly. (a)ThisCourthas never heldthatagivenfunction maybebothjudicialandadministrative.Indeed,the Courthasforgenerationsheldtheoppositethat judicialofficersperformingnon-judicialfunctionsare notentitledtoabsoluteimmunityevenifthefunction concerns the case-deciding Apologistsforabsoluteimmunityclaimthe injusticesitimposesarecheckedbyadversarial process, restraint by principles of law, and vulnerability to appellate review.See, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S.193,207-08(1985)(refusingtograntprison-disciplinecommitteeabsoluteimmunitybecauselackof proceduralsafeguards);Butzv.Economou,438U.S. 478,516(1978)(grantingadministrativelawjudges absolute immunity because procedural safeguards were comparabletojudicialprocess).ButJudgeKnutsons override of the DeputyAdministrator to assign himself toallpastandfuturecasesisnotreviewable,nota resolutionofadispute,andnotsubjecttoprinciplesof lawbut a ministerial rule. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com15 Othercircuitsrecognizethatajudgeperforming executivefunctionscannotbeimmuneundereither StumporImbler.See,e.g.,Lopezv.Vanderwater,620 F. 2d 1229, 1235-36 (7th Cir. 1980) (declining immunity to judgeperformingprosecutorialfunction);Harperv. Merckle,638F.2d848,857(5thCir.1981)(declining immunitytojudgeactingasascomplainingwitness, prosecutor,factfinder,andjudge.).Thefactthata judge is authorized to also function asan administrator doesnotconverttheadministratorfunctionintoa judicialone.SeeLynchv.Johnson,420F.2d818,820 (6th Cir. 1970) (cited favorably in Stump at 370 n. 10) ("A judge does not cease to bea judge when he undertakes tochairaPTAmeeting,but,ofcourse,hedoesnot bring judicial immunity to that forum, either."). (b)Further,theexistenceofstatutory responsibilityisnotdispositiveofthejudicialin natureissue.Statutesmaygrantjudgesavarietyof non-judicialdecision-makingauthority.Asimple exampleisthatChiefJusticeRobertsisauthorized under 20 U.S.C. 76cc to serve as the Chancellor of the BoardofRegentsoftheSmithsonianInstitution.Such authorizationdoesnotconvertChiefJusticeRoberts governance into a judicial act. Further,evenunderMartinezJudgeKnutson couldnotbeimmune because,unlikeJudgeWinner,he isnotaChiefJudgeandhasnooversightauthority over Deputy Administrators.Martinez at 434. (c)Finally,thecourtofappealsfailedtoobserve thedistinctionbetweenJudgeKnutsonsstatusasa judge and the functions accused.Courts must examine thenatureofthefunctionperformed,nottheidentity 16 oftheactorwhoperformedit.Buckleyat269.The mere fact that an officer claiming immunity is a judge is insufficienttoaccomplishabsoluteimmunity.Rather, absoluteimmunitydependsonwhethertheaccused functionwasabsolutelyimmuneasof1871.Stumpat 362; Malley at 339-40. The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits construction andanalysisunderStumptoextendimmunityto administrativecaseassignmentunderMartinezand Rheuark iserrorsubjecttoreviewinthisCourtunder Supreme Court Rules 10(a) and (c). 2.ProperlyConstruingStump,the CourtofAppealsWouldHaveFoundNo Immunity WouldthecourtofappealshaveappliedStump,it wouldhavefoundJudgeKnutsonwasnotimmune: UsurpingcourtfilesbyoverridingDeputy AdministratorReichenbachscaseassignmentprocess isnot(a)normallyperformedbyajudgeand(b) within the expectations of the parties. (a)JudgeKnutsontooktheunusualstepof commandingJudicialDistrictDeputyAdministrator Reichenbach toassign him tothe divorce andorder for protectioncasesrelatedtothefamily,andthenmade orders assigning himself to all court proceedings of any typeinvolvingSandraGrazzini-RuckiandDavid Rucki.App.54a.TheseincludedDavidRuckis criminalcases,andcasesinvolvingthirdparties.App. 8a,48a-63a.Ajudgeusurpingallpendingandany future cases to himself is not normally performed by a judgecaseassignmentisalwaysrandomand Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com17 performedbyJudicialDistrictAdministrators.App. 46a (b) Nor can any officers case assignment be within theexpectationsofthepartiesbecauseassignment occurs before a judge is assigned a case, and long before the parties have any expectation about a judge acting. CertainlyJudgeKnutsonpresentednoevidencethat Petitionerhadanysuchexpectationofsuch.Infact, Petitionersexpectationsweretheoppositeunder Minnesotarules,anypartycanremoveaJudgeby noticewithin10daysafterthepartyreceivesnotice ofwhichJudgeistopresideoverthecase.Judge Knutsonsadministrativeoverrideeviscerated Petitioners right to removal. 3.TheFifth,Eighth,andTenth CircuitsImproperlyApplyImblers Intimately Associated Test CitingMartinez,thecourtofappealsextended immunitybecauseJudgeKnutsonsoverridedirectly concernsthecase-decidingprocess.Thistest resemblesImblersintimatelyassociatedwiththe judicialphaseofthecriminalprocess.Imblerat430. However,Imblerstestdoesnotapplytojudges(see, e.g., Lopez, supra) and there is no prosecutorial function orcriminalprocessinfamilycourt.Obviouslycases areassignedbyacourtadministratorbeforethe judicial phase begins.Minnesota family court judges, guardians, and psychologists exercise nearly unfettered discretionunderweakproceduralrestrictiondespite thatfamilycourtsadjudicatefundamentalrights includingspeech,association,conscience,movement, andpropertyownershipandcontrol.See,e.g.,People 18 UnitedforChildren,Inc.v.CityofNewYork,108F. Supp. 2d275, 286(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holdingfamilycourt isnotacourtofcompetentjurisdictionforRooker-Feldmananalysisbecauseofweakproceduraland constitutionalprotections); Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57, 65 (2000) (describing parental rights as perhaps the oldestofthefundamentallibertyinterestsrecognized by this Court.). TheEighth,Fifth,andTenthCircuitsincorrect applicationofImblertoextendimmunitytojudges performingadministrativecaseassignmentwarrants exerciseoftheCourtssupervisoryandconflict resolution jurisdiction under Rules 10(a) and (c). B.PsychotherapeuticFunctionIsNot J udicial Thecourtofappealsextendedabsoluteimmunity toJudgeKnutsonforparticipatinginwhathehimself describedasalisteningsessionwiththeGrazzini-Ruckichildrenforthesolepurposeoffacilitating therapy...Thissessionwasnotpursuanttoany motionorissueunderconsiderationatthetime. App.3a-4a.Thoughhethreatenedandcoercedthe children,hisbehaviorbyhisownadmissionwas irrelevanttoanyissueandwasnotadjudication,but psychotherapy. Neitherlowercourtmadefindingsrequiredunder Stumpregarding(a)whetherpsychotherapywasa functionnormallyperformedbyajudge(at1871 commonlaw)and(b)theexpectationoftheparties. Thecourtofappealsfurthererredinfindingthat psychotherapyisjudicialbecausethesessionwas(a) Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com19 heldatthecourthouse;(b)...attendedbythe parties,theattorneys,theguardianadlitem,andthe therapist;and(c)...wasrecordedbyacourt reporter.App.3a-4a.Thesefactsarenotrelevant under Stump. 1.The Court of Appeals Cited Stump, butAppliedtheAbrogatedFifthCircuit Test from McAlester v. Brown Thecourtofappealsfocusedonthelocationofthe session,attendancebyparties,andrecordation.App. 3a-4a.These are not relevant under Stump, but may be relevantunderatestoriginatingintheFifthCircuitMcAlesterv.Brown,469F.2d1280(5thCir.1972)a testthatwasabrogatedinStumpatp.361,yettoday somehowthriveswithinthecircuits,requiringthe Courtssupervisoryandconflictresolutionjurisdiction under Rules 10(a) and (c). Stumpsettledcacophonyamongthecircuits extendingimmunityinconsistently.Stumpat360-363 and n.10.Justice White cast aside considerable debris amongthecircuits,includingMcAlester,theleading immunitycasefromtheFifthCircuit.SeeHarperv. Merckle,638F.2d848,857(5thCir.1981),cert.denied 454U.S.816(1981).McAlesterstestfoundanact judicialinnaturebasedonfourfactors:(1)the preciseactcomplainedof...isanormaljudicial function; (2) the events involved occurred in the judge's chambers;(3)thecontroversycenteredaroundacase then-pendingbeforethejudge;and(4)the confrontationarosedirectlyandimmediatelyoutofa visitto thejudgein his officialcapacity.McAlester at 1282 (analyzed in Stump at 361). 20 InStump,JusticeWhiterecited,thenrejected McAlestersfocusonlocationoftheactbeingin chambersrelatingtoapendingcase,andduringa visittoajudge.Stumpat361-2.Inrejecting McAlesterstestJusticeWhitefavorablycitedaNinth Circuitdecision, Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d59 (9th Cir.1974)whichrejectedimmunityforajudgewho physicallyevictedalitigantfromchambersduringa visit to a judge and relating to a pending case.Stump at370,n.10.HealsoanalyzedLynchv.Johnson,420 F.2d818(6thCir.1970)whichsimilarlyheldthata countyjudgeforciblyremovingamanfromafiscal courtwasnotimmune.Id.at820.ClearlyJustice White cited Gregory and Lynch to reject McAlester and to emphasize that even if a judge acts in chambers, or relatingtoaconfrontationorpendingcase,the judgesbehaviormaynotbejudicialinnature.See alsoHarperv.Merckle,638F.2d848,857(5thCir. 1981),cert.denied454U.S.816(1981)(decidingchild supportenforcementproceedinginsideofcourtroom, byajudge,andrecordedbyreporternotimmune); Mirelessv.Waco,502U.S.9,13(1991)(deciding physicalassaultbyajudgeoutsideofcourtroom immune). Stumpitselfunderminesthecourtofappeals relianceonattendedbytheparties.PlaintiffLinda Sparkmanwasabsentfromanddeceivedofher motherspetitiontosterilizeher:Linda[Sparkman] enteredtheDeKalbMemorialHospital,havingbeen toldthatshewastohaveherappendixremoved.The followingdayatuballigationwasperformeduponher. Shewasreleasedseveraldayslater,unawareofthe true nature of her surgery.).Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com21 Yet,despiterejectioninStump,thecourtof appealsappliedMcAlesterstestexclusivelyfocusing onlocation,attendedbyparties,andrelationshiptoa pendingcase.Thelowercourtsapplicationofthe wrong test warrants review under Rule 10(c). 2.TheCircuitsHaveConsistently Mis-Construed Stump McAlesterspersistencedespiteabrogationin StumpfollowsanaberrationoccurringintheFifth CircuitcaseofAdamsv.McIlhany,764F.2d294(5th Cir.1985).SevenyearsafterStump,theFifthCircuit inAdamsrefusedtorecognizeStumpsabrogationof McAlesters four factors.As if the Supreme Court were asistercircuit,theFifthCircuitcitedStump,then turneditsbackonit.Id.at297(Thefourfactors generallyrelieduponbythiscircuit....)(emphasis added).Adamsproceededtoanalyzeunder McAlesterstestratherthanStump,erroneously relyingonthefour-factortestdebriscastasideby Justice White.Adams at 297. AdamsmisperceivedMcAlestersvitalitybecause ofapeculiaroutcome inthecaseofHarper v. Merckle, 638F.2d848,857(5thCir.1981).InHarper,theFifth CircuitdeterminedthatJudgeMercklewasnot immuneforfalselyarrestingHarper,amanwhohad attemptedtomakeaspousalsupportpaymentdirectly tothejudgeinthejudgeschambers.Thejudge attemptedtoplaceHarperunderoathtolearnhis address,whereuponHarperfled.JudgeMerckle orderedbailiffstochase.Theyshortlycapturedand returnedHarpertoJudgeMerckleschambers whereuponJudgeMerckleplacedHarperunderoath 22 andquestionedhimascomplainingwitness, prosecutor,factfinder,andjudgeinacontempt proceedingofsorts.Harperat852.Thehearingwas recorded, related to a pending child support case, in the courtroom.Id.JudgeMercklefoundHarperin contempt, and three days later released.The contempt convictionwasreversedonappeal,andHarpersued Judge Merckle.Id. at 854. InanalyzingimmunitytheFifthCircuitcitedboth McAlesterandStumpastheguidinglightsinour analysis.Id. at 859.Yet the court ignored Stump and analyzedjudicialactonlyunderMcAlestersfour-factortest,findingJudgeMercklesbehaviordidnot satisfyallfourfactors.Harperat858-59.Judge Merckle appealed to this Court, which denied certiorari. Merckle v. Harper, 454 U. S. 816 (1981). FouryearslaterAdamscitedthedenialof certiorariin Harper asindicia ofvitalityof McAlesters fourfactortest.Thedeductioniserror.Though Harper cites McAlester and Sparkman as two guiding lights,Harperreachedresultconsistentwithboth McAlesters(abrogated)four-factortestaswellas Stumps(controlling)two-factorauthority.Harpers result was thus correct, but by means of faulty analysis thatresurrectedMcAlesterstesttoequaltoStumps, makingthisCourtsdenialofcertiorarionresult proper.SeeSec.&Exch.Comm'nv.CheneryCorp., 318 U. S. 80, 88 (1943). TheFifthCircuitsresurrectionofMcAlesterhas beenperpetuatedamongmanycircuits,includingthe Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com23 First,1Second,2Fifth,3Eighth,4Ninth,5Eleventh,6and of course the court of appeals below.7 ThewidespreadperpetuationoftheFifthCircuits refusaltoalignwithStumpwarrantsexerciseofthis Courtssupervisoryandconflictjurisdictionunder Rules 10(a) and (c). 1 Concepcion v. Cintron, 905 F. Supp. 57, 61 (D. P.R. 1995). 2 Figueroa v. Blackburn, 39 F. Supp. 2d 479, 487 (2d. Cir. 1999). 3Adamsv.McIlhany,764F.2d294(5thCir.1985);Brewerv. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1982). 4 Patten v. Glaser, 771 F.2d 1178, 1179 (8th Cir. N.D. 1985). 5Ashelmanv.Pope,793F.2d1072(9thCir.1986)(applying Dykes,infra.);Olajidev.Gaffey,2013U.S.Dist.LEXIS991,*5, 2013 WL 57862 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2013). 6 Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir. 1985) (reading HarperasfocusedonMcAlesterstest,therebyperpetuating McAlestersfourfactortestatStumpsexpense);WilliamB. CashionNev.SpendthriftTrust v. Vance, 552Fed. Appx.884, 886 (11th Cir. 2014).7ThecircuitshavealsoperpetuatedtheFifthCircuits erroneouspro-immunitypolicy(seeMcAlesterat1282-83)in defianceoftheCourtscondemnationoffreewheelingpolicy analysisfromMalleyv.Briggs,475U.S.335,339-340(1986) through Rehberg v. Paulk,, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1503-07 (2012).Circuits applyingafreewheeling policy include at least the Fifth (Adams v.McIlhany,764F.2d294,297-98(5thCir.1985);Hollowayv. Walker,765F.2d517,522(5thCir.1985)(freewheelingpolicyto immunizejudgeconspiringtoplunderacorporation));Ninth (Ashelmanv.Pope,793F.2d1072,1075(9thCir.1986));Tenth (Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d435, 439 (10th Cir.1983)); and Eleventh (Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 945 (11th Cir. 1985)).24 3.Psychotherapy Is Not JudicialFunction Today or in 1871 Ifthe courtof appealswould haveapplied Stumps judicialinnaturetest,itwouldhavebeenapparent thatinalisteningsessionisneitherafunction normallyperformedbyajudgenorwithinthe expectationsoftheparties.JudgeKnutson affirmativelystatedhispurposewassolelyto facilitatepsychotherapy.App.3a.Psychotherapyis notnormallyperformedbyajudgeinMinnesotait maybelegallyperformedonlybylicensed psychologists.8Independentinvestigationisforbidden tojudges.ModelCodeofJudicialConductCannon 3(B)(7) cmt. (1990). Thereisnoevidencethepartiesexpectedthat JudgeKnutsonwasfunctioninginanywayotherthan heclaimedfacilitatingongoingpsychotherapy.Most importantly,thepartiescertainlydidnotexpect Judge Knutson to threaten the children that they would follow his commands or be punished, causing them fear, and to run away days later. i.Thedistrictcourtandthecourtofappeals divertedfromnecessaryhistoricalinvestigationto determinewhetherpsychologistsevenexistedin 1871,insteaddrawinganalogybetweenthelistening sessionandabestinterestsofthechild determination.App.4a,39a.Theywronglyconcluded thatabestinterestsdeterminationisafunction normallyperformedbyajudgeindecidingcustody 8 Minn. Stat. 148.88, Psychology Practice Act.Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com25 disputes...andtherefore,byanalogy,sowasthe listening session. Id. YetthisCourthasdisapprovedofsuchimmunity by analogy.As noted by Justices Thomas and Scalia in Hoffman,thisimmunitybyanalogytacticdoesnot satisfytherequirementtoexamine1871commonlaw. SeeHoffmanatslipop.5-6(recitingImblerv. Pachtman424U.S.409(1976)asholdingprosecutors areentitledtoimmunityforfunctionsintimately associatedwiththejudicialphaseofthecriminal process)(emphasisbyJusticeThomas).Justices ThomasandScaliacriticizedthesecourtsforignoring theimportantthresholdquestionwhethersocial workersare,underanycircumstances,entitledto absolute immunity. Likethecourtofappeals,manyothercircuits continuetoextendimmunitybyanalogytomodern functionswithoutexamininghistoricalfactual foundation,includingatleasttheFirst9,Fifth10, Eighth11Ninth12andTenth.13Unsurprisingly,the 9Buchananv.Ford, 638F.Supp.168 (N.D.N.Y.1986) (analogizingchildabuseworkertopoliceratherthan prosecutor);Doev.CountyofSuffolk, 494F.Supp.179 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (same).10 Austinv.Borel,830F.2d1356,1363(5thCir.1987) (denying absoluteimmunitybyanalogizingsocialworkertocomplaining witness, without analyzing common law); 11 Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1373 (8thCir.1996)(extendingimmunitytosocialworkerinitiating childprotectionproceedingsbyanalogytoprosecutorialfunction, without analyzing common law); 26 circuitshaveextendedimmunitybyanalogy inconsistently.Id. 14 ii.Thecourtofappealsfailedtoidentifyabest interestsfunctionsofafamilycourtexistingat1871 commonlawbecausein1871nociviljudicialtribunal possessedjurisdictionoverdivorceorchildcustody. Itiselementarythatintheearlyhistoryof jurisprudenceinEnglandthecommonlawcourts exercised no jurisdiction over divorce cases, jurisdiction insuchmattersrestingentirelywiththeecclesiastical courts of the realm. Peterson v. Peterson, 24 Haw. 239, 246(1918).Americanfamilylawhasnocommonlaw lineageitisentirelyatwentiethcenturystatutory creation.N.Blake,TheRoadToReno,AHistoryof Divorce in the United States 56 (1962). The concept of best interests of the child arose in the twentieth century.See R. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:JudicialFunctionsintheFaceof Indeterminacy,39LAWANDCONTEMP.PROB.226,234 (1975). 12Doev.Lebbos,348F.3d820(9thCir.2003),abrogatedin Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008) (Lebbos extendedabsoluteimmunitybyanalogytoprosecutor;Beltran overruled Lebbos. Neither case examined 1871 common law); 13Czikallav.Malloy, 649F.Supp.1212 (D.Colo.1986) (analogizingchildabuseworkertopoliceratherthan prosecutor);14 See generally M. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not A Big Tent: The ImproperExpansionOfAbsoluteJudicialImmunityToNon-Judges In Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L.REV. 265, 276. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com27 4.UnderBradley,FamilyCourt FunctionsareInferior,andThusNot Entitled to Absolute Immunity Familyjurisdictionisincontrovertiblyspecificandthusinferiortoacourtofgeneraljurisdiction. Minn.Stat.518.Familycourtinadissolution proceedingisacourtoflimitedjurisdiction.Kingv. StateEduc.Dep't,182F.3d162(2dCir.1999);People UnitedforChildren,Inc.v.CityofNewYork,108F. Supp. 2d275, 286(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holdingfamilycourt notacourtofcompetentjurisdictionforRooker-Feldmananalysis).Randallv.Brigham,74U.S.523 (1868)describesthelimitedscopeofimmunityfor inferiorcourts:Judgesexercisinglimitedjurisdiction wereimmuneforactswithinthelimitedjurisdiction, yetwereliableforcivildamagesforactsinexcessof theirjurisdiction,andforactsdonemaliciouslyor corruptly.Randall at 531.15This observation was not disturbedinBradly.WhileJudgeKnutsonbearsthe burdenofdemonstratingfamilycourtfunctioneven existedat1871commonlaw,innocasewillheidentify animmunityscopegreaterthanan1871inferior courtjudicialactswithinfamilyjurisdictionnot done maliciously or corruptly.Id. Thecourtofappealsextensionoftherulefora courtofgeneraljurisdictionwhichimmunizesacts donewithmaliceorcorruptionofmotive16to inferior family jurisdiction was error. 15ThisdistinctionwasrecognizedinStump,435U.S.349,356 (1978),fn.7.SeealsoRandallv.Brigham,74U.S.523,535-36 (1868). 16 App. 3a. 28 5.The Court of Appeals Conflated (1) Judicial in Nature and (2) Subject Matter Jurisdiction The court of appeals referenced the flexibility that Minnesotascustodylawstogivetothecourtto determinethebestinterestsofthechildrenconcludingthatstatutoryauthorizationsupportsa conclusionthatthelisteningsessionconstituteda functionnormallyperformedbyajudgeindeciding custodydisputes.App.4a.Thisisamisconstruction ofStumpstest:Theexistenceofsubjectmatter jurisdiction(flexiblestatutestodeterminethebest interestsofthechildren.)isnotdeterminativeof judicialinnature.Anofficialassertingimmunity mustproveboth(1)judicialactand(2)withinsubject matter jurisdiction.Stump at 362. Yetthecourtofappealsattributedthesecond subjectmatterjurisdictionelementtothefirstjudicialactfactor.Whenflexiblejurisdictionis properlyanalyzedonlyunderthesecondsubject matterjurisdictionprong,thecourtofappeals analysisunderthefirstprongisbereftofsupporting findings.Thecourtofappealsextensionofimmunity absent proof of both elements was error.Id. 6.The Circuits are Divided on Immunity of Psychologist and Social Worker Function Thecourtsofappealdisagreeonthelevelof immunityappropriateforcourt-connected psychologistsandsocialworkers,warrantingreview Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com29 underRules10(c).TheThird,17Seventh,18Eighth,19 andTenthCircuits20haveincorrectlyextendedquasi-judicialimmunitytovariousfunctionsofcourt-appointedsocialworkersandpsychologists,reasoning theseinvestigatorsarearmsofacourtsimilarto prosecutors. The Ninth Circuit has corrected its course, 17Hughesv.Long,242F.3dat126-28(extendingjudicial immunitytoprivatechildcustodyevaluatorandapointed psychologistasarmsofthecourt);D.T.B.v.Farmer,114F. Appx446,447(3dCir.2004)(applyingHughesv.Longto immunizecourt-appointedpsychologist);McArdlev.Tronetti,961 F.2d1083,1085(3dCir.1992)(immunizingappointedprison psychiatrist);Williamsv.Consovoy,333F.Supp.2d297,302 (D.N.J.2004)(findingpsychologistappointedbyparoleboard absolutelyimmune); Pierson v. Members ofDelawareCounty, No. 99-3435, 2000 WL 486608, at *4 (E.D. Pa. April 25, 2000) (appointed psychiatristconductingcompetencyevaluationabsolutelyimmune asanarmofthecourt);P.T.,A.T.&H.T.v.RichardHallCmty. Mental HealthCare Ctr.,364 N.J.Super. 460,462 (N.J.Super. Ct. App.Div.2003)(applyingabsolutejudicialimmunitytoacourt-appointed psychologist). 18Duzynskiv.Nosal,324F.2d924,929(7thCir.1963) (immunizing appointed psychologist evaluating mental health). 19Morstadv.DeptofCorr.andRehab.,147F.3d741,744(8th Cir.1998)(immunizingappointedpsychologistasessentialtothe judicialprocess.));Mosesv.Parwatikar,M.D.,813F.2d891,892 (8thCir.1987),disapprovedonothergrounds,Burnsv.Reed,500 U.S.478,496(1991) (extendingabsoluteandwitnessimmunityto court-appointed psychiatrist conductingcompetency examination); Myersv.Morris,810F.2d1437,1466-67(8thCir.1987) (immunizing[n]onjudicialpersonswhofulfillquasi-judicial functions intimately related to the judicial. . . . ). 20Turneyv.OToole,898F.2d1470,1474(10thCir.1990) (extendingquasi-judicialimmunitytopsychologist);Martinezv. Roth, No.94-2206,1995WL261127, at*3(10thCir.Apr.26, 1995) (extending quasi-judicial immunity to court-appointed psychologist assisting courtin best interestof the childinvestigation because service was integral to the judicial process). 30 aligningwithAntoineandKalina.21Thesestubbornly inconsistentdecisionswarrantreviewunderRules10 (a) and (c). C.TheCourtofAppealsFailedto Analyze(c)StayAway andProperty Commands and (d) Arrest and Shackling of Counsel in a Wheelchair at Trial Neitherthedistrictcourtnorthecourtofappeals analyzedwhether(c)movementandpropertycontrol ordersor(d)arrestandshacklingofcounselwere immune.22 Regarding(c),movementandpropertycontrol orders,asnotedabove,modernfamilycourtsexercise highlyinvasiveequitablepowerstoorderlitigantsto stayawayfromtheirfamilyandfriends,abandontheir home,surrenderproperty,andundergoexpensiveand humiliatingforensicexaminations,psychotherapy, 21See,e.g.,Millerv.Gammie,335F.3d889,898-900(9thCir. 2003)(reversingBabcockv.Tyler,884F.2d497,502-03(9th Cir.1989)asfundamentallyinconsistentwiththisCourts decisionsinAntoinev.Byers&Anderson,Inc.,508U.S.429 (1993)andKalinav.Fletcher,522U.S.118(1997));Beltranv. SantaClaraCounty,514F.3d906,908(9thCir.2008)(reversing Doev.Lebbos,348F.3d820(9thCir.2003)asinconsistentwith AntoineandKalina,andfindingsocialworkersnotimmunefor investigative conduct); and Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no firmly rooted tradition atcommon law of absolute immunity for psychiatrist function). 22 Thecourtofappealsmayhaveignoredtheargumentas outsidethescopeoftheopeningbrief,citingJaspersonv. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736 (1985). Such would be error. Grazzini-Ruckis opening brief set forth all four categories, arguing not one was immune. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com31 andsupervisedvisitation.[O]verthreethousand fourhundred(3,400)directivesofDefendantDavidL Knutson[sic]regulatethis[Plaintiffs]family,without dueprocessorruleoflaworruleofevidenceseizing Plaintifffromherhome,childrenandProperty. App.22a.Giventhatthesesweepingpowerstocontrol familyareenabledbytwentieth-centurylegislationandonlyintwentiethcenturyfamilycourtsJudge Knutsoncouldnotcarryhisburdenofprovingsuch function as judicial in 1871. Regarding(d) --- arrestandshacklingofcounsel --- severalcourtshaveheldphysicalassaultorevicting litigantsarenotjudicialacts.See,e.g.,Greggory, Harper,supra.ItisapparentthatJudgeKnutson couldnothavecarriedhisburdenofshowingimmunity fortheillegalarrestandshacklingofPetitioners counsel,andthencarryingonthetrialwiththe attorney in handcuffs. I.PI ERSONANDSTUMPSTANDINERROR FOREXCEEDINGTHEJ UDICIALPOWER VESTEDINUNITEDSTATESCOURTSUNDER ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION IndecidingPiersonv.Ray,386U.S.547(1967), thisCourtconstruedSection1983tonarrowits sweepfindinganimmunitywhichisinconsistentwith thefaceofthestatuterestrainingeveryperson. Imblerat417(Thestatutethuscreatesaspeciesof tortliabilitythat onitsfaceadmits ofnoimmunities.); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 US 158, 163 (1992).Clearer language has likely never emerged from Congress.Id. 32 A.ThisCourtLacksJ urisdictionto Construe An Unambiguous Statute ArticleIIIvestsonlyjudicialpowerinthis Court.ArticleIreserveslegislativepowerto Congress.For I agree there is noliberty, if the power ofjudgingbenotseparatedfromthelegislativeand executivepowers.A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 (1788).If congress has given the power to this court, we possess it, not otherwise....Turnerv . Bankof NorthAmerica,4U. S . 8,10n.1(a)(1799). These principles of course apply to Section 1983.[I]t is forCongress,notthisCourt,todeterminetowhat extenttoabrogatethejudiciary'scommon-law immunity. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S.522, 543 (1984). Section1983isnotasubjectforstatutory interpretation.Whenwefindtheterms... unambiguous,judicial inquiryis complete . . . . Pavelic &LeFlorev.MarvelEntertainmentGroup,493U.S. 120,123(1989);CTSCorp.v.Walderburger,573U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op.,p. 10)(Congressional intentis discernedprimarilyfromthestatutorytext.).The Courtdoesnotreviselegislation...justbecausethe textaswrittencreatesanapparentanomaly. Michiganv.BayMillsIndianCommunity,572U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., p. 10). Piersons presumptionofCongressionalintentto read an immunity into Section 1983 was a legislative act narrowinganunambiguousstatutean act in excess of this Courts jurisdiction under Article III, and invading exclusive congressional authority under Article I, of the Constitution.Onthisbasisalone,Piersonmustbe reversed. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com33 B.AnyConstructionofTheCivilRights Act Must Admit Congresss Remedial Intent CongressadoptedthelanguageofSection1983 fromitscriminalpredecessorthe1866CivilRights Act, today codified at 18 U.S.C. 242.Monroe v. Pape, 365U.S.167(1961).23Section1983wasintroducedby OhioRepresentativeShellabarger,whoexplainedhis billontheHousefloorbyreferencingSection2ofthe 1866Act:thatsectionprovidesacriminalproceeding inidenticallythesamecaseasthisoneprovidesacivil remedyfor...24Section1ofthe1871Act(now Section 1983) passed rapidly through Congress because CongressrecognizedSection1asmerelyaddinga civilremedytothe1866Act,forwhichthereisno absoluteimmunity.UnitedStatesv.Lanier,520U.S. 259,266(1997)(percuriam).TheActsthusmustbe construedasinparimateriaanyconstructionofthe 1871Actmustadmitcongressionalintentinenacting the1866Act.Pickingv.PennsylvaniaR.R.,151F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945). Onthatrecorditisincontrovertiblethatthe42nd Congressaffirmativelyrejectedcommonlawjudicial immunity. [T]hedecisionsofthecountyjudges,whoaremade little kings, with almost despotic powers to carry out thedemandsofthelegislaturewhichelectedthem-powerswhich,almostwithoutexception,havebeen 23Seealso,Note,LiabilityofJudicialOfficersUnderSection 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 327-328 (1969) (hereinafter Yale Note)24 Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (App.) (1871); Yale Note at 327. 34 exercisedagainst Republicanswithoutregard tolaw orjustice,makeupacatalogueofwrongs, outrageousviolations,andevasionsofthespiritof thenewconstitution,unscrupulousmalignityand partisanhateneverparalleledinthehistoryof parties in this country or any other. Cong.Globe,42ndCong.,1stSess.186(1871)(remarks of Representative Platt). Whatistobethecaseofajudge?...IsthatState judge to be taken from his bench? Is he to be liable in an action?... It is the language of the bill: for there is nolimitationwhatsoeveronthetermsthatare employed,andtheyareascomprehensiveascanbe used. (remarks of Senator Thurman).25 (1866)(remarksofRepresentativeLawrence).The 1866ActwasvetoedbyPresidentJohnsonbecauseit abrogated common law judicial immunity.26In the fight todefeattheveto,SenateJudiciaryCommittee ChairmanTrumbullexpressedrevulsionattheentire concept of judicial immunity: It is the very doctrine out of which the rebellion was hatched.27

25 Seealso Yale Note at 328 therewasno universalacceptance of the broad English immunity rule in 1871, and the only legislative historyavailablesupportsthepropositionthatCongressintended Section 1983 to cover judges.Yale Note at 328.26 Yale Note at 327. 27Cong.Globe,39thCong.,1stSess.1758(1866)(remarksof Senator Trumbull); Yale Note at 328. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com35 C.Piersons Adoption of Tenney v. Brandhove Was Startling Error Instead of applying the unambiguous statute, Chief JusticeWarreninPiersonadoptedanalysisof legislativeprivilegefromTenneyv.Brandhove,341U. S.367(1951),readingimmunityintothestatute becauseheperceivedTheimmunityofjudgesfor actswithinthejudicialroleisequallywellestablished [asthespeechanddebateprivilege],andwepresume thatCongresswouldhavespecificallysoprovidedhad itwishedtoabolishthedoctrine.Piersonat554-555 (1967). In Tenney Justice Frankfurter aligned the English speechlibertywiththefederalspeechordebate analogintheUnitedStatesConstitutionatArticleI, Sec.6,cl.1.28LikeChiefJusticeWarren,Justice Frankfurterpresumedcontrarytotheunambiguous statute,andanalyzingnolegislativehistorythatthe 42ndCongresswouldnothaveintendedtolimitany stateslegislativeactivityinenactingthe1871law becauseCongresswasitselfastaunchadvocateof legislativefreedom.Id.at376(emphasisadded). Tenneyalsoheldthenarrowimmunitywaslostif therewasausurpationoffunctionsexclusivelyvested in the Judiciary or the Executive.Id. 28Thatprivilegeisagainstarrestnotcivilliabilitydoesnot extendtofeloniesortreason,orbreachofthepeace.Arrest outsideofSessionispermitted,andmembersmaybe questioned for activity other than speech or debate.Tenney at 377. 36 Yet judicialimmunity isthe oppositeof legislative privilegejudgesaresovereignspossessingnot rights but delegated authority.While judges have all the rights of any citizen qua a citizen, a judge qua judge possessesnorights.FirstandFourteenth Amendments restrain only such action as may fairly be saidtobethatoftheStates.UnitedStatesv. Morrison,529U.S.598,621(2000).Thefunctionofa judge is to adjudicateapply the given law to properly-admittedfacts.Judgesarenotrepresentativesof voters,butradicallyindependentofelectoralwilland accountability.Thereisnoneedforajudgetoexpress opinions of her own or those she represents to create lawshe is given law.Other than necessary for faithful adjudication,ajudgesprivatefreedomofconscience is irrelevant to judicial function.Relevant conscience isgivenintheformoflawthathasmaturedthrough freedebateelsewhere.Countyjudgesdonotfunction asabody,and(should)havenoonetodebate.The framersoftheUnitedStatesandStateofMinnesota constitutions did notdraftajudicial speech ordebate privilegebecausejudgesarenotempoweredtospeak or debate. There is no need to protect a judges speech other thantopreserveabilitytopronounceadjudicationmerelyasubstantialstateinterest29thatmustinall casesyieldtofundamentalrights.Therebeingno judicialspeechlibertyin1871,thereisnoreasonto presumethatthe1871Congresswouldhaveseen needtoexpresslyabrogateatraditionofimmunityto constitutional injury that has never existed. 29 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U. S. 1030, 1074 (1991). Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com37 D.AmericanCommonLawDoes Not Support J udicial Immunity This Court has commanded that courts considering anofficersaffirmativedefenseofimmunitymust examinethecommonlawtradition.In Pierson Chief justiceWarrenfoundthatjudicialimmunitywasat least as well established as legislative privilege in 1871 withoutconductinganyhistoricalanalysisofcommon law,citingonlyBradleys(post-CivilRightsAct) holdingandtheKingsBenchcaseofScottv. Stansfield.30Pierson at 554. Yet Bradley wasdecided in1872ayearafterCongresspassedSection1983. Congresscouldnothavehaditinmindwhiledebating Section 1983. JusticeFieldsarticulationofimmunityinBradley wasinnovativenotdescriptive.31Bradleyrationalized adoptingtheEnglishsovereignimmunityasgood policy.Thisprovisionofthelawisnotforthe protectionorbenefitofamaliciousorcorruptjudge, butforthebenefitofthepublic,whoseinterestitis thatthejudgesshouldbeatlibertytoexercisetheir functionswithindependence,andwithoutfearof consequences.Bradleyatn.16.Thispolicy 30 3 Law Reports, Exchequer, 220 (1868), analyzed in Bradley at n. 16.Available at http://www.forgottenbooks.com/readbook_text/The_Law_Reports_1868_v3_1000098717/237.31SeeJ.Feinman,R.Cohen,SuingJudges:Historyand Theory,31S.C.L.Rev.201,243-249,254-56(1979)(hereinafter SuingJudges)(Certainly,nobroadruleofimmunityexisted priortoBradley.Formostofthehistoryofthecommonlaw, judgeshadonlyaverylimitedimmunity.);YaleNoteat323-327 ([J]udicial immunity was not a universal doctrine.). 38 exhortation was an expansion from the more restrictive rulesanalyzedinRandallv.Brigham,74U.S.523 (1868):[Was]theactdoneajudicialact,donewithin hisjurisdiction?Randallat531.Randall acknowledgeddecisionswhichdeniedanabsolute immunity wherethe acts,in excessofjurisdiction,are donemaliciouslyorcorruptly.Moreover,every authoritycitedinbothRandallandBradleyisor adoptsforeignlawtheEnglishsovereignimmunity rulesimposedbyanautocracyournationfoughtwars to become independent of. See, e.g., Randall, n. 14.32 Farfromanintenttoincorporatecommonan English monarchical sovereign immunity rule, Congress inpassingtheunambiguousCivilRightsAct specifically intended to eliminate it as the source of the monumentalevilofstate-sponsoredoppression jeopardizingournationsexistencebyprecipitating civilwarfare.Piersonwasastartlingindeed dangerousdeparturefromprinciplessettledatthe founding of our nation and cherished for centuries since. Becausethecourtofappealsextendedimmunity relyingonPiersonsprogeny,Stump,itdecidedan important question of federal law that has not been, but should be,settled bythis Courtpursuant to Rule 10(c): Whether this Court in Pierson exceeded its jurisdiction underArticleIII,andinvadedlegislativepowerunder Article I, of the United States Constitution. 32 SeeSuingJudgesat224-43(analysisofpre-Bradleyprimary sources). Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com39 CONCLUSION The Petition for certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted, Michelle Lowney MacDonald ShimotaSupreme Court Bar No. 28825 MacDonald Law Firm, LLC 1069 South Robert Street West St. Paul, MN 55118 Telephone: (651) 222-4400 Facsimile: (651) 222-1122 Michelle@MacDonaldLawFirm.com Attorney for Petitioner Sandra Grazzini-Rucki Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com