Peter Rietmann, Global Product Management SAS, 2015 · PDF filePeter Rietmann, Global Product...
Transcript of Peter Rietmann, Global Product Management SAS, 2015 · PDF filePeter Rietmann, Global Product...
Seminario ABB, 2015-02-19Desarrollo Nueva Normativa
Peter Rietmann, Global Product Management SAS, 2015-02-19
Content
February 19, 2015 | Slide 2© ABB
§ IEC 61850 Edition 2
§ IEC61850 process bus
§ Cyber security
Trends and technologies of control systemsFrom traditional to future grids
1975 1995 20102005 2015
FutureSA Systems
NCITsMerging unitsIEEE1588Cyber security
What else?
IEC 61850Edition 1
IEC 61850Edition 2
IEC 61850development
February 19, 2015 | Slide 4© ABB
IEC 61850 Edition 2Scope mapped to system architecture
February 19, 2015 | Slide 5© ABB
Communication networks and systemsfor substations
IEC 61850Edition 1
1995-2004
3 workinggroups
14 docs
1400pages
IEC 61850 Edition 2Scope mapped to system architecture
February 19, 2015 | Slide 6
Communication networks and systemsfor power utility automation
IEC 61850Edition 1
1995-2004
3 workinggroups
14 docs
1400pages
IEC 61850Edition 2
2005-??
5 workinggroups
30+ docs
2500+pages
© ABB
IEC 61850 Edition 2Solidify existing parts, extension for new applications
February 19, 2015 | Slide 7
§ Error corrections§ Compatibility of Edition 1
and Edition 2§ IED and system tools
conformance statement
Improve interoperability
§ Top down ,Bottom up,modifications
§ Multiple projects§ Substation to substation
More flexible engineering process
Substation 1 Substation 2
Control Center
§ Substation to substation§ Substation to control
center (not released yet)
Communication beyond substation
§ Bumpless link redundancyfor end devices
§ No single point of failure
Increase system availability
© ABB
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureData model extension
February 19, 2015 | Slide 8
§ New Logical Nodes (LN) à functions
§ Edition 1: Approx. 90
§ Edition 2: More than 150
§ Example of new LNs
§ FCNT: Counter
§ LCCH: Communication channel
§ LBRI: Bridge
§ Advantages
§ Reduce anonymous information to aminimum – no generic IOs (GGIO)
§ Integrate more information via IEC61850 – e.g. Ethernet switches
GroupIndicator
Logical Nodes Group
A Automatic control
C Control
D Distributed Energy Resources (DER)
F Functional Blocks
G Generic
H Hydro
I Interfacing and archiving
K Mechanical and non-electrical primary equipment
L System LN
M Metering and measurement
P Protection
Q PQ events detection related
R Protection related
S Sensor and monitoring
T Instrument transformers
X Switchgear
Y Power transformers
Z Further power system equipment
© ABB
§ Data model accordingIEC/TR 61850-90-4 whichcovers all aspects ofnetwork components
§ Unified approach tosupervise communication,protection and controldevices using standardizedlogical nodes
§ No separate tools andprotols for supervision andintegration
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSupervision of communication infrastructure
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 9
§ New SCL extensions
§ IID: Instantiated IED Description –Describes the instantiated data modelof an IED
§ SED: System Exchange Description –Describes interface data exchangebetween different projects
§ More flexible System engineering
§ Top Down (already supported in Ed1)
§ Bottom up
§ Use of IID file for modifications
§ Multiple projects
§ Substation to substation
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSystem Configuration description Language Extension
IEC 61850-6
February 19, 2015 | Slide 10© ABB
IED ModificationIID
February 19, 2015 | Slide 11© ABB
§ Defines configuration of one IED for aproject
§ Data exchange format from the IEDconfigurator to the system configurator
§ Contains only data for IED beingconfigured:
§ one IED section
§ communication section with the IED'scommunication parameters
§ IED's data type templates
§ optionally, a substation section with thebinding of functions (LNodes) to thesingle line diagram
§ SCL implementation conformancestatement (SICS)
§ IED configurator conformancestatements
§ System configuration conformancestatements
§ Stating mandatory and optionalfeatures of IED tools and systemtools
§ Improved interoperability
§ Allows judging the degree ofinteroperability between differentengineering tools, system tools aswell as IED tools.
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSCL implementation conformance statement (SICS)
February 19, 2015 | Slide 12© ABB
PICS Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement:Which Communication services are supported ...
PIXIT Protocol Implementation ConformanceExtra Information for Testing:Restrictions and Limitations found in a device ...
MICS Model Implementation Conformance Statement:Models supported ...
TICS Tissue Implementation Conformance Statement:Which tissues have beenimplemented: www.tissue.iec61850.com
SICS SCL Implementation Conformance Statement:Which aspects of SCL have been implemented in aTool
§ System configurator conformancestatements
§ .icd and .iid import and usage
§ Communication engineering
§ Data flow engineering
§ .scd substation section handling
§ .scd modification, export, import
§ .sed handling
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – System Tool RequirementsEdition 2 ready
February 19, 2015 | Slide 13© ABB
IEC 61850-6
§ System configuration tool according IEC61850-6 Ed.2 SICS (SCL ImplementationConformance Statement).
§ Unlike for the IEDs, currently there are noUCA conformance tests for tools to verifythe IEC 61850-6 Ed.2 SICS
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureCommunication – Beyond the substation
February 19, 2015 | Slide 14
§ Two Guidelines (Technical Reports)
§ Substation to substation
§ Substation to control center(not released yet)
§ Customer Benefits
§ Homogeneous communication
§ Reduce engineering & training effort
Proxy Gateway
Transparent Tunnel
© ABB
NSD570 Rel. 3.3 / GOOSE LAN Interface G3LSProxy gateway solution – mixed operation
Max. 4 commandsvia analog channels,max 8 commandsvia all others
Commands arrangedin pairs of two, e.g.2x contact I/O and
6x GOOSE
PLCPower Line
Optical Fibre
Copper Wires
Optical Fibre
Radio Link MUX
MUX
PLC
MUX
MUX
analoganalog
anal
ogan
alog
digi
tal
anal
ogdi
gita
lop
tical analog
digital
optical
analog
digital
analog
EthernetEthernet
IP based network
ProtectionCommands of
Contact I/OType
ProtectionCommands of
Contact I/OType
Stationbus according IEC 61850-8-1
ProtectionCommands in
GOOSEmessages
ProtectionCommands in
GOOSEmessages
Stationbus according IEC 61850-8-1
February 19, 2015 | Slide 15© ABB
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureLink Redundancy
§ Redundancy within the network§ RSTP, IEEE 802.1D§ (n-1) criteria§ With recovery time upon failure
§ Redundancy in the end nodes§ PRP, IEC 62439-3
Parallel Redundancy Protocol§ HSR, IEC 62439-3
High-available SeamlessRedundancy
§ (n-1) criteria§ Zero recovery time upon failure
© ABB
§ Operation principle
Link Redundancy – IEC 62439-3 PRPParallel Redundancy Protocol
sender
receiver
§ DANP (Double Attached Nodeimplementing PRP) are attached to2 independent LANs
§ Source DANP sends same frameover both LANs
§ Destination DANP receives framefrom both LANs, consumes 1stframe, discards the duplicated
February 19, 2015 | Slide 17© ABB
Redundant network with IEC 62439-3 PRPAdvantages and disadvantages§ Any topology supported§ Network is autonomous, independent of IEDs§ Standard Ethernet components§ Flexible network speed and media
ì § 0 ms failure revovery time§ No frame loss
ì
§ Failure or power-off of 2 or more IEDshas no impact to the network
ì
§ High costs for switches and network cabling î
§ Connect single port IEDs to one network§ Fully interoperable with non redundant IEDs
ì
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 18
§ Operation principle
§ DANH (Double Attached Nodeimplementing HSR) has 2 portsoperated in parallel
§ Source DANH sends a frame overeach port (“A”-frame and “B”-frame)
§ Destination DANH receives framefrom each port, consumes 1st frame,discards the duplicated
§ DANH support bridge functionalityand forward frames from one port tothe other (not frames that it injected)
Link Redundancy – IEC 62439-3 HSRHigh-availability Seamless Redundancy
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 19
Redundant network with IEC 62439-3 HSRAdvantages and disadvantages
endnode
endnode
endnode
endnode
endnode
endnode
endnode
A B A B
B A B A B A B A B A
BA
switch
RedBox
singly attached nodes
interlink
§ 0 ms failure revovery time§ No frame loss
ì
§ No direct connection of single port IEDspossible (only via RedBox)
§ Not interoperable with non redundant IEDs
î§ Only ring or ring of ring topologies§ IEDs are integral part of network§ Standard Ethernet components cannot be used§ Fix network speed (100MBit/s)
î
§ Failure or power-off of more than 2 IEDshas impact to the network
î
§ Low cost (no switches andfew network cables)
ì
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 20
IEC 61850 Edition 2Increased availability through PRP und HSR
© ABB
HSR
615 & 620 Series
HSR: High availabilitycombined with optimal
installation effort
670 und 650 Series, REB500
PRP
PRP: Highest availability andperformance
MicroSCADA Pro
RTU500
LAN A
LAN BPRP
AFS Serie
§ Interoperable seamlesslink redundancyaccording IEC 62439-3
§ Available in Relionseries, MicroSCADAPro und RTU500 series
§ New logical node LCCHto supervise linkredundancy standard inIEC 61850 Ed2 IEDs
NOTE: PRP / HSR is also available in Ed1 devicesFebruary 19, 2015 | Slide 21
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureRecord critical process using service tracking
February 19, 2015 | Slide 22© ABB
§ Critical infrastructure requires tokeep logs (records) of allimportant information changes
§ Record the “manipulation” of theprocess by tracking all services,even those with negativeresponses
§ Control block related services
§ Command related services
§ Other services
§ Use client to log these additionalinformations for audit trail
IED(IEC61850 Server)
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSupervision Logical Nodes – LTRK
February 19, 2015 | Slide 23© ABB
Description
ApcFTrk CTSAnalogueValueCtlF Control service tracking for controllableanalogue setpoint data with float command.
ApcIntTrk CTSAnalogueValueCtlInt Control service tracking for controllableanalogue setpoint data with integer command.
BacTrk CTSBsControlKind Control service tracking for binary controlledanalogue data.
BrcbTrk BTS Access service tracking for buffered reportcontrol blocks.
BscTrk CTSBsControlKind Control service tracking for binary controlledstep position data.
DpcTrk CTSBOOLEAN Control service tracking for controllable doublepoint status data.
GenTrk CST Common service tracking for all services forwhich no specific tracking data exists.
GocbTrk GTS Access service tracking for GOOSE controlblocks.
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSupervision Logical Nodes – LTRK
February 19, 2015 | Slide 24© ABB
Description
IncTrk CTSINT32 Control service tracking for controllable integerstatus data.
IscTrk CTSINT8 Control service tracking for integer controlledstep position data.
LocbTrk LTS Access service tracking for log control blocks.
SgcbTrk STS Access service tracking for setting groupcontrol blocks.
SpcTrk CTSBOOLEAN Control service tracking for controllable singlepoint status data.
UrcbTrk UTS Access service tracking for unbuffered reportcontrol blocks.
EncTrk1 CTSEnum Control service tracking for enumerated ncontrollable status data.
EncTrk2 CTSEnum Control service tracking for enumerated ncontrollable status data.
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureMechanism for testing, simulation, maintenance
February 19, 2015 | Slide 25© ABB
§ Mod and Behavior is now preciselydescribed
§ Ed1: It was up to the vendor todecide on how an IED behaves
§ Defines how IED behave in case a LNor LD is set into a certain Mod
§ Switching between modes only as anoperator command to the data objectMod
§ Improves testing capabilities in IEC61850 systems
IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureMod / Beh – 670 2.0
© ABB
§ LD0/LLN0 (Root LD) accepts the values
§ On, Blocked, Test and Test/Blocked
§ but not Off for Mod.
§ Only values ON and Off are accepted by the individual LNsfor Mod.February 19, 2015 | Slide 26
Test mode of a functionNormal command – test flag FALSE
© ABB
§ LN or LD can be put in test mode
§ data object Mod of the LN or ofLLN0
§ Command to operate initiated by
§ Control operation or
§ GOOSE
§ Behavior
§ Only executed if LN or LD Mod ON
§ LN or LD in test mode no commandexecution
Input Mod Process Output
Test=FALSE ON Yes Yes
Test No No
Test/blocked
No No
February 19, 2015 | Slide 27
Test mode of a functionTest command – test flag TRUE
© ABB
§ Not executed if function is "ON"
§ If function "TEST", command will beexecuted
§ If function "TEST-BLOCKED",command will be processed
§ all reactions (e.g. sending acommand confirmation) will beproduced
§ but no wired output to the processwill be activated
Input Mod Process Output
Test=TRUE ON No No
Test Yes Yes
Test/blocked
Yes No
February 19, 2015 | Slide 28
Simulation of messages
February 19, 2015 | Slide 29© ABB
§ Subscribe to GOOSE or SV from simulationor test equipment.
§ Flag indicate if message is original orsimulated
§ Data object in LPHD defining if IED shallreceive original or simulated message
§ Data object Sim set to TRUE
§ IED receive for all GOOSE messages itis subscribing the ones with thesimulation flag set to TRUE.
§ If for a specific GOOSE message nosimulated message exists, it willcontinue to receive the originalmessage
GOOSE
Simulation=FALSE
Simulation=TRUE
LPHD
Sim= FALSE
Sim= TRUE
Combining TEST mode and SimulationA future scenario
February 19, 2015 | Slide 30© ABB
§ Protection device receivessimulated sampled valuesfrom a test device
§ Protection IED will initiate atrip
§ Trip is sent as GOOSE withq.test=TRUE to XCBR
§ XCBR will receive GOOSE butnot trip as it is in TEST-BLOCKED mode
§ Output can be verified throughOpOk and tOpOk attributes
Pxxx
LPHD
TCTR
TVTR
Merging Unit
XCBR
Breaker
Testequipment
Mod=Test Sim=TRUE
Mod=Test/blocked
SV (Sim=FALSE) SV (Sim=TRUE)
XCBR.Pos.opOkXCBR.Pos.tOpOk
GOOSE (q.test=TRUE)
IEC 61850 Edition 2
§ Edition 2 starts with initialportfolio
§ Markets whereMicroSCADA Pro andRelion 670 isestablished
§ Tools PCM/IET/ITT 600are ready
Available ABB products
© ABB
670 series
MicroSCADA ProSYS600/SYS600C
SDM 600
LAN ALAN B
IED Configuration
SystemConfiguration
AFS 600 series
Testing Tools
Product Version
MicroSCADA Pro 9.4
SDM 600 1.1
Relion 670 2.0
PCM 600 2.6
IET 600 5.3
ITT 600 2.0
NSD570 3.5
NSD570
February 19, 2015 | Slide 31
Client
GOOSE
§ Latest IEDs like 670 seriessupport IEC 61850 Edition 1 andEdition 2
§ Most easy way to replace IEDs inan existing system or to extend anexisting system
§ Full system functionality can bemaintained
§ Well proven with minimalconfiguration and testing effort
IEC 61850 Edition 2System extension – using only Edition1 IEDs
SCD Ed1
IED
Ed 1 Ed 1
IED New IED
Ed 1GOOSE
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 33
§ Clients need to support both IEC61850 Editions
§ Edition 1 and Edition 2 IEDsneed to be configured inseparate projects / subnets
§ GOOSE cannot be appliedbetween Edition 1 and Edition 2IEDs
§ Well suited solution for verticalintegration of IEDs
IEC 61850 Edition 2System extension – mixing Edition1 and Edition2 IEDs
SCD Ed2
GOOSE
IED
Ed 1 Ed 1
IED New IED
Ed 2GOOSE
New IED
Ed 2
Client
SCD Ed1
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 34
§ Edition 1 and Edition 2 devices canwork together with limitation
§ Today standard does not provideclear rules how to handle Ed1 andEd2 in respect of SCL/engineering
§ No round trip engineering
§ No SCD file reimport in Ed1 IEDtools from Ed2
§ Consequence: No GOOSE betweenEd1 and Ed2 devices
IEC 61850 Edition 2New system – mixing Edition1 and Edition2 IEDs
SCD Ed2
GOOSE
IED
Ed 1 Ed 2
IED IED
Ed 2GOOSE
IED
Ed 2
Client
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 35
Digital Substation and IEC61850Today
IEC 61850 Station BusReplace wiring and legacyprotocols between baysby digital communication
Interface to fieldHardwired point to pointconnections betweenprimary and all secondaryequipment
IEC 61850-8-1
REB500 650 series670 series
© ABB
Digital Substation and IEC61850Tomorrow
IEC 61850-8-1
REB500 650 series670 series
SAM600NCITNCIT
SAM600SAM600
IEC 61850-8-1IEC 61850-9-2
Digital substation1) All signals digital, station and process2) Analog, status and commands3) Acquire once, distribute on a bus
NCIT Non-conventional instrument transformers© ABB
Benefits of a digital substationMotivations for EPCs and Utilities
February 19, 2015 | Slide 39© ABB
EPCsEPCsFaster project deliveryReduce material (cabling)Reduced risk on cableengineering
High degree ofstandardizationpre-engineered buildingblocks, e.g. panels, kiosks
Easier handling of latechangesas all communication isdigital IEC61850
IET600
UtilitiesUtilitiesIncreased safety bydigitizing all signals right attheir source reduces the riskof electrical hazards
Integration of NCITs byadherence to standards andby that further increase safety& availability
Outage time reductionfaster installation due tothrough pre-tested processbus systems
Cost effective maintenancemore supervision anddiagnostics, reduced spareparts
Lower requirements onCTs/VTs by reducing burdenfrom cabling and minimizingNo of circuits
Conventional vs. digital substationQualitative assessment of cost items
February 19, 2015 | Slide 40© ABB
MK MK
IEC 61850 Station Bus
Process level
Bay level
Station level
MK = Marshalling Kiosk
MU MUMU MU
§ Project Management§ Base/Concept Design
§ SA Engineering
§ Protection, control IEDs
§ Panel mfg + testing
§ Fiber mat., laying, connecting
§ Copper mat., laying, connecting
§ Commissioning
IEC 61850Process Bus
Same Less More
§ Kiosk mfg + testing
à
à
æ
æ
æ
æ
Primary
ä
Conventional Digital substation
§ Panel and cable eng. æ
ä
§ MU devices ä
§ Retrofit outage time æ
§ Total costs æ
100m+
5-30m+
§ Signal test
§ Maintenance
æ
æ
Introduction to process bus
§ The station bus connects IEDs andsubstation automation system
§ It transmits information between thestation level and the bay level aswell as between IEDs (GOOSE)
IEC 61850 on station and process level
February 19, 2015 | Slide 41© ABB
§ The process bus connects the processto the bay level
§ Binary data as GOOSE messagesbetween merging units and IEDs
§ Sampled analog values aretransferred via Ethernet accordingIEC 61850-9-2
§ Implemented according to UCAIugimplementation guideline“IEC 61850-9-2LE”
NCIT
MU
IEC 61850-9-2process bus
Process level
Bay level
MU
IEC 61850station bus
Station level
MU = merging unitNCIT = non-conventional instrument transformer
MU
Standardization and interoperability
§ The smallest part of afunction thatexchanges data iscalled logical node(LN) in IEC 61850
§ Logical nodes areallocated to logical andphysical devices
IEC 61850 logical nodes
© ABB
Primary Technology (Switchgear)
SecondaryTechnology(SubstationAutomation)
PTOCXSWI
XSWI
SIMG
XCBR
SIMG
PTRC
CSWI
CSWI
CSWISIMG
TVTR
TCTR
February 19, 2015 | Slide 42
Standardization and interoperabilityAllocation of logical nodes
Station Bus
XCBRTVTR TCTR
PTRC
PTOC PDISPDISPDIS
ProtectionIED
hardwiredXCBRTVTR
PTRC
PTOC PDISPDISPDIS
TCTR
ProtectionIED
with Process Bus
BreakerIED
MergingUnit IED
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 43
© ABB
Standardization and interoperabilityIEC 61850-9-2 standard and implementation guideline
The standard: IEC 61850-9-2
§ Standard for communication networks and systems insubstations, part 9-2: “Specific Communication ServiceMapping (SCSM) - Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3”
§ The standard is very broad, leaving wide room forinterpretation, which complicates interoperability
Implementation Guideline for digital Interface toinstrument transformers using IEC 61850-9-2
§ To facilitate implementation and enable interoperability,the UCA International Users Group created a guidelinethat defines an application profile of IEC 61850-9-2
§ Commonly referred to as IEC 61850-9-2LE for “lightedition”
© ABB
Standardization and interoperabilityStandard IEC 61850 and implementation guideline
Area StandardIEC 61850-9-2
Implementation guidelineIEC 61850-9-2LE
Sampling rate ofanalog values
Free parameter 80 samples per period forprotection and metering256 samples per period forpower quality
Content of dataset Configurable 3 phases current + neutralcurrent values and quality3 phases voltage + neutralvoltage values and quality
Timesynchronization
Not defined Optical pulse per second(1PPS)
Standardization and interoperabilityTwo distinct types of merging unit for analog values
February 19, 2015 | Slide 46© ABB
Merging unitfor conventional CTs/VTs§ With interfaces to conventional
CTs/VTs (SAMU*)§ Allow connection of any
conventional current/ voltagetransformer
§ Dynamic behavior at the 9-2output is not yet defined
SAMU
Merging unitfor a specific NCIT§ With interface to NCIT
§ The MU is developed for, andverified with, a specific NCIT
§ Dynamic behavior at the 9-2output is known
IEC 61850-9-2
*SAMU: stand-alone merging unit (will be defined in IEC 61869)
NCIT MU
IEC 61850-9-2
Standardization and interoperabilityDynamic behavior
February 19, 2015 | Slide 47© ABB
Current transformer
Principle:magnetic
Protection device
SamplingA/D conversionFiltering
Protectionalgorithm
Internaldata exchange
Transient / dynamicbehavior is notstandardized
ClassesTPX, TPY, TPZ
IEC60044/IEC61869
Standard IEC 61869-13under preparation by IECtechnical committee TC38
Current transformer
Principle:magnetic, optical,etc.
Merging unit
SamplingA/D conversionFiltering
Protectionalgorithm
Protection deviceTransmissionof values:
IEC61850-9-2
Current transformer
Principle:magnetic
Stand alone MU
SamplingA/D conversionFiltering
Protectionalgorithm
Protection deviceTransmissionof values:
IEC61850-9-2
Conventional
Independent transformer and merging unit
NCIT with related merging unit
Standardization and interoperabilityNew standard for instrument transformers
IEC 61850Communication networksand systems in substations
Part 9-2Sampled values overEthernet
IEC 61850-9-2LEImplementation Guidelinefrom UCAIug
IEC 61869Instrument transformers
Part 9 *Digital interface forinstrument transformers
Part 13 *Stand-alone merging unit
Communication in substations Instrument transformers
Standard
Application Standard* Under preparation by IEC TC38 WG37
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 48
MaintainabilityWorkforce challenges
© ABB
§ IEC 61850 at working level
§ Cross skilling of workforce
§ New design considerations
§ Change to the test equipmentand testing methods
§ Fault finding techniques
§ System design, functions andtools need to support efficientmaintenance
February 19, 2015 | Slide 49
“Wiring” test
§ Done automatically through self-supervisionfeatures of NCITs, MUs and IEDs
Protection and control testing
§ “Non-conventional” secondary injection
§ Simulation of IEC 61850-9-2 LE trafficinstead of secondary injection
§ Test modes to simulate U/I, by
§ NCIT
§ Merging unit
§ Primary injection
§ Primary injection for stability anddirectional tests
Commissioing and maintenanceImpact on protection and control testing
NCIT
MU
Protection
IEC 61850-9-2LE
9-2simulator
Control
Primaryinjection
SAMU
Secondaryinjection
February 19, 2015© ABB
| Slide 50
Testing tool for IEC 61850ITT600 SA Explorer - Overview
February 19, 2015 | Slide 51© ABB
IED ConfigurationTools
SystemConfiguration
Tool
Station bus
Process bus
StationComputer
IED IED IED IED
Process Interface Process Interface
SCLConfigure testingenvironment
.SCD
ConfigureSA System
ITT600 SA Explorer
ITT600 SA ExplorerComprehensive testing of GOOSE messaging
February 19, 2015 | Slide 52© ABB
Hardwired signal exchange§ Testing wire per wire with volt meter
IEC 61850 GOOSE signal exchange§ Comprehensive overview of goose messages
in state diagrams
ITT600 SA ExplorerSimple testing of sampled values
February 19, 2015 | Slide 53© ABB
Conventional Process bus
SAM600SAM600
IEC 61850-9-2Software replaces multimeter§ Intelligent software for the collection,
display and evaluation of sampled-valuestreams§ Oscilloscope display of U/I values§ Phasor diagram§ Quality information of all values§ Online and offline analysis
Complete system supervisionTaking advantage of modern IEC 61850 based SA
§ For efficient operation andmaintenance:Permanent system supervision ofall intelligent electronic devices.From communication gatewaysto MUs and NCIT electronics
§ Supervision diagrams for fastoverview of the substation health
§ System overview with allsubstation automation,protection and controlequipment as well asmerging units
§ Process bus overview withdetailed information aboutmerging units and NCITs
© ABB
ABB‘s portfolio for process bus applications
Station level§ SAS600 series of substation automation solutions
with IEC 61850 station busBay level§ 670 series control and protection IEDs§ REB500 Busbar protection system§ IEC 61850 system engineering: IET600
IEC 61850 testing: ITT600 SA Explorer§ UnigearDigital with 615 series IEDS, 9-2 and GOOSEProcess level – NCIT§ ABB NCITs for GIS, CP-MU merging unit for
ELK-CP14 and ELK-CP3 (current and voltage)§ Fiber Optic Current Sensor FOCS-MU (current only).
Freestanding or integrated in DCBProcess level – stand-alone merging units§ SAM600 modular process bus IO system
Overview
February 19, 2015 | Slide 55© ABB
IEC 61850 station bus
IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus
Remote control
Product portfolio670 series protection and control IEDs
February 19, 2015 | Slide 56© ABB
§ 670 series high-end protection and controlIEDs with IEC 61850-9-2LE:
§ Bay control IED REC670
§ Line distance protection REL670
§ Line differential RED670
§ Transformer protection RET670
§ Generator protection REG670
§ All IEDs can have a 1PPS input forsynchronized sampling
§ All devices support mixed mode withconventional CT and VT interfaceseg, transformer low-voltage side fortransformer differential protection
§ Line differential protection runs withconventional and 9-2 remote-end substations
IEC 61850-9-2LE
Product portfolioREB500 busbar and breaker failure protection
February 19, 2015 | Slide 57© ABB
§ REB500 decentralized busbar protectionsystem is fully compliant withIEC 61850-9-2LE
§ Busbar protection
§ Breaker failure protection
§ End-fault protection
§ Seamless combination of bay units withIEC 61850-9-2LE and conventional bay unitsin one system
§ This allows flexible extension ofconventional substations
IEC 61850-9-2LE
ABB’s process bus product portfolioNCIT for metal-clad switchgear
§ Fully redundant, combined currentand voltage sensor(Rogowski coils, capacitivedividers)
§ Redundant secondary converter(sensor electronics) can bereplaced during operation, nocalibration necessary
§ Configurable current ratingsenable future adaptation of CTratios without the need to replaceCT cores or to open gascompartments
§ Covers metering, protection andcontrol accuracy in a single device
2/19/2015© ABB Group
| Slide 58
Nominal values:100 … 4000A175 … 550 kV/Ö3
© ABB
ABB’s process bus product portfolioMerging unit to integrate NCIT
The world’s first UCA-certifiedmerging unit
§ IEC 61850-9-2LE-compliant
§ Merges the U and I valuesfrom the individual phasesinto aIEC 61850-9-2LE stream
§ Multiple Ethernet ports andconnections to NCITs offerhigh flexibility to systemdesign
§ Reducing the need forEthernet switches inprotection circuits
The UCA International Users Group is a not-for-profit corporation focused on assisting users and vendors inthe deployment of standards for real-time applications for several industries with related requirements.
2/19/2015© ABB Group
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Product portfolioFully redundant and independent system design
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System 1 System 2
PPL PPL
IEC 61850-9-2LE IEC 61850-9-2LE
System 1 System 2
Protection Metering Protection and controlMetering
Product portfolioFOCS-FS, Free-standing optical CT
§ Free-standing optical CT
§ 245 to to 800kV
§ IEC 61850 9-2LE
§ Redundancy as option
§ Meets modern performance requirements(0.2S; 5TPE) in terms of accuracy
§ Being filled with N2 at <0.5 rel bar, it isintrinsically safe and environmentally friendly
§ It does not require modification in substationlayout, where conventional CTs are installed
© ABB
Product portfolio
ABB’s functionally modular AISplatform is fully flexible to customerneeds
§ DCB
§ Integration of disconnecting functioninto circuit breaker (=disconnectingcircuit breaker, DCB)
§ FOCS
§ Integration of redundant opticalcurrent sensors to LTB with IEC61850-9-2LE process bus interface
DCB with integrated FOCS
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SAM600 process bus IO system
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SAM600 process bus IO system enables digital substationsby integrating conventional switchgear equipment into IEC61850 process bus.
SAM600 – ABB’s process bus IO system
Modular IO system for interfacing§ One hardware module per primary object philosophy§ Conventional current or voltage transformers§ Time synchronization§ Modules can be chained in order to adapt to different application
types
Optimized form factor§ Indoor - bay cubicles for retrofit applications§ Outdoor - marshalling kiosks, VT terminal boxes for new or retrofit
installations§ DIN-rail mountable for fast installation and replacement
Termination of primary cabling on SAM600 module§ One hardware module per primary object terminating all signals,
including supervision (e.g., fuse failure)§ Process interface terminals are part of SAM600 and can be
customized§ Usage of standard cabling
Digitizing primary signals made easy
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SAM600-CT
SAM600-VT
SAM600-TS
SAM600 – the digital substation enablerFlexible placement, scalable communication
© ABB
IEC 61850-9-2LE
SAM600 modulesper primary object Protection and control IEDs
Control
Feeder protection
Busbar protection
IEC 61850-9-2LEprocess bus
SAM600 modules are allocated per primary object.(In version 1 for CT and VT)
With increasing SAM600 system size the amount ofcommunication port increases, allowing lean systemswith minimum Ethernet switches.
1PPS
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SAM600 – the digital substation enablerEfficient upgrade for conventional substations
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IEC 61850-9-2LE
SAM600 modules inoutdoor cubicle
Relion Series IEDs andREB500 with process
and station bus
Application example with SAM600 modulesmounted in outdoor marshalling kiosk.
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Service experiencePilot installation Laufenburg
§ Pilot installation at a 380kV feeder inLaufenburg, Switzerland
§ ELK-CP3 non conventionalinstrument transformer (NCIT)installed in addition to conventionalCT/ VT
§ IEC61850-9-2 protectionequipment REL670 and REB500
§ Pilot installation withoutconnections to trip circuits
§ Direct comparison to conventionalinstallation
§ Analysis of performance of pilotequipment
Ø Commissioned 2009-12-04
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Service experiencePilot installation Laufenburg
§ Conventional current transformer
§ ELK-CP3 NCIT
§ Earthing switch
§ Disconnector and conventionalvoltage transformer
§ Circuit breaker
Service experienceFOCS in 420kV disconnecting circuit breaker
§ Fibre optic current sensor(redundant)
§ Merging units(redundant)
§ Protection panel with670 series IEDs
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Service experience
§ Between 1998 and 2001, ABBand Powerlink Queensland,AU commissioned substationsequipped with NCITs andIEDs with proprietary processbus
§ The systems, with over 300NCITs, have been incontinuous operation for morethan 14 years
§ Refurbish the substations toIEC 61850 compliant systemswith process bus
Complete process bus and NCIT systems
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Service experience
§ Secondary system upgrade atLoganlea 275kV SS
§ Upgrade to IEC 61850-9-2LEcompliant system by keepingprimary equipment
§ Main functions:
§ Control
§ Line distance protection
§ Line differential protection
§ Transformer differentialprotection
§ Breaker failure protection
Ø Commissioned December 2011
Complete process bus and NCIT systems
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Service experienceComplete process bus and NCIT systems
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A10-T2
A10-T1 A30-T2
A30-T1
A20-T2
A20-T1
A40-T1
A40-T2
PDIFMain X
Control
BFP
PDIFMain X
Control
BFP
PDISMain X
Control
BFP
PDIFMain X
Control
BFP
The picture showssimplified one of twofully redundantprotection systems
© ABB
Cyber Security for Substation AutomationWhy is Cyber Security an issue?
Cyber security has become an issue by introducing Ethernet(TCP/IP) based communication protocols to industrialautomation and control systems. e.g. IEC60870-5-104, DNP3.0 via TCP/IP or IEC61850
Connections to and from external networks (e.g. officeintranet) to industrial automation and control systems haveopened systems and can be misused for cyber attacks.
Cyber attacks on industrial automation and control systemsare real and increasing, leading to large financial losses
Utilities need to avoid liability due to non-compliance withregulatory directives or industry best practices;
Cyber security for substation automationWhat are the threats?
Hacking Malicious software Mistakes
Personal computer Control System
Threats
Targets
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Cyber Security Standards / Guidelines / RegulationsOverview
IEC 62443
Substation
Network control Center
Substation
NERC CIP IEEE 1686
IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 60870-5-104 ….
IEC62351
Cyber Security Standards / Guidelines / RegulationsStandards and their scope
EnergyIndustrial AutomationIT
Design Details
Completeness
IEC62443
NIST 800-53
IEC 62351
NER
CC
IP
Operator Manufacturer
ISO 27K
Technicalaspects
Relevance
for Utilities
(operations)
Relevance
for Manufacturers
IEEE P 1686
Source: IEC 62351 Part 10: Security architecture guidelinesFebruary 19, 2015© ABB
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Cyber Security Standards / Guidelines / RegulationsKey Cyber-Security initiatives
Standard Main Focus StatusNERC CIP NERC CIP Cyber Security regulation for North
American power utilitiesReleased
IEC 62351 Data and Communications Security Partly released,On-going *
IEEE 1686 IEEE Standard for Substation Intelligent ElectronicDevices (IEDs) Cyber Security Capabilities
Finalized
IEC 62443(ISO 99)
Industrial Automation and Control System Security Partly released,On-going *
Joint WorkingGroup B5-D2.46
Application and Management of Cyber SecurityMeasures for Protection and Control Systems
Draft
BDEW WhitePaper
White Paper Requirements for Secure Control andTelecommunication Systems
Released
* On-going: major changes will affect the final solution
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Rea
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Ver
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Developer securitytraining
Securitytesting
Secure codeSecuredesign
Plantsecurity
assessment
Plantsecurity
architecture
Secureconfiguration
Securitypolicy
Securitytesting
Security architecturemaintenance
Incident handling
Monitoring & audits
Threat modeling
Platform patchmanagement
CustomerSecuritytraining
Development Installation / migration Operations
Cyber Security for Substation AutomationCyber Security in the system lifecycle
© ABB
Cyber Security for Substation AutomationCyber security and robustness threats
Physical Security Perimeter
Electronic Security Perimeter
Network disturbance,malware, Cyber attacks
��
� Electronicperimeter protection
UnauthorizedPerson
�
Security measures
� Physical perimeterprotection
InfectedMobile
datastorage
InfectedNotebook
Data storm by aFaulty Device
UnauthorizedPerson
�
��
� Defense in depth
© ABB
SAS 600 seriesElectronic perimeter protection and defense in depth
Monitorsecurity and health activitiesin real-time
Reporting,Auditing
Managecritical activities, such asconfigurations, changes
and patches
PatchManagement
Accounts,Authenti-
cation
Protectagainst threats to substationautomation systems
PerimeterProtection
Manage
Monitor
Protect
§ Customer Needs§ Robust and reliable products and
solutions
§ ABB’s Solution§ Centralized security testing center
guarantees a common and bestpractice robustness testing of allproducts
§ Regular regression tests on ABBproducts and systems ensure a highlevel of robustness against cybersecurity attacks
§ Security deployment guidelines forproducts
Cyber security for SA – RobustnessHardened devices out of the box
© ABBFebruary 19, 2015 | Slide 84
§ The most named advanced securitymarket requirements
§ Central user account management
§ Central user activity logging
§ Open solution based on internationalstandards (IEC 62351)
§ ABBs answer: System Data ManagerSDM600
§ Complement existing ABB SAproducts
§ Add to existing solutions or part ofnew SA system
Cyber security for substation automationManage cyber security from a central point
Gateway
Serial Protocols
IEC 61850 and otherEthernet based protocols
IEC 60870-5-101/104 or DNP3
SDM600
SDM600
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SDM600 system data managerProduct Overview
Data Management
DisturbanceRecorder DataManagement
DisturbanceRecorder Data
Evaluation
Cyber SecurityManagement
Central UserAcount
Management
Central UserActivity Logging
Service andMaintenance
IED SoftwareVersions
IED ConfigurationRevisions
Collect , store and provideevaluation support for DR filesincluding short reports
Provide centralized UserAccount Management andActivity logging for cybersecurity related events
Documentation of Firmwareand configuration revisions ofthe supervised IEC 61850IEDs
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Cyber Security in SA – MonitorReal-time monitoring security and health activities
Legend:
Local event logging
Central eventcollection
Service Data
Disturbance RecorderData
SDM600
SDM600
Proof securitycompliance andcreate efficientlyincident reports
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Cyber Security in SA – ManageEfficient data and security management
Central User Accounts
Authentication to SDM600
Legend:
SDM600
SDM600
Add / remove auser withinseconds on
entire system
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SDM600 system data managerBring data to valuable information
When did it happen
Correlations
DR Eventrepresentation
User activity andconfigurationchanges
Where did it happen
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© ABB
SAS 600 SeriesStandard Security Architecture
Disabled ports / services
Removable media access
Individual User Accounts
Malware protection
Firewall
Legend:
© ABB
SAS 600 SeriesEnhanced Security Architecture
Disabled ports / services
Removable media access
Individual User Accounts
Malware protection
Firewall
Router
Encryptet communication
Legend:
© ABB
SAS 600 SeriesAdvanced Security Architecture
Disabled ports / services
Removable media access
Individual User Accounts
Malware protection
Firewall
Router
Encryptet communication
Local security event loggingCentral security event logging
Legend:
SDM600
SDM600
SDM600
Summary
§ Non-conventionalinstrument transformers,among other advantages,increase availability andsafety of substations
§ IEC 61850 process busreduces field cablingsimplifies engineering andenables slim and smartsubstation retrofit
February 19, 2015© ABB
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Summary
§ ABBs NCITs, merging unitsand IEDs with IEC 61850process bus are incommercial operation sinceseveral years
§ Designing products andsystems fully compliant toIEC 61850 (and futureIEC 61869) is the key tofuture proof andinteroperable systems
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§ Ready to start with Edition 2 systems
§ Ensure future sustainability
§ Full support by tools initialrequirements
§ Handling of mixed Ed1 and Ed2needs special considerations
§ Cyber Security is integral part ofsubstation automation
§ Standards still ongoing
§ New needs for central management
Summary
SDM600
670 series
MicroSCADA Pro SYS600/SYS600C
LAN ALAN B
IED Configuration
SystemConfiguratio
n
Testing Tools
© ABBFebruary 19, 2015 | Slide 96