PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITYPERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITY

ASSESSING the Sit & ASSESSING the Sit & EXPLORING THE OPTIONS

Kiran NAIRKiran NAIR

Centre for Airpower StudiesCentre for Airpower Studies

New DelhiNew Delhi

SCOPE SCOPE

Confine to the present & foreseeable Confine to the present & foreseeable future.future.

Inclusive of;Inclusive of;→ → Prevailing Military Dynamics.Prevailing Military Dynamics.→ → Prevailing Legislative Dynamics.Prevailing Legislative Dynamics.→ → Prevailing Civil & Commercial Dynamics.Prevailing Civil & Commercial Dynamics.→ → Prevailing Environmental Dynamics.Prevailing Environmental Dynamics. Wider Perspective - Common rather Wider Perspective - Common rather

than collective space security.than collective space security.

Common ↔ CollectiveCommon ↔ Collective• Original Wilsonian concept of “Collective Original Wilsonian concept of “Collective

Security” concept not likely to apply in space.Security” concept not likely to apply in space.• Normal Interpretation: Connotates coalition of Normal Interpretation: Connotates coalition of

states or groups for securing interests.states or groups for securing interests.→ → OS accptd as “common heritage”, comn area OS accptd as “common heritage”, comn area

beyond state jursdcn & less suited to indvdual beyond state jursdcn & less suited to indvdual or collective interests & more to common.or collective interests & more to common.

→→Common utility & dependency on space rising. Common utility & dependency on space rising. States, individuals, industry etc incrsngly States, individuals, industry etc incrsngly depend on space. Widen concept to incld variety depend on space. Widen concept to incld variety of common intrst & concerns of present times. of common intrst & concerns of present times.

→ → Conditions mature for co-op transition to seek Conditions mature for co-op transition to seek solutions to common problems; secure common solutions to common problems; secure common rather than competing intrsts. Eg Space debris.rather than competing intrsts. Eg Space debris.

Nonetheless, core (& tougher) issue is Space Security. Semantic noise secondary (& easier) issue. Finally, goal “… which approaches offer the most productive path towards achieving a space environment free of threats to all peaceful uses of space …”

Space SecuritySpace Security

Defined as “Defined as “secure and sustainable access to secure and sustainable access to and use of space; and freedom from space and use of space; and freedom from space based threatsbased threats”. – Space Security 2003”. – Space Security 2003

Confine myself largely to Confine myself largely to secure & sustainable use of space & measures possible for freedom from space based threats.

Explore the determinants of insecurity in space.

Prevailing Military DynamicsPrevailing Military Dynamics Unlike CW era, greater no. of nations draw Unlike CW era, greater no. of nations draw

military capabilities from satellites.military capabilities from satellites. Visions of ‘Force Application’ wpns in space.Visions of ‘Force Application’ wpns in space. Concerns over ‘Counter Space Ops’ leading Concerns over ‘Counter Space Ops’ leading

to weaponisation of space.to weaponisation of space. Concerns over emerging technologies of Concerns over emerging technologies of

BMD, consequent ‘shooting galleries’ in BMD, consequent ‘shooting galleries’ in space etc.space etc.

BLUF: Not much headway in reducing BLUF: Not much headway in reducing concerns on account of the above.concerns on account of the above.

Mil dynamics related to national dynamics Mil dynamics related to national dynamics and individual perceptions of self defence and individual perceptions of self defence etc. Little common ground.etc. Little common ground.

Prevailing Legislative DynamicsPrevailing Legislative Dynamics

Semantic noise on terms like peaceful uses, weapons, delimitation of outer space etc.

Legal lacunae in OST & other legsltion being targeted for fulfilling indvdl self-interests.

Negotiations on legal instrument for banning weapons in space at CD deadlocked since 1998.

In brief, prevailing legislation widely perceived to be inadequate & in need of change. For eg, OST bans only nuclear & WMD, hence KEASAT tests etc, etc.

Fairly well known.

Other Significant DynamicsOther Significant Dynamics

More (& diverse) stake holders in space today. Greater inter-relation & complexity. Eg no clear demarcation of mil, civil or cmrcl use sats.

Increasing debris in space.Traffic congestion in space.Conflicts over distribution of space resources.Legislation based on Cold War era & focus

largely on regulating military affairs of states.As opposed to the above;

An Unconventional ViewAn Unconventional View FA Wpns : No wpns after 05 decades; too ambitious in next FA Wpns : No wpns after 05 decades; too ambitious in next

05 years.05 years. CS Wpns: No sys with known oprnl utility. At least nothing CS Wpns: No sys with known oprnl utility. At least nothing

akin to aircraft within 1akin to aircraft within 1stst two decades of air flight. two decades of air flight. No sats destroyed in warfare till date, though capabilities did No sats destroyed in warfare till date, though capabilities did

exist.exist. ASAT tests; great source of concern, but on a comparative ASAT tests; great source of concern, but on a comparative

scale – scale – → → No of ASAT tests during Cold War average less than 2/yr as No of ASAT tests during Cold War average less than 2/yr as

opposed to 01nuclear test/week in same time frame.opposed to 01nuclear test/week in same time frame.→ → Last ASAT test in 1985. Jan 11, 2007: ???Last ASAT test in 1985. Jan 11, 2007: ??? No known cases of mil interference in sat ops as opposed to No known cases of mil interference in sat ops as opposed to

over 1,374 reported incidents (till 2005) in civil & commercial over 1,374 reported incidents (till 2005) in civil & commercial arena.arena.

Mil msns most useful & suited to space Mil msns most useful & suited to space already there: Sats for info/FE; no shared already there: Sats for info/FE; no shared global desire for their elimination.global desire for their elimination.

Mil dynamics, areas of intense national Mil dynamics, areas of intense national interst, less common vulnerabilities, less scopinterst, less common vulnerabilities, less scop

Concerns OK, focus since last 05 decades Concerns OK, focus since last 05 decades yielding no great results. CD deadlock since yielding no great results. CD deadlock since almost decade, do we continue?almost decade, do we continue?

Continue, & meanwhile: Focus alsoContinue, & meanwhile: Focus also

→→ On areas of reduced national allegiance.On areas of reduced national allegiance.

→ → Areas of common insecurity.Areas of common insecurity.

Areas which include not only state but also non-Areas which include not only state but also non-state entities like commercial firms, industry, state entities like commercial firms, industry, insurance coys, individuals etc.insurance coys, individuals etc.

Areas more amenable to equitable security by Areas more amenable to equitable security by mutual agreement & negotiation.mutual agreement & negotiation.

Areas where insecurities need to be addressed Areas where insecurities need to be addressed emergently & have greater scope of redress.emergently & have greater scope of redress.

Areas where demonstrated progress would trigger Areas where demonstrated progress would trigger scope for opening deadlock in other areas.scope for opening deadlock in other areas.

Areas less visible and well known but with potent Areas less visible and well known but with potent for equally disastrous consequences.for equally disastrous consequences.

IN PRESENT ERA, INCREASED FOCUS ON THESE AREAS DOESN’T

NECESSARILY IMPLY REDUCED FOCUS ON

CONVENTIONAL ASPECTS B’COS MORE

STAKEHOLDERS, MORE POSSIBILITY OF DSTBN OF

LABOUR UNLIKE IN CW ERA.

Areas Areas To begin with, in near term, focus also on workable To begin with, in near term, focus also on workable

near-term space security options for near-term space security options for → → Debris Debris mitigation.mitigation.→ → Equitable space resource allocation.Equitable space resource allocation.→ → Traffic managementTraffic management..→ → Common security measures (share R&D, Common security measures (share R&D,

Technology) against natural threats like asteroids, Technology) against natural threats like asteroids, solar activity etc.solar activity etc.

→ → Regulate non-state activities.Regulate non-state activities.→ → Reinforce (not review) the OST & other legislation Reinforce (not review) the OST & other legislation

for greater common security in space.for greater common security in space. Some measures underway in some areas but Some measures underway in some areas but

grossly insufficient.grossly insufficient.

What’s in it for Asia?What’s in it for Asia? The same as for all & much more.The same as for all & much more.→ → Asian continent most disaster prone.Asian continent most disaster prone.→ → Great scope for human development;Great scope for human development; 60% of human popln,10/20 most populous 60% of human popln,10/20 most populous

countries, 02 world’s largest populaces.countries, 02 world’s largest populaces.→ → Rising economies; lo cost ↔ hi commercial gain.Rising economies; lo cost ↔ hi commercial gain. energy dependent; He reserves of Moon.energy dependent; He reserves of Moon.→ → Earth resource detection & distribution.Earth resource detection & distribution. Imperative to explore solutions for “ Imperative to explore solutions for “ Secure &

sustainable use of space & measures possible for freedom from space based threats.”

“ “ In the end, the roots of man’s security does In the end, the roots of man’s security does not lie in his weaponry. It lies in his mind”.not lie in his weaponry. It lies in his mind”.

Robert McNamaraRobert McNamara

US Secy of DefenceUS Secy of Defence

1967. 1967.

Some examples of close encounters/collisions in orbit

Satellite nameSatellite name Date of collision/close Date of collision/close encounterencounter

DamageDamage Safety measureSafety measure

US Fltsatcom-1US Fltsatcom-1 3 May 19803 May 1980 Predicted distance from DSP-F4 Predicted distance from DSP-F4 9.4km and reduced to 3.5km a few 9.4km and reduced to 3.5km a few day laterday later

Fltsatcom-1 performed evasive Fltsatcom-1 performed evasive manouvremanouvre

US Fltsatcom-1US Fltsatcom-1 During 2During 2ndnd half of 1981 half of 1981 Eight close encounters with US Eight close encounters with US SBS-1 satellite, five between 2.6km SBS-1 satellite, five between 2.6km and 6km; and five encounters with and 6km; and five encounters with four other satellitesfour other satellites

Collision avoidance manoeuvres Collision avoidance manoeuvres performedperformed

Cerise, a French military micro-Cerise, a French military micro-satellitesatellite

July 1996July 1996 Stabilisation boom damaged by Stabilisation boom damaged by debris from Ariane boosterdebris from Ariane booster

Regained attitude control by Regained attitude control by reprogramming the payloadreprogramming the payload

CRISTA-SPAS-a communications CRISTA-SPAS-a communications satellitesatellite

12 August 199712 August 1997 Passed very close (3.1km) to an old Passed very close (3.1km) to an old rocket motor from 1984 Shuttlerocket motor from 1984 Shuttle

Failed to reach the GSOFailed to reach the GSO

Russian Mir stationRussian Mir station 15 September 199715 September 1997 US satellite MSTI-2 passed close US satellite MSTI-2 passed close (~500m)(~500m)

Mir not manoeuvredMir not manoeuvred

Russian Mir stationRussian Mir station 28 July 199928 July 1999 Close encounter with a rocket bodyClose encounter with a rocket body Mir not manoeuvredMir not manoeuvred

Several Shuttle missions: STS-44, Several Shuttle missions: STS-44,

-48, -53, -72, -82-48, -53, -72, -82

In each at least five manoeuvres In each at least five manoeuvres were carried outwere carried out

International Space Station (ISS)International Space Station (ISS) 26 October 199926 October 1999 Altitude raised to avoid close Altitude raised to avoid close encounter with a satellite rocketencounter with a satellite rocket

ISSISS 28 March 200228 March 2002 Passed within 14km of a Delta 2 Passed within 14km of a Delta 2 rocketrocket

ISS manoeuvred to avoid collisionISS manoeuvred to avoid collision

Orbital Debris Created by the Breakup of a 10-ton Satellite

1mm to

1cm

1cm to

10cm

> 10

cm

Total debris in LEO as on Dec06

140 million

180,000 9,700

Debris From B-up of 10 Ton Sat

14 million

250,000 5,000

Debris Proportion Of Break-ups in Orbit

May be associated with national security activity