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I. PRELIMINARY TITLE, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (RA 386) Effect and Application of Laws (Arts. 2-18, Civil Code) o Taada v Tuvera (1986) o Facts: original petition was for writ of mandamus; new petition was Motion for

Reconsideration/Clarification o Is publication a necessary requirement for a law to be effective? YES.

Due process, right to information. The phrase unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity

and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot be omitted. This clause does not mean the legislature may make the law effective

immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

o Where and when should publication be done? Published in full in the Official Gazette, immediately thereafter approval of

law. Why? The former is what is required by law (Art 2), although justices recognize that newspapers of general circulation may better serve the purpose of publication.

o What kinds of laws must be published? The term laws should refer to all laws and not only those of general

application. To be valid, the law must affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable to only one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application, city charters and private laws, and presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers must be published. Same with administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to enforce or implement an existing law. Internal regulations, such as those regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency, need not be published.

o EO 200: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their

publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. (Approved June 18, 1987. Took effect immediately after publication in Official Gazette.)

o State Prosecutors v Muro (1994) o Facts: On Aug. 13, 1992, Muro dismissed 11 criminal cases of violation of CB

Foreign Exchange Restrictions against Imelda Marcos, based on newspaper reports on announcement by the President of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions (decided by the Monetary Board). Muro contended that there was no need to wait for the actual publication of the law repealing the existing lawthe Presidents announcement was enough; the new law deprived the court of jurisdiction over Imeldas cases.

o Should the judge have taken judicial notice of the newspaper announcement? No. Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective.

Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites: the matter must be one of common & general knowledge it must be well & authoritatively settled, not doubtful & uncertain it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court

o Dadole v Commission on Audit (2002) o Facts: RTC & MTC judges of Mandaue City were receiving 1,260, then 1,500 a

month. DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55, which declared allowances in excess of 1,000 as conditional and also provided for its own immediate effectivity. This circular prompted Mandaue City Auditor to issue notices of disallowance & reimbursement. Judges protested, COA denied.

o Is LBC 55 issued by the DBM valid and enforceable, considering that it was not duly published in accordance with law? No. LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, in violation of ruling

in Taada v Tuvera: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

o Republic v Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (2008) o Facts: DOE/ERB wanted Shell to pay not just underpayments and risk fees, but

surcharges, as per MOF Circular 1-85, as amended by DOF Circular 2-94. MOF Circular 1-85 has been neither published nor filed at the Office of the National Administrative Register.

o Is MOF Circular 1-85 rendered invalid by the subsequent enactment of a law requiring registration at the ONAR? As per Taada v Tuvera, MOF Circular 1-85 should have been published

since it is intended to enforce PD 1956. It should also comply with the requirement stated in Sec 3, Chapter 2, Book 7

of the Administrative Code of 1987: filing with the ONAR in the UP Law Center. Existing rules must be filed w/in 3 months of Admin Code, lest they lose their effectivity.

Failure to comply with the requirements of publication & filing of administrative issuances renders MOF Circ 1-85 ineffective.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS ATTY. EVALYN URSUA 1st SEM SY 2009-2010

Art 2: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

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o Kasilag v Rodriguez (1939) o Facts: Emiliana Ambrosio & Marcial Kasilag entered into a mortgage

agreement, and then a verbal contract which gave Kasilag possession of the land as well as the benefit of receiving the fruits of the land.

o Is the contract legal? No. Possession of the land and enjoying its fruits is a contract of

antichresis, which is a lien and is prohibited by Sec 116, Act 2874. o Given that the contract was illegal, could Kasilag be held accountable for its

illegality? Did he act in bad faith? No. Court said that even if Kasilags contract was antichresis, it was made in

good faith. He was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. He was excusably ignorant as he was neither highly educated nor a lawyer, and could not be expected to know and properly interpret provisions of law.

o Alfonso-Cortes v Maglalang (1993) o Facts: Judge Maglalang was charged with misconduct for failing to decide Civil

Case No. 3810, regarding foreclosure and sale of a Bataan fishpond, within the 90-day period prescribed by lawhe decided the case more than a year after the case was submitted. Maglalang contends that the case was not submitted as dated (April 10, 1986), that he had double his normal workload since April 14, 1987 because he was handling two courts (Branches 1 and 2 of RTC Balanga, Bataan), and that the civil case involved difficult questions of law on his part.

o Is the judge excused from noncompliance with the law requiring that civil cases in RTCs be decided within 90 days? No. It was held in Marcelino v Cruz, Jr. that failure to observe the rules

constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In Diputado-Baguio v Torres, it was held that certain factors could mitigate a

respondent judges liability: congestion of docket, lack of personnel, detail in other courts, and illness.

o People v Lacson (2003) o Facts: In 1999, 11 members of Kuratong Baleleng were killed by the

Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, led by Panfilo Lacson. In this case, he prayed

o (1) that certain justices be inhibited from participating in deliberations (omnibus motion): DENIED

o (2) for a motion to set the case for oral arguments: DENIED

o (3) for reconsideration of an earlier resolution regarding the prospective and retroactive application of the time-bar under Sec 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: DENIED Lacson contends that Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively and

retroactively without reservation because it is favorable to the accused. He insists Sec 8 was crafter to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his casea check on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. Rule should have retroactive application because it is a procedural rule. March 29, 1999: dismissal of cases by RTC Dec. 1, 2000: RRCP took effect Thus, cases were revived in the RTC beyond two-year bar, in violation of

his right to a speedy trial, in derailment of his Senate bid. Petitioners contend that prospective application of Sec 8 is in keeping with

Sec5(5), Art 8 of the 1987 Constitution: rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. Sec 8 secures rights of the accused but should not preclude the right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right and work injustice, the rule may not be given a retroactive application.

Lacson replies that State had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar but failed to do so. The operational act was the refilling of the Informations with the RTC on June 6, 2001, beyond the two-year bar.

o Does the time-bar apply? NO. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to Sec5(5), Art 8 of Consti. The

Court is not mandated to apply Sec 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The new rule was approved not just to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused: time-bar was fixed by the Court for the benefit of both the State and the accused. The State also has a right to due process.

Time-bar: can only revive criminal cases one to two years after they are provisionally dismissed. Supposed to be a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties.

The Court may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective. The retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the Constitutional provision on which it is based. Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute.

The Court intended Sec 8 to be applied prospectively and not retroactively. Cases are governed by existing rules, not by rules yet to exist. Petitioners had until Dec. 1, 2002 to revive the cases. Cases were revived June 6, 2001well within the time-bar.

Statutes regulating procedure will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. It is in this sense that procedural laws are retroactive.

Art 3: Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Art 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

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o Did Lacson fail to comply with requisites of Sec 8, Rule 117 of RRCP? Lacson contends that CA case (double jeopardy for being charged with

murder in some cases despite dismissal of other cases) and SC case (if prosecution of criminal cases was barred by Sec 8, Rule 117) are on different issues and thus, any admissions he made in CA are not judicial admissions in SC.

The Court held that the issues in the CA case and in the SC are the same. Lacson invoked the same Sec 8, Rule 117 and the Constitution in both cases.

Sec 4, Rule 129 of Revised Rules of Court: an admission made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case does not require proof.

The Court held that when Lacson admitted that he did not move for dismissal of some of his criminal cases in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential requisites of Sec 8 Rule 117 was absent.

No need to remand the case to RTC. Judge Agnir could not have complied with the mandate under Sec 8 because said rule had yet to exist.

o Sandoval-Gutierrez: Dissent: When a new law will be advantageous to the accused, the same shall be given retroactive effect. Also, Sec 8 Rule 117 was meant to protect the accused against protracted prosecution. Statement of Atty Fortun during CA proceedingsthat the dismissal of Lacsons case was without his express consentcannot be taken as a judicial admission.

o Ynares-Santiago: Dissent: State doesnt have rights, only powers. Rule should be retroactiveprotect the individual.

o Harrison Motors Corporation v Navarro (2000) o Facts: In June 1987, Renato Claros sold 2 Isuzu Elf trucks to Rachel Navarro of

RN Freight Lines, saying all taxes & customs duties had been paid for. In September 1987, the BIR and the LTO entered into a MOA providing that prior to LTO registration of any re-/assembled motor vehicle, a Certificate of Payment should first be obtained from BIR. In October 1987, the Bureau of Customs issued a Customs Memorandum promulgating regulations for payment of duties and taxes on imported motor vehicles assembled by non-assemblers. In December 1987, BIR issued a Memorandum Order on the procedure governing processing and issuance of the Certificate of Payment. In June 1988, BIR, BOC and LTO entered into a MOA which provided that prior to LTO registration, a CP should first be obtained from the BIR and BOC to prove that all existing taxes and customs have been paid. In December 1988, government agents seized and detained Rachel Navarros 2 Elf trucks. She paid the taxes and customs duties and asked for reimbursement from Harrison Motors, but was refused. RTC and CA both ruled that Harrison Motors needed to reimburse Navarro.

o Harrison Motors contends that it was no longer obliged to pay taxes and duties imposed by the Memorandum Orders and MOAs because these administrative regulations only took effect after the execution of its contract of sale with

Navarro. Holding it liable for payment would violate the non-impairment clause of the Consti and Art 4 of the Civil Code.

o Does the set of admin regulations violate the principle of retroactivity? No. The admin regulations in question do not impose any new taxes. They

merely enforce payment of existing taxes and duties at time of importation. The Court held that Harrison Motors is obliged to paynot because of the

administrative regulations but from the tax laws existing at the time of importation. Even if Navarro now owned the trucks, it was still Harrison Motors that was obliged to pay the taxes and duties.

o Morales v People (2002) o Facts: Eulogio Morales, General Manager of the Olongapo City Water District,

sold a company-owned car to Wilma Hallare, Finance Officer, who in turn sold it to Rosalia Morales, Eulogios wife. The car was valued at P75,000 and yet was sold for only P4,000. The car was in good running condition. The sale was done in violation of an existing Board Resolution, and no new board resolution authorized the sale of the 1979 Gallant car Sigma. Sales Dept manager filed the complaint.

o Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction? Is the Olongapo City Water District a government-owned or controlled company? YES. Feb. 20, 1984: Baguio Water District: water districts fall under the general

term government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and are covered by the Civil Service Law

August 18, 1986: commission of crime April 17, 1989: Tanjay Water District echoed Baguio Water District May 16, 1990: Metro Iloilo Water District: water districts were private

corporations Sept 13, 1991: Davao City Water District: returned to ruling in Baguio Water Petitioners contend that Metro Iloilo should be applied because it was the law

in force at the time of the commission of the crime charged. The Court held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the crime. When the Information in this case was filed, it was 1992: the Davao City Water was the prevailing ruling, which makes Olongapo City Water District a government-owned/controlled corporation, and thus, under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

o Other issues: The sale was grossly disadvantageous to the government, because the book value was P75,000 when the sale value was P4,000. The car was not junk, as petitioners contend, but was in good condition. It was the second salethe sale to Rosalia Moralesthat violated Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, as it is reasonable to suppose that Rosalia bought the car with her husbands knowledge and consent.

o PNB v Office of the President (1996) o Facts: A Marikina subdivision developer mortgaged its subdivision lots in favor

of PNB. Buyers of the subdivision lots were unaware of this and continued to

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pay for their lots and construct their houses. The subdivision developer then defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank got the lots. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) said that PNB could collect only the remaining amortization of the lot buyers. The Office of the President affirmed this decision, invoking PD 957, which protects condo and subdivision lot buyers from fraud.

o PNB contends that PD 957 was enacted on July 12, 1976, while the mortgage was executed on Dec. 18, 1975, and that PNB is not privy to the contracts between the lot buyers and the subdivision developer.

o Is the application of PD 957 valid? YES PD 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity, but this could be inferred

from the intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from unscrupulous subdivision developers. Besides, PNB should have done their due diligence in checking the foreclosed lots.

Sec 21, PD 957: In cases of lots sold prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condo to complete compliance with its obligations within two years from the date of this Decree.

Justice Cruz: A contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of police power, it will prevail over the contract.

o Can PNB take the developers place & accept remaining payment? YES Sec 18, PD 957 obliges PNB to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid

amortizations of the lot buyers. o Far East Bank & Trust Co. v Marquez (2004) o Facts: Arturo Marquez entered into a contract to sell a 52.5 sq. m. lot in

Diliman, which is a portion of the property covered by TCT No. 156254 (now 3833697), with Transam Sales & Exposition through the latters owner and GM, Engr. Jesus Garcia. On May 22, 1989, TSE loaned P7,650,000 and mortgaged the property covered by the TCT. TSE couldnt pay, so the bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage and became the highest bidder in the subsequent auction sale. Marquez had already paid P600,000 and his townhouse unit was under construction. Marquez filed a case with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB on Jan 29, 1991 to compel TSE to complete construction of his townhouse, prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure, and have the TSE/FEBTC mortgage declared invalid, because the mortgage violated Sec 18 of PD 957. The OAALA ruled in Marquezs favor, and so did the CA, who found that the bank had known about the subdivision and that the Certification against forum shopping attached to the Petition had not been made under oath, in violation of the Rules of Court. Petition was denied, CA ruling affirmed.

o Did the mortgage contract violate Sec 18 of PD 957? Yes, even if the lot itself was just part of a bigger parcel of land. PD 957 aims to protect innocent lot buyers, and Sec 18 addresses the

problem of fraud committed against buyers when the lot is mortgaged without their knowledge. The lot was mortgaged in violation of Sec. 18 of PD 957. Marquez was not notified of the mortgage before the release of loan proceeds by Far East Bank. Sec 18 of PD 957 is prohibitory. Acts contrary to it are void.

Far East Bank already knew about the subdivisionwhen they took on the mortgage, it was not with good faith. They were negligent in finding out what Marquezs rights really were as to the lot.

o Assuming there was a violation of PD 957, was the remedy granted by HLURB/Office of the President/Court of Appeals the proper one? The remedy granted by the HLURB and sustained by the Office of the

President was proper only in its reference to the lot of Marquez. The mortgage contract is void as against him. The rest of the land is none of his business.

o Does the failure of the notary public to sign the Certification against forum shopping provide sufficient basis for dismissal of the appeal? SC upheld CA ruling; no more need to pass upon this issue. CA ruling: certification had not been made under oath, and is thus in violation

of the Rules of Court. o Republic v Court of Appeals (2003) o Facts:

On Nov. 27, 1985, the DPWH Minister asked Marcos for P800 million for dredging, flood control & related projects in Metro Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga and Leyte. P615 million was allocated to 21 contracts, 4 of which were with the Navotas Industrial Corp (NIC).

NIC says it did 95.06% of the work, but DPWH paid only 79.22%, so NIC filed a complaint for sum of money (civil case). They were denied because (1) the DPWH fact-finding committee discovered that the dredging contracts were null and void, (2) NIC worked on the projects 5 to 6 months before they were awarded the DPWH contracts, (3) NIC got the contracts without bidding for them, and (4) NIC falsified documents so it seemed theyd worked when they hadnt.

DPWH filed a case of estafa (criminal case) against NIC with the Tanodbayan. Contentions were the falsification of documents and that the former DPWH minister violated RA 3019 (Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act).

Petitioner filed a motion to consolidate the collection and estafa cases, because the cases arose from the same incidents and involved the same facts. The consolidation petition and its reconsideration were denied.

The CA ruled that the RTC could not rule on the violations of RA 3019, and that the Sandiganbayan could not rule over collection cases. The Sandiganbayan would have no authority to order the defendant in the civil case to pay NIC their money.

Art 5: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

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o Was the petition filed on time? YES NIC said petition was sent by registered mail only on Sept. 12. Deadline for

filing was Sept. 11, a Sunday. However, Sec 1 Rule 22 of the Rules of Court states that in this case, time shall not run until the next working day.

o Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the consolidation? NO Consolidation happens only when the cases involve similar questions of fact

& law. Its purpose is to avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, simplify the work of the trial court, and so on.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over civil collection cases. Rules of Court do not allow filing of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint

in a criminal case. Normally, Article 31 of the Civil Code would apply: civil action may proceed

independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. However, when the action is based on a contract that is illegal, as when the contract violates the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Art 31 does not apply. Under Section 3 of the aforementioned Act, entering into a contract that is grossly disadvantageous to the governmentlike the dredging contractsis unlawful. The act purporting to create the obligation to pay NIC is assailed as a crime in itself. Thus, a contract executed against the provisions of prohibitory laws is void, and if the contracts are illegal, then no valid obligation to pay can arise from it.

o Petition denied, CA decision affirmed with modification. Civil case was suspended until termination of civil cases to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions on the validity of NICs dredging contracts.

o BPI v IAC (1998) o Facts: Rizaldy Zshornack and his wife maintained a dollar savings account and

a peso current account at COMTRUST Bank, which was later absorbed by BPI. Virgilio Garcia, COMTRUST Asst. Branch Manager, withdrew $1,000 from the Zshornacks dollar savings account without the couples authorization.

o The Zshornacks had originally entrusted $3,000 cash for safekeeping, and this agreement had been embodied in a document. Despite demands, the bank refused to return the money. COMTRUST also did not deny the authenticity and execution of said document.

o BPI argues that the document is a contract of depositum, which banks do not enter into. Garcia was alleged to have exceeded his powers when entering into that transaction. Thus, the bank could not be held liable under the contract, and the obligation is purely personal to Garcia.

o Court held that COMTRUST could have denied under oath the due execution of the document if it had so desired, according to the Rules of Court: they couldve questioned the authority of Garcia to bind the corporation, and denied its capacity to enter into such a contract. But they didnt, so the bank admitted both Garcias authority and the banks power to enter into the contract in question.

o Court held that the mere safekeeping of greenbacks is a transaction not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, as amended by CB Circular No. 281, and

thus falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Pursuant to Art 5 of the Civil Code, the safekeeping of greenbacks is void.

o Because the contract was void, neither party can have a cause of action against each other, according to Art 1411 of CC. The only remedy is to prosecute the parties for violating the law. Thus, Zshornack cannot recover damageshas no cause of action.

o Decision modified. BPI ordered to repay $1,000 to bank account and pay damages.

o Nicolas v Court of Appeals (1987) o Facts: Madlangsakay bought 3 parcels of land from Felipe Garcia in 1951. At

the time of the purchase, the petitioners were living on one of the lotsLot 8. In 1958, Madlangsakay entered negotiations for the sale of Lot 8 to petitioners, and Madlangsakay promised to subdivide the land among them, but nothing happened. In 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint in CFI Bulacan for Madlangsakay to quiet title over Lot 8, saying that in a 1958 affidavit, he had agreed to sell the property to them at P0.70 per sq. m., and that he had executed several deeds of sale transferring the land to the petitioners, plus an affidavit to facilitate the registration of the deeds of sale. Madlangsakay had filed criminal cases against the petitioners when they had cut and cleared bamboo groves near their houses; petitioners countered with criminal complaints of perjury. Madlangsakay said that all the deeds of sale and all affidavits were forgeries. He said that the land was conjugal property, registered under the Torrens system & mortgaged with PNB.

o Did the CA err in concluding that the deeds of sale were spurious? NO There was evidence that the deeds of sale were falsified; the notary knew

nothing and could not actually vouch for credibility of petitioners. Contract said the land was not registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law

but it was. The land was conjugal property & was heavily mortgaged with PNB. The land was titled property, and any conveyance affecting titled property

must be registered under Act 496 and not under Act 3344, which is what the petitioners did.

The very conspicuous absence of the wifes conforme to the disposition of the property renders the alleged sale void ab initio because it contravenes the mandatory requirements of Art 166 CC.

o Decision affirmed. Decision immediately executory. o For a waiver of rights to exist: o existence of a right o knowledge of the evidence thereof

Art 6: Rights may be waived, except when the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs, or is prejudicial to a third party with a right recognized by law.

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o intention to relinquish said right o A waiver must be a voluntary, intelligent and informed decisiona person

can only waive his/her rights if he/she has sufficient awareness of relevant circumstances.

o Corpuz v Spouses Grospe (2000) o Facts: Gavino Corpuz was a farmera beneficiary of the Operation Land

Transfer (OLT) Program of DAR. Pursuant to PD 27, he was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over 2 parcels of agricultural land. After Corpuzs mortgage contract with Virginia de Leon expired, he mortgaged it to Mrs. Grospe. They had an agreement (Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan) which allowed the Grospes to use or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. Before the DAR, Corpuz instituted action for recovery of possessionthe Grospes had allegedly entered the land by force & destroyed his palay.

o The Grospes claimed the Kasunduan allowed them to take possession of the land until the loan was paid. Instead of paying the mortgage, Corpuz had allegedly executed a Waiver of Rights. Corpuz denied having waived his rights and interest over the land and said the signatures therein were forgeries.

o Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Ernesto Tabara ruled that Corpuz had abandoned and surrendered the land to Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had recommended the reallocation of the lots to the Grospes, who were the most qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

o CA ruled that Corpuz had abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary. The waiver of rights and conformity to Samahang Nayon resolutions are evidence of his abandonment and voluntary surrender of his rights as beneficiary under the land reform laws. Also, he failed to prove that signatures were forgeries.

o Was appellate court correct in finding that the signatures were not forged? YES. Petitioner failed to prove forgery.

o If signatures were genuine, was waiver null & void for being contrary to agrarian laws? YES. Sale or transfer of rights over property covered by CLT is void, except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary succession. Thus, waiver was void.

o Did Corpuz abandon his rights, under PD 27? NO. There was no abandonment because the waiver of rights was void.

o Did Corpuz forfeit his right as a beneficiary? YES. Corpuz voluntarily surrendered his landholding. PD 27: Title to land acquired pursuant to land reform program shall not be

transferable except through hereditary succession or to the government. RA 3844 Sec 8: The agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished by

voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee. The land was surrendered to the government, not to a private person. It was

the government that awarded the land to the Grospes.

o Spouses Valderama v Macalde (2005) o Facts: In 1977, Albano acquired a lot in Tondo, Manila, that was being rented

by the Macaldes, who had an ancestral home on two-thirds of said lot. The Macaldes leased the property from Albano and paid monthly rentals; the remaining one-third of the land was leased by the spouses Valderama. In 1978, Marcos issued PD 1517 proclaiming Urban Land Reform Zones. A subsequent Marcos proclamation included Albanos property in the Urban Zones. In 1990, Albano offered to sell the property to the Macaldes. The Macaldes offered to buy Albanos property but Albano did not respond; the Macaldes continued paying rent. In 1991, Albano told Macalde she sold the property to Valderama. Albano and Valderama rejected Macaldes offer to buy the property on which their ancestral home stood. Macalde invoked PD 1517, saying they had a preferential right to buy the property. Albano said the land was not covered by PD 1517; the Valderamas said the Macaldes had waived their preferential right since they failed to exercise it when Albano first offered the property to them.

o Did the Macaldes waive their rights to the property? NO. Sec 6, PD 1517: the Macaldes did have the right of first refusal. The Macaldes exerted every effort to stop the sale to the Valderamas. There

was no intent to let go of the property. Albano failed to respond to the Macaldes offer to buy, and concealed the

identity of the buyer of the lot from the Macaldes. Under Sec 9, PD 1517, Albano was mandated to declare to the Land

Management Committee her proposal to sell the property, but she didnteven the government was deprived of its preemptive right to acquire the property.

Herminia Albano forged the signature of her dead husband for some of the legal documents. LOL!

o Borromeo-Herrera v Borromeo (1987) o Facts: Vito Borromeo died in 1952, leaving behind several properties in

Cebu. In 1969, the Regional Trial Court invoked Art 972 of the Civil Code and listed 9+ heirs to the Borromeo estate. In 1972, Fortunato Borromeo, an acknowledged illegitimate son, filed a petition praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate, asserting and incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights, dated 1967 and supposedly signed by the Borromeo heirs. In the waiver, 5 of the 9 heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate.

o Is the Waiver of Hereditary Rights valid? NO. o For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential. o The intention to waive a right must be shown clearly and convincingly.

When the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage such that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.

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o In this case, the signatories to the waiver did not have clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights.

o Look at the effectivity clause and the repealing clause of a law. Example:

Art 254 of Family Code is a repealing clause. o Laws not usually followed: o law against concubinage o law against discussing cases pending in court o law against premature marriage: widows are not allowed to marry within 300

days of the death of spouse or the end of the marriage o Art 7 tells us of the hierarchy of laws: o the Constitution is the fundamental law; all laws must conform to it as it is a

direct enactment of the people o statutes and treaties must conform to the Constitution o administrative orders and executive acts must conform to statutes

o This is judicial/interstitial legislation. o Follow the principle of stare decisis: judical decisions as precedents. o Stare decisis is a matter of agreeing on what are relevant facts.

o Note also that we now have international human rights laws. Basic human rights: liberty, privacy.

o Courts may use international human rights decisions in making their own. o Treaties may also be used in determining a case. o Van Dorn v Romillo: It was the Filipino who initiated divorce proceedings in the

US. When this case was decided, there was no Art 26 of the Family Code yet, but the court did not refuse to rule. They ruled with the principle of equity as their basis.

o This is a general principle of law. o Van Dorn v Romillo: She cannot be discriminated against in her own country.

o Sec 31, Book 1, Executive Order 292: Instituting the Administrative Code

of 1987 o Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar

months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.

o There is a conflict between the Civil Code and the Admin Code in the definition of a year: follow the Civil Code. The Admin Code only applies to administrative agencies; generally, the Civil Code applies.

o Non-working days and legal holidays are included ONLY according to rules of procedure, such as the Rules of Court.

Art 13: When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights

Art 14: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.

Art 8: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Art 9: No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of laws.

Art 10: In case of doubt in the determination or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Art 11: Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

Art 12: A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.

Art 7: Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

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o Art 2, Revised Penal Code o Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and

laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine

Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

o There are treaties, like the Vienna Convention, that exempt certain people, like

diplomats. o Liang v People (2000) o Facts: Liang was an ADB economist who uttered defamatory words against

his co-worker, Joyce Cabal. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong issued a warrant of arrest, as Liang was charged with 2 counts of oral defamation. The DFA sent an office of protocol stating that Liang was immune from the legal process, according to Sec 45 of an Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.

o Does Liang have immunity from the legal process? NO. DFAs determination that a person is covered by immunity is only

preliminary, which has no binding effect in courts. The DFAs advice to dismiss the criminal cases, as well as the actual dismissal of the criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, violated the latters right to due process.

Sec 45 of the Agreement pertains to immunity that is not absoluteit is subject to the exception that the act was done in official capacity.

Slandering a person is not covered by the immunity of the Agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent has immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state, except in cases relating to actions outside his official functions.

o J. Puno: concurring opinion:

Does Liang, as an official of an international organization, is entitled to diplomatic immunity?

A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international conventions and agreements will show that the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is.

Is an international official is immune from criminal jurisdiction for all acts, whether private or official? The generally accepted principles which are now regarded as the

foundation of international immunities are contained in the ILO Memorandum, which reduced them in three basic propositions, namely: (1) that international institutions should have a status which protects

them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented;

(2) that no country should derive any financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and

(3) that the international organization should, as a collectivity of States Members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States.

The thinking underlying these propositions is essentially institutional in character. It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members.

Is the authority to determine if an act is official or private is lodged in the courts? Positive international law has devised three methods of granting

privileges and immunities to the personnel of international organizations. (1) by simple conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague

Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (2) by internal legislation whereby the government of a state, upon

whose territory the international organization is to carry out its functions, recognizes the international character of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain privileges and immunities to better assure the successful functioning of the organization and its personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission of the Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome.

(3) by a combination of the first two. In this third method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a certain status of an international organization and its personnel, but the status is described in broad and general terms. The specific definition and application of those general terms are determined by an accord between the organization itself and the state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of Justice, and the United Nations.

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The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations. Those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a right of the sending stated based on customary international law, those granted to international officials are based on treaty or conventional law.

Is the certification by the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner is covered by immunity is a political question that is binding and conclusive on the courts? The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel

of international organizations to a minimum. The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of

practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials.

There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations, which enjoy absolute immunity.

In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have no right to waive an officials immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to assume jurisdiction over and individual for an act, which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and appear in court, not the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization.

The current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives.

Who is competent to determine whether a given act is private or official? The trend is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act

as private or official in the courts of the state concerned. Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of immunity from every

form of legal process accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official acts.

The authority of the Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity.

o Bayan v Zamora (2000) o NOTE: This case tells us that certain acts may be prosecuted under certain

laws, in certain jurisdictions. o Facts:

March 14, 1947: RP and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement formalizing the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel. The Agreement was due to expire in 1991.

August 30, 1951: Mutual Defense Treaty

September 16, 1991: RP Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.

1998: FVR approved the VFA. October 5, 1998: Erap, through Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the

VFA. October 6, 1998: Erap, through Exec Sec Zamora, officially transmitted to

the Senate the VFA for concurrence. May 27, 1999: Senate approved the VFA by a 2/3 vote. June 1, 1999: VFA officially entered into force.

o The VFA is considered a treaty in the Philippines; it has been ratified in accordance with Philippine laws. The power to ratify is vested in the President; the legislature is limited to giving or withholding its consent to the ratification.

o It is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, it is to be taken equally as a treaty.

o Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty? Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses

committed by US personnel? The Court did not answer this, but I think the answer is YES.

Is the SC deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher? The Court did not answer this, but I think the answer is YES.

o J. Puno: dissenting opinion: o The absence in the VFA of the slightest suggestion as to the duration of

visits of US troops in Phil. territory, coupled with the lack of a limited term of effectivity of the VFA itself, justify the interpretation that the VFA allows permanent, not merely temporary, presence of US troops on Philippine soil.

o The 1947 RP-US Military Bases Agreement was ratified by the Philippine Senate, but not by the US Senate. In the eyes of Phil law, the Military Bases Agreement was a treaty, but by the laws of the US, it was a mere executive agreement.

o Fr. Bernas: require that the US Senate concur in the treaty because under American constitutional law, there must be concurrence on the part of the US Senate to conclude treaties.

o VFA doesnt fall under the category of an executive agreement made by the US president pursuant to authority conferred in a prior treaty.

o The Court should not place a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the same constitutional plateau as a treaty. It falls short of the RP constitutional requirement that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Philippine soil must be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

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o This law follows the nationality principlewhat applies is ones personal

national law, which is decided by his citizenship. o An example of a condition of a person is his mental capacity. o Art 26, Family Code: Any marriage abroad is valid in the Philippines, as long

as: o the marriage is valid abroad o the marriage complies with our laws

o Art 15 refers to absolute divorce, which terminates marriage, as opposed to limited divorce, which suspends (Garcia v Recio).

o Van Dorn v Romillo, Jr. (1985) o Facts: Alice Reyes, a Philippine citizen, married Richard Upton, a US citizen,

in Hong Kong in 1972. In 1982, the couple divorced in Nevada, US, and Alice remarried in Nevada, to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton filed a suit against Alice, stating that the latters business was conjugal property and asked for an accounting of the business as well as the right to manage it. Alice moved to dismiss the case, saying that in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, Upton had acknowledged that he and Alice had no community property. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, saying that the property involved is located in the Philippines, so the divorce decree has no bearing in the case.

o Is a foreign divorce valid and binding in the Philippines? There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in the

US. The decree is binding on Upton as a US citizen. Upton cannot sue petitioner as her husband in any US state. What he contends in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in the Philippines, as it is contrary to local law and public policy.

Art 15 of the Civil Code: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, under American law, divorce dissolves the marriage.

o Llorente v Court of Appeals (2000) (Paula Ll. v CA and Alicia Ll.) o Facts: Lorenzo Llorente was an enlisted US Navy serviceman who married

Paula on Feb. 22, 1937 at Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed at the conjugal home in Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became a US citizen. When he got back to the Philippines in 1945, he discovered that Paula was pregnant and was living in with his brother, Ceferino. They

made a written agreement and Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California, San Diego County. The divorce became final on Dec. 4, 1952. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament, leaving everything to Alicia and their 3 children. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC gave due course to Paulas petition, without terminating Alicias testate proceedings. Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals, which declared Alicia as co-owner of whatever conjugal properties she and Lorenzo had. Paula brought the case up to the SC after being denied by the CA.

o Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenze Llorente? o Art 15: Lorenzo became an American citizen before and at the time of his

divorce, 2nd marriage, execution of will and death. Thus, this issue is governed by foreign law. o Our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like

any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. o Quita v CA: once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen

when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could lose her right to inherit from him.

o Pilapil v Ibay-Somera: Divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in RP civil law on persons.

o Thus, the divorce was legal. o Art 17: The forms and solemnities of contracts shall be governed by laws

of the country in which they are executed. o The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his 2nd wife and

children is manifest in the will he executed. SC has no wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, and not covered by Art 15 (citizens of the Philippines).

o Is the will intrinsically valid? Who shall inherit from Lorenzo? These issues are best answered by foreign law, which must be pleaded and proved.

o Was the will executed in accordance with the formalities required? YES. It fulfilled the necessary requirements of Philippine law, as per Art 16 (laws of the country in which they are executed).

o Garcia-Recio v Recio (2001) (Grace Garcia-Recio v Rederick Recio) o Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian

citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They were divorced through an Australian family court in 1989. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen, and in 1994 married Grace, a Filipina. In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared single and Filipino. In 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, on the ground of bigamyRederick allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time of their

Art 15: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

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marriage. Rederick said he had legal capacity to marry, as the Australian divorce was valid. While suit for declaration of nullity was pending, Rederick secured an Australian divorce decree. The RTC ruled that the marriage was dissolved, as the divorce issued in Australia was valid. RTC said the marriage ended not because Rederick had a lack of legal capacity to remarryrather, it was because of the new Australian divorce decree.

o Was the divorce between Rederick and Editha Samson proven? o A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved by divorce obtained

abroad. Art 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. o Art 26 of the Family code allows the former to contract a subsequent

marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

o A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

o A writing or document may be proven as a public record of a foreign country by: o an official publication o a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the

document o If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy must be o accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular

officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept

o authenticated by the seal of his office o Was the divorce proven? NO. The burden of proof lies with the party who

alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Redrick must prove the divorce according to pertinent Australian laws. The divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. o There are two basic types of divorce: o absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii: terminates marriage o limited divorce or a mensa et thoro: suspends marriage, leaves the

bond in full force o Was Rederick proven to be legally capacitated to marry Grace? NO. o Art 21 of FC: certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage o Rederick did not have any evidence proving his legal capacity to marry

Grace. o Case remandedneed more evidence.

o Roehr v Rodriguez (2003) o Facts: Roehr married Rodriguez in Hamburg, Germany, on Dec. 11, 1980.

The marriage was ratified on Feb. 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. On Aug. 28, 1996, Rodriguez filed a declaration for nullity of marriage. On Dec. 16, 1997, Roehr got a decree of divorce from Hamburg-Blankenese.

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II. PERSONS GENERAL PROVISIONS o Juridical capacity (Art 37) (AKA legal capacity, and personality) o the fitness to be the subject of legal relations o inherent in natural persons o lost only through death o aptitude for the holding and enjoyment of rights

o Capacity to act (Art 37) o the power to do acts with legal effect o is acquired o may be lost o aptitude for the exercise of rights

o Juridical capacity can exist without capacity to act, but the existence of the latter implies that of the former.

o Art 38: There is no such thing as full capacity to act. Yet, restrictions on

capacity to act do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, such as those arising from his acts or property relations.

o Art 39: Some modifications or limitations on capacity to act: age, mental

capacity, physical capacity (state of being a deaf-mute), family relations, alienage, absence.

NATURAL PERSONS o Art 40: Birth determines personality o Art 40 remains the same, although superseded by Article 5 of the Child and

Youth Welfare Code (PD 603, effective 6 months after Dec 10, 1974): The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code.

o Birth means the removal of the fetus from the womb (Tolentino). This may take place either through natural or artificial means.

o Fetus is considered born alive if: o completely delivered after seven months o if less than 7 months, has to live for 24 hours (even if aided by medical

equipment) o Test for life: complete respiration. o The child need not be viable. It just needs to be alive for an instant.

o Personality of a conceived child is: o limited: only for the purposes favorable to the child

o provisional: it depends on the child being born alive later (Art 41) o It is presumed that a child is born alive.

o Art 42: Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the

rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. o The estate continues personality.

o Art 43: Applies only when 2 people are called to succeed each other.

o Presumption of Death in the Rules of Court in the state of calamity: Who is

presumed to have survived? o if both below 15: older o if both over 60: younger o if one is under 15 and the other is over 60: younger o if both over 15 and under 60, and the sexes are different: male o if both over 15 and under 60, and the sexes are the same: older o if one under 15, one over 60 and one in between: one in between o Presumption of death is based on strength, age and sex.

JURIDICAL PERSONS o Juridical persons (Art 44, 45): o the State o governed by specific laws

o public interest entities o personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law o governed by specific laws

o private interest entities o juridical personality of entity is distinct from that of its individual

components o may be constituted by 5 to 15 people, with the majority residing in the

Philippines o created by filing in the Securities and Exchange Commission o juridical personality begins when certificate of incorporation is issued by

SEC o governed by laws of general application o partnerships and associations are governed by the Civil Code provisions

concerning partnerships

o Art 46: Juridical persons may o acquire and possess property of all kinds o incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws

and regulations of their organization

CIVIL PERSONALITY: Art 37-47, Civil Code

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o Art 47: Upon dissolution of a public interest entity, their assets shall be disposed of as according to law, or applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the area that benefited from the entity during its existence.

o 1987 Constitution o Art 2, Sec 12 (Principles and State Policies): The State recognizes the

sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. o This state policy keeps the SC from declaring unconstitutional the anti-

abortion provisions in the Revised Penal Code. o This was originally supposed to be in the Bill of Rights. It would have

changed the concept of persons. o Art 2, Sec 13 (Principles and State Policies): The State recognizes the vital

role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

o Art 3: Bill of Rights

o RA 7192 (Feb. 12, 1992): Women in Development and Nation-Building Act o Sec 14, Art 3, 1987 Constitution: The State recognizes the role of women in

nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of men (RA 7192).

o Sec 3, Sec 4, RA 7192: NEDA, with the assistance of the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, has the mandate to affect the participation of women in national development and their integration therein.

o Sec 5, Equality in Capacity to Act: Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances. In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights. o This repeals Par 2 of Art 39 of the Civil Code, which pertains to the

modifications and limitations on the capacity to act. Par 2 reads: A married woman, 21 years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law.

o Sec. 13, Effectivity Clause: The rights of women and all the provisions of this Act shall take effect immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

o Geluz v Court of Appeals (July 20, 1961) o Facts: Oscar Lazo, husband of Nita Villanueva, instituted action against

physician Antonio Geluz for giving his wife an abortion. It was Nitas 3rd

abortionthe first had been a baby conceived out of wedlock, the second had been due to her work and because the husband was away in a province, campaigning for an election. Lazo was aware of the first two abortions, but not the third. He sued for damages on behalf of the fetus, and the CA gave damages of P3000 to Lazo, citing Art 2206 of the Civil Code.

o The SC said this was done in error, as Art 2206 does not cover the death of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality. There is also no defense in citing Art 40 of the Civil Code because the fetus must be born alive, as per the conditions of Art 41.

o The SC said that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the fetus on account of its injuries, no such right of action could be transferred to its parents or heirs. Even if a cause of action did happen on behalf of the fetus, it was extinguished by its pre-natal death (Art 41).

o No transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality/capacity.

o Does the fetus have legal personality? NO. It died before being born. o Can Oscar Lazo get damages on behalf of the fetus? NO. o Can Lazo get damages for himself? Normally, yes: moral damages for the

illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, anguish attendant to its loss, disappointment of parental expectations (Civil Code Art 2217). But in this case, there was no factual or legal basis for the awarding of damages. So, NO.

WHAT IS THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ONES NAME? o Republic v CA (1992) o It is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in

which he lives and is best known. It is the combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals, and it is how he is addressed by the world at large. It is one method of indicating the identity of persons. It is a right of personality (Tolentino).

o A name usually has two parts: the given name and the surname. The given name, given at birth or baptism, distinguishes him from other individuals. The surname identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The surname is fixed by law.

o A name has the following characteristics: o absolute, intended to protect one from being confused with others o obligatory, for no one can be without a name o fixed, unchangeable, immutable: may be changed only for good cause and

by judicial proceedings o inalienable and intransmissible: outside of the commerce of man o imprescriptible

USE OF SURNAMES: Art 364-380, Civil Code

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o Only the name in the civil register can be changed. The name in the civil register is considered the true name of an individual. (Yasin v Judge, Sharia District Court)

CHANGE OF NAME o Valid grounds for change of name (Republic v Marcos, 1990):

o the name is ridiculous or tainted with dishonor o the change of name is a consequence of a change in legal status o the change is meant to avoid confusion o being unaware of alien parentage (In the case of Josefina Ang Chay v

Republic, continuous use of the Filipino surname was also a valid reason for change of name.)

o erase all former alienage (Uy v Republic: the alien name Uy caused his business to suffer and made it difficult for him to entertain civil organizations)

o NOTE: The change of name must not be for fraudulent purposes, and must not prejudice public interest. It must not erase evidence of ancestry (Naldoza v Republic), or create confusion in paternity and discredit the legality of ones paternity (Padilla v Republic).

o NOTE: The change of name is meant to provide an opportunity to a person to improve his personality and to provide his best interest (Republic v CA).

o A change of name does not alter family relations nor create new rights. What is

altered is only the label by which a person is known (Tolentino). o Petition for a change of name must include all names and aliases; otherwise, it

defeats the purpose of publication (Telmo v Republic: title of case and order setting for hearing were deficient, as Milagros Telmo did not say she wanted to change her name to Thelmo).

o Sec 1, CA 142, prior to amendment by RA 6805: a person is allowed to use the

name with which he was christened of by which he has been known since childhood. RA 6085 regulates the use of aliases; it was approved on Aug. 4, 1969 (Tan v Civil Registrar of Cebu City).

o CA 142 (An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases), before amendment, was

originally meant to stop confusion and fraud in business transactions. It is a penal statute and should be construed in favor of the accused (Ursua v CA). (Personal note: CA 142 happened because the Chinese businessmen kept changing their names.)

o An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him

publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to his real name (Ursua v CA).

o The purpose of statutory procedure authorizing the change of name is to have a record of the change (Republic v CA). However, a clerical/typographical error can be corrected, and a first name or nickname can be changed in the civil registry, without need of a judicial order (RA 9048).

o The State has an interest in the change of name for purposes of identification; it

is a matter of sound judicial discretion, and not a right. (Republic v CA) MIDDLE NAME o A middle name is not required by law. However, if it is already part of ones

name, it cannot be dropped (In re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang).

o The question in the case of In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy

Astorga Garcia (2005) was, Can an illegitimate child, upon adoption by the natural father, use the natural mothers surname as her middle name? YES. The Court held that the use of a surname is fixed by law, but the law is silent as to the use of a middle name. However, the OSG pointed out that in drafting the Family Code, the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name was recognized. The committees approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Justice Caguioa commented that the use of the surname of the father is mandatory, while the use of the surname of the mother is permissive. Because the intention of the adoption process is to make a child possess rights accorded to a legitimate child, and one of the rights of a legitimate child is the right to bear the surnames of both parents, Steph is entitled to use both her parents surnames. It preserves her filiation with her mother, as she remains an intestate heir of the latter, and removes the stigma of her illegitimacy. Also, adoption statutes are construed liberally in favor of adoption: it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail (Art 10, CC).

USE OF NAME: CHILDREN o Principally (but not exclusively) uses the surname of the father: o natural child, but if recognized by only one parent, uses that parents

surname o natural child by legal fiction o legitimate and legitimated children o Art 164, Family Code: legitimate children are those conceived or born

during the marriage o Art 177, FC: legitimated children are those conceived out of wedlock, but

whose parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. Legitimation takes place by a subsequent valid marriage between

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the parents (Art 178). This also pertains to children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage (Sutesta v Republic).

o Illegitimate children o Art 165, Family Code: illegitimate children are those conceived and born

outside of a valid marriage o Art 176, FC: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under

the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.

o Sec 1, RA 9255 (approved by GMA on Feb. 24, 2004): Article 176 of the Family Code is hereby amended to read as follows: o "Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under

the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."

o Adopted child o bears the surname of the adopter o In Johnston v Republic (1963), Isabel Valdes-Johnston wanted to change

her adopted daughters surname to Johnston. However, the adoption was made singly by her, so the SC ruled that the adopted daughter carry the surname of the adopter. Using Johnstons name might mislead people as to the status of family relationships and raise questions of successional rights.

o Republic v CA: it may be inferred that the use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a right.

USE OF NAME: MARRIED WOMAN

o A married woman may use her maiden name and add her husbands name, her

first name and husbands surname, or husbands full name: o Grace Garcia-Recio o Grace Recio o Mrs. Rederick Recio

o In the case of Telmo v Republic (1976): A married woman cannot change her husbands surname. It is the husband who must file the petition for change of name.

o In the case of Legamia v IAC (1984), Corazon Legamia was accused of using the alias Corazon Reyes, in violation of CA 142, which governs the use of aliases. Corazon wasnt married to Emilio Reyesthey lived together and had a child, but Emilio was married to someone else. The legitimate wife was the one who filed the complaint. The Court ruled that Corazon was a wife in all appearances, and that the use of the surname Reyes would be allowed, especially for the benefit of the son. The court did a culture-based interpretation of the case, but Maam Ursua would have used legal principles, such as Sec 14, Art 2 of the 1987 Constitutionon the equal rights of women and men before the lawin order to decide this case.

o It is Maam Ursuas opinion that some laws, like the name change laws,

prejudice women. The RP entered a treaty on the anti-discrimination of women, which forms part of international human rights laws; thus, the State has an obligation to ensure the equality of men and women before the law (Sec 14, Art 2, 1987 Consti).

o In the case of Tolentino v CA (1988), Constancia Tolentino tried to stop

Consuelo David from using the Tolentino name, as David and Arturo Tolentino were divorced during the Japanese occupation, due to Davids desertion and abandonment. However, David was using the Tolentino name with the consent of both her ex-husband and his siblings. The Court ruled that NO, Constancia could not stop Consuelo from using the name Tolentino, as the use of a name is not a crime. Changing Consuelo David Tolentinos name would seriously dislocate her; besides, Constancia suffers no injury, as there is no usurpation of her namethere is no usurpation of her status as wife of Arturo Tolentino. The Court also held that the legal possibility of bringing the action to enjoin the divorced wife from using the surname of the former husband determines the starting point of the period of prescription (Tolentino). The Court also held that in his commentary on Art 370 of the Civil Code, Tolentino himself stated, the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. Art 371 of the same code is not applicable to the case at bar because it speaks of annulment, not divorce. Annulment: it is as if there had been no marriage at all; divorce: it is as if the husband has died.

o However, in the case of Yasin v Judge, Sharia District Court (1995), it was

held that Art 370 and 371 of CC show that the use of a husbands name is permissive rather than obligatory. When a marriage no longer exists, there is no need for judicial confirmation of a change in civil status in order to revert to the maiden name.

o Romeros concurring opinion: No law prohibits a woman from continuing to use her maiden name and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses her husbands family name during matrimony.

o Vitugs concurring opinion:

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o It is mandatory that the husbands surname should be used during the existence of the marriage.

o In the case of legal separation, the wife must continue using the names employed before the decree of legal separation. She may not revert to her maiden name.

o In the annulment of a marriage, refer to Art 371 of the CC. o In case of death of husband, the widow may use her husbands surname

(Art 373, CC) or revert to her maiden name (general rule). o In case of divorce, the rule is the same as that of death of husband (Tolentino

v CA). o In case of declaration of nullity of marriage, the general rule applies: she

may use only her own maiden name. o Maam Ursuas opinion is that there is no difference in legal effects because

annulment, divorce and death all end a presupposed valid marriage. She agrees with the application of Art 371 in Yasin.

o Annulment (Art 371) o if wife is guilty: she shall resume her maiden name o if wife is innocent: she may resume her maiden name, or retain husbands

surname, except when o court decrees otherwise o one of them gets married again to another person

o Legal separation (Art 372) o It is mandatory for the wife to use her name before the legal separation,

because legal separation does not dissolve marriage (Tolentino). o Widow (Art 373) o A widow may use husbands surname as though he were still living. The use

of the husbands surname is optional, not obligatory (Tolentino). o Identical names (Art 374-375) o if unrelated: younger person uses additional name to avoid confusion o if related: son can use junior, other male descendants either add a middle

name or mothers surname, or add roman numerals o Usurpation of name (Art 377): may be subject of action for damages.

Usurpation means: injury to the interests of the name owner, and confusion of identity. The following are the elements of usurpation of a name (Tolentino; Tolentino v Court of Appeals): o there is an actual use of anothers name o the use is unauthorized o the use of anothers name is to designate personality or identify a person

o Art 378: Unauthorized or unlawful use of another persons surname gives right of action to the latter.

o Art 379: Pen names: permitted, provided done in good faith and there is no injury to third persons. These cannot be usurped.

o Art 380: Except for pen names, no person shall use different names and surnames.

AGE OF MAJORITY o Art 234, FC: Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless

otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twenty-one years. Emancipation also takes place: o By the marriage of the minor; or o By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument

executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be irrevocable.

o Sec 1, RA 6809 (Dec 13, 1989): Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the

Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows: o "Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless

otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years." EMANCIPATION o Art 236, FC: Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over

the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.

o Sec 3, RA 6809: Art 236 is also hereby amended to read as follows: o "Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and

property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.

o "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.

o "Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

o Marriage of a person between 18 and 21 years old still requires parental

consent. Anomaly: an emancipated person still requires parental consent in order to contract marriage (Tolentino).

o Another anomalous situation: Parental authority ceases at 18, while

responsibility for a childs torts continues until the age of 21 (Tolentino).

ABSENCE: Art 381-396, Civil Code

EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY: Art 234 & 236, FC

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o Tolentino: Absence is that special legal status of one who is not in his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and it is uncertain whether he is dead or alive. o 2 kinds of absences: o ordinary absence: disappearance under normal circumstances, without

apparent danger o qualified absence: disappearance under extraordinary circumstances, or

with apparent danger o Stages of absence: o temporary or provisional absence

o a person disappears o whereabouts unknown o no administrator of his property

o normal or declared absence o judicially declared o after 2 years since the last news was heard from him o after 5 years if he left an administrator

o definite absence or presumptive death o takes place when, after the period provided by law, a person is

presumed dead PROVISIONAL ABSENCE o When may a representative be appointed? o no news of person who has disappeared after a reasonable period has

lapsed o immediate necessity for his representation in specific, urgent matters

o Who may be appointed as representative for absentee? (Art 383) o the spouse is preferred, when there is no legal separation and the spouse is

not a minor o any competent person

o What rules govern the powers, obligations and remuneration of the

representative? Rules concerning guardians. (Art 382) DECLARED ABSENCE o When may absence be declared? (Art 384) o after 2 years without any news, or since receipt of the last news o after 5 years if the absentee has left an administrator

o Who may ask for the declaration of absence? (Art 385) o spouse present o testate heirs o intestate heirs

o those who may have some right, subordinated to the condition of his death, to the property of the absentee

o When does a judicial declaration of absence take effect? (Art 386) o 6 months after publication in a newspaper of general circulation

ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY OF ABSENTEE o What authority does the wife-administratrix hold over the absentee husbands

property? o She holds all administrative authority o Art 142, FC: The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either

spouse may be transferred to the court to the other spouse (2) when one spouse is judicially declared an absentee.

o Except in the sale or encumbrance of property. o Art 388, CC: The wife-administratrix cannot alienate or encumber the

husbands property, or that of conjugal partnership, without judicial authority.

o When does administration cease? (Art 389) o when the absentee appears, either personally or through an agent o when the absentees death is proven and the in/testate heirs appear o when a 3rd person appears, showing by a proper document that he has

acquired the absentees property by purchase or other title PRESUMPTION OF DEATH o When is an absentee presumed dead? o for all purposes, except succession: after a 7-year absence o for succession: after a 10-year absence o for succession: if absentee is over 75 years old and has been absent for 5

years o for re-marriage of spouse present: after a 4-year absence, if spouse present

believes absent spouse is already dead (Art 41, FC) o When is death presumed to have occurred? o on the last day of the period of absence required by law o starting date of period of absence: date of last receipt of news

o Art 391: MISSING PERSONS o People to be presumed dead for ALL PURPOSES: o 4 years since: o loss of ship during sea voyageperson onboard o loss of airplaneperson onboard

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o participation in war (all military operations or armed fighting)armed forces

o disappearance, in danger of death and other circumstancescount from the last day, ex. 3-day earthquake or expedition

o only 2 years, if for remarriage of spouse present (Art 41, FC) o Presumptive date of death for missing persons: day of the occurrence of the

event, or if it cannot be fixed, the court determines the middle of the period in which the event could have happened.

IF SPOUSE PRESENT WANTS TO REMARRY o Art 41, FC: The spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as

provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

ABSENTEE APPEARS o Art 392: Absentee can recover all his property in the condition it may be found

but cannot claim either fruits or rents. Others possession of property ceases when absentee appears. IN CASE OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE, absentee spouse has to terminate spouse presents new marriage. An affidavit of reappearance has to be recorded in the local civil registry, under Art 42 of FC. Without this, the presumption of death continues, regardless of absentees reappearance.

ABSENTEES RIGHTS o Art 393: An absentee must prove that he was actually alive at the time that his

existence was necessary for the acquisition of a right. Life is not presumed before the date of presumptive death.

o Art 394: If an absentee stands to inherit something, his share goes to his co-

heirs, unless he has heirs, assigns or a representative. They shall all make an inventory of the property.

o Art 395: The rights vested in an absentee, his representatives or successors in

interest shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for prescription. o Art 396: Whoever inherited anything shall appropriate the fruits receive in good

faith, so long as the absentee does not appear, or while absentees representatives or successors do not bring proper actions.

o A corpse cannot be the subject of rights, because juridical personality is extinguished by death. Neither is it property.

o Why does the State give juridical protection to corpses? o to protect the feelings of those related to the deceased o to avoid dangers to the health of the living o to allow scientific investigation and study

o Chapter XXI, PD 856 (Code on Sanitation of the Philippines, December 23,

1975): Disposal of Dead Persons. A body can be scientifically investigated or studied; for example, for health reasons. o Burial grounds requirements o Burial requirements o Disinterment requirements o Funeral and embalming establishments o Licensing and registration procedures o Autopsy and dissection of remains o Donation of Human Organs for Medical, Surgical and Scientific purposes o Use of Remains for Medical Studies and Scientific Research o Special Precautions for