1  

GELUZ VS. CA 2 SCRA 801 QUENNIE ANN N. CALVA

FACTS: Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.

Court of First Instance of Manila is Convinced of the merits of the complaint

upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion. ISSUE: Whether or not the unborn child endowed with personality to constitute death of a person HELD: The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.00 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death

pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

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PEOPLE VS. TIROL AND BALDESCO 102 SCRA 558 ADAMS RALPH JORDAN S. ELEGINO

Facts: BONIFACIO TIROL and CIRIACO BALDESCO are convicted for seven (7) murders and for two (2) frustrated murders. Sentences each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death for each of the seven murders of the seven deceased, and to an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS for each of the two Frustrated Murders of the two wounded persons and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the seven deceased with the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) for each of the seven deceased, or FORTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P42,000.00) in all, and pay the costs, fifty-fifty. rtual law library

The penalty herein imposed for each of the seven murders being the maximum - death - the records of this case are hereby automatically elevated to the Supreme Court.c Hanrobles

During the pendency of this appeal, or on October 23, 1977, appellant Baldesco died in the New Bilibid Prison so that on January 28, 1978, We resolved to dismiss this case insofar as the criminal liability of the said appellant is concerned. Issue: Whether or not, the trial on Baldesco will be dismiss on the grounds that the accused is already dead. Held: Trial will proceed but this appeal will be resolved insofar as Baldesco is concerned only for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate may be liable.

Death of the accused will extinguished criminal liability but not civil liability.

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JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO 93 Phil. 257 CHRISTIAN MONTEFALCON

FACTS: On 2/6/45, while the battle for the liberation of Manila. was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN, Sr.) and Angela Joaquin (AJ), together w/ their 3 daughters and their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.) and the latter's wife, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. During their stay, the bldg. was packed w/ refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire.

Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the bldg, especially those who were trying to escape. the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and JN, Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could not convince AJ, who refused to join them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the latter's wife dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people, presumably including AJ. JN, Sr., Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and stayed there for about 3 days, until they were forced to leave bec. the shelling tore it open. They fled but unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, killing the two.

The trial court found the deaths to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.; 3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found that the deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr. HELD: Where there are facts, known or knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption (in the Rules of Court) does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence controls.

Are there particular circumstances on record from w/c reasonable inference of survivorship bet. AJ and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony competent and sufficient for the purpose?

It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr. died before his mother.

While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed , while running, in front of, and 15 meters from the Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or less, and so died w/in that interval from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.

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According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr. died, and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer than 5 seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that AJ was still alive when her son expired.

The CA mentioned several causes, besides the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have been killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by falling beams bec. the bldg. was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's departure and his death.

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."

In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is deduced from established facts w/c, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.

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The Standard Oil Co. of NY Vs. Juan Codina Arenas and others 19, PHIL, 363 No. 5921, July 25, 1911

MAY CLAUDINE GADOR Case under the topic of Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon: Presumption of Capacity- Capacity to act is presumed until the contrary is proven, and that it be the reason for the specific act attributed. Proof of restriction: habituality, presence at the time, no other cause. FACTS: December 15, 1908 –Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties sign a bond in favor of plaintiff for the obliged to pay the amount of P 3,305.76 at three months from date, with interest at P 1.00 per month. April 5, 1909 – The plaintiff sued the debtors regarding the bond sign and was summoned, the record showing that summons was served on Villanueva; May 12, 1909 - Villanueva did not appear, and was declared in default. On process:

-­‐ Wife of Villanueva appeared when judgment was about to be executed and asked that he be relieved from the bond and the judgment because he was insane (declared July 24, 1909) with his wife as his guardian.

-­‐ Case was reopened and tried and the evidence showed that Villanueva executed the bond with full understanding of the nature and consequences of the act performed by him although he was suffering from monomania of great wealth.

-­‐ He was, therefore, held liable on the bond. Hence appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not monomania of wealth necessarily warrants that the person does not have capacity to act.

2. Whether or not Villanueva was actually incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was executed.

RULING: SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. it would have been necessary to show that:

1. Such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient;

2. That the bond executed was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that is, that there were not, or could there have been any other cause for the contract than the ostentation of wealth and this was purely an effect of such monomania of wealth.

3. That the monomania existed on the date the bond in question was executed. Monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of executing a bond such as that in question.

4. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue for so long as the contrary is not proved, that is, at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind; which, in the opinion of the court has not been proved in this case.

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Mercado & Mercado vs. Espiritu; 37 Phil 215

NIKKO LOUIS LABRADA FACTS: The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares.

The defendant (Luis Espiritu) was accused to have induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum of P400 as opposed to its original value. The annulment of a deed of sale was sought by the plaintiffs. They asserted that two of the four parties were minors. These two minors (Domingo & Josefa Mercado) presented themselves to be of legal age upon signing it and they made a manifestation in front of the notary public. ISSUE: In light with the well-settled rule of Legal Capacity under Article 38 of The New Civil Code, will the minority of the contracting parties affect the validity of the deed of sale when the minors presented themselves that they were of legal age based on the manifestation that they have made in front of the Notary Public?. HELD: The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid since it was executed by minors, when in fact they are not, and they are not permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of their obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled. Their contention of being minor that time when they contracted their obligations, their allegations will be negated by the fact that, they have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors pretended that they had already reached their majority. Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on estoppels Book IV, Title IV of the NCC. Art 1431 of Civil Code. Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

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Balamban vs. Maramba, 51 Phil 417 HONEY MAY PRINCESS BAROMAN

FACTS: Petitioner Isidro Bambalan, a minor, owned a piece of land. Isidro was forced by his mother, Paula Prado, to sell the land to Genovena Muerong, since the latter was threatening Paula of imprisonment due to loan Genovena gave Paula. To have the document of the sale acknowledged, the respondent even purchased the cedula of the petitioner. Isidro didn’t try to conceal his age and in fact the respondent was well aware that Isidro was a minor. The decision in Mercado vs. Espiritu cannot be used since the petitioner didn’t try to hide his age. The land in question wasn’t even registered in the Register of Deeds, thus, the sale of land cannot be executed without registration as provided in section 50 of Act 496. ISSUE: Was the sale of the land valid or void, since Isidro was a minor at the execution of the alleged sale? HELD: The sale of the land is void because of the following reasons:

• Isidro is incapacitated to enter into such contracts, • Because the land wasn‘t even registered and hence, cannot be sold.

Ratio: Art. 1390 NCC: The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract... Art. 38 NCC: Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act (aptitude for the exercise of rights), and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. Art. 1397 NCC: The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract. (1302a)

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BRAGANZA vs. VILLA ABRILLE WARREN LUNA

FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no paid, Abrille sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract. ISSUE: Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan they have signed. RATIO: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because the minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest. However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence – “in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit.” The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent to P1,166.67.

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Carillo vs Jaojoco , 46 Phil. 957 THEA DESEREE A. CENIZA

Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion. Facts:

• Adriana Carillo, nine days afterwards was declared mentally incapacitated by the Court of first Instance (CFI) which later on died.

• Miguela Carrillo, sister of Adrianna Carrillo and was appointed judicial administratrix of the said estate brought action to the CFI for the annulment of the said contract of sale.

• The defendants were absolved from the complaint and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed. Nov. 13, 1918

• On November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo was confined in “Hosppital de San Juan de Dios by reason of having a cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia (Paralysis affecting only one side of the body.), and there she was attended by Doctor Ocampo until she left on December 18, 1918.

o According to Dr. Ocampo, the hemiplegia did not affect Adrianna’s head but only one-half of her body.

• Marcos Jaojoco and his father Justiniano, defendant-appellees, nephew and

brother-in-law, respectively to the deceased, were the ones who took her to the hospital and cared for her.

• Om December 18, 1918, Adrianna called a notary public to execute the contract of

sale of land (eleven parcels of land, situated in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona Province of Cavite) containing an area of 330,409 square meters, for the price of P4,000.

• Nine days later, she dies and Miguela is appointed judicial administratrix of said

estate. (It is interesting to note that Miguela was the surety of her sister when the latter acquired it from her husband in January 1917.)

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Issue: Whether or not Adriana was mentally incapacitated at the time the document of sale was executed. Held: No. The plaintiff’s attempt to prove that Adriana was mentally deranged was insufficient. Being confined in a hospital does not prove insanity. Her doctor testified that her sickness did not affect her head but only ½ of her body. Documents produced before the Court before the execution of the document of sale, shows complex tasks done by Adriana which couldn’t be done by a mentally incapacitated person It must likewise be noted that the other witnesses of the plaintiff, who testified to the incapacity of Adriana Carrillo, also made transactions with her precisely at the time, when according to them, she was mentally incapacitated. In view of all of this, which is proven by documents and the testimonies of witnesses completely disinterested in the case, it cannot be held that on December 9, 1918, when Adriana Carrillo signed the document, she was mentally incapacitated. The fact that nine days after the execution of the contract, Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract. After all, this can perfectly be explained by saying that her disease became aggravated subsequently. Our conclusion is that prior to the execution of the document in question the usual state of Adriana Carrillo was that of being mentally capable, and consequently the burden of proof that she was mentally incapacitated at a specified time is upon him who affirms said incapacity. If no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, her capacity must be presumed.

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US v. Vaquilar 27 Phil 88 NEIL BRAYAN N. MONINIO

Topic: Insanity Effect on Crimes – Article 12 Revise Penal Code Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

Facts: The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. His commission of these crimes is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to the commission of the crimes. They also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. Issue: Whether or not Vaquilar who murder his wife and daughter with a bolo is liable for the crime with the allegation of being insane. Ruling: The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an enlarged criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each information having been proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance with the law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant. Related Cases: People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776) - passion vs. insanity The supreme court explain: But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and restrain their persons, and are liable to the law if they do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far as to make them reckless, the fact that they have become at last too infuriated to keep them from mischief is merely the result of not applying restraint in season. In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664) – Motive of crime The court said: "The court very properly continued with an explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such conditions, responsible for

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the crime, because a large share of homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives as these.' " People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 (1986) – Schizophrenia is covered by the term insanity Schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions, formerly called dementia pracecox. People v. Lacera, 69 Phil. 350 – Malignant malaria is covered by the term insanity One who is suffering from malignant malaria when she wounded her husband who died as a consequence is not criminally liable, because such illness affects the nervous system and causes among other such complication as acute melancholia and insanity at times.

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Dumaguin v.Reynolds Sept. 30, 1952 G.R. No. L-3572 MAY ANN ESOLANA

Nature: Paulino Dumaguin, plaintiff-appellee, invokes insanity to declare transfer of mining claims to his employers invalid. Facts: May 21, 1929 - Dumaguin was admitted to the Insular Psychopathic Hospital at San Felipe, Neri, Mandaluyong, Rizal due to paranoia but was discharged a few months later (Nov. 11, 1929). Sept. 16, 1930 - His wife, in order to withdraw his retirement gratuity from the government, filed for and was appointed guardianship of her husband. During 1930-1931, Fructuoso, Paulino’s brother, helped the plaintiff get a job with Reynolds and Harrisonto relocate mining claims and locate new ones. Plaintiff, however, claimed that he was only employed to relocate. From May to July of 1931, the brothers staked and located ten new mining claims and registered Paulino as the locator. Sept. 10, 1931 – Paulino transferred the claims via “Deeds of Transfer” to Reynolds and Harrison in two separate actions (the first contained the first nine deeds, while the second, the last one). On Nov. 2, Reynolds via “Deed of Sale” sold eight of the claims to Big Wedge Mining Co. June 4, 1940 – After re-amending his original complaint on Nov. 5 1934(without the “under guardianship” plea), he asked the court to nullify the deeds of transfer/sale and be declared owner of the mining claims. He also sought any profit made by the end-buyer, Big Wedge Mining. Co, while of the plaintiff’s alleged property. Feb. 5, 1940 – The reply from the defendants, Reynolds and Harrison(after the re-amended complaint),entailed that the brothers Dumaguin were expressly employed to locate mineral claims with the understanding that these be transferred to the defendants; that they were not aware of any alleged mental incapacities and bought the claims in good faith. The case was heard by CFI Baguio on July31, 1940 and was dismissed on Jan. 16the following year in favor of the defendants. Two appeals were made on Nov. 3, 1941 and December 31, 1941 agains tReynolds and Harrison and Big Wedge Mining Co., respectively. The CA found that the amount involved was beyond its jurisdiction and so certified the case to the SC. It was assumed that Reynolds and Harrison had died after/during Japanese occupation since they never answered the appeals leaving Big Wedge Mining Co., the only defendant.

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Issue Held/Ratio:

(1) WON the plaintiff and his brother were working as employees and agents of the defendants when the mining locations were claimed.

Yes. All profits made, and advantages gained, by agent in the execution of the agency belongs to the principal. The fact that the plaintiffs found the claims merely means that that they were fulfilling an obligation and complying with a trust. (2) WON the plaintiff’s alleged insanity nullifies the deeds of transfer originally made to his employers and subsequently, the end-buyers. No. The presumption of insanity is only juris tantum, subject to rebuttal. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the presumption of mental incapacity (and insanity) is only prima facie and may be rebutted by evidence; and that a person under guardianship for insanity may still enter into a valid contract and even convey property, provided it is proven that at the time if entering into said contract, he was not insane or that his mental defect did not interfere with his capacity to appreciate the meaning and significance of the transaction entered by him.

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People v. Sasota REX FRIOLO

Facts: Defendant was charged with the crime of rape of a deaf and dumb girl. Sasota, found guilty of the crime because of the victim’s testimony, now posits that the testimony of the deaf and dumb should not have been accepted by the court at its full value. Issue: Whether or not a deaf and dumb person is considered a competent witness by the court. Held: There is no merit in the contention of the defendant that deaf and dumb persons are to be considered incompetent witnesses. Though formerly, deaf and dump persons were considered incompetent, experience and observation have shown conclusively that the mere fact that a person is deaf and dumb is not sufficient to justify the finding that he is incompetent as a witness. When such a witness is produced, the court may ascertain whether he has the requisite intelligence, and the judge will allow the witness to adopt such mode of communicating his ideas, whether by signs or writing as he deems most satisfactory. An excerpt from the opinion of Justice Moreland, United States v. Estrada, lends further support to the conclusion reached by us: "The commission of the crime at the place, at the time, and in the manner charged is not impossible and, although the charge that it was so committed may be unreasonable, still such unreasonableness may be overcome by the direct and positive testimony of unimpeachable witnesses. From the evidence before him the learned trial court found that the witnesses for the prosecution were telling the truth in their relation of the story of the case and that the facts occurred substantially as they stated them. We have held on many occasions that 'this court will not interfere with the intelligent conclusion of a trial court concerning the credibility of witnesses, the court having seen the witnesses in the act of testifying and having carefully observed their manner and demeanor as witnesses, unless the record discloses that some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has either been overlooked by the court or has been misapprehended or misinterpreted." There is no such showing in this case, notwithstanding the valiant efforts of counsel for appellant to create such an impression.

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Director of Lands v. Abelardo MALOU MAMAC

Facts: The case revolves around proving the ownership of 2 parcels of lands, which were properties subject in a successional litigation. Siblings Fulgencia and Jose Dino are contesting the ownership of subject properties in Manuel Libunao’s possession. They further claim that as deaf-mutes, they should not be barred by prescription in filing the case. Issue: Whether or not the prescription period in filing the case should be relaxed due to their being deaf-mutes. Held: No, they are not. The SC ruled that the subject lands are still and should still be owned by Manuel Libuano and family due to the following reasons (1) the preponderance of evidence as to the ownership of the lands are in favor of Libunao, (2) the action for filing a claim regarding the partition of the estate has already prescribed. Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law, considered included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons, in connection with the running of the prescriptive period. And we arrive at this conclusion, inasmuch as, even supposing that the evidence of the appellees in regard to the ownership of the lands did not preponderate (we believe it does), there is still the prescription in their favor inasmuch as the continued possession by the appellees of the land in question, which is exclusive as has been seen, not only because it so appears from the evidence of the appellees, but also because the appellants' own witness, Julian Ignacio, testified to that effect, operates as an extinguishment of any right which the appellants may have had to said lands, unless there is another legal reason to prevent this conclusion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library And this possible reason is merely the alleged incapacity of the appellants, due to their being deaf-mutes. Such a physical condition is no obstacle to the running of the prescriptive period; since it has been proved in this case that it was not accompanied by mental deficiency or any other legal incapacity. Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law, considered included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons, in connection with the running of the prescriptive periods. The old doctrine that a deaf-mute was presumed to be an idiot no longer prevails, and such persons are now held capable of entering into contracts if shown to have sufficient mental capacity. (Alexier vs. Matzke, 151 Mich., 36.) chanrobles virtual law library Where one was born deaf and dumb, but had his intellectual faculties, though these were not improved by the modern system of education for persons of that class: Held, that he was not within the exception of the statute of limitations, which only exception of is non compos mentis. (38 N. C. Ire. Eq., 535. 1)

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Martinez v Martinez March 31, 1902 IQBAL SINGH

Facts: This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father. The son claimed that the father is dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his second wife and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given over the administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives. The defendant alleged that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of attorney under which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years, that the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be registered in his own name without the consent of the father and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an account of his administration. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court. Issue: Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby injuring the estate of his son? Held: No. Petition dismissed. The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of applying general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons. Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate. Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons who can contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.) Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon the owner, but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by public policy may well be regarded unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property, and as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.

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While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased since her marriage, there is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any perceptible diminution of the defendant’s property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother. A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff himself possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his father.

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Silverio vs. Republic G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007 RIZZA ALMIROL

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent FACTS: On December 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jascinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name to and sex his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 105207, impleaded the Civil Registrar of Manila as respondent. The petitioner alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is “anatomically male but feels, thinks, and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he transform himself to a woman on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio – Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. On June 4 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read: “Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive…” The court rules in the affirmative. Firstly, the court is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the court of appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief (changing his first name and sex on his birth certificate) asked for. RULING: On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis.

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1. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth

certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Under RA 9048, it intent to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of

Rule 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the rules of the court unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be

allowed: 1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with

dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. 2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by

the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community

3. The change will avoid confusion.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. The

petition in trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. Under section 2 of RA 9048 which defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as substitute. The birth certificate of the petitioner contained no error. No correction is necessary. The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. The changes sought by the petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. To grant the petition will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage

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and family relations. Second, there are various laws (Labor Code on employment of women, etc.) which apply particularly to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. Therefore, the petition is hereby DENIED.

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REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN JOY PALMA

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar. ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court. HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances

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when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.