Performative violence? The Multitude of Lone Wolf Terrorism.pdf

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Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base

Volume I, Issue 1

Performative Violence?

The Multitude of Lone Wolf Terrorism

Author: Jelle van Buuren

Universiteit of Leiden

August 2012

Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base | Volume I, Issue 1 | August 2012

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Performative violence? The Multitude of Lone Wolf Terrorism

Jelle van Buuren

Lone wolf terrorism - violent acts committed by single individuals with a significant impact

on society - has moved up the public, political and scientific agendas. Without doubt, the

double terrorist attacks by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway last July, which claimed 77

lives, have functioned as an important catalyst in this growing attention. But lone wolves

asserted themselves prior to the Norway attacks. Think for instance of Baruch Goldstein, an

American-born Israeli citizen who was responsible for the death of 29 Muslims praying in the

Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron; the Austrian Franz Fuchs, who used letter bombs to kill 4

and injure 15 people; US army major Nidal Malik Hasan, who is accused of a mass shooting

at Fort Hood in which 13 people died and 30 were wounded; and the American mathematician

Theodore Kaczynsky, also known as the “Una Bomber”, who engaged in a mail bombing

spree that killed three and wounded 23. In addition, there have been several lone wolves who

assassinated political leaders, such as Yigal Amir, the assassin of former Israeli Prime

Minister Yitzhak Rabin; Volkert van der Graaf, who killed the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn;

and Mijailo Mijailovic, who is responsible for the death of the Swedish Minister for Foreign

Affairs Anna Lindh (Bakker and De Graaf 2010). In The Netherlands we can also notice the

murder of movie director and opinion maker Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Byouri, or the

attack in April 2009 on the Royal Family by Karst Tates, who tried to ran with his car into a

bus which carried the Dutch Queen and other members of the royal family, killing seven

bystanders. In The Netherlands, the responsible authority for counter terrorism NCTb has

warned for the threat that emanates from radicalised individuals (Ministerie van Veiligheid en

Justitie 2011).

These facts seem to give more than enough reason to scrutinize the phenomenon of lone wolf

terrorism more closely. However, some prudence is called for. Whenever a new term hits the

public, political and scientific discourse we have to be aware of the possible fashion fad of the

new concept. In the Netherlands, for instance, we have witnessed political murders (Fortuyn,

Theo van Gogh) perpetrated by individuals, that were never referred to as the acts of lone


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wolf terrorists. At forehand, the lacking label of ‘lone wolf terrorism’ didn’t seem to have had

any influence on the degree Dutch society was able to interpret these attacks, let alone deal

with them. Further, it should be noted that the introduction of a new term does not necessarily

mean that the phenomenon the term is referring to also is brand new. More important

probably is that we should have some restraint in thinking that once we put the right label - or

scientific definition or concept - in place we obtain by definition a better understanding of

social reality. The opposite could also be true: by approaching a subject from a too clear-cut

or abstract definition or conceptualisation important themes that could be of importance in

understanding the issues at stake could get out of our sight. This ‘ethnocentrism of the

scientist’ leads to substituting the practical relation to the world for the observer’s theoretical

relation to practice, or, to use Bourdieu’s formula, ‘to take the model of reality for the reality

of the model’ (Bourdieu 1987: 62;; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 69). An exploratory

approach seems for now an appropriate route to follow, as we are far away from any theory

that could explain, let alone predict lone wolf terrorism. In this article we will therefore look

into a triad of issues that have been turned up in research into lone wolf terrorism: (1) How

‘lone’ are lone wolves;; (2) is lone wolf terrorism a new phenomenon and is it on the rise; (3)

What motivates the lone wolf terrorist? We will end the article with an initial impetus to some

theoretical or conceptual approaches that could be of use in further researching lone wolf

terrorism.

1. How lone is the lone wolf?

What exactly do we mean when we speak of lone wolf terrorism? It’s a question that is not

easy to answer to. Some of the confusion surrounding lone wolf terrorism can be seen back in

the different definitions that circulate within literature. A commonly used definition of lone

wolves is that it is ‘a person who acts on his or her own without orders from - or even

connections to - an organization’ (Stewart and Burton 2008). In the definition of COT (2007:

6) lone wolf terrorism is described as the intentional acts committed by persons (a) who

operate individually; (b) who do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network; (c)

who act without the direct influence of a leader or hierarchy; (d) whose tactics and methods

are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or direction.

According to Kaplan (1997), lone wolf terrorism may be defined as ‘an operation in which an

individual, or a very small, highly cohesive group, engages in acts of anti-state violence


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independent of any movement, leader or network of support’. The latter definition paves way

to a concept of lone wolf terrorism in which more than one person is engaged. This confusion

in definitions has of course its effects on what is counted for as acts of lone wolves. For

instance, the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, which is usually presented as a prototype act of

lone wolf terrorism, is not counted as such in a study of the COT (2007) because Timothy

McVeigh executed the attack indeed by himself, but got some help in preparing the attack by

his friend Terry Nichols.

Other scholars however contest that there is anyhow something like lone wolf terrorism.

Based on their research into 40 terrorist attacks by right extremists in the United Kingdom, all

labelled by the authorities as lone wolf attacks, Jackson and Gable (2011) concluded that the

phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism is mostly a myth. All perpetrators proved to have a long

and clear involvement in organised right extremist networks. Their motivation and knowledge

to carry out terrorist attacks were handed to them through virtual networks that nourished

them both ideologically and practically. Most of the perpetrators used the internet to establish

contacts with like-minded activists, to exchange ideas and to get hold on information how to

get weapons or how to build bombs. The researchers cite a senior FBI officer who stated that

the only genuine lone wolf the FBI ever had come across was Ted Kaczynski, the so-called

Unabomber (Jackson and Gable 2011: 13). Of course, this confusion can be partly explained

by realizing that ‘terrorism’ is a social construct and that definitions of terrorism typically

reflect the interests of those who do the defining (Spaaij 2012: 15). But it also shows the

complexity of lone wolf terrorism and the danger that a too clear-cut definition of it comes at

the price of a serious reduction of complexity.

A typology formulated by Pantucci (2011: 7-8; 12-32) of lone wolves inspired by a Jidahist

world view also shows that the ‘lone’ wolf in one way or the other is linked (virtually) to

others. Pantucci distinguishes between ‘Loners’ (an individual who plans or attempts to carry

out an act of terrorism using the cover of extreme Islamist ideology without having any actual

connection or contact with extremists - beyond what they are able to access through passive

consumption on the internet or from society at large);; ‘Lone Wolves’ (individuals who, while

appearing to carry out their actions alone and without any physical outside instigation, in fact

demonstrate some level of contact with operational extremists);; ‘Lone Wolf Pack’ (similar to

the Lone Wolves, except rather than there being a single individual who becomes

ideologically motivated); and ‘Lone Attackers’ (individuals who operate alone, but


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demonstrate clear command and control links with active extremists, rather than loose online

connections or aspirational contacts).

Under closer examination lone wolves therefore seem to be to a lesser degree individuals who

operate completely on their own than we would expect on the face of it. It seems most of the

lone wolves are somehow - passive or active - part of broader communities, or at least

understand themselves as being part of a broader community. It therefore seems sensible not

to overestimate the importance of the ‘acting alone’ of a lone wolf in preparing and

committing an attack, but instead look more closely into the changing dynamics and relations

between individuals and communities. In the literature on terrorism a great deal of attention

has always been devoted to the analysis of group dynamics, on how immediate social

interactions shape and change ideology and sentiment. Current and ongoing debates within

the literature powerfully impact the extent to which group dynamics of some form still play a

role in the processes of ‘lone-wolf’ radicalization. Some observers note that the viral spread of

extremism online, especially social media, can act as a surrogate offline social network. If this

is the case, it is possible the group dynamics usually described to radicalisation within

terrorist groups also occur within a ‘digital ecology in some adumbrate form’ (Bartlett and

Miller 2012: 3).

The paradox seems to be that Internet gives rise to the birth of a ‘community of loners’

(Pantucci 2011: 6). De availability of extremist readings and ‘how to do’ instructions can have

furthered the growth of the ‘autodidactic extremist’. The loner leaning towards violence can

now easily teach himself the extremist creed, and then define his global outlook along the

same lines, using it as a justification when carrying out an act of violence. (Pantucci 2011:

11). As Matthew Feldman - who doesn’t refer to lone wolf terrorism but to broadband

terrorism - states: ‘a few mouse-clicks enable the assembly of everything from radical

doctrines to bombs’ (2011). Virtual group dynamics therefore may influence, at least to some

extent, individuals who operate autonomously. Conversely, lone wolf terrorists may also

influence wider movements (Spaaij 2010: 866). The case of Breivik shows a combination of

both tendencies. By citing a range of ideological readings from authors belonging to the

international counter-jihad movement, Breivik shows that he understands himself as being

part of this ‘community of belief’ or ‘ideology of extremism and validation’ (COT 2007: 7);; At

the same time Breivik hoped that his acts would inspire his allies to do the same. He sketched

his - real or imagined - allies how to operate in order not to be discovered timely by law


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enforcement or intelligence: ‘[Their] Achilles heel is their vulnerability against single/duo

martyr cells’ (Berwick 2011: 934).

2. Is lone wolf terrorism on the rise?

In spite of the current attention for lone wolf terrorism it is not a new phenomenon. The

concept of ‘Leaderless Resistance’ for instance has been for decades the favourite battle

model for right wing and anti-government militias in the United States (Kaplan 1997).

Historically the phenomenon of ‘radicalised individuals’ even can be traced back to the 19th

century when anarchists enjoyed some reputation for their individual ‘Propaganda of the

Deed’ (Novak 1954: 176). This historical outlook is also of interest for the current discussions

as these examples show that individuals who for tactical, ideological or personal reasons acted

alone in perpetrating their attacks nevertheless were embedded in broader social and political

environments.

The question whether there is a significant rise during the last decades in attacks by lone wolf

terrorist is not easy to answer in an unambiguous way. As far as international data are

available about the threat and violence of lone wolves – data that are difficult to compare

because of the differences in definition – the results are quit murky. According to the COT-

study (2007: 19) Europe witnessed a peak in lone wolf attacks in the eighties (13 incidents);

in the nineties the amount of attacks equalled that of the seventies (7 incidents). In the first

decade of the 21st century the figure advanced to 11 incidents. In the United States there was

a peak in the nineties (13 incidents) and a decline in the number of lone wolf attacks to 8 in

the last ten years. According to data collected by START (2010: 2-3) there is a watershed in

the amount of lone wolf attacks before and after the 1995 Oklahoma Bombings. In the period

1970-2006 6,5% of the terrorist attacks in the U.S. could be ascribed to lone wolves. Since

1995 however 43 out of a total of 131 incidents seemed to be the work of individuals. In the

light of these figures Spaaij (2010: 866) concluded that lone wolf terrorism counted roughly

for one percent of all terrorist attacks, that the phenomenon especially can be found in the

United States and show an upward trend, but that the same cannot be established for other

countries. Research into the attacks of individuals against public persons in Germany

(Hoffmann e.a. 2010), against politicians in Western-Europe (James e.a. 2007), against

Members of Parliament in Canada (Adams e.a. 2009), against presidents in the US (Megargee


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1986) or against public persons in the US (Fein en Vossekuil 1999) shows similar results:

attacks by individuals are not tied to a particular period but are of all time, but it is not crystal-

clear if we witness a significant upward trend.

The same can be said for The Netherlands. Bovenkerk (2005) conducted research into the

phenomenon of death treats by individuals against politicians and other public authorities as a

result of the boom in death treats against politicians after the murder of Pim Fortuyn. An

inventory by the department of Home Affairs showed that more than thousand death treats

(bullet letters, threats by telephone and hate mails) against politicians were made during the

period May 6th 2004 to May 28th 2004. The period after the turbulence in May 2004 also

showed a tidal wave of death threats against politicians and administrators. A special police

squad grounded in 2004 registered during the period 2005-2010 1234 death threats against

national politicians and Members of Parliament with an average of 250 a year.1 A total of 106

politicians reported death threats. The average victim was threatened eight to ten times a year.

The dark number of course is not known. Politicians and public authorities at the local level

were also the victim of threats. The department of Home Affairs reported in 2009 that three

out of ten local authorities were the victim of aggression by individuals (BZK 2010). The

research of Bovenkerk however also showed that public authorities were the object of

aggression for decades. Respondents came up with examples of death threats from twenty or

thirty years ago. Threats and attacks by individuals against public authorities therefore are

also in The Netherlands not a new phenomenon.

The lack of reliable figures makes it difficult to give a sound judgement about the prevalence

of lone wolf terrorism. The perceived rise in lone wolf terrorism therefore can also be the

result of the so called registration effect (Bovenkerk 2005: 187; for a more general discussion

of registration effects and its impact on crime figures see Wittebrood & Nieuwbeerta 2006).

When law enforcement authorities devote more attention to a specific criminal phenomenon

and start registering all incidents the usual result is an increase in figures that can easily give

the impression that there is a huge problem compared to earlier days. Bovenkerk further

argued that there is a difference in the way public authorities reacted on threats and political

violence. According to Bovenkerk the authorities were traditionally inclined to dispose of the

1 Figures from the period 2004-2008 are retrieved from NCTb 2010; figures from the period 2009-2010 are retrieved from press statements of the Public Prosecutor; see: http://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/bedreigingen/@155307/lichte-stijging/


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involved individuals as harmless quarrel mongers and choose deliberately not to give any

public attention to the threats in order not to give other ‘lunatics’ the inspiration to come up

with the same ideas (Bovenkerk 2005: 51). Nowadays almost every incident hits the press; not

only national incidents but also international incidents thanks to the internationalisation of

communications. This could also influence and stimulate copycat behaviour (see for instance

Berkowitz and Macauly 1971: 238; Kostinsky, Bixler, Kettl 2001: 999).

In connection to this attention should be drawn to societal’s increasing sensitivity for

everything that is connected with insecurity and risk. Modern societies are dominated by fear,

risk and insecurity and ‘security’ has become a governmental technique to produce meaning

and order in society. The loss of social connections, identities and public morality has put the

issue of meaning and significance to the foreground and has subscribed a permanent feeling

of existential insecurity in the capillaries of society (Bauman 2006; Beck 1992; Boutellier

2005; Furedi 1997 en 2006). Incidents not only emerge faster and more often into the public

consciousness, the political and societal reactions they provoke are also harsher. When the

Dutch revolutionary group RaRa planted and detonated a bomb that destroyed the house of

state secretary Kosto responsible for asylum policies in 1991, there was a short discussion at

the highest political-administrative levels whether politicians should be better protected. The

conclusion however was that as a matter of principle, public authorities in The Netherland

should not be encircled with body guards (Muller 1994: 378-380). Nowadays personal

protection by body guards is the order of the day. Whether this just reflects the expanded

threat these authorities are facing or that the changed societal context and sensitivity also

comes into it, remains an open question.

3. What motivates the lone wolf?

A last question relates to the motivation of lone wolves. Partly this has to do with the terrorist

character of lone wolf attacks and therefore also refers to definitional issues and in connection

with that the quantative and qualitative reading of the phenomenon. Some definitions require

a terrorist intention in order for attacks to be qualified as lone wolf attacks (COT 2007); other

definitions don’t have this requirement or focus on the terrorist effect instead of the terrorist

intention. Of course there are sound arguments to distinguish between the terrorist or non-

terrorist dimension in the attacks by individuals. But for the broad, explorative approach we


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have chosen for this article it seems not sensible to put the terrorist dimension to the

foreground of our analysis; it runs the risk of removing at forehand acts by individuals that

apparently not qualify for the terrorist requirement whereas it could be the case that those acts

provide important information for our understanding. Besides that there is an inherent

problem in determining the motives of individuals: outsiders attribute intentions to the acts of

individuals. The danger of subjective interpretations is constantly lying in wait (COT 2007:

8). This seems especially the case when it concerns acts of terrorism. Terrorists are

‘containers into which one can project one’s unconscious hostility’, according to DeMausse

(cited in Victoroff 2005: 33). Victoroff warns against the tendency to explain the terrorist

mind-set by projecting the state of mind supposedly ‘required’ to act in this way. Our default

reaction is that evil acts must be the product of fundamentally evil or insane individuals. A

comparable critique was launched by Durodié - at the occasion of the 2005 attacks in London

- who stated that all kind of self-appointed experts and commentators projected according to

their pre-existing political persuasions their own pet theory onto the situation with a view to

shaping ensuing policy (2007: 427). According to Durodié the uncomfortable truth could be

that the London attacks were largely pointless and meaningless and in that way reflected the

nihilist sentiments of other disgruntled individuals like the youngsters responsible for the

Columbine high-school massacre (2007: 434) - an analysis which of course could also reflects

particularly preoccupations held by Durodié.

An additional problem - assuming that something can be said about the motivations of lone

wolves - is that scientist some times have the tendency of slicing up social reality into nice

fitting but abstract categories, classifications and concepts that hardly ever can be found in

reality. Generally spoken, social reality - for as far as there is such thing as reality - and

especially the individual agents living in it, hardly show any interest in or behave themselves

according to the definitions, concepts and categories scientists stick onto it. When reading the

motivations of lone wolves it can be of scientific relevance to classify them: is there a

political motive, a personal motive or is the motive diffuse or incomprehensible? However as

soon as a concrete case shows up these classification schemes are hardly tenable. Take for

instance the case of Tristan van der Vlis who killed arbitrary bystanders in a shopping mall in

a small village in The Netherlands before taking his own life. As far as we know, Van der

Vlis was driven by a diffuse anger against ‘society’, a personal rage against ‘God’ and rage

against ‘the municipality’. Most scientists will not qualify Van der Vlis as a lone wolf terrorist

because he seemed not to have a political or terrorist intention or goal. The question however


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remains if Van der Vlis in his diffuse anger wanted or could make the same fine conceptual

distinctions between ‘society’, ‘politics’ or ‘political system’. The same can be said of

Nordine Amrani who killed six bystanders in Liege (Belgium) before killing himself. Amrani

apparently hated ‘the world’, hated ‘the system’ and thought ‘everybody was against him’.

What if he had not chosen his victims randomly at the square in front of the local court house

but had entered the court? Would his act then have been qualified as a terrorist or political act

of a lone wolf? Looking at the fear and panic provoked by the attacks of Amrani one has to

conclude that the result of his actions corresponds to what usually is considered to be acts of

terrorism. The ‘diffuse’ or ‘incomprehensible’ rage attributed to lone wolves could therefore

partly reflect the diffuse state of politics and the fragmented character of society in which

guiding ideologies have lost much of their importance, politics and administration are

nodalized and in which it is increasingly unclear who is responsible for what policies or

policy outcomes. Instead of keep trying to classify the deeds and motivations of lone wolves

according to previously defined categories, it could be more promising to take this vagueness

as a starting point and accept that one of the characteristics of lone wolf terrorism is that

‘society and state are fused together into a single, all-rounding threat’ (Wieviorka 2003: 16).

Case studies that have been conducted show that there are indeed real problems in attributing

motivations and intentions to lone wolves. Assigning motivations to individual acts of terror is

inherently subjective and open to considerable interpretation. This fact becomes all the more

problematic as individuals move away from explicitly claiming their attacks and prefer

instead to let their actions speak for themselves. A particularly apt example comes out of

Oklahoma City. Timothy McVeigh could have been (and was) described as a terrorist

motivated by religion for his adherence to the Christian Identity movement. However, later it

became clear that McVeigh viewed himself more as a political terrorist acting in response to

the federal raids at Ruby Ridge and Waco and out of his virulent opposition to gun control

measures. Less often cited is the contention that McVeigh acted on ethnic principles based on

his alleged belief in the White supremacy movement (Quillen 2002: 287). Given these

limitations on identifying motivations, the difference between religious and political motives

is also hard to prove. According to Quillen, many of these questions about terrorist

motivations are simply unanswerable. In fact, seeking definitive answers may obscure more

than it reveals (Quillen 2002: 288). A last comment on this subject is that the emphasis on the

diffuse or incomprehensible dimensions of modern terrorism runs the risk of ascribing in


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retrospective crystal-clear and unambiguous motivations to ‘old school’ terrorists. It can be

questioned if that view is correct.

4. Are lone wolves lunatics?

Two different reactions dominate the debate after lone wolf incidents have taken place. The

first is to classify the attacks as the work of lunatics and to state that these acts should be

judged accordingly. Any possible relationships with underlying societal phenomena are

rejected. The second reaction postulates these acts have to be understood as social or political

acts.

Are lone wolves mostly mentally ill and should we understand and judge their actions

accordingly? The question whether radicalised individuals are ‘insane’ has been earlier put

forward in the case of ‘old school’ terrorists. After reviewing the literature on this subject,

Victoroff (2005) concluded there is no robust scientific evidence to support the position that

terrorists suffer from mental disorders. Research into (attempted) attacks or threats against

public figures by individuals however tends towards the conclusion that most of them suffer

from mental disorders. According to Fein en Vossekuil (1999) most perpetrators had a history

of depressions and despair. Most of them once or more had tried to commit suicide and were

known by mental health authorities. Research by Mullen (2007) shows that a majority (65%)

of perpetrators were mentally ill. A recent review of literature by Meloy c.s. (2011) on

attackers and individuals issuing death threats concluded that the vast majority of the subjects

suffered from serious mental disorders. ‘Grandiosity’ seems to be an important element in the

mental illnesses most subjects suffered from. Grandiosity is analysed as a form of

pathological narcism and ‘entitlement’ that also can be found regularly with stalkers. This

narcism asks for recognition and reward and, when recognition is not given, is the source for

depression or suicide attempts. Research into attacks by individuals against European

politicians (James c.s. 2007) showed that 13 out of 24 of the perpetrators suffered from mental

disorders (schizophrenia, paranoia, borderline, depressions and obsessions). Ten of the

perpetrators were classified as ‘loners’ that were socially isolated and detached from society.

Thirteen attacks were motivated idiosyncratically or were the result of fixation on a public

figure (2007: 339).


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However, inside academics the exact role of mental illness plays is being disputed. Fein en

Vossekuil emphasize that mental disorder should not be seen as the primary origin of lone

wolf attacks. Before an attack is being executed an attacker has to go through a rational

process. A target has to been chosen and a planning and an escape plan have to be made.

Evidence shows that attackers and near-attackers evinced a range of sophistication and

attention in their planning. ‘All could think clearly enough and were sufficiently organized to

mount an attack or make a near-lethal approach to a prominent person of public status (1999:

331). Mullen c.s. (2007: 3) however disagrees. Combining their own research results with

other research findings they conclude that mental illness is common under individual

attackers and that there can be established a clear link between mental disorders and attacks or

threats against public figures.

Specific research into the more narrow category of lone wolf terrorists shows that the rate of

psychological disturbance appears to be higher amongst lone wolf terrorist compared to

terrorists in general and that they suffered from a variable degree of social ineptitude: they

were, to varying extents, loners with few friends and generally preferred to act alone (Spaaij

2010: 867). Further, some kind of breach in their personal biography can be noted; a sweeping

and life changing experience that functioned as a trigger (Fein & Vossekuil 1999: 327;

Springer 2009: 79-81). Researchers however emphasize that, even when psychological factors

are present, lone wolf terrorism should be approached as combination of individual, social and

external factors. According to Spaaij (2010: 867) it involves a social process that is inherently

individual in nature and that depends on the specific situation and personal characteristics of

the individual involved and his/her interaction with significant others. The mixture of causal

factors is diverse and unique for each individual. Political and sub cultural conditions are

mediated by social and psychological dynamics in which the individual is directly involved.

5. Social and political motives

According to most researchers, clear political motives are hardly of any importance for lone

wolves. A modification of this assumption however seems to be needed at forehand. Attacks

by lone wolves can partly be the result of conscious tactical choices made by terrorist

organisations or networks to encourage their potential adherents to conduct their own


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operations (Pantucci 2011: 4)2. These terrorist entrepreneurs therefore have a clear political

motive and their adherents are apparently seduced to follow the call for autonomous action.

Whether this political legitimation of their acts is central for their motivation or merely

presents to them the grammar to legitimize their actions remains to be seen. Besides that,

researchers have acknowledged that some kind of a grief is always underlying the acts of lone

wolves (Calhoun en Weston 2003). A ‘grief’ is defined as a situation that gives occasion to

frustration, anger or dissatisfaction. Perceptions of injustice or dishonesty could be the result

of this. Goldberg (2003: 15) postulates that ‘fanatic violence’ is an attempt to seek social

justice. The ‘fanatic hatred’ claims that the state has violated the social contract with society

by treating them unjust. ‘In short, an individual who is treated unjustly can legitimately

declare his contract with the social order null and void and demand that his natural rights be

restored - taking whatever retaliatory actions necessary to protect his own well-being’.

According to Goldberg, justice has a deep emotional appeal that goes beyond any legal or

political definition and is related to one’s frustrations and resentments. Their hate is therefore

mostly an attempt to be seen and heard (Goldberg 2003: 17).

Fein en Vossekuil (1999) however state that attacks and threats don’t have to be motivated by

grieves. The motive can also be to achieve notoriety or fame. Many of the assassins and

would-be assassins simply felt invisible. They didn't want to see themselves as nonentities.

They experienced failure after failure after failure, and decided that rather than being a

'nobody,' they wanted to be a 'somebody’. That’s why according to Fein and Vossekuil some

attackers appeared to have clothed their motives with some political rhetoric. They chose

political targets because political targets were a sure way to transform this situation: They

would be known. If the objective is notoriety or fame, that's the most efficient instrumental

mechanism by which to achieve that. Associating with a broader political movement or goal

allows would-be assassins to see themselves as not such a bad person. In this way assassins

are basically ‘murderers in search of a cause’ and construct a narrative to legitimize their acts.

The importance of ‘being seen’ can also be found in studies into suicide terrorists. The ‘quest

for significance’ is interpreted as an overarching motivational mechanism in which personal

frustrations, ideological frameworks and social pressure play mostly a functional role

(Kruglanski e.a. 2009). Spaaij (2012: 38-39) concludes that lone wolf terrorists combine the

2 The Jihad-glossy Inspire published for instance the article “How to make a bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom”, which according to Western intelligence agencies had the purpose of encouraging potential lone wolves to take matters in their own hands.


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broad structures of a more prevalent extreme ideology with their own personal grievances.

Lone wolves tend to create their own individualized ideologies from a broader political,

religious or social aims and personal frustrations and aversion. So it seems that what

characterizes the motivation of lone wolves is that they transcend existing categories and

classifications and botch together a narrative that suits them.

6. Discussion

Lone wolf terrorism is a complex and contradictory phenomenon which should be treated

prudently. We have to guard ourselves against easy assumptions or conclusions. As we have

seen, lone wolf terrorism is not something that just occurred recently. Political violence and

threats committed by individuals can be found through history. As reliable figures are lacking

it is hardly possible to make any grounded statement about the suggested upward tendencies

or future trends. It seems that individuals are more than it used to be responsible for carrying

out attacks, but also here some prudence is required. The emergence of the virtual world has

changed the relations and dynamics between individuals and communities. Further it seems

that there are difficulties in reading the motivations of lone wolves which some times are

seemingly diffuse or incomprehensible, some times can resolve into more or less known

extremist ideologies and are mediated by psychological disorders to a varying degree. This

issue is further complicated as it is inherently difficult to ascribe from the outside intentions to

individual perpetrators, as it is to establish whether a motive is ideologically consistent or not.

Lastly, the societal context has been changed. Politics have been polarised, the public

discussion is sharp and - especially in The Netherlands - rude or hateful. Death treats can be

found on a regularly base not only in the political spectre, but saturate all kinds of societal

communications.

For now, the best starting point for further research and theorizing seems to be the interplay

between individual, social and external factors. In the words of Spaaij (2010: 867): it involves

a social process that is inherently individual in nature and that depends on the specific

situation and personal characteristics of the individual involved and his/her interaction with

significant others. The mixture of causal factors is diverse and unique for each individual.

Political and sub cultural conditions are mediated by social and psychological dynamics in

which the individual is directly involved. Besides digging deeper in concrete cases of lone


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wolves it seems therefore of importance to also explore further the underlying political and

cultural circumstances in which the acts of lone wolves are embedded. We understand lone

wolf terrorism not as an isolated phenomenon but as the product of modern society. Just as

nobody is born as a terrorist, nobody is born as a lone wolf terrorist. We would like here to

further explore two issues that we hypothesize as being of importance for our reading of lone

wolf terrorism and that are both situated at the cross point of political, social and individual

dynamics: the relationship between individuals and communities and the motivational issue.

8. A continuum of lone wolf terrorism

We start with the changing relationship and dynamics between individuals and communities.

The current state of research emphasizes that the degree in which lone wolves act ‘alone’

should be put into perspective. In most cases lone wolves are part of broader communities of

belief or at least they understand themselves as being part of such communities. Although we

can postulate that to a certain degree we witness the ‘individualisation of terrorism’ at the

same time it is imperative to render account of the complex and paradoxical nature of what is

defined as ‘individualisation’. Individualisation is a fact of modern life but at the same time

new communities and connections are being configured making those new communications

both more large-scale as small-scale. Digitalisation and virtualisation give rise to new forms

and connections and at the same time change existing relationships. A central issue in these

new (re)configurations is the question of significance. Individuals have loosened their ties

with institutions and close communities but are not totally atomitized. Duyvendak and

Hurenkamp (2004: 15-16; Duyvendak 2004) have labelled these developments as the

transformation into communities light, or neo-tribes (Maffesoli 1998): individuals indeed are

looking for connections with broader communities and want to be part of something bigger,

something that gives meaning to their lives and produce identity and self-understanding; at the

same time however these connections must me be of a more informal or noncommittal

character. Therefore the most crucial transformation can be situated in the make-up of these

connections. Connections between individuals and between individuals and communities are

looser; weak, temporarily and fragmented ties replace the strong and all-embracing ties that

connected people in the era of close defined classes, ideologies and identities. It could even be

the case that exactly these modern possibilities to connect oneself at a distance in a ‘light’,

anonymous way with virtual communities are par excellence suited for those individuals who


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- for one reason or the other - are reluctant or unable to participate in ‘real’ thick

communities. The ‘lightness’ of communities and the way individuals are connected with

them does not mean they are of less importance for identity formation, signification and self-

understanding. Quite the contrary.

Instead of focusing on individualization it is better to understand these developments as de-

institutionalization or de-collectivization. This reflects a more general trend in modern

societies and is also applicable to the political level. Stolle and Hooghe (2003) pointed at the

emergence of informal political participation in which attendance in formal and hierarchically

organised participation channels descends but this loss is compensated by an increasing

informal participation. Beck (1993) has labelled this sub politics: politics is no longer the

monopoly of institutionalised political actors. Sub politics interweaves daily and political

worries and therefore withdraws itself from institutionalisation and hierarchy. The common

denominator is that formal institutions loose strength while individual citizens design their

political and societal involvement in different, less institutionalised manners. Sub politics is

especially designed in the new social media. According to Bartlett, Birdwell and Litter (2011:

15; 30) ‘the melange of virtual and real-world political activity’ is the dominant way millions

of people - especially young people - relate to politics in the twenty-first century. This

‘nascent, messy and more ephemeral form of politics’ is becoming the norm for a new, digital

generation. Social media are the new face of politics and political expression.

How and in which ways new political identities, political actions, political communications

and political significance are produced by virtual networks asks for more research, just like

the relationship between on-line and off-line identities and activities. The same can be

postulated for our understanding of the more extremist digital frontlines that emerge. One of

the few articles that devotes special attention to the meaning extremist virtual communities

offer their members is by De Koster and Houtman (2008) who interviewed members of the

right-wing extremist website Stormfront. They concluded that offline stigmatization, creating

feelings of dissociation or detachment underlies virtual community formation by Dutch right-

wing extremists. Stormfront is like a second home for them, a safe place in which they find

refuge and can be who they want to be and freely express their thoughts and identities. It

could be hypothesized that in general individuals who feel stigmatized, humiliated or denied

in real life find refuge in virtual communities of like-minded. A better understanding of the

dynamics between individuals and communities as mediated by virtuality, the meanings that


16

are produced, identities and worldviews that are being articulated and the interplay between

the off-line and on-line world could give us more knowledge of the processes that drive

individuals to convert knowledge, political views and encouragements acquired in the virtual

communities into actions in the real world. Too much fixation on the apparent ‘loneliness’

character of acts by lone wolves runs the risk of loosing sight of what is also, or even more

important: the changing relationship, and the changing dynamics between individuals on the

one hand, and groups, networks or environments on the other hand. It seems therefore a

mistake to create an opposite between an individual, and a group or network and treat them as

completely different cases. We should think instead of it as a continuum, in which individuals

are connected in different ways, with different magnitude and with different objectives with

their environments, which we should understand as ‘communities of belief’ (COT 2007) in

which ‘ideologies of extremism and validation’ flourish.

9. Performative violence

The second issue that calls for more research is the (political) motivation of lone wolves. As

Sprinzak (1991: 50) stated: ‘Terrorism does not exist in isolation and is a form of human

behaviour that is integrally linked to the normal world. Terrorism is a direct behavioural

extension of non-terroristic opposition politics.’ Sprinzak analyzed the processes of

delegitimation that convert individuals and organisations from ‘dissatisfied democrats’ into

uncompromising terrorists. It’s a challenge to utilize these insights for modern political

phenomena and to investigate if and how these kinds of processes of delegitimation are still at

work. Sprinzak wrote his article at a time that politics particularly was formed in solid

organisations on the base of coherent, all-covering ideologies. Nowadays the great ideologies

are almost gone, crumbled or fragmentized and partly replaced by new or modified ideologies

like populism that are not easy positioned in established political schemes. Moreover,

individuals influenced by the possibilities new social media offers are constructing their own

copy-paste ideologies and signify their own, sometimes idiosyncratic meaning to the world.

Such a copy-paste ideology is not ‘just’ a random ideology of a lunatic. It is, for the people

involved, a highly sophisticated worldview that gives meaning to the world, provides a sense

of direction and enables a person to express their position in the world. The Internet plays an

important role here since it makes it very easy for people to assemble and express their own


17

worldview (De Koning 2011)3. The ‘diffuse’ motivation or ‘individualized ideologies’ that

are often attributed to lone wolves therefore can be read as the reflection of a diffused world

of politics and policies in modern societies. Political centres seems to be displaced,

disappeared or dissolved in hybrid national and international governance networks of an

unprecedented complexity in which it is hardly knowable who is responsible for what.

Discomfort, dissatisfaction, rage, alienation or repudiation will compared to earlier days

conform itself less in collective political identities and institutions and more in personalized

ideologies and political identities. It is not that much the question whether these forms of

discomfort are ‘political’ but the question whether these ‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott 1998) are

recognized as ‘politics’ and by whom.

That way, the cultural embedment and the cultural scripts of modernity should also be taken

into account. Some of the cultural scripts lone wolves apply (Breivik, Van der Vlis, Armani)

are not dumfounded. Larkin (2009) pointed for instance at the cultural script - both in the

matter of form as well as content - the Columbine High School shootings have produced for a

number of succeeding rampage shootings. Rampage shootings were no longer the provenance

of isolated, loner students who were psychologically deranged. Columbine raised rampage

shootings in the public consciousness from mere revenge to a political act. The shooters

Klebold and Harris were overtly political in their motivations to destroy their school. In their

own words, they wanted to ‘kick-start a revolution’ among the dispossessed and despised

students of the world. They understood that their pain and humiliation were shared by

millions of others and conducted their assault in the name of a larger collectivity. Klebold and

Harris identified the collectivity - outcast students - for which they were exacting revenge.

That is what distinguishes Columbine from all previous rampage shootings (2009: 1320). One

of the cultural scripts that are a consequence of the Columbine shootings is that the shooters

engage in their rampages to ‘make a statement’. The body count exists primarily as a method

of generating media attention. Killing for notoriety is the second outcome of the Columbine

shootings. The extent of media attention seems to be closely related to body count. To such

disgruntled students, payback consists of killing convenient targets, making a statement, and

dying in a blaze of glory (2009: 1323).

3 Copy-paste ideologies can also be discovered in the intermingling of ideologies from the extreme left and the extreme right in what is called the ‘Third Position’: a collective interest in opposing the police and state regardless of differences in other social philosophy or ideals (Borum and Tilby 2005: 209).


18

It is interesting to compare the cultural scripts lone wolves make use of with more general

cultural scripts that can be found in late modernity and that are of importance for identity

formation and the production of significance. Modern times seem to put a premium on self-

exhibition. The importance of individual responsibility, authenticity, wealth, celebrity status

and self-expression the ‘casting society’ emphasizes paves way to understanding oneself and

presenting oneself to the out world as a brand (‘the brand Me’). The essence of this personal

branding is to recommend your self constantly or to ‘expose’ the Self one way or the other to

the outer world. This exposition of the Self asks for a reaction, for confirmation by others.

Nothing is worse than placing a message on Facebook and not getting any reaction to it. That

comes close to a denial of existence... Performativity therefore seems to be the essence.

According to Mayer (2001: 366), following Mark Juergensmeyer’s analysis (2000: 122-126),

the acts of lone wolves are not executed to achieve some political strategic goal but to make a

symbolic statement. Juergensmeyer labels this as ‘performance violence’, ‘drama’s designed

to have an impact on the several audiences that they affect.’ This performative violence can

apply to terrorist as well as to self-destructive actions; in the case of lone wolf terrorism a

combination of both often exists. Bovenkerk (2005) also has pointed at a shift from

instrumental towards expressive violence. Most political actions in the sixties, seventies and

eighties were clearly political and societal inspired and can be seen as instrumental to a goal.

Nowadays the political dimensions have moved to the background and working off one’s

emotions has gained more importance. Staging a spectacular action allows an individual to

attract the attention of the world and may to some extent be intended to reach that goal. Think

for instance of the videotapes made by the Columbine killers in 1999. They had been eager to

document everything and hoped that movies would be made of their stories: ‘Directors will be

fighting over this story,’ one of them said (Mayer 2001: 365). Performative violence therefore

foremost refers to itself. It is the construction of identity or position through active expression.

Performative violence is not directed so much against the world, but clamours for attention

from audiences, demands audiences to look intently to the actor/perpetrator and by doing so

recognizing and acknowledging the actor/perpetrator in its very existence and uniqueness.

An understanding of lone wolf terrorism requires attention for both change as continuity, for

the changing dynamics and relations between individuals and communities and the political-

cultural scripts in which identities are being expressed and individuals give meaning to

themselves and the world they inhibit. Some lone wolves will be driven by more or less

established and coherent political ideologies or political-religious ideologies (Jihadism, right-


19

wing extremism), whether or not actively encouraged by terrorist entrepreneurs or the virtual

communities of belief they have converted themselves to, and to some extent originating from

feelings of discontent, alienation, anger and detachment. Other loners will be motivated by

more idiosyncratic factors, more driven by personal feelings of denial, humiliation and

alienation and translated in a variety of motives. All will be drawing on political-cultural

scripts to find the grammar to express themselves both in form as well as content. It should

not come as a surprise that in a heavily personalized and de-institutionalized society such

manifestation of rage and hate will express themselves in the form of personalised

performative violence that transcends established categories and classifications. Whether we

read these manifestations as ‘political’ or put them aside as the incomprehensible acts of

lunatics tells as much of our ability to recognize the hidden transcripts of politics in a liquid

post-political age as it tells of lone wolves.


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