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Performance Audit

Vehicle Emissions Control Schemes

Follow-up

2 Vehicle Emissions Control Schemes Follow-up

Contents

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations 4 Executive Summary 5

Chapter 1 Introduction 13 1.1 Follow-up 14 1.2 SituationasreportedbyNAOinJuly2009 14 1.3 VehicleFleetStatus 15 1.4 CurrentEmissionsLevels 15 1.5 RegulationofLandTransport 17 1.6 RecentlyIntroducedVehicleEmissionsReductionMeasures 18 1.7 Focusofthefollow-upaudit 19 1.8 Structureofthereport 19 Chapter 2 Emissions testing in the Vehicle Roadworthiness Test 21 2.1 Introduction 22 2.2 SituationasreportedbytheNAOinJuly2009 23 2.3 AmorerigorousVRTstationsmonitoringandenforcementregime hasbeenadopted 24 2.4 Qualitycontrolinspectionrelatedrecordshaveimprovedsignificantly 26 2.5 EmissionsrelatedVRTfailureshavedoubledin2011overthepreviousyear 27 2.6 InconsistenciesinVRTemissionsfailureratesatthevarioustesting stationspersist 28 2.7 Risk-basedtargetingofenforcementmeasuresrelatedtoVRTstation operatorscanbefurtherimproved 29 2.8 Conclusion 29 Chapter 3 The Emission Alert Campaign 31 3.1 Introduction 32 3.2 SituationasreportedbytheNAOinJuly2009 33 3.3 TheEmissionAlertCampaignregisteredadeclineinpublicresponse 34 3.4 AnExpressionofInterestforacustomisedITenforcementsystemhasbeen pendingsince2010 35 3.5 MoresummonedvehiclesarepassingtheEACtest 35 3.6 Thenumberof‘noshows’fortheEACtestincreasedby13percent between2009and2011 36 3.7 Non-compliancewithTM’sreportthresholdpolicyandthetimelinessofEAC testingprevails 37 3.8 CallforimprovedcontinuityinthepublicitycomponentoftheEAC 39 3.9 Conclusion 39 Chapter 4 Roadside Vehicle Emissions Test 41 4.1 Introduction 42 4.2 SituationasreportedbytheNAOinJuly2009 43 4.3 EmissionsrelatedfailuresdetectedthroughRTIshavedecreased 43 4.4 RTIsincreasedtargetingtheGozo-basedvehicles,whileRTIsundertakenin Maltaareheldinlesslocations 46 4.5 TheaudittrailrelatedtoRTIshasbeenstrengthened 47 4.6 Conclusion 47

Vehicle Emissions Control Schemes Follow-up 3

Contents

Tables

Table1 Inspectionmeasures,targetsandresults(2010and2011) 24Table2 VehicleavailabilityforEACtest(2011) 37Table3 RoadsideInspection(2007to2011) 44Table4 RTIresults(2010and2011) 45Table5 RTIsperformedondieselandpetrol-enginevehicles(2009to2011) 46Table6 RTILocations 47

Figures

Figure1 Totalvehiclesbyenginetype(2008to2011) 15Figure2 Totalvehiclesbyage(2008to2011) 16Figure3 Quantityofpollutant,bytype(2007to2010) 17Figure4 VRTfailureratesincethe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’ 27Figure5 PercentageemissionsfailurerateforallVRTstationsduring2011, ascomparedwiththeperiodunderreviewduringthe ‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’ 28Figure6 TotalnumberofSMSreportsreceivedperyear(2005to2011) 34Figure7 NumberofUsersoftheEACSMSreportingperyear(2009to2011) 34Figure8 EACtestPassrates(July2009toDecember2011) 35Figure9 PercentageofvehicleswhichdidnotshowupfortheEACtest, perquarter(July2009toDecember2011) 36Figure10 Delaysintheprocessingandsummoningofpotentially non-compliantvehiclesforanEACtest 38Figure11 QuantityofSMSreportsreceivedperquarter(July2009toDecember2011) 39

Appendix

AppendixI TechnicalRoadsideInspectionReport(assetoutinCommission Directive2010/47/EUAnnexI) 50


ListofAbbreviations

AQP AirQualityPlan

CBD CommonDatabase

CO CarbonMonoxide

CO2 CarbonDioxide

EAC EmissionAlertCampaign

EU EuropeanUnion

IT InformationTechnology

LGV LightGoodsVehicle

LTD LicensingandTestingDirectorate

MEPA MaltaEnvironmentandPlanningAuthority

MITA MaltaInformationTechnologyAgency

MRA MaltaResourcesAuthority

NAO NationalAuditOffice

NMVOC Non-MethaneVolatileOrganicCompounds

NO2 NitrogenDioxide

NSO NationalStatisticsOffice

RET RoadsideEmissionsTest

RTI RoadsideTechnicalInspection

SMS ShortMessageService

SO2 SulphurDioxide

TM TransportMalta

VECS VehicleEmissionsControlSchemes

VERA VehicleRegistrationAdministration

VIU VehicleInspectorateUnit

VOSA VehicleandOperatorServicesAgency

VRT VehicleRoadworthinessTest

List of Abbreviations


Executive Summary


Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Introduction

1. Themainaimofthisfollow-upperformanceauditistodeterminetheextenttowhichthefindingsandrecommendationsproposedintheperformanceauditreport:VehicleEmissionsControlSchemespublishedinJuly2009,hereafterreferredtoasthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’,havebeenaddressed.ThisstudyaimstoreportontheprogressregisteredinthereductionofvehicleemissionsthroughvariouscontrolmechanismsemployedbyTransportMalta(TM),namelythemandatoryVehicleRoadworthinessTest(VRT),theEmissionAlertCampaign(EAC),andthesurpriseRoadsideTechnicalInspection(RTI).

2. Thisfollow-upauditwascarriedoutduringtheperiodJanuarytoMay2012andbaseditsfindingsandconclusionsondataandinformationavailableasattheendofMay2012.Forthepurposeofthisfollow-upstudy,theNationalAuditOffice(NAO)retainedtheobjectivesfromits2009Report,andsoughtto:

• Evaluatetheproperconductandeffectivenessofthevehicleemissionscontrolschemes;

• Assess the proper implementation of the schemes through the quality control carried out by theregulatorybodiesconcerned;

• Review the proper and consistent enforcement actions contemplated by these schemes, so as toensurethatvehiclesfoundtohaveexcessiveemissions,rectifytheirsituation.

3. Inorderto illustratetheprogressattainedbyTMsincethepublicationofthe ‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’,thisExecutiveSummaryreproducesthekeyrecommendationsproposedthereinasmarginalnotesingreentext.Theserecommendationsaddressedthestrategicandoperationalaspectsofthevehicleemissionscontrolframeworkaswellasissuesspecifictoparticularschemes.ThedegreeofprogressbyTMregisteredinconnectionwiththeserecommendationsispresentedadjacenttotheproposals.

Strategic and operational issues common to all vehicle emissions control schemes

4. Theeffectivemanagementofvehicleemissionscontrolschemesnecessitates,thatatthestrategiclevel,individualmeasurescomplimentandsupporteachother.Thisfollow-upauditestablishedthatsincethepublicationofthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’,variousschemespecificeffortshavebeenundertakentostrengthenthevehicleemissionscontrolframework.


Executive Summary

5. Themissionstatementof theLandTransportDirectoratewithin TM includes the provision of an effective regulatoryframework for land transportwith road safety as a top priority,whilst at the sametimepromoting socio-economicdevelopmentandprotectionoftheenvironment.ThestrategybeingadoptedbyTMisabalancebetweentheestablishmentofstandards,educatingthepublic,andenforcement.(Section 1.5.1)

6. Forthispurpose,TMhasorisintheprocessofimplementingvarious schemes. These include aspectsofeco-driving indrivertraining and testing, ascertaining that the public is aware ofthe importance of vehicle emissions testing, ensuring that VRTrequirementsareinlinewithEUDirectives,maintainingapresenceontheroadsidewithregularroadsidechecksandthesupportingof fiscal measures that are aimed at improving the cleanlinessof vehicles on the road, like registration tax and the scrappagescheme.(Section 1.5.2)

7. However,todate,thevehicleemissionscontrolschemesarestillnotadequatelyfeedingandappropriatelycomplementingeachotherintermsoftargetingandenforcementaction.Furthermore,the compilation of polices relating to further educating andincentivisingownerstoundertakeregularvehiclemaintenance,aswasproposedbytheNAOin2009,havenotyetfullymaterialised.Transport Malta contends that budgetary constraints limitedfurtherprogressinthisregard.(Section 3.8.4)

8. Since the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’, TM is individuallymanagingthevariousvehicleemissionscontrolschemesthroughreadily-available software. Although an Expression of Interestregardingacustomised InformationTechnology(IT)enforcementsystemwas drafted, lack of funds prohibited theAuthority frommaking furtherprogress towards thisend. Consequently,a real-time,integrateddatamanagementsystemthatwouldfacilitatetheplanningandcoordinationofthevariousvehicleemissionscontrolinitiatives,isstillnotavailabletoTM.(Sections 3.4.4 and 3.9.2)

9. In view of such circumstances, and notwithstandingthe benefits reaped, lengthy periods of more than six months,regarding thereporting,processing,callingandemissions testingof potentially non-compliant vehicles at TM’s facilities continuetomaterialise. Furthermore, the inability toprocess in real-timevehicle emissions test results, significantly dilutes the impact ofTM’s enforcement action. For example, an average of aroundthreemonthselapsedbeforeTMwasabletoimposearestrictionontherenewalofthevehicle’sannualcirculationlicense,incaseswherevehicleswerefoundtobenon-compliant.Suchasituationimplies that potentially defaulting vehiclesmay not be promptlyrepairedorpreventedfromcirculatingontheroadformorethanispracticallyreasonabletothedetrimentofMalta’sambienceairquality.(Sections 3.7.6, 3.7.7, 3.6.5, and 3.9.1)

A review of all the vehicle emissions control schemes be undertaken so as to formulate more effective and efficient schemes.

The various vehicle emissions control schemes need to be equipped with real time, integrated data management applications to enable good data analysis, monitoring, and effective enforcement.


Executive Summary

11. Since the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’, TM has sought toanalyseVRTresultsonamonthlybasis. TransportMaltautilisedsuchanalysis toenable it tobetter identifypotentially ‘high-risk’VRTstations,andconsequentlytargetenforcementinitiativesandactions.(Section 2.7.2)

12. TransportMalta’spersonnelfromitsTechnicalDepartmentaimtoallocateVRTstationsinspectionpriorityinaccordancewithvariouscriteriaandindicatorsemanatingfromitsanalysisofVRTresults. Despite the ensuing inspections, since the ‘VECS AuditReport (2009)’, the standard deviation of emissions tests failurerates among VRT station operators increased, as did the overallVRTfailurerate.(Sections 2.6 and 2.5)

13. Since the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’, TM has increasedthe number and type of inspections targeted at VRT stations.This inspection regime includes the retestingof vehicles at TM’sfacilities(Post-VRTChecks)aswellassurpriseSpotChecksandFullDayInspectionsatVRTstations.Moreover,VRTstationoperatorsarealsoobligedtophotographvehiclesduringVRTs.Thenumberof inspections carriedout annuallywas in accordancewith TM’spredeterminedtargets.(Section 2.3)

14. Post-VRT Checks are carried out through a risk-basedapproach,whichtakesintoconsiderationvariousfactors.Thehighoverall pass rates of Post-VRT Checks emphasises the combinedpositiveeffectofTM’senforcementmechanisms,whichultimatelyresulted in VRT stations detecting a higher number of pollutingvehicles.However,whenindividuallyevaluated,ittranspiredthatsomeofTM’senforcementmechanismsweremoreeffectivethanothersatidentifyingshortcomingsinVRTtestingpractice.(Sections 2.3.8 and 2.3.12)

15. In2011, through the retestingof1,224vehicles, inPost-VRTChecks, TMdetected12 irregularities. Similarly, the18FullDay Inspections at 12 VRT stations revealed only three minorinfringements. On the other hand, surprise Spot Checks wasthe mechanism which detected 10 irregularities through the 75inspectionscarriedout.(Section 2.3)

16. Since2010,theseenforcementmeasuresresultedinatotalofapproximately€57,014finesimposedondefaultingVRTstationsby TM. However, due to the lengthy appeals system, which isindependentofTM,asregulatedbytheAdministrativeJusticeAct

Emissions testing in the Vehicle Roadworthiness Test

10. Thisfollow-upauditevaluatedthemechanismsinplacetoensurethatemissionstestingduringVRTsarecarriedoutproperlybyVRTstationoperators. Suchmechanismsmainly involvethatthroughvariousinspections,TMascertainsthatVRTstationoperatorsareadheringtostipulatedtestingprocedures.

Transport Malta is to routinely analyse the VRT results. This will enable the Authority to identify, investigate and act on abnormal trends in VRT results with respect to individual stations and/or specific vehicle categories.

The improved inspection regime of VRT stations, as adopted in 2008, needs to be sustained and the necessary timely follow-up undertaken in cases of infringements.


Executive Summary

(CAP.490.), around39per cent (€22,215)of thesefinesare stilloutstanding.(Section 2.3.2)

17. This follow-up audit revealed a significant improvementinthemaintenanceofinspectionrelatedrecordsbyTMsincethepublicationofthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’.Recordspertainingto inspections and reviews undertaken by personnel from TM’sTechnical Department, namely, Post-VRT Checks, Spot Checks,FullDayInspectionsandthephotographingofvehiclesduringtheVRT,aregenerallyappropriatelymaintained.Suchrecordsprovidean adequate audit trail of inspections and reviews carried out.However,theaudittraildoesnotfullydocumentTM’sinspectiontargeting,whichisprimarilybasedontheriskclassificationofVRTstationsaswellasarandominspectionschedule.Inthisregard,amorerobustaudittrail,isconsideredtobeofcriticalimportancetotheeffectiveregulationofamarket-drivenindustry.(Sections 2.4 and 2.8.2)

Transport Malta is to ensure that comprehensive documentation relating to quality control inspections of VRT stations is maintained.

The Emission Alert Campaign

18. TheprimaryobjectivesoftheEmissionAlertCampaign(EAC)includedincreasingpublicawarenessonthenegativeimpactofharmfulvehicleemissions,andinparallel,increasingtheenforcementonvehicleemissionsthroughtheinvolvementofthegeneralpublic.TheEACurgedthepublictoreport,viaamobilephonetextmessage,theregistrationnumberofvehicleswhichtheyperceiveasemittingnoxiousexhaustfumes.AccordingtoTM’sfollow-upprocedures,thosevehicleswhichgetreportedatleastthreetimesbythreedifferentmobilephonenumberswithinathreemonthperiod,wouldbesummonedforanemissionstestatTM’sfacilities.

19. This follow-up audit revealed that the number of ShortMessage Service (SMS) reports received from the general publichas decreased by around 74 per cent between 2008 and 2011.Moreover,thenumberofSMSreportsreceivedthroughdifferentmobile phones, assumed to represent different persons, alsodeclinedbyapproximately51percentfrom2009to2011.(Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3)

20. Despitethedeclineinthepublic’sparticipationintheEAC,this initiative forms a complimentary elementwithin the vehicleemissionscontrolframework.Therewereminimalpolicychangesrelatingto theEAC’sobjectivesandoperational frameworksincethe ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’. Transport Malta’s initiatives inthis regard extended to the development of an Expression ofInterest toautomate itsoperationsrelatedtotheEACthroughacustomizedITenforcementsystem.However,theseeffortswerenotfollowedthroughsincetherequiredfundswerenotavailabletotheAuthority.(Sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.4)

21. Although TM is identifying those vehicles which havereached the SMS report threshold within the three consecutivemonth time-window, it is processing the mobile phone textmessages received at fixed intervals every quarter. By not

The Campaign’s operational strategy is to be reviewed in the light of the public’s response to the initiative and of the resources available to TM.

Consideration for testing should start from the date a vehicle is reported for the first time through SMS.


Executive Summary

processingSMSreports,atleastonamonthlybasis,TMwouldhaveforfeitedtheopportunitytotaketheappropriateactiononthosevehicleswhichhave reached the report thresholdat theearliestopportunity. Consequently, a maximum delay of two monthsresultswhenavehicle reaches its reports thresholdbeforeTM’sprocessing date. Transport Malta contends that such processingtimesarenotreducingtheeffectivenessoftheEAC,sinceultimatelypotentially non-compliant vehicles are summoned for emissionstesting. Nevertheless, theAuthoritynoted that itwill continuetoidentifyareasforpotentialimprovement.(Sections 3.7.6 and 3.7.8)

22. FurtherprocessingtimeofaroundfourmonthsmaterialiseinsummoningvehiclesforanEACtestatTM’sfacilitiesaftertheywouldhavereachedtheSMSreportthreshold.Towardsthisend,thisfollow-upauditrevealedthat78outof86vehiclescalledforanEACteston19August2011hadreachedtheirreportthresholdduringtheperiodJanuarytoMarch2011.SuchdelaymaybeattributedtothefactthatTMreducedthenumberofEACtestscarriedoutfromanaverageof241monthly in2009toapproximately11monthlyin 2011. These circumstances materialised due to TM’s otherpriorities,namelythoserelatingtothereformofpublictransport.(Section 3.7.7)

23. MattersarefurthercomplicatedsinceasubstantialnumberofownersdonotsubjecttheirvehicleforanEACtestinaccordancewithTM’srequest.Thisfollow-upauditrevealedthatin2011,therewere274‘noshows’,involving160vehicles,outofthe252vehiclessummonedforanEACtestthroughthe411EACtestnoticesissued.(Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.4)

24. Fromthe252vehiclessummonedforanEACtestduring2011,arandomsampleof60outofthe160vehiclesthatdidnotshow-upfollowingthereceiptofoneormoreEACtestnoticeswasanalysedbytheNAO.Areviewofthese60vehiclesshowedthatarestrictiononthevehiclesannualcirculationlicensewasimposedin 79 per cent of cases after the second consecutive ‘no show’.TransportMaltanotedthisobservationandshallbeensuringthatproceduresareconsistentlyapplied. (Section 3.6.4)

25. TransportMalta’spublicitycomponentoftheEACentailsthat vehicle owners are reminded about the SMS number onevery road licence that is printed, a banner on the TMwebsitewhichencouragespeopletosendSMSreportsandsomeadvertsareissuedtoremindpeopleaboutthescheme.Notwithstandingtheseefforts,publicresponsedeclined.Inpart,suchadeclinemaybe attributed to a decrease in SMS reports received in relationto former public transport buses and the overall improvementregisteredinairquality.(Section 3.8.1)

The publicity component of the EAC should be revived and particularly aim to educate owners about the vehicle maintenance they should undertake to ensure emissions compliance.


26. Publicinterestinthisschemewashowever,revivedinearly2011throughanad hocpublicitycampaign.ThepositiveeffectsofthispublicitycampaignremainedeffectiveforaroundsixmonthswherethenumberofSMSreportsreceivedincreasedfromaround2,932 to 4,395. However, following this period, the number ofreportsreceiveddeclinedtothesamelevelpriortotheundertakingof TM’s awareness raising programme. It is to be noted, that,contrarytothepreviouspublicityinitiativesundertaken,TM’s2011awareness campaign did not seek to educate owners about thebenefits of regular vehicle maintenance, especially with regardsthepreventionofexcessivevehicleemissions. (Sections 3.8.2, 3.8.3 and 3.8.4)

Roadside Vehicle Emissions Test

27. SurpriseroadsidechecksofvehicleemissionsareofcriticalimportancetoensurethatvehiclesareappropriatelymaintainedatalltimesandnotjustpriortoaVRT.RoadsideTechnicalInspections(RTIs)arecarriedoutbytheEnforcementDirectoratewithinTM.Upto2009,theseinspections,whichfocusonallaspectsofvehiclesafetyandmaintenance,usedtobecomplementedbyRoadsideEmissionsTests(RETs)whichwerecommissionedbytheJointCommitteesofLocalCouncilsandcarriedoutbyLocalWardens.

28. Thenumberofroadsideinspections,whichalsoincorporatevehicleemissionstesting,hasbeendecreasingovertheyears. Infact,therehasbeenadeclinefromatotalof3,165to1,979roadsideemissionstestscarriedoutduringtheperiodunderreviewbythe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’and2011respectively.(Section 4.3.4)

29. Mostnotably,thedecreasematerialisedintheaftermathofthecurtailmentofRETs,whichwerecarriedoutbyLocalWardensup to early 2008. To date, no official studies have been carriedouttoascertainwhethertheeffectsresultingfromthecurtailmentof the RETs, which specifically targeted emissions, have beenappropriatelyabsorbedthroughthecurrentRTIregime.Itistobenoted thataroundhalfof thevehicles tested throughRETswerefoundtobenon-compliant.Suchahit-rateissubstantiallyhigherthan thecurrentRTIemissionshit-rateof less than6.5percent.(Sections 4.3.5 and 4.3.6)

30. Despite the NAO’s recommendation in the ‘VECS AuditReport (2009)’, RTI targeting is still highly dependant on theacumenoftheAuthority’senforcementofficers.TheAuthorityonlyprovidesgeneral targetingguidelines to its enforcementofficers.Suchdirectionentailsthatenforcementofficersfocusontheolder,poorly maintained and excessively emitting vehicles. (Sections 4.3.12 and 4.6.2)

Roadside emissions tests are to be conducted on a more frequent basis, particularly targeting vehicles older than eight years, and the vehicle categories with a high failure rate in road-side tests or in VRT.

Consideration is to be given for the Roadside Emissions Test (RET) conducted as part of the Local Enforcement System to be restarted with an improved regulatory framework.

Executive Summary


Overall Conclusions

31. This follow-up audit determined that since the publication of the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’,a significant improvement inMalta’s ambient air quality was registered. In part, such improvement isattributabletolesspollutionfromvehicles’emissions.Towardsthisend,recentlyintroducedregulatoryandfiscalmeasureshavecontributed.However,thesustainablereductionoftoxicemissionsfromvehiclesisalsohighlydependantonvariousenforcementmechanisms,whichareimplementedthroughvehicleemissionscontrolschemes,suchastheVRT,EACandRTI.

32. Tovaryingdegrees,schemespecificrecommendationsproposedintheNAO’spublicationof2009havebeenimplemented.AmongthemostcriticalinitiativesinthisregardisamorerigorousenforcementregimeoverVRTstationoperators,whichgenerallyledtoahigherdetectionrateofnon-compliantvehicles.DespitetheimprovedandbroadercontrolsinplacetherestillexistssignificantvariationinvehicleemissionstestingfailureratebythevariousVRTstationoperators.

33. Althoughtheaudittrailhasbeenstrengthened,inaccordancewithNAOrecommendationsin2009,theEACisstillsubjecttooperationallimitations,namelylengthyprocessingperiods,whichultimatelyimpingeonitsenforcementeffectiveness. Inmanycases,thesecircumstancesleadtothecontinuedutilizationofpotentiallynon-compliantvehiclesforasubstantialnumberofmonths.

34. TransportMaltahasalso increased its roadsidetestingcoveragetoencourageandascertainthatvehiclesareproperlymaintainedatalltimes. Such increasedcoverage,however,hasnot fullyabsorbedthelacuna,whichmaterialisedafterthecurtailmentofRETsin2008,whichusedtobecarriedoutbyLocalWardens.Thecurtailmentofthelatteralsoimpliesthatcurrently,thereisnospecificroadsidetestfocusingsolelyonemissions.

35. Theforegoingsuggeststhatthe initiatives implementedsincethe ‘VECSAuditReport (2009)’hadmixed results. Although TM has increasingly adopted a risk-based approach to target its enforcementmechanisms, further improvements in this area would have enhanced the overall effectiveness of theinitiativesundertaken.

36. InviewofsuchcircumstancesandinaccordancewithrecommendationsproposedbytheNAOin2009,theopportunitystillexiststofurtherensurethatvehicleemissionscontrolschemesaredesignedandimplementedaspartofaholisticandcomprehensivestrategyaimedattacklingexcessivevehicleemissions.Theeffectivenessofsuchanapproachwouldalsobedependantonthecompilationofpolicesrelatingtofurthereducatingownerstoundertakeregularvehiclemaintenance,suchasthoseenvisagedtoemanatefromtheeco-drivinginitiative.

Executive Summary


Introduction

Chapter 1


Chapter 1 – Introduction


1.1 Follow-up

1.1.1 Thisfollow-upperformanceaudit,undertakenbytheNationalAuditOffice(NAO),aimstoreportonthe progress registered in the reduction of vehicleemissions, thereby improving Malta’s ambient airquality.Themainaimofthisstudyistoensurethatfindings and recommendations, in the performanceaudit report: Vehicle Emissions Control SchemespublishedinJuly2009,hereafterreferredtoas‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’,havebeenaddressed.

1.1.2 The follow-up audit will also outline thevarious initiativesandmeasuresundertakenbytheGovernment in order to reduce vehicle emissions,which came into force after the publication of the‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’, namely the AnnualCirculationTax,theRegistrationTax,theScrappageSchemeandthereforminPublicTransportbuses.

1.1.3 In order to obtain a clear picture of theimprovement or otherwise since the ‘VECS AuditReport (2009)’, data pertaining primarily to theperiod 2009 to 2011 has been analysed. Unlessotherwisestated, issuesandconclusionspresentedduring this follow-up audit reflect the informationavailableasattheendofMay2012.

1.2 Situation as reported by NAO in July 2009

1.2.1 The ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’ discussedtheextenttowhichtheimplementation,monitoringand enforcement of Malta’s vehicle emissionscontrol schemes had the desired impact. Such

vehicle emissions control mechanisms include thefollowingfourschemes:theVehicleRoadworthinessTest (VRT), theEmissionAlertCampaign (EAC), theRoadsideTechnicalInspection(RTI)andtheRoadsideEmissionsTest(RET).Theseschemesaimedtobringaboutgreatercompliancefromownerstoproperlymaintaintheirvehiclestoensurethatemissionsarewithinthelevelsprescribedbylaw.

1.2.2 The2009Reportconcludedthateventhoughan improvement in vehicle emissions compliancehadbeenrecordedsincetheimplementationoftheschemes,furtheranalysisshowedthattheschemesdidnotfullyrealisetheirpotential.

1.2.3 Moreover, there was minimal effort tocoordinate the planning, operational, enforcementandmonitoringelementsofthefourschemes.

1.2.4 The lack of an integrated managementinformation system also hindered effectivemanagement, rendered data analysis problematic,andresultedinincompleteaudittrails.

1.2.5 In its 2009 Report, the NAO proposedrecommendations aimed at strengthening Malta’semissions control framework, through variousimprovements at the strategic and operationallevels. Theseincludedareviewofalltheschemes,aimed both at educating owners and at the sametime devising emission control schemes whichtarget the high-risk vehicles. With an appropriatedata management application for each scheme,interlinked intoa singledatamanagement system,theeffectiveplanning,monitoringandenforcementwouldbeensured.



1.2.6 Other recommendations targeted thespecificschemes. ThesewillbebetterdiscussedinthefollowingChapters.

1.3 Vehicle Fleet Status

1.3.1 At the end of 2011, the stock of licensedmotor vehicles stood at 311,947.1 This impliesthat an overall increase of 24,827 vehicles hasbeenregisteredsince2008.Figure1describes thechangesinthetotalvehiclefleetsinceyear2008,forbothpetrolanddiesel-enginevehicles.

1.3.2 Figure2depictsthetotalnumberofvehiclesby age group. As at end 2011, Malta’s averagevehicleagewas13.86years.2 This isconsideredtobesubstantiallyhigherwhencomparedtotheUK’saverageofsevenyears.TwomajorconclusionsthatcanbedrawnfromFigure2arethatthequantityofvehiclesagedlessthantwoyearshavedecreasedby543since2008,whilethehigheragegroups,from15yearsandover,arealmostalwaysonthe increase.However, a decrease has been noticed for thosevehiclesaged25yearsandover,Figure2refers.

1.4 Current Emissions Levels

1.4.1 Air emissions are continuously beingmonitoredbytheMaltaEnvironmentandPlanningAuthority (MEPA) through theuseof 144diffusiontubes distributed all over Malta and Gozo, andanotherfourrealtimemonitoringstationslocatedatKordin,Floriana,ZejtunandMsida.

1.4.2 The latter monitoring station is located ata traffic site and, according to MEPA, provides agood indication of the type and volume of vehicleemissions.AnincreasingtrendinBenzenetraceshasbeen recorded from theMsidamonitoring stationinrecentyears.Benzene,formingpartoftheNon-MethaneVolatileOrganicCompounds (NMVOC)asdisplayedinFigure3,canonlybeattributedtopetrol-engine vehicles. This increase may be accreditedto various factors suchas the increase in the totalnumberofvehiclesontheroad,asnoticedinSection1.3,and/oreventrafficcongestions.

1.4.3 A considerable number of calculations arethencarriedoutbyMEPAofficialsinordertoestablish

Figure 1 : Total vehicles by engine type (2008 to 2011)

Source:NSO.

1NationalStatisticsOffice–Malta,News Release 1 February 2012 - Motor Vehicles:Q4/2011,[online]Availableat:http://www.nso.gov.mt/statdoc/document_file.aspx?id=3239

[Accessed3April2012].2SourceNationalStatisticsOffice.



thoseemissions,apartfrombenzene,pertainingtovehicletransport.Anumberofassumptions,eventhough constant over the years, are made in theprocess,namely:

• Totalconsumptionoffuel,asprovidedbytheMaltaResourcesAuthority(MRA),isallocatedtolandtransport;

• Average mileage per vehicle was assumedfromrandomSpotChecksdoneatVRTstationsinthepast;

• European Emission Standard3 was assumedin line with the year of manufacture of thevehiclesconcerned.

1.4.4 The emissions data collected throughthe diffusion tubes and the real time monitoring

3EuropeanEmissionStandarddefinestheacceptablelimitsforexhaustemissionsofvehiclessoldwithintheEuropeanUnion(EU),rangingfrom‘Euro1’to‘Euro6’,thelatter

havingthemoststringentrequirementswithrespecttothefumesemittedfromlightpassengerandcommercialvehicles–Regulation(EC)No715/2007.

Figure 2 : Total vehicles by age (2008 to 2011)

Source:NSO.



stationsiscontinuouslyrecordedbyMEPAandwassummarisedinFigure3fortheperiod2007to2010.4

1.4.5 FromFigure3itisevidentthattherehasbeen an overall reduction in vehicle emissions,resulting inacontinuous improvement,particularlyinminimisingNitrogenDioxide(NO2),NMVOCwhichinclude benzene from petrol-engine vehicles andSulphur Dioxide (SO2). Similar emissions data for2011willonlybeavailableattheendofyear2012,asindicatedbyMEPAofficials.

1.5 Regulation of Land Transport

1.5.1 The mission statement of the LandTransportDirectoratewithin TransportMalta (TM)includes the provision of an effective regulatoryframework for land transport with road safety asa top priority, whilst at the same time promotingsocio-economicdevelopmentandprotectionoftheenvironment.ThestrategybeingadoptedbyTMisabalancebetweentheestablishmentofstandards,educatingthepublic,andenforcement.

Figure 3 : Quantity of pollutant, by type (2007 to 2010)

Source:MEPA.

4EuropeanEnvironmentAgency,Malta National Emission Inventory 2000-2009 and projections for 2010,[online].Availableat:http://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/mt/eu/nec/

envthgitg/MT_2000_2009_Inventory_and_projections_for_2010.XLS/manage_document[Accessed3April2012].



1.5.2 For this purpose, TM has or is in theprocess of implementing various schemes. Theseinclude aspects of eco-driving in driver trainingand testing, ascertaining that the public is awareof the importance of vehicle emissions testing,ensuringthatVRTrequirementsarein linewithEUDirectives,maintainingapresenceon the roadsidewith regular roadside checks and the supportingoffiscalmeasures thatareaimedat improving thecleanlinessofvehiclesontheroad,likeregistrationtaxandthescrappagescheme.

1.6 Recently Introduced Vehicle Emissions Reduction Measures

1.6.1 Since the publishing of the ‘VECS AuditReport (2009)’, Government introduced variousinitiatives,includingregulatoryandfiscalmeasures,aimedat further reducingemissions fromvehicles.However, thesustainabilityof thesemeasureswill,inthemediumtolong-term,behighlydependantonaneffectivevehicleemissionsenforcementregime,namely the VRT, the Emission Alert Campaign(EAC) and surprise Roadside Technical Inspections(RTIs). To-date,therehavebeennoofficialstudiestoaccuratelydeterminethe impactof therecentlyintroduced measures. These measures were notwithinthescopeofthisaudit,neverthelessinsomecasestheirimpactisalreadyapparent.

1.6.2 Since its introduction, inNovember 2010until December 2011, over 2,400 vehicles whichwereolderthantenyearshavebeenscrappedandreplacedby anewand consequently less pollutingvehicle. The scrappage scheme entails that agrant, up to amaximumof €2,000, is put forwardtofacilitatethepurchaseofthenewvehicle,whichmustcomplywith‘Euro5’emissionstandards.Thisimplies that as a minimum, on average each newvehiclewouldemitaround10percentlessCO2thanthescrapped10yearoldvehicle.5AsattheendofApril2012,itisestimatedthatthecostofthegrantsawardedamountedto€4,504,476.6

1.6.3 Aregulatorymeasurewhichobligesthatthenewbusserviceoperates‘Euro5’emissionstandardvehiclesalsohadan immediate impact in reducingemissionsfromvehicles.Theseregulatorymeasuresimplied that a fleet comprising of buses with anaverage age of 35 years, and thus subject only tominimal emissions standards, was replaced with afleetwhichcompliestostringentemissionlevels.

1.6.4 Thenewvehicleregistrationtaxationsystem,as introduced in January 2009, encourages thepurchaseofsmallervehicles,inotherwordsvehiclesthatemitlowerlevelsofpollutants,sincethebiggerandmore polluting vehicles pay more registrationtax than the previous system. This initiative wascomplemented by another fiscal measure reform,namely the annual circulation tax. The revampedregime aimed to stimulate the purchase of lesspollutingvehiclesthroughthepolluter-paysprinciplebybasingthecirculationtaxonCO2andparticulatematteremissions.

1.6.5 In addition to the recently introducedmeasures discussed above, in acknowledgmentthat road traffic is amajor source of air pollution,theMEPA Air Quality Plan (AQP) of January 2010,setsanumberofmeasures inordertoachievethefollowinggoals:

• Reductioninvehicleemissions;

• Encouragingamodalshift;

• Reducing the traffic impact of newdevelopments.

1.6.6 Themeasureswhichhavethehighestimpactvis-à-vistheaimsoftheplan,thatistocurbambientconcentrationsofcertainpollutants,arethosewhichwillentailareductionintrafficvolumes.Currently,thesemeasures are being subjected to further in-depthstudiesbyMEPA.

5Calculationisbasedona150g/kmmaximumCO2emissionsstipulatedby‘Euro5’standardsandanaverageof167g/kmofCO2emissionsforvehiclesagedtenyearsas

indicatedinthedocumentbytheEuropeanCommissionentitled:Progress Report on Implementation of the Community’s Integrated Approach to Reduce CO2 Emissions

from Light Duty Vehicles. 6Source:TM.



1.7 Focus of the follow-up audit

Audit Objectives

1.7.1 Againstthisbackground,theNAOundertookthis follow-up audit to examine the improvementsregistered since the July 2009 publication. Forthepurposeof thisaudit, theNAO focusedon thefollowingobjectivesfromthepreviousstudy,namelyto:

• Evaluatetheproperconductandeffectivenessofthevehicleemissionscontrolschemes;

• Assess the proper implementation of theseschemes through the quality control carriedoutbytheregulatorybodiesconcerned;

• Reviewtheproperandconsistentenforcementactionscontemplatedbytheseschemes,soastoensurethatvehiclesfoundtohaveexcessiveemissions,rectifytheirsituation.

Audit Methodology

1.7.2 This report examined the extent towhichthe recommendationsproposed in the ‘VECSAuditReport (2009)’ have been implemented. ThisentailedthereviewofkeydocumentationincludingthelocalandEUlegislativeframeworkregulatingthevehicleemissionscontrolschemes.ThisenabledtheNAO to determine the extent of adherence to thelegalframework.

1.7.3Recordsrelatedtoallthevehicleemissionscontrol schemes were analysed. This dataanalysis enabled the determination of the overallcontributionoftheseschemestowardsthereduction

invehicleemissions,andconsequentlytheresultingimprovementintheambientairquality.

1.7.4 The NAO carried out interviews with therelevantofficialsatTMandMEPA.Theseinterviewsfacilitatedtheevaluationofthedegreetowhichtheimplementation of the above mentioned vehicleemissionscontrolschemeswasbearingthedesiredresults.

1.8 Structure of the report

1.8.1 Following this introductory Chapter, thereportisstructuredaroundthesekeyareas:

• Chapter2evaluatestheextentofdevelopmentsregarding emissions testing in the VRT byTM. This Chapter discusses the degree ofeffectiveness of the various monitoring andcontrolproceduresadoptedbyTM.

• Chapter 3 discusses the present role of the

EAC in increasing awareness of the negativeimpact brought about by vehicle emissions.This includes an evaluation of the relativemonitoringandenforcementandtheextenttowhich theCampaign is integratedwithothervehicleemissionscontrolschemes.

• Chapter 4 reviews the implementation ofsurprise roadside vehicle emissions tests,namelytheRTIcarriedoutbytheEnforcementDirectorate at the Vehicle Inspectorate Unit(VIU)withinTM.

1.8.2 Theoverallconclusionsemanatingfromthisstudyareincludedinpage12ofthisReport.


Emissions testing in the Vehicle Roadworthiness Test

Chapter 2


Chapter 2 – Emissions testing in the Vehicle Roadworthiness Test


2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Chapter2 focusesonthevehicleemissionstestscarriedoutaspartoftheVehicleRoadworthinessTest (VRT), predominantly on developments sincethe ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’. This part of thereport evaluates the quality control carried out byTransport Malta (TM) to guarantee that the VRTemissionstestingiscarriedoutproperly,resultinginaneffectiveschemeandensuring thaton-the-roadvehiclesarecompliantatalltimes.

2.1.2 TheVRTstartedtobegradually introducedin Malta in October 1999. Currently such testingcomprises about 20 aspects related to the overallroadworthinessconditionofmostvehiclesagedfouryears and over. The following emissions-relatedtestingbecameanobligatorycomponentoftheVRTinJanuary2002:

• Testing the exhaust gas opacity of diesel-enginevehicles,asthisisconsideredtobeanadequateindicatorofadiesel-enginevehicle’sstateofmaintenancewithregardtoemissions.

• Testing the Carbon Monoxide (CO) level ofpetrol-enginevehicles’exhaust.

2.1.3 The VRT also assesses the security andcompleteness of the exhaust system because anysuchdefectsarelikelytoleadtoexcessiveemissionsinthenearfuture.

2.1.4 Additionally, theVRT also examinesdiesel-enginevehiclesforthesealingofthehighpressurefuelpump.Suchaprocedureisgenerallyapplicabletooldervehicles.ThischeckhasbeenincorporatedwithintheVRTsincevehicleownersmightbreakthepumpseal,eitherdue tomaintenanceor toadjustthe engine performance, resulting in excessiveemissions.SuchtamperingresultsinaVRTfailure.

2.1.5 When a broken fuel pump seal has beenidentified,thevehicleownerisobligedtorectifytheemissions levels and subsequently the VRT stationinstallsanewenumeratedsealsuppliedbyTM.TheVRT stations record the application of new sealsinto their online database managed by the MaltaInformationTechnologyAgency(MITA).

2.1.6 The vehicle owner is charged a variableamountfortheservicerenderedbytheVRTstation.However, to date, a broken fuel pump seal is notconsideredtobeanoffenceandthevehicleownerconcernedisnotliabletopayanyfineorbesubjecttoanypenalty.TransportMaltahasnotedthatitwillbeconsideringsuchanissuefromaregulatorypointofview.

2.1.7 TheVRTmayonlybeperformedat testingstationsrunbyoperatorswhoaregrantedapermitto do so by TM, after the necessary requirementsstipulated in the VRT Regulations have beenmet.7Asattheendof2011,therewere35licensedactivetestingstations.8

7VRTRegulations,SubsidiaryLegislation65.15.8Source:TM(during2011twoVRTtestingstationshadcloseddown).



2.1.8 Every VRT station is required to have fullycomputerized test lanes equipped to test the gasopacityofdiesel-enginesandthecarbonmonoxideandhydrocarbongaslevelsofpetrol-engineexhaustemissions. Vehicle Roadworthiness Test stationsmust employ aminimumof one licensed qualifiedtester.Theequipmentmustbecalibratedregularlyso as to ensure the validity of the measurementstaken, up to the standard required by the VRTRegulations.

2.1.9 Vehicle Roadworthiness Test stationoperatorshavevariousrecordkeepingandreportingobligations.TheactualresultsofthevehiclestestedaretransmittedelectronicallytoTM,updatingTM’scomputerisedvehicledatabase.

2.1.10 ToascertainthattheVRTisbeingcarriedoutproperlyandinlinewiththeVRTRegulations,TMhasbeenempoweredbythelattertoundertakevariousqualitycontrolmeasures.TransportMaltasoughttoundertakequalitycontrolthroughitsTechnicalUnit,mainlybymakingunannouncedSpotChecksandFullDayInspectionsoftheVRTstations.

2.1.11 TransportMalta’sTechnicalUnitiscomposedoffourofficers,includingatechnicalmanagerwhoisinvolved throughoutall of theVRTmonitoringandenforcement process, supported by an assistanttechnical manager, a technical officer and a clerk.Since2010,TMhasbeensub-contractingtheserviceof a security guard to attend random Spot ChecksandFullDayInspections,togetherwiththetechnicalofficerfromTM.

2.2 Situation as reported by the NAO in July 2009

2.2.1 The ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’ concludedthat TM is to routinely analyse the VRT results,enablingtheidentificationofabnormaltrendsinVRTresultswithrespecttoindividualstationsorspecificvehiclecategories.Atthetime,thislackofanalysisprohibited the implementation of a risk-basedapproach toenableTM to target its inspections atVRTstations.

2.2.2 Quality control was further constrainedbecauseinspection-relatedrecordsfor20oftheVRT

stationswere incomplete. TransportMaltawas toensure that comprehensive documentation shouldbemaintainedinordertostrengthentheaudittrailregardingtheseinspections.

2.2.3 Subsequenttotheperiodunderreviewinthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’9,qualitycontroloftheVRTprocess improved significantly since TM embarkedon various initiatives aimed at strengthening itsmonitoringandqualitycontrolfunctions.Asaresultof its stepped upmonitoring, six VRT stations hadbeen fined for VRT related infringements by TM.Despitesuchimprovements,the‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’notedthatVRTenforcementwasstillbeingconstrainedbyalongdrawnappealsprocess.

2.2.4 The VRT emission compliance effect wasfound to be short-lived. In fact, half the vehicleswhichwere subjected toa roadsideemissions testwithinayearofVRTcertification,failed.Thisshort-lived emissions compliance was attributed to thefollowingfactors,namelythelackofregularvehiclemaintenance,on-the-roadabusesbyvehicleowners(such as fuel pump tampering) and the relativelyoldageoftheMaltesevehiclefleet.TheforegoingclearlyindicatedthatvehicleroadworthinesscannotbeensuredsolelythroughVRTalone,butalsoneedsto be complemented through regular on-the-roademissionstesting.

2.2.5 In view of the conclusions reported inthe ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’, the NationalAudit Office (NAO) proposed the following mainrecommendations:

• Transport Malta is to routinely analyse theVRT results. This will enable the Authorityto identify, investigate and act on abnormaltrendsinVRTresultswithrespecttoindividualstationsand/orspecificvehiclecategories.

• The improved inspection regime of VRTstations, as adopted in 2008, needs to besustainedandthenecessarytimelyfollow-upundertakenincasesofinfringements.

• Transport Malta is to ensure thatcomprehensive documentation relatingto quality control inspections of VRT

9Theperiodunderreviewinthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’refersbetween1October2006and30June2007.



stations is maintained. The quality of suchdocumentationwill serve to strengthen theaudittrailregardingtheseinspections.

2.2.6 The next sections of this Chapter discussthe extent to which these recommendations havebeenimplementedbyTM.Aprimaryinputtowardsimplementing the NAO recommendations wasthe VRT Compliance Report compiled by the LandTransportDirectorate,TM,inSeptember2010.

2.3 A more rigorous VRT stations monitoring and enforcement regime has been adopted

2.3.1 Subsequent to the conduct of the ‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’,TMadoptedvariousinitiativestoimprovethemonitoringandenforcementofVRTstations,namelyPost-VRTChecks,SpotChecks,FullDayInspectionsandthephotographingofvehicles.AspecifictargetwassetbyTMforeveryinspectionmeasureandtherespectiveachievementsfor2010and2011wererecorded,Table1refers.

2.3.2 AsindicatedinTable1,bytheendof2011,TMmanagedtomeetandsometimesexceedmostofthetargetsrelatedtoenforcementinspectionsatVRTstations.Theseenforcementmeasuresresultedin a total of approximately €31,675 and €25,339fines imposed on defaulting VRT stations by TMduring 2010and2011 respectively. However, duetothelengthyappealssystem,whichisindependentofTM,around39percent(€22,215)10oftheabovementionedfinesarestilloutstanding.

2.3.3 The ensuing sections further discuss theenforcementmechanismsoutlinedinTable1.

The decrease in the number of irregularities detected during Post-VRT Checks is indicative of the effectiveness of such inspections

2.3.4 Post-VRTChecksentail that a vehicle is re-testedatTM’sfacilitieswithinaweekofbeingVRTcertified.SuchatestseekstoensurethatVRTsareproperlyundertakenbytestingstations.In2011,the

Table 1 : Inspection measures, targets and results (2010 and 2011)Inspection Measure Target Results 2010 Results 2011

Post-VRTChecks(Vehicles are re-tested at TM’s facilities within a week of being VRT certified)

1,000

978 1,224

26 vehicles with irregularities

12 vehicles with irregularities

SpotChecks(Surprise checks by TM to ascertain that the prescribed roadworthiness test procedures are adhered to by the VRT station operators)

80(eachVRT

stationatleasttwiceayear)

52 75

Seven cases of irregularities identified

10 cases of irregularities identified

FullDayInspections(Detailed verification of the VRT procedures to be followed by the VRT station operators)

14(oneperhigh-riskVRTstation)

13 18

No irregularities identified (the high-risk

VRT stations had not yet been identified)

Three irregularities identified (two out of the 18 Full Day Inspections were carried out at the

high-risk stations)

PhotographingofVehicles(During the VRT. Implemented in October 2010)

Fivepercentsamplecheckor

more

810photosverified(Fivepercentofphotos

taken)

6,349photosverified(Fivepercentofphotos

taken)

No irregularities identified

Three irregularities identified

Source:TM.

10Source:TM.



numberofPost-VRTChecksincreasedby25percentoverthepreviousyear.Nonetheless,almost54percentlessirregularitieswereidentified.

2.3.5 ThedecreaseinthenumberofirregularitiesdetectedduringPost-VRTChecksisindicativeoftheeffectiveness of such inspections, which broughtabout improved performance and compliance toVRTregulationsbytestingstations.Moreover,suchPost-VRTChecks have the addedbenefit that theyencourageVRTstobecarriedoutmorescrupulouslysincetestingstations’ownerswouldbeawarethatanycertifiedvehiclescanbecalledforre-testingbyTM.

2.3.6 ThenumberofPost-VRTChecksundertakencan be considered substantial, especially whenconsidered against the number of irregularitiesdetectedbyTM.Infact,in2011only12irregularitieswere detected with respect to the 1,224 vehiclesinspected. Furthermore, only one of the 12irregularities, identified through the Post-VRTChecksperformedduring2011,wasrelatedtonon-compliantvehicleemissionslevels.

2.3.7 The12 irregularities identifiedpertainedtoninetestingstations.Inviewoftheseirregularities,TM imposed fines totalling €7,150, amounting toaround 28 per cent of the total fines imposed ontestingstationsregardingVRTirregularitiesin2011.Additionally, VRT station operators are allocatedpenalty points, consequently leading to therevocationoftheVRTstation’slicenseifamaximumnumberofpointsisreachedwithinaspecifiedperiodoftime.

Around one seventh of surprise Spot Checks by TM at VRT stations revealed irregularities

2.3.8 Transport Malta also carried out surpriseSpot Checks to ascertain that the prescribedroadworthiness test procedures were adhered tobyVRTstations.ThenumberofSpotCheckscarriedouthas increasedby44per cent in2011over theprevious year. The hit-rate of these inspections,that is the number of irregularities identified, wasaround13percentintheyearsunderreview.Sucha hit-rate is significantly higher than that achievedthroughPost-VRTChecks.

2.3.9 EachVRTstationwassubjectedfromonetofour surprise Spot Checks. Although TM regularlymonitorsVRT stationperformance in termsof testthroughput,thetargetingcriteriaadoptedfortheseSpotChecksisnotdocumented.Moreover,TMdoesnot document the reasons for deviating from theinspection targeting criteria which stipulated thatalltestingstationsweretobevisitedat leasttwiceannually. This lack of documentation weakensthe relative audit trails since it is not possible tocorrelate inspection targeting with the associatedriskpresentedbyspecifictestingstations.

2.3.10 During2011,TMimposedatotalof€12,920fines on five defaulting VRT stations, identifiedthrough the surprise Spot Checks performed. It ispertinenttopointoutthatnearly90percentofthesefineswereimposedononestationforirregularitiesdetectedduringoneinspection.

Full Day Inspections by TM detected only minor infringements at VRT stations

2.3.11 TransportMalta’senforcementmechanismsalso include Full Day Inspections at VRT stations.These inspections entail verification that thestipulated VRT procedures are being followed bytesting stations. Full Day Inspections provide TMwiththeopportunitytomonitortheworkpracticesofindividualtestingstationsoveranumberofhours.Suchinspectionsareintendedtobetargetedathigh-risktestingstations.

2.3.12 During 2011, TM carried out 18 Full DayInspections at 12 testing stations. Each of thesestations was monitored on up to three occasions.Theseinspectionsrevealedonlyminorinfringementswith respect toVRT regulations,namely related tothe photographing of vehicles during testing. Thenumberandtypeofinfringementsdetectedimplyalower hit-rate than Spot Checks. It is to be notedthatnoirregularitiesweredetectedbyTMthroughthe13FullDayInspectionsperformedduring2010.

2.3.13 Such circumstances question theeffectiveness of this enforcement mechanism.These concerns are based on the assumption thathigh-risk testing stations are being targeted andthatTMadoptsthesamemonitoringproceduresas



thoseutilisedduringSpotChecks.Insuchascenarioitwould be expected that, at least, the same rateof irregularitieswouldresultthroughbothtypesofinspection. On the other hand, TM contends thatthemainaimoffulldayinspectionsistomonitorandensure the quality of tests carried out by stationswhichcarryoutahighnumberoftests.ThisisdonebycomparingthenumberoftestscarriedoutduringthedaywhenTMofficersarepresentatthestationwith thenumberof tests carriedoutby that samestationduringthesamedayofadifferentweekwhenTMofficersarenotpresent.Anymaterialvariancesinthenumberoftestscarriedoutonbothdatesarethen followedupbyadditional spot checksat thatparticularstation.

2.3.14 Acontributoryfactorleadingtothesituationdiscussed in the preceding paragraph relates tolimitationsinTM’stargetingofFullDayInspections.Issuesrelatedtorisk-basedinspectiontargetingarediscussedinparagraph2.7.

The photographing of vehicles has significantly minimised the potential for abuse related to VRT certification

2.3.15 Another control mechanism which wasimplemented by TM to ensure that VRTs areappropriately carried out entail the photographingofvehiclesduring testing. This control is intendedto provide further assurance that vehicles wereactually certified at the respective testing station.

Vehicle Roadworthiness Test stations are obligedto electronically submit these photographs to TMinaccordancewithVRTRegulationsasstipulatedinLegalNotice49of2012.Itistobenoted,however,thatTMpilotedthisinitiativeduring2010and2011.

2.3.16 In accordance with its own establishedtargets, TM reviews at least five per cent of thephotographstakenbyeverytestingstation.During2011, the 6,349 photographs reviewed identifiedonlythreenon-conformities.

2.4 Quality control inspection related records have improved significantly

2.4.1 This follow-up audit has revealed asignificant improvement in the maintenanceof inspection related records by TM since thepublicationofthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’.

2.4.2 Records pertaining to inspections andreviews undertaken by TM officers, namely, Post-VRT Checks, Spot Checks, Full Day Inspections andthe photographing of vehicles during the VRT, aregenerally appropriately maintained. Such recordsprovide an adequate audit trail of inspections andreviewscarriedout.

2.4.3 However,aspointedoutinparagraph2.3.9,the audit trail does not extend to the targetingof testing stations with regard to the differentinspectionmeasures.



2.5 Emissions related VRT failures have doubled in 2011 over the previous year

2.5.1 The enhanced inspection regime, broughtabout by the intensified enforcement actionsundertakenbyTM,resultedinasubstantialincreasein the VRT failure rate, both as regard the overallcondition of the vehicles tested and also theemissionsrelatedfailures,Figure4refers.

2.5.2 As evidenced in Figure 4, the emissionsrelated VRT failures have almost doubled during

2011overthepreviousyear. Thisfollowsasimilartrend when considering the overall VRT failures,suchasbrakes,lights,suspensionsandothercheckscarriedoutduringtheVRT.

2.5.3 Transport Malta contends that thesubstantialincreaseintheVRTfailureswasprimarilybroughtaboutbytheintensifiedenforcementregimeadopted since 2009. Furthermore, the Authorityremarked that the increasedenforcement resultedinover-cautiousVRTstationoperators,preferringtofailavehicleinborder-linecases.Suchoccurrencesparticularly result when testing is based on visual

Figure 4 : VRT failure rate since the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’

Source:TM.



checks. The over-cautious attitude adopted bysometestingstationsmayhavedevelopedsinceVRTstations are liable to fines and also penalty pointswhen infringements are detected by TM. It is tobe noted that when the maximum penalty pointsareaccumulatedwithinaspecifiedperiod,theVRTstation’slicensewillberevoked.11

2.5.4 Notwithstanding the overall improvementsin VRT certification, substantial variation in testingstations’ failure rates, including those related toemissions,isstillpresent.

2.6 Inconsistencies in VRT emissions failure rates at the various testing stations persist

2.6.1 The significant variation in VRT stations’emissions failure rates, as previously highlightedin the ‘VECSAuditReport (2009)’,prevails. SuchasituationresulteddespiteTM’sstrengtheningof itsenforcementregime,Figure5refers.

2.6.2 During October 2006 to June 2007, that istheperiodunderreviewbythe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’, the standard deviation was calculatedat 1.24. As at end 2011, this value increased to3.60. It is pertinent to note that the standarddeviationpertaining to theoverallVRT failure rate

Figure 5 : Percentage emissions failure rate for all VRT stations during 2011, as compared with the period under review during the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’

Source:TM.

also showed an increasing trend over the abovementionedperiods. Althoughothervariables,suchas the number and vehicle mix tested influencethesecalculations, it ispertinent tonote thatovertime, there have also been significant shifts in thefailurerateofindividualstations.

2.6.3 TransportMaltacontendsthatvariousissuesinfluencetheresultingvariationinemissionstestingfailurerates.Theseincludethefollowing:

• Selective VRT station operators tend topostpone emissions testing if it is perceivedthat a visibly polluting vehicle will fail toadhere to the stipulated standards. Suchcircumstances result in a lower VRT failurerateforthetestingstation.

• VehicleRoadworthinessTeststationoperatorsmay also adopt the practice indicated inthe above paragraph to avoid losing anycustomers.

• Analysis of VRT emissions testing resultsmaybe subject todistortions sincepre-1979registered vehicles are subjected to a visualtest,whichisconsideredashighlysubjective.

11VRTRegulationsSubsidiaryLegislation65.15.


• IntensifiedenforcementbyTM,coupledwiththe amount of accumulated penalty pointsand the relative risks associated with therevocationof theVRToperator licence,haveled some testing stations to adopt an over-cautiousattitude.

2.6.4 TransportMaltacontendsthatitwillfurtheranalyse the variation in the VRT emissions failurerate. Furthermore, TM noted that its analysiswouldconsidertheproportionofvehicletestedbyindividualstationoperatorsandtheaverageageofthevehiclesbeingtested.

2.7 Risk-based targeting of enforcement measures related to VRT station operators can be further improved

2.7.1 Duringthelatterpartof2010,TMdevelopedcriteriatoenableittoidentifytestingstationswhichposed a risk to the integrity of VRT certification.ThesecriteriaincludedVRTstations:

• which perform a high number of tests andwhose failure rate is lower than theaverageby threepercentagepoints or higher byfivepercentagepoints;

• whosefailurerateissevenpercentagepointslower or ten percentage points higher thantheaverage;

• which were the subject of three or morepublic complaints, as well as three or moreinfringements over the past three years asidentifiedbyTM.

2.7.2 At theoutset,TM intended toutilise suchcriteria for its Full Day Inspection programmes forboth 2010 and2011. Theprofiles of 14of the 37testingstationsfittedtheabovecriteria. However,onthebasisofexperienceaccruedfrominspectionscarried out in 2010, TM felt that, rather thanbeing strictly bound by the criteria indicated inthe preceding paragraph for its 2011 inspectionprogramme,inspectionswouldbemoreeffectiveifitalsotookintoconsiderationtheresultsofamonthly

reviewofallVRTstations’performance. TransportMalta contended that this approachwould renderits targeting practices more effective since theywouldbebasedonthelatestinformationavailable,including complaints received. In fact, TM onlyconducted two of the Full Day Inspections at thepreviouslyidentified14testingstations,whileontheotherhanditcarriedout16FullDayInspectionsonotherstationsthatwerenotinitiallyidentified.

2.7.3 OncomparingtheresultsachievedfromtheFullDay Inspectionscarriedout in2011withthosecarriedoutin2010,itisevidentthattheutilisationof the latest criteria by TM proved to be moreeffective. However, to avoid potential subjectivitywhenprioritisinginspections,TMistodocumentanyadditionalcriteriaandtheirrelativeweighting,inthepolicytobeadoptedwhentargeting inspectionsatVRTstationoperators.

2.8 Conclusion

2.8.1 Whilst acknowledging that TM’senforcement regime has made a positive impacttowards further ensuring VRT integrity, there stillexists some limitations in its inspection targetingpractices.TheselimitationsareconsideredtohinderTM fromoptimising the effectiveness through thevarious enforcement measures. In part, this isevidencedbythevariationinVRTemissionsfailureratesofthevarioustestingstations.

2.8.2 Although TM made substantialimprovementssincethe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’inmaintainingenforcementrelateddocumentation,a weak audit trail relating to inspection targetingprevails. This documentation is of criticalimportancetotheeffectiveregulationofamarket-drivenindustry.

2.8.3 The ensuing Chapters of this report willmainly evaluate any improvements in the othervehicle emissions control schemes, namely theEmissionAlertCampaignandtheRoadsideTechnicalInspection.Thus,thecontributiontothecontrolofvehicle emissions of these on-the-road emissionscontrolschemesshallbeverifiedinChapters3and4respectively.



The Emission Alert Campaign

Chapter 3


Chapter 3 – The Emission Alert Campaign


3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 ThisChapterdiscussestheEmissionAlertCampaign (EAC). The Campaign was launchedby TransportMalta (TM) inAugust 2005. The keyobjectivesoftheEACinclude:

• increasing public awareness on the negativeimpactofharmfulvehicleemissions;

• increasing enforcement through theinvolvementofthegeneralpublic;

• reducingdrasticallyvehicleemissions.12

3.1.2 TheCampaignwasalsointendedtoinduceVehicle Roadworthiness Test (VRT) stations to actmoreresponsiblywhenissuingVRTcertificates.IfareportedvehiclefailstheEACtestafterarecentVRTpass,thenthiswouldsurelyreflectnegativelyontotheVRTstationconcerned.13

3.1.3 Toincreasevehicles’emissionscompliance,the EAC urged the public to report, via a mobilephone text message, the registration number ofvehicles which they perceive as “emitting noxiousexhaustfumes”.14

3.1.4 According toTM’s follow-upprocedures,those vehicles which get reported at least three

times by three different mobile phone numberswithina threemonthperiod,wouldbesummonedforanemissionstestatTM’sfacilities.Thisfilteringmechanismaimstoascertainthat,asfaraspossible,non-compliant vehicles are identified. Moreover,this approach minimises the risk that owners ofthe tested vehicles would be victims of pranks ormaliciousreports.

3.1.5 SummonedvehicleswouldbesubjectedtotheemissionscomponentsoftheVRT,namely:

• checkingoftheexhaustsystem;

• testing the opacity of diesel-engine vehicles’exhaust;

• testingthecarbonmonoxideandhydrocarbonexhaustlevelsofpetrol-enginevehicles.

3.1.6 Ifthevehiclefailsthetest,TMissuesaCourtsummonswhereafineof€46.59couldbeimposedontheowner.Moreover,thevehicleownerwouldalsobeaskedtorectifythematterandreturnforasubsequent emissions testwithin twoweeks. If avehiclefails there-testordoesnotturnupforthetest,afterbeingsummonedtwice,TMwouldplacearestrictiononthevehicle’sannualcirculationlicenserenewal.15 Thisimpliesthatthevehicleownerwillnotbeabletorenewthevehicleroadlicenseonceit

12EmissionsAlertinformationleafletissuedbyTM,MinistryforInfrastructure,TransportandCommunications[previouslyknownastheMaltaTransportAuthority(ADT),

MinistryforUrbanDevelopmentandRoad].13EmissionAwarenessandEnforcementProjectBriefissuedbythePR/ExecutiveOfficeoftheMaltaTransportAuthority,page3,22August2005.14EmissionAlertinformationnoticeissuedbyTM,MinistryforInfrastructure,TransportandCommunications[previouslyknownastheMaltaTransportAuthority(ADT),

MinistryforUrbanDevelopmentandRoad].15MaltaTransportAuthority,ExecutiveOffice,EmissionAwareness&EnforcementProjectBrief,pages3to4,August2005.



isoverdue,eitherthatsameyearorthefollowingincaseitwasrecentlyrenewed.


3.2.1 The‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’concludedthat,tovaryingextents,theCampaignwassuccessfulin attaining its objectives of creating awareness,bringing out enforcement and also at reducingvehicleemissions.

3.2.2 The Campaign was also effective inincreasing public awareness about the healthhazards and illegality of excessive fumes. Thiswasparticularly evident from thenumberof ShortMessage Service (SMS) reports received by TM.However,theEACwasnotdeemedtohavemanagedtogenerateapreventiveandproactiveawareness,thatis,consciousnessaboutthesimplemaintenancemeasuresthatvehicleownersneedtotakeinordertopreventexcessiveemissions.

3.2.3 With regard to theCampaign’sobjectivesof enforcing emissions standards and of reducingvehicle emissions, the Campaign made modestinroads, although less than its’ potential. Themajorityoflicenserenewalrestrictions,84percent,wereeffective. Therestwererendered ineffectivemostlybecauseofthetimelaginregisteringissuedrestrictions, while some other restrictions wereeitherneverregistered,orignoredonceregistered.

3.2.4 Additionally,thepotentialoftheCampaignwas not fully realized largely because a significantnumberofreportedvehicleswhichwereeligiblefortestingwerenotsummoned.TheimplementationoftheEACwasnotalwaysconsistentandtransparent.Inparticular,thevehiclesreportedwerenotfilteredregularlyandthesummonedvehiclesdidnotalwaysfollow the Campaign’s publicised procedures. Thefailure to record the filtering dates constituted anincompleteaudit trail and reduced theCampaign’soperationaltransparency.

3.2.5 In explanation of the above mentionedshortcomings, TM stated that enforcement was asecondary objective of the Campaign. Secondlyit did not summon all vehicles eligible for testingbecause it lacked the necessary resources,

particularly the testing capabilitiesneeded to copewith the significant public response. TransportMalta acknowledged the fact that an integratedautomated data management system would haveincreased transparency and reduced transcriptionerror risks, but deemed the costs to outweigh thepotentialbenefits.

3.2.6 TheCampaignwaseffectiveatidentifyingdiesel-engine vehicles with excessive emissions.However, since the public is generally unableto assess the exhaust of petrol-engine vehicles,the Campaign cannot be regarded as a means ofcontrolling emissions from petrol-engine vehicles.Thelatterwouldneedtobetargetedthroughotherformsofvehicleemissioncontrolschemes.

3.2.7 Despite its limitationsand shortcomings,the Campaign played ameaningful role inMalta’sefforts to curb excessive vehicle emissions. Anadequately resourced and well planned Campaignhas the potential to complement the VRT androadsideemissionstestscheme.

3.2.8 Inviewoftheconclusionsreportedinthe‘VECSAuditReport (2009)’, theNAOproposed thefollowingmainrecommendations:

• TheCampaign’soperational strategy is tobereviewedinthelightofthepublic’sresponsetotheinitiativeandoftheresources–includingtestingcapacity–availableortobeprovidedto TM. An updated operational strategyshould facilitate planning, implementation,enforcement, monitoring and improve theoveralleffectivenessoftheScheme.

• Thefilteringtimeperiodshouldstartfromthedate a vehicle is reported for the first time.Such vehicle-centred filtering has variousadvantagesoverthecurrentmethodofsettingthe same filtering period for all vehicles. Itwould linkeligibility fortestingmoredirectlytoavehicle’sactualperformance.

• The publicity component of the Campaignshould be revived and particularly aimed toeducate vehicle owners about the vehiclemaintenancetheyshouldundertaketoensureemissionscompliance.



3.2.9 The next sections of this Chapter discussthe extent to which these recommendations havebeenimplementedbyTM.

3.3 The Emission Alert Campaign registered a decline in public response

3.3.1 Since its launching in August 2005 up tothe end of 2011, a total of 257,451 SMS reportswerereceived. Ayearlybreakdownofthe latter isillustratedinFigure6.

3.3.2 From Figure 6, it is evident that, since2008, the number of SMS reports received hasbeendecreasing,byaround74percent,untilyear

ending2011.Moreover,thenumberofSMSreportsreceivedthroughdifferentmobilephones,assumedto represent different persons, also declined,Figure7refers.

3.3.3 The foregoing implies that publicparticipation in this vehicle emissions reductionCampaignhasbeendecliningduringrecentyears,byapproximately51percentfrom2009to2011.Thisdecreasemaybeattributedtothefollowingfactors:

• The improvement in air quality due to anoverall reduction in vehicle emissions, asreferredtoinChapter1ofthisReport.

Figure 6 : Total number of SMS reports received per year (2005 to 2011)

Source:TM.

Figure 7 : Number of Users of the EAC SMS reporting per year (2009 to 2011)

Source:TM.



• The lack of continuity in the publicitycomponentof theEAC. Thisshallbe furtherexaminedinSection3.8ofthisChapter.

• Othercontributingfactorssuchasthechangeinpublictransportbusesto‘Euro5’emissionsstandard engines. Further details regardingnew measures and initiatives are found inChapter1ofthisReport.

3.4 An Expression of Interest for a customised IT enforcement system has been pending since 2010

3.4.1 Despitethedeclineinthepublic’sparticipationintheEAC,thisinitiativeformsacomplimentaryelementwithinthevehicleemissionscontrolframework.Therewere minimal policy changes relating to the EAC’sobjectivesandoperationalframeworksincethe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’.

3.4.2 However, TM developed an Expressionof Interest to automate its operations related tothe Campaign through a customized InformationTechnology (IT)enforcement system. Someof theprimaryfunctionalrequirementsforthisapplicationinclude the automatic analysis of the SMS reportsreceivedandthegenerationofthelistofvehiclestobecalledinfortheemissionstest.

3.4.3 Inaddition,thecustomisedITenforcementsystemwasexpectedtointegratewithTM’ssystemstogeneratemailmergesandbeabletointerfacewith

alltherelevantstakeholderssuchastheTestCentre,the Common Database (CBD) and also with theVehicle RegistrationAdministration (VERA) system.Thisintegrationisconsideredessentialsincethenetresultwillbean improvedsynchronisedoperation,facilitating the timely sharing of vital information,suchastheregisteringofrestrictionsissued.FurtherdetailsarefoundinSection3.6.

3.4.4 TransportMaltacompletedthedraftingofthisdocumentinMay2010.However,theAuthorityconteds that this Expression of Interest was notpublished due to lack of funds. Consequently thissituation has prevented TM from comprehensivelyandaccuratelyevaluatingthecostbenefitofsuchasystem.

3.5 More summoned vehicles are passing the EAC test

3.5.1 The number of vehicles which are foundtobeemissions compliant followinganEAC test isincreasing. In2011,252vehicleswere summonedbyTMforanEACtest.Thepassratewas97percentfromthe137testedvehicles.Thiscontrastswiththesituationreportedfollowingthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’, where 1,448 EAC tests were performedbetweenJulyandDecemberof2009,andthepassratewas81percent,Figure8refers.

3.5.2 The increasing trendof theEAC’s testpassrate can be primarily attributed to vehicle ownersmaking the necessary maintenance and repairs

Figure 8 : EAC test Pass rates (July 2009 to December 2011)

Source:TM.



to ensure a successful test outcome. Such actionis in line with TM guidelines, included in the EACtest notice, which encourage owners to addressany malfunctions in order to avoid the stipulatedpenalties should the vehicle be found to be non-complianttopredeterminedemissionslevels.

3.6 The number of ‘no shows’ for the EAC test increased by 13 per cent between 2009 and 2011

3.6.1 In 2011, 252 vehicles were summonedforanEACtest through411notices. However, in274cases,vehicleownersdidnotshowupatTM’sfacilities. This constitutes a 13 per cent increase

in the number of ‘no shows’ for 2011 over 2009.Figure9 reveals thepercentageof vehicleswhichdid not show up for the EAC test, per quarter,duringtheperiodJuly2009toDecember2011.

3.6.2 The Authority’s policy regarding EAC ‘noshows’entailsthatifthevehicleinquestionfailstobeexaminedorre-examinedatTM’sfacilitieswhenrequested, the vehicle’s annual circulation licensewill be suspended until such time that the vehiclehasbeenexaminedandcertifiedroadworthy.

3.6.3 A review of the 411 notices issued byTM in 2011, relating to 252 vehicles shows that aconsiderable number of ‘no shows’ occur on the

Figure 9 : Percentage of vehicles which did not show up for the EAC test, per quarter (July 2009 to December 2011)

Source:TM.



receipt of the first EAC test notice. A number ofowners,however,alsoopttoignorethesecondandsubsequentEACtestnotices,Table2refers.

3.6.4 Fromthe252vehiclessummonedforanEACtest during 2011, a random sample of 6016 out ofthe160vehiclesthatdidnotshow-upfollowingthereceiptofoneormoreEACtestnoticeswasanalysedbytheNAO.Areviewofthe60vehiclesshowedthata restriction was imposed in 79 per cent of casesafter thesecondconsecutive ‘noshow’. TransportMaltanotedthisobservationandshallbeensuringthatproceduresareconsistentlyapplied.

3.6.5 ThissituationmainlyarisessinceEACtestingpersonneldonothavethefacilitytopostrestrictionsonvehiclesthroughtheVERA,whichismanagedbytheLicensingandTestingDirectorate(LTD).Mattersare further complicated since the LTD registersbatches of restrictions at isolated intervals, whichconsequently increases the lead time betweenthe ‘noshow’andtheregisteringof therestriction

imposed on the vehicle’s annual circulationlicense. In fact suchdurationbetween the issuingand registering of restrictions has been confirmedthroughtheabovementionedsampleof60noticesissuedin2011,wherebyanaveragedurationperiodof95dayswasrecorded.ThislackofanimmediateenforcementactionbyTMresultsalsoinadditionaltime being taken to rectify a non-compliantvehicle, consequently increasing hazardous vehicleemissions.

3.7 Non-compliance with TM’s report threshold policy and the timeliness of EAC testing prevails

3.7.1 The ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’ reportedthatathoroughassessmentofTM’sfilteringprocesscouldnotbecarriedoutduetoanincompleteaudittrail. The filtering process is a critical element ofthe Campaign since it enables the identification ofpotentially polluting vehicles, as reported throughSMSbythepublic.TransportMaltahasnowrectified

Table 2 : Vehicle availability for EAC test (2011)

Number of notices received per vehicle during 2011

Vehicles summoned for EAC test by TM

(number)

Vehicle made available for EAC test

(number)

One notice 97 92

Two notices 152 43

Three notices and more 3 2

Totals 252 137Source:TM.

16Forthepurposeofthisanalysis,the92vehicleswhichweremadeavailableforanEACtestuponreceiptofthefirstEACtestnoticesentbyTM,wereexcluded.



this situation through a more suitable computerapplication. This application facilitates queries inrespectofSMSreportsreceived.

3.7.2 Despite these improvements, the followingissuesnotedinthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’persist.The computer application used to process SMSreportsdoesnotprovideanyaudittrailofthefilteringprocess– forexample, thecomputerapplication isnotcapableofidentifyingdifferentusersandisnotevenpasswordprotected.Moreover,theinputtingprocessiscarriedoutmanually,withaconsiderableamountofdatahandling. Thus the system is verytime-consumingandpronetotranscriptionerrors.

TM’s policy of subjecting vehicles to an EAC test was not always adhered to

3.7.3 According to TM’s prescribed follow-upprocedures,vehicleswhichgetreportedthreetimesby at least three different mobile phone numberswithin a threemonth periodwould be summonedfor an EAC test. The ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’noted that, in practice, the Authority was testingvehicles following the receiptof fourormoreSMSreportsfromdifferentmobilephonenumberswithinthe afore mentioned period. The NAO follow-uprevealedthatthissituationprevails.

3.7.4 TransportMaltacontendsthatthissituationoccurssincetheAuthorityhastoprioritizetestingofvehicleswhichreceivedagreaternumberofreports,

andconsequentlydeemedtoposeagreaterriskofpolluting.PrioritizationisresortedtosinceTMlacksthehumanresourcestocarryoutmoreEACtests.

It may take more than six months for reported vehicles to undergo an EAC test

3.7.5 Areviewofthe411EACtestnoticesissuedbyTMduring2011revealedthat itmaytakemorethansixmonthsforavehicletobetestedfollowingTM’squarterlyfilteringprocess. Therearevariousstages in the process of testing potentially non-compliantvehicles.3.7.6 Although TM is identifying those vehicleswhich have reached the SMS report thresholdwithin the three consecutivemonth time-window,it is processing the mobile phone text messagesreceived every quarter. By not processing SMSreportsonamonthlybasis,TMwouldhaveforfeitedtheopportunity toprocess reports receivedat theendofeachthreeconsecutivemonthtime-window.Consequently, a maximum delay of two monthsresultswhenavehiclereachesitsreportsthresholdbeforeTM’sprocessingdate,Figure10refers.

3.7.7 A secondmajor time lag of approximatelyfour months occured between TM’s processing ofSMSreportsandthesummoningofpotentiallynon-compliant vehicles for an EAC test. Seventy-eightoutof86vehiclescalledforanEACteston19August2011hadreachedtheirreportthresholdduringthe

Figure 10 : Delays in the processing and summoning of potentially non-compliant vehicles for an EAC test

Source:TM.



Figure 11 : Quantity of SMS reports received per quarter (July 2009 to December 2011)

Source:TM.

period January toMarch 2011. Such a delaymayoccur since TM has reduced the number of EACtestscarriedoutfromanaverageof241monthlyin2009 toapproximately11monthly in2011. Thesecircumstances materialised due to TM’s otherpriorities, namely those relating to the reform ofpublictransport.

3.7.8 The foregoing is conducive to enablingpotentially polluting vehicles, as identified by thepublic,tobeutilisedforseveralmonthspriortobeingsubjectedtoanEACtest.TransportMaltacontendsthat such processing times are not reducing theeffectivenessoftheEAC,sinceultimatelypotentiallynon-compliantvehiclesaresummonedforemissionstesting.Nevertheless,theAuthoritynotedthatitwillcontinuetoidentifyareasforpotentialimprovement.

3.8 Call for improved continuity in the publicity component of the EAC

3.8.1 Transport Malta’s publicity component ofthe EAC entails that vehicle owners are remindedabout the SMSnumberon every road licence thatis printed, a banner on the TM website whichencouragespeople to send SMS reports and someadverts are issued to remind people about theCampaign. Notwithstanding these efforts, publicresponsedeclined. Inpart, suchadeclinemaybeattributed to a significant decrease in SMS reportsreceivedinrelationtoformerpublictransportbusesandtheoverallimprovementregisteredinairquality.

3.8.2 Publicinterestinthisschemewas,however,revivedinearly2011throughapublicitycampaign.Costs incurred by TM in this respect amounted to€2,448.Intheimmediateaftermathofsuchpublicityin2011,thedecliningtrendofSMSreportsreceivedwasreversed,Figure11refers.

3.8.3 Figure 11 also indicates that the positiveeffects of such a publicity campaign remainedeffective foraroundsixmonthswhere thenumberof SMS reports received increased from around2,932to4,395.However,followingthisperiod,thenumber of reports received declined to the samelevel prior to the undertaking of TM’s awarenessraisingprogramme.

3.8.4 Itistobenotedthat,contrarytothepreviouspublicityinitiativesundertaken,TM’s2011publicitycampaigndidnotseektoeducateownersaboutthebenefits of regular vehiclemaintenance, especiallywith regards the prevention of excessive vehicleemissions.

3.9 Conclusion

3.9.1 Tovaryingdegree,TMsoughttoimplementthe recommendations about enhancing theeffectiveness of the EAC which were proposed inthe ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’. Transport MaltahaspartiallyimproveditsaudittrailsrelatingtotheprocessingofSMSreportsreceivedfromthepublic.Moreover,inthelightofadecliningtrendinpublic



participation,TMsoughttorevivetheEACthroughapublicitycampaignin2011.DespiteTM’sefforts,the EAC is still subject to operational limitationswhich ultimately impinge on its effectiveness. Insuch instances potentially non-compliant vehicles,asidentifiedbythepublic,continuetobeutilizedforasubstantialnumberofmonthstothedetrimentofMalta’sambienceairquality.

3.9.2 Transport Malta does not have the ITinfrastructure to support the EAC. Although anExpression of Interest was drafted, lack of fundsprohibited the Authority from making furtherprogress in this regard. The non-availability ofthe appropriate data management applications isconducive to inefficiencies when processing andanalyzingtheSMSreportsreceived.Dataisstillnot

analysed in real-time,which consequently leads tosubstantialdelaysincallingandtestingofpotentiallynon-compliantvehiclesatTM’sfacilitates.

3.9.3 The lack of the appropriate datamanagementapplicationsalso translates itself intoenforcement inefficiencies. Transport Malta isunable to immediately impose a restrictionon therenewalofthevehicle’sannualcirculationlicense.Insuch circumstances, TM cannot effectivelyprohibitvehicleswhichwerenotmadeavailableorfailedtheEACtestfrombeingontheroad.

3.9.4 ThenextChapterof thisReportdealswithRoadsideTechnicalInspectionswhichareundertakenbyTM.


Roadside Vehicle Emissions Test

Chapter 4


Chapter 4 – Roadside Vehicle Emissions Test


4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 Surprise roadside checks of vehicleemissionsareof critical importancesince theyaimtoensurethatvehiclesareappropriatelymaintainedat all times, and not just prior to the VehicleRoadworthinessTest(VRT).ThisChapterfocusesontheextenttowhichrecommendationsproposedbytheNationalAuditOffice (NAO) through the ‘VECSAudit Report (2009)’, have been implemented inorder to ensure that this enforcementmechanismiscontributingtomaintainvehicleemissionswithinthepermissiblelimitssetbylaw.

4.1.2 RoadsideTechnical Inspections(RTIs)arecarried out by the Enforcement DirectoratewithinTransportMalta(TM).Upto2009,theseinspections,which focus on all aspects of vehicle safety andmaintenance,usedtobecomplementedbyRoadsideEmissionsTests(RETs)whichwerecommissionedbythe JointCommitteesof LocalCouncils andcarriedoutbyLocalWardens.

4.1.3 TheRTIsperformedbyTMaremeasuresemanating from Commission Directive 2010/47/EU of 5 July 2010, amending European Parliamentand Council Directive 2000/30/EC of 6 June 2000.The VRT Regulations17 transpose this EuropeanUnion (EU) requirement to conduct surprise RTIsespeciallyon theheavy-use (generally commercial)

vehicles intoMalteseLaw. Consequently,roadsideinspections(includingemissionstesting)aremostlycarriedoutonthefollowingvehiclecategories:

• vehiclesusedtocarrypassengerswithatleasteightpassengerseats;

• vehicles weighing more than 3,500kg, andusedforthecarriageofgoods;

• trailersandsemi-trailersweighingmorethan3,500kg.

4.1.4 RoadsideTechnicalInspectionsverifyseveralaspectsofthevehicles’overallcondition,18primarilyrelated to safety, security and environmentalprotection. Thelatter issubdividedintospillageoffueloroil,andemissions,whicharecategorisedasfollows:

• theexhaustsystem;

• thesmokeopacityofdiesel-enginevehicles;

• gaseousemissionsofpetrol-enginevehicles.

4.1.5 Since 2006, the Vehicle InspectorateUnit (VIU), which forms part of the EnforcementDirectorate within TM, is responsible for carryingoutRTIs.19TheseinspectionsareundertakenbyfiveEnforcement Officers. On average, these officers

17MotorVehicleRoadworthinessTestRegulationsSubsidiaryLeglislation65.15.18RefertoAppendixI.19BesidestheRTIs,theVIUalsoundertakeinspectionsrelatedtothecarriageofdangerousgoods,tachographchecks,inspectionsrelated to overloading of vehicles,

inspectionsonbuses, company checks, follow-up inspections related to vehicles stoppedduring roadside checks and inspectionsfollowingreportsfromTMofficials.



allocate a total of around 30 hours per week toconductRTIs.EnforcementOfficershavethepowerto stop any vehicle on the road, including vehiclesregisteredinanothercountry.

4.1.6 TransportMalta’spracticesentailthat,inthose instanceswhere faults have been identified,the vehicle owner is requested to carry out thenecessary maintenance and then to report at theVIUGarage for a follow-up test or a VRT. In caseofmajorfaults, theownerofthe inspectedvehiclewouldbe issuedwithatrafficoffenceticketbyTMofficials.Ifthefaultyvehicledoesnotturnupforthefollow-upinspections,orfailsthetests,theLicensingandTestingDirectoratewouldbe instructed to setarestrictionontherenewalofthevehicle’sannualcirculationlicense.

4.1.7 Furthermore, if an inspected vehicle isfoundtobeinaverybadcondition,thedriverwouldbeobligedtogaragethevehicle immediately. Thenumberplateswouldberevokeduntilthevehicleisrepaired.


4.2.1 The‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’pointedoutthat, during the period under review, both RETsandRTIswereableto identifyasignificantnumberofvehicleswithexcessiveemissions,throughoutallvehiclecategories. RoadsideEmissionsTestswere,however, discontinued in early 2008. The ‘VECSAudit Report (2009)’ also reported that roadsideinspections primarily concentrated on commercialand public transport vehicles, and targetedmainlydiesel-engine vehicles. Consequently, high-riskpetrol-enginevehiclesremainedlargelyuntargeted.

4.2.2 The ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’ alsoremarked that Gozo based vehicles were hardlytargeted during RTIs. Moreover, itwas concludedthatwithanenhancedmanagementframework,riskbasedtargetingandbettercoordinationbetweenthetwoschemes,roadsideinspectionshadanessentialandcomplimentaryrolewithinthevehicleemissionscontrolregime.

4.2.3 In view of the findings and conclusionsreported in the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’, theNAO’srecommendationsincluded:

• Roadsideemissionstestsaretobeconductedonamorefrequentbasis,particularlytargetingvehiclesolderthaneightyears,andthevehiclecategorieswithahighfailurerateinroadsidetestsorinVRT.

• Considerations be given for the RETsconducted, aspartof the Local EnforcementSystem, to be restarted with an improvedregulatory framework. This scheme hadthe potential of being highly effective atidentifying vehicles with excessive emissionsasitexclusivelyfocusedonvehicleemissions.

4.2.4 ThenextsectionsofthisChapterdiscusstheextenttowhichtheserecommendationshavebeenimplementedbyTM.SinceRETswerediscontinued,findings and conclusions presented in the ensuingsectionsarebasedonananalysisoftheRTIscarriedoutbyTMduringtheperiod2009to2011.

4.3 Emissions related failures detected through RTIs have decreased

4.3.1 The importance of roadside tests isemphasized by the fact that the VRT standards ofvehiclemaintenancetendtobeshort-lived,hencetherelevanceofRTIsasacontrolmechanism.Towardsthisend,anNAOtestof322vehiclessubjectedtoanRTIduring2011revealed,thatonaverage,thefailedvehicleshadbeenVRTcertifiedaroundeightmonthspriorthesurpriseroadsideinspection.

4.3.2 Anumberofvariablesshouldideallydictatethenumberandextentoftheseinspections.Factorswhichcouldbeconsideredincludevehicleemissionstrends with regards air quality, previous roadsideinspection results, trends emanating from VRTtestingandotherenforcementschemes,aswelltheavailabilityofresourcestoconductsuchtests.

4.3.3 Table 3 shows the number of roadsideinspections carried out during the period underreview by the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’ and theperiod2009to2011.

4.3.4 This demonstrates that the number ofroadside inspections, which may also incorporateemissions testing, has been decreasing over theyears.Infact,therehasbeenadeclinefromatotal



of3,165 to1,979 roadside testscarriedoutduringtheperiodunderreviewbythe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’and2011respectively.

4.3.5 Mostnotablythedecreaseisevidentintheaftermath of the curtailment of the RETs, whichwerecarriedoutbyLocalWardensuptoearly2008.To date, no official studies have been carried outtoascertainwhether theeffects resulting fromthecurtailmentoftheRETs,whichspecificallytargetedemissions, have been appropriately absorbedthroughthecurrentRTIregime.

4.3.6 However,twomainfactorsindicatethatthecurtailment of RETs have left a gap in the vehicleemissions control framework. PrimarilyRETswereroadsideinspectionswhichtotallyfocusedonvehicleemissions.Infact,aroundhalfofthevehiclestested

werefoundtobenon-compliant.Suchahit-rateissubstantiallyhigher than the currentRTIemissionshit-rateof lessthan6.5percent.21 Secondly,evenwhenassumingthateachroadsidetestcarriedoutbyTMentailsanemissionstest,thenumberoftestsundertakenbythisAuthority in2011isstillaround37percentlowerthanthetotalnumberofroadsideinspections carried out during the period underreviewbythe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’.

4.3.7 The number of roadside tests carried outbyTM in2011wasaround30percent lower thanthenumberofRTIscarriedoutinthepreviousyear.SuchadeclineismainlyattributabletoadecreaseinTM’s resourceallocation forRTIs. TransportMaltacontended that it was constrained to take such ameasuresincethelaunchingofthenewbusservicewasgivenpriorityoverroadsideinspections.

Table 3 : Roadside Inspection (2007 to 2011)

RTI quantity RET quantityTotal attainable Emissions

tests (RTI & RET)

October 2006 to June 20072 0 1,552 1,613 3,165

2009 2,693 0 2,693

2010 2,812 0 2,812

2011 1,979 0 1,979

Source:TM.

20Periodunderreviewduringthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’(amountsquotedarecalculatedona12monthperiod).21The6.5percentincludesboththeemissionsfailures,relatedtotheactualfumes,andexhaustfailuresrelatedtothephysicalcomponentoftheexhaustsystem.



Roadside Technical Inspections targeting is still predominantly dependant on the enforcement officers’ acumen and alertness

4.3.8 During 2010 and 2011, RTIs carried out byTMtargeted2,812and1,979vehicles respectively.The majority of these vehicles were light goodsvehicles, lorries, mini-buses, buses and coaches.Table4comparesthetestresultsamongthevariousvehiclecategoriestargetedthroughRTIs.

4.3.9 TheemissionscomponentoftheRTIrevealedthat 6.5per centof vehicles failed this test during2011. Theresultanttest’shit-rateisdependantona number of variables, such as the vehicle’s age,utilisation, degree of maintenance and not leastthe ability of TM’s enforcement officers to detectpotentiallydefaultingvehicles.

4.3.10 Despite theNAO’s recommendation in the‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’, TM has not yet fine-tuneditsRTItargetingpracticesthroughtheanalysisofthevariablesindicatedintheprecedingparagraph.Consequently,theAuthority isonlyabletoprovidegeneral targeting guidelines to its enforcementofficers. Such direction entails that enforcementofficers focus on the older, poorlymaintained andexcessivelyemittingvehicles.

4.3.11 Onanalysis,itwasrevealedthattheaverageage of the vehicles which successfully passed theroadsideinspectionis21years,whilethosevehicleswhichfailedthetesthavearelativelyhigheraverageageof25years.Theforegoingisbasedonareviewof 322 randomly selected vehicles from the 1,979whichweresubjectedtoasurpriseroadsidetechnicalinspectionduring2011.Theoutcomeofthisanalysis

Table 4 : RTI results (2010 and 2011)

LGV LorryMini/Bus & Coach

ArticulatedRoad Trains

Private S/Trailer22 Trailers

2010

Inspections 661 782 538 272 12 547 275 12

Failure 323 411 365 122 7 235 143 8

% Failure 48.9 52.6 67.8 44.9 58.3 43.0 52.0 66.7

2011

Inspections 504 537 433 171 10 324 171 10

Failure 264 308 278 81 4 130 108 6

% Failure 52.4 57.4 64.2 47.4 40.0 40.1 63.2 60.0

Source:TM.

22S/TrailersandTrailerswerenotapplicableforanemissionandexhaustcheck.



reaffirms that the age of the vehicles inspectedthroughRTIsisacriticaltargetingconsideration.

4.3.12 The absence of more formal guidelinesimplies that RTIs targeting is still predominantlydependant on the enforcement officers’ acumenandalertness.SuchcircumstancespreventTMfromfurther improving the outcome of its RTIs. To acertainextent,thelackofformalandmorespecifictargeting guidelines is mitigated by the fact thatenforcementofficersreceivedformaltrainingbytheVehicle and Operator Services Agency (VOSA) andhaveeachaccumulatedanexperienceofaroundsixyearsinvehicleemissionstesting.

The roadside inspection regime is still only marginally targeting commercial petrol-engine vehicles

4.3.13 Roadside Technical Inspectionspredominantly aim to target vehicles within thecommercial and public categories, where around97percentofwhicharediesel-engine. Duringtheperiod2009 to2011,99percentof theRTIswereperformedondiesel-enginevehicles.

4.3.14 Similarly to the situation reported in the‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’,thegeneralfocusonthehigh-riskdiesel-enginevehicleswasat theexpenseofRTI coverageonpetrol-engine vehicles. In fact,during 2011, only 20 inspections where carriedout on the 1,539petrol-engine vehicleswithin therelevantcategories,Table5refers.Itispertinenttonotethatthesevehicleshaveanaverageageof24yearswhich,whencoupledwiththeirprobablehighutilizationrate,renderthemhighlypronetoexceedthepermissibleemissionslevel.

4.3.15 The low number of petrol-engine vehiclessubjectedtoRTIscouldalsoemanatefromanotherpracticality.Suchproblemsmayariseasitisdifficultto detect defaulting petrol-engine vehicles since,unliketheirdiesel-enginecounterparts,theytendtoemitclearerexhaustfumes.

4.4 RTIs increased targeting the Gozo-based vehicles, while RTIs undertaken in Malta are held in less locations

4.4.1 The location atwhich roadside inspectionsareheldisanimportantelementwhichcontributestotheoveralleffectivenessofthiscontrolmechanism.Primarily, the testing locations have to cater forthe safety of enforcement officers, the driver andpassengers in the vehicle under test, as well astoother roadusers. Theroad lay-by identifiedasthe testing location must also offer the necessaryarea to enable the conduct of vehicle roadsideinspections. Due considerations have also to begiven so that roadside tests do not hinder trafficflows.Operationally,thelocationisalsoimportantto enable appropriate coverage throughout mostregions of Malta and Gozo, which consequentlyensuresthatallvehiclescouldbesubjectedtosuchtests.

4.4.2 Since the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’, thelocationswhereroadsidestestswerehelddecreasedinMaltawhilemoreinspectionswereheldinGozo.Although thematter is still in theprocessofbeinganalysed further, TM contends that the primaryreason for thedecline in testing locations inMaltarelatetosafetyissuesandtheprobabilitythattrafficflows in the chosen location would encompass ahighdegreeofvehiclespertainingtothepublicandcommercialcategories,Table6refers.

Table 5 : RTIs performed on diesel and petrol-engine vehicles (2009 to 2011)

Year

Population of Diesel vehicles Population of Petrol vehiclesTotal Population of Diesel and Petrol

vehicles

Commercial

& Public

Total

RTIs

% of Commercial

& Public vehicles

undertook a RTI

Commercial

& Public

Total

RTIs

% of Commercial

& Public vehicles

undertook a RTI

Commercial

& Public

Total

RTIs

% of Commercial

& Public vehicles

undertook a RTI

2009 45,682 2,663 5.8 1,589 30 1.9 47,271 2,693 5.7

2010 45,696 2,778 6.1 1,555 34 2.2 47,251 2,812 6.0

2011 45,751 1,959 4.3 1,539 20 1.3 47,290 1,979 4.2

Source:NSOandTM.



4.5 The audit trail related to RTIs has been strengthened

4.5.1 Since the ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’, TMhas strengthened the audit trail related to RTIsundertaken. Such audit trails also extend to thecalibrationofequipmentutilisedbyTMduringtheseinspections.

4.5.2 Inadditiontomanualrecords,followingthepublicationofthe‘VECSAuditReport(2009)’,TMisalsomaintainingRTIdatainelectronicformat.Inspiteofsuchanimprovement,dataanalysisisstilllimitedsinceRTIdataisnotintegratedwiththecoreVehicleRegistrationandAdministrationSystem(VERA).Thislimitscertaindataanalysisandprecludesthatsuchinformation is utilised as inputs by other vehicleemissions controlmechanisms. Consequently, theopportunity to facilitate inspection targeting andenforcementmeasures,suchasthevehicle’sannualcirculation licence renewal restrictions in case ofdefaultingvehicles,isnotbeingexploited.However,TM contends that currently it is in the process ofaddressingtheissuesreferredtointhisparagraph.

4.6 Conclusion

4.6.1 Roadside testing constitutes an importantcontrol mechanism since it encourages vehicleownerstomaintaintheirvehiclesuptotherequiredstandardsatalltimes. Despite the increase in thenumberofRTIsundertakenbyTM,thelacunawhichmaterialised after the curtailment of RET in 2008prevails. Even though TM carries out emissionstestsontargetedvehicles,agapmaterialisesastheAuthority is not legally obliged to test emissionslevels when conducting RTIs. In fact, even if it isconsidered that all of theRTIs conducted includedemissionstesting,thenumberaccomplishedwouldstillbeconsiderablylessthanthelevelofemissionsroadside testing reported upon in the ‘VECS AuditReport(2009)’.

4.6.2 ThetargetingofRTIsisstillhighlydependanton the acumen of enforcement officers. Suchcircumstances arise since TM only provides itsofficials with general targeting guidelines. Theprovisionofmorespecificguidelineswouldincreasefurtherthealreadysubstantialnumberofdefaultingvehicles detected through TM’s roadside tests. Acaseinpointrelatestothefactthatveryfewpetrol-enginevehiclesaresubjectedtoroadsidetests.

Table 6 : RTI Locations

Region

As reported in ‘VECS Audit Report (2009)’ As at end 2011

Number of different locations

utilised for the conduct of RTIs

Frequency of RTI

Quantity of RTI

Number of different locations

utilised for the conduct of RTIs

Frequency of RTI

Quantity of RTI

Northern 11 83 509 8 54 627

Northern Harbour 6 69 280 1 1 14

Southern Harbour 14 82 395 6 268 922

South Eastern 11 51 235 5 28 276

Western 4 6 19 4 23 261

Gozo 1 1 17 1 11 60

Totals 47 292 1,455 25 385 2,160

Source:NSOandTM.


Appendix


Appendix I – Technical Roadside Inspection Report (as set out in Commission Directive 2010/47/EU Annex I)



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