“Perestroika” Lost: Why the Latest “Reform” Movement in Political ScienceShould Fail

Having been a political scientist sincethe mid-1960s, I have seen calls for dis-ciplinary change come and go (see alsoSalisbury 2001). The latest “revolution”is particularly disappointing. Dubbed the“Perestroika movement,” after the nomde plumeof the “revolt’s” conjurer(Miller 2001), supporters of this latest“protest” often make sweeping claims,couched in apocalyptic imagery. Ulti-mately, Perestroikans alienate some whofavor disciplinary changes. Those whorail against the profession’s political ir-relevance are themselves bad politicians.

Even though I applaud disciplinarychanges, I do not sympathize with Perestroika’s main themes, so I let sup-porters’ words carry most of the freight.To make it easy to check my scholar-ship, I rely on sentiments expressed inPS since December 2000.

Perestroikans’ ire is directed at theAmerican Political Science Associationand The American Political Science Review.An open letter signed by 222 persons claimed a 1998 survey ofAPSA members “reportedly found that,in fact, a very large portion of APSAmembers, to say nothing of scholarswho have given up on APSA, were critical of the current condition of theAPSR” (PS 2000, 735).

An accompanying letter from GregoryKasza, who has emerged as aspokesperson for the “Perestroika ‘re-volt’” (Kaymak 2001), offered severalways to increase the “representativenessof APSA and its journals” (Kasza2000a, 737). According to Kasza, “Toassure the representativeness of theAPSA leadership, which is the real is-sue behind the Perestroika protest, thereshould be competitive, membership-wideelections to the top posts” (737). Kaszacalled for “multiple candidates on theballot” who would offer “statements oftheir ideas concerning political scienceand the Association” (737). Accordingto Kasza, “in my view, the problemhere is not just with results, it is withthe organizational procedures that pro-duced those results” (737).

Calls for more “democracy” in APSAseem unimpeachable. Many would agreewith Steven Brams’s (2000) call forcompetitive elections in the organiza-tion. One ought to remember, however,that the same calls in the past camefrom persons with very definite agendas.Does the “Caucus for a New Political

Science” ring any bells (see Surkin andWolfe 1970)?

Other supporters of Perestroika alsocriticize APSA. Calling himself “oneof the legions of alienated members ofthe APSA,” Ronald Libby focused onAPSA’s tendency to “deaden anyscholarly interest in what is inherentlyan interesting field of study” (Libby2001, 203). According to Libby, “Notonly has APSA elevated mindlessnumber-crunching to the realm ofpenultimate scholarship in the profes-sion, but also tragically, it has createda reward structure that rejects anyscholar who seeks to understand poli-tics” (204). This is why Libby and“many midcareer political scientistshave given up on research and writing” (204).

Libby asserted that “the most damningindictment of the profession” (204) is thepaucity of political scientists serving asTV commentators on the Bush-Gore election. He noted the TV networks’ pro-clivity for relying on lawyers and lawprofessors, who “hugely outnumbered”political scientists. As the spouse of a po-litical scientist, who is also a former—successful—TV commentator, I can attestto how difficult it is for academics to de-velop the skills necessary to communicateeffectively to a TV audience. These skillsare widely employed by the legal profes-sion’s denizens. Paul Brewer and LeeSigelman (2002) identify the “gameframe” that is ubiquitous in media cover-age of politics, and note that some politi-cal scientists have mastered the argot demanded by TV newscasts.

Libby’s missive was very favorably re-ceived by a journalist, who admitted that,while in graduate training to be a politi-cal scientist, he was “no good at statis-tics” (Brunori 2001, 599). David Brunoriimplied that he did not complete thePh.D. because “political science, at leastAmerican politics, was all about num-bers” (599). In fact, “Political science hasbecome nothing more than statisticalanalysis of volumes of data” (599).

Charges that political science is triv-ial and “out of touch with real-worldconcerns” are frequently made by Pere-stroikans, be they graduate school drop-outs (Brunori 2001), newly mintedPh.D.’s (Gunawardena-Vaughn 2000),younger faculty (Kremer 2001), or sen-ior scholars (Werlin 2001). Critics suchas Mark Kremer (2001) and Therese

Gunawardena-Vaughn (2000, 741), at-tribute political science’s disconnectionfrom the “great political issues” and the“real world” to researchers’ “fixation onquantitative tools.” Some, such as Herbert Werlin (2001), lay the blame on“APSR’sbehavioral orientation, whichcauses authors to present trivial findings.”

Oddly, some of the behavioral move-ment’s founders used essentially thesame claim to justify their “revolt”against traditional political science (Dahl1961; Easton 1953). Dissatisfaction withthe “state of the discipline,” and espe-cially with the disconnection betweentraditional political science and political“reality,” was a primary factor in thebehavioral movement’s emergence afterWorld War II (Somit and Tanenhaus1967, 184). It did not take long for thesame charge to be leveled against behavioralists (Bay 1965; McCoy andPlayford 1967; Storing 1962). PerhapsHeinz Eulau (1969) was right; therewill always be tension between “ancient” and “modern” approaches inpolitical science.

Perestroikans wax especially elo-quently when condemning APSR, whichthey believe is biased in favor of “tech-nicism” (Kasza 2000a), more specifi-cally “rational choice” and “statisticalanalysis.” Kasza (2000b) rejects then-APSA President Robert Jervis’s (2000)claim that the Reviewreflects the sub-missions process, and he (2001a) laterdisputed the Review’s managing editor,Ada Finifter, who has reported thatAPSR’s published articles, in terms ofdisciplinary subfields, roughly reflect thepapers submitted to the Review(2000;see also Finifter 1996, 1997, 1998,1999; and Powell 1994, 1995).

Although Kasza (2001a) admits thatself-selection may be a factor in thekinds of articles that appear in the Review, he nonetheless argues that APSRand the review process is biased in favorof “hard science”—viz., “rational choicetheorists, formal modelers, and thosewho do exclusively quantitative research”(2001a, 597)—and against “soft sci-ence”—presumably everyone else in po-litical science. Kasza calls for a separatejournal—which presumably APSA mem-bers would automatically get—that wouldbe book reviews and perhaps review essays, while divorcing receipt of APSRfrom APSA membership. He would “Let

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the APSRfend for itself on the sub-scribers’ market” (2000a, 737).

What kind of political science doKasza, and presumably many Pere-stroikans, favor? His most detailed state-ment appeared in the September 2001 PS(Kasza 2001b). He opens by assertingthat Perestroikans reject the attempt toachieve “hegemony” in political scienceby the “hard sciences.” Kasza offers threereasons for rejecting “the hegemonic proj-ect of hard science.” First, “hard science”in political science “threatens academicfreedom,” because “hard scientists don’trealize the damage they do to youngscholars.” He asserts that “today’s hardscientists have convinced many youngpeople that they must sacrifice their intel-lectual integrity to enter this profession”(2001b, 597). Second, “normal [i.e., hard]science makes for bad science in thestudy of politics” (597). Here Kaszarefers to Donald Green and Ian Shapiro’s(1994) critique of “rational choice.”Third, “hard science” “is increasingly irrelevant to the normative and practicalproblems of real politics” (597). He be-lieves that moral questions “get little at-tention from today’s hard scientists,” whohave pushed classical political philosophyto “the margins of the curriculum” (597).He asserts, “Although hard science osten-sibly addresses empirical questions, it inevitably degenerates into an unempiricalexercise” (597). This is because “hardscientists” do not appreciate human complexity—shades of the Straussians(Storing 1962)—and, instead, “turn theirsubjects into robots or abstractions, re-stricting their thoughts and actions fortheoretical convenience” (597).

So far, we have seen what the Pere-stroikans—assuming Kasza reflects theirviews—are against. Now let us seewhat kind of political science they favor. To that end, Kasza offers sevenproposals (2001b, 598–99). First, hewould restore political philosophy to “acentral place in political studies so thatthe ends of political life once again become our common focus.” It is notclear what type of political philosophyKasza has in mind, although he proba-bly means “classical political philoso-phy.” But, what would happen to postmodern political philosophy, whichquestions many, if not all, the normativevalues that Kasza claims to favor?Moreover, how many academics want tosee “dead white European males” restored to primacy in the curriculum?Kasza’s second recommendation is toinclude “qualitative research methods”in graduate schools’ training. He doesnot specify how this would work. His third proposal is to “reorganize re-search around the study of substantive

problems,” a proposal that has alreadyraised questions (Kaymak 2001). Fourth,Kasza would “reverse the decline ofpolicy studies,” although he offers noguide to offset this genre’s decline.Kasza’s fifth proposal would “revampour professional associations and jour-nals to emphasize political substanceand catholicism with respect to methodsand approaches.” Kasza combines thiswith the assertion that “we must facili-tate the full participation of women,ethnic minorities, foreign scholars, andthe faculty of liberal arts colleges, all ofwhom have special contributions tomake to the ecumenism we hope to fos-ter.” (Kazsa includes the groups usuallyfavored by the politically correct, but issilent about persons from rural andworking class backgrounds, who mightalso have something to contribute to di-versity.) Proposal six is to “renew ourcommitment to study the politics of different parts of the world.” Kasza be-lieves that “hard science flourishes inthat most parochial of areas—Americanpolitics” (597). One wonders whatscholars of comparative politics whoemploy quantitative research methodsmake of this (see, e.g., Almond andVerba 1963; Barnes et al. 1979; Dalton2001; Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Norris, 1999, 2000; Pharr and Putnam2000; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Finally, Kasza calls for promoting inter-disciplinary research, which was onegoal of the behavioral movement thathe claims has distorted the discipline(see Eulau 1963).

Consider two more of Kasza’s asser-tions, and one begins to see the problemsassociated with the Perestroika move-ment. At one point, Kasza asserts, “Goodpolitical scientists need to read history soas to know the limits of theory” (2001b,598). As someone with two degrees inhistory, I can hardly argue with that. But,what kind of history would Kasza haveus read? The old-fashioned political his-tory, typified by the late Richard Hofstadter (1996) or Alonzo Hamby(1992)? The quantitative history producedby Paul Kleppner (1982) or RichardJensen (1971)? Or the newer kind of so-cial history that focuses on “everydaylife,” as exemplified by David FreemanHawke (1988) and Stephanie GraumanWolf (1993)? It makes a big difference.

My final point about Kasza is moresubstantive. In connection with his callfor putting some kind of political philos-ophy as the discipline’s centerpiece (seealso Kremer 2001), he writes that “it isno wonder that undergraduate enroll-ments have plummeted in step with thehegemony of hard science” (2001b, 598).If Kasza were more conversant with

empirical research in political science, hemight know that young Americans’interest in politics has declined recently(Bennett 1997), and that first-year stu-dents lose interest in politics before theyenroll in institutions of higher education(Bennett and Bennett 2001; Mann 1999).Young people’s lessened interest in poli-tics helps account for why they are lesslikely to enroll in college-level politicalscience courses. In short, if Kasza werea better political scientist, he wouldknow enough not to blame quantitativeresearch for young people’s declining interest in public affairs, which has set inbefore they could have taken any college-level class in political science.

In the first paragraph, I wrote that Per-estroikans alienate some who might favorcalls for changes in political science, andthat they are bad politicians. On what ba-sis can I write? Let me step forth as casein point. Bluntly put, I am a quantoid.My scholarship has been entirely quanti-tative. Almond and Verba’s (1963, vii)call to test “classic themes in politicalscience” with empirical data inspired meto become a quantitative political scien-tist. Yet, my research does not appear in the American Political Science Review.I long ago gave up trying to place re-search there. The folks in charge of theReviewconvinced me that my scholarshipdid not merit appearance in its pages.

Moreover, I suspect that APSA isdominated by persons from certain insti-tutions, mostly on the east coast, butsome on the west coast, with a fewfrom elite institutions situated in “fly-over country.” It would take an entirelydifferent piece of writing to prove this.I have suspicions, but no proof. (Ironi-cally, many who signed the “open let-ter” supporting “Mr. Perestroika” comefrom the same campuses as those theyclaim to oppose [PS 2000].)

The implication ought to be obvious.I ought to be attracted to the Pere-stroika “revolt.” But I am not. Why?Because Kasza and other Perestroikansmake it clear that types such as me arenot welcome. Not only are we lumpedwith rational choicers and others withwhom we have little, if nothing, incommon, we are also stigmatized. Calling us “robots” (Kasza 2001b, 597),“statisticians,” or “mathematicians”(Kremer 2001) hardly appeals to thoseof us who are political scientists andemploy quantitative methodology.

Finally, the Perestroikans often useapocalyptic phraseology. We hear aboutgraduate students pressured into disser-tations in which they do not believe.We read about young scholars whosecareers are either destroyed or stunted.But, of specifics, we hear not. Why?

178 PS June 2002

Acts of the kinds of which the Perestroikans accuse their foes are unprofessional, and perhaps legally actionable. Instead of hiding behindanonymity and vague charges, if actssuch as those alleged by the Pere-stroikans have transpired, then comeforth, make specific allegations, and ifthere is proof, let the guilty pay theprice for their unprofessional activities.

A good politician knows her/his base,and understands how to reach potentialsupporters. Hubris may define certainkinds of academic movements, but itdoes not make successful protests.

Stephen Earl BennettAppalachian State University

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