Perceptual Experience and Concepts in Classical Indian Philosophy

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Perceptual Experience and Concepts in Classical Indian PhilosophyFirst published Thu Dec 2, 2010

Classical Indian Philosophy accepts perception (pratyaka), or perceptual experience, asthe primary means of knowledge (prama). Perception (pratyaka) is etymologicallyrooted in the sense-faculty or the sense-organ (aka) and can be translated as sensoryawareness, whileprama, on the other hand, is derived from knowledge (pram) and,literally means the instrument in the act of knowing. However, the standardinterpretation of perception accepted by classical Indian philosophers, barring the

Buddhists and the Vedntins, is that it is a cognition arising within the selftheknowing subjectfrom mental operations following a sense-object contact. It, therefore,is neither an instrument in the act of knowing, nor a mere sensory awareness. Definitions

of perception from various classical Indian philosophy schools are given in section 2

below.

1. Introduction 2. Perspectives on Perception

o 2.1 Buddhist nominalismo 2.2 Nyya realismo 2.3 Mms realismo 2.4 Skhya definitiono 2.5 Advaita Vednta: direct knowledge

3. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Pratyakao 3.1 The basis of Buddhist nominalismo 3.2 The development of Hindu realism: the Nyya missiono 3.3 The Mms advance in realismo 3.4 The bdika (Grammarian) nominalism and realist objectionso 3.5 The Advaita Vednta: a compromise on Hindu realism

4. Perceptual Illusion Bibliography

o Texts in English translationo General works

Other Internet Resources Related Entries

1. Introduction

The etymology of perception in Sanskrit underlines a major and, perhaps the mostcontroversial, issue in classical Indian epistemology, viz. is the sensory core allthere is

to the content of a perceptual experience? Put differently, it is asked whether

the contentof a perceptual experience is restricted to being unconceptualized

(nirvikalpaka), or can any part of it be conceptualized (savikalpaka) as well? TheNaiyyikas generally take perception to be a two-staged process: first there arises a non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception of the object and then a conceptual (savikalpaka)
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perception, both being valid cognitions. For Buddhists, non-conceptual perceptions

alone are valid, while Grammarians (bdikas) deny their validity altogether. Skhyaand Mms agree with the Nyya position. These two realist schools, Nyya andMms, contest the Grammarian as well as the Buddhist positions. Advaita Vednta

position on perception seems to agree, in spirit, with the Buddhists, but their reasons for

supporting non-conceptual perceptions alone as ultimately valid (paramrthika satta) arevery different. This debate, on the role of concepts in perception, is discussed in detail insection 3.

A very critical question germane to these epistemological issues is raised by the skepticVasubandhu (c. 4th century CE): how do we distinguish veridical perceptions from the

non-veridical ones? This is taken up in the last section.

Before we start out with the definitions, the following observation may be noted. It is

true that the classical Indian philosophers were seriously concerned with the notions ofenlightenment, the highest good, freedom from the cycle of rebirth and the attainment of

ultimate bliss, etc. Therefore, some even question whether they were concerned with anyepistemological questions at all, much less the ones raised here? But they were! For

Naiyyikas, in particular, this was a major focus: the reason offered in the early Nyyatradition, in Vtsyyana's (c. 450500 CE) commentary on theNyya-stra, is thatwithout knowledge of objects there is no success in practical response to them. Not very

enlightening, perhaps. However, a much sharper justification comes from Gagea (c.12th century CE), the founder of the Navya-Nyya school, in the introduction to hisgreat work,Jewel Of Reflection On The Truth(Tattvacintmai):

In order that discerning persons may have interest in studying the work, AkapdaGautama (c. 2nd century CE) laid down thestra: Attainment of the highest goodcomes from right knowledge..

It should not then be surprising that one of the most sophisticated classical Indian

treatises dealing with perception, Kumrila's (c. 7thcentury CE)Pratyakapariccheda (aportion oflokavrttika pertaining to the fourthstra ofMms-stra), discusses thenature and validity of perception without any consideration of its role in the

ascertainment of religious and moral truth; in fact, theMms-stra itselfcharacterizes perception as not being a means of knowing righteousness (Dharma). It istrue that epistemological debates in classical Indian philosophy arose in the religio-

philosophical context; however, there is plenty of evidence on record to show thatclassical Indian philosophers were haunted by the very same epistemological concerns

that have troubled the minds of Western philosophers through the ages. The

controversial classical Indian epistemology issuewhether perception is conceptualizedor not?continues to be debated in the Western and Indian philosophy journals eventoday. That said, what makes this historical inquiry significant is that the epistemological

issues in classical Indian philosophy are introduced against the backdrop of radically

different metaphysical and ethical presuppositions.

2. Perspectives on Perception


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Most classical Indian philosophical schools accept perception as the primary means of

knowledge, but differ on the nature, kinds and objects of perceptual knowledge. Here wefirst survey Buddhist and orthodox Hindu schools' definitions of perception (excludingVaieika and oga schools since they simply take on board Nyya and Skhya ideas,respectively) and note the issues raised by these definitions. As mentioned above, the

orthodox schools generally accept both non-conceptualized (indeterminate) and

conceptualized (determinate) perceptual states in sharp contrast to the Buddhist view thatperception is always non-conceptualized or indeterminate awareness.

2.1 Buddhist nominalism

The oldest preserved definition of perception in the Buddhist tradition is the one byVasubandhu (c. 4thcentury CE), Perception is a cognition [that arises] from that object[which is represented therein] (Frauwallner, 1957, p. 120). However, the more

influential and much discussed view is that of later Buddhist philosopher Dinga (c.480540 CE) for whom perception is simply a cognition devoid of conceptualconstruction (kalpanpodha). Taber (2005, p. 8) notes two important implications ofthis definition. First, perception is non-conceptual in nature; no seeing is seeing-as,

because that necessarily involves intervention of conceptual constructs, which

contaminate the pristine given. Perception is mere awareness of bare particulars withoutany identification or association with words for, according to Dinga, such associat ionalways results in falsification of the object. Referents of the words are universals which,

for the Buddhist, are not real features of the world. Second, Dinga's definition onlyindicates a phenomenological feature of perception; it says nothing about its origin and

does not imply that it arises from the contact of a sense faculty with the object.Therefore, for the Buddhist idealist, the object that appears in perceptual cognition need

not be an external physical object, but a form that arises within consciousness itself.Both these ideas led to vigorous debates in classical Indian philosophy between the

Hindus and the Buddhists. The first of these ideas relates to the notion of non-conceptualperception, the second to idealism. Dinga's philosophy is idealist-nominalist in spiritand his epistemological position is in sync with the Buddhist metaphysical doctrines ofno-self and evanescence of all that eists which, epectedly, evoke strong reaction fromthe realist Nyya-Vaieika and Mms schools.

2.2 Nyya realism

The most comprehensive, and the most influential, definition of perception in classicalIndian philosophy is offered in Gautama'sNyya-stra 1.1.4:

Perception is a cognition which arises from the contact of the sense organ and object and

is not impregnated by words, is unerring, and well-ascertained.

Expectedly, each part of this definition has raised controversy and criticism. Ifperception is a cognition (and non-erroneous), then it is a state of knowledge, rather than

a means to knowing! How does that constitute a primary means of knowledge? Some

Naiyyika commentators, Vcaspati Mira (c. 900980 CE) and Jayanta Bhaa (c. 9th


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century CE) among them, suggest that thestra is to be understood by adding to it theterm from which (yata), since the precedingstra-s indicates that Gautama'sformulation of thisstra was intended to define the instrument of a valid perceptualcognition. Another issue has been the interpretation of the word contact. In what senseare the eye and the ear, the sense organs for vision and auditory perception, respectively,in contact with their objects Here a careful look at the term sannikara, generallytranslated as contact, helps resolve the issue Sannikara literally means drawingnear, and can be interpreted as being in close connection with or in the vicinity of. Thus

perception is that which arises out of a close connection between the sense organ and its

object.

More substantial debates on the nature of perception focus on the adjectives in the latter

part of thestra, viz., non-verbal (avyapadeyam), non-erroneous or non-deviating(avyabhichri), and well-ascertained or free from doubt (vyavasytmaka). There is

some disagreement among the Naiyyika commentators about the interpretations of theadjectives non-verbal and well-ascertained. Vtsyyana, in his commentary ontheNyya-stra, argues that the adjectives non-verbal and well-ascertained are really

part of the definition; non-verbal to point out that perceptual knowledge is not associatedwith words (Bharthari, the famous Grammarian, on the other hand, holds that awarenessis necessarily constituted by words and apprehended through them) and well-ascertained

to affirm that perceptual knowledge is only of a definite particular and specificallyexcludes situations in which the perceiver may be in doubt whether a perceived object

a is anFor a G. Vcaspati Mira, argues that the adjective well-ascertained need notbe used to exclude the so-called perception in the form of doubt, as doubtful knowledge,

being invalid, is already excluded by the adjective non-erroneous. Rather, theterm vyavasytmakastands for determinate perceptual judgment. Thus understood, theadjectives non-verbaland determinate seem to be complementary; a piece ofnon-

verbalperceptual knowledge cannot be said to be, at the same

time, determinate.Vcaspati Mira posits that these two adjectives indicate two differentforms of perceptual cognition and are not to be regarded as its defining characteristics.

According to him, Gautama included these adjectives to identify two kinds of perceptual

knowledge:avyapadeyam indicates non-conceptual or non-verbal perceptionand vyavasytmaka indicates conceptual or determinate perceptions. He contends that

by the term non-verbal, Gautama refutes the Grammarian view and includes non-conceptual perception and, by the term well-ascertained, he refutes the Buddhist view

and includes conceptual or judgemental perceptions as valid. Pradyot Mondal (1982)

traces the history of this controversy among Naiyyikas. He offers overwhelmingscholarly evidence in favor of the view that Naiyyikas mostly regard the adjectives as

part of the definition of perception and do not agree with Vcaspati's interpretation. Formost Naiyyikas non-verbal is included to deny the causal role of words in originationof perceptual cognition and, therefore, it applies to non-conceptual and conceptual

perceptions both, the difference being that the former is inexpressible in language, whilethe latter is not. Thus Mondal claims that the adjective non-verbal is sufficient on its

own to reject the Grammarian and the Buddhist views of perception. Non-verbal hasraised a most contentious debate, for over a millennium, between Nyya and Buddhist


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philosophers, and it is still alive today. The role of concepts in perceptionin dispute inthis debatewill be discussed in the next section.

The Navya-Naiyyika Gagea objects to the notion sensory connection in the classicalNyya definition of perception, arguing that this makes the definition too wide and toonarrow at the same time: too wide because it implies that everyawareness is perceptual

being produced by virtue of a connection with the inner sense faculty or mind(manas); too narrow because it fails to include divine perception, which involves no

sensory connection. Gagea offers a simpler definition of perception as an awarenesswhich has no other awareness as its chief instrumental cause. Being concerned that hisdefinition may be interpreted as ruling out conceptualized or determinate perception that

may have non-conceptual or indeterminate perception as one of it causes, he argues that

indeterminate perception can never be the chief instrumental cause of determinateperception, although it is a cause, since it supplies the qualifier or the concept for

determinate perception.

2.3 Mms realism

ThePurvaMms-stra (MS) were originally composed by Jamini around 200 BCE.The fourth MS 1.1.4 says:

The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a personwith an existing (sat) objectthat (tat) is perception; it is not the basis of the knowledgeofDharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present. (Taber, 2005:44)

There is no consensus among Mms commentators on whether this is intended as adefinition of perception, even while an initial reading of it suggests that it may be.Kumrila, the noted Mms commentator argues that the first part ofthestra isnotintended as a definition because of the context in which it figures;thestra-s preceding it are concerned with an inquiry into righteousness (Dharma).Moreover, thestra construed as a definition of perception, results in too wide, and nottoo accurate, a definition, because it only says that perception arises from a connection

between the sense faculty and an existing object and does not exclude perceptual error or

inferential cognition. Taber (2005, 16), on the other hand, suggests that it is possible to

construe MS 1.1.4 as a valid definition, and indeed such a construal was proposed by anearlier commentator, the so-calledVttikraquoted at length by bara inhis barabhyam. This, the most extensive commentary on theMms-stra,suggests that the words of thestra (tat= that andsat= eisting) be switched aroundfor a different reading for the first part of thestra, which would then state that, acognition that results from connection of the sense faculties of a person with that ( tat)

[same object that appears in the cognition] is true (sat) perception. This switch rules outperceptual error and inference; both these present objects other than those that are the

cause of the perception.

2.4 Skhya definition


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In the oldest Skhya tradition, perception is the functioning of a sense organ. This isclearly inadequate, as the ancient skeptic Jayari Bhaa (c. 8th century CE) is quick to

point out. Perception in this sense cannot be a means of knowledge (prama) as it doesnot distinguish between proper and improper functioning of sense organs and, therefore,

between valid and erroneous perceptions. A more sophisticated definition is later

devised wherein perception is an ascertainment [ofbuddhi or intellect] in regard to asense faculty (Skhyakrik 5 in Yuktdipik). This implies that perception is amodification of the intellect in the form of selective ascertainment of an object, broughtabout by the activity or functioning of a sense faculty. In some respects, this

characterization of perception as an ascertainment of the intellect neatly captures theidea that perception, being an instrument of knowledge, is the primary means ofknowledge. Ascertainment residing in the intellect is regarded as the instrument of

perception, while residing in the self it is regarded as the result of the process of

perception. Furthermore, theSkhyakrik states that the function of the senses with

regard to the objects is a mere seeing (Skhyakrik, 28b), and the function of theintellect, referred to as ascertainment, can be thought of as identification of the objectas in this is a cow, etc. (Skhyakrik 5ab). This suggests a two-stage process: firstthe functioning of the sense faculty results in mere seeing of the object (non-conceptualized awareness) and, later this mere seeing is acted upon by the intellect ormind and results in a conceptual identification of the object. This two-stage process is

very similar to the detailed account of conceptual (savikalpaka) perception offered by

the Mmsakas and the Naiyyikas.

2.5 Advaita Vednta: direct knowledge

According to Advaita Vednta the defining characteristic of perception is the directnessof knowledge acquired through perception (Bilimoria, 1980:35). In highlighting thedirectness of the perceptual process, the Advaitin differs from Nyya and Mms

proponents for whom the contact of the sense faculty with its object is central to theperceptual process. Vednta Paribh (ed. 1972: 30) cites pleasure and pain as instancesof perception that are directly intuited without any sense object contact. For the Advaitin

perception is simply the immediacy of consciousness; knowledge not mediated by anyinstrument (Gupta et. al., 1991, p. 40). It is worth noting that this definition is very close

to that accepted by Navya-Naiyyikas. Like the latter, the Advaitins regard the role ofthe sensory connection as accidental, rather than essential, to the perceptual process. The

Neo-Advaitins accept the distinction between conceptual or determinate perception (they

refer to it as viayagata pratyaka) and non-conceptual or indeterminate perception(nirvikaplapkapratyaka), but do not think of non-conceptual perception as simply a

prior stage of conceptualized perception, as other Hindu schools do.

3. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Pratyaka

The Sanskrit term kalpan is variously translated as imagination or conceptual

construction and is meant to be the source of vikalpa, roughly translated as concepts,but which may stand for anything that the mind adds to the given. The time-honoreddifferentiation of perception into conception-free perception (nir-vikalpa pratyaka) and


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conception-loaded perception (sa-vikalpapratyaka) is made on the basis of concepts(vikalpa) (Matilal, 1986: 313).

3.1 The basis of Buddhist nominalism

The distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual was first drawn by Dinga whocontended that all perception is non-conceptual because what constitutes seeing things as

they really are must be free from any conceptual construction. The claim is that a verbal

report of proper perception is strictly impossible, for such a report requiresconceptualization, which is not perceptual in character; the objects of conceptualawareness are spontaneous constructions of our mind and are essentially linguistic in

character. On the other hand, what is seen, the given, does not carry a word or a nameas its label and neither is such a label grasped along with the object, nor inherent in it,nor even produced by it; objects-as-such, the real particulars (svalakaas), do not, as

Quine would say, wear their names on their sleeves. Furthermore, the sense facultycannot grasp a concept or a name; if I have never smelt garlic before I first encounter it, Icannot smell it as garlic, though I can smell IT; an olfactory awareness can only grasp

asmellpresent in the olfactory field. The Buddhists argue that a perceiver apprehends

only the real particulars, arbitrarily imposes concepts/words on them and believes,

mistakenly, that these are really there in the objects and integral to them. The conceptualawareness conceals its own imaginative quality and, because it results directly fromexperience, the perceiver takes it to be a perceptual experience. The perceiver fails to

notice that imagination is involved and mistakenly thinks that he really perceives theconstructed world. From the Buddhists standpoint, therefore, a perceiver can only

perceive real particulars so that any perceptual experience is always and only at the non-conceptual level.

3.2 The development of Hindu realism: the Nyya mission

The Nyya view evolves in response to Buddhist account of perception. They regardperception as a cognitive episode triggered by causal interaction between a sense faculty

and an object. This interaction first results in a sensory impression, nothing more than

mere physiological change. This preliminary awareness, non-conceptual perception, is anecessary first step in the process of perception and is invariably followed by a

structured awareness leading to conceptual perception. A cognition that is independentof preliminary sensory awareness cannot result in a perceptual judgment. The firstawareness does not destroy the perceptual character of the second; rather, it facilitatesthis subsequent awareness. Non-conceptual perception is an indispensable causal factor

for generation of conceptual perception, although memory, concepts and collateral

information may also be required. It is important to note that the Nyya notionofvikalpa (in their distinction ofnir-vikalpa andsa-vikalpa) is different from that of the

Buddhists. Unlike the latter, the Naiyyikas do not think ofvikalpa-s as mental creationsor imaginative constructions but as objectively real properties and features of

objects. Vikalpa in this sense indicates the operation of judging and synthesizing ratherthan imagining or constructing. Thus conceptual perceptions truly represent the structureof reality. Of the five types of concepts (vikalpa-s) recognized by the Buddhists,


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viz. nma (word),jti (universal),gua(quality), kriy (action) and dravya (substance),the Naiyyikas, regard all but the firstvikalpa as categories of reality (Mondal, 1982, p.364). Unlike the Grammarians, the Nyya schools do not accept the objective reality ofwords; words are not inherent to the object presented in perception. Rather, the

Naiyyikas hold that the relation between word and object is created by convention in alinguistic community. Although a concept is associated with a word (nma-vikalpa) bymeans of a convention, it is not merely a fabrication. For example, when someone bringsgarlic clove near my nose and teaches me by pointing to it that it is called garlic, thensubsequently confronted with the garlicky odor and a similar clove, I can see it and smell

it as garlic. Thus perceptual awareness includes knowledge of words but, insofar as it is

perceptual awareness, it is brought about by sensory contact with the object and, itsproperties which exists independently of words.

The Buddhists reject this argument on the basis tarthakriysmarthya). Only particular

real garlic can flavor one's food or ruin it, but the universal garlichood cannot do any ofthese; in this sense, only the particulars are real for they fulfill the purposes (artha) of

humans.

The foregoing discussion shows that the epistemological debate between the Buddhists

and the Naiyyikas regarding the nature of perception rests on, and brings to the fore,their metaphysical disagreement about the nature of universals. The Naiyyikas arerealists about universals; universals are objective features of the world that impressthemselves upon minds they are not mere figments of our imagination. The Naiyyikashold that particulars are qualified propertied wholes and we directly perceive them as

they are, without any kind of manipulation or imposition; we do not impose universalson property-less real particulars, rather we find stable, durable, relational wholes inreality that do not require any imposition or manipulation. They argue that there is no

evidence of a world of bare particulars, as claimed by the Buddhists. Therefore

conceptual or determinate perception does not involve distortion of reality; rather it

presents things as they really are. To see a piece of sandalwood as itreally is, we do notneed to see the sandalwood as a colorless, odorless pure particular; indeed, since the

piece of sandalwood is really brown and really fragrant, to see it as a propertied whole is

to see it as it reallyis.

The idea that the world consists of propertied particulars seems to put pressure on thenotion of non-conceptual perception. If there are no indeterminate particulars, what isthe object of indeterminate perception? Indeed some Navya-Nyya thinkers hold that theraw data of perception (real particulars in the Buddhists sense) is too inchoate andelusive to count as objects of knowledge. Recently, Arindam Chakrabarti (2000), a

prominent contemporary Navya-Nyya thinker offered seven reasons for altogethereliminating non-conceptual, or immaculate perceptions as he calls them, from Nyyaepistemology in an attempt to understand the deeper relation between direct realism andconcept-enriched perception. Chakrabarti's skepticism about non-conceptual perception

as a cognitive state stems from the fact that we cannot assign an intentional role to theobject of indeterminate perception because the object of non-conceptual perception is

incapable of being apperceived or directly intuited in


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it [nirvikalpa pratyaka] is posited by the force of the following inference as the firststep of a two step argument. The perceptual cognition A cow (for eample) isgenerated by a cognition of the qualifier, since it is a cognition of an entity as qualified

(by that qualifier appearing) like an inference. The second step takes a person's firstperception of an individual (Bessie, let us say) as a cow (i.e., as having some such

property) as the perceptual cognition figuring as the inference's subject (paka) such thatthe cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly

provide the qualifier cowhood. The qualifier has to be available, and the best candidateseems to be its perception in the raw, a qualifier (cowhood), that is to say, not (as some

are wont to misinterpret the point) as divorced from itsqualificandum (Bessie) but rather

as neither divorced nor joined, and, furthermore, not as qualified by another qualifier(such as being-a-heifer) but rather just the plain, unadorned entity. In the particular

example, the entity is the universal, cowhood, or being-a-cow, although, again, it would

not be grasped as a universal. Or as anything except itself.

The Navya-Nyya notion of non-conceptual perception differs from that of theBuddhists in many respects, two of which are very important. First, according to Navya-

Naiyyikas, there is no apperceptive evidence for non-conceptual perception, unlike theBuddhists who contend that conception-free awareness is necessarily self-aware. The

Navya-Naiyyikas, as is obvious from the quote above, emphasize that the evidence fora non-conceptual sensory grasp of universals comes in the form of an inference. Second,according to Navya-Nyya, the object of non-conceptual perception is a qualifier(concept), although not given as that in the first instance, but not a bare particular as theBuddhists hypothesize. It is, as the above quote explains, posited by the force of an

inference the bare object of non-conceptual perception becomes the qualifier in aresultant determinate perception. While this does not satisfactorily address Chakrabarti'sconcern that lack of apperceptive evidence implies that the subject cannot assign an

intentional role to the object of non-conceptual perception, Chadha (2006) argues that

the subject's not being in a position to assign an intentional role to the object of non-conceptual perception is no hindrance to the intentionality of non-conceptual perception

itself. Non-conceptual perception is awareness ofa non-particular individual(Chakrabarti, 1995) and can be assigned the intentional role of a qualifier in virtue of therecognitional abilities acquired by the subject on the basis of the perceptual episode. The

subjectsees a non-particular individual but, since there is no apperceptive or consciousawareness, the subject does not see it as an instance of a universal or a qualifier. Chadha

eplicates Gagea's insight that a qualifier is given as a non-particular individual,neither divorced from nor joined to the qualificandum and, therefore it is wrong tosuggest that lack of apperceptive evidence implies that non-conceptual perception is not

an intentional perceptual state.

3.3 The Mms advance in realism

Kumrila argued against the Buddhist position to show that perception is not always

devoid of concepts. InPratyakapariccheda, he principally targets Dinga's theory,while simultaneously addressing some of Dharmakrti's ideas and arguments. Kumrila,like Naiyyikas, holds both the two kinds of perception as valid. For him the initial non-


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conceptualized perception is borne of the undifferentiated pure object (uddhavastu) andis comparable to the perception of an infant and others who lack a language. The pureobject is the substratum for the generic and specific features of the object, but thesubject is not distinctly aware of any of these and simply cognizes the object as anindeterminate particular, as this or something. Although Kumrila agrees with theBuddhists that the object of immediate perception is inexpressible in language, he

maintains that it is different, in at least one respect, from the real particular (svalakaa)of the Buddhists; the latter being a structure-less unitary whole, whereas the former isnon-unitary and grasps both the particular and the universal aspects of the object.

Otherwise, Kumrila argues, it could not give rise to conceptual awareness, whicheplicitly identifies such features. Dinga's counterpoint to this is that conceptualawareness at second stage cannot be a perception, since it involves application of

concepts and words which, in turn, requires memory. If we admit conceptual awareness

as perception, we are forced to accept that a sense faculty is capable of remembering

(since perception is a cognition brought about by the functioning of the sense faculty)but that cannot be the case because a sense faculty, being a mere instrument of cognition,

is in itself unconscious and cannot remember anything. Kumrila admits that conceptualawareness is aided by memory and concepts, but argues that that does not rob it of its

perceptual character for the sense faculty is still functioning while in contact with thevery same object. He further suggests that we should not expect a perceptual cognition to

arise as soon as there is contact between a sense faculty and its object. He uses the

analogy of entering a dimly lit room after walking in the blazing sun; even though thecontents of the room are directly available to the sense faculties of the subject who has

just walked in, he does not immediately apprehend the objects in front of him. However,the subject may become distinctly aware of the objects in the room and their features in

the following moments. The perceptual character of the latter awareness is maintained solong as the connection between the sense faculty and the object is intact, even whenother conceptual awarenesses or memories intervene between the initial contact with the

object and the subsequent awareness. A conceptual awareness can be referred to as a

perception even though the mind,qua memory, is involved because the functioning ofthe sense faculty is the factor responsible for arising of the awareness. Furthermore, he

insists that the mind must be involved in all perceptions since it functions as a link

between the sense faculty and the self; the sense faculty is turned on or activated by a

connection with the self and, the self as the subject of knowledge is involved in allcognitions. He points out that even Buddhists do not deny this, since they hold that self-reflexive awareness accompanies every cognition. He contends that the Buddhists are

wrong to insist that only a cognition arising directly from the functioning of a sensefaculty is perception; they agree that we perceive inner states, e.g., pleasure and pain,and if the mind is accepted as the operative sense faculty in the self-reflexive awareness

of such cognitions, it follows that they should admit that the mind is also the sense

faculty that gives rise to conceptualized cognitions. He, however, clarifies that not everycognition that follows a contact between a sense faculty and an object is a perception, for

if one were to open one's eyes momentarily (in the above analogy) and construct a

judgment such as that was table with eyes closed again, it would not be a perceptualcognition since it solely depends on the memory of a fleeting sensory contact.


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Later, Dharmakrti, using a methodology very different (and akin to proof bycontradiction) from his predecessor Dinga, raises new problems for the Nyya-Mms view. Assuming, he says, for the sake of the argument, that universals are real.Then the judgments This is a cow, It is an animal, relate two distinct entities,namely a particular (or object) and a universal (or concept) arguably via a non-relational

tie as in being substratum and superstratum, with the proviso that the substratum object

has the power to let the universal reside in it. This leads to all the universals (such ascowness, animalhood, etc) then being tied to the object by this simple and single power.In such a scenario, any perceptual judgment involving the universal cowhood as in the

case of This is a cow makes subsequent judgments This is an animal, This is asubstance, etc., superfluous. For, if one perceives an object along with its power to letany one universal reside in it, one must be able to perceive its power to attract all other

universals that reside in it. Thus, there would be no distinction between This is a cowand This is a substance clearly an unacceptable thesis. Matilal (1986, p.326) notes

two points in connection with this argument. First, Dharmakrti assumes that an object,or a unique particular, is perceived in its entirety and no part of it is left unperceived.Second, the realist has objectified all the universals including the relation-universal. If,

as the realist believes, the object of perceptionthe particularhas the power toaccommodate all universals in it, then the onus is on him to show why only a singleuniversal manifests itself in a perceptual judgment. This concern is pertinent, especially

against the Nyya philosophers who admit only one single relation-universal: inherence,which supposedly unites all nesting universals with the object. The Naiyyikas readilyrespond to this argument by pointing out that the redundancy objection rests on

Dharmakirti's assumption that an object is grasped in its entirety in perception. Thisassumption is false; perception is perspectival, we never see all sides of an ordinary

three-dimensional object, but we still see it.

Furthermore, Dharmakrti's argues that conceptual orjudgmental awareness isphenomenologically distinct from non-conceptual awareness. In the latter we areconfronted with the object of perception which is vivid and immediate, while in the

former no object is present. In the judgment this is a cow, even the subject of thejudgment does not refer to the object of perception, since words do not refer to perceivedparticulars but to universals which etend across space and time. Dharmakrti admits that

the words we apply to things have some objective basis in those things; we callsomething a cow because it has a certain effect, it gives milk, is gentle, or it calls forth a

certain cognition, etc. This effect, in turn, inclines us to associate the word cow withother things that have the same effect and we do that by jointly dissociating them fromthings that lack that effect. Universals, according to the Buddhists are arbitrarily

constructed eclusions (apoha); words serve the purpose of separating things off fromother objects. For eample, the word cow singles out a class of things by ecludingthem from things they are not, all things assembled together under the concept cow aredistinct from each other and do not share a single nature that the word cow names. Aconceptual awareness insofar as it imputes a word to a particular object and, therefore a

universal nature it shares with all others of the same universal-kind, essentially falsifiesthe object. Kumrila objects to the Buddhists theory of universals (apoha) on thegrounds that it is counterintuitive and circular. The theory of universals (apoha)


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contradicts our intuition that meaning of a positive word is positive; there is nothing

negative about the word cow. A negative entity can be the meaning of a word onlywhere something is negated. Moreover, if we accept that understanding x requires

eliminating non-x, then in turn we presuppose knowledge of non-x, which entails anunderstanding of non-non-x, and so on (Drefyus, 1997, p.215). The Mmsakas alsotake on board the concerns raised by the Naiyyika philosopher Uddyotakara (c. 7thcentury CE), who questions the theory of exclusions on the specific grounds that it failsto offer an adequate theory of reference and relation between concepts and reality. Heargues if the word cow primarily designates a negative entity, either this entity is a cowin disguise or is different from a cow. If it is a cow in disguise then the Buddhist view of

universals is no different from the Nyya common sense realism that words are used tosingle out phenomena in the world. If the negative entity is different from a cow, then

the word cow does not refer to real cows, making it difficult to eplain how any wordcan refer to real objects or classes thereof. This last point begs the question because the

Buddhist denies that words refer to the objects in the real world. For him words refer touniversals, and that is precisely what the world does notcontain. The onus is put back onthe realists to show that universals, which serve as meanings of words, are real

properties of objects rather than imagined or mentally constructed features. Thischallenge is taken up by the Naiyyikas and their position against the nominalist stand of

both the Buddhists and the Grammarians is presented later below.

3.4 The bdika (Grammarian) nominalism and realist objections

Bharthari, the most notable Grammarian, highlights the intimate relation between

language, thought, and knowledge. Two aspects of his theory have importantimplications for the nature of perceptual experience. First, there is no non-linguistic

cognition in the world all knowledge appears permeated by words. Though Bharthari'stheory may leave room for extraordinary, or other-worldly, cognitions, there is no scope

for pure non-conceptualized perception in this world. The essence of his theory is: wordsdo not designate objects in the external world directly, but through the intervention of

universals, which are inherent in words. Thus universals constitute the basis of our

knowledge of the external world, since they are intimately connected with language andmind on the one hand, and the world on the other. Given this, the Grammarians question

the very possibility of non-conceptual perception? The second aspect is underscored by

Kumrila who ascribes the so-called Superimposition Theory to Bharthari (Taber, 2005,p.27), according to which, a word has its own form superimposed upon its meaning.This has implications for determinate conceptual perception, which (for the pluralists

and direct realists of Mmsand Nyya persuasions) arises purely out of the objectitself and involves discrimination and determination of its nature.

Bharthari's argument can be thought of as an attack, on the adjective non-verbal(avyapadeyam) in the Nyya definition of perception, aimed at their belief that forcognitive comprehension language is an inessential detail. For him, bare sense-

impressions cannot count as awarenesses because they are nor effective enough, nothingis accomplished by them and, they do not result in appreciable mental activity.

Bharthari gives an eample: a man walking along a village path to approach his house


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would invariably touch some grass on the road, and in some sense this would be tactile

awareness at a pre-linguistic level (Vkyapadya, Ch.1, verse 123). But this would notcount as an awareness unless combined with the further ability to sort it out or verbalize

it; consciousness cannot reveal an object to us unless we discriminate it, and the processof discrimination requires verbalization. What about a baby's awareness, or that of a

mute person, asks Vtsyyana Bharthari points out that a baby's sensations or a muteperson's awarenesses may still count as cognitive because they are linguistically potent.A pre-linguistic state of an infant can be cognitive if and only if it has speech potency,which is the cause of verbal language. So also, in the non-conceptual perceptual

awareness (in adults and even some animals) speech-potency is latent; it is an essential

trait of human consciousness and the defining characteristic of cognitive awareness(Vkyapadya, Ch.1, verse 126). All knowledge of what is to be done in this worlddepends on speech-potential; even an infant has such knowledge due to residual traces

from previous births (Vkyapadya, Ch.1, verse 121). The initial sensory awareness of

external objects which does not grasp any special features of them, nonethelessilluminates them in a non-specific manner as mere things by such epressions as this orthat (Bharthari 123 and 124). Thus, insofar as the initial sensation is an awareness, itcan be verbalized. The following analogy is offered as an argument for positing the

presence of speech-seed (verbal disposition, as some modern philosophers call it) in pre-linguistic awareness: think about the experience of trying, but failing, to remember a

verse heard before. Bharthari claims that the entire verse eists in the cognitive facultyas speech-potency but because of lack of other contributory factors there is noverbalization. Similarly, a non-linguistic experience of a mute-person is an awareness

because of the presence of verbal disposition or speech-seed even though there is noactualization of speech. There are no non-conceptual perceptions, because ordinary

objects are not given to us without a concept (vikalpa) or some mode of presentation;verbalization makes the concept explicit. There are infinite concepts associated with anobject, none integral to it. However, we always perceive an object in a concept as an

instantiation of a universal; it is a cow, white, bovine, four-legged, etc. The point to note

is that concepts or universals (vikalpa-s) are word-generated and superimposed on theobjects there are no thing-universals or real universals over and above these.Bharthari's defends linguistic nominalism, according to which, words are the onlyuniversals that exist; thing-universals are word-generated illusions. As Matilal remarks,

for Bharthari there is not much of a distinction between words and concepts, they aretwo sides of the same coin (Matilal, 1986, 396).

Naiyyikas and Mmsakas, the common sense realists, raise specific objections to theGrammarian view on the grounds that it is not borne by experience. We have separate

awarenesses of words and universals. While we may not perceive something as a cow

prior to acquiring the word cow, we are surely aware of cowness before we acquire thelinguistic expression, just as we are aware of and can discriminate shades of red even

before we acquire the names of some of those shades. A non-conceptual awareness ofthe object is implied by the subsequent occurrence of a conceptual awareness with

determinate content. Kumrila also points to other phenomena which indicate that theawareness of the meaning of a word (the object) is independent and distinct from theword itself. Furthermore, awareness of the meaning and that of the word are usually


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different kinds of representations; there is no possibility of confusing or conflating these.

Kumrila brings to attention linguistic phenomena that reinforce the point that words andmeanings must be distinct representations, e.g., homonymy, synonymy, categorizing and

recognizing grammatical parts of speech, etc. The ability to distinguish and discriminatetypes is perhaps enhanced by knowledge of language and concepts, but is not completely

dependent on it. Those who are not trained in music can certainly hear the difference

between distinct notes, even though they are unable to identify them by name.Vtsyyana also appeals to the ordinary experience of people who are conversant withwords. Ordinarily, words are apprehended as names of objects. The knowledge of the

word-object association comes after the perceptual knowledge derived through sense-

object contact. Such contact results in a perceptual awareness which, in turn, providesthe occasion for recalling the appropriate word, if indeed the appropriate word exists in

the experiencer's linguistic repertoire. Perceptual knowledge is antecedent to verbal

knowledge and cannot owe its existence to words. Vcaspati Mira specifically objects

to Bharthari's claim that infants and adults who lack a language perceive objects bymemory impressions of their names from previous births. Objects are vividly and clearlygiven to us in perception, but the memory-impressions of previous births are at best

vague and indistinct. Vcaspati Mira asks, How can such a vague and unclear thing beidentified with a clear and distinct perception (Nyyavrttikattparyak, p. 127). Hisother argument against Bharthari is the obvious point that words do not necessarily referto their objects, for example words in quotation marks do not refer to objects, only to

themselves. Moreover, if the word and its denotation were identical, a blind man wouldgrasp red orredness when he grasps the word red and a deaf person would grasp theword red when he grasps a red thing (Nyyavrttikattparyak, p. 129).

The Naiyyikas also have a general response to nominalistsBuddhists as well asGrammarians. They posit monadic universals that correspond to natural and

metaphysical kinds and one dyadic universal, viz. inherence. The main nominalist

objection is that once we accept real universals in our ontology we risk overpopulatingthe world with entities corresponding to every expression that designates a property. For

example, if we accept horsehood and cowhood as universals, we also need to accept

universalhood as another universal. The Naiyyikas propose that not every epressionwhich designates a property generates an objective universal (jti); some property-

expressions correspond to subjectively constructed categories (updhi), which thoughuseful for analysis, are not ontologically real. Uddyotakara argues that to correspond to areal universal a general term must meet two conditions: (i) a general term should be

based on a ground, which accounts for the common awareness of a number of differentobjects, that makes the application of the term possible, and (ii) that ground should be a

simple (non-compound), unitary property or entity that cannot be analyzed or explainedaway otherwise (Commentary onNyya-stra, 2.2.65). Universalhood isa bogus universal; it violates the second condition. There is no simple basis or ground

for universalhood as opposed to universals such as cowhood and horsehood; the groundof being one-in-many can be analyzed in terms of inherence. The same applies to

universals like barefooted, cook, reader etc. the basis for their application ispresence of compound features such as bare feet, etc. However, this stratagem forces theNaiyyikas to admit that many general terms designate bogus universals and,


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consequently, they start succumbing to the nominalist pressure. Matilal (1986, p. 420421) notes that there is another way in which it happens to Navya-Nyya: A realuniversal mustpartake of the nature of one-in-many. The Navya-Naiyyika, Udayana(c. 10th century CE), lists a third necessary condition for disqualifying a property from

being regarded as a real universal. Under this condition, an abstract property that belongs

only to one individual is also a bogus universal even though it is simple and

unanalyzable; skyness in the sky is bogus because it is only a nominal attribute.However, since both cowhood and skyness are simple properties, they are grasped as

suchin perception without further qualification. In this sense, Naiyyikas maintain thatsome real universals are directly perceptible. When we see a cow, we do not necessarily

see it as a cow, the cow and the cowness are not given as separate entities in ourawareness, rather they appear fused. This leads to the peculiar Nyya view that realuniversals and basic properties are grasped in our awareness as epistemic firsts orultimates (Matilal, 1986, p.421). Gagea calls such perception, in which universals are

grasped as such, non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception.

3.5 The Advaita Vednta: a compromise on Hindu realism

The Advaita Vednta theory compromises on the realism of earlier classical Hinduphilosophy. Their early view on perception is akin to the Buddhists, although arrived atfrom a different perspective. Maana Mira says:

Perception is first, without mental construction, and has for its object the bare thing. Theconstructive cognitions which follow it plunge into particulars. (Brahma-Siddhi, 71.1-2)

He draws a distinction between perceptual cognition and constructive cognition, but is

careful to use vikalpa-buddhi, rather thansavikalpaka pratyaka, for the latter cognition.For him perception is always non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception and it is of auniversal, indeed of the highest universal, Being (sat). According to early Vedntins, thereal is bereft of all character since its nature is non-differentiated consciousness orBrahman. Therefore, perceptual cognition, which presents the real, must be non-

conceptual or indeterminate for it is the knowledge of the existence of a thing without

any qualifications or predications. Maana Mira also denies the thesis that non -conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception is non-verbal. This surprising claim is clearly owed

to Bharthari's influence, as is evidenced by the eample used by Maana Mira in theargument. Confronted by an opponent with the claim that verbal knowledge involves

duality and relation, and therefore must involve concepts, Maana Mira replies thatverbal knowledge is not necessarily relational: a baby's non-verbal knowledge of itsmother's breast, grasps it merely as this (of course we do not assume that the babyarticulates the word this the word, as in Bharthari's account, has a more subtle form inthe baby's mind) and, therefore, the highest knowledge of the Ultimate reality (Brahman)

in which there is no duality, no relations, no concepts, may still be verbal.

Neo Advaita-Vedntins, however, accept a distinction between non-conceptual(nirvikalpaka) perception and conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perceptions from empirical orpractical (vyvahrika) standpoint; from ultimate (paramrthika) standpoint such


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distinction is untenable. A brief description of conceptual (viayagata, Advaita-Vedntaterm forsavikalpaka) perception will help put in perspective Applebaum's (1982)reconstruction of their notion of non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception later.

Determinate perception is the result of the activity of mind (manas)orantakaraa(literally translated as inner vehicle)the terms are frequently usedinterchangeably. Advaitins maintain that the mind (antakaraa)goes out through therespective sense organ (the eye, say) and pervades the object of attention. As a result ofthis contact, the object presents itself as data to the receptive mind (antakaraa) which,in turn, transforms into mental state (vtti) (Bilimoria, 1980, p.38). As soon as the dataare presented to inner faculty, there is an identification of consciousness associated with

the mental state (antakaraa-vtti) with the consciousness associated with the object.To say that vtti and data are identified is to say that the form of the mental state, if allgoes well, corresponds one-to-one with the form of the object; the mental state is a

reflection of the object of perception, and as such is non-different from the object. Thus

results a determinate judgment (vttijna) of the form this is a jar. Furthermore,according to them, we do not perceive our mental states; we directly perceive the objectsthemselves. Bilimora explains,

The vtti in the form of the object impresses itself as it were in the mode of the subjectitself, and thereby comes to be apprehended, but as a predicateand not as the puresubject-content which is the I-notionin the subject's apperception. (Bilimoria,1980, p.41)

The initial mental state subsides and the subject becomes directly aware of the object

itself; the cognition is self-evident to the subject, just like the cognition of pleasure andpain. In this reflective stage, the mind (antakaraa) integrates the mental contentscorresponding to the object with familiar or recognized percepts. Determinate perception

of the totality of the object occurs with the completion of the assimilative process.

David Applebaum (1982) notes that Bilimoria's discussion of the Advaitin's notion ofperception focuses on the necessary conditions or criteria for valid or veridical

perceptions. According to him, this approach while justified in the light of perception'sinclusion among the means of knowledge (prama-s) is mistaken because it onlyfocuses on sensation as a species of mental state (vtti). For the Advaitin, sensation is nota mode exhausted by the judgmental content of a mental state (vtti), it has epistemicvalue independently of its role in judgmental perception. Applebaum quotes from theUpanisadic texts to support this view:

Manasis for men a means of bondage or liberation of bondage if it clings to objectsof perception (visayasangi), and of liberation if not directed towards these objects(nirviayam). (Applebaum, 1982, p.203)

Non-conceptual perception furnishes us with knowledge of pure existence (sanmtra)

rather than with protodata to construct imagined particulars. Therefore, it is not simply aprior stage of conceptual perception and so also not necessarily a mental state produced

in cooperation with the object. Applebaum (1982, p.204) suggests that non-conceptual


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perception in this sense focuses attention on sensing, in which consciousness turns its

attention inwards to the activity of the sense-organs resulting in deepening andbroadening their proprioceptive content. Proprioception, he claims, points the way to the

soul or self (tman); mind (antakaraa) returns to its presentational activity, itsfunction of monitoring and unfolding the sensory manifold to create conditions for the

emergence of self (tman), which according to the Advaitin, is identical with theUltimate reality (Brahman). In non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception, consciousnessis returned to itself and opens up the possibility of manifesting or seeingthe Seer(tman) or knowing the Ultimate reality (Brahman).

4. Perceptual Illusion

The skeptics challenge strikes at the claim made by the Naiyyikas that perceptionshould be non-erroneous (avyabhichri) and well-ascertained or free from doubt

(vyavasytmaka). They ask: how do we distinguish between veridical perceptions andthe non-veridical ones? In case of a perceptual doubt, say, seeing something at a distancewhich looks like a pole or an old tree-trunk, we are uncertain which it is but are a

priori sure it cannot be both. In case of perceptual illusion, I see a snake but Imisperceive as there is only a rope in front of me. Illusoriness of the experience (seeing a

snake) is exposed with reference to another veridical experience (seeing a rope), butagain, we are a priori sure that both cannot be true together. Then, the Buddhist skeptic,

Vasubandhu, raises the ante with the question: could they not both be false

simultaneously? The skeptical argument is premised on a denial of the realist thesis thatexperiences refer to a mind-independent reality. Vasubandhu's argument for idealism

appears right at the beginning ofVimatik, when he states:

This [the external world] is consciousness only, because there is appearance of non-existent things, just as a person with cataracts sees non-existent hairs, moons et cetera.(Feldman, 2005, p. 529).

Vasubandhu offers many other examples of dreams, delusions, hallucinations, etc.,

where we are aware of non-existent objects that are products of our imagination and notobjects external to the mind. If it is possible for awareness to create its own object andthen grasp it (as in a dream) then, Vasubandhu argues, everything that we seem to be

aware of could be a making of awareness.

The standard reply to this view appeals to the intuition that illusory experience isparasitic on veridical eperience. The Naiyyika, Vtsyyana eplains that an erroneouscognition depends on a principal cognition as its basis. This is a man for a tree-trunk,which is not a man, has for its basis a principal cognition of a man. If a man has never

been perceived in the past, an erroneous cognition of a man, in what is not a man, can

never be produced (Nyya-Stra-Bhya, 4.2.35). A similar argument is put forth by theAdvaita-Vedanta founder ankara. He challenges Vasubandhu's view on the ground that

it is incoherent when the Buddhists say that which is the content ofan internalawareness appears as thougheternal, they are


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assuming the eistence of an eternal thing even while they deny it For they use thephrase as though because they become aware of a cognition appearing eternally For nobody speaks thus: Vinumitra appears like the son of a barren woman. (Brahma-Stra-Bhya, 2.2.28)

Feldman (2005, p. 534) argues that this does not suffice to defeat Vasubandhu'sidealism. The illusory experience ofx, no doubt requires a memory impression whichcan be produced by a previous cognition, but there is no further requirement that the

previous experience be veridical, because such impressions can be produced by illusory

experiences. Feldman uses the case of someone who has only experienced snakes indreams. He can mistake a rope for a snake, because the previous dream experience

provides the necessary memory impression. Feldman's argument ignores the gravity of

the concern raised by Vtsyyana and ankara, however. They reject Vasubandhu'sargument on the grounds that we cannot imagine (dream, hallucinate, etc) an absolutely

unreal thing, like a barren woman's son. The Nyya theory of imagination, working inthe background here, says that to imagine something is to superimpose or attributeproperties belonging to one kind of thing to a thing of different kind, provided that thereis some resemblance between the two kinds of objects (Uddyotakara's Nyya-Stra-

Bhya, 3.1.1). For example, to imagine a centaur is to attribute a property belonging tothe human-kind to a thing of the horse-kind. There is some general resemblance between

the two kinds: both are animals and have legs. However, an absolutely unreal thing canhave no properties, and hence a fortiori no properties in common with an existing thing.

They, therefore, cannot be an object of imagination.

Uddyotakara presents an even stronger argument against the skeptics. In hisNyya-Vrttika he turns Vasubandhu's own argument against him. Uddyotakara asks: how dowe know that the object of a dream experience is non-existent? Vasubandhu accepts that

the dreamer does not know that he is dreaming; the knowledge that the object is non-

existent occurs only when he awakens and no longer apprehends the object. If non-

apprehension of an object in the waking state is required to support the claim that theobjects of dream experience do not really exist out there, then apprehension in the

waking state must be an indicator of their existence, otherwise there would be no

contrast between what is apprehended and what is not (Nyya-Vrttika, 4.2.33). If there

is no such contrast, then Vasubandhu's argument fails because there is no support for theclaim that objects of dream experiences do not exist in the external world. And, if there

is such a contrast between apprehension and non-apprehension, then at least someexternal objects must exist. Clearly, Vasubandhu's argument for thesis of universaldelusion (or idealism) does not succeed completely, nor are the realists totally defeated.

We close this article on the note that Stra-s were primarily composed in the sevencenturies from 5th BCE to 2nd CE and, thereafter, for the next millennium and more, the

philosophical work was carried forward by Stra commentators (tikkr-s) fromrespective schools. This latter period saw these epistemological debates rage among

scholars from these schools. Note also that there is no consensus on the dates given here;most Western scholars accept these, while Indian schools place them further back in

antiquity.


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Bibliography

Texts in English translation

Aksapada Gautama,Nyya-Stra, with Vatsyayana'sNyayabhasya,Uddyotakara'sNyayavartikka, and Udayana'aParisuddhi, A. Thakur (ed. and trans.), vol.1, Mithila, 1967.

Bhartr hari, Vkyapadya, Abhyankar K.V. and Limaye V.P. (eds.), Poona University,1965.

Gagea,Tattvacintmai,Epistemology Of Perception: Gagea'sTattvacintmai,Jewel Of Reflection On The Truth (About Epistemology): The Perception Chapter(Pratyaka-khaa), Transliterated Text, Translation, And Philosophical Commentary,

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Philosophy, 10: 211238, (1982). Vcaspati Mira,Nyyavrttikattparyak, Anantlal Thaur (ed.), Indian Council of

Philosophical Research, 1996.

Vasubandhu, Viatik-Vtti, Triatika, and Tri-Svabhva-Nirdea, ThomasKochumuttom (trans.), inA Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and

Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogcrin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1982.

Kumarila Bhatta, The Determination of Perception Chapter of Slokavarttika,A HinduCritique of Buddhist Epistemology: The Determination of Perception Chapter of

Kumarila Bhatta's Slokavarttika commentary by Taber, J. (trans.), Routledge CurzonHindu Studies Series, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005.

General works

Appelbaum, D., 1982, A Note on Pratyaka in Advaita Vednta,Philosophy East andWest32:2, pp. 201205.

Bhatt, Govardhan P. 1989, The Basic Ways of Knowing, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Bilimoria, P., 1980, Perception (Pratyaka) in Advaita Vednta,Philosophy East and

West, 30(1): 3544. Chadha, M., 2001, Perceptual Cognition: A Nyya-Kantian Approach,Philosophy

East and West, 51(2): 197209 Chadha, M., 2004, Perceiving Particulars-as-Such Is Incoherent: A Reply to Mark

Siderits,Philosophy East and West, 54(3): 382389

Chadha, M., 2006, et Another Attempt to Salvage Pristine Perceptions!,PhilosophyEast and West, 56(2): 333342


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Chakrabarti, A., 2000, Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for EliminatingNirvikalpaka Perceptions from Nyya,Philosophy East and West, 50(1): 18.

Chakrabarti, A., 2001, Reply to Stephen Phillips,Philosophy East and West, 51(1):114115.

Chakrabarti, A., 2004, Seeing Without Recognizing More on Denuding PerceptualContent,Philosophy East and West, 54(3): 365367

Chakrabarti, A., 1995, Non-Particular Individuals, in P. K. Sen and R. R. Verma(eds.), The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson, New Delhi: Indian Council of PhilosophicalResearch, pp. 124144.

Dreyfus, G. B. J., 1997,Recognizing reality: Dharmakrti's philosophy and its Tibetaninterpretations, New York: State University of New York Press.

Feldman, J., 2005, Vasubandhu's Illusion Argument and the Parasitism of Illusion uponVeridical Eperience,Philosophy East and West, 55(4): 529541

Gupta, B., Dharmarajadhvarindra, and Anantakrishna Sastri, N. S., 1991,Perceiving inAdvaita Vedanta: Ppistemological Analysis and Interpretation, London: AssociatedUniversity Presses.

Matilal, B. K., 1986,Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge,Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mohanty, J.N., 2000, Classical Indian Philosophy, Lanham, MD: Rowman andLittlefield.

Mondal, P. K., 1982, Some aspects of perception in old Nyaya,Journal of IndianPhilosophy, 10(4): 357376.

Phillips, S. H., 2001, There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response toChakrabarti's Attack on Nyya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyaka,Philosophy East and West,51(1): 104113

Phillips, S. H., 2004, Perceiving Particulars Blindly: Remarks on a Nyya-BuddhistControversy,Philosophy East and West, 54(3): 389403

Siderits, M., 2004, Perceiving Particulars: A Buddhist Defense,Philosophy East andWest, 54(3): 367382

Thrasher, A. W., 1993, The Advaita Vedanta of Brahma-Siddhi, Delhi: MotilalBanarsidas.

Wezler, A. and Motegi, S., 1998, (eds.) Yuktidipika: The Most Significant Commentaryon the Samkhyakarika, Volume 1 (Alt und Neu-Indische Studien, No. 41), Stuttgart:

Franz Steiner Verlag.

Perceptual Experience and Concepts in Classical Indian Philosophy

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