Department of Political and Economic Studies Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Helsinki

Cold War Perceptions

Romanias policy change towards the Soviet Union, 1960-1964

Elena Dragomir

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in the Arppeanum Auditoriun, Helsinki

University Museum, on 25 January 2014, at 10 am.

Helsinki, 2014

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ISBN 978-952-10-9682-2 (paperback) ISBN 978-952-10-9683-9 (PDF) Helsinki University Printing House Helsinki 2014

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Abstract

This study investigated Romanias early 1960s policy change towards the Soviet Union, focusing on two questions why the change occurred and what actually changed. Calling it detachment from Moscow, dissidence, new state security strategy, independent or autonomous line, historiography focuses from an objectivist perspective on the external permissive conditions that allowed the change. It works within a paradigm which maintains that after the war Romania allied (balanced) with the USSR against the Western threat but contends that Romanias alliance with the USSR and its (post-1960) opposition to the USSR were mutually exclusive. In tackling this dichotomy, some scholars argue that the change was simulated or apparent, while others acknowledge a partial, incomplete detachment but pay little attention to what actually changed.

Drawing from recently declassified archive materials, this study used a perceptual approach and a paradigm which argues that post-war Romania allied not against the threat but with the (perceived) threat the USSR. It focused on the proximate causes triggering the change and explained what changed. It investigated the emergence of Romanias opposition to the USSR mainly through two case studies (the CMEA reform process and the Sino-Soviet dispute) and covered the period between 1960 and 1964 between Romanias first categorical (albeit non-public and indirect) opposition to the USSR and the issuing of the Declaration marking Romanias first public and official (although indirect) acknowledgement of the disagreements with the USSR.

This study found that the proximate causes of Romanias policy change towards the Soviet Union resided in the Romanian leaders perceptions of the threats posed to Romanias interests by various specific Soviet policies, such as the attempts to impose the CMEA integration or a strong collective riposte against China. The Romanian leaders considered that such Soviet policies had to be blocked, but they feared that opposition risked triggering even bigger threats or even the ultimate (perceived) threat to Romanias security an open confrontation with the USSR. Thus, they responded to the perceived threats by conceptualising the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR not in terms of breaking off the alliance, but in terms of finding practical ways (tactics) to block specific (perceived) less-than-ultimate Soviet threats, without provoking a confrontation with the USSR.

Through its findings, this study opens new research perspectives on the Romanian-Soviet post-war relations and on the role of the leaders beliefs in Romanias foreign policy choices. It may also be a starting point to understand the unusual present-day relations between Romania and the Russian Federation.

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Acknowledgements

During the time I spent on this study, I incurred considerable debts to many individuals in Finland and Romania. Pursuing a doctorate is an experience that truly reveals the importance of teachers and mentors, of colleagues and friends, and, over the past years, I have had the privilege to found myself within a supportive set of social and professional networks. As a researcher and graduate student, I greatly benefited from the academic environment at several institutions: the Department of Political and Economic Studies (at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki), the Graduate School for Russian and Eastern European Studies (at the Aleksanteri Institute in Helsinki), and the Grigore Gafencu Research Centre (at the Valahia University of Trgovite, Romania).

I also had the privilege to participate in two significant research projects, Competition in Socialist Society, run by the University of Helsinki (director of project Dr. Katalin Miklssy) and Utopia versus realism in Romanias foreign policy, run by the University Valahia of Trgovite (Director of Project Dr. Silviu Miloiu). The weekly Graduate Seminar at the Department of Political and Economic Studies, the conferences and seminars organised at the Aleksanteri Institute, the monthly conferences and workshops from the Grigore Gafencu Research Centre provided me with settings for presenting work in progress and sometimes distress and for receiving supervision, guidance, feedback, comments, suggestions or challenging questions.

Numerous participants joined these academic groups over the years, and many deserve particular mention for their comments on different working papers which I presented or for how they supported me in solving different but often crucial administrative and practical matters. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Seppo Hentil, Pauli Kettunen, Katalin Miklssy, Suvi Kansikas, Silviu Miloiu, Marjukka Laakso, Marjatta Rahikainen, Riikka Palonkorpi, Juhana Aunesluoma, Sari Autio-Sarasmo, Ohto Rintala, Markku Kivinen, Markku Kangaspuro, Ira Jnis-Isokangas, Eeva Korteniemi, Hanna Ruutu, Anna-Maria Salmi.

Working under the supervision of Professor Seppo Hentil and of Dr. Katalin Miklssy, I have been taught rigor and reason. Time is a very precious commodity of academic life and I am very grateful for the time that Professor Seppo Hentil and Katalin Miklssy took to read and comment my apparently never-ending drafts. The study could not have reached the current state without their patient reviews and rechecks, and I feel most deeply indebted for their useful discussions and numerous remarks pinpointed on each chapter. I would also like to thank to Professor Mihai Retegan, from the University of Bucharest, who has agreed to act as opponent during the public examination and to Professors Dennis Deletant and Liviu Tirau, who, acting as pre-examiners of my dissertation, presented me with challenging and useful suggestions and comments.

I am deeply indebted to my colleague and friend Suvi Kansikas who unselfishly devoted time and effort to read and comment my work. Moreover, Suvis help and guidance with regard to the practicalities of the last phases of the doctorate programme was crucial. I am convinced that without Suvis support with regard to different practicalities I would have not finished the programme. Thank you, Suvi!

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Silviu Miloiu also read and commented my drafts and for that I am very grateful to him as well. I am also indebted to Dr. Mihai Croitor (from the Department of Contemporary History and International Studies, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babe-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) for his insightful discussions, especially during the last phases of the research.

Silviu Miloiu and Katalin Miklssy have been the first two people who have shown confidence in me and in my academic potential. If my work will ever count for something, then that is because they encouraged me to do research and because they often guided me through it. I am also forever grateful to my friends and neighbours, Cati and Florin Savu. Without their support, I could not have started the programme several years ago. Many thanks are also due to Dr. Tom Junes for his useful language corrections.

During the time I was in this doctoral programme, several funding bodies financed my work: The Finnish Centre for International Mobility, the Valahia University of Trgoviste (through the Utopia versus realism research project), the University of Helsinki (through the Competition in Socialist Society research project), and the Dinu Patriciu Foundation (through the Open Horizons scholarship program). I am grateful to them all.

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Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................ 3

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................... 4

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... 8

List of Tables .................................................................................................................... 8

1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 9

1.1 The research problem .............................................................................................. 9

1.2 Theory and method ................................................................................................ 11

1.3 Previous research................................................................................................... 15

1.4 Sources .................................................................................................................. 19

1.5 Structure of the study............................................................................................. 23

2 Romanias post-war grand strategy .............................................................................. 24

2.1 Conceptualising Romanias post-war grand strategy .............................................. 24

2.2 Bargaining for friendship ....................................................................................... 27

2.3. Romania A loyal bandwagoner .......................................................................... 33

3 The reformation of the CMEA, 1960-1962 ................................................................... 36

3.1 Romanias opposition to specialisation .................................................................. 36

3.1.1 Threat perceptions ........................................................................................... 37

3.1.2. Early opposition tactics .................................................................................. 42

3.2 Attempts at CMEA integration .............................................................................. 49

3.2.1 Manoeuvring against integration ..................................................................... 50

3.2.2. An early compromise ..................................................................................... 56

4 Coping with the perceived integration threat ................................................................ 59

4.1 Re-launching integration ....................................................................................... 59

4.2 Romanias first dissent .......................................................................................... 61

4.3 Developing new tactics to block integration ........................................................... 65

4.3.1 Making the divergences public ........................................................................ 67

4.3.2 China-related arguments ................................................................................. 72

4.3.3 The sovereignty argument ............................................................................... 74

4.4 Settling the integration dispute .............................................................................. 78

4.4.1 The Iron Gates Power Plant project ................................................................. 78

4.4.2 Bargaining a compromise ................................................................................ 81

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4.4.3 Reaching an agreement ................................................................................... 90

5 Looking for a balance with China............................................................................... 100

5.1 Romania and the Sino-Soviet dispute, 1960-1962 ................................................ 100

5.1.1 Supporting the CPSU .................................................................................... 102

5.1.2 Romanias neither-nor-position ..................................................................... 106

5.1.3 Ideological considerations ............................................................................. 109

5.2 In search of an ally .............................................................................................. 111

5.2.1 Initiating rapprochement with China ............................................................. 112

5.2.2 Mutual signs of goodwill ............................................................................... 115

5.2.3 Towards a Romanian public position ............................................................. 124

5.2.4 Mutual promises of support ........................................................................... 131

6 The April 1964 Declaration of Independence ........................................................... 136

6.1 The perceived threats of early 1964 ..................................................................... 136

6.1.1 A Warsaw Pact body of coordination .......................................................... 137

6.1.2 CMEA-related threats ................................................................................... 139

6.1.3 Where two are fighting, the third does not win .............................................. 142

6.2 Attempts at mediation .......................................................................................... 145

6.2.1 The official Romanian objectives .................................................................. 148

6.2.2 The secret Romanian objectives .................................................................... 150

6.2.3 The results of the mediation .......................................................................... 152

6.3 Romanias public dissent ..................................................................................... 156

6.3.1 The April 1964 RWPs Declaration ............................................................... 158

6.3.2 The Declaration and the CMEA .................................................................... 162

6.3.3 The Valev Plan .............................................................................................. 164

6.4 Soviet reactions to the RWPs Declaration ........................................................... 170

6.4.1 Accusations in anti-Sovietism ....................................................................... 171

6.4.2 A new compromise ....................................................................................... 175

7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 179

Annex Biographical information ................................................................................ 194

References .................................................................................................................... 197

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Abbreviations AA Armistice Agreement AC Agricultural Conference AMAE AMAE The Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ANIC The National Central Historical Archives CC Central Committee CCP Chinese Communist Party CAER The Romanian equivalent of the English CMEA/Comecon CMEA Comecon/ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union EC-CMEA Executive Committee of the CMEA GDR The German Democratic Republic GNA Grand National Assembly MIA The Marxist Internet Archive NDF The National Democratic Front NLP National Liberal Party NPP The National Peasants Party OSA Open Society Archives PCAF The Permanent Commission for Agriculture and Forestry PCM (Archive Fond) Presidency of the Council of Ministers PCC Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact PHP Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact PPS Problems of Peace and Socialism PRC Peoples Republic of China RCP The Romanian Communist Party RPR The Romanian Peoples Republic RWP The Romanian Workers Party TFCMA Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance UNO United Nations Organization US/USA United States/United States of America USSR The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization

List of Tables

Table 1: The Romanian-Soviet exchange of letters (March-June 1963)........81

Table 2: The dissemination abroad of the RWPs 1964 Declaration ...........162

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1 Introduction After the collapse of the socialist system, an improvement in Romanian-Russian relations was expected, but it turned out that such an expectation was too optimistic. The two parties negotiated for ten years until they reached an agreement making possible the signing on 4 July 2003 of a treaty intended to unlock the bilateral economic and political relations.1 Despite this achievement, relations remained relatively cold until today, with representatives in Moscow and Bucharest declaring from time to time that they were looking forward towards an improvement in their relations.

For instance, in February 2011 the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister, Teodor Baconschi, declared that he had been given the mandate to improve the Romanian-Russian relations and to take symbolic measures to increase trust between the two states. Few days later, the ambassador of the Russian Federation in Romania, Aleksandr Churlin, characterising the bilateral relations as pretty good and normal, asked Romania to replace the symbolic gestures with concrete actions and emphasised that he would wish Romania and the Russian Federation to return, if not to the very close relations from 130 years ago, then at least to friendly relations.2

This study is an investigation into the origins of the process that brought Romania and the Russian Federation to the present-day situation, being neither friends nor enemies. For the last two decades, Romanian-Russian relations experienced an ongoing transition which did not result though in improved relations. In this situation, a reassessment of bilateral Romanian-Russian/Soviet relations could be relevant for two reasons. Firstly, todays bilateral relations cannot be unlocked without the proper understanding of the historical burdens that they carry, and, secondly, this investigation could serve as a benchmark to restructure Romanian-Russian relations.

1.1 The research problem

The case of Romanian-Russian relations is very generous with regard to examples of reversing or restructuring state relations, as through history they oscillated between cordial ties, close cooperation, friendship, neutrality, pretty good relations, open hatred and even war. During the First World War, Romania and the Russian Empire were on the same side, but in the interwar period the two experienced tense relations which culminated during the Second World War, in which they found themselves on opposite sides. The end of the conflict brought the former two enemies into a frame of friendship, cooperation and alliance, and from the late 1940s to the end of the 1950s, Romania acted both domestically and internationally as the most trusted friend and ally of the USSR, posing no serious problem to Soviet policy. From the early 1960s onwards Romania became a problem for

1 Dinu C. Giurescu (coordinator), Istoria Romniei n date, Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2010, 818. 2 Corneliu Vlad, Faz a semnalelor n relaiile romno-ruse, in Curentul, 20 February 2011.

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Moscow, being called the nationalist of the bloc3, and opposing in many instances all the other bloc members, the USSR included. However, officially, Romania and the USSR remained friends and members within the same military alliance the Warsaw Pact.

The major reversals of relations from the first half of the 20th century from allies and friends to enemies and then from enemies to friends and allies again occurred within the context of major military conflicts, while the change of the early 1960s did not occur in circumstances of war. In a way, the 1960s change was not a reversal as it did not replace friendly relations with open hostile relations. The early 1960s Romanian approach to the USSR was rather unusual neither friends, nor enemies, collaborators with regard to some aspects, and adversaries (even public adversaries) with regard to others. Still, both Romania and the USSR continued to declare publically that there were no divergences between them. Given the absence of any military conflict or of any drastic domestic change (a regime change, for instance) within Romania or the USSR, and the unusual Romanian position towards the USSR (neither friends, nor enemies, supporters in some cases, public contesters in others) the following research questions arise: Why did the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR occur in the early 1960s and what actually changed?

This study investigates the emergence of Romanias opposition to the USSR between 1960 and 1964 that is between Romanias first categorical (albeit non-public and indirect) opposition to the USSR and the issuing of the RWPs Declaration marking the Romanian leaders first public and official (although indirect) acknowledgement of the Romanian-Soviet disagreements. It focuses on two case studies: the development of Romanias opposition to the USSR in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and its defiance of the USSR with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The former case was chosen because the CMEA specialisation was perceived by the Romanian leaders as the first major post-war Soviet threat to Romanias interests hence their opposition to the USSR in relation to the Councils reformation. The latter case was chosen because, on the one hand, the Romanian leaders tried to use the Sino-Soviet dispute to pressure the USSR to accommodate their views with regard to the CMEA reform process and because, on the other hand, the Sino-Soviet quarrel provided the proximate cause for the issuing of the April 1964 Declaration.

Focusing on the emergence of a change in the policy of a small state, Romania, towards a great power, the USSR, this study does not intend, however, to survey the bilateral Romanian-Soviet relations, nor to analyse the USSRs policies towards Romania, nor to provide a detailed analysis on Romanias participation in the CMEA in the early 1960s or on Romanias involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Nor is it interested in investigating the international response to the new Romanian approach, its consequences for Romanias international situation or how the Romanians beliefs, perceptions or ideas were formed. The purpose of the study is limited to revealing the proximate causes of the change and the content of the change.

3 Note concerning the talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, the Chinese ambassador in Romania, 5 June 1964, in Romulus Ioan Budura (coordinator), Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974, Bucuresti, 2005, 465.

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1.2 Theory and method

In addressing the causal research question why the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR occurred this study focuses on the proximate causes of the change. According to Randall L. Schweller, a cause could refer to both permissive causes (permissive conditions) and proximate causes. The antecedent conditions allow an event to happen, but they cannot explain the occurrence of the event if not joined by the proximate ones. Oxygen and dry fuel, for instance, are permissive conditions for there to be a fire. But there must also be a spark, the proximate cause, Schweller contends.4 Other researchers use the distinction between long-term causes or preconditions and short-term causes or immediate triggers.5 The previous literature on Romanias detachment from Moscow prevalently concentrated on the permissive, external conditions allowing the change, but this study focuses on the proximate, immediate causes triggering the change.

The main concepts that the study operates with are perceived threats, state grand strategy and tactics (ways of acting). The study focuses on the perceived threats posed by a superpower, the USSR, vis--vis a small state, Romania. According to one historiographical perspective, a small state is defined in terms of territory, population, and resources.6 A second perspective underlines the capacity of the state to obtain or preserve security in other words, its power7, while a third analyses the role of the state in the system.8 This study, however, considers Romania a small state and the USSR a great power because this is how the Romanian leaders perceived and defined Romania and the USSR in the 1960s. Taking into consideration variables such as the states territory, resources, power or their international influence, the Romanian leaders considered that Romania was a small state and that the USSR was a world superpower threatening Romanias interests.9

The Romanian archives provide evidence of the Romanian leaders beliefs, perceptions, views, conceptions with regard to the Soviet Unions goals and intentions towards Romania. It is not the focus of the study to establish whether the Romanian leaders perceptions of the Soviet Unions intentions were accurate, according to reality as it was, or whether they were misperceptions. In this study the terms perceptions or views refer to how the world or a certain aspect of it was viewed and interpreted by the Romanian decision makers.

In the International Relations field, there are two contrasting perspectives on the linkage between an actors behaviour and external conditions. One is the objectivist perspective which considers that the researcher can describe the environment in

4 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered threats: political constraints on the balance of power, Princeton University Press, 2006, 16-18. 5 Chester S.L. Dunning, Russias first civil war. The time of troubles and the founding of the Romanov Dynasty, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001, 15. 6 David Vital, The inequality of states: a study of the small power in international relations, republished in Christine Ingebritsen, Iver B Neumann, Sieglinde Gstohl (eds.), Small states in international relations, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2006, 81. 7 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and small states, New York University Press, 1968, 1-29. 8 Robert O. Keohane, Lilliputians dilemmas. Small states in international politics, in Ingebritsen et al, 55-61. 9 For instance, The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum of the CC of the RWP, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 7/1964, 4-32.

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objectively accurate terms and that the decision makers correctly see objective incentives in this environment. The main problems with this approach are that decision makers may perceive the external environment differently than assumed by researchers, that the perceptions of the external conditions may vary between different decision makers, and that the role of perceptions in the decision makers policy choices is overlooked.10

On the other hand, a perceptual perspective takes into consideration the role of the perceptions and views of the actors in explaining the states behaviour. Colin S. Gray, Robert Bathurst, William Wohlforth and Alexander George, for instance, contend that the actors act in accordance with their perceptions, views of the world, set of beliefs, values, ideology. As George phrases it, much of an individuals behaviour is shaped by the particular ways in which he perceives, evaluates and interprets incoming information about events in his environment. A perceptual approach accepts that the objective factors affect the actors views, but argues that scholars should not assume that they could know what the actors think about those factors.11

While it is a truism that people act on the basis of their perceptions or views of the world, the previous literature on Romanias early 1960s detachment from Moscow advances an exclusive objectivist perspective, paying no systematic attention to the Romanian leaders beliefs, views or perceptions. There seems to be one timid exception, however, in the form of a 2009 study by Mihai Croitor, who, addressing Romanias involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute, paid constant attention to the views of the Romanian leaders.12 Occasionally, different authors do write about what the Romanian leaders believed, feared, hoped or intended13, but there is no work produced so far to systematically propose a perceptual approach. Thus, this is the first study that, investigating Romanias policy change towards the USSR in the early 1960s, systematically takes into consideration the way in which decision makers perceived and internalised the external environment.

Regarding the questions as to who made the decision to change Romanias policy towards the USSR, the study selected the key actors in Romanias domestic and foreign policy in the early 1960s (and many years before and after) Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Alexandru Brldeanu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Nicolae Ceauescu, Emil Bodnra, Gheorghe Apostol or Corneliu Mnescu.14 This selection is also supported by the fact that there is enough data to study these leaders perceptions and views or their role in making the decision of changing Romanias policy towards the USSR.

10 Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century. U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900, University of Chicago Press, 2001, 6-10. 11 Colin S. Gray, Recognizing and understanding revolutionary change in warfare. The sovereignty of context., Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2006, 20-49; Alexander George, Presidential decision making in foreign policy. The effective use of information and advice, Westview Press, Boulder, 1980, 57; Robert Bathurst, Intelligence and the mirror. On creating an enemy, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1993, 3-20; William Wohlforth, The elusive balance. Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, Cornwell University Press, Ithaca, 1993, 6-48. 12 Mihai Croitor, Romnia i conflictul sovieto-chinez, 1956-1971, Mega, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, 240-241. 13 For instance, Dan Ctnu, Tot mai departe de Moscova. Politica extern a Romniei, 1956-1965, INST, Bucureti, 2011, 388; Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincer a poporului romn, Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2008, 487 ; Cezar Stanciu, Devotai Kremlinului. Alinierea politicii externe romneti la cea sovietic n anii 50, Cetatea de Scaun, Targovite, 2008, 8-25. 14 See Annex Biographical information.

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Regarding the other research question what actually changed in Romanias policy towards the USSR the study operates with the concepts of state (grand) strategy and tactics. According to Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, in modern terms, grand strategy came to mean the adaptation of domestic and international resources to achieve security for a state, but in this study the term grand strategy is understood as a theory explaining how it [a state] can cause security for itself as Stephen M. Walt phrased it.15 If in this study the term grand strategy refers to the way the Romanian leaders theorised on how Romania could provide security for itself, the term tactics refers to ways of acting, to something done.

Laure Paquette observe that a state strategy is an imaginative idea that orchestrates and/or inspires sets of actions (tactics) in response to a given problem and that it is composed of a goal (the object to be accomplished by actions), tactics (the actions, the ways of acting to achieve the goal), a core idea (a metaphor or analogy expressed by a slogan or image) and style or principles (that is general ideas that guide the selections of tactics).16 In this study, doing nothing is also regarded as a form of action, as a type of response to a problem. Thus, here the term includes doing-nothing-tactics, passive tactics, argumentative tactics and active tactics (avoidance, ignoring, postponement, drawing analogies, alteration, employing threats or balancing).

To analyse the written material, this study uses discourse analysis, drawing on the concepts of discourse and foreign policy discourse developed by Ole Waever, Lene Hansen and Henrik Larsen, who contributed to a theory designed to introduce discourse analysis as a method of foreign policy analysis. Ole Waever argues that discourse is the dimension of society where meaning is structured, forming a system which is made up of a layered constellation of key concepts. Seeing structures in language, Waever contends that discourse can deliver the coherent, well-structured constraints on foreign policy.17 Henrik Larsen maintains that a general problem in foreign policy analysis is how to deal theoretically with general beliefs to which actors adhere where beliefs refer not only to their political ideology, but also to meaning attributed to concepts such as state, security etc. and argues that a discursive analysis approach can solve this problem.18

Accepting Larsens thesis according to which the meaning attributed by actors to concepts (that is the political discourse on those concepts) is important in explaining foreign policy choices, this study focuses on the Romanian leaders discourse about Soviet (perceived) threats to Romanias interests. Lene Hansen emphasises that foreign policy discourses are analytical constructions and not empirical objects and that they are identified through the reading of texts. However, there are not as many discourses as (spoken or written) texts, the individual texts converging instead around common themes and sets of policies, Hansen maintains, reasoning that the foreign policy debates are

15Richard Rosecrance, Arthur A. Stein, Beyond Realism. The study of grand strategy in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), The Domestic bases of grand strategy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993, 4; Stephen M. Walt, The origins of alliances, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London, 1987, 2. 16 Laure Paquette, Political Strategy and Tactics: A Practical Guide, Nova Science, New York, 2002, 4-19. 17 Ole Weaver, Identity, communities and foreign policy. Discourse analysis as foreign policy theory, in Lene Hansen, Ole Weaver (eds.), European integration and national identity. The challenge of the Nordic states, Routledge, London, New York, 2003, 20-49. 18 Henrik Larsen, Foreign policy and discourse analysis, Routledge, London, 1997, 1-6.

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bound together around a smaller number of discourses which are built around key representations which might be geographical identities, historical analogies, striking metaphors or political concepts.19

Focusing on the Romanian discourse of the perceived Soviet threats to Romanias interests, this work provides also a detailed study of the articulations of those perceived threats and of the responses to threats as identified within the texts. Not all texts explicitly advance the perceived threats and the response policies to the threats. The minutes of secret Politburo meetings and Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations on different reports, for instance, provide explicit examples of the perceived threats to Romania presented by the USSR and by the other bloc members, while official communiqus or public declarations, without explicitly elaborating on the perceived threats, do incorporate the policy response to these perceived threats and are part of the political discourse.

The Romanian early 1960s (non-public) discourse on the perceived Soviet threats is built around a set of key representations under the main umbrella of the relationship between Romania and the (allegedly threatening Soviet) other. There are geographical and power representations such as the vicinity of the threatening other, the opposition between the (perceived) small powerless Romania and the (perceived) powerful Soviet Union or its (perceived) territorial expansionism. The discourse is also built around historical analogies between the perceived early 1960s Soviet threats to Romanias interests and previous Soviet behaviour and polices such as the annexation of Bessarabia and Bukovina, the Soviet (perceived) vengeance upon Romania in the aftermath of the Second World War (for instance, in the form of organising the SovRoms20 or of maintaining Soviet troops, counsellors and spies on Romanias territory), the Soviet conduct towards Yugoslavia in the late 1940s or towards Albania and China in the early 1960s. The public responses to perceived threats, on the other hand, are structured mostly around key concepts and representations such as the states sovereignty and independence, mutual advantage, territorial integrity, unity or friendship.

This study uses new primary evidence to analyse events and historical facts that have been rarely if ever presented in the previous literature. Thus, besides providing an analysis of the perceptions behind the decision-making process, this study also presents detailed accounts on several events that the historiography has failed to consider or even notice, despite their significance in understanding the Romanian-Soviet relations in the early 1960s. For instance, nobody has noticed until now the relevance of the 1960 Agricultural Conference in the process of Romanias detachment from Moscow. Nobody has ever investigated Romanias role in blocking Mongolias accession to the Warsaw Pact in 1963 or Romanias reasons for acting in such a way. Nobody has observed or studied the March-June 1963 Romanian-Soviet crisis and the scholarship has not raised awareness to the fact that the 1962, 1963 and 1964 Romanian-Soviet secret negotiations on the CMEA integration concluded with secret agreements relevant not only for the bilateral relations, but also for the overall bloc integration. Moreover, nobody observed until now that the Valev Plan was not known in Romania until early June 1964.

19 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War, Routledge, London, 2006, 17-54. 20 SovRoms were joint Romanian-Soviet ventures, established in 1945, in place until the mid-1950s.

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1.3 Previous research

Scholars have paid much attention to what triggered Romanias early 1960s change of policy towards Moscow, but there has been little if any systematic exploration of what actually changed. According to the historiography, Romania was the most loyal, the perfect or one of the most docile satellites of the Soviet Union until the late 1950s and early 1960s, afterwards detaching herself from Moscow and turning to independence, autonomy or emancipation. Generally, the leaders desperate need to stay in power is seen as the reason for which the foreign policy of Romania represented until the late 1950s a loyal emulation of the directives and principles supported by the Soviet Union at the international level, as Cezar Stanciu phrased it.21

Addressing the reasons and/or causes for Romanias detachment from Moscow, scholars focus, from an objectivist perspective, on the Romanians leaders material interests and on the permissive causes/conditions allowing detachment to occur. They often emphasised that the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR was caused, triggered, allowed or favoured by the 1958 withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania, by the victory of the Gheorghiu-Dej group over the Muscovites group, by Stalins death, by the Soviet attempts to reform the CMEA, by Khrushchevs policies of peaceful coexistence and de-Stalinisation, by the Cuban Missile Crisis, by the Sino-Soviet dispute or by the abolition of SovRoms.22 Without contesting the important role of such permissive conditions a subject often addressed by previous research, this study focuses instead on identifying the proximate causes of the change.

Regarding the causes of Romanias detachment, historiography advances three main interpretations. According to the dominant one, the Romanian leaders feared that the Soviet de-Stalinisation or the CMEA reform process would have resulted in their replacement with another leading team. Thus, according to this interpretation, they decided to distance themselves from Moscow as a means of preserving their domestic political power.23 A second school of thought argues that detachment from Moscow was

21 Stanciu, 2008, 8-25; Vladimir Tismneanu, Stalinism for all seasons. A political history of Romanian communism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2003, 167; Mioara Anton, Ieirea din cerc. Politica extern a regimului Gheorghiu-Dej, INST, Bucureti, 2007, 17-31; Gheorghe Boldur-Lescu, The communist genocide in Romania, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2005, 36; Gheorghe Ciobanu, Relaiile internaionale ale Romniei ntre anii 1948-1964, Junimea, Iai, 2006, 38; Dennis Deletant, Communist terror in Romania. Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State 1948-1965, Hurst&Co., London, 1999, 147, 244; Maria Murean, Romanias Integration in Comecon. The Analysis of a Failure, in The Romanian Economic Journal, Year XI, no. 30, (4) 2008, 27-58, 45-48; Raluca Rus, Romnia i conflictul israeliano-plestinian, Lumen, Iai, 2008, 24-25. 22 Elis Neagoe-Plea, Rolul lui Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej n elaborarea politicii externe i n direcionarea relaiilor romno-sovietice (1960-1965), in Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Historica, 9/I, 2005, 231-240; Mihai Retegan, In the shadow of the Prague spring. Romanian foreign policy and the crisis in Czechoslovakia, 1968, The Center for the Romanian Studies, Iasi-Oxford-Portland, 2000, 17-18; Florian Banu, Liviu ranu, Studiu introductiv, in Florian Banu, Liviu ranu, Aprilie 1964. Primvara de la Bucureti. Cum s-a adoptat Declaraia de independen a Romniei, Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2004, VII-C; R.J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the twentieth century and after, Routledge, London, 1997, 311-312; Raymond L. Garthoff, When and why Romania distanced itself from the Warsaw Pact, in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995, 111. 23 For instance, Brndua Costache, Activitatea Romniei n Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc, 1949-1974, INST, Bucureti, 2012, 43; Ctnu, 2011, 388; Vladimir Tismaneanu, Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers Party. From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, CWIHP,

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Romanias way of defending its economic interests in the context of the CMEA reform process24, while the third contends that in opposing the CMEA integration the Romanian leaders were genuinely concerned with the preservation of the states independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic interests.25 Many scholars however argue that the Romanian-Soviet divergences were not about Romanias sovereignty, independence or economic interests and that the Romanian leaders claims in this regard were just propaganda.26

Regarding the question of what changed in Romanias policy towards the USSR from the early 1960s onwards, there are also three main historiographical approaches. According to the first, nothing changed, Romania only simulated her detachment from Moscow. According to the second, Romania opted for a complete detachment, for independence or autonomy, for a new foreign policy doctrine or for a new state strategy; while according to the third, detachment was incomplete, partial, or limited to some political independence, to independence in a numbers of areas, to economic independence or to domestic autonomy.

Traian Ungureanu, for instance, contests the existence of a change in Romanias relations with Moscow and argues that the myth of Romanias independence inside the pan-Soviet system was only a product of communist propaganda.27 Criticising the myth of Romanias autonomy or even independence, Andrei Miroiu emphasises that Romania remained throughout the Cold War a member of the CMEA and of the Warsaw Pact and implying that Romanias alliance with the USSR and Romanias opposition to the USSR were mutually exclusive contends that Romanias opposition to the USSR appeared as such, but was not necessarily so [opoziie aparent, in Romanian]. Miroiu claims that the real goal of this simulated opposition was to trick the West into developing better economic relations with Romania.28

Most scholars, however, acknowledge a change in Romanias policy towards the USSR in the early 1960s, and this change is presented under a large variety of names, although it is rather poorly conceptualised. It is defined either as a fake autonomy or as a

Working paper no 37, 2002, 31-46; Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing politics. Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, New York Free Press, 1992, 82; Retegan, 2000, 19-22, 35-42; Constantiniu, 485-488; Richard C. Frucht, Eastern Europe. An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 2005, 760; S.N. Sen, Contemporary world, New Age International Publishers, New Delhi, 2006, 121; Deletant, 1999, 281; Mircea Munteanu, When the Levee Breaks. The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia on Romanian-Soviet Relations, 19671970, in Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 2010, 4361; Stelian Tnase, Elite i societate. Gurvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej, 1948-1965, Bucureti, Humanitas, 1998, 187-189. 24 Georges Haupt, La genese du conflict sovieto-roumain, in Revue francaise de science politique, vol. XVIII (1968) no 4, 669-684; Horia Socianu, The foreign policy of Romania in the sixties, in James A. Kuhlman (ed.), The foreign policies of Eastern Europe. Domestic and international determinants, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1978, 167-173; Tismneanu, 2003, 179, 182; Stephen Fischer-Galai, Europa de Est i Rzboiul Rece, Institutul European, Iai, 1996, 52-55. 25Banu&ranu, VII-L; Brndua Costache, Romania and Comecon. Principles of Cooperation, 1949-1991, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, No 1-2/2002, 168; Ana-Maria Ctnu, Tensiuni n relaiile romno-sovietice n anul Primverii de la Praga, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, No 1-2/2006, 227. 26 Tnase, 187-189; Tismneanu, 2003, 179; Cezar Stanciu, Fria socialist. Politica RPR fa de rile lagrului socialist. 1948-1964, Cetatea de Scaun, Trgovite, 2009, 280-281. 27 Traian Ungureanu, Despre Securitate. Romnia, ara Ca i Cum, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 2006, 94. 28 Andrei Miroiu, Balan i hegemonie. Romnia n politica mondial, 1913-1989, Tritonic, Bucureti, 2005, 136-186.

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Romanian liberal foreign policy; either as a greater independence vis--vis Moscow or as a genuine independent line from the USSR.29 However, scholars often observe the next dichotomy on the one hand, Romania opposed the USSR, its leadership and its policies, but on the other it praised the Soviet Union, the common Romanian-Soviet interests, collaboration and alliance; on the one hand, Romania criticised the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact, but on the other it remained a member of both organisations and the USSRs ally. Seeing these two alternatives as mutually exclusive, some analysts contend that, as Elis Neagoe-Plea phrased it, a genuine independence was out of the question since Romania continued to be member of the Warsaw Pact and member of the CMEA two of Moscows main instruments of control.30

Trying to solve this dichotomy, scholars operate with concepts like comparative independence, limited independence, economic sovereignty, economic independence, domestic autonomy, some political independence, substantial independence in a number of areas, independence of the Romanian communist elites from the Soviet elites, suggesting that detachment affected only some aspects of the bilateral relations such as the economic or the party fields. Sometimes, scholars even argue that one could at most acknowledge Romanias independence from Moscow only by comparison with the previous period, implying that independence was allowed by the USSR itself and that it was not complete.

Stelian Tnase and Mircea Chirioiu, for instance, argue that, in the context of de-Stalinisation, the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR was about the autonomy of the Romanian political elites from the Soviet elites. In other words it was not about the autonomy of the state. According to Tnase, between 1962 and 1965, Romania renounced pro-Sovietism, while the 1964 Declaration was the climax of the conflict between the local elite and the suzerain [Soviet] elite.31 Joseph F. Harrington and Bruce J. Courtney maintain that from the late 1950s onwards Romania struggled to obtain its economic autonomy or its economic independence, while Gheorghe Ciobanu writes about Romanias new economic doctrine of economic independence32 which means that only in the economic field Romania could act independently or autonomously.

Amy Hampartumian and Paul D. Quinlan consider that from the early 1960s onwards Romania exerted some political independence or a foreign policy substantially independent from Moscow in a number of areas33, but they do not detail why Romania chose to be substantially independent only in some areas, what substantially actually 29 Boldur-Lescu, 49; Mihaela Cristina Verzea, Desovietizarea culturii romneti la nceputul deceniului apte, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, No 3-4/2003, 127; Johanna Granville, Dej-a-vu. Early roots of Romanias independence, East European Quarterly, XLII, Vol. 4, January 2009, 366; Donald F. Busky, Communism in history and theory, the European experience, Praeger, Westport, 2002, 23; John Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe. A Century of War and Transition, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, 201. 30 Dennis Deletant, Taunting the Bear. Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 196389, in Cold War History, Vol. 7, No. 4, November 2007, 496; Neagoe-Plea, 231-240. 31 Mircea Chirioiu, ntre David i Goliat. Romnia i Iugoslavia n balana Rzboiului Rece, Demiurg, Iai, 2005, 111; Tnase, 123, 172, 192-199. 32 Joseph F. Harrington, Bruce J. Courtney, Relaii Romno-Americane, 1940-1990, Institutul European, Iai, 2002, 196, 197, 214, 225; Ciobanu, 175. 33 Amy Hampartumian, The relationship between Britain and Romania during the Rule of Nicolae Ceausescu, 1966-1989, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, No 3-4/2003, 55; Paul D. Quinlan, The United States and Romania. American-Romanian relations in the twentieth century, Woodland Hills, 1988, 165.

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meant or how and why some areas were selected and other were not. According to Oca and Popa, after the issuing of the RWPs 1964 Declaration Romania was able to surpass to some extent her condition of [being] a satellite state rigorously subordinated to the uncontested leader of the communist world namely the USSR but what to some extent meant is a problem that the two authors do not tackle either.34 Vlad Georgescu similarly argues that in the early 1960s Romania moved from full subordination to comparative independence. 35 Duu contends that in the early 1960s Romania adopted a policy of limited emancipation from under the Soviet tutelage.36 According to Stanciu, in the early 1960s, Gheorghiu-Dej did not pursue a complete detachment from Moscow but only some space of manoeuvre. These scholars do not explain either what they mean by incomplete detachment or by comparative independence.37

However, Robert King and Dennis Deletant conceptualise Romanias detachment more carefully. According to Deletant, autonomy, defined by the right to formulate indigenous policy rather than independence, characterised Romanian foreign policy in the early 1960s under Gheorghiu-Dej and under Ceauescu thereafter, for throughout the Cold War Romania remained a member, despite some misgivings, of both the Warsaw Pact and Comecon and consistently restated its loyalty to the Socialist camp.38

King reasons that independent is not the accurate term to describe Romanias policy change towards the USSR as independence means a total liberation from the foreign control. Autonomy is therefore a better term to describe Romanias right of self-government, of making ones own laws and of administering ones own affairs, King contends, emphasising also that autonomy was granted or permitted by the Soviet Union.39 But this approach cannot explain why Romania blocked in July 1963 Mongolias membership in the Warsaw Pact, why in November 1963 Romania voted at the United Nation Organisation (UNO) in favour of a resolution to establish a nuclear-free zone in Latin America when the other socialist bloc countries abstained, or why in 1964 Romania opposed the Soviet intended strong collective riposte against China to give just few examples from the early 1960s.

The early 1960s change in Romanias relations with the USSR is differently and rather vaguely conceptualised by different authors. It is called detachment, dissidence, distancing, separateness, independence, economic independence, opposition, pretended opposition, economic sovereignty, comparative independence, turn, shift, rift, new foreign policy doctrine, re-orientation of the Romanian external politics, autonomy, emancipation, deviation etc. With very few exceptions, authors do not explain why they choose one concept over the other, but they all work within a paradigm maintaining that after the war

34 Alexandru Oca, Vasile Popa, O fereastr n cortina de Fier Romania. Declaraia de Independen din aprilie 1964, Vantrop, Focani, 1997, 209. 35 Vlad Georgescu, Romania 40 years, 1944-1984, Praeger, New York, 1985, 41. 36 Alessandru Duu, Revoluia din 1989. Cronologie, Craiova, Sitech, 2010, 36. 37 Stanciu, 2009, 280-281. 38 Drawing from Deletants definition, in a recent study, Cezar Stanciu made his option for the term autonomy, which should be limited only to the foreign policy, meaning Romanias self-proclaimed right to make decisions and pursue interests that were not coordinated with or accepted by Moscow. Cezar Stanciu, Crisis management in the Communist bloc. Romanias policy towards the USSR in the aftermath of the Prague Spring, in Cold War History, Volume 13, No 3, August 2013, 356; Deletant, 2007, 496. 39 Robert R. King, History of the Romanian Communist Party, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1980, 135-136.

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Romania allied (balanced) with the USSR against the Western threat and contend (or imply) that Romanias alliance with the USSR and its (post-1960) opposition to the USSR were mutually exclusive.

In rather rare cases, historiography defines Romanias change of policy towards the USSR in terms of state security strategy. Andrei Miroiu, for instance, argues that until 1958 Romania identified the security threat in the West, therefore looking for a strategic alliance with the USSR and its eastern allies. From 1972 onwards, Miroiu continues, Romania opted for a new security strategy, identifying threats coming from all directions, including the USSR. However, Miroiu fails to discuss what happened in terms of security strategy between 1958 and 1972 or how this change affected Romanian-Soviet relations.40 Cristian Troncot also suggests that after the war Romania identified threats to its security in the Imperialist West, but he argues that from the late 1960s onwards, the USSR became the main threat to Romanias security.41 Similarly, Cezar Stanciu and Paul Nistor contend that allying with the USSR in 1948 (through the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance) and in 1955 (through the Warsaw Pact Treaty) Romania aimed to secure her strategic interests against a prospective Western attack.42 This paradigm, which maintains that after the war Romania allied (balanced) with the USSR against the Western threat, lead scholars to assume that Romanias alliance with the USSR and its post-1960 opposition to the USSR were mutually exclusive.

Drawing from the balance of threat theory as developed by Stephen M. Walt this study advances instead a paradigm which argues that in the aftermath of the Second World War Romania allied not against the threat but with the (perceived) threat which was the USSR. The balance of threat theory contends that the alliance behaviour of states emerges depending on the level of threat. According to Walt, when entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition to the principle source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the major threat).43 Or, as Patricia A. Weitsman phrased it, when the threat becomes so grave that a states very survival is at stake, the threatened state may opt to ally with its enemy, that is, bandwagon, to save itself.44 In other words, alignment with the perceived source of danger may be motivated by fear and may be a form of defensive appeasement.

1.4 Sources

The study is based on Romanian primary sources, especially on unpublished documents from the Romanian National Historical Central Archive (ANIC) and from the Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry (AMAE). The laws in force regulate the access to the 40 Miroiu, 136-173, 186. 41 Cristian Troncot, Securitatea i serviciile secrete sovietice (1968-1989), in Constantin Hlihor (coord.), Structuri politice n secolul XX, Curtea Veche, Bucureti, 2000, 548. 42 Paul Nistor, nfruntnd Vestul. PCR, Romnia lui Dej i politica de ngrdire a comunismului, Vremea, Bucureti, 2006, 285; Stanciu, 2008, 25-35, 71-74, 116-117. 43 Stephen M. Walt, Alliance formation and the balance of world power in International Security, vol. 9, No 9, 1985, 4. 44 Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous alliances. Proponents of peace, weapons of war, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, 12.

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Romanian historical archives so that documents concerning foreign policy can be available for research 50 years after their creation, personal files of different politicians 75 years after their creation, documents regarding national security and national integrity 100 years after their creation.45 However, the ANIC allows researchers access to the documents up to 1989 provided that they have been processed.

From the ANIC, the study uses several main fonds: the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (with the sections Foreign Relations; Office; Foreign RelationsAlphabetical; Administrative-Political; Propaganda and Agitation); Presidency of the Council of Ministers (with the sections Presidency of the Council of Ministers and Minutes); the CMEA (with the sections The Governmental Commission for Economic and Technical Collaboration and Cooperation in the CMEA Governmental Commission for the CMEA problems, and The Protocols of the CMEA sessions); and the Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection (Fond 80). The Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection was taken over by the National Archives from the Ministry of the National Defence in 1995 and contains valuable reports and letters (most of them annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej himself) regarding Romanias relations with the USSR, with China or Romanias activity within the CMEA, for the period 1960-1964, included.

Many documents from these fonds provide information regarding the decision-making process concerning the change of Romanias policy towards the USSR: minutes of the Politburo of the CC of the RWP from the period between 1960 and 1964, minutes of different bilateral (Romanian-Soviet, Romanian-Chinese, Romanian-Yugoslav, Romanian-Indian etc.) talks, reports by different ministries and commissions sent to Gheorghiu-Dej, etc. Usually, these documents carry Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations a very important source regarding his perceptions and views. Often, Gheorghiu-Dej also wrote on these documents directives for his party or government colleagues, which provide us with a source on the Romanians responses to perceived threats.

While the access to the ANIC documents poses no special problem, the access into the AMAE is restricted to a great extent. This archive functions according to the same laws as the National Archives, and since foreign policy documents cannot be released for research prior to 50 years after their creation, the access is in theory allowed only for the period prior to 1963. However, the access to the AMAE is very difficult even for the period prior to 1960 and usually researchers do not even have access to the inventory books describing the archive evidence that should be by law available for study. Fortunately, telegrams, notes, reports produced within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are present in copies in the Archive of the CC of the RWP detained by the ANIC and thus available for study.

The research could not benefit from Soviet unpublished documents due to funding constraints and to well-known access limitations46, but the study used published Soviet sources47 and available Soviet-produced texts, in copies or in original, in the Romanian

45 Law no 16/ 2 April 1996, modified by the Law no 358/ 6 June 2002 and by the Emergency Ordinances no 39/ 31 May 2006 and no 64 /28 June 2003, Monitorul Oficial, No 71/9 Aprilie 1996; no 476/3 Iunie 2002; nr. 464/29 Iunie 2003. 46 Suvi Kansikas explained how difficult and arbitrary the access in the former Soviet archives still is. Suvi Kansikas, Trade blocs and the Cold War. The CMEA and the EC challenge, 1969-1976, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 2012, 24. 47 A.A. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954-1964, Tom 1, Chernovye Protokol'nye Zapisi Zasedanii, Stenogrammy. Postanovleniia, Rosspen, Moscow, 2003; Radu Ciuceanu (coordinator), Misiunile lui A.I.

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Archives. Additionally, this study used the online collections provided by the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, by the Open Society Archives and by the Kremlin Decision Making Project at the Miller Center of the University of Virginia. These collections include English language versions of documents issued not only by the Soviets, but also by other bloc members, and they proved very useful for this research.48

On the other hand, this study argues that the Romanian archival evidence is relevant and sufficient in addressing its two research questions, for the following reasons. Firstly, the Romanian leaders made the decision regarding the policy change towards the USSR based on the incoming information from the external environment, and it is the Romanian archives that can tell us (to some extent49) what kind of information was available to them in that respect. Secondly, the Romanian archives hold copies of the Czechoslovak, East German, Bulgarian, Soviet etc. projects, speeches, declarations, as well as Romanian-produced syntheses with regard to such bloc proposals or positions. Moreover, such bloc documents are usually annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej and extensively commented in different Politburo meetings by the Romanian leaders, offering valuable insights into the perceptions, interpretations, but also responses of the Romanian leaders concerning the others intentions or plans.

Thirdly, the Romanian archives provides minutes, protocols, resolutions, reports, communiqus of different CMEA or Warsaw Pact gatherings, as well as the correspondence exchanged between the CMEA or Warsaw Pact members on different issues, but also between Romania, the USSR, China, Yugoslavia or other states, which means that proposals and plans produced in and throughout the bloc are available, to an important extent, through the Romanian archives. However, it is important to emphasise that this study does not intend to produce an exhaustive analysis of the intra-bloc or intra-camp negotiations on the CMEA integration or on the controversies within the communist movement, its focus being instead on its two research questions.

The Romanian archives provide also extensive reports, literature reviews, translations of press and academic texts published in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, but also Yugoslavia, China or North Korea with regard to the CMEA integration or to the disputes within the communist movement. Often these texts are annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej another important source of the Romanian leaders perceptions and interpretations of the others intentions.

The daily bulletins of the Romanian news agency Agerpres are also used in this study. Annotated issues of these bulletins are available in the ANIC in the Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection. The Romanians perceptions and interpretation on the Sino-Soviet dispute are available through the minutes of different RWP Politburo meetings, and through Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations on the letters exchanged between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Romanian archives hold Romanian, Russian and Chinese versions of these letters, but for the English Vinski n Romnia. Din istoria relaiilor romno-sovietice, 1944-1946. Documente secrete, Bucureti, 1997. 48 The Miller Center Collection provides translation into English of the volumes edited by A.A. Fursenko, Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954-1964, Rosspen, Moscow, Tom 1 (2003), Tom 2 (2006) and Tom 3 (2008). 49 The archives tell us what was discussed. There might have been additional information available to the Romanian leaders that was hidden from discussions with others or that, although discussed, was not recorded.

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version of the missives the study used the Marxist Internet Archive which provides excellent translations.50

Many documents relevant for Romanias detachment have been published and such collections of documents51 provide further valuable information for this study. Apart from the archival evidence, this study uses published memoirs and interviews of former communist dignitaries. In the case of socialist Romania, there are no journals known yet for the period under investigation here. Regarding the interview genre, it should be mentioned that there are no former top decision makers alive today in order to interview them. However, three of the people that participated directly in the decision-making process regarding Romanias policy change towards the USSR were interviewed by Lavinia Betea in the 1990s Alexandru Brldeanu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Corneliu Mnescu.52

The memoirs genre is also quite rare, but it is represented by politicians or diplomats, such as Paul Niculescu-Mizil (Chief of the Central Committee Section Propaganda and Agitation, 1956-1968), Ioan Sfetcu (Gheorghiu-Dejs chief of Cabinet), Mircea Malia (deputy of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1962-1970) or Ion Porojan (a junior Romanian diplomat in Moscow in the early 1960s).53 Silviu Brucan (Romanias ambassador to the UNO, 1955-1962) and Sorin Toma (Chief editor of Scnteia and Member of the CC of the RWP, 1955-1960) occasionally tackle in their memoirs the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR. However, these two authors have not been involved directly in the decision-making process and often they recall events in which they were not involved, their recollections being in this respect personal opinions and post-1989 reinterpretations.54

The memoirs and interviews used as historical primary sources raise a number of problems concerning their credibility and representativeness. Researchers and scientists have questioned the reliability and accuracy of memoirs in general and of the memoirs and interviews of the previous communist dignitaries in particular, suspected of having intrinsic problems such as factual errors, distortions, falsifications and self-censorship.55 These problems apply also in the case of Romania, as the interviews and memoirs were 50 The Western views on the Romanian early 1960s foreign policy changes are also available through a series of published and online collections of documents such as the CIA FOIA Annual Reports, which this study occasionally used. However, as interesting as a detailed investigation of the Soviet or Western archival sources might be in relation to the Romanian policy change, it is beyond the scope of this study. 51 Romulus Ioan Budura, Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1954-1975, Bucuresti, 2008; Dan Ctnu, ntre Beijing i Moscova. Romnia i conflictul Sovieto-Chinez, INST, Bucureti, 2004; Mihai Retegan, Rzboiul politic n blocul comunist. Relaii romno-sovietice n anii aizeci. Documente, Rao, Bucureti, 2002; Vasile Buga, O var fierbinte n relaiile romno-sovietice. Convorbirile de la Moscova din iulie 1964, INST, Bucureti, 2012; Banu&ranu; Budura, 2005. 52 Lavinia Betea, Partea lor de adevr, Compania, Bucureti, 2008. 53 Paul Niculescu-Mizil, O istorie traita, Memorii, I, Enciclopedica, Bucuresti, 1997; Paul Niculescu-Mizil, O istorie trait, Memorii, II, Democraia, Bucuresti, 2003; Mioara i Ion Porojan, Obsesie i adevr. Diplomai romni la Moscova (1962-1975), Semne, Bucuresti, 2006; Gheorghe Apostol, Eu i Gheorghiu-Dej, Paco, Bucureti, 2011; Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani n anticamera lui Dej, Edituda Fundaiei Culturale Romne, Bucuresti, 2000; Mircea Malia, Tablouri din Rzboiul Rece. Memoriile unui diplomat romn, C.H.Beck, Bucuresti, 2007. 54 Silviu Brucan, Generaia irosit (Memorii), Teu, Bucuresti, 2007, 77-100; Sorin Toma, Privind napoi. Amintirile unui fost ziarist communist, Compania, Bucuresti, 2004, 177-189. 55 Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Soviet memoirs as a historical source, in Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.), Researcher's guide to sources on Soviet history in the 1930s, M.E. Sharpe, 1992, 233-254.

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produced after the collapse of the socialist system and carry much of the post-1989 discourses, ideas, concepts or views.

Nonetheless, despite some misgivings, the memoirs and interviews genres do offer details and personal reflections not to be found elsewhere. They provide data on the authors perceptions and beliefs concerning the others perceptions and beliefs, and therefore they are important historical sources as long as their mentioned limitations could be surpassed by cross-checking them against each other or against the archival evidence. Consequently, this study regarded the data provided by such sources with extreme care, continuously corroborating and comparing them with data provided by the archival evidence.

1.5 Structure of the study

The first chapter of the study is its Introduction. Providing the adequate background for the study, the second chapter briefly reviews the Romanian-Soviet pre-1960 relations and advances a new way of understanding these relations. It argues that after the war Romania entered and preserved a bandwagon alliance with the USSR the perceived threat. The next two chapters investigate the emergence of Romanias opposition to the Soviet Union within the context of the CMEA reform process. They focus, on the one hand, on the Romanian leaders perceptions of the threats posed to Romanias interests by the Soviet-intended CMEA reforms and, on the other hand, on the responses and tactics that the Romanian leaders developed to block or deter these perceived Soviet threats.

The fifth chapter investigates, on the one hand, Romanias attempts to obtain Chinas support against the (perceived) Soviet intentions to reform the CMEA through specialisation and integration and, on the other hand, the emergence of Romanias separate position with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The study of the Romanian-Chinese negotiations concerning the CMEA reform process and the study of Romanias attitude towards the Sino-Soviet dispute are relevant within the discussion of Romanias policy change towards the USSR in the early 1960s for several reasons. They shed additional light on how the Romanian leadership conceptualised and perceived its relations with the Soviet Union; they provide insights into the tactics that a small state used in order to cope with a (perceived) threatening, neighbouring and allied superpower; and they shed light on the self-imposed limits of the Romanian anti-Soviet opposition, a very relevant element regarding the question of what changed in Romanias relations with the USSR.

Discussing the proximate causes for the issuing of the RWPs April 1964 Declaration which marked the first public (albeit indirect) acknowledgement by the Romanian leaders of a position that was different from that of the USSR, the sixth chapter continues to detail on how the Romanian leaders conceptualised Romanias relations with the neighbouring superpower in relation to the two approached cases studies the CMEA reforms and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The concluding chapter highlights the findings and accomplishments of the study and opens up discussions for further research.

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2 Romanias post-war grand strategy

Addressing Romanias early 1960s policy change towards the USSR, the existing scholarship has worked within a paradigm which maintains that after the Second World War Romania entered (and preserved throughout the Cold War) a balancing alliance with the USSR in order to counterbalance the Western threat. Contending or implying that Romanias alliance with the USSR and its opposition to the USSR were mutually exclusive, the existing scholarship argues that the change was either fake or incomplete.

Influenced by Stephen M. Walts theory of balance of threat according to which states react to perceived external threats56, this study conceptualises the change in Romanias relations towards the USSR within a different paradigm which maintains that in the aftermath of the war Romania allied with the main source of the (perceived) threat that is, bandwagoned with the USSR. This interpretation, however, is completely new in the field of Romanias post-war studies and needs therefore to be supported by strong evidence, and this is what this chapter aims to do by focusing on how the Romanian leaders conceptualised Romanias post-war grand strategy. 57

2.1 Conceptualising Romanias post-war grand strategy

In late 1944, Romania was a defeated former ally of Germany, under Soviet military occupation, towards which Great Britain or the USA showed no special interest.58 Romanian society and its political elites thought that the very existence of the state was at stake, and that in the worse case, Romania would become a Soviet republic and, in the best case, Moscow would impose a communist regime there, as Time Agency reported on 23 October 1944.59 For instance, Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the National Peasants Party (NPP) was convinced that the country had been already lost to the Russians and doubted that Romanias annexation or at least Moldovas annexation to the Soviet Union could be prevented.60

Expecting severe Soviet repercussions for Romanias role in the anti-Soviet war, many Romanians argued in late 1944-early 1945 in favour of a policy of friendship, collaboration and alliance with the source of the danger, the Soviet Union, which was seen

56 Walt, 1987, 1-49. 57 As already mentioned in Introduction, many scholars have studied Romanias pre-1960 foreign policy. For example of collections of published documents regarding the pre-1960 Romanian-Soviet relations see Tatiana Volokitina (ed.), Vostochnaia Evropa v Dokumentakh Rossiiskikh Arkhivov, 1944-1948, Tom I, Moskva, 1997; Tatiana Volokitina (ed.), Vostochnaia Evropa v Dokumentakh Rossiiskikh Arkhivov, 1944-1953, Tom II, Moskva, 1998; Tatiana Pohivailova, Transilvanskii Vopros. Vengero-Rumynskii Territorialnyi Spor I SSSR, 1940-1946, Dokumenty, Rosspen, Moskva, 2000; Ioan Scurtu (coordinator), Stenogramele edinelor Biroului Politic i ale Secretariatului CC al PMR, 1952, Bucureti, 2007; Dan Ctnu, Vasile Buga, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej la Stalin, 1944-1952, INST, Bucureti, 2012. 58 Alessandru Duu, ntre Wehrmacht i Armata Roie, Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2000, 231-233. 59 Time Agencys comment concerning the Russian policy in Romania, 23 October 1944, AMAE, Fond 71/1939, E 9, vol. 157, 204-206. 60 Burton Y. Berrys report, 17 March 1945, in Ioan Scurtu (coordinator), Romnia, Viaa politic n documente, 1945, Bucureti, 1994, 212.

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as the only solution able to appease the Soviets and to secure Romanias future security. According to Iuliu Maniu, the war and its outcome had proved undoubtedly to the Romanian people and political elite, that in this part of Europe there is only one big power with decisive influence the Soviet Union, that friendship with the Soviet Union constitutes the main condition of the existence of the Romanian state and that any other foreign policy but that of active collaboration and good neighbourly relations with the USSR amounts to self-destruction. Thus, the fulfilment of the difficult conditions of the Armistice Agreement (AA) imposed upon Romania in September 1944 was seen by Maniu as a sacrifice that Romania needed to make in order to obtain the Soviets trust.61

Dinu Brtianu, the leader of the National Liberal Party (NLP), was to a lesser extent the supporter of a pro-Soviet policy, but, still, in March 1945 he also argued that the Romanian elites needed to do everything they can to consolidate the feelings of mutual trust between our country and our big Eastern neighbour.62 However, the main supporter of such a policy was the Gheorghe Ttrescu wing of the NLP. In December 1944, Ttrescu (future Minister of Foreign Affairs, between 6 March 1945 and 5 November 1947), argued in a public speech that in choosing the future state security strategy Romania had to first take into consideration the reality of the existence of a victorious and powerful neighbour at its Eastern border. According to Ttrescu, Romanias future security was conditioned by a future permanent collaboration with the Soviet Union that could be formally recognised through a bilateral treaty of alliance and mutual assistance. To reach such a goal, Ttrescu further reasoned, first Romania had to ransom through many sacrifices the mistakes of having participated in the anti-Soviet war.63

In late 1944-early 1945, the communist leaders argued in similar terms in favour of a Romanian pro-Soviet foreign policy. On 30 September 1944, Ana Pauker (future Minister of Foreign Affairs, between 1947 and 1952) reasoned that Romania was to perish for good64 if friendship with the USSR did not become the basis of the states future grand strategy. According to Pauker, at that time, the USSR was a vindictive neighbouring giant, powerful enough to put Romania in its right place with a single move of the hand, in a context in which neither the USA, nor Great Britain could or wanted to get in the way of the Soviet Union as far as Romania was concerned. Because Romania had fought and lost the war against the USSR, now she had to redeem herself and to accommodate the Soviet Unions demands, otherwise she risked loosing her independence, Pauker argued in different party meetings.65

61 Iuliu Manius letter to A.Vishinski, 15 November 1944, in Ciuceanu, 93. 62 Dinu Brtianus Memorandum to Dr. Petru Groza, 22 March 1945, ANIC, Fond Ministry of National Propaganda, Studies and Documents, File no 2/1944-1945, 2-4. 63 Gheorghe Ttrescus speech from 17 December 1944, in Gheorghe Ttrescu, Mrturii pentru istorie, Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 1996, 282-294. 64 S se prpdeasc complet, in Romanian. 65The minutes of the talks between the delegations of the Social Democratic Party and of the Communist Party of Romania, 30 September 1944; The minutes of the meeting of the Council of the National Democratic Front, 29 October 1944, in Radu Ciuceanu, Corneliu Mihai Lungu (coordinators), Stenogramele edinelor Conducerii PCR, 23 septembrie 1944-26 martie 1945, INST, Bucureti, 2003, 78-94, 103, 117-123.

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Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca or Petru Groza advanced identical positions. In January 1945, during a meeting of the Council of the National Democratic Front66, Dr. Petru Groza the leader of the Ploughmens Front and Romanias future Prime Minister (between 6 March 1945 and 2 June 1952) argued that Romanias geopolitical situation, which he defined in terms of Romanias vicinity to the USSR and the Soviet victory in war, called for a policy on two levels: firstly, alliance with the Soviet Union up to a pact of mutual assistance on the economic, political and military levels and, secondly, friendship with the Western democracies. Vasile Luca, member of the Communist Party67 and future Minister of Finances (between 6 November 1947 and 9 March 1952), agreeing, added that, in the given international and military situation, Romania must not look for the vicinity of England and America, but for friendship and alliance with the USSR, the only one that he saw as being capable to guarantee the independence and existence of our country as a national state and to help preserving our national life.

Arguing that the only perspective of existence of our country [Romania] is friendship with the USSR, in January 1945 Vasile Luca and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej considered that the threat to Romanias interests was coming not from the West, but from the East, from the USSR. If the Soviet leaders trust in Romania and in its leaders was not obtained rapidly, Romania risked to remain an occupied country and to lose Transylvania, Luca and Gheorghiu-Dej argued. In order to convince the leaders in Moscow that her friendship was sincere, Romania needed to make many sacrifices such as complying with the difficult economic, military or administrative stipulations of the AA, the two communist figures stressed on the same occasion.68

The non-communist government officials conceptualised in a similar way Romanias future relations with the Soviet Union. On 9 February 1945, for instance, Constantin Vioianu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared to A.P. Pavlov (political counsellor of the Allied Control Commission) that Romania was committed to collaboration with the USSR and that, replacing Paris, Moscow had become the centre towards which Romanias future foreign policy was oriented. According to Pavlov, however, the USSR was not convinced yet that it could count on Romanias friendship, and demanded therefore, as further proof of Romanians loyalty, the improvement of the fulfilment of the AA and the purging of the so-called collaborators of the previous regime from the historical parties the NLP and the NPP and from the administrative state body.69

In the Cabinet of Dr. Petru Groza, formed on 6 March 1945 under Soviet pressure, the communists held five of the 18 ministerial portfolios. On 31 March 1945, Gheorghe Ttrescu (Vice-president and Minister of Foreign Affairs) announced that the Cabinets main aim was to secure the states international security by establishing a tight friendship and a long-lasting alliance with the big neighbour from the East. Two sets of reasons were considered when making this choice, Romanias recent experiences in terms

66 The National Democratic Front (NDF) included the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Ploughmens Front, the Patriotic Union and the Union Federation. 67 The Communist Party had several names in Romania, namely The Socialist-Communist Party (1921-1922), the Communist Party of Romania (1922-1943), the Romanian Communist Party (1943-1948), the Romanian Workers Party (1948-1965), and the Romanian Communist Party (1965-1989). 68The minutes of the 24 January 1945 meeting of the NDF Council in Scurtu, 1994, 80-93. 69Tele-phonograms sent by A. P. Pavlov to V. M. Molotov from Bucharest, on 9 February 1945 and 2 March 1945, in Ciuceanu, 111-113; 137-139.

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of alliances and the long-lasting (perceived) Soviet threat. Thus, Ttrescu observed, on the one hand, that Romanias alliances with Western faraway powers or with Eastern European small states had proved inefficient in providing security for the state and, on the other hand, that in the aftermath of the war the USA, Great Britain and France had agreed to the USSRs prevalent role in Eastern Europe. Ttrescu believed that, as a small and defeated state, Romania lacked the capabilities to oppose the great neighbouring Soviet Union, which instead had the motives to penalise Romania for its war alliance and had the power to crush its western neighbour if it wanted. According to Ttrescu, earning the Soviets friendship and trust was a mandatory condition for Romanias future existence and security. Thus, he concluded that Romania needed to carry onwards only a policy with the face to the East, a policy of friendship, assistance and collaboration in all fields with the USSR.70

Conceptualising a policy of friendship and collaboration with the USSR, in the second half of the 1940s, the Romanian political elites also took into consideration Romanias previous experience in terms of alliances. After the First World War, Romania had sought its security through defensive alliances with France and Great Britain, in an attempt to balance against the revisionist states in the region Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. When the two Western powers showed little interest in concluding military alliances with Eastern European states, Romania entered the regional security defensive alliances the Little Entente in 1921 and the Balkan Entente in 1934. In 1926, Romania had concluded Treaties of Friendship with France and Italy, but these treaties offered no security guarantees against an attack from a third party. In 1921 and 1926, Romania and Poland signed alliance treaties offering mutual security guarantees against any type of aggression, but those agreements proved useless when the Second World War began. In November 1940, Romania allied (balanced) with Germany in order to counterbalance the USSR, but this alliance failed to reach its goal too, and in late 1944 Romania was a defeated state, under Soviet military occupation, completely isolated internationally. Given these historical experiences and the perceptions of the Soviet threat, in the send part of the 1940s the Romanian elites conceptualised Romanias future grand strategy in terms of friendship, collaboration and alliance with the USSR, the perceived source of danger.

2.2 Bargaining for friendship

Immediately after its instalment, the Groza Cabinet began to act to earn the Soviets trust. On 9 April 1945, Petru Groza was promising Pavlov that the Soviet representatives in Romania were to be asked for their approval with regard to all the important or less important matters.71 In return for their trust in Romanias declarations of loyalty and friendship, the Soviets repeatedly requested the so-called democratisation of the country, and despite the attempts of King Mihai and of Gheorghe Ttrescu to limit the

70 Articles and speeches by Gheorghe Ttrescu, March-December 1945, in Ttrescu, 311-313, 351-367, 397, 519. 71 Notes regarding the talk between A. P. Pavlov and P. Groza, Bucharest, 9 April 1945, in Ciuceanu, 163-165.

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infringement of human rights the Cabinet began the democratisation process by shutting down newspapers and periodicals critical to the government or to the Soviet Union, by dissolving the NPP and the NLP, by annihilating the organisations seen as anti-Communist or anti-Soviet, by purging those considered fascists, war criminals and enemies of the people from the public life.72 Such proofs of loyalty to the Soviet Union were accompanied though by attempts to obtain from the USSR alleviations of the economic and political burdens imposed upon Romania.

On 13 April 1945, Ttrescu assured Pavlov o