People's Liberation Army Navy’s Influence on People’s ...particularly the activities of the...

JJMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected)

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People's Liberation Army Navy’s Influence on People’s Liberation Army’s Decision-Making System

Perception Gap between PLA and PLAN over Sea

YAMAMOTO Katsuya Introduction It is undoubtedly clear that recently the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increasingly been active and expanding its activities in the surrounding areas of Japan. It is also confirmed that China’s Naval Surface Combatants have advanced into the Pacific Ocean every year since 2008. PLA’s activities, particularly the activities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), are understood to be based on the China’s economic development strategy emphasizing an expansion of its activities into ocean areas. The latest defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2010” defines the role of the PLA as to “safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests” together with the security of China’s lands, territorial waters and airspace 1 . Admiral Wu Shengli, the Commander of the PLAN (the top position of the PLAN), stated that “China holds enormous strategic interests in the sea. ……. To effectively safeguard our national maritime interests we must build a powerful navy2.” Thus, Admiral Wu showed his strong will to advance into the sea. Facing the increased activities of the PLAN, neighboring countries including Japan as well as the United States tend to think that the PLA as a whole is actively seeking its interest in the sea and that it is evidenced by the PLAN’s visible forays into the ocean. Experts of military strategy of China have also been focusing on China’s naval strategy in their recent studies. However, as the PLA has its English name of the People’s Liberation Army, the army (i.e. PLA Ground Force) remains the core of the PLA, and this has not changed ever since the 1 People’s republic of China State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, March 2011 http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-03/31/content_4249942.htm (Last access date: January 25, 2012) 2 Wu Shengli, “Building a Powerful People’s Navy that meet the requirement of the Historical Mission for our Army,” Qiushi, July 2009 http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2007/200714/200907/t20090707_6624.htm (Last access date: December 19, 2011)


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foundation of the China’s military force. If you look at the PLA’s composition of service arms, you will notice the fact that the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) still outweighs other forces such as navy or air force. Therefore, it is too early to say, solely based on the intensifying activities of the PLAN, that the PLAN’s weight within the PLA has changed and that the PLA has turned its main interest toward the sea. The author worked in China as the Defense Attaché for three years and some months since 2008, and had an opportunities to watch the PLA in person. From my experience in China, I cannot stop feeling strange with the gap between the people’s perspective in Japan that the PLAN’s activities represent the PLA’s general intent and my observation of the PLAN’s position within the PLA. There have been many studies on the PLA’s decision making-system such as: “Politics of Contemporary China” (Kazuko Mouri3) and “Military Forces of China” (Ryo Asano4), both focusing on the relation between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the PLA; and “The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century: Second Edition” (Bernard D. Cole5), studying the PLAN and the PLA from the viewpoint of maritime security. In this paper, I would like to discuss the PLA’s decision-making system from the viewpoint of the PLAN’s position and its power within the PLA. This point has not been studied well in previous research. In Chapter 1, I would like to provide an overview of the structure of the PLA’s decision-making system which constitutes the essential part of the PLA, to analyze the PLAN’s position within the PLA and to clarify that the PLAGF has a predominant influence in the PLA. In Chapter 2, I would like to provide an outline of the China’s military diplomacy and to confirm that the PLAGF plays more important roles than others in the China’s military diplomacy. Based on the analysis in Chapter 2, I would like to summarize in Chapter 3 the view of the PLA in which the PLAGF is predominant on China’s security situations, and to study what interest the PLA has in the sea and naval power. In this paper, I would like to demonstrate that there is the gap between the PLA’s 3 Kazuko Mouri, New edition: Politics of Contemporary China, The University of Nagoya Press, 2004. 4 Ryo Asano, Military Forces of China” Soudo-sha, 2009. 5 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century: Second Edition, Naval Institute Press, 2010.


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view on the sea and the PLAN’s actual activities, which explains the reason for my strange feeling mentioned above, and to clarify that the PLAN’s influence in the PLA’s decision-making system is limited. This study covers the period approximately between 2008 and 2011. The reason why I take 2008 as a starting point is that around that time the PLAN has started to go beyond the so-called First Island Chain and has done it repeatedly. I stayed in China most of the time during that period. Chapter 1: PLA’s decision-making system In order to understand the PLA, a massive organization with more than 2.4 million officers and soldiers, it is essential to know at first the core decision-making structure of the PLA. In this Chapter, recognizing the PLA’s relationship with the Communist Party of China (CPC) which is regarded as a body ensuring “civilian control” of the PLA in a very unique way of China, I would like to provide an overview of the PLA’s decision- making system and to clarify the predominance of the PLAGF in that system. One of the educational materials for the CPC’s executive officers, “National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period6,” edited by General Li Jinai, one of the members of the Central Military Committee and the Director of General Political Department of the PLA, provides detailed information of the China’s decision-making mechanism on national defense policy. I used the information in this book as base materials for my study. (1) Central body of the CPC and the PLA In China’s political system, the PLA as a military organization is separated and independent from the State Council, China’s state’s administrative body. As opposed to the Japanese system where the Prime Minister who represents the national government concurrently takes a position of the commander-in-chief of the Self-Defense Force, the Chinese Premier of the State Council does not command the PLA. China’s supreme decision-making body on national defense policy is the Central body of the CPC. More in concrete, the Central Committee of 6 Li Jinai (Ed.), National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, Renmin Chubanshe (People’s Publishing House), Beijing, 2008.


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the CPC (the Central Committee) and the Politburo are designated as the supreme leading (lingdão) body7 for national defense. Leading power conferred to the Central Committee and the Politburo includes (i) decision-making on overriding principles and important institutions of national defense, (ii) leadership in important defense activities, (iii) supreme command over all military forces and (iv) guidance for building and developing economic society in conjunction with defense activities8. The term “decision-making on overriding principles … of national defense” is understood to mean (i) to decide national defense policy and military strategy in line with overall strategy of national security and development, (ii) to decide on, and coordinate among, security-related strategies in politics, military, economy, science and technology, diplomacy and other areas, (iii) to establish a plan for building and developing military force and (iv) to formulate objectives, strategic plans, guiding principles and allocation of duties to promote building of military force9. The term “supreme command over all military forces” of the Central Committee is understood to include (i) leadership for building and development of military forces, (ii) operational command to carry out operational mission of military forces and (iii) coordination and control over duties of military forces in peacetime10. In contrast to the CPC’s power on national defense policy, the power of the State Council is limited. It does not have any supreme decision-making power in relation to national defense issues, nor does it have any supreme command over military forces. This is why the PLA is called as the forces for the CPC but not as the national defense forces. (2) Central Military Commissions (CMC) A. Central Military Commission of the CPC and the Central Military Commission 7 Generally in China, the term “ leading (lingdão)” means to imply directions and orders with enforcement power (Tomoki Kamo, Politics of Contemporary China and the National People’s Congress – Functional Reform of the NPC and Change in Relations between “Leaders and Followers,” Keio University Press, 2006, p. 19 etc. 8 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, pp. 124-125 9 Ibid. p. 125 10 Ibid. p. 127


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of the PRC In order to lead the PLA, the Central body of the CPC establishes the CMC as its part of organization which works as the supreme military leading body. In addition, the supreme military decision-making body is also organized at the state’s level which is the Central Military Commission of the PRC11. So, there are two different organizations, however, they are completely the same in terms of members and the leading functions toward the PLA, so they are de facto one organization12. CMC has absolute power over the PLA as it is delegated the following authorities: (i) to exercise a unified command over all military forces (including the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (CAPF) and citizen’s militia), (ii) to determine operational objectives of military strategy and military forces, (iii) to build the PLA’s military force, to establish rules and regulations and to guide and administer an implementation of plans, (iv) to submit bills to the National People’s Congress (NPC) or the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), (v) in accordance with the Constitution of the PRC or the laws, to adopt and publish military rules and regulations and to issue orders, (vi) to determine the PLA’s organization and organic units and to define roles and responsibilities of each of General Departments, Military Regions, Service Arms and Senior Command/Research Academies, (vii) in accordance with general laws or military laws, to decide on appointments and dismissals for all members of the military forces, to provide them with training and to give them rewards or punishments, (viii) in cooperation with the State Council, to approve plans and implementation of armament of all military forces and to guide and administer development of scientific technology and production for national defense, (ix) in cooperation with the State Council, to administer defense spending and defense assets and (x) to exercise other powers assigned to it under the laws13. 11 Constitution of the PRC, article 93, the Central People’s Government of PRC, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62714.htm (Last access date: February 12, 2012). 12 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, p. 134 13 PRC National Defense Act, article 13, Ministry of National Defense of PRC, http://www.god.gov.cn/policy/2009-09/15/content_4088018.htm (Last access date: February 12, 2012).


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B. Members of the CMC CMC consists of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members. It forms a collegial body and exerts its power collectively. Current members of the CMC are as follows: (i) Hu Jintao, Chairman, and Xi Jinping, Vice-Chairman, who are the civilian leaders, (ii) two members of Vice-Chairman who have a title of General (of the PLAGF)14 and (iii) eight members who are concurrently serving as the Minister of National Defense, Chief of General Staff, Director of General Political Department, Director of General Logistics Department, Director of General Armament Department, Commander of the PLAN, Commander of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Commander of Second Artillery Corps respectively15. As you may notice, four members of the CMC concurrently assume the top position of executive departments of the CMC respectively, which are General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armament Department, which are collectively called General Departments of the CMC. There are ten members of the CMC who have military title, among whom eight members belong to the PLAGF. All four directors of General Departments are also officers of the PLAGF. From the PLAN and the PLAAF, only Commanders of these service arms are appointed as the CMC members. It is too obvious that the PLAGF has an overwhelmingly greater number of representations in the CMC. C. Hierarchy in the CMC (a) Hierarchy as member of the CPC The members of the CMC have different positions in the CPC, regardless of the CMC being a collegial body that exerts its power collectively.

14 In the PLA, ranks of PLAN and PLAAF are called with the name of service arms, such as Navy Admiral and Air Force Colonel, while ranks of PLAGF are simply called without the name of service arm, such as General and Colonel. This also indicates something different between PLAGF and PLAN/PLAAF in positioning within the PLA. 15 Leadership of General Departments of the Military Commission, Ministry of National Defense of PRC, http://www.mod.gov.cn/leader/index.htm (Last access date: December 22, 2011).


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Hu Jintao, Chairman of the CMC, is the President of the PRC as well as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, which is the top position of the CPC. Xi Jinping, Vice-Chairman of the CMC, is Vice President of the PRC, and is also one of the members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. General Guo Baoxiong and General Xu Caihou, who belong to the PLAGF but have no post within the PLAGF, assume full-time positions as Vice-Chairman of the CMC, and they are the members of the Central Politburo of the CPC, which is immediately beneath the Central Politburo Standing Committee, usually called as “Central body of the CPC.” Except these three Vice-Chairmen, other CMC members are the members of the Central Committee of the CPC, which is immediately beneath the Central Politburo of the CPC. Figure 1 presents what I have described above in a graphic way. Ranking of the CMC members in the CPC is definitive and decisive, and persons who are ranked higher in the CPC are expected to have larger influence on decisions of the CMC although the CMC makes decisions on a consensus basis. Wu Shengli, the Commander of the PLAN, is only sailor in the CMC. He is recently elected as the member of the Central Committee of the CPC, and is presumably lower in the

Figure 1: Hierarchy within the CMC

(The Figure is prepared by the author based on the information obtained from the website of the Chinese government and other materials.)

DIR of General Logistics DIR of General Armament


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hierarchy of the CPC than other CMC members. (b) Hierarchy as military personnel According to Article 11 of the Regulation on the Military Ranks of Officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army16, Chief of General Staff and Director of General Political Department are ranked higher than “officers at the level of commander of a major military command.” This “officers at the level of commander of a major military command” is understood to be the position of Commanders of Military Regions (MR) and the equivalent positions, to which General or Lieutenant General is usually assigned. Among the top positions of the four General Departments, Director of General Logistics Department and Director of General Armament Department are ranked as “officers at the level of commander of a major military command” like Commander of MR. The same applies to three Commanders of Service Arms (i.e. Commander of PLAN, Commander of PLAAF and Commander of Second Artillery Corps), and they are ranked as “officers at the level of commander of a major military command.” In the General Staff Department and General Political Department, Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Director of General Political Department are also ranked as “officers at the level of commander of a major military command.” Table 1: Posts and ranks of the PLA personnel

Post Rank (army rank) Assignment

General Chief of the General Staff, Director of the General Political Department

Officers at the level of commander of a major military command

General or Lieutenant General

Director of General Armament Department, Director of General Logistics Department, Deputy Chief of Staff, Deputy Director of the General Political Department, Commander of PLAN, Commander of MR,

16 Regulation on the Military Ranks of Officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Central People’s Government of PRC, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/gm/content_63642.htm (Last access date: December 23, 2011).


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Commander of PLA Air Force, President of Military Academies etc.

Officers at the level of deputy commander of a major military command

Lieutenant General or Major General

Deputy Commander of MR, Fleet Commander

Officers at the level of corps commander

Major General or Lieutenant General

Chief of Combat Operations from General Staff, Chief of Foreign Affairs Office from Ministry of National Defense, etc.

Officers at the level of deputy corps commander

Major General or Senior Colonel

President of Dalian Naval Academy

Officers at the level of division commander

Senior Colonel or Major General

Division Commanders, Destroyer division Commanders, etc.

Officers at the level of deputy division commander

Colonel or Senior Colonel Brigade Commanders, etc

Officers at the level of regiment commander

Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel

Regiment Commanders, Commanding officer of Destroyers, etc.

Officers at the level of deputy regiment commander

Lieutenant Colonel or Major

Deputy regiment commanders, etc

Officers at the level of battalion commander

Major or Lieutenant Colonel Battalion commanders, etc.

Officers at the level of deputy battalion commander

Captain or Major Deputy battalion commanders, etc.

Officers at the level of company commander Captain or Lieutenant Company commanders, etc.

Officers at the level of deputy company commander

Lieutenant or Captain Deputy company commanders, etc.

Officers at the level of platoon leader

Second Lieutenant or Lieutenant Platoon leaders, etc.

(The table is prepared by the author based on the Regulation on the Military Ranks of Officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and other materials.) In terms of posts assigned to the PLA officers, Chief of General Staff and


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Director of General Political Department, who hold a higher position in the CMC, are ranked the highest among the heads of four General Departments. These four General Departments are positioned at the same level as the ministries and commissions of State Council which are the counterpart to the central government’s ministries and agencies of Japan. So, General Staff Department and General Political Department are positioned higher not only than other General Departments but also higher than the ministries and commissions of State Council. Minister of National Defense is not only one of the ministers of the State Council (who correspond to the ministers of central government of Japan) but also Vice Premier of the State Council, ranked higher than other ministers. He is also one of the members of the Standing Committee, which is an inner cabinet of the State Council17. Recently, officers who had served as the Chief of General Staff or other positions of the CMC have been appointed as the Minister of National Defense. Summarizing the above, the ranking of the members of the CMC seems to be as follows: (1) Hu Jintao, Chairman; (2) Xi Jinping, Vice-Chairman; (3) Guo Baoxiong and Xu Caihou, both assigned to Vice-Chairman; (4) Liang Guanglie, Minister of National Defense, Chen Bingde, Chief of General Staff and Li Jinai, Director of General Political Department and (5) other CMC members. Members ranked numbers 3 (two persons) and 4 (three persons) above are all from the PLAGF. In contrast, Admiral Wu Shengli is the only CMC member from the PLAN. As he is promoted to Admiral after he is appointed as the Commander of the PLAN, he is relatively a newly-arrived Admiral among the CMC members. Chairman Hu Jintao and Vice-Chairman Xi Jinping are concurrently serving as President and Vice President of the PRC respectively. Therefore, two Vice-Chairmen, Guo Baoxiong and Xu Caihou are the only CMC members working full-time for the CMC who hold the membership of the Central Politburo of the CPC. So, we can imagine that they are relatively influential in the CMC.

17 People’s Republic of China State Council Organization Act, the Central People’s Government of PRC, http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005-06/10/content_5548.htm (Last access date: December 23, 2011). Standing Committee consists of Premier, Vice Premiers, State Councilors and Secretary General of the State Council.


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Other members of the CMC are also engaged in other full-time assignments, such as Minister of National Defense, Directors of the General Departments or the Commanders of the Service Arms. Consequently, these two Vice-Chairmen seem to be playing an important role to connect the Central body of the CPC with the nerve center of the PLA on a daily basis. (3) Executive Departments of the CMC A. Four General Departments (General Staff Department, General Political

Department, General Logistics Department and General Armament Department)

Executive functions of the CMC are carried out by each of four General Departments of the CMC, i.e. General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armament Department. The CMC executes operational commands, guides army building and exerts other power to all military forces through these four General Departments. The General Staff Department is the CMC’s military operation body leading all military forces in military operations. It is responsible for building all military forces and directing all military actions. It consists of various divisions undertaking command, military intelligence, communication, training, mobilization, electronic warfare, aviation, foreign affairs, etc. The General Political Department is the CMC’s political work body leading the PLA in political works and carrying out the CPC’s activities in the PLA. It consists of various divisions undertaking organization, human resources, propaganda, security, discipline inspection, mass works, etc. The General Logistics Department is the CMC’s logistics operations body leading the PLA in logistics operations. It consists of various divisions including those undertaking finance, military goods, fuel, sanitary service, traffic and transportation, military facility construction, etc. The General Armament Department is a part of the CMC organization in charge of armament leading the PLA in equipping weapons and supplies. It consists of various divisions undertaking armament planning, armament for service arms and branches, scientific and technological research, procurement,


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etc.18 The CMC is a decision-making body on the issues assigned to each of the four General Departments. In the case of China, we usually can make a guess as to ranks or powers of internal institutions or organizations of the CPC, the State Council or the PLA by comparing ranks of top leaders assigned to such institutions or organizations. As mentioned above, Chief of General Staff and Director of General Political Department are ranked higher than Directors of other General Departments and the Commanders of Service Arms and Military Regions. Thus, General Staff Department which is responsible for military operations and General Political Department which is responsible for human resources and the CPC’s political works are given a special status in the decision-making system of the PLA and have more power than other Departments/Service Arms/MRs. Most of high-ranking officers working for the CMC and the General Departments are the officers of the PLAGF19. Naval officers and Air Force officers are rarely seen in these departments. Foreign military attachés staying in Beijing often meet the staff officers of the General Departments, most of who belong to the PLAGF. B. Organizational structure of the PLAGF for operational command and control PLAN, PLAAF and the Second Artillery Corps under the leadership of the CMC have leading bodies within each of service arms which are called “General Departments” consisting of Headquarters20 , Political Department, Logistics Department and Armament Department, each of which are connected to the four General Departments of the CMC respectively. In the case of PLAN, the Commander of the PLAN and the Political Commissars of the PLAN are appointed as heads of the PLAN’s General Departments.

18 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, pp. 137-139. 19 Leadership of General Departments of the Military Commission, Ministry of National Defense of PRC, etc. 20 Chief of Staff of the PLAN is appointed as the head of Headquarters of the PLAN.


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There is no independent leading body in the PLAGF, but each of the seven Military Regions of the PLAGF has a Headquarters, Political Department, Integrated Logistics (liánqin) Department21 and Armament Department which are linked to the four of the CMC’s General Departments respectively. In accordance with the functions assigned to it, each of the CMC’s General Departments – most of its members are the PLAGF officers – gives directions and commands to the seven Military Regions, PLAN and PLAAF through its counterpart general departments in each of the MRs and service arms. This flow of directions and commands is illustrated in Figure 2 above. As far as we know from media reports, the four General Departments of the CMC are structured primarily to direct the PLAGF. Within the organization of the General Staff Department which is in charge of operational commands, the Naval (Operation) Bureau headed by Senior Captain (PLAN) is responsible for the naval operations, and this Bureau is directly under the Combat Operation Command Department, to which Major General (PLAGF) is assigned as a head of the department. At the same level of the Combat Operation Command Department, 21 Each of the Military Regions has in its organization air force and fleet under its command. So the MR is responsible for logistics not only for ground force but for unified command including navy and air force (equivalent to joint force). This is way the MR’s logistics department is called integrated logistics (liánqin) department.

Figure 2: Flow of leadership (lingdão)

(The Figure is prepared by the author based on the information in “National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period” and other materials.)


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there are two departments, which are the Military Training Department in charge of training of the PLAGF and Army Aviation Department in charge of air unit of the PLAGF (one of the service arms of the PLAGF). Apparently, the organizational unit responsible for the naval operations is ranked lower than these PLAGF’s departments. This organizational structure indicates the position of naval operations in the decision-making mechanism of the PLA, meaning that, inside the PLA, the PLAN is still regarded as one of the support arms for the PLAGF.

As the PLA is primarily dedicated to carry out ground operations, the resources allocated to naval operations in the PLA’s leading organization may be limited. To the contrary, it is specifically mentioned that the Nuclear Submarines receives direct commands of the CMC as the Second Artillery Corps do, both of which engage in strategic counterattacks22. It can be said that this reflects that the PLAN’s activities including naval operations may to a considerable extent be left in the PLAN’s hands. (4) Does the PLAN have much influence on the strategic decisions of the PLA? It is very much possible that the influence of the PLAN and PLAAF is limited on the strategic decision of the PLA. The Strategic Planning Department was established in the General Staff Department on November 22, 2011. Assignment of the Strategic Planning Department includes (i) research on

22 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, pp. 154 & 159.

Figure 3: General Staff Department (Combat Operation Command Department & Naval (Operation) Bureau) and PLAN


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strategically important issues and (ii) preparation of development and improvement plans of military forces23. This indicates that the Department may be developed into a core unit of the strategic decision in the PLA. In the inauguration ceremony, Guo Baoxiong, Vice-Chairman of the CMC, was invited as a guest of honor, and it was attended not only by the people in the General Staff Department but also by the leaders of major institutions engaging in the strategic decisions of the entire PLA including the four General Departments, National Defense University and Academy of Military Science and the leaders of the relevant state institutions. The establishment of the Strategic Planning Department was extensively published by the Ministry of National Defense emphasizing the importance of the Department in the entire PLA24. However, I have failed to find any press articles reporting the attendance of leaders of the PLAN and PLAAF at the ceremony. It is often the case in China that information in press reports concerning actual or possible attendees at an important ceremony gives a critical clue to power or rank of such attendees or relevant institutions which the ceremony concerns. Accordingly, an absence of such high-ranking officers of the PLAN and the PLAAF as are at the same level of the attendees from the four General Departments indicates that it may be highly possible that neither PLAN nor PLAAF participate in the important decision-making process of the PLA including strategic decisions covering the entire PLA. Chapter 2: PLA’s military diplomacy In order to analyze in which issues the PLA has an interest in peacetime, it is important to verify to which arms the PLA gives priority in updating its armament and on which training the PLA puts focus. In addition, it is equally important to verify which country’s army the PLA has contacted and what military diplomacy it has developed. In this Chapter, I would like to provide an

23 “An inauguration meeting was held for Strategic Planning Department of the People’s Liberation Army on November 22 in Beijing,” Ministry of National Defense of PRC, November 23, 2011, http://www.mod.gov.cn/auth/2011-11/22/content_4318443.html (Last access date: November 23, 2011). 24 In the inauguration ceremony for Military Intelligence Department which was established at the same time of the establishment of Strategic Planning Department, Vice-Chairman of the CMC did not seem to attend it, and it is reported that the ceremony was organized by Chief of General Staff and below.


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outline of what roles are performed by military diplomacy in China and to confirm that the PLAGF carries more weight in the China’s military diplomacy than other service arms. (1) Independency of China’s military diplomacy It is mentioned that the China’s military diplomacy is “a part of the nation’s entire diplomatic strategy and policy” as well as “a part of the nation’s military strategy and national defense policy,” and is “subject to the entire nation’s political, diplomatic and military strategy25.” As mentioned above, the PLA and the State Council are independent from each other, and the State Council’s intervention in the PLA’s issues is very limited. China’s military diplomacy is promoted under the direct leadership of the Central body of the CPC and the CMC. Current China’s diplomatic policy is simply represented by the words “Harmonious Society (héxié shiìjiè).” There are a variety of organizations in China exerting influence on the country’s diplomacy, that include not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which corresponds to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) but also the Ministry of Commerce, the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Culture, etc. that are involved in the economic, cultural and other matters. The slogan of “Harmonious Society” is given to the ministries and commissions including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by their ruling bodies respectively, and they construe it in their own way and take actions independently. So it is very difficult to coordinate among ministries and commissions even though they are under the same umbrella of the State Council. To solve this problem, the Central body of the CPC has a small group named the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs immediately under the Politburo Standing Committee led by the General Secretary Hu Jintao. This small group is responsible for coordination and guidance among relevant ministries and commissions26.

25 Zhãng Wei “Cultivation and Building of China’s Characteristic Military Diplomacy” China Military Online (Online version of the “PLA Daily”), http//www.chinamil.com.cn/item/saloon/lunyuan/276.asp (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 26 Táng Liàng “Relationship between Communist Party of China and Politics in Contemporary China,” Keio University Press, 1997, pp. 52 and etc.


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However, the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs does not seem to provide cooperation or coordination for foreign affairs on a daily basis, and it looks like the PLA carries out its own activities of military diplomacy. There are some examples of this: one is the test flight of the stealth jet J-20 at the time when the US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates visited China; and the other is the PLA’s reaction to the collision of China’s fishing boat with Japan Coast Guard’s patrol vessel in the waters near the Senkaku Islands. While the Ministry of National Defense – but not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumes primary responsibility for the acceptance of Mr. Gates’ visit to China as a part of its military diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for arranging a courtesy visit of foreign dignitaries to the President of the PRC. Generally speaking, a test flight of prototype aircraft has nothing to do with diplomatic schedule. However, given the diplomatic circumstances at that time, one can expect that the authorities responsible for foreign affairs would carefully study possible impact of the test flight given to the foreign counterpart and discuss it with relevant people before taking any actions. Nonetheless, no discussion or coordination seems to have taken place between the PLA and the State Council at the time. This incident brought serious negative consequences on China. China’s opaqueness was widely publicized by the US Defense Secretary. Foreign mass media reported that President Hu Jintao might not hold control over the PLA. The collision between China’s fishing boat and Japan Coast Guard’s patrol vessel in the waters near the Senkaku Islands deteriorated the relationship between both countries’ foreign authorities. The Chinese Ministries of State Council took a series of quick actions, such as an arrest of Japanese expatriate employees, a slowdown of export of rare-earth materials to Japan, an imposition of voluntary restriction on Chinese visiting to Japan, a halt of invitation of Japanese students to the 2010 Shanghai Expo, etc., which worsened the relationship with Japan. On the other hand, there was no change for a while in the attitude of the Ministry of National Defense concerning the acceptance of the Training Squadron of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. After a long while, the PLA eventually decided not to receive the visit of Japan’s war ships to China. This indicates that at an early stage of the collision incident the PLA may have estimated the incident’s


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impact on the relationship with Japan more optimistically than the State Council. These examples demonstrate that the PLA’s military diplomacy is not necessarily consistent with the general diplomacy developed by the State Council. (2) Predominance of PLAGF in military diplomacy A. Foreign Affairs Office of Ministry of National Defense The Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense is in charge of practical businesses of the PLA’s military diplomacy. The Ministry of National Defense is one of the ministries and commissions of the State Council, but practical tasks of the Ministry are undertaken by the General Departments of the

PLA27. Military diplomacy is assigned to the General Staff Department as one of its tasks. This indicates that the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense is in its actual status one of the divisions of the General Staff Department (Foreign Affairs Bureau of Combat Operation Command Department of the General Staff Department28). One of the staff of the Foreign Affairs Office whom I met when I stayed in Beijing as Defense Attaché gave me his name card specifying his affiliation of the “Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense” and “Foreign Affairs Office of the Central Military Commission.” This also indicates that all organizational units in charge of foreign affairs within the

27 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, p. 122. 28 Jun-ichi Takeda “The People’s Liberation Army” Business-sha, 2008, p.85.

Figure 4: Contact for Military Diplomacy (Foreign Affairs Office of Ministry of National Defense)

(The Figure is prepared by the author based on the information in “PLA Daily” and other materials.)

Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office


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Ministry of National Defense, General Staff Department and the Central Military Commission are combined and virtually integrated into one entity. In the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, it is the North East Asian Affairs Section of Asian Affairs Bureau that is in charge of issues with Japan. This section consists of several military officers who are engaged in military diplomatic tasks toward Japan, including the Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs Office, to which Major General (of PLAGF) is assigned, Director of Asian Affairs Bureau, to which Senior Colonel (of PLAGF) is assigned, and Chief of North East Asian Affairs Section, to which Lieutenant Colonel (of PLAGF) is assigned. I do not know that there are any sailors in this section except an interpreter (as of the end of 2011). This section also deals with foreign affairs with South Korea, North Korea and Mongolia. So, they are not occupied by the issues with Japan nor do they have many ocean or naval issues to handle. They are the contact persons with the Japanese attachés in China, and are the Chinese representatives to the consultation or negotiation with foreign countries’ defense authorities, such as Working-Level Talks on Maritime Communication Mechanisms between Japan and China’s Defense authorities. Most of the people working for Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense are the PLAGF officers. Four or five people are appointed as Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs Office, one of whom is the Rear Admiral of PLAN. The Senior Colonel of PLAAF is appointed as Director of the General Affairs Bureau of Foreign Affairs Office who is in charge of diplomatic protocol. These are a few of the personnel of PLAN and PLAAF whom I can name. PLAGF officers dominate not only the Asian Affairs Bureau but also other offices of the Foreign Affairs Office. The Rear Admiral of PLAN, who is only one Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office with naval career, is responsible for American and Pacific affairs. According to one of the staff of the Headquarters of PLAN, PLA’s human resource management is made in a “linear” fashion, meaning that most of the officers who are currently engaging in foreign affairs start working for foreign affairs from the beginning of their entering into PLA after graduation from the university or other education and continue their career to deal with those matters. They rarely work on front-line duties. Thus, while some of them are very skillful in


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diplomacy and are sometimes known to foreigners as tough negotiators, they do not have much knowledge about military operations. Most of these people are PLAGF officers and have some knowledge about ground troop’s operations environment though this is very different from that of maritime operations. Therefore, it is very difficult for them to share common knowledge of maritime operations with their foreign counterparts, such as Japanese officers who have much experience in fleet or air operations. PLAN has a unit called the “Foreign Affairs Bureau.” This is one of the units of the “General Affairs Office of Headquarters of PLAN,” which is in charge of general administration of the Headquarters. The Foreign Affairs Bureau, headed by an officer in the class of Navy Captain, provides PLAN’s contact for foreign countries’ naval delegation visiting China or foreign naval attachés stationing in China. It deals with diplomatic protocols as its main business, and is not given any power to negotiate with foreign military delegations as a representative of the Ministry of National Defense. It is similar to the liaison office of local troops under the Military Regions. Recently, many countries’ military organizations including Japan have arranged a consultation scheme with their foreign counterparts at a working level in various frameworks, such as one between joint forces or between service arms, which is sometimes called “staff talks.” The PLA has been frequently invited by many countries including Japan to have bilateral staff talks. The United States and China have set up a maritime consultation scheme under the MMCA (Military Maritime Consultative Agreement). While the US Pacific Command represents the United States to this consultation, the PLA is represented by the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense. So, there is thin representation of PLAN to this scheme. Furthermore, the power delegated to the PLA representatives is limited29. Defense Ministers level of Japan and China have agreed to promote the staff talks30. Nonetheless, the attitude of PLA representatives to set up the talks is not

29 Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issue for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, February 2012, p. 25. 30 “Joint Press Release” Ministry of Defense of Japan, March 20, 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/youjin/2009/03/20.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011).


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positive, and tends to restrict it to a dialogue of policy issues, which PLA representatives – actually they are people of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense – are in charge. The PLA has recently been expanding the PLAN’s activities as its means of military diplomacy, such as counter-piracy operations, port visits to foreign countries, joint exercises with foreign navies, etc31 . Nonetheless, from the above-mentioned examples I would say that the PLA’s military diplomacy is dominated by the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense – effectively it is the General Staff Department – and that PLA does not consider to involve other service arms (such as navy, air force) actively in its military diplomacy32. B. Military Attachés In 1974 (two years after the normalization of diplomatic relations), Japan and China started communication between defense authorities by mutually exchanging attachés to each other’s country (an officer of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force was dispatched to China). Since then, Japan has dispatched an officer of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force in 1995 to China and an officer of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in 2000. Currently, three attachés, one each from the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, are stationed in the Japanese Embassy in Beijing. On the other hands, there are several military attachés in the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo at the moment. They are Defense attaché, Army attaché, Deputy Defense attaché and a few assistant military attachés. It is the fact that, not only current members of military attachés in Tokyo but also those who have stayed the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, almost all of whom are PLAGF officers. Businesses concerning maritime or airspace issues have been served by the

31 “More practical, active and open China’s military diplomacy – Director of Foreign Affairs Office of Ministry of National Defense talks about the China’s military diplomacy in 2011” “PLA Daily” China Military Online, January 17, 2012, http://chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/contentnes/2012-01/17/content_76342.htm (Last access date: January 19, 2012). 32 It is interesting that Deputy Director of Foreign Affair Office of Ministry of National Defense who is in charge of Japan retreated from PLAGF to PLAN Admiral at the just time of publishing of this paper’s Japanese edition.


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Defense attaché. Most of them used to study in universities in Japan, and have been working for the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo more than one time. So, among the PLA they are quite knowledgeable and insightful about Japan. However, they do not have expertise in navy and maritime issues. This situation is not only in Japan, but there are the same situations in other countries. While China sends military attachés to more than a hundred countries33, most of them are PLAGF officers. According to one of the staff of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, there are a few diplomatic missions abroad, in which a PLAN officer is included. These few examples are the Chinese Mission to the UN and Chinese Embassies in the US, the UK and Russia. So, not only in Japan but also in other countries, there are many Chinese diplomatic missions in which only PLAGF officers are involved. It is somewhat puzzling that there is no naval officer in the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo even in the situation where maritime issues are taken up in every meeting with Japan – including high-level talks or defense ministers’ meetings as one of the important agenda. I would say that this explains that the PLA does not have much interest in maritime issues. The Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, a part of the General Staff Department, is responsible for contact with foreign military attachés staying in China. In the same way, the General Staff Department (actually it is the Military Intelligence Department) is responsible for giving instructions to Chinese military attachés staying in foreign countries34. It is unknown to what extent the Ground Force attachés are given the relevant knowledge of military situations with PLAN, PLAAF and other service arms and share the interests with these service arms through (the Military Intelligence Department of) the General Staff Department.

33 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, 2011, p. 65. 34 The author watched the program of CCTV broadcast on the Chinese New Year Eve in 2010 that Major General Yang Hui, Director of Military Intelligence Department of the General Staff Department read the message on behalf of the Chinese people encouraging military attachés staying in the world and the message on behalf of those military attachés thanking the Chinese people for their support.


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Chapter 3: PLA’s view on maritime security Based on the analysis in previous Chapters, in which I have articulated PLAGF’s predominance in the PLA’s decision-making and military diplomacy, I would like to take up a few examples of the PLA’s military diplomacy in this Chapter, and look over the priority issues of the PLA’s military diplomacy and the PLA’s view on national security. (1) PLA’s focus on domestic issues China’s defense white paper, which is issued approximately biyearly, explains the PLA’s view on security situations. In the latest defense white paper, it is mentioned that “The Asia-Pacific security situation is generally stable. … Nevertheless, Asia-Pacific security is becoming more intricate and volatile35.” It continues that “Regional pressure points drag on and without solution in sight. There is intermittent tension on the Korean Peninsula. The security situation in Afghanistan remains serious. Political turbulence persists in some countries. Ethnic and religious discords are evident. Disputes over territorial and maritime rights and interests flare up occasionally. And terrorist, separatist and extremist activities run amok.” It summarizes the Asia-Pacific security situation stating that “Profound changes are taking shape in the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape.” It concludes that relevant major powers, particularly the United States, is reinforcing its military regional alliance and increasing its involvement in regional security affairs. As for security challenges that China is facing, the defense white paper states that “China is meanwhile confronted by more diverse and complex security challenges.” It continues that “China has vast territories and territorial seas. It is in a critical phase of the building of a harmonious society in an all-round way. Therefore, it faces heavy demands in safeguarding national security.” As the biggest obstacles and threats inflicting serious damage on China’s national security and social stability, the white paper takes up the following issues in order: “Taiwan independence activists;” “East Turkistan independence movement;” and “Tibet independence movement.” Following these issues, it refers at first to the 35 China’s National Defense in 2010. The information concerning the PLA mentioned in this Chapter is extracted from this book.


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pressure built up in preserving China's territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests, and then, non-traditional security concerns, such as existing terrorism threats, energy resources, finance, information and natural disasters. Finally, it criticizes that the United States continues to sell weapons to Taiwan, severely impeding Sino-US relations and impairing the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Concerning China’s relationship with Taiwan, while China severely accuses the US of its arms export to Taiwan, the economic ties between China and Taiwan have been deepened since Ma Yingjiu has formed the government in March 2008. The defense white paper states that “China seeks the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations accords with the interests and aspirations of compatriots on both sides of the Straits, and this is widely applauded by the international community.” According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011” issued by the US Department of Defense, it appears that China is “prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes long term reunification remains possible and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits36.” Summarizing the above, the issues that China recognizes as threat against its stable development, and therefore, the highest priority to which the PLA must give are mainly domestic issues, such as East Turkistan (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) independence and Tibet independence. Consequently, the PLA has more military interest37 in the countries with which China shares the borders in its western and southern regions, and as a result, has relatively lower military interest in the sea. It can be said from the PLA’s military viewpoint that the PLA may have lower military interest in Japan compared to the other countries with which China shares common borders because there is a “natural barrier38” between Japan and China which is water. From the viewpoint of the PLAGF, it has much higher military interest in the ground forces of the bordering countries than Japan 36 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, 2011, p. 48. 37 In this paper, the term “military interest” means to include militaristic threats and concerns. 38 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 180.


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since the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force does not have any intention or capability to carry out the transoceanic invasion into the mainland China. The PLA does not have more military interest in the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (except the JASDF’s cutting-edge scientific technologies) than the air forces of the bordering countries as the JASDF does not have long-distance and transoceanic air strike capabilities. I do not say that the PLA does not have any military interest in Japan at all. It sometimes sends a warning to Japan. For example, in its official newspaper “PLA Daily” it expresses concern over revival of the Japanese Militarism, and criticizes Japan’s new National Defense Program Guideline. As mentioned above, however, the PLA puts in its decision-making relatively lower priority on the relationship with Japan. Accordingly, it is possible that leaders and staff in the PLA’s supreme leading bodies – most of whom are PLAGF officers – do not pay much attention, nor do they allocate substantial resources of their military diplomacy, to Japan. (2) High-level military diplomacy Diplomatic protocol is of great importance in diplomacy. The information, such as the rank of officials who attend the courtesy visit or the format of meeting, gives us important indication of the diplomatic relationship between the countries. Especially, China is the country that has historically emphasized hierarchy and formalities, and thus pays special attention to counterparts or formats of meetings at their visit to foreign countries and takes special care in formalities in receiving foreign guests in China. This is known in some examples: Chinese mass media’s reaction moving from joy to sorrow to the way how the United States received the visit of President Hu Jintao; and the tumultuous process in which Vice President Xi Jinping’s audience with the Emperor of Japan was materialized when he visited Japan in 2009. At the time of visit of high-level leaders of military or defense organizations of foreign countries, we can have an indication of the level of interest that the PLA has in such country’s military force by checking who in the PLA actually attended the meeting with such country’s visitors. The higher the PLA leader who met the foreign visitors is ranked in the PLA hierarchy, the greater military interest the


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PLA has in such country or its military force. From this viewpoint, we have to pay attention to the appearance of the CMC Vice-Chairmen, in the foreign countries’ courtesy visits or the meetings with foreign officials. Table 2 lists the foreign defense officers’ visits in China, on which one or two of the CMC Vice-Chairmen met the foreign representatives or received their courtesy visits.

In summary, Table 2 shows that one of the CMC Vice-Chairmen met the following foreign representatives in their visits to China: (i) the Defense Minister or the equivalent high-ranking officials of South Korea or some of the Central Asian or Southeast Asian countries; (ii) the Commander of armed force at the national level or the equivalent top-ranking military officers of Russia, Australia or some Eastern European countries; (iii) the Commander of ground force or the equivalent top-ranking military officers in service arms of Pakistan or Bangladesh; and (iv) the military officers at the next-highest rank, such as Deputy Commander or Vice Minister, of Vietnam, the United States, New Zealand, Turkey, North Korea or Italy. The PLA has a regular meeting with North Korea and Vietnam, which are

Table 2: Senior officers of foreign armies to whom CMC Vice-Chairmen have met

(The Table is prepared by the author based on the information in “PLA Daily” and other materials.)


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regarded as communist fraternal countries due to their historical relations, at the level of director of political department (4-star General-level). This indicates strong ties between the PLA and the military forces of North Korea and Vietnam. The CMC Vice-Chairman received a courtesy visit of the Commander of the US Pacific Command. This indicates that China has a high interest in the US military powers in the Asia-Pacific region, which China’s military force may confront. The Commander of the US Pacific Command is one of the few navy officers whose courtesy visit is accepted by Vice-Chairman Guo Baoxiong. Diplomacy with the United States is one of the highest priority issues of China’s foreign strategy39. China is said to have a regular meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Army of Pakistan and Bangladesh, which indicates China’s interest in the southern border areas and India. China’s close relation with Russia and Eastern European countries seems to have been historically developed since the Cold War era and is still continuing. Central Asia is important to China as one of the energy sources. It is also geopolitically important where the Islamic extremists are active which supported the separatist and independent movement in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in the past40. Table 3 shows the CMC Vice-Chairmen’s trips abroad (except

39 Rumi Aoyama, “China’s External Strategy and the United States,” Ryosei Kokubun (Ed.), China’s Governance Capability – Analysis on Mutual Relationship between Politics, Economy and Diplomacy, Keio University Press, 2006, p. 262. 40 Shigemitsu Konno, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Ryosei Kokubun (Ed.), China’s Governance Capability – Analysis on Mutual Relationship between Politics, Economy and Diplomacy, Keio University Press, 2006, p. 358.

Table 3: CMC Vice-Chairmen’s trips abroad (except Vice-Chairman Xi Jinping as Vice President of the PRC)

(The Table is prepared by the author based on the information in “PLA Daily” and other materials. )


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Vice-Chairman Xi Jinping travelling as Vice President of the PRC) since 2008 when the CMC was reformed into the current organization. In this Table, we can identify the CMC Vice-Chairmen’s visits to: (i) the United States and Russia; (ii) communist fraternal countries, such as Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea; (iii) former communist countries in Eastern Europe; (iv) Middle Eastern countries including Turkey; (v) the ASEAN member states; and (vi) Latin American countries. The overview of the countries, delegates of which are accepted by the CMC Vice-Chairmen, and the countries where the CMC Vice-Chairmen visited, indicates the regions in which the PLA has military interest, and implied that even in such regions it does not have much interest in maritime issues41. In the first half of 2011, both Vice-Chairman and Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie frequently visited ASEAN member states. These visits are reasonably seen as their attempt to overcome the difficulties in the issues of the South China Sea, in which the United States was actively involved at that time. If we look at the contacts of personnel between Japan and China, there has been no official visit of the CMC Vice-Chairman to Japan after General Cao Gangchuan, then-Minister of National Defense, was invited to Japan by then-Defense Minister Masahiko Komura in August 2007. After General Cao Gangchuan retired and the CMC was reformed into the current organization, the CMC Vice-Chairman has never had a meeting with high-level Japanese officials, such as the Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, etc. To the present, it is said that each of two Vice-Chairmen stopped over in Japan during transit to their trips abroad and spent some time for sightseeing. Even on such occasions, there seems to be no contact with the relevant persons of Japanese defense authorities. While Japan’s Chief of Joint Staff visited China, his Chinese counterpart, the PLA’s Chief of General Staff, has never come to Japan. When the Chiefs of Staff of Japan’s Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces came to China, they paid a 41 It is interesting that China and New Zealand had developed frequent mutual exchange between their military forces. For example, while in 2011 Vice-Chairman Guo Baoxiong and Director of General Political Department Li Jinai visited New Zealand together with the China’s Naval Surface Combatant, a courtesy visit of NZ Deputy Minister was accepted by Vice-Chairman Guo Baoxiong.


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courtesy visit to the Minister of Nation Defense, but not to the PLA’s Chief of General Staff. I would have to say that the PLA’s way of dealing with the Japanese defense officials indicates that the PLA has lower military interest in Japan than other countries mentioned above. As Japan and China are separated by the sea, they may feel easy to Japan or may have a superiority feeling over Japan from their military viewpoint rather than having a fear of Japan. (3) Consultation for Maritime Communication Mechanism Since the waters or airspace where a country’s navy carries out its activities are adjacent or overlapping to those of the other country’s navy, the countries have sought and developed a variety of communication frameworks or mechanisms ever since the Cold War era to prevent unexpected incidents and to control risks at the time of contingencies42. Top leaders of Japan and China have shared concern over contingency situations on the sea as the PLAN is increasingly expanding its activities. However, despite the agreement reached between top leaders of both countries, they have failed to establish any mechanisms for dialogue or communication, and their discussions have been dragged on for a long period of time without success. I have tried to verify the PLA’s intention in the consultation with Japan for a maritime communication mechanism on the basis of the report made by the “PLA Daily43” at the time or the facts that no information was publicized in the “PLA Daily.” At the time when Wen Jiabao, the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, visited Japan on April 11, 2007, the governments of Japan and China issued the joint press release specifying that “a communication mechanism between the two defense authorities will be established, and thereby, prevent the occurrence of 42 In detail, please refer to the following: David Griffiths, U.S.-China Maritime Confidence Building- Paradigms, Precedents, and Prospects, Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 2010; Takahiro Ishihara “Japan’s Naval Strategy – Focusing on International Institutionalization of the INCSEA (Incidents at Sea Agreement) – “ Hatou (A club magazine of JMSDF) No. 211, November 2010; Takahiro Ishihara, “ Japan’s Naval Strategy (No. 2) – Recent Development in the western Pacific” Hatou (A club magazine of JMSDF) No. 212, January 2011. 43 “PLA Daily” is an official publication of the PLA under the direct control of the General Political Department. It is one of the sources that gives us correct information of the PLA’s intention.


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unforeseen circumstances at sea.” On the following day, the “PLA Daily” published the same information in China44, which indicates that both governments’ concern over maritime security was shared by the PLA. On August 30, 2007, Japan’s then-Defense Minister Masahiko Komura and China’s then-Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan reaffirmed that “both countries agree to establish the communication mechanism between their respective defense authorities to prevent the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances and to maintain security in the East China Sea. Both countries’ experts will have a joint working group meeting as soon as possible to accelerate the consultation process45.” The article of the “PLA Daily” on the following day referred to the Defense Ministers’ meeting and the agreement to “accelerate the consultation process46.” Six months after the meeting of both countries’ Defense Ministers, the 1st Working-Level Talks on a maritime communication mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China (hereinafter referred to as “Working-Level Talks”) was held on April 1, 2008. The “PLA Daily” did not publish anything about the Working-Level Talks. However, both countries’ governments published their top leaders’ “joint press release47” on May 7, 2008 when President of the PRC Hu Jintao visited Japan, in which they appreciated the result of the Working-Level Talks and would continue their efforts. At that time, although the “PLA Daily” published many articles of President’s visits to Japan, it reported nothing about the “Working-Level Talks” and the “joint press release” (which include 70 points of agreement including promotion of defense exchange). This implies the PLA’s negative attitude toward the Working-Level Talks. Defense authorities of both countries could not make any progress in the

44 Japan-China joint press release, “PLA Daily” China Military Online, April 12, 2007. 45 Joint press release of Japan-China defense authorities, Ministry of defense of Japan, August 30, 2007, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/youjin/2007/08/30a.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 46 “ Cao Gangchuan had a meeting with Japan’s Defense Minister.” “PLA Daily” China Military Online, August 31, 2007, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbxl/2007-08/31/content_935137.htm (Last access date: December 22, 2011). 47 Joint press release on enforcing exchange and cooperation between governments of Japan and China” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 10, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/0805_kp.html (Last access date: December 22 , 2011).


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Working-Level Talks until Japan’s then-Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada visited China on March 20, 2009. In his visit, he agreed with China’s Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie that “defense authorities of both countries will continue their talks to establish the maritime communication mechanism as soon as possible. The second meeting of the Working-Level Talks was held in the first half of 2009 in Tokyo48.” This information was published by the “PLA Daily” on the following day49. However, no progress was made for the Working-Level Talks, and Japan’s then-Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa agreed with China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie who visited Japan on November 27, 2009 that “the second meeting of the Working-Level Talks will be held in Tokyo promptly in order to establish the maritime communication mechanism between both countries’ defense authorities at an early date50.” This was published in the “PLA Daily” on the following day51. After Six months of the both countries’ defense ministers’ meeting, the second meeting of the Working-Level Talks was held in Tokyo on July 26, 2010. In this second meeting it was agreed that the next meeting would be held in Beijing in 201052.” However, nothing was reported in the “PLA Daily” about the meeting. After that, the collision incident happened between the Chinese fishing boat and the Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel in the waters near the Senkaku Islands. After such incident, then-Defense Minister Kitazawa and his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie had a meeting on October 11, 2010 in Hanoi, in which they

48 Joint press release, Ministry of Defense of Japan, March 20, 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/youjin/2009/03/20.html (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 49 “China and Japan have reached ten points of agreement on defense exchange.” “PLA Daily” http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbxl/2009-03/21/content_1696203.htm (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 50 Joint press release, Ministry of Defense of Japan, November 27, 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/youjin/2009/11/27b.html (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 51 Joint press release of Japan-China defense authorities, Ministry of Defense of Japan, November 28, 2009, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2009-11/28/content_14095.htm (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 52 “The second meeting of the Working-Level Talks on maritime communication mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China (Summary of Results)” Ministry of Defense of Japan, July 26, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/nikoku/asia/kaijo_02.html (Last access date: December 22 , 2011).


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“agreed that it is necessary to establish the maritime communication mechanism between both countries’ defense authorities as early as possible53.” In June 2011 in Singapore, they also “agreed to hold the third meeting of the Working-Level Talks as soon as possible in order to establish the maritime communication mechanism between both countries’ defense authorities54.” Despite these agreements, neither the third meeting of the Working-Level Talks was held in 2011 nor did the articles in the “PLA Daily” mention anything about the maritime communication mechanism although it published the defense ministers’ meeting in Hanoi and Singapore55. Furthermore, in the Foreign Ministers meeting in November 201156 and the

53 “Talks between defense ministers of Japan and China (Summary)” Ministry of Defense of Japan, October 11, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2010/10/11_gaiyou.html (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 54 “Summary of the meeting between defense ministers of Japan and China” Ministry of Defense of Japan, June 4, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2011/06/04g.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 55 “Liang Guanglie had a meeting with Japanese defense Minister.” “PLA Daily” China Military Online, October 12, 2010, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-10/12/content_40232.htm; “ Liang Guanglie had meetings with the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Defense Minister of New Zealand, Defense Minister of South Korea, Defense Minister of Japan and the US Deputy secretary of State respectively.” “PLA Daily” China Military Online, June 5, 2011, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2011-06/05/content_59243.htm (Last access to both articles on December 12, 2011). 56 “Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba paid a courtesy visit to the Premier of the State Council of the PRC Wen Jiabao (Summary).” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 23, 2011,

Figure 4: Information reported by the “PLA Daily” about the maritime communication mechanism between Japan and China

(The Table is prepared by the author based on the information in “PLA Daily” and other materials. )


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subsequent summit meeting in the following month, the Japanese government proposed to China to organize the “Senior Officials Talks on Maritime Issues57” involving not only defense authorities but also all relevant maritime organizations of both countries. The “PLA Daily” did not report anything about the discussion on this proposal. This is one of the evidences demonstrating that the PLA has the exclusive authority over China’s military diplomacy and that its military diplomacy is not necessarily coordinated with the diplomacy engaged in by the State Council which is China’s central government. Although Defense Ministers of Japan and China agreed to establish the maritime communication mechanism between both countries’ defense authorities in 2007, they have made very slow progress in the working-level consultations and have failed to establish any mechanism so far. This shows the PLA’s negative attitude toward establishment of maritime communication mechanism with Japan. This also proves that the PLA has neither much interest in, nor any urgent need for, the mechanism to prevent the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances at sea while the PLA has expanded its activities in the sea areas surrounding Japan. As mentioned above, although China has the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) with the United States which is similar to the attempted mechanism of maritime communication with Japan, the PLA has not shown any positive interest in the existing consultation scheme with the US58. (4) PLA’s view: “Ocean Territory” The PLA’s view on the sea is represented by the words “Ocean Territory.” The words have been frequently used by a variety of people including those of the CPC, the State Council as well as the PLA when they talk about China’s maritime interest. The words mean to include not only contiguous sea zone but also exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, and they called them “the

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_gemba/china1111/meeting3.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 57 “Japan-China Summit Meeting (Summary)” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 25, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_noda/china_1112/pm_meeting_1112.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 58 Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts,”, pp. 24-26.


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waters under the jurisdiction of the state59.” China’s view of “Ocean Territory” and their interpretation of EEZ under such view seem to represent the concept that China regards areas and spaces covered by the “Ocean Territory” and the airspace above as if they were their land territory and territorial airspace. This view or interpretation gives a clear contrast to the conventional interpretation adopted by the United States or other maritime nations that they must be able to enjoy as much benefits of freedom as possible from the sea. The concept of the “Ocean Territory” is easy to understand for the PLA, most of whose officers and soldiers belong to the ground force and who are not so familiar with the international laws and customs of the sea. It seems that this concept is an extension of the ground force’s traditional concept of land territory which they consider to consist of “our territory and their territory with a border line.” It seems that such concept is transplanted into their concept of the sea. The PLA is promoting this concept among PLA officers and soldiers through the “China Defense Paper (Zhōng guó guófáng bào), one of the affiliated papers of the “PLA Daily,” and other media60. The concept of applying territorial restrictions on the sea like the land may resultantly bind the PLAN’s activities despite the PLAN’s efforts to increase its activities on the sea. This indicates that the concept is not developed taking the expansion of the nation’s naval force into account. This is also seen as one of the evidences that the PLA remains the ground force-centered military forces of the continental state. Chapter 4: Conclusion It is no doubt that China considers the advancement into the sea and ocean development as one of its overriding principles for national development. Also, China has intentionally invested huge resources in the PLAN, one of the means of advancement into the sea. Accordingly, the PLAN’s ability is expanding and its activities are increasing. However, these facts do not necessarily suggest that the

59 State Oceanic Administration, Institute for Ocean development Strategy, Report on China’s Ocean Development in 2011, Haiyang Chubanshe (Ocean Press), 2011, p. 22. 60 The full text of relevant article can be seen in the reprinted version in Xinhuanet (Internet version of China’s national news agency Xinhua News Agency (http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2010-12/07/c_12854815.htm). (Last access date: December 22, 2011).


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PLA has its greatest interest in the sea. I can get a glimpse of this by studying the structure of the PLA’s decision-making system, the military diplomacy the PLA has developed and the PLA’s view on national security as I described above. So far as the PLA’s decision-making bodies are mostly composed of PLAGF officers, it is inevitable that the PLAGF’s conception disproportionately outweighs and the PLA tends to have a major interest in domestic issues. The PLA recognizes domestic issues as the biggest threat and puts more focus on them rather than the frictions with foreign countries at the sea. As a result, the PLA does not have relatively higher military interest in the sea, and leaves daily maritime operations to the PLAN. Relatively lower interest China’s military diplomatic authorities have in the maritime and naval issues are one of the reasons why Japan and other neighboring countries cannot dispel concerns over the expansion of the PLAN. The PLAN has gained experience and knowledge through its contacts with other countries’ navies. However, the PLAN does not have much power to give influence on the PLA’s military diplomacy, and the PLA’s military diplomacy does not reflect the PLAN’s intent. Furthermore, the PLAN was not authorized to exchange opinions with other countries’ navies on strategic and political matters. This makes it difficult for the PLAN and other countries’ navies to exploit opportunities to reduce conflicts or avoid misunderstanding thought dialogue. The gap between the PLA’s view on the sea and the PLAN’s recognition on the maritime issues, the latter of which is represented by the statement of the PLAN’s Commander Wu Shengli mentioned at the beginning of this paper, is a major factor which causes the neighboring countries including Japan that face the intensifying activities of the PLAN to be increasingly concerned about China and the PLA. Closing comment The PLA is called as “Armed Forces for the Communist Party of China,” and has very different organizations and decision-making mechanisms from those of Japan and other democratic nations. It is difficult for us to understand their decision-making and their pattern of behavior by our standard. The PLA looks tightly-integrated and a monolithic organization having the Chairman of the CMC


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as a top leader and led by the absolute leadership of the Central body of the CPC. However, the appearance of the PLA from outside the country that looks significantly expanding its naval power is very different from how the PLA looks like inside the country. The major reason for this difference is the gap of the views on the sea between the PLA and the PLAN which is a part of the PLA, and this gap is caused by the structure of the Ground Force-centric PLA and the difference of views on geopolitical threat between the PLA and the PLAN. The gap between the PLA and the PLAN cannot be filled without such a structural reform that the PLAN can have reasonable influence on decision-making and military diplomacy of the entire PLA. But, it would not be easy. However, unless the PLA could solve this gap, it would be difficult for the defense authorities of neighboring countries including Japan to have a deepened discussion over the maritime security issues with the PLA. People in each country’s defense authorities are required to continue their efforts to stimulate the interest in maritime security issues among leaders of the PLA who come out to the stages of military diplomacy including the Vice-Chairman of the CMC, the Chief of General Staff and the Minister for National Defense, and to invite them to the forum of discussions. Mr. Nan Li, Associate Professor of the US Naval War College, said that “as long as the PLA remains to be the forces of the CPC, it pays the most attention to domestic issues, and will not change its structure led by the PLAGF.” At the same time, he emphasizes the analysis from the personality viewpoint mentioning that “in parallel with the structural considerations, PLA leaders’ personality and their human relations are equally important in Chinese society61.” At the time when the CPC leaders will change in autumn of 2012, it is expected to reshuffle the PLA leaders, and it is rumored inside and outside China that the PLAN’s Commander Wu Shengli may be promoted to Vice-Chairman of the CMC or the Minister of National Defense. Vice-Chairman of the CMC is the highest position for PLA military officers, and the Minister of National Defense is responsible for military diplomacy. If Admiral Wu Shengli would be promoted to Vice-Chairman of the CMC or Minister of National Defense, it would not just be the case that he would

61 I interviewed Mr. Nan Li personality at the US Naval War College in March 2012.


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be the first Admiral who is appointed to such offices62, but also the case that the number of naval officers would be doubled in the CMC together with newly-appointed Commander of the PLAN. This situation could give a good opportunity to reduce the gap between the PLA’s view and the PLAN’s view on the sea. China calls Japan as “a neighbor country separated only by a narrow strip of water.” Waters where the PLA, in particular the PLAN, carries out its activities are the sea areas surrounding Japan. Therefore, the changes in the structure or leadership of the PLA’s decision-making system would have a significant impact not only on the relationship between both countries’ defense authorities but also on the security environment of both countries. Japan must pay careful attention to those changes constantly, and continue its efforts to facilitate communication between both countries’ defense authorities.

62 There was an example that Liu Huaqing who had been in the position of the PLAN Commander was appointed as the Vice-Chairman of the CMC in 1989. However, at the time of appointment he had resigned the PLAN Commander and had the title of General (of PLAGF). So, he was not the Admiral when he was in the office of the CMC Vice-Chairman.

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