REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESREGIONAL TRIAL COURTNATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGIONBRANCH 10, MANILA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

CRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434For: Violation of P.D. No. 1612

- versus -

ROBERT CABAL ERAN,Accused.x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

On September 9, 1999, an Information was filed against accused Robert Cabal Eran charging him with violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, committed as follows:

That on or about September 1, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ROBERT CABAL ERAN, with intent to gain for himself or for another did then and there, willfully unlawfully and feloniously, keep, acquire, possess, sell or dispose of, or in any other manner deal with NINETY (90) SETS OF DIGITAL ENHANCED CORDLESS TELEPHONE VALUED AT US $6,543.00, more or less, which he knew or should have known to him to have derived from the crime of ROBBERY or THEFT, to the damage and prejudice of the private complainant SKY FREIGHT FORWARDERS, INC. in the aforestated amount as may be awarded to it under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Contrary to law.

On September 23, 1999, accused was duly arraigned and with the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Ernesto A. Gonzales, Jr. (Atty. Gonzales), pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

Pre-trial was conducted on February 7, 2000. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Two (2)I. Antecedents

The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc., a local forwarding company, was commissioned by Dae Ryung Ind., Inc., Phil. (now Radix Communication, Inc.), a company engaged in the manufacture of cordless telephones, to haul cartons containing Sanyo Digitalk Model DECT-1000 with receiver, operating manuals and brochures from the latters address at Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), Lot 1-13, Block 20, Phase 4, Main Avenue, Rosario, Cavite to South Harbor, Port Area, Manila on May 3, 1999 and May 17, 1999. From the consignors premises, the items were loaded in container vans and, upon arrival at the port, were received by the port checker in good order. Covered by two separate bills of lading, the container vans were then saddled on a vessel for exportation to the consignees address in Hamburg, Germany and Felixtowe, United Kingdom. However, upon opening the containers of export shipments by the consignees at the port of destination on May 3 and May 17, 1999, respectively, they were found to have suffered losses to the extent of 77% and 80%, respectively. The value of the losses were estimated to be around P16,000,000.00.

On June 23, 1999 Eduardo G. de Guzman (de Guzman), Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer of Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc., received a letter-complaint dated June 22, 1999 from Dae Ryung Ind. Inc. Phil., through its Asst. Trading Manager, Esther Cuasay (Cuasay), and its General Manager, C. H. Chan, alleging that Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc.s driver and helper, namely, Wilfredo Nablo (Nablo) and Dennis Labastida (Labastida), respectively, who handled both shipments, could be involved in some manner. They failed to report for work since May 17, 1999. By reason of such complaint, on July 6, 1999, Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc., through de Guzman, wrote a letter to Director M. Panfilo Lacson, Jr. Chief of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force to request his office to investigate the pilferage which it suspected to have been perpetrated by a crime syndicate. A similar request was also earlier filed by Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc., through Noel Tariman y Fetalvero (Tariman), its Brokerage Manager, with the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) on June 25, 1999 and with Lt. Reynaldo Jular of the Western Police District, Precinct No. 6 on an unspecified date.

On July 8, 1999, Atty. Lucas M. Managuelod (Atty. Managuelod), Police Chief Superintendent and Director of CIDG, sent a written communication to de Guzman, informing him that he has directed P/Supt. Ruben A. Zacarias and P/C Insp. Wenceslao A. Sombero, Jr. (P/C Insp. Sombero) of the CIDG Criminal Investigation and Detective Office and CIDG Special Operations Office, respectively, to investigate the case. Furthermore, the concerned CIDG units have reproduced the pictures and bio-data of Nablo and Labastida and have distributed the same to different special operations team for case build-up. The concerned officers, as per Atty. Managuelods assurance, were zeroing-in on a syndicate known as Bawas Gang which is reportedly engaged in the theft of cargoes through skillful opening of container vans.

SP01 Florentino A. Roxas (SP01 Roxas) and P01 John G. Frial (P01 Frial), both undercover police operatives assigned at the CIDG Special Operations Office, were tasked by P/C Insp. Sombero to conduct an investigation relative to Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc.s complaint and to exert efforts to recover the stolen goods. On September 1, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., an unidentified informant called their office and tipped them of the impending delivery to a store in Comercio St. near Divisoria Mall in Binondo, Manila of ninety (90) pieces of Sanyo Digitalk Model DECT-1000 which were looted from the container vans of Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc. Said informant, however, did not specify who would be fencing these effects either by a real name or alias or by any other distinguishing characteristic by which the fence may be identified. The informant also relayed that units of the contraband were seen by him or her being sold inside Divisoria Mall. On the strength of this information, SP01 Reynaldo Ramos (SP01 Ramos), SP01 Roxas, P01 Frial and other CIDG operatives were dispatched to verify the truth thereof. Upon reaching said Divisoria Mall located at Comercio St., Binondo, Manila at around 3:30 p.m. of the same date, they saw the accused unloading one box (which was 15 inches long and 10 inches wide, more or less) from a maroon Tamaraw FX with plate number UAM 189. The CIDG operatives, who were positioned about 1 meter away from the accused, approached the Tamaraw FX and saw on top of the boxes, which were 20 in number, more or less, conspicuous markings SANYO DIGITALK DECT-1000 but sans any inscription of the source where they emanated. The CIDG operatives then asked the accused what the contents of the boxes were. The accused replied that the boxes contained SANYO DIGITALK DECT-1000 as was obviously printed thereon; accused, nonetheless, reasoned out that his services as porter were merely hired by a certain Kathy to unload the boxes. Strangely, however, accuseds contention that he was a mere porter seems to run afoul with the motion for the release of the above adverted Tamaraw FX filed on September 13, 1999 by one Eusebio Sy (who claims ownership thereof) through Atty. Gonzales (who is accuseds cousel). The motion reads in part:

DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Three (3)COMES NOW, Claimant-owner EUSEBIO SY through undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:

1. That he is the lawful owner and claimant of one (1) unit Maroon Tamaraw FX with Plate No. UAM-189;

2. That on September 1, 1999 the said vehicle was rented by Robert Cabal Eran;

xxxx

Without opening the boxes to ascertain their contents, the CIDG operatives confiscated them and the Tamarax FX through which they were conveyed, arrested the accused on the street, and brought him to the CIDG office. Upon reaching the office, accused was booked and was made to undergo medical examination. The serial numbers of the confiscated items (consisting of 90 pieces of SANYO DIGITALK DECT-1000) were recorded by CIDG operatives and a computer-print out thereof were faxed by them to the office of Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc. During the investigation, the accused, who was appraised of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, voluntarily told, among others, that as a porter in Divisoria, he was merely paid by Kathy (whom he thought was the owner of the boxes) to unload said boxes and had nothing to do with and has no knowledge of how they were obtained. The driver of the Tamaraw FX, according to accused, was a certain Eric. After the investigation, SP01 Roxas and P01 Frial executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension, which detailed the events which transpired before and after the arrest of the accused. The affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before by P/C Insp. Joselito M. Vera Cruz (P/C Insp. Vera Cruz), Deputy Chief of CIDG-DSOO.

DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Four (4)On September 2, 1999, someone from the CIDG called Tariman of Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc. to inform him that a certain Robert Cabal Eran was arrested by CIDG operatives and that some units of SANYO DIGITALK DECT-1000, believed to be part of the shipment Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc. was tasked to the port for shipment to the consignees, were recovered from him. Tariman relayed this information to his boss, de Guzman, who then instructed him to proceed to the police station to ascertain if the items reported by Dae Ryung Ind., Inc., Phil. as missingare the same items which were confiscated from the accused. Sometime in the morning of the same day, Tariman received a fax message from the CIDG containing a list of serial numbers of SANYO DIGITALK DECT-1000 seized by them from the accused. He then compared the list with the records of his office and found out that the serial numbers in CIDGs list tallies with Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc.s record of serial numbers of items entrusted to it by Dae Ryung Ind., Inc., Phil. for delivery to the latters consignees abroad. He then informed the CIDG of his finding. Accordingly, his sworn statement was taken by P/C Insp. Vera Cruz. The case, including the evidence gathered by the CIDG operatives as well as the affidavits of witnesses, was then referred by CIDG to the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service of the Department of Justice (DOJ) for the purpose of conducting an inquest. Finding probable cause to hold the accused (respondent therein) for trial, Atty. Reynaldo J. Lugtu, State Prosecutor II at the DOJ prepared a resolution September 3, 1999, which was approved by Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. An Information was correspondingly filed by him on September 9, 1999 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, as hereinabove mentioned.

On November 7, 2002, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence consisting of documentary exhibits, as follows:

ExhibitNo.DescriptionPurpose

Aletter of Cuasay dated June 22, 1999to prove that the subject incident involving the missing items resulting to shortages in expected deliveries was reported to de Guzman Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc.

Bletter dated June 25, 1999 of de Guzman addressed to Atty. Managuelodto prove that Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc. sought the assistance of Atty. Managuelod for deeper investigation of the subject incident

Caffidavit of de Guzman dated July 6, 1999to prove that de Guzman initiated the filing of the instant complaint in his capacity as Chief Operating Officer of Skyfreight Forwarders, Inc., which was in charge of the delivery of the missing items subject of this case

Dreply of Atty. DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Five (5)Managuelod dated July 8, 1999 addressed to de Guzman informing him of the action taken in his request for police assistance and deeper investigation of the subject incidentto prove that de Guzman has indeed sought police assistance through Atty. Managuelod relative to the incident in issue

E,E-1DOJ Resolution dated September 3, 1999to prove that DOJ, after investigation and hearing, found probable cause to indict the accused for violation of P.D. No. 1612

F,F-1,F-2Joint Affidavit of Apprehension consisting of two pages signed by SP01 Roxas and P01 Frialto prove the fact of arrest and its surrounding circumstances

G,G-1,G-2Sworn Statement dated September 2, 1999 of Tariman which consists of two pages, and signed by himto prove that Tariman reported the incident to the police for investigation and identified the missing telephone units confiscated from the accused

The foregoing exhibits were admitted by the Court in an Order dated September 11, 2003 despite the opposition interposed against its admission by the accused on November 12, 2002.

On December 3, 2002, the accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence. No comment or objection thereto was counter-filed by the prosecution. On October 6, 2003, the accused filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Demurrer to Evidence and to Resolve the Same. As the Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Demurrer to Evidence was filed only after the Demurrer to Evidence was filed the Court deemed the Demurrer to Evidence dated December 3, 2002 as filed without prior leave. In an Order dated ___________, the Court denied Demurrer to Evidence for lack of merit.

II. The Issues

The issues for resolution in this case are whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. No. 1612, and whether he is civilly liable therefor.

III. Ruling of the Court

Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.[footnoteRef:1] [1: People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 77368,October 5, 1993]

DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Six (6)The elements of fencing are:

(1) a robbery or theft has been committed;(2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft;(3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and(4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.[footnoteRef:2] [2: Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994; Tan v. People, G.R. No. 134298, August 26, 1999 (emphasis added)]

Simple robbery is committed when a malefactor takes personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against, or intimidation of any person, or use of force upon things.[footnoteRef:3]In fine, its elements are the following: (a) that there is personal property belonging to another; (b) that there is unlawful taking of that property; (c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and (d) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[footnoteRef:4] To be sure, the case at bar does not involve robbery through the use of force upon things as robbery of this category contemplates the use of force either to enter a building or to break doors, wardrobes, chests or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle inside the building or to force them open outside after taking the same from the building.[footnoteRef:5] [3: Art. 293, Revised Penal Code] [4: Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009; Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009] [5: Arts. 299 and 302, Revised Penal Code]

Theft, in contradistinction, is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation ofpersons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the latters consent.[footnoteRef:6] To sustain conviction thereof, the confluence of the following elements is imperative: (a) that there be taking of personal property; (b) that said property belongs to another; (c) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (d) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (e) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[footnoteRef:7] Verily, unlike robbery, theft is marked by an absence of violence or intimation employed against the owner of the object of asportation. [6: Art. 308, Revised Penal Code] [7: Astudilo v. People, G.R. No. 159734, November 30, 2006]

It can hardly be gainsaid that theft was consummated when the some of the cordless telephones with brand SANYO DIGITALK DECT-1000 were surreptitiously raided, without the consent of their owner, by unknown rouges somewhere from the point they were loaded at the owners/manufacturers/shippers (Dae Ryung Ind., Inc., Phil.) storehouse to the point they were unloaded and reloaded in a maritime carriage for transportation to their respective consignees. The furtive taking of these goods is presumed by law to have been accomplished with intent to gain (aninums lucrandi), and this intent was epitomized when the goods eventually found their way in stalls in Divisoria, Manila, being peddled gingerly. Furthermore, the unlawful taking is properly denominated as theft, and not robbery, for want of proof that the assailants exerted violence or intimidation directly upon the person or persons then in the possession or custody of the goods to enable them to spirit away said goods.

DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Seven (7)No pretense can likewise be made that the accused actually possessed the subject chattels as CIDG operatives caught him unloading from a Tamaraw FX sealed boxes with a prominent impression thereon of the words SANYO DIGITALK DECT-1000, giving the accused a foreknowledge of the items the boxes supposedly contains.

With respect to the element of intention of accused to gain for himself or for another, the same is presumed by law from the mere possession by him of the object unlawfully taken through robbery or theft. As aptly explained by the Supreme Court in a panoply of cases, intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person.[footnoteRef:8] The sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act.[footnoteRef:9] It bears stressing that dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special stature like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979[footnoteRef:10] because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense.[footnoteRef:11] [8: Soriano v. People, G.R. No. L-3008, March 19, 1951; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197] [9: People vs. Sia Teb Ban, G.R. No. 4963, September 15, 1909; 1 Reyes, supra at P. 46; Sec. 3(b), Rule 131, Rules of Court] [10: US v. Go Chico, G.R. No. L-8646, March 31, 1915; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58] [11: US v. Siy Cong Bieng, G.R. No. L-31695, November 26, 1929; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 52]

It begs to inquire, however, if the overt act of the accused in unloading items from a conveyance, which were subsequently established to have proceeded from illegal channels, per se indicates that he knows or should have known that the things were derived from theft. This is significant as they form part of the integral elements of the crime of fencing.

In Dizon-Pamintuan v. People,[footnoteRef:12] the Supreme Court had occasion to elucidate the distinction between knows and should have known: [12: Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, supra., citing Diong-an v. CA 138 SCRA 39 (1985)]

One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity.When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist.On the other hand, the words should know denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.

DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Eight (8)Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the Court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein and what his resolve is in performing an act, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 supplies the third and fourth elements of the crime of fencing by establishing a prima facie presumption, to wit: Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.[footnoteRef:13] This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.[footnoteRef:14] In Ong v. Sandiganbayan,[footnoteRef:15] the Supreme Court explained as follows: [13: Dela Torre v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996, citing Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, supra.] [14: Sec. 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution] [15: G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005]

[N]o constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the State of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.

xxx The State having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention.

In his book on constitutional law, Justice Isagani A. Cruz said:

Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct [People vs. Labara, April 20, 1954]. Unexplained flight, for example, may lead to an inference of guilt, as 'the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a lion. Failure on the part of the accused to explain his possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself who had stolen it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under our Revised Penal Code, the inability of an accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him will be considered prima facie evidence that he has appropriated them to his personal use [Art. 217]. According to Cooley, the constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is "some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary mandate" [1 Cooley, 639].[footnoteRef:16] [16: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1993 ed., 313]

DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Nine (9)Verily, mere possession, however transient, of anything derived from robbery or theft raises a disputable presumption of fencing. It is of no moment that accused had no intention to commit a crime because P.D. No. 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.[footnoteRef:17] The presumption being disputable, the same may be controverted by the accused by advancing clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. But until it is overcome, the presumption is sufficient to prove the particular proposition or fact that it supports. Unfortunately, instead of presenting evidence to overthrow the presumption, accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence, and disdainfully, without prior leave. The accused and his counsel de parte should not have ignored the potentially prejudicial consequence of the filing of a demurrer to evidence without the leave of court required in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. They were well aware of the risk of a denial of the demurrer being high, for by demurring the accused impliedly admitted the facts adduced by the State and the proper inferences therefrom. The Court cannot step in now to alleviate his self-inflicted plight, for which he had no one to blame but himself. [17: Mendoza v. People,G.R. No. 183891,August 3, 2010]

We now proceed to determine the penalty that must be meted on the accused. According to the allegation in the Information, the aggregate value on September 1, 1999 of the effects confiscated from the accused is US $6,543.00. The Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, takes judicial notice[footnoteRef:18] of the fact that on September 1, 1999 the then exchange rate of United States (US) dollars to Philippine peso is P39.6825 for each US dollar. This fact is capable of unquestionable demonstration as uniform historical data on the daily exchange rates of US dollars to Philippine peso from the 1990s up to the present is publicly available in various reputable trading sites on the internet.[footnoteRef:19] A conversion of $6,543.00 to its peso equivalent based on the foregoing exchange rate would yield a total of P259,642.5975. Following the computation of the appropriate penalty ensconced in Section 3 (a), P.D. No. 1612, the accused would have been sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for 20 years. Said provision reads: [18: A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions (Sec. 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court).] [19: see, for example, Online Currency Converter, United States dollar (USD) and Philippine peso (PHP) Year 1999 Exchange Rate History - Yahoo Finance, http://www.freecurrencyrates.com/exchange-rate-history/USD-PHP/1999]

Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:

(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.

DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Ten (10)xxxx

Unfortunately, however, the prosecution utterly failed to substantiate its summation of the properties involved by invoices, receipts, mercantile documents, or any other competent evidence. This is fatal, and the prosecution only has itself to blame. While photocopies of commercial invoices[footnoteRef:20] were attached to the record of the instant case which reflects, among others, the price for each unit of Sanyo Digitalk Model DECT-1000, the Court cannot consider them without committing judicial tyranny as they were not among the documentary exhibits which were formally introduced in evidence by the prosecution. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court cannot be any clearer: [20: Rollo, pp. 21-24]

Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

As held by the Supreme Court in Westmont Investment Corp. v. Francia, Jr.:[footnoteRef:21] [21: G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011]

A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Evidence not formally offered during the trial can not be used for or against a party litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on appeal.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in Francisco v. People,[footnoteRef:22] a case likewise involving violation of P.D. No. 1612, in the absence of evidence to prove the value of the stolen property, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused should be the minimum penalty prescribed in Section 3 (f) of P.D. No. 1612, that is, arresto mayor in its minimum period, which is equivalent to imprisonment for 1 month and 1 day to 2 months. Nonetheless, the Court is aware of the rule that when a special penal law makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties under the Revised Penal Code the rules established in the latter Code pertaining to duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code shall have supplementary application to said special penal law. This was explained at length by the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Regalado, in People v. Simon:[footnoteRef:23] [22: G.R. No. 146584, July 12, 2004] [23: G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994]

DECISIONCRIM. CASE NO. 99-176434Page Eleven (11)We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

xxxx

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. xxxx

xxxx

xxxx [T]he rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress.

xxxx

Guided by the foregoing liberal principles, the Court is, therefore, constrained to reduce by one period the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period, as fixed in Section 3 (f) of P.D. No. 1612, to arresto menor in the maximum period, which is equivalent to imprisonment for 21 days to 30 days, considering that the crime was committed without the attendance of any modifying circumstance.

Anent the civil liability of accused, considering that the subject items were already recovered, the Court finds no more reason to order the accused to indemnify the private complainant the amount corresponding to the value of said items.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Robert Cabal Efran GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. No. 1612 and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 21 days to 30 days of arresto menor in the maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, ______________.

VIRGILIO M. ALAMEDA Judge

/raffy