31ANIB

People, Profit, and Politics:State-Civil SocietyRelations in the Context ofGlobalization1

TERESA S. ENCARNACION TADEM2

___________________________

INTRODUCTIONThis research project analyzes the relationsbetween the Philippine stateand selected civil-society actors in thecontext of globalization. It focuses on foursectors: the Benguet vegetable, hog,garment, and telecommunicationsindustries. These sectors are widely knownto have been affected by economicliberalization—negatively in the case ofthe first three, and positively in the caseof the telecommunications industry. Theproject investigates two interrelatedaspects of state-civil society relations: (1)how civil-society actors engage withofficial state agencies through variousformal and informal strategies ofdialogue, negotiation, and bargaining; and(2) the extent to which civil-society actorshave been able to influence governmentalpolicymaking.

These concerns come in light of studiesshowing the importance of the role of astrong and effective civil society as one ofthe major factors in furtheringdevelopment and democracy. While thisstudy does not assume that a strong civilsociety is automatically beneficial todevelopment, it is predicated on the viewthat civil-society participation and inputscan make a positive contribution to thepolicymaking process.

In the academic literature, for example,it is generally accepted that there is somekind of relationship between economicdevelopment and the kinds ofparticipatory democracy signaled by theproactive role of civil society. Someanalysts claim that there is a strongassociation between the two; othersassert that they exhibit a positive linearrelationship, while still others claim thisrelationship is indeed causal (see

1 This article is taken from the Introduction and Conclusion of the book People, Profit, and Politics: State-CivilSociety Relations in the Context of Globalization edited by Ma. Glenda S. Lopez Wui and Teresa S. EncarnacionTadem (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme-Philippine Office, 2006).2 Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem is associate professor at the Department of Political Science, University of thePhilippines (UP) Diliman, and director of the UP Third World Studies Center.

ANIB32

Przeworski et al. 2000 for acomprehensive discussion; Sen 2000;Bensabat-Kleinberg and Clark 2000).

These academic claims are alsosubstantiated in the policy statements ofmajor international development agencies.There is a near-universal acceptance byagencies such as the World Bank, theAsian Development Bank, bilateraldonors, and the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) thatdemocratic forms of policymaking andcivil-society participation are integral toeffective decision making. Above all, eachof these agencies now subscribes to thenotion that stakeholders and beneficiariesshould participate in all stages of thepolicy and project cycle. The UNDP, forexample, has long been explicit on thispoint: it suggests that stakeholderparticipation and the role of civil societyare crucial in shaping the political andgovernance contexts in which policy ismade and implemented (UNDP 1993).The creation, in 2000, of the UNDPBureau for Resources and StrategicPartnerships to coordinate and nurtureUNDP’s working relationships with civil-society organizations, among others, addsinstitutional weight to the participatoryapproach. Finally, the UNDP bookPartners in Human Development: UNDPand Civil Society Organizations (2003)suggests important ways to operationalizethe partnership among the internationalcommunity, states, and civil society.

Beyond these general statements ofprinciple about state-civil society relationsand participatory approaches todevelopment and good governance, whatis needed is a much more empiricallygrounded research that can reveal notsimply the presence (or absence) of civil-society actors in policy dialogue butprecisely how civil-society actorsnegotiate and bargain to open up greaterpolitical and policy space and thesubstance of the policy outcomes of suchengagement. The need, therefore, is for anassessment of state-civil society relationsboth as a means (the context in whichpolicy is negotiated, shaped, and set) andas an end (the implementation,

monitoring, and adaptation of moreeffective policy).

That the Philippines provides thesetting for the study, particularly inlooking at the dynamics of state-civilsociety engagement in a time ofdemocracy, is also significant, evencrucial. As pointed out by Cielito Habito(2005):

This is the country that has beenacknowledged to have among themost, if not the most, vibrantcivil society movements aroundthe globe, and especially withinthe Asia-Pacific region. It is also acountry wherein a relatively widevariety of avenues for civilsociety engagement with thestate have been made available,especially after the overthrow ofthe Marcos dictatorship with theEDSA People Power Revolution.Thus, a similar study focused onanother country probably wouldnot have been [as] rich andsubstantive.

Habito, however, notes that “thisuniqueness in the Philippine situationcould also be its handicap in the sensethat it may limit the study’s potentialaudience, as the wide applicability of itsobservations and findings may be open toquestion.”

One may argue that the vibrancyof Philippine civil society and thewide variety in modes of state-civil society engagementopportunities present in thecountry in a way make it astandard to which others mayaspire, and a kind of yardstickwith which other countries’situations and experiences maybe assessed. (Habito 2005)

DEFINING CIVIL SOCIETYCivil society is generally identified withthe “private” sphere of the capitalistmarket, which is to be distinguished from

33ANIB

the “public” domain of the state (Colas2002: 14). It consists of non-state actorsand these include the private sector. Civil-society players or organizations (CSOs)are considered part of social movementscomprising amorphous and fluid groups inwhich the bonds are common grievancesor conviction, and shared goals forsocietal and policy change (rather thanstructures). They connect people withcauses through developing communities ofinterests around shared conditions (Clark2003: 4). Their relevance is seen in thelight of non-state actors as “crucialdeterminants of state policies, whetherdomestic or foreign.” Of importance isthat the real change is in the breadth ofthe social interests represented by CSOs,which has witnessed a move towarddemocratization that is both domestic andinternational (Uvin 2000: 17-18).

CSOs can be categorized in variousways. One category of CSO is engaged involuntary organizing, which is primarilydevoted to promoting policy changethrough public education, direct lobbying,policy research, and so on. Differentiation,however, is made between a profit CSOand a nonprofit one. The former includeschambers of commerce and producers’associations. The latter performs its tasksout of a sense of the public’s generalinterests, e.g., environmentalorganizations (Uvin 2000: 12). NonprofitCSOs are also defined as nongovernmentorganizations (NGOs), which areconsidered as key players in socialmovements

that do grassroots support andadvocacy work. They areintermediary organizations incontrast to membership groupswith relatively defined socialconstitutions. They, therefore, donot directly represent thegrassroots constituencies theyattempt to serve. (Fox and Brown1998: 21)

Some would consider this a secondcategory of nonprofit CSOs—thevoluntary organizations that seek topromote change, also referred to as

intermediary organizations or grassrootssupport organizations (Uvin 2000: 11-12). A subcategory here is the so-calledinternational NGOs (INGOs), which refersto organizations that are located in one ormore rich countries and seek to promotesocial and economic change in ThirdWorld countries (Uvin 2000: 12). A thirdcategory of nonprofit CSOs is people’sorganizations (POs)—NGOs whosemembers belong to the same communitythey are serving. They also generallyconsist of member-organizationscomposed of people seeking to advancetheir own community interests, e.g.,peasant associations (Uvin 2000: 11).What also emerges here is thephenomenon of CSO networks in whichthere is no single organization or centerfor decision making and often not evenany formal process. In this situation,cooperation is nonhierarchical, informal,and often temporary and issue-specific(Uvin 2000: 12).

DEFINING GLOBALIZATIONThe other important concern of thisresearch is globalization, which is “therapidly expanding process through whichsocieties are connecting to each otherthrough markets and new technology”(Grugel 2004: 29-30). Social-movementscholars have pointed out thatglobalization is not a new phenomenon.“The world economy had interlockingtrade and investment patterns as early asthe 19th century.” What distinguishestoday’s global economy, however, is itsneoliberal character, which structurescontemporary transnational content(Ayres 2002: 191). Proponents ofneoliberalism argue that there should beno government intervention with marketforces for economic growth to occur. Thisis because the neoliberal economic theorybelieves that “the law of free markets issufficient regulation for an economyseeking to find sustainable income flowsand thus distributes revenues to the mostneedy segments of society” (Peters 2000:6). The view is that premium must beplaced on trade liberalization and the

ANIB34

unfettered entry of foreign investmentsinto any country. Second, globalizationwith its emphasis on a free-marketeconomy and privatization seeks tominimize the role of the state. By doingso, it hopes to put an end to theinefficiency and corruption that hasplagued state-dominated economies asepitomized by capitalist authoritarianstates as well as socialist authoritarianstates. Another tenet of globalization istrade liberalization and the opening up ofthe economy to foreign investors.

Critics, however, have pointed out thatsuch a setup does not create politicalopportunity for long-term development.Investors, for example, can easily fly outof the host country when the latter ceasesto provide them optimum environmentfor capital accumulation. Moreover,emphasis on export would give lessattention to the development of adomestic mass following for localproducts. Although the emphasis onexport could create more employment forthe local workforce because of biggermarkets abroad, problems nonethelessarise if importing countries begin to tapother sources offering better-qualitygoods at lower prices. The other critiqueconcerns the class bias of globalization—that is, against the poor. This is becauseglobalization has intensified economic,social, and political inequalities byprivileging the private over the publicsphere and by marginalizing the actual, aswell as the potential, importance of thecommons (Thomas 1997: 6). As noted byits critics, globalization has resulted in therich countries growing richer and the poorcountries becoming poorer; within thecountry itself, the rich are getting richerand the poor are getting poorer. Such areality has been a major criticism of theneoliberal development policy whereby“20 years of liberalization of the worldeconomy has not led to the generoustrickle-down that they have predicted,either in absolute or in relative terms”(Wilkin 1997: 28). These inequalities arefurther perpetuated because globalizationallows the private sector, e.g.,multinational corporations (MNCs), to

have unfettered access to the markets of adeveloping country. Because of this, thereis a real likelihood that there will be acontraction of wealth that is heavilyskewed in favor of the wealthiest sectionsof developing countries (Serrano 2001:9). And lastly, creating a favorableenvironment for foreign investors is oftentranslated to the repression of workers’wages.

Besides the class bias of globalization,the other issue is concerned with thequality of life that this economicphenomenon is promoting. Critics arguethat globalization has brought about arapid development that threatens thequality of life, and the absence of genderequality despite the growth in the numberof working women (Peters 2000). Thisstage of capitalism is also accused ofdegrading the environment (Callinicos2001: 116). It also does not help muchthat the agents of globalization such as theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) haveaccelerated globalization without socialcontrol. This it attributes to theperpetuation of undemocratic WTO rulesand procedures, which have marginalizedthe majority of the world’s people whomust live with the instability and socialdegradation (Tabb 2001: 191). Related tothis is the critique of the loss of statecontrol of the economy. The market-basedsolution, for example, is seen in the biggercontext of globalization’s integrating anational economy into the worldglobalized free markets. This thus bringsabout a situation whereby states are leftto have very little control of theireconomies as seen during the Asianfinancial crisis (Peters 2000).

STATE-CIVIL SOCIETYENGAGEMENT IN A PERIOD OFGLOBALIZATIONTaking into consideration the pros andcons of globalization, this research looksinto how this economic phenomenon hasaffected state-civil society engagement inthe Philippines. Although there areexisting studies on the broad effects of

35ANIB

economic globalization on differentsectors of the Philippine economy, to dateno research has focused on the nature ofinteraction that takes place between thestate and civil-society actors within anenvironment shaped by globalization.Further, little analysis has been undertakenon the implications of this engagement fordevelopment policy outcomes and raisingthe standards of governance (includingtransparency, accountability, andresponsiveness). The research, therefore,attempts to fill these gaps. A systematicstudy on how civil-society groups engagethe state could yield valuable lessons—both for the civil-society community in itsadvocacy and for the government in itspolicymaking responsibilities, and forboth state and civil society in theirdevelopment partnership. This wouldinclude the identification of thecircumstances under which broader andmore effective participation in thedecision-making process is achieved, aswell as when it is not. It would also helpto clarify areas for possible reforms,especially in relation to thedevelopmental outcomes arising fromeconomic liberalization in specific sectors.

Such an engagement is also defined bythe manner in which members of civilsociety situate themselves. There areNGOs, for example, that are promoters ofneoliberalism. That is, they work with“large sums from the World Bank, the USAgency for International Development,and other international and state fundingagencies on a ‘subcontracted’ basis toundermine national comprehensivewelfare institutions” (Petras 2003: 141).There are NGOs, however, that areconsidered reformists as they “receivemiddle-range funding from private socialdemocratic foundations and progressivelocal or regional governments to fundameliorative projects and to correct theexcesses of the free market. Thereformists try to ‘reform’ the WTO, IMFand World Bank and regulate capital”(Petras 2003: 142). And lastly, there areradical NGOs, which believe that basicstructural changes from below, e.g.,redistribution of power, property and

income, are necessary to achievesustained development and social justice(Petras 2003: 143). In all these, theinteraction between social movements ofcivil society and the institutions of globalgovernance is still mediated through thestructure of the state. The interestingquestion in this context, therefore, “is notso much if state sovereignty isdisappearing in the face of globalization,but rather how is the relationship betweenstate and civil society being shapedinternationally under the pressures ofglobalization” (Colas 2002: 139).

Moreover, the engagement is alsodetermined by the manner in which theglobal process has shaped both domesticand transnational mobilization of civilsociety. This is because global processesproduce similar responses by movementsin different contexts by structuringcommon transnational threats oropportunities. Second, global pressureshave also produced similar opportunitystructures for collective action in differentnational contexts (Smith and Johnston2002: 3). “Transnational actors becomemore relevant as they organize to addressgrievances of global character and to takeadvantage of parallel state-levelorganized groups like AmnestyInternational … can readily advance acommon political strategy that targetsmultiple national governments” (Smithand Johnston 2002: 3). Third, cross-national movements have also beenidentified as due to the diffusionprocesses whereby there emerge globallydefined targets or sources of grievancesbrought about by the structural affinityamong states. A proponent of this isMarco Giugni who points out thattransnational diffusion is also a crucialprocess for explaining common ideologiesand tactics across differing nationalmovements (Smith and Johnston 2002: 3).

Globalization also brings with it anexpanded array of political institutionsthat create both opportunity andconstraints for activity. Not only do globalinstitutions have distinguished effects onactivists’ political strategies andopportunities; they also shape the ways

ANIB36

that social movement actors relate to eachother (Smith and Johnston 2002: 9). Aphenomenon that has also emerged areglobal civil societies, which operate at theinternational level. Because of this, “manystudies of transnational associations andpolitical contention implicitly or explicitlyargue that global processes are creating anexpanded web of interdependence amongstates, thereby nesting nationalinstitutions within a broader, globalframework of interest and obligations”(Smith and Johnston 2002: 7).

Propositions on Civil Society-StateEngagementIn determining the role which civil societywould like the state to play in an era ofglobalization, a number of proposals havebeen put forward. There are those whoargue that governments should not divestthemselves wholly of the provision ofessential services such as health andeducation. By maintaining a strongpresence in civil society, government canstill exercise some influence over thevagaries attendant to a free-marketeconomy (Peters 2000). There is also aneed to create conditions for markets thatempower the impoverished and in theprocess respond to local demands.Furthermore, “governments should beencouraged to take a more active role inthe regulation of markets as a means ofensuring that those who are mostvulnerable to fluctuations in financialmarkets, particularly those who are livingin poverty, can be assured of some meansof protection by a state committed toprinciples of equity, democracy, andsustainability” (Peters 2000: 6-7).

Civil Society and State Engagement andthe Specific SectorsAnother dimension introduced by thisstudy in state-civil society relations in atime of globalization is the empiricalfocus. In highlighting four sectors—theBenguet vegetable, hog, garment, andtelecommunications industries—which

have been both positively and negativelyaffected by economic liberalization, theresearch is predicated on the assumptionthat some form of state-civil societyengagement is both necessary anddesirable if the new context forpolicymaking—globalization—is to be“managed” or “governed” in ways thatminimize its downside effects andmaximize its developmental potential. Inthe Philippine context, there are built-inmechanisms and venues in the threebranches of government (executive,legislative, and judiciary) where civil-society actors can formally engage thestate to negotiate policy reforms thataddress specific concerns. Civil-societygroups can engage Congress in theenactment of laws; they can also engagethe executive branch in theimplementation and enforcement of thelaws and the formulation of otherprograms and policies. They can alsoappeal to the judiciary for theinterpretation of laws and redress ofgrievances. Likewise, summits, dialogues,and other fora as well as tripartite andmultisectoral councils have been madeavailable to civil-society actors wherethey can sit and conduct dialogue withstate actors. This is all part of the generaldrive to enhance the transparency ofgovernmental decision making. It is alsothe case that, beyond these formalchannels, much of the quality of state-civilsociety relations is determined informallythrough flexible policy networks that arealso present in processes of lobbying,bargaining, policy shaping, policy setting,and policy change. The research seeks tounderstand the precise nature of theseformal and informal state-civil societyrelations along a spectrum of engagement,ranging from inclusion throughaccommodation to exclusion, and seeks toaccount for these different modalities.

A third dimension of the researchexamines the specificities of policyoutcomes through an analysis of thesefour sectors. The rationale for choosingthem is twofold. First, each of thesesectors of the Philippine economy, withthe exception of the telecommunications

37ANIB

industry, has confronted difficulties in thelast few years and these problems arewidely attributed to liberalization policiesassociated with the globalization process.The research establishes whether thisunderstanding is well founded and how itdetermines the forms and means ofintervention civil-society actors utilize intheir engagement with the government.Second, the effectiveness of these modesof intervention and how the stateresponds to the processes of dialogue,negotiation, and bargaining are alsoassessed to account for substantive policychanges or, alternatively, policydisagreement or policy inertia.

Theoretical Perspectives on State-CivilSociety RelationsThere are three major approaches inviewing and explaining state-civil societyrelations: liberal-oppositional, liberal-relational, and Marxist-relational (Ku2002). This research has a bias toward theliberal-relational approach. The liberal-relational approach views civil society “asbeing necessarily intertwined with thestate. Much liberal theory believes thatcivil society may effectively defend itselfagainst an encroaching government onlythrough legal and political institutions”(Ku 2002: 534-35). If in the liberal-relational approach the state is necessaryto ensure the rights of individuals in a civilsociety and of the civil society itself, theMarxist-relational approach considers thestate as a referee among contendingegoistic interests in civil society. “In thistheory, state intervention is legitimate if itis to remedy injustices and inequalitieswithin civil society, and if it is to protectthe universal interest of the people” (Ku2002: 532). As for the liberal-oppositional approach, it views civilsociety “as a realm outside and inopposition to the state. Believing that thestate is necessarily coercive andoppressive, it favors a highly autonomouscivil sphere outside the state. It advocatesthe self-management of the sphere,through self-help bodies, informalnetworks and social movements” (Ku

2002: 534). These two approaches havetheir own explanatory power; however,given the current developments in state-civil society relations in the case studies ofthe industries covered in the context ofglobalization mentioned above, theliberal-relational approach is deemed tocapture much of the ongoing dynamics inthe sectors being studied. This is becausein the liberal-relational approach, civilsociety in this research “exists at theintersection where the various elements ofsociety come together to protect andnurture the individual and where theindividual operates to provide those sameprotections and liberating opportunitiesfor others” (O’Connell 2000: 474). These“various elements” refer to thecommunity; the business sector; thevoluntary, nonprofit, independent sector;and even, in part, the government (Hearn2001: 342).

Theoretical Framework of PoliticalOpportunity StructuresThese perspectives, however, may notfully capture state-civil society relationswhen a new element is introduced:globalization. Will globalization weakenthe intertwined relationship of the stateand the civil society, and thereby alsoreduce the democratizing potential of suchrelation to the detriment of the peoplewho have to suffer the effect ofundemocratically crafted socioeconomicpolicies? Or, is it also possible thateconomic liberalization, the maineconomic regime that underpinsglobalization, will result “in the transfer ofeconomic decision making and power tomarket forces and social actors, thereforepotentially empowering civil society”(Kamrava and O Mora 1998: 896-97)?

To examine these questions, the studyalso draws heavily from the framework ofresource mobilization in explaining theemergence of social movements in termsof the capability of movemententrepreneurs to mobilize resourcestoward the attainment of identifiedcollective objective. In addressing thequestions posed in the research, the

ANIB38

theory of political opportunity structure(POS) was used as the framework of thestudy. The concept of POS is part of theresource mobilization theories conceivedto analyze social movements. This theoryis based on the assumption that aspectswithin the political milieu determine theemergence of strategies utilized by civilsociety in engaging the state as well as theoutcomes of the engagement. Whileprevious theories emphasize internalcharacteristics and resources ofmovements that could affect mobilizationand realization of objectives, the bias ofthe political opportunity model is towardexternal factors or conditions; in this case,the broader political system thatstructures the opportunities for collectiveaction. Succinctly, a social movement’spolitical environment influences the kindof approach and the result of protest. ThePOS framework, however, also points tothe importance of movements to createand mobilize resources at their disposal toadvance their agenda. Thus, the concept ofpolitical opportunity structures is appliedin examining how a specific politicalenvironment determines the outcome ofthe actions of civil-society actors in eachof these respective sectors of the studyand how these actors are also able to takeadvantage of opportunities that areexternal to them.

Changes in political opportunitystructures are also monitored as thesemay either encourage or discourage socialmovements, and when or how struggleswould lead to actual reforms. Politicalopportunity structures include the openingup of access to power, shifts in rulingalignments brought about by cleavageswithin and among elites, and theavailability of influential allies (Tarrow1994). Also, political opportunitystructures are not confined to the state. Inan environment where the state does nothave monopoly of trade policymaking andgovernance, it is likewise imperative tolook at intergovernmental andsupranational institutions. Furthermore,political opportunity structures, accordingto Tarrow (1994), are “consistent but notnecessarily formal or permanent

dimensions of the political environmentthat provide incentives for people toundertake collective action by affectingtheir expectations for success or failure”(85).

By privileging the structure of politicalopportunity, the fortunes of movements interms of mobilization and policy influencecan be explained largely by the nature ofpolitical institutions within the challengedpolity and the movement’s preferences inapproach anchored in this environment(Meyer 2003). In simple terms, therefore,the political context, conceptualizedbroadly, produces opportunities foractions, responsiveness to change, andpolicy influence. Corollary to this is theidea that movements decide on goals andstrategies based on political circumstancesinstead of organizational dispositions.Therefore, political opportunity structureis largely used to explain three mainaspects of social movements: theiremergence, preference in tactics orstrategies, and the degree to which theyachieve their objectives (McAdam,McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 27).Furthermore, in looking into politicalopportunity structures, Giugni (1998)identifies two salient features central tothis model: the system of alliances andoppositions, which movements can use asa political resource for their success, giventhat they are considered as powerlesschallengers; and the structure of the state.

The Case StudiesThese theoretical perspectives wereapplied to the four case studiespresented. Sharon M. Quinsaat’s casestudy, “Mobilizing against VegetableImportation,” looks into the mobilizationof the civil society in cooperation withgovernment to end the importation ofcheaper vegetables, which has broughtabout the demise of the alreadyunderdeveloped Benguet vegetableindustry. It looks into how civil societyexplored the different channels openedunder a democracy to penetrate thehostile policy environment in advocatingfor reforms to save the industry. A similar

39ANIB

situation is also found in Ma. Glenda S.Lopez Wui’s “Confronting the Challengesin the Garment Industry.” Like thevegetable industry, the garment industryalso suffers from the adverse effects ofcheaper importation of garments. Unlikethe vegetable industry, though, it isexport-oriented and is not geared towardthe domestic market. Furthermore, itenjoyed its heyday as a leading exportindustry and continues to be one of themajor export earners of the country.However, its export earnings arethreatened by the expiration of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) and the removalof the assured quota for its products.Members of the industry, i.e., the garmentfactory owners and laborers, togetherwith members of civil-society groups,have launched an advocacy campaign forpolicy reforms to prevent the industryfrom further demise.

Joel F. Ariate Jr.’s “Protests andPerceived Threats in the Hog Industry”depicts the hog industry as suffering thesame fate of the Benguet vegetable andgarment industries with regard to the lossof profit as brought about by cheaperimports. Like the Benguet vegetableindustry, it primarily serves the domesticmarket. Unlike the other two industries,however, the hog industry’s profitcontinues to increase and has notexperienced the bankruptcy of any of itsmajor players. Despite these, however,the hog industry owners are not taking anychances and have launched a series ofcampaigns and lobbying with regard topolicy reforms to be undertaken by thegovernment to secure their profits. As inthe Benguet vegetable and garmentindustries, however, there are also certaininternational treaties and agreements thathave bound the Philippine state to abideby the entry of cheaper imports. The lastcase study, “Balancing Consumer andCorporate Interests in theTelecommunications Industry” by RonaldC. Molmisa, highlights a different

experience of state-civil societyengagement in a period of globalization.This is because the telecommunicationsindustry—unlike the Benguet vegetable,garment, and hog industries—hasgenerally benefited from the liberalizationof the industry with the emergence oftelecommunication companies asepitomized by the cellphone and Internetphenomena in the country. The bone ofcontention now lies on the power of theregulatory state to prevent any form ofmonopoly and to come out with policiesthat will benefit most the industry playersand the consumers.

PALLIATIVES FOR“GLOBALIZATION WITH AHUMAN FACE”In determining whether globalization hasindeed brought about positiveor negative outcomes in the concernedindustries—vegetable, hog,garment, and telecommunications—thecase studies initially looked into the stateof these industries before tradeliberalization.3 The nature of state-civilsociety engagement during this period wasalso examined. Among those studied, thePhilippine vegetable industry, prior toliberalization, had generally been the mostunderdeveloped and lacking ingovernment support, although it hadsurvived as it held a monopoly on itstarget domestic market. The situation isdifferent for the garment industry, whichexperienced growth in the past threedecades on account of the MFA whosequota system assured local garmentmanufacturers overseas markets for theirproducts. Garments became a majordollar earner for the country through theMFA, even as the industry benefited fromthe state’s export-led industrializationpolicy. Similarly, the hog industry, thoughnot export-driven, profited much, buoyedby the Filipinos’ penchant for pork.Though industry players have expressed

3 Trade liberalization in the Philippines is defined as “lowering tariffs and lifting quantitative restrictions onhundreds of goods (notably, not rice); removing capital controls to allow capital to flow unimpeded in and out of thecountry; and opening previously restricted sectors and industries to foreign ownership” (Abinales and Amoroso2005: 245).

___________________________

ANIB40

their apprehensions regarding theimportation—and smuggling—of meatproducts, profit from hog raising can stillbe realized. As for thetelecommunications industry, the absenceof market competition beforeliberalization had left it in dire straits. Theintroduction of new players in the market,however, spelled more effectiveness andefficiency, as well as options for theconsumers.

GLOBALIZATION AND THENATURE OF STATE-CIVIL SOCIETYENGAGEMENTThe case studies focus on state-civilsociety engagement in the vegetable,garment, and hog industries, which arestruggling against the ill effects of tradeliberalization; and the telecommunicationsindustry, which profited fromglobalization. Civil society consists of thestakeholders who are directly affected bythe problem and may entirely benefit orsuffer from the outcomes of theengagement in terms of policy response.Based on the previous discussion, thosethat can be categorized as profit civil-society organizations are the farmers/peasant organizations in the vegetableindustry, and the owners of the garmentfactories and their workers. The hogindustry has at least seven majorstakeholders; the case study focuses onthe hog farmers and the feed millers, aswell as other players outside the hogindustry, i.e., the meat processors,slaughterhouse operators, and the hog andmeat dealers. The telecommunicationscompanies’ (telcos) civil society includesthe Internet service providers (ISPs). Theconsumers, who played an important rolein the telecommunications industry, mayalso be considered part of CSOs.

The nonprofit CSOs in the vegetableindustry consisted of political blocs,NGOs, coalitions, and the church. Thesegroups not only took on commodity-specific engagement of the state but alsotackled issues concerning agriculturaltrade liberalization or even the Philippineeconomic framework in its entirety; thus,

on some occasions, these groups wereactually advocating for policy reforms thatthey believe would benefit the entireagricultural sector and not exclusively thevegetable industry. Global CSOs, on theother hand, were found in the garmentindustry as the workers linked up withglobal CSOs engaged in protectingworkers’ rights.

The researches recognized the role ofconsumer groups in these industries, butwith the exception of thetelecommunications sector, these groupsdid not figure prominently in the debateon the positive or negative impact ofglobalization in relation to the industriesbeing studied. These include the majorconsumer groups in the Philippines, suchas the Consumer Union of the Philippines(CUP), one of the biggest consumerorganizations in the country; theConsumers Federated Groups of thePhilippines Inc. (CFGP), a privateorganization that works for the welfareand protection of consumers; and theCitizens’ Alliance for Consumer Protection(CACP), which has been part of aworldwide social movement since itsfounding days in the late 1970s (Directoryof Consumer Organizations). Theseconsumer groups each have differentadvocacies. The CUP, for example,focused on opposition to electric ratesand airline and other transportation fares.It also campaigned against theimportation of sugar and rice, and theneed to test products and assure theirquality. The CFGP is mainly concernedwith monitoring prices and quality ofprime commodities, and assistingconsumers in seeking redress for theircomplaints. The CACP, on the other hand,made its mark in protesting oil price hikesduring the Martial Law period and calledfor the promotion of locally producedgoods. It was also concerned withexposing questionable goods and servicesand opposing institutions that wereharmful to consumers (Directory ofConsumer Organizations).

Other consumer groups wereestablished for even more specificreasons. The Coalition for Consumer

41ANIB

Protection and Welfare (formerlyCoalition 349), for instance, wasorganized as a result of the Pepsi“Numbers Fever” marketing scandal in1992, which was characterized by“changing the rules while the game wasbeing played.” The NationwideAssociation of Consumers Inc. (NACI), onthe other hand, was “born out of the needto protest illegal pyramid schemes”(Directory of Consumer Organizations).No prominent consumer groups emergedout of the impact of globalization on thegarment, hog, and Benguet vegetableindustries, i.e., for cheaper garments,pork, and vegetables, respectively. Mostprobably, the consumers foundthemselves benefiting from the cheaperproducts in these industries, and so, whyprotest against trade liberalization?

Before Trade Liberalization: CSOs’Bargaining Leverage vis-à-vis the StateFor the vegetable and hog industries,trade liberalization began during thecountry’s ascension to the World TradeOrganization’s (WTO) rules andregulations, which had a direct impact onthese two industries. During the sameperiod, in the Ramos administration, thetelecommunications monopoly wasbroken up beginning in 1992.

Trade liberalization for the garmentindustry, on the other hand, began in the1970s under Marcos’s martial law regime,when the state pursued an export-orientedindustrialization program under theauspices of the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF).Therefore, state-civil society relations inthe industry were discussed within thecontext of the shift from an authoritarianto a democratic regime, i.e., in 1986. Onemay also consider this period as the “pre-neoliberalism” period in the garmentindustry, in which the authoritarian statehad a heavy hand in determining theindustry’s development thrust. A majorquestion that emerged during the periodwas whether the process ofdemocratization had a distinct impact onstate-civil society relations.

The Benguet vegetable farmers beforetrade liberalization exercised littlepolitical clout to gain state support fortheir industry despite its importance tothe province’s economy. The weakness intheir bargaining leverage may havestemmed from the lack of demand forvegetables. But because these farmersenjoyed a sort of market monopoly, therehad been no need for them to engage thestate. Also, vegetable farming is a high-risk enterprise, providing farmers verylittle incentive. Furthermore, vegetable isnot a political (or major) crop in thePhilippines insofar as the number offarmers, the total area planted/harvested,and its contribution to the economy (GDP,gross-value added, etc.) are concerned. Inthe era of globalization, instead offighting for government support, thefarmers simply considered alternativemeans of livelihood.

The same cannot be said of the garmentand hog industries. As one of the country’stop dollar earners, the garment industry’scaptains enjoyed a privileged position,particularly with the MFA and the demandfor Philippine exports as facilitated by theboom in garment industries in the FirstWorld. But state-civil society engagementin the garment industry had differentialimpact on the stakeholders. That is, theowners/employers had the bargainingleverage vis-à-vis the state because theywere the ones who profited from theearnings. However, the same could not besaid of the industry’s laborers. As pointedout in the case study, workers have beenexploited not only in terms of low wagesbut also in terms of inhuman workingconditions. This had been exacerbated bythe political dispensation at the time, i.e.,the Martial Law period, in which politicaland civil rights were curtailed. Thus, forexample, the workers could not strike.Stripped of their political rights, theworkers, like the vegetable farmers, alsodid not have the economic clout to engagethe state. But unlike the vegetablefarmers, the garment workers benefitedfrom the labor unions, particularly thoseorganized by the militant Left movement,i.e., those identified with the Communist

ANIB42

Party of the Philippines (CPP), whichstrengthened particularly during theMartial Law period. The broadeningprotest movement against Marcos’srepressive regime provided the workersthe political opportunity to organize anddemand for higher wages and betterworking conditions. One, therefore, had asituation in which profit CSOs were alliedwith nonprofit CSOs. It was unfortunatethat, first, the Left did not organize theworkers in a sectoral manner, i.e.,attention was given to the sector ingeneral and not the specific demands ofeach sector. Second, workers’ rights wereintegrated into the overall revolutionarystruggle, so that the Left was moreconcerned with what the workers’movements could contribute to theoverthrow of the government and theestablishment of a revolutionary societyrather than what kind of reforms couldimprove the workers’ conditions. Andlastly, even at the height of itsorganization, only 10 percent of theworkers were organized. The hog industryapparently saw no need to engage thestate since it has always been a profit-making venture. And even if it had to, ithad the economic clout to pursue such anengagement.

As for the telecommunications industry,because of the decades-old monopoly ofthe Philippine Long Distance Telephone(PLDT) Company, there was also nopressing need to engage the state. Thiswas especially so when it was taken overby the government during the Martial Lawperiod. During the Aquino administration,the PLDT was perceived as “protected”from other sources of competition asthen-President Corazon Aquino’s relativeshad interest in the company.

These “pre-trade liberalization”/“pre-neoliberalism” experiences reveal that interms of state-civil society engagement,those with economic clout, such as thegarment industry, can engage the stateand gain favorable policies, helped by theworld demand for garment exports. Onthe other hand, the hog andtelecommunications industries found noreason to engage the state because theformer was doing well on account of the

domestic demand, and the latter enjoyeda monopoly. The garment workersengaged the state through the laborunions, and the demands were framed notin terms of industry reforms but the needfor radical change in society.

Arguments For or Against LiberalizationThe assessment of the impact ofliberalization on the sectors studiedduring the globalization period showssimilarities and differences inperspectives. Liberalization’s positiveeffect is best seen in thetelecommunications industry, which sawnew players in the market and thereforemore options for the consumers. Foreigninvestors forged partnerships with localcompanies; more phone lines wereinstalled; and, since 2000, there has beena phenomenal growth in cellular andmobile telecommunication services(CMTS). There has also been maximumutilization of the short message service(SMS) or “texting” in many parts of thecountry. Healthy competition amongindustry players, favoring the consumersand other local players outside theindustry, has also been another positiveimpact of globalization. Liberalizationmeant something else for the hogindustry: cheaper imports not only of porkbut also of other low-priced meat—beef,buffalo meat, and poultry—could bringabout a shift in consumption patterns,thus keeping other local players fromhaving a complete monopoly.

On a wider sphere, globalization hasalso opened up spaces for transnationalmovements to bond for a common cause.For example, the garment industry haslinks with local and global networks touphold workers’ rights, such as the CleanClothes Campaign.

Losing out to cheaper imports

One major negative impact for theindustries, however, is the loss of profitsfor the producers in the vegetable,garment, and hog industries on account of

43ANIB

tariff reduction as directed by the WTOand the government’s unilateral action.

Impacts differ, however, across theindustries, even as their main concernshave to do with tariff, import, and quota.For example, since the ratification of theWTO agreement, the Philippines hasconsistently imported less pork andpoultry meat than what the minimumaccess volume (MAV) agreementstipulates. This means that the threat ofimports to the domestic hog industry hasnot yet fully materialized (Habito 2002).

Despite the closure of several factoriesbecause of cheaper imports, the garmentindustry continues to be one of thecountry’s dollar earners. However, it isheavily dependent on imported rawmaterials—about 95 percent of its fabricand textile requirements are importedbecause the price of local textiles isrelatively higher than the prevailing worldprice. Also because it is dollar-dependentexport, it is vulnerable to fluctuations inthe world market and the protectionistpolicies of importing countries like the USand the European community.

Sadly for the Benguet vegetableindustry, globalization has driven the lastnail on its coffin.

The class bias

That globalization is favoring the rich isalso seen in the experiences reported inthe four case studies. For example, cheaplabor and long working hours characterizethe garment industry, in an effort tocompete with other garment-producingcountries. This situation is epitomized bythe garment subcontracting industrywherein the workers are not given theopportunity to unionize. Furthermore,there persists the practice of part-time,temporary, and casual work. Women, whocomprise the majority of the industry’sworkforce, are the biggest victims. Capitalfor garment industries has moved toproduction sites that offer betteropportunities for profit accumulation, i.e.,lower wages.

Class bias: An issue of governance orphilosophy of development?

At the industry level, the four case studiesreveal that the state supportsliberalization in industries where theplayers are “weak,” as in the vegetableand garment industries, and allows formonopolistic behavior in an industrywhere the players are “strong,” e.g., thetelcos. The state has been passive on theissue of telecommunications marketservices. It has even encouragedmonopolistic behavior by protectingstrong ties with telco executives onaccount of their contribution to thenational treasury.

Are these more of an issue ofgovernance or the philosophy ofdevelopment, i.e., neoliberalism? Whatemerges in the case studies is that this isneither an either/or question nor are theymutually exclusive. Neoliberalism breedsa particular form of governance, whichmakes it difficult to addresssocioeconomic inequalities. That is, it isnot concerned with the redistribution ofwealth. It argues that a market economyunder the auspices of liberalization willbring about the trickle-down effect.

But as critics of globalization havepointed out, and what has emerged in thecase studies as the class bias,globalization has witnessed the richerstates becoming richer and the poorernations becoming poorer. Moreover,within the respective societies, the rich arebecoming richer while the poor arebecoming poorer. What is seenparticularly in telecommunications is theelite’s capture of the state whereby thestate has allowed for monopolistictendencies. Although globalization isviewed as a means to end the“patrimonial state,” which is captured bypatronage politics and is lacking the“vision, autonomy, and bureaucraticcapacity necessary to implement adevelopment program,” this is really notthe case (Budd 2005). Globalization haseven aggravated socioeconomicinequalities because of the unequalcompetition in a country where there is a

ANIB44

wide gap between the rich and the poor.Thus it seems that globalization hasfacilitated the elite capture of the state.The powerless in the person of theBenguet vegetable farmers and thegarment workers have asked for stateintervention in the form of safety nets. Butthis also goes against the very tenet ofneoliberalism, which demands no stateintervention. Neoliberalism states that ifyou cannot compete, you wither away.Thus there is actually no room forgovernance as neoliberalism sees aminimal role for the state. As argued byJomo (2006): “The ‘retreat of the state’ inmuch of the developing world in recentdecades has involved a generally reducedrole for government, including thecapacity to lead and sustain development,as well as its progressive socialinterventions.”

The reality, therefore, is thatglobalization falls short of pushing thedemocratization process in a countrywhere socioeconomic inequalities prevail.Thus workers in the garment industry, forexample, are exploited even more nowbecause worldwide cutthroat competitionhas become more intense. If they do notallow themselves to be exploited, theylose their jobs as their factories fold upupon failing to compete.

The same argument could also apply tothe intensification of smuggling withglobalization. One can argue that this is agovernance concern and cannot be blamedon globalization. But this brings again thereality of the elite capture of the state,which allows for smuggling. The only wayto end this is to address the incomeinequalities in society to empower themajority to put an end to the corruptionof the elites. Neoliberalism as aphilosophy of development, however,does not address this concern. Worse, thestate is hostage not only to the elites butalso to international financial institutions(IFIs) that pressure the Philippines, forexample, to adhere to furtherliberalization in exchange for much-needed loans and economic assistance.

Favoring the majority at what cost?

Globalization is also seen as favoring the“interests” of the majority (e.g., theconsumers) vis-à-vis the stakeholders(e.g., the farmers in the Benguet vegetableindustry and the workers in the garmentindustry). But at what cost? The cost liesin the aspect of the sustainability of aneconomy that can no longer compete withforeign goods, resulting in the ultimatedeaths of key industries, i.e., vegetable,hog, and garment.

Based on the case studies, localproducers argue that globalization doesnot provide an environment conducive tothe creation of political opportunities forlong-term development, particularly in thedevelopment of a domestic market forlocal products. With globalization’s classbias, even if the imported vegetables,pork, and garments are cheaper, who canafford to buy these? Certainly not theBenguet vegetable farmers and thegarment workers who have been laid offbecause their industries can no longercompete with their foreign counterpartson account of liberalization. There is need,too, to disaggregate the consumers,particularly with regard to those who canactually afford to eat three meals a dayand those who cannot. Certainly these arenot the farmers, the workers, and theirfamilies who have lost their sources oflivelihood.

The Objectives of EngagementState-civil society engagement has to dowith how the industries’ stakeholdersadversely affected by globalization,particularly with regard to the profits theyearn, attempt to address the issuepolitically. Politics here is defined as “aprocess whereby a group of people,whose opinions or interests are initiallydivergent, reach collective decisions whichare generally accepted as binding, on thegroup, enforced as common policy”(Miller 1991: 390). For the stakeholders,the arena for intervention is the state. Theframework used is the liberal-relationalapproach to state-civil society

45ANIB

engagement, which looks at thepossibilities of forming alliances withstate elites.

At the microlevel, there is the call forsafety nets in the vegetable and garmentindustries to keep these industries fromdying. There is also a call for stateregulation as a necessary countervailingforce against market power, asexemplified by the telecommunicationsindustry, in which there must be a fairdistribution of market power parallel tothe creation of an environment thatdiscourages monopolistic behavior. Forexample, the telcos did not want theindependent ISPs to provide the Voiceover Internet Protocol (VoIP), claimingthat this fell under their jurisdiction. ISPscould provide this service at a cheaperrate, but this would pull away profits fromthe telcos. The situation required a strongand neutral state regulator to assureupfront competition.

Engagement also seeks theparticipation of the affected sectors inpolicymaking. As pointed out in theBenguet vegetable industry, the Philippinegovernment has created a politicalenvironment hostile to civil societyadvocating reforms in trade policies thatare deemed threatening to the fullrealization of its economic orthodoxy.And for the garment industry, the policychallenge is for civil society to link theissue of the workers with the bigger rubricof pushing further the democratizationprocess that would uphold the workers’rights. Another challenge for theseindustries is how to modify state policiesthat put them at a disadvantage if thegovernment’s hands are already tied byagreements it has signed.

Moreover, it is also necessary toprioritize the needs of the industries alongwith those of the consumers and todetermine what would be best for thepublic good. Should the country, forexample, continue importing vegetables tosatisfy the consumers in exchange for thedeath of the Benguet vegetable industry?On the other hand, the hog raisers,despite being a powerful business lobbygroup, are prevented from exercising a

complete monopoly because ofcompetition from other powerful playerslike the meat processors and the corn andgrain feeders. The state’s entry intoagreements for liberalization has alsobasically tied its hands with regard to fullysupporting the interests of the hogindustry.

In all of these, the question is, underwhat political conditions can civil societyengage the state to address the impact oftrade liberalization, which is a by-productof government’s submission to marketforces?

Again, solutions in the form of safetynets for the Benguet vegetable farmersand garment workers and moreparticipation in decision making can bedismissed as an issue of governance. Butthis is not the case with a philosophy ofdevelopment that diminishes the role thestate can play in the economy.Furthermore, the diminished role of thestate comes at a time where there persistsa big gap between the rich and the poor.Thus, if ever stakeholders couldparticipate in decision making, thesewould be the well-off, as can be seen inthe telecommunications and hogindustries. One witnesses, for example,the state’s inability to regulate the telcosbecause it has been captured by the elite.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITYSTRUCTURES AT THE DOMESTICLEVELFactors facilitating the actions taken bycivil society can be viewed within theinternal and external dimensions of thepolitical environment. Notably, state-civilsociety engagement is happening in aperiod of democratization, i.e., not underthe repressive political environment of theMartial Law period, which was the contextof state-civil society engagement duringthe pre-trade liberalization period of eachof the industries, with the exception of thegarment industry. The case studies showthat civil society also made use ofinstitutional openings to dialogue with therelevant government agencies. This has

ANIB46

been made possible by the expandingspace for democratic and consultativeprocesses evident in post-EDSAgovernments.

Engaging the State InstitutionsThe general willingness of the post-Marcos Philippine state to engage civil-society actors in designing its policies andin implementing its programs—thusconferring on its actions a constant veneerof democratic legitimacy—has benefitedcivil society as it explicitly opened spacesfor participation of non-state actors inregular politics. Such participation isfacilitated by laws, such as the RepublicAct (RA) 8435 or the Agriculture andFisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) of1997, which recognizes that civil-societyactors will play a key role in its effort tomodernize agriculture, and that the statewould set the rules on such partnership.There were also institutionalizedmechanisms such as those embodied inthe Local Government Code, which alsofacilitated civil society engagement at thelocal level, particularly seen in theexperience of the Benguet vegetableindustry stakeholders. Another is throughthe creation of agencies, which allows forparticipation of various sectors in thedecision-making process as seen in thegovernment-sponsored National TripartiteConference that gathered representativesfrom major labor organizations,management, and government experts onthe garment industry (Magadia 2003: 67-68). It is mainly through agencies likethese that labor groups formally engagethe executive branch. Civil-societyengagement also focused on theestablished institutions of thebureaucracy, the legislature, and thejudiciary.

The garment industry, for example,engaged the bureaucrats when it heldformal and direct dialogues with relevantgovernment officials from the Garmentsand Textile Export Board (GTEB), theDepartment of Trade and Industry (DTI),and the Department of Labor andEmployment (DOLE), among others.

Issues the garment industry raised had todo with the case of displaced workers infactories that have closed; acomprehensive plan on how to save thegarment industry; and preparing theworkers for the MFA phaseout. Civilsociety in the garment industry alsofocused its efforts in reforming the Bureauof Customs. Corruption in the bureau hasmade it easier for smuggled garments toenter the country. Labor groups in thegarment industry likewise engaged thejudiciary through the filing of cases againstemployers.

Political opportunity structures alsopresented themselves at the legislativeand judicial levels. The PhilippineCongress, for example, was used as avenue for articulating the grievances of theBenguet vegetable farmers, particularlythrough the party-list system, which hasmade possible the representation of themarginalized and underrepresented in thelegislative process. In filing cases againsttheir employers, labor groups in thegarment industry made use of thejudiciary.

Mobilizing AlliesEqually important in engagement is theidentification of key allies in governmentinstitutions. The Benguet vegetableindustry, for example, found a major allyin then-Department of Agriculture (DA)Undersecretary Ernesto Ordoñez, whoendorsed the actions of the vegetabletraders, allowing them to penetrate theBureau of Customs. In some cases, allieswere also formed not on the basis ofprinciple but because of certainindividual’s self-serving interest. Forexample, former DTI Secretary and now-Senator Manuel “Mar” Roxas III, anadvocate of consumer-orientedglobalization and thus opposed to anincrease in tariff rates, changed hisposition because the vegetablestakeholders played on his electoralambitions to appeal for the protection ofthe vegetable industry. Roxas’s case is notunique as electoral politics provides anopportunity for policy advocacy in

47ANIB

exchange for votes. In thetelecommunications industry, SenatorRoxas also emerged as a crucial ally. Hesupported the interests of ISPs when hefiled a resolution in Congress calling forthe Senate to remove all obstacles to thefull commercialization and developmentof VoIP as a cheaper alternative tointernational calls.

Such a situation reveals that althoughstable aspects of political opportunitystructures are fixed and regarded as givens(Tarrow 1994), for example the strengthof state institutions or the party system,there are precarious elements that shiftwith events and policies, and areessentially “matters of contention in whichmovements participate” (Gamson andMeyer 1996). This could be seen in thecase of elections and the manner in whichthe Benguet vegetable industry framed itsconcerns whereby “these volatile featuresare conceived as processual rather thanstructural and entail perception or framingof such political opportunities bymovement participants in order toinfluence mobilization” (Tarrow 1994;Gamson and Meyer 1996; McCarthy,Smith, and Zald 1996). Furthermore, inthe case of engaging the state institutions,“importance is attributed to points ofaccess and inclusion in policymaking. It issaid that mobilization is strongest whenthe political system is in the process ofopening up to movement demands, ratherthan when access is completely closed orwhen the regime has fully met themovement’s demands” (Tarrow 1994).

Local allies are found not only in thenational bureaucracy but also in the localgovernment. This was the experience ofthe Benguet vegetable farmers when civilsociety was able to mobilize the localgovernment because of its huge stake invegetable farming. The farmers’ allieswere the Benguet local governmentofficials who were running during theelections, opening doors for civil society’sadvocacy in the vegetable industry.Moreover, the farmers also mobilizednonstakeholders by making the issue partof the larger campaign against agriculturaltrade liberalization.

As for powerful allies at the level of thelocal government, this was found inBenguet local officials such as Fongwan,Kim, Molintas, Sacla, and Uy. Somealliances were also formed because someof these local officials were formerlyvegetable traders themselves and thuscould commiserate with the plight of theBenguet vegetable industry players. Theyare referred to as “institutional activists,”being government officials formerlyassociated with civil-society advocacygroups.

Civil Society Engaging the PrivateSectorThe battle among the players in civilsociety was most evident in thetelecommunications sector: the ISPsversus the telcos that found support fromtelephone companies such as BellTelecoms with regard to the VoIP. Therewas also the involvement of big UStelephone companies such as AT&T Corp.,which urged the Philippine government toclassify VoIP as a value-added service(VAS), i.e., not within the control of thetelcos, which will ultimately liberalize theindustry. Thus, deregulation of theindustry would be good for the public asit would prevent foreign players to easilycapture a portion of the market. Civil-society groups emerged, like thePhilippine Internet Services Organization(PISO), which is the voice of the smallISPs. In March 2005, the NationalTelecommunications Commission (NTC)classified VoIP as a VAS, thus breaking themonopoly of telcos as the sole providerof VoIP services. Thus, in the battle ofthese two profit-making enterprises,public good was served with the triumphof the ISPs.

While liberalization, i.e., deregulation,frees the market for more players, there isstill need for a strong regulatory body thatwould prevent a monopoly. While thetelcos and consumers checked thegovernment on the tax on text messaging,the consumers seemed to be powerlesswith regard to the government’s andtelcos’ collusion on a franchise tax. The

ANIB48

government and the ISPs, in turn, checkedthe telcos’ monopoly of the VoIP service.This highlights the issue of whether thereshould be a strong regulatory state inplace before liberalization occurs. Themore structural issue, however, is whetherliberalization can work in a societycharacterized by a big gap between therich and the poor.

COMPLEMENTING DOMESTICPOLITICAL OPPORTUNITYSTRUCTURES WITH RESOURCEMOBILIZATIONThe domestic political opportunitystructures that civil society could takeadvantage of were also made possible bythe resources at their disposal. One of themore important ones was their ability toform alliances with other like-mindedplayers. In the case of the Benguet-vegetable civil society, for example, ittapped alliances at the national level, suchas the Fair Trade Alliance (FTA), a middle-class movement; and the KilusangMagbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) and theAlyansa Dagiti Pesante iti TaengKordilyera (Alliance of Peasants in theCordillera Homeland [APIT TAKO]), whichare part of the lower-class movement. Italso forged alliances with political blocs,e.g., Akbayan and Bayan Muna, whichcarried their advocacy campaign. Notably,the KMP was an organization thatemerged during the Martial Law periodwhile the leadership of Akbayan andBayan Muna consists of personalities whowere active during the anti-dictatorshipstruggle. Thus, the Benguet civil societybenefited from political movementsestablished in the past as well as newlycreated ones like the FTA and the APIT-TAKO.

A similar experience is also shared bycivil-society campaigns in the garmentindustry wherein civil society formedalliances to determine a course of actionupon the MFA’s expiration. Among theseorganizations are the BMP-Almagate(Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino–Alyansa ng Manggagawa sa Garment at

Textile), the Labor Forum Beyond MFA,and the GARTEX Labor Council(Garments, Textile, and Allied IndustriesLabor Council). The latter is spearheadedby the FTA and comprises eighteen laborfederations. Thus, the FTA is one networkwhose concerns cut across sectors, in thiscase, the concern of the vegetable andgarment industries vis-à-vis liberalization.

The hog industry could also rely on itsstrong organizational and businessnetworks and its prior experience inbuilding cooperatives. This is seen in itsability to lobby members of thelegislative and executive branches of thegovernment through formal dialogues,letter-writing campaigns, and attendancein hearings and sectoral consultations aswell as in the use of the media to air theirconcerns. Its strength has been furtherreinforced with the formation of alliancessuch as the Agricultural Sector Alliance ofthe Philippines (ASAP) in 2001, whichinclude feed millers’ and hog raisers’associations and cooperatives.

The civil-society network in thetelecommunications industry involvedmainly the players who had direct stakesin the industry and the consumers (whodid not figure at all in the vegetableindustry). The tax issue, specifically the so-called text tax, brought the players to aconfrontation. The government along withsome legislators framed the issue byarguing that the text tax will raisegovernment revenue that can provide formore social services. Civil society, whichdid not agree, framed its argument bysaying: (1) there is no need to tax, if thegovernment spent public money correctly;(2) to impose taxes on text messaging isantipeople; and (3) government shouldjust run after the big tax evaders. Civilsociety found allies in legislators, churchgroups, and overseas Filipino workers(OFWs), among others. The telcos alsosupported civil society on the issue, sayingthat the cost would merely be passed onto the subscribers. In the end, thepresident raised the value-added tax(VAT) system on telecom providers from10 percent to between 12 and 14 percentinstead of the franchise tax, which could

49ANIB

translate into higher cost of service. Thus,one had a case of the telcos and civilsociety coming together vis-à-vis thegovernment.

Networks and alliances in thetelecommunications sector were alsoformed because of a common cause. Thetax issue, for example, provided a politicalopportunity for civil society to continue torally around concerns for more affordableand efficient cellular phone service. Oneof these groups was TxtPower, a looseorganization of different progressiveorganizations. One of the issues theyraised was the telcos’ reduction of thefree-text allocations for prepaidsubscribers without due consultation withthe consumers. Others were the dropcalls, i.e., calls charged to subscribers whodid not make the calls. The group alsoquestioned the limited period imposed bytelcos for the use of prepaid load credits.Civil society remained vigilant vis-à-visthe government’s apparent penchant forcreating new taxes and/or increasingcurrent rates.

Rallies and Protest ActionsProtest actions also characterized thepolitical environment. This was seen whenthe garment industries held rallies anddemonstrations to express workers’grievances in the workplace and the illegalclosure of factories. It is equally importantfor the garment industry to targetinternational institutions in its campaignto improve the industry as it engages thestate. Such a strategy is not new as laborgroups were particularly involved inseveral antigovernment mobilizationsduring the Marcos regime; well-knownamong these mobilizations is the welgangbayan (people’s strike). In fact, afterPresident Corazon Aquino’s ascension topower, one of her first acts was toaddress industrial labor relations inrecognition of the labor movement’scontribution to the downfall of thedictatorship. Along with the workers’utilization of the formal venues are theinformal engagements that they launch

occasionally (usually through rallies andpickets) to air their grievances.

Protest actions, however, were notlimited to holding rallies. In the hogindustry, there was the “meat holiday,”i.e., the nondistribution of meat productsto the public markets in protest of therampant smuggling of meat products. Thiswas led by ASAP.

The Use of the MediaThe media, for example, gave the Benguetvegetable industry crisis wide coverage. Ina society where the media often set theagenda, it was reasonable for the civil-society actors to count on the institutionfor forming and influencing public opinion.The garment, hog, andtelecommunications industries also usedthe media to talk about their problems.Thus, the media’s openness to socialmovements, although these are oftenexcluded in the standardoperationalization of politicalopportunity, is in itself an importantcomponent of political opportunitystructures, which has both structural anddynamic elements (Gamson and Mayer1996). As seen in the case studies, thecontent of media coverage may radicallyinfluence the prospects for mobilization ofchallenging demands and movements, asit affects public awareness and perceivedimportance of a particular issue(McCombs and Shaw 1993). Massmedia’s agenda-setting function,therefore, has progressed from theclassical assertion that the news merelyinforms the public. The selection ofobjects for attention and frames forinterpreting these objects shape themanner in which news is construed(McCombs and Shaw 1993).

Other Resources for MobilizationCivil society in the telecommunicationsindustry, coming from the upper andmiddle classes, also had the resources andthe capacity to launch massive publiceducation, organizing and mobilizingconsumers, reinforcing media activities,

ANIB50

and lobbying with sympathetic lawmakersand government officials. Public campaignthrough SMS, Internet, and the broadcastmedia was also used. Civil-society groupsalso visited colleges and schools, markets,churches, government offices, andcommunities to gather signatures for theirpetition against measures that they feltwent against the public regardingtelecommunications. The nature of theirorganization, i.e., the loose structure,enabled them to move effectively andforge interorganizational linkages toaccommodate more resources in theircampaign. Civil-society groups alsoforged alliances in Congress. Theireffectiveness was seen when the text-taxissue died a natural death and civil-societygroups, like TextPower, already had thecapability to involve themselves in othertax issues and link up with others, like theanti-VAT groups. They framed these issuesin relation to those affecting thetelecommunications sector, such as thefranchise tax, which will affect a broaderrange of telecommunication services.

Such resources for civil society toengage government and the public werenot seen in the Benguet vegetable industrywhose constituency comes from themiddle and lower classes. However, civilsociety’s knowledge of the issue wasreflected in its strategy and policyproposals. Also favorable to the advocacycampaign of civil society was the divisionof labor among the federations of peasantpolitical organizations, i.e., some focusedon the defense of resources and landreform while others tackled the issue ofvegetable importation.

As for the garment industry, the abilityof the workers to engage in formal (e.g.,dialogue with government) and informal(e.g., pickets) strategies to gaingovernment attention has much to do withtheir organizational skills and technicalknowledge.

Civil society’s advocacy work in thegarment and the Benguet vegetableindustries has gained governmentrecognition as well as appreciation of theirpolitical and economic importance. Anevidence of this is that the Benguet

vegetable industry is represented inpertinent Philippine trade agreementswith other countries. Moreover,grassroots organizing and advocacy haveincreased social awareness of theindustry’s plight and have heldgovernment accountable to thecommunity. This has also opened upopportunities for others to address similarconcerns vis-à-vis government and societyin general. Some refer to this as “state–social movement coalition,” whereby stateactors use their resources to enhance theobjectives of the social movement. This isvery much in the mode of the liberal-relational approach in understandingstate-civil society engagement. Such analliance happens when the concerns ofcivil society adversely impact on thelocality, which local and nationalgovernment officials cannot ignore.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES ATTHE EXTERNAL LEVELPolitical opportunities at the external levelwere best seen in the formation oftransnational alliances. For example, thegarment industry forged alliances at theglobal level, which differentiated it fromthe Benguet vegetable industry whosealliances were limited to the local level.This is because transnational actors couldrelate to the issue of human rights, whichwas raised vis-à-vis the garment workersin the context of globalization. The loss oflivelihood for the vegetable farmers, onthe other hand, did not generate muchsympathy from transnational actors. Therewas also transnational civil-societysupport for the garment workers becausethey are better organized, unlike the smallvegetable farmers. This enabled thegarment-industry groups to network withoverseas organizations, which allowedthem to learn from the campaigns takenby other groups and eventually applythese at home. These campaigns usuallycenter on the corporations’ socialresponsibility, with specific focus on theirresponsibilities toward their workers. TheClean Clothes Campaign, for example,was formed to improve working

51ANIB

conditions and empower workers in theglobal garment industry. Local chapters ofinternational organizations were alsoestablished in the Philippines. Moreover,because of the international networking oftrade unions in the Philippines, they canreport to multinational companies theviolations committed by local contractors.

Civil-society groups are not the onlyones making use of such campaigns.Governments, for example, have also usedthese to instill social responsibility amonglocal manufacturers. Agreements forgedthrough the efforts of internationalinstitutions have also been very useful insetting the directions of the country’s lawswith regard to the protection of workers.For the garment industry, therefore,external political structures were utilizedto protect the workers’ rights rather thanstopping the flow of cheaper garmentimports to the country.

As for the telecommunications sector,an external political opportunity was forthem to draw in the OFWs in theircampaign to ban the text tax. The externalenvironment in which the neoliberalideology dominates as perpetuated by theinternational financial institutions, e.g., theWorld Bank and the IMF, has broughtmore positive rather than negative results.This brings out the fact that neoliberalismdiscourages too much state interventioneven as it does not dissipate the statepower to tax. The “WashingtonConsensus” even stipulated that a countryshould have a stable exchange rate and abalanced government budget. This can beaccomplished through proper taxcollection alongside less spending.

FACTORS HINDERING THEACTION OF CIVIL SOCIETYFactors that hindered the action of civilsociety could be seen within the context ofthe limitations in the political opportunitystructures both at the domestic andinternational levels, and with regard to theresources that could be utilized. In theBenguet vegetable industry, for example,there were key government officials whowere not supportive of the vegetable

farmers like then-DA Secretary ArthurYap. Yap epitomizes government officials,particularly technocrats, who are shieldedfrom political pressures in their pursuit ofthe neoliberal ideology because they carryno political ambitions. Although theremay be a façade of openness toconsultation as seen in the engagement ofgovernment agencies, the reality is thatthese institutions are insulated frompopular pressures. Corporate interestshave greater sway on governmentagencies at the national level, thus theirambivalent attitude toward civil-societyparticipation. The elite capture of thestate is an issue that neoliberalism doesnot address.

There were also limitations in the hogindustry, one of which was government’ssheer ineffectiveness. This was seen in thefoot-and-mouth disease (FMD) incident inwhich the hog industry had to rely ongovernment to control, e.g., through theimportation of FMD vaccines, vigilantpolicing of hog and pork traffic, imposingquarantine measures, and massiveinformation campaign on FMD, amongothers. Civil society criticized thegovernment for corruption with regard towithholding money allotted for FMD. Animportant concern was the government’srefusal to act. Stakeholders in the hogindustry, for example, linked the issue ofmeat imports with FMD—that is, to stopFMD was to stop the importation ofmeat, particularly carabeef, which hadflooded the meat market. They alsopointed out that the smuggling andexcessive importation of meat wouldultimately lead to the collapse of the localhog industry. No decisive action, however,was taken by the government despite thefact that the ASAP held protest actionsand declared a meat holiday, amongothers. They even demanded theresignation of government officials whothey believed were involved in smuggling,but this was also to no avail.

In the Benguet vegetable industry, thestrategy of civil society to focus on theexecutive branch rather than the legislaturealso seems to have been flawed. For one,executive orders served only as temporary

ANIB52

measures with very short-term impact. Theexecutive can also issue a policy that maybenefit the Benguet vegetable farmers butonly to be negated by another policy. Forexample, the government is in partnershipwith the vegetable industry to stopsmuggling but it will not accede tolowering the tariff rates on importedvegetables. The legislature also has itslimitations as an arena for engagement.These include the very low awareness ofpolicymakers of international trade; thehigh rate of absenteeism, which mayindicate lack of interest or littleknowledge of the issue; the long-windedprocess of legislation; and the parochialdisposition of Congress as an institution.Changes in policy, therefore, are notbased on principles but on realpolitik orquid pro quo. Furthermore, at the end ofthe day, the executive is tasked toimplement the trade policies mandated byCongress.

In the case of the telecommunicationsindustry, the legislature generally played asupporting role either to the state (e.g.,the NTC) or to the civil-society players(i.e., the telcos, the ISPs, and theconsumers). The telcos have moreresources; they are able to translate theseto political influence. The reality,therefore, is that the state must addressthe adverse effects of globalization,despite the fact that neoliberalism callsfor the state’s diminished role.

To reiterate what Mittelman (2002, 10)said, globalization as manifested by itsmajor conveyors, the intergovernmentalorganizations (IGOs) like the WTO, tendsto fragment the national political systemand leaves winners and losers. Among thewinners, as very well seen in the casestudies, are the executive and thebureaucracy, which conduct negotiationsand provide the representatives to IGOmeetings; they therefore occupy poleposition (Hague and Harrop 2004: 27).The losers, on the other hand, include thelegislature and the political parties. Theformer may only learn of an internationalagreement after the government hassigned it. The latter may have lost ground

under the pressure from IGOs. This mayexplain why in the case studies, politicalparties do not seem to play a role at all instate-civil society engagement (Hague andHarrop 2004: 28). This is certainly mostunfortunate for civil-society groups as thelegislature and the political parties are theinstitutional vehicles of representation forthe citizenry.

Furthermore, despite the inroads, suchas the institutionalization of NGOs’ andtraders’ participation in the antismugglingoperations of government agencies andtask forces in the Benguet vegetableindustry, the government response hasbeen minimal. In this context, stateaccession to civil-society demands is seenas a mere rhetoric or a means to legitimizestate policies, e.g., the antismugglingprogram. In this light, changes in politicalopportunity structures as brought aboutby the democratization process are onlycapable of facilitating civil society’s entryinto the policymaking arena and itsadvocacy of modest policy reforms. Thelong-term but still-elusive solution,therefore, is for civil society to craft afeasible alternative economic paradigmthat serves as the foundation for its policyadvocacy on agriculture in general and thevegetable industry in particular. Thiswould also prevent the government fromtreating the concerns of the vegetableindustry as issue-specific rather thancomprehensively.

Therefore, the adverse effects ofglobalization cannot be fully confrontedas long as there are impediments in thedemocratization process. Theseimpediments, on the other hand, cannotbe addressed when socioeconomicinequalities pervade in society, a realitywhich neoliberalism has failed to address.

Limitations in the Political OpportunityStructures at the International LevelAt the international level, the majorstumbling block was the state’ssubmission to external forces, i.e., marketforces, over which it had no control.Nevertheless, civil society in the Benguet

53ANIB

vegetable industry sought to remedy thisby engaging the state.

As for the hog industry, the governmentcould not stop the importation of meatsbecause it had already signed agreementsthat opened up the country forliberalization. Importation has haddifferent impacts on the various sectorsdirectly or indirectly linked with the hogindustry. For example, it led to the loss ofprofits for the hog industry unless thegovernment reduced production costs bylowering tariff on corn and soybeans,primary components of hog feeds. Thismeant that pursuing the interest of hogindustry players would go against civil-society advocates of the producers ofthese commodities, such as the cornfarmers. This was also seen in the case ofthe call to stop the importation ofcarabeef from India, which benefited thehog industry but not the meat processorswho were benefiting from carabeefimports. Thus, although the governmenthas attempted to address the interests ofthe different affected sectors, it has failedto come up with a win-win solution.

Only the garment industry workerscould take advantage of linking up withtransnational movements fighting for asimilar cause. Unlike the vegetable andhog industries, these movements are morefocused on workers’ rights rather thanlivelihood issues.

Limitations in Resources forEngagementOne of the factors that went against theBenguet vegetable industry was the lackof organization among the farmers, whichkept them from any meaningfulparticipation. The highly technical natureof discussions during public hearings andconsultations also alienated groups thatwere not conversant with the differentaspects of tariff policy. This wasaggravated by the lack of pertinentinformation and data, thus making itdifficult to establish the validity of thecase through hard facts and, in theprocess, undermining civil society’scredibility vis-à-vis the policymakers.

In the formal approach to stateengagement, there was also the issue ofmisrepresentation. Traders, for example,misrepresented themselves as farmers andtheir approach, i.e., of carrying out theantismuggling drive, was not approved ofby other civil-society groups that believedthis to be the task of the government.There was also resistance amongvegetable farmers to political organizingfor fear of being manipulated to advancea particular dogma. Misrepresentationalso benefited the traders, creating a gapbetween them and the farmers.Furthermore, the Benguet vegetableindustry, unlike the hog industry, could nottake advantage of RA 5435 whereby thestate recognizes state and civil-societypartnership in development.

For the telecommunications industry, itwas very clear what organizations thecivil-society members belonged to, i.e.,whether they were with the telcos, theISPs, or the consumer groups. The samecould be said for the civil-society playersin the hog and garment industries.

As for the labor movement in thegarment industry, questions that ariseinclude why the labor movement, one ofthe oldest movements in the Philippines,is unable to assert itself with regard to theworkers’ condition in a period ofdemocracy. One view is that the labormovement has not been sector-specific,i.e., attention has not been given to thenuances of each of the sectoral needs ofthe workers. Also, subcontracting hasmade it difficult for workers to organizesince they are diffused.

CONCLUSIONThese studies have shown globalization’sdifferent effects within and acrossdomestic industries as well as the multiplestrategies of engagement between civilsociety and the state. The impact on thestakeholders in the Benguet vegetable,garment, and hog industries has beennegative. The impact was most severe inthe case of the Benguet vegetableindustry, which barely survived despite its

ANIB54

pre-trade liberalization monopoly of theindustry.

The garment industry, despite beingamong the top export earners, shows thatglobalization in a time of democracy hasbrought about profit losses translatinginto the closure of several factories andthe layoff of hundreds of workers. Theexpiration of the MFA will only makematters worse. Globalization has broughtin cheaper meat, but this hardly threatensthe hog industry. For thetelecommunications sector, however,globalization has been positive as theentry of more players encouraged greatercompetition.

In all these, the consumers are the oneswho supposedly benefit the most asglobalization provides them with cheaperproducts. However, this comes at theexpense of the industries that clearlycannot compete. There is therefore a needfor reforms that could be implementedvis-à-vis developmental outcomes arisingfrom economic liberalization in specificsectors. Prioritization as well as safetynets are most urgent if communities are tosurvive the adverse impact ofglobalization. In other words,globalization should not be adoptedwholesale but on a case-to-case basis,with preference for the more marginalizedsectors.

Another important lesson from thesecase studies is that the state cannot affordto treat the adverse impact ofglobalization on a piecemeal basis, i.e.,being issue-specific. Civil society, on theother hand, also has to do its homeworkto provide a feasible alternative withregard to their specific sectoral concernvis-à-vis what unbridled neoliberalism hasto offer. More important, there is a needto come together to put these concernswithin the bigger framework ofdevelopment.

The upside is that the situation providespolitical opportunities for civil society toengage the state at both the local andnational levels. This can be best attributedto the current democratic dispensation,which, despite its shortcomings, hasprovided the space for state-civil society

engagement. Such an engagement is bestseen in the context of the liberal-relationalapproach that views civil society as notjust any nonstate and nonmarket actor orthat civil society is in opposition to thestate (Hearn 2001: 342). What emerges isa civil society construed “as part of whatlinks the state to society more broadly,and as providing the channels throughwhich people influence their states, andstates cultivate legitimacy” (Hearn 2001:340). This interaction “reinforcesdemocracy by encouraging andentrenching the pursuit of sectionalinterest through generally agreed norms”(Friedman 2003: 10).

Such a situation was best exemplified incivil-society engagement of the localgovernment unit and the local governmentofficials as well as their engagement of thestate at the national level, i.e., engagingthe executive and its bureaucracy, thelegislature, and the judiciary. The nature ofengagement is formal and direct, e.g.,through committees on tariff involvingNGOs, as well as informal and direct, e.g.,lobbying government officials. Politicalopportunities are also present for civilsociety to engage the state in an informaland indirect manner, e.g., the use of themedia as well as demonstrations.

The state is not monolithic. Whileindustry players may tap key allies ingovernment, there will always be statefunctionaries who are insulated from thepressure to provide for safety nets toindustries, as in the case of the Benguetvegetable and garment industries. Theallies may come from local governmentofficials whose communities are at riskbecause of globalization, or allies who areideologically against globalization killingoff industries, or those who see thatsupporting the antiglobalizationmovement would mean electoral votes.These combinations were, for example,seen in the Benguet vegetable industry,where “rifts among elites could providemovements occasions to influencepolicymaking” and “the presence orabsence of influential allies, such as theelite, could also have direct impact on themovement’s actions.” This is mainly

55ANIB

because “elite allies possess resources andpolitical influence that movements lackand could serve as indirect channels ofaccess in the system” (Tarrow 1994) aswas seen in the case studies.

The study also reveals that theindustries that have more resources, e.g.,the hog and telecommunicationsindustries, are in a better position toengage the state because of the profitsthey bring to the economy. This is wherethe state has to come in to provide thebalance by, for example, leveling theplaying field. One consolation, though, forthe marginal players is that thecompetition between big industry playerswho are in conflict with one another hasprovided a check and balance as seen inthe hog and telecommunicationsindustries. Ironically, the check andbalance does not come from the statebecause of its patrimonial character, i.e.,dispenser of patronage politics, which canbe attributed to the elite capture of thestate. In all these experiences, onewitnesses not the retreat of the state butthe state as a major actor of contentionfor the different civil-society playersaffected by globalization.

Nevertheless, the state is still the majorarena of contention to confront theadverse effects of liberalization. Butdespite the importance of the state, it alsohas its limitations, as seen in itshelplessness in the face of the FMDoutbreak. Executive orders as well as thecompetence of legislators also have theirlimitations. Furthermore, as the casestudies also reveal, the hands of the stateto go against the tide of liberalization aretied, particularly in situations where it hadalready signed agreements to open up thecountry’s economy. One, therefore, has toacknowledge the presence of “exogenousfactors that enhance or inhibit prospectsfor mobilization, for particular sorts ofclaims to be advanced rather than others,for particular strategies of influence to beexercised, and for movements to affectmainstream institutional politics andpolicy” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004: 1457-58). And as for situations in whichglobalization brings about a positive

effect as seen in the telecommunicationsindustry, the reality is that state regulationalone cannot provide the necessarycountervailing force against marketpower. What is needed, therefore, is a fairdistribution of market power parallel tothe creation of an environment thatdiscourages monopolistic behavior. Thiscan only be attained once socioeconomicinequalities are addressed, which will leadto the empowering of the majority.

Where does that leave civil-societyplayers? As earlier noted in the garmentindustry, much is to be gained fromexploring political opportunity structuresat the international level, and this mayalso be true for the other sectors, whichcan learn from the experiences of othersthat have suffered or will suffer the samefate. Transnational activism is on the riseand as such, some issues, e.g., workersrights, have been mainstreamed intointernational policymaking. There is alsostill much to be desired in empoweringthe stakeholders not only in terms of theneed to organize but also in terms of theresources available.

The anchor of all of these is the pushfor further democratization, i.e., theenlargement of the space that would allownot only state-civil society engagementbut also state-civil society cooperationvis-à-vis the onslaught of globalization.

Such engagement and cooperation haveto take into consideration the similaritiesand differences in the impact ofglobalization on the various sectors. Thesuccess of civil society in engaging thestate has much to do with takingadvantage of the political opportunitiesand in mobilizing available resources inadvocating what they perceive to be thebest for the public good. Thus, much ofthe role of civil society is to monitor thechanges in political opportunity structuresand to determine which among the varioussituations encourage or discourage theiradvocacy and, most of all, discern whenor how struggles could lead to actualreforms (Tarrow 1994). As can be gleanedfrom the case studies, their success maymean incremental gains not only for theirspecific sectors but for the advancement

ANIB56

of the country’s development anddemocratization process.

The long-term objective of all of theseis to come out with an alternativephilosophy of development that does notseparate the economic from the politicalas what neoliberalism does. The challengeis to come up with a philosophy ofdevelopment that will not only beconcerned with bringing about a “trickle-down effect” of the fruits of developmentbut will immediately pour in the much-needed economic benefits to the majorityof the population. That is, it will have abias for the poor. This will come aboutonly when one can be assured that elitecapture of the state will be eliminated andthat economic policies will be determineddemocratically with the participation of allthose concerned. All of these will be madepossible not by the state and theadvocates of globalization but by avigilant civil society, i.e., those who aremarginalized by neoliberalism, whoagainst all odds have not lost hope tobring about a just situation in whichwinners should always be those who haveless.

Because of the positive experience inthe telecommunications industry, can allthese therefore be attained through“globalization with a human face,” i.e.,“tackling the abuses of an unregulatedcapitalism without the need to alter itsfundamentals” (Amin 2004: 221), or isthis merely a transition phase to a movefor “de-globalization,” if the experiencesof the vegetable, hog, and garmentindustries are uncontrollably replicated inthe rest of the country’s industries? Thereseems to be some ambivalence on thepart of civil-society players in these threeindustries, and for as long as such asituation prevails, the state will be thefinal arbiter between civil society and theforces of globalization. Such uncertaintyalso impacts on state-civil societyengagement, e.g., whether there should bemore state regulation or not. But whatremains certain is, despite theambivalence, mere palliatives will not beacceptable, and engagement will bepursued for as long as the adverse impact

of globalization is felt, until there are nolonger excuses.

REFERENCESAbinales, Patricio N., and Donna J.

Amoroso. 2005. State and Society in thePhilippines. Anvil Publishing Inc, PasigCity.

Amin, Ash. 2004. Regulating economicglobalization. Transactions of the Instituteof British Geography, Vol. 29, pp. 217-233.

Ayres, Jeffrey. 2002. “Transnational politicalprocesses and contention against theglobal economy.” In Jackie Smith andHank Johnston (eds.), Globalization andResistance . Rowman & LittlefieldPublishers, Inc, Lanham.

Bensabat-Kleinberg, Remonda, and JenineA. Clark (eds.). 2000. EconomicLiberalisation, Democratization and CivilSociety in the Developing World. London:Palgrave Macmillan.

Budd, Eric. 2005. “Wither the patrimonialstate in the age of globalization?”Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of ThirdWorld Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 37-55.

Callinicos, Alex. 2001. Against the ThirdWay. Polity Press, Cambridge.

Clark, John. 2003. “Civil society andtransnational action.” In John Clark (ed.),Globalizing Civic Engagement: CivilSociety and Transnational Action.Earthscan Publishing Inc, London andSterlina.

Colas, Alejandro. 2002. International CivilSociety. Polity Press, Cambridge.

Directory of Consumer Organizations. http://www.eyp.ph/complete.jsp?page=65,accessed on 12 December 2005.

Fox, Jonathan A., and L. David Brown.1998. The Struggle for Accountability: TheWorld Bank, NGOs and GrassrootsMovements . The Massachussetts Instituteof Technology Press, Cambridge andLondon.

57ANIB

Friedman, Steven. 2003. “The state, civilsociety and social policy: Setting aresearch agenda.” Politikon, Vol. 30, No.1, pp. 3-25.

Gamson, William A., and David S. Meyer.1996. “Framing political opportunity.” InDoug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, andMayer N. Zald (eds.), ComparativePerspectives on Social Movements:Political Opportunities, MobilizingStructures, and Cultural Framings.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Giugni, Marco G. 1998. “Was it worth theeffort? The outcomes and consequencesof social movements.” Annual Review ofSociology, Vol. 98, pp. 371-93.

Grugel, Jean. 2004. “State power andtransnational activism.” In Nicola Piperand Anders Uhlin (eds.) TransnationalActivism in Asia: Problems of Power andDemocracy. Routledge, London and NewYork.

Habito, Cielito F. 2002. Impact ofinternational market forces, tradepolicies, and sectoral liberalizationpolicies on the Philippines hogs andpoultry sector. http://www.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/LEAD/X6115E/X6115E00.HTM, accessed on 05 July2004.

Habito, Cielito F. 2005. “State-civil societyrelations in the context of globalization: Areview.” Draft manuscript. UP ThirdWorld Studies Center and UnitedNations Development Programme.

Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. 2004.Comparative Government and Politics: AnIntroduction. 6th ed. Palgrave, New York.

Hearn, Jonathan. 2001. “Taking liberties:Contesting visions of the civil societyproject.” Critique of Anthropology, Vol.21, No.4, pp. 339-60.

Jomo K.S. 2006. Worlds apart.BusinessWorld, February 22.

Kamrava, Mehran, and Frank O Mora.1998. “Civil society and democratizationin comparative perspective: Latin

America and the Middle East.” ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp.893-916.

Ku, Agnes S. 2002. “Beyond the paradoxicalconception of ‘civil society withoutcitizenship’.” International Sociology, Vol.17, No. 4, pp. 529-48.

Magadia, Jose. 2003. State–SocietyDynamics: Policy-Making in a RestoredDemocracy. Ateneo de Manila UniversityPress, Quezon City.

McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, andMayer Zald (eds.). 1996. ComparativePerspectives on Social Movements .Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

McCarthy, John D., Jackie Smith, and MayerN. Zald. 1996. Accessing public, media,electoral and governmental agendas. InDoug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, andMayer N. Zald (eds.), ComparativePerspectives on Social Movements:Political Opportunities, MobilizingStructures, and Cultural Framings.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

McCombs, Maxwell E., and Donald C.Shaw. 1993. “The revolution of agenda-setting research: Twenty-five years in themarketplace of ideas.” Journal ofCommunication, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 58-67.

Meyer, David S. 2003. “Politicalopportunity and nested institutions.”Social Movement Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1,pp. 17-35.

Meyer, David S., and Debra C. Minkoff.2004. “Conceptualizing politicalopportunity.” Social Forces, Vol. 82, No.4, pp. 1457-92.

Miller, D. 1991. Politics. In V. Bogdanor(ed.), Blackwell Encyclopedia of PoliticalThought. Blackwell, Oxford andCambridge, Massachusetts. Cited in RodHague and Martin Harrop, ComparativeGovernment and Politics: An introduction.Palgrave, New York.

Mittelman, James H. 2002. “Makingglobalization work for the have-nots.”

ANIB58

International Journal on World Peace, Vol.19, No. 2, pp. 3-25.

O’Connell, Brian. 2000. “Civil society:Definitions and descriptions.” Nonprofitand Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 29,No. 3, pp. 471-78.

Peters, Chris. 2000. “An assessment of theADB’s poverty reduction strategy paper.”Freedom from Debt Coalition document.October.

Petras, James. 2003. The New DevelopmentPolitics: The Age of Empire Building andNew Social Movements . AshgatePublishing Limited, England.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, JoseAntonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi.2000. Democracy and Development:Political Institutions and Well-being in theWorld, 1950-1990. CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge.

Sen, Amartya. 2000. Development asFreedom . Oxford University Press,Oxford.

Serrano, Isagani. 2001. “Globalization andpoverty eradication in Asia and Pacific.”Paper presented at the Asia and PacificForum on Poverty, Asian DevelopmentBank Headquarters, Manila, February 5-9.

Smith, Jackie, and Hank Johnston. 2002.“Globalization and resistance: Anintroduction.” In Jackie Smith and HankJohnston (eds.), Globalization andResistance . Rowman & LittlefieldPublishers, Inc, Lanham.

Tabb, William. 2001. The Amoral Elephant:Globalization and the Struggle for SocialJustice in the Twenty-first Century.Monthly Review Press, New York.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in Movement:Social Movements, Collective Action, andPolitics . Cambridge University Press,Cambridge.

Thomas, Caroline. 1997. “Globalization andthe South.” In Caroline Thomas and Peter

Wilkin (eds.), Globalization and the South.MacMillan Press Ltd, Thomas.

United Nations Development Programme(UNDP). 1993. Human DevelopmentReport: People’s Participation. http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1993/en/default.cfm, accessed on 15 December2005.

———. 2003. Partners in HumanDevelopment: UNDP and Civil SocietyOrganizations . United NationsDevelopment Programme, New York.

Uvin, Peter. 2000. “From localorganizations to global governance: Therole of NGOs in international relation.” InKendall Stiles (ed.), Global Institutions andLocal Empowerment: CompetingTheoretical Perspectives. MacMillan PressLtd, London.

Wilkin, Peter. 1997. “New myths for thesouth: Globalization and conflict betweenprivate power and freedom.” In CarolineThomas and Peter Wilkin (eds.),Globalization and the South. MacMillanPress Ltd, London.