Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz •...

33
Pension reform in Georgia World Bank April 5th, 2016

Transcript of Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz •...

Page 1: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Pension reform in Georgia

World Bank

April 5th, 2016

Page 2: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Agenda

• Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia – Anita Schwarz

• Georgian Reforms in Regional Context – Peter Holtzer

• Market structure: International Context – Fiona Stewart

2

Page 3: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Agenda

• Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia – Anita Schwarz

3

Page 4: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Pension Systems Have 2 Objectives

Financing of Old Age Security in Georgia 4

• Prevent poverty in old age

• Fully accomplished if basic pension is inflation-

indexed

• Provide modest replacement of income worker

earned while working

• Not really achieved now for middle income and higher

income workers and will not even be achieved for

lower income workers in the future

• Basic pension only provides 18% replacement of

average wage

Page 5: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Income Replacement Can Be Done in One of Two

Ways

• Pay As You Go

• Contributions collected from current workers

are used to pay current pensioners, typically

as a percentage of their salary per year

worked

• Savings approach

• Contributions paid on behalf of current

workers are saved and invested, and then

available to them when they reach retirement

age

5

Page 6: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

New Pay As You Go Not Recommended in Older

Countries

• Pay As You Go benefits are typically defined as x% wage per year worked

• When the population is demographically young: If there are 10 workers per retiree, a 5% of wage

contribution rate can translate into a 50% of average wage pension for each retiree

• But if there are less than 2 workers per retiree: This same 5% contribution will only be able to pay a

10% of average wage benefit

• If Pay As You Go has promised a higher benefit, the remainder ends up having to be financed by Government

6

Page 7: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Georgia is demographically old, with declining working

age population and increasing elderly

7

.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Projected Population Changes

% of Population 15-Ret Age % of Population>Ret age

Page 8: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

The Georgian Population is Aging

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

Percentage of Population Above Retirement Age

Financing of Old Age Security in Georgia 8

Page 9: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Overall Population Also Expected to Decline

9

3,400

3,600

3,800

4,000

4,200

4,400

4,600

4,800

Popula

tion in T

housands

Future Population Expected to be 15% Lower than Today

Page 10: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Pension Spending Largely Because of Pay As You Go

Systems is Unaffordably High in Most European Countries

Financing of Old Age Security in Georgia 10

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

16.0%

18.0%

Ita

ly

Fra

nce

Gre

ece

Spain

Ma

lta

Belg

ium

Slo

ven

ia

Cypru

s

Lu

xe

mbo

urg

De

nm

ark

Port

ug

al

Sw

ede

n

Un

ite

d K

ing

dom

Austr

ia

Germ

any

Fin

land

Ne

therl

and

s

Irela

nd

No

rwa

y

Cro

atia

La

tvia

Geo

rgia

Arm

enia

Pola

nd

Esto

nia

Ru

ssia

Alb

ania

Bulg

aria

Czech R

epu

blic

Hu

nga

ry

Lithu

ania

Ro

man

ia

Slo

vakia

Serb

ia

BH

Fed

era

tion

Bela

rus

Re

pub

lika

Srp

ska

Kazakhsta

n

Aze

rbaija

n

Kyrg

yz

Turk

ey

High Income GenerousSpenders

High Income Moderate Spenders Lower Spending Transition Countries HighSpendingTransitionCountries

Youngcountries

2010

Page 11: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Countries now undertaking all kinds of reforms:

Public pensions reforms

Reforms focused partly on reducing spending

Restricted eligibility criteria• Raising retirement age

• Tightening disability conditions

• Raising years of service requirements

Reducing benefits in the long run• Basing benefits on full career salary

• Indexing only to inflation

• Lowering accrual rate

Also focused on ensuring poverty prevention through generous indexation of minimum benefits

Some opted by default or by choice for flat, universal benefits, sometimes complemented by savings pillar

General emphasis on tightly linking contributions to benefits

Defined benefit systems based on average lifetime wages; point systems; notional accounts

Wanted pension differentiation to match newly differentiated wages

Wanted to use incentives to combat informality

11

Page 12: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

12

Pension system structures, Europe and Central AsiaPoint System Notional

Accounts

Funded Defined

Contribution

Universal

Pensions

Germany

Romania

Slovak Rep

Estonia

Bosnia

Croatia

Montenegro

Serbia

Sweden

Italy

Latvia

Poland

Azerbaijan

Kyrgyz Rep

Russia

Turkmenistan

Sweden

Denmark

Ireland

Poland

Slovak Rep

Lithuania

Latvia

Estonia

Bulgaria

Romania

Croatia

FYR Macedonia

Kazakhstan

Kosovo

Kyrgyz Rep

Russia

Ireland

Kazakhstan

Kosovo

Georgia

Page 13: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Savings Approach is More Robust for Aging Population

• Fiscal costs are transparent and more

predictable

o Individuals get only what is contributed by them

or on their behalf

• Consistent with European approach which argues

that individual savings will have to play a critical

role in providing retirement income

o Savings rate in Georgia is currently lower than

in other countries

13

Page 14: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

BUT…

Financing of Old Age Security in Georgia 14

• Need to make sure that the money is secure

• Need to make sure that there are assets which

will pay reasonable rates of return and enough

assets that portfolio can be diversified

• Need to keep administrative costs low

Page 15: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Agenda

• Georgian Reforms in Regional Context – Peter Holtzer

15

Page 16: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

European Reversals – Why is Georgia different?

Eastern Europe

• Fiscal crisis main cause of reversals - second

pillar pensions have been an easy target but are

clearly not the cause of fiscal issues

• Revenues meant to finance transition to new

systems over estimated

• Pension fund assets remained in government

securities and were not diversified into productive

investments

• Returns failed to keep pace with wage growth

• Costs have remained high

16

Georgia

• Georgia proposals ‘add on’ system not a

‘carve out’ so no ‘transition costs’

• Capital market development plan being

developed in parallel to pension reform

• Low cost system being built from the start

Page 17: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

In summary: what is relevant and what is not?

• Fiscal issues with mandatory 2nd pillar – NOT

• Need of low costs!

• Capital market developments!

• Well-diversified portfolios!

17

Page 18: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Voluntary or mandatory?

• Purely voluntary systems usually have relatively low coverage.

• Coverage rarely exceeds 15-20%.

• Mostly reaches better off, formally employed people. Poor targeting.

• Even this requires generous tax benefits. Without benefits almost never works.

18

Source: The Inverting Pyramid, The World Bank, 2014

Page 19: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Mandatory solutions may also have challenges

19

• Either substitutes previous PAYG contributions, or is additional.

• The former case creates fiscal problems (see CEE experience).

• It is deemed as a tax and not as private property (again see CEE).

• If additional, wage burden may become too high and people may protest.

• Linked to taxation: people in grey/black economy don’t want to get involved.

• Covers formal labor market mostly, the rest remains unsolved.

Page 20: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Auto-enrolment is best possible compromise

20

• Participation is much higher than in pure voluntary due to inertia.

• International experience shows 60-90% coverage instead of 10-20%.

• No need for expensive client acquisition (as in pure voluntary systems).

• Does not mandate any worker: freedom to opt out.

• Easy message: stay in and you will get more adequate (higher) pensions.

• No room for future nationalization: private property.

• Might even get grey/black economy in, if not linked to other tax systems.

BUT

• Still needs incentives (government match, employer match).

• Still mostly targets more formal sectors, but better than pure voluntary.

• The need for basic/universal pensions for those left out remains.

• No real experience yet of AE reform in high informality country!

Page 21: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Public versus private retirement income sources

21

Page 22: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Second pillar contribution rates vary

22

• There is no standard and universally accepted contribution rate. Individual

countries determine it based on country specific indicators.

2.0%

Latvia

Lithuania

Norway

Russia

(2014)

2.3%

Poland

5.0%

Bulgaria

Croatia

9.0%

Slovakia

Australia

10%

Chile

Peru

Kosovo

Armenia

(2014)

12-16%

Bolivia

El Salvador

Uruguay

Colombia

Page 23: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Current replacement rates of public systems

23

Page 24: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Lessons Learnt

24

1) Tax not debt financing pension reforms

2) Stability and Growth Pact rewards not penalizes Governments for keeping

pension promises implicit rather than explicit

3) Regulation needed to deliver significant reductions in costs + through changing

the ‘industrial organization’ (central admin etc.)

4) Actively develop capital markets with explicit reforms rather than expecting

development simply because there is now a private pensions system;

5) Diversified asset allocation rather than over-investment in bonds needed +

sensible investment regulations

6) Labor market policies that mean working lives are long enough to support

retirement;

5) Regular pension incomes rather than lump sum payments

6) Create, develop and sustain political and public acceptance for reform

7) Build in automatic adjustment mechanisms to prevent strains from building

Page 25: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Agenda

• Market structure: International Context – Fiona Stewart

25

Page 26: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Market structure

26

• Efficiency and pricing of CEE and LatAm pension markets is not ideal

• Competition has not worked well

Canadian survey – people rather go to the dentist than think about retirement

UK survey – people spend more time planning their annual holiday

• Segmented pension fund markets lead to high marketing costs, missed scale

efficiency in administration, and captive (hardly competitive) asset management.

• Best practice (Sweden, Kosovo) indicate centralized collection and record

keeping, default solutions, ‚blind account’, and competitive wholesale AM fees.

• This may lead to better asset management services, and overall fees even 50-

100bp p.a. lower.

• It may generate 15-30% higher pensions.

Page 27: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

27

Impact of Costs on Pension Benefits

Page 28: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

28

What are the main challenges that II pillar pension schemes face?

• Fee structures vary by its design and scale

• It is determined by national regulatory agencies

Management costs are perceived as a significant burden for participants

2.09

1.711.54 1.51 1.48

1.27

0.75 0.740.54

0.11

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

Bulgaria

Macedonia

Latvia

Romania

Estonia

Lithuania

Poland

Croa

a

SlovakR.

Russia

Percentage

IIPillarPensionFundManagementFeesin2011

% of total assets

World Bank estimates, National sources

Page 29: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

29

Cost ratios vs. # Providers / Market Share

Page 30: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

30

Cost saving versus centralization

Page 31: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Investment Diversification – has disappointed in some countries /

and investment has suffered

Source: World Bank Pensions Database / OECD

Page 32: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Actual foreign investments

32

Source: OECD Statistics. Percentage of assets invested abroad.

Page 33: Pension reform in Georgia€¦ · • Drivers of Pension Reform in Georgia –Anita Schwarz • Georgian Reforms in Regional Context –Peter Holtzer • Market structure: International

Key questions for the New Pension Trust

33

• The Trust, the Board, governance.

• Default portfolio setting.

• Investment activities, asset manager selection.

• Choice.