PEER Older Hazardous Concrete Buildings Policy Issues Peter J. May Center for American Politics and...
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Transcript of PEER Older Hazardous Concrete Buildings Policy Issues Peter J. May Center for American Politics and...
![Page 1: PEER Older Hazardous Concrete Buildings Policy Issues Peter J. May Center for American Politics and Public Policy University of Washington Laurence Kornfield.](https://reader030.fdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032800/56649d455503460f94a21f21/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
PPEEEERR Older Hazardous Concrete Buildings
Policy Issues
Peter J. MayCenter for American Politics and Public Policy
University of Washington
Laurence KornfieldChief Building Inspector
City and County of San Francisco
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Policy Challenges for Addressing Older Hazardous Concrete Buildings
• Insufficient information for guiding policy development – How many? What condition?
• Inappropriateness of “one size fits all” regulatory solutions – too costly, politically unacceptable
• Limited willingness of owners to undertake retrofits “voluntarily” – not our problem!
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California Un-reinforced Masonry Programs
• California Law 1986 – inventory and planning requirements for 25,000 buildings
• By 2004, some 55% retrofitted, 14% demolished – many remain unaddressed
• Cities are participating as required, but voluntary programs are not working well
• 85% retrofit in mandatory programs addressed, only 10 to 21 % in other programs
• Mandatory warning placards prior to 2004 were not posted – no enforcement mechanism
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Lessons from Un-reinforced Masonry Programs
• 2004 placard law – posting of placards about unsafe buildings
• More teeth added to notification requirements
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Lessons from URM experience(Alesch and Petak; Berke and Beatley; Olson)
Barriers
• Limited problem recognition – not our problem!
• Lack of technically feasible, affordable, solutions
• Legal challenges to ordinances
• Limited enforcement abilities for regulations
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Hospital Retrofit ExperienceSB 1953
California mandatory hospital retrofits enacted in 1994 (regulations 1998)
Lengthy policy development and negotiation(diagram – Alesch and Petak 2004)
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California Hospital Retrofit ExperienceSB 1953 (Alesch and Petak 2004, CA SSC 2001)
• Notable for risk classification of facilities – but, arguably too many classified as high risk
• Circa 40 % initially classified as highest risk category of imminent danger of collapse
• High costs of compliance for the industry – inducing delays –
• Some 260 facilities seeking “diminished capacity” exemptions as of 2006 for meeting initial 2008 deadline
• Shakeout in the health care industry due to economics of the industry – 50 % or more facilities with revenue shortfalls
• More feasible to close facilities than upgrade in many instances; premature closure?
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Political Realities
• Retrofit as a tough sell – costs are up front and benefits are perceived as uncertain Comment cited by Alesch and Petak re LA URM:
• Who pays, when, and for what?
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Political Realities (con’t)
Other consequences that are often unintended can dominate -- potential impacts for:
• Tenant costs, property conversions, affordable housing, housing displacement, open space, costs of construction
• Retrofits become excuses for owners to achieve other desired ends – that in the aggregate exacerbate other policy problems
Solutions require intervention – of some form – in complex markets for employment, housing, and services
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What NOT to Do?
• No quick fix – will take decades to ameliorate the risks posed by older hazardous concrete buildings
• No one-size solution – impossible to mandate a uniform retrofit program
• No need to wait for the perfect solution – it will not arrive in our lifetimes; the risk is real
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What to Do?
• Work toward a mix of solutions:
• Mandated actions for the “worst” buildings, yet to be defined
• Realistic voluntary actions for other buildings
• No action for lowest risk structures
• Solutions should come from coalition-building among stakeholders; not imposed from above
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What to Do?Some Potential Directions
• Seek to foster markets for seismic safety –
• Akin to “green building” movement – coalition building for green buildings
• Use of rating systems, information disclosure, building credits, and other policy incentives
• Foster demands for seismically “safe” structures
• The Societal Challenge: How to foster a seismic safety ethic among building owners, tenants, suppliers, and others?