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1. PEDRO J. VELASCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., WILLIAMSNYDER, its President; JOHN COTTON and HERMENEGILDO B. REYES, itsVice-Presidents; and ANASTACIO A. AGAN, City Engineer of QuezonCity, defendants-appellees.

Noise may constitute a nuisance but it must be of such character as to produce actual physical

discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

FACTS:

Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots situated at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets,

Diliman, Quezon City.. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and maintained the last one as his

residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance of 10-20 meters away

from appellants house. The company also built a concrete wall at the sides along the streets

but put up only an interlink wire fence (previously a sawali wall) on the boundary with

appellant. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers

(probably decepticons). Such, appellent contends, constitute a nuisance which has worsened

his health condition and has lowered the value of his property. Several witnesses came forth

but their testimonies were vague and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The

audible sound from different areas in Velasos property was measured in terms of decibels. It

was found that the sound exceeded the average intensity levels of residences.

ISSUE:

Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound?

HELD:

Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. In

fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical machinery and

appliances. The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such

character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary

sensibilities. However, appellants testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses

testimonies revealing on account of different perceptions. Consequently, sound level meters

were used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the

testimonies of appellants physicians (which were more reliable since they actually treated him,

unlike the appellees) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss of sleep, irritation and

tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where

the nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was 44 decibels while in the instant,

the readings include 52, 54, and 55. The decision goes on to discuss the proper award of

damages. But Meralco was ordered either to transfer the facilities or reduce the produced

sound to around.

2. TEODORO ACAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDY DE LOSREYES, respondents.

Doctrine: Ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process.

While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of

ownership over a thing in question.

FACTS:

The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was

evidenced by OCT No. R-12179. The lot has an area of 13,720 sq. meters. The title was

issued and is registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After

both spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a

duly notarized document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor

of Cosme Pido.

Teodoro Acap has been a tenant of a portion of land of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre since1960. Said lot was formerly owned by Spouses Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma, which upon their

death was inherited by Felixberto. In 1975, Felixberto sold the lot to Cosme Pido. Acap

remained to be a registered tenant of the said land and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to

Pido and thereafter, upon his death, to his widow Laurenciana. On 1981, Pidos wife and

children executed a notarized document denominated Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of

Rights of the land in favor Edy Delos Reyes. Delos Reyes alleged that he and Acap entered

into an oral lease agreement whereby Acap undertook to pay him 10 cavans of rice per year

as lease rental. From 1983 onwards Acap refused to pay further lease rentals. In defense,

Acap denied having entered in an oral lease agreement with Delos Reyes and that he did not

recognize his ownership over the land. As a matter of fact he alleged that he continued to pay

Laurenciana, Pidos wife. Delos Reyes filed a suit of recovery of possession against Acap and

for the payment of rentals accruing to him as owner of the said lot. Trial court rendered

decision in favor of Delos Reyes ruling that there was a perfected sale between heirs of Pido

and delos Reyes over the said lot and ordered Acap to deliver possession of the same toDelos Reyes. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the lower courts decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not Delos Reyes acquired ownership over the lot in question.

HELD:

NO. The Court noted that an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing

arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership

over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by

law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process.

While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of

ownership over a thing in question. Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, modes of acquisition

may either be original or derivative. Original modes of acquisition include occupation,

acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation. Derivative modes of acquisition on the

other hand include succession mortis causa and tradition as a result of certain contracts such

as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum. In the instant case, the Court determined

whether delos Reyes acquired ownership over the lot in question through any of the modes

mentioned. It was ruled that he had not acquired ownership by virtue of sale, as opposed to

the ruling of both RTC and CA. The execution of the heirs of Pido the Declaration of Heirship

and Waiver of Rights was held to be not tantamount to sale. Such declaration is only one

whereby heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they

see fit. The Court further noted that waiver of hereditary rights is different from sale of

hereditary rights. Sale of hereditary rights presupposes an existence of a contract of sale

whereas waiver of hereditary rights is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known

right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it in favor of other persons who

are co-heirs in the succession. As Delos Reyes is a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido,

he cannot claim ownership over the lot on the sole basis of the document executed. Hence,

private respondent Delos Reyes had not acquired ownership over Lot 1130 and consequently

had no right to exact lease rentals from petitioner Acap.

3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petit ioner, vs. LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSAMANGUBAT, respondents.

Facts:

Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land in favour of the

Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of Donation,

respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively andforever for school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the

District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of

Donation.

A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong

Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land could

not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of

land. To remedy this predicament Buendia was authorized to officially transact for the

exchange of the old school site to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications

of the government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of

Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. The

Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the schoolbuilding previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new

location.

The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay learned that Vice-

Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property. They filed a

complaint to annul the donation claiming that there was no valid acceptance made by the

donee and that there was a violation of the condition in the donation.

Issue:

(1) Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC?

(2) Was the condition in the donation violated?

Ruling:

(1) Yes. There was a valid acceptance.

The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: If the acceptance is made in a separate

instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted

in both instruments. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to

ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor.

Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was

executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building. It was when the

school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor

Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to

know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and

existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the

donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.

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Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to accept the donation personally, or

through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and

sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.

The respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donation was

ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of the

Philippines. The donation was made in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the

case, Buendias acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Codewhich states:

SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be executed

for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies,

or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service

and as long as the same are not prohibited by law.

(2) No. The condition was not violated.

The exclusivity of the purpose of the donation was not altered or affected when

Buendia exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It was in furtherance and enhancement of

the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of

funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be

accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

4. C-J YULO & SONS, INC., petit ioner, vs.ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SANPABLO, INC., respondent.

FACTS:

On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang,

Calamba, Laguna on the condition that it shall be used for the construction of a home for the

aged and infirm and for other charitable purposes and cannot be used for any other purposes

without the consent of the former said land with all real improvements thereon shall revert in

otherwise trust to the Donor for prompt disposition in favor of some other charitable

organization that Donor may deem best suited to the care of the aged.

Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build theperimeter fence on the donated property and the construction of a nucleus building for the

aged and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to one Martin Gomez who

planted said portion with sugar cane. There is no dispute that the lease agreement was

entered into by the donee without the prior written consent of the donor, as required in the

deed of donation. The lease to Gomez ended in 1985.

The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the donee,

this time to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained by the donee,

it entered into a lease agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from vandals and for the

electrification of the nucleus building of the home for the aged and in the infirm, which wasnamed as Casa dela Merced. As before, however, the donee executed the lease contract

without the prior written consent of the donor.

After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased a

portion of the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for fattening

cattles. The donee explained that the lease agreement with Bostre was also for the purposes

of generating funds for the completion of Casa dela Merced. Again, however, the donee did

not secure the prior written consent of the donor.

Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its

president Miguel A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was

revoking the donation in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due to the donees non -

compliance with and material breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated.

ISSUE: WON revocation is proper?

HELD:

NO. In Republic vs. Silim, where the donor sought to revoke the donation on the ground that

the donee breached the condition to exclusively and forever use the land for school purpose

only, the Court ruled in favor of the donee:

Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when

the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the

same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not

altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance

and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved wayfor the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not

be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

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As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the sole

purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In fact, such lease was

authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed of donation, albeit the prior written

consent therefor of the donor is needed. Hence, considering that the donees acts did not

detract from the very purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such

purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the

deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the donation.

Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor for

all contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for revocation of

the donation because such a condition, if not correlated with the purpose of the donation,

would constitute undue restriction of the donees right of o wnership over the donated property.

5. SOLEDAD CALICDAN, represented by her guardian GUADALUPECASTILLO, petit ioner, vs. SILVERIO CENDAA, substituted by his legalheir CELSA CENDAA-ALARAS, respondent.

FACTS:

The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of unregistered land located in

Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who

died intestate on November 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and three

children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.

On August 25, 1947, Fermina Calicdan executed a deed of donation whereby she conveyed a

parcel of land to respondent Silverio Cendaa, who immediately entered into possession of the

land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon. He

occupied the land from 1949 until his death in 1998. On June 1992, petitioner, through her

legal guardian, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages"

against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of

her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated respondents possession

of the land as well as t he construction of his house thereon.

In his Answer, respondent alleged that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and

that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for

a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in

the special proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan",

where the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the

petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the Court of Appeals reversed

the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is valid.

HELD:

NO. As correctly held by the the trial court, the donation of the land was void because Fermina

was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents. Thus,

the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan,

because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the

surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse.

However, notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, the Court found that respondent has

become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

6. NAZARIO VITA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SOLEDAD MONTANANO, ESTANISLAOJOVELLANO and ESTEBANA JOVELLANO, defendants-appellants.

JOSE, ELENA AND ALODIA, ALL SURNAMED MONTANO, intervenors-appellants.

In a resolution dated March 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals certified this case to Us because itinvolves pure questions of law (pp. 70-80, Rollo).

The pertinent facts are as follows:

A complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lagunaby plaintiff-appellant Nazario Vita, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate ofdeceased Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover from defendants-appellants Soledad Montanano,

Estanislao Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the possession of three (3) parcels of landlocated in Barrio Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna and their annual yield since January, 1962 inthe amount of P1,100.00 a year. Plaintiff-appellant claims that during the lifetime of EdilbertoVita, he was the owner and possessor of these three (3) parcels of land covered by: TaxDeclaration No. 1252 (73, old) with an area of 3,640 square meters, Tax Declaration No. 1231

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(72, old) with an area of 1,000 square meters, and Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) with anarea of 640 square meters; and he was enjoying the fruits therefrom. When he died onJanuary 23, 1962, defendants-appellants, through stealth and strategy, took possession of theabove-stated parcels of land and gathered the fruits therefrom. Notwithstanding demands fromplaintiff-appellant, defendants-appellants refused to surrender the possession of these parcelsof land. Plaintiff-appellant further claims reimbursement in the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney'sfees and P1,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.

In their answer dated December 1, 1964, defendants-appellants deny that the three (3) parcelsof land belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita. Instead, they claim that the two parcels of landcovered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 and Tax Declaration No. 1231 belong to SoledadMontanano as these were conveyed to her by Isidra Montanano (her aunt and wife of EdilbertoVita) and Edilberto Vita in a document signed and executed by them on November 22, 1938and ratified by one Mr. Matienzo, a Notary Public from Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, all copiesof said document were lost during the last war. The parcel of land covered by Tax DeclarationNo. 1253 is owned in common by Soledad Montanano, her brother Jose and sisters Elena andAlodia. It originally belonged to Francisca Asilo, deceased sister of their grandmother, MicaelaAsilo. Its ownership was transferred to them under the arrangement sanctioned by EdilbertoVita himself wherein all the proceeds from the yearly harvests therefrom shall be spent for theyearly masses to be held for the souls of Francisca Asilo and Isidra Montanano. This being thecase, plaintiff-appellant is now estopped from instituting this action. Defendants-appellantsclaim also that Edilberto Vita could not have inherited these parcels of land from IsidraMontanano as the latter's estate has never been the subject of a judicial or extra-judicialproceeding. The erroneous inclusion of these parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of

Edilberto Vita in Special Proceedings No. SC-136 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna doesnot make them actually a part of his estate. There is no fixed income from these parcels ofland because since 1962, plaintiff-appellant, with unknown persons, has been gatheringwhatever crops that may be taken therefrom. And, by reason of the malicious filing of thiscomplaint, they seek reimbursement of the amount of P1,000.00 representing attorney's feesand other litigation expenses.

Replying to defendants-appellants' answer, plaintiff-appellant claims that Isidra Montanano andEdilberto Vita never executed any document on November 22, 1938 and if they had, it wasthereafter repudiated, canceled and destroyed, for which reason, the three (3) parcels of landremained in the possession of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita; that upon the death onSeptember 25, 1957 of Isidra Montanano, who left neither descendants nor ascendants, hersurviving spouse Edilberto Vita succeeded her and took immediate possession of her estate;and that from the time defendants-appellants took possession of these parcels of land, theyhave continuously gathered the fruits therefrom.

In a petition dated August 20, 1966, Jose, Elena and Alodia Montanano sought leave of courtto intervene in this case. In the order of the trial court dated April 12, 1967, the amendedanswer dated September 10, 1966, which intervenors-appellants filed jointly with SoledadMontanano, was admitted as their answer-in-intervention. Incorporated therein is a

counterclaim that Soledad, Jose, Elena and Alodia Montanano are the co-owners of (pp. 43-44, Record on Appeal):

(a) A parcel of coconut land situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an areaof 2,450 square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Declaration No. 8953;

(b) A parcel of coconut and secano land situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna with anarea of 15,096 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 10228;

(c) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Yucos, Nagcarlan, Laguna,with an area of 2,500 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 7999;

(d) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan,Laguna, with an area of 12,865 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax DeclarationNo. 1233 (sic) (third parcel of land in the complaint); and

(e) A parcel of residential land, with its improvements, situated in Gen. Luna, Nagcarlan,Laguna, with an area of 167.50 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax DeclarationNo. 102;

that Jose Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan,Laguna, with an area of 10,000 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax DeclarationNo. 6493; and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Banago, Nagcarlan,Laguna, with an area of 9,604 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax DeclarationNo. 8304;

that Soledad Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan,Laguna, with an area of 4,165 square meters more or less, and covered by Tax DeclarationNo. 123 (sic) (the second parcel of land in the complaint); and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan,Laguna, containing an area of 10,434 square meters, more or less; and covered by TaxDeclaration No. 1252 (the first parcel of land in the complaint);

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that Alodia Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land and irrigated riceland, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo.Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 24,153 square meters, more or less andcovered by Tax Declaration No. 10268; and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan,Laguna, containing an area of 1,619 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax

Declaration No. 8510;

that Elena Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan,Laguna, containing an area of 6,242 square meters, more or less, and covered by TaxDeclaration No. 8511; and

(b) A portion of a parcel of riceland situated at C. Lirio St., Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing anarea of 9,691 square meters, more or less and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1184.

They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the three (3) parcels of land mentioned inthe complaint, which are in the possession of Soledad Montanano, and the other parcels ofland mentioned in their counterclaim, which are in the possession of plaintiff-appellant, by

virtue of a donation mortis causaexecuted by Isidra Montanano on November 22, 1938 or by adonation executed by her on December 20, 1940 which was confirmed by Edilberto Vita. Theypray that these parcels of land be adjudicated to them in the manner set forth in theircounterclaim; that plaintiff-appellant be ordered to account for the harvests from these parcelsof land from the time he took possession; and that they be awarded damages corresponding totheir litigation expenses.

In his reply dated July 4, 1967, plaintiff-appellant denied all the allegations contained in theanswer-in-intervention and reiterated that there was no such donation executed by IsidraMontanano. If such donation were really executed, she was forced to do so at a time when shewas not mentally in a position to execute and sign freely said document.

On September 15, 1973, the trial court rendered judgment adverse to all parties, thedispositive portion of which reads (p. 52, Record on Appeal):

Considering that the plaintiff has not shown by preponderating evidence that the three (3)parcels of land covered in the complaint belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita and it appearinglikewise that the defendants and intervenors have not shown that the parcels of land coveredin the counterclaim were validly donated to them and that they have legally accepted thedonation made by Isidra Montanano, the complaint filed by the plaintiff and the counterclaim

filed by the intervenors are hereby DISMISSED. This is without prejudice to the filing of aseparate proceedings (sic) in Court for the proper disposition of the estate of the deceasedIsidra Montanano, including that of her share in the fruits of the properties donated to herduring her marriage with Edilberto Vita which is considered part of their conjugal properties. Noassessment is hereby made with respect to the damages sustained by the parties as theyoffset each other, if any.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case is now before Us raising mainly thefollowing legal issues:

1) whether or not the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint are included in theestate of Edilberto Vita (as regards the appeal of plaintiff-appellant); and

2) whether or not acceptance is necessary in a donation mortis causa;and whether thedonation dated December 20, 1940 is mortis causaorinter vivos (with respect to the appeal ofdefendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants).

Plaintiff-appellant avers that the trial court failed to consider that Edilberto Vita's right to the

conjugal half in the first two parcels as surviving spouse had ceased to be inchoate upon thedeath of Isidra in 1957, and that such right had been vested upon him by operation of law. Withrespect to the conjugal half pertaining to Isidra in said two parcels, and the entirety of the thirdparcel as her paraphernal property, they were likewise vested upon him by operation of law,subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces, pursuant to Articles 995 and 1001 of theNew Civil Code.

In other words, plaintiff-appellant is again claiming that the parcels of land covered by TaxDeclaration No. 1252 (73, old) and Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) are conjugal propertiesof Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita whereas the parcel of land covered by Tax DeclarationNo. 1253 (4, old) is the paraphernal property of Isidra Montanano. We are in conformity withthe finding of the trial court that the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint wereparaphernal properties of Isidra Montanano, being supported by documentary and testimonialevidence (p. 48, Record on Appeal):

. . . plaintiff claims that in accordance with the inventory prepared by Edilberto Vita of hisproperties before his death (Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-1-A", "O-1-B", and "O-1-C"), the parcel ofland covered by Tax Declaration No. 4 (old) was a paraphernal property of his wife IsidraMontanano while the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 72 (old) and 73 wereconjugal properties of the spouses Edilberto Vita and Isidra Montanano as they were donated

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to the latter by Francisca Asilo during their marriage. It is the contention of the plaintiff thatupon the death of Isidra Montanano, her husband Edilberto Vita acquired ownership of theseproperties.

This contention of the plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of the defendants andintervenors that an the three (3) parcels of land, subject-matter of the complaint, including allthe parcels of land being claimed by them in the intervenor's counterclaim, were allparaphernal properties of Isidra Montanano. The two (2) parcels of land supposedly received

as donation by Isidra Montanano during her marriage with Edilberto Vita should be classifiedas her paraphernal properties, it being acquired by her through lucrative title (Art. 148, CivilCode). On the other hand, plaintiffs testimony that the third parcel of land covered in thecomplaint was inherited by Edilberto Vita from Isidra Montanano is an admission that the saidproperty was the paraphernal property of the latter.

The defendants and intervenors claim that the above-stated three (3) parcels of land and theproperties covered in their counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano by virtue oftwo (2) deeds of donation she executed on November 22, 1938 and December 20, 1940. Theypresented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano acquired allthese parcels of land, either by inheritance or donation, from her father Domingo Montanano,her aunt Francisca Asilo and her uncle Juan Asilo. Aside from this, the tax declarationscovering the properties involved in the complaint and counterclaim are mostly in the name ofIsidra Montanano, except one each in the name of her father Domingo Montanano, her auntFrancisca Asilo and her nephew Jose Samonte. The court is convinced, therefore, that all theproperties involved in t litigation were the paraphernal properties of the deceased Isidra

Montanano.

Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellant's claim that upon the death of IsidraMontanano, the ownership of these parcels of land (except with respect to the parcel of landcovered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) which was validly donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by Isidra Montanano, as We shall discuss later) arevested upon Edilberto Vita by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew andnieces, liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita must beundertaken prior to the adjudication of properties to the heirs (Vicente J. Francisco, TheRevised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970 Edition, p. 619). In this connection, contrary tothe trial court's ruling, it is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the properdisposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, ifboth spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestateproceedings of either. In the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of IsidraMontanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the latter.

Defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants allege the following: 1) that adonation mortis causa(as in the case of the November 22, 1938 donation), being in the natureof a legacy, need not be accepted; their acceptance of that donation is superfluous and 2) that

the December 20, 1940 donation is a donation inter vivosbecause: a) there is no stipulation orprovision therein that the donation is essentially revocable; b) there was an acceptance of thedonation; c) the donation was not simply made in consideration of the death of the donor but ofher affection for the donees.

It is explicit in Article 725 *of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. Thisapplies to all kinds of donation because the law does not make any distinction. The rationalebehind the requirement of acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his

will (Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of thePhilippines, Volume II, 1972 Edition, p. 521). We uphold the trial court that (p. 50, Record onAppeal):

. . . notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence presented, the said deed ofdonation mortis causa of November 22, 1938 seems to have been legally and validly executed,it cannot be given force and effect as the acceptance thereof by the donees is void and illegalin as much (sic) as they were made at the time of the execution of the document, not after thedeath of the donor Isidra Montanano. A donation mortis causa takes effect only after the deathof the donor, consequently it is only after the latter's death that its acceptance maybe made.

xxx xxx xxx

However, We adopt a view contrary to that of the trial court regarding the second allegation ofdefendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants. According to the trial court (p. 50, Record

on Appeal):

The defendants and intervenors further claim that all the properties covered by thatcounterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano pursuant to a second deed ofdonation executed by the latter on December 20, 1940 (Exh. "3"). A careful study of the saiddocument, however, shows that it is another deed of donation mortis causa, considering thefollowing provisions appearing therein with respect to its effectivity:

Na bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa ngpag-aaring dito'y itinungod sa kani-kanila, matangi ang ganang napaukol sa kay Dr. Vicente C.Chipongian at kay Maria Osuna, na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ngwalang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari,gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang atpamomosision sa kani-kaniyang pag-aaring ditoy ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na angbawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay,

ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabangsa mga pag-aaring iyan na dito'y inihayag nila ang pagtangap.

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From this provision of the document, it clearly appears that the donors shall continue to be theowner and possessors of the properties involved in the donation and shall continue to enjoythe fruits of said properties while they are still living and it is only upon their death thatownership will transfer to the donees. It was the evident intent of the donors in this case to givethe donation after their death. In the meantime, they retain full or naked ownership and controlof the properties while they are still living and title will pass to the donees only after their death.This is donation mortis causa (Heirs of Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6600, July 30,1954, 50 O.G. 3568; Howard v. Padilla, G.R. L-7064, 7098, April 22, 1955).

The quoted provision in the second deed of donation should be understood in its entirety.Thus, based on the first part of the paragraph which states " '[n]a bagaman at sa kasulatang itoay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa . . . na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'yiginagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayonbilang tunay na may-ari. . . " (Emphasis supplied), supra,it was obviously the intention of IsidraMontanano to grant a donation inter vivos to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants.Although the rest of the paragraph states "'gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa angmananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision, na kani-kaniyang pag-aaringdito'y ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay,at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamonila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan . . . supra," We haveadjudged in the case of Heirs of Juan Bonsato, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481,488:

It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of

the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective." . . . However, said expression mustbe construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearlyappears to be that after the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make thedonees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; forit must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the landdonated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear uponthe donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees.

It was also Our observation therein that ( ibid,at p. 487):

. . . The donor only reserved for Himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits orproduce . . . a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated propertyremained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor couldrevoke the donations . . .

Furthermore, mention must be made of the fact that the consideration of the second deed ofdonation is love and services rendered by defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants toIsidra Montanano, as revealed by the third and fourth paragraphs therein (Exhibit "3," for thedefendants):

Na sapagkat ang banal kong nais ay kung bawian man ako ng aking hiram na buhay aymatumbasan man lamang sa pamamag-itan ng isinasagawa kong pagkakaloob sa hinaharapna kasulatan yuong manga pagdamay, pagmamahal at paghahasikaso na tinanggap ko attunay na ipinakita sa akin ng mga ditoy itinangi ko,

Kaya't dahil diya'y buong puso kong ibinibigay, isinusulit at ganap na IPINAGKAKALOOB, angmga natitira ko pang mga pag-aari, na wala pang kinatutunguran o napagbibigyan, sakaparaanang dito'y itinatagubilen ko, sa manga taong gaya nitong mga sumusunod:

xxx xxx xxx

As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, 830:

. . . even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect after his death, when from thebody of the instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of thedonation is not the death of the donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee or hisaffection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, . . . and thecondition that the donation is to take effect only after the death of the donor should beinterpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the its of the property donatedshould take place only after donor's death.

Along the same line of ratiocination is Our holding in Balaqui, et al. v. Dongso, et al., 53 Phil.673, 677:

. . . that as the donor guaranteed the right which she conferred on the donee by virtue of thedeed of gift, wherein, in recompense of the latter's good services to the former, she donates toher the two parcels of land with their improvements, said gift is inter vivosand irrevocable, andnot mortis causa,notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did nottransfer the ownership of the two parcels of land donated, save upon her death, for such astatement can mean nothing else than that she only reserved to herself the possession andusufruct of said property, and because the donor could not very well guarantee the aforesaidright after her death.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal of plaintiff-appellant is hereby DENIED whereas the appeal ofdefendants-appellants is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of FirstInstance of Laguna dated September 15, 1973 is MODIFIED as follows: 1) the dismissal of thecomplaint of plaintiff-appellant is AFFIRMED; 2) the dismissal of the counterclaim ofdefendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants is SET ASIDE; and 3) plaintiff-appellant is

ordered: a) to deliver the possession of the properties donated to defendants-appellants andintervenors-appellants by virtue of the deed of donation dated December 20, 1940, and b) torender an accounting of the products harvested therefrom from January 23, 1962 up to thepresent.

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SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

7. HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO,petitioners, vs. COURT OFAPPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL.,respondents.

FACTS:

On the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had beeninduced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor ofhis brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to themseveral parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated inthe municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having beenduly accepted in the same act and documents.

Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of therequisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averringthat the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of pastservices rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freelywithout the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for thedismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000.

The lower court ruled that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latterwas of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation intervivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of thedonor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquiredduring the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations wereonly valid as to an undivided one -half share in the three parcels of land described therein.

In the Court of Appeals, majority of the justices declared that the aforesaid donations to be nulland void, because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without thetestamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato tosurrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two justices,however, dissented, claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations intervivos.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner Nocedas acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude sufficient to grantthe revocation of the donation?

HELD:

YES. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him byprivate respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C whichbelongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioners act of occupying the portion pertainingto private respondent Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act ofusurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act ofingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it isenough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations, orelse legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite thewidespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present that theCivil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed theFrench doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), bymerging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thussuppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.

ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of thenature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established fortestamentary successions.

Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favorof the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of thefollowing characteristics:

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, whatamounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) andcontrol of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil.,633);

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor todispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.

L-4326, November 18, 1952);

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2,executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his

lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce, a reservation that would be unnecessary ifthe ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is theabsence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deedsexpressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea ofconveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a

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testator cannot lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; NewCivil Code, Art. 828).

HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL.,respondents.

If the donation conveys the ownership and only reserves for himself during his lifetime the

owners share of the fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly decla res the act to beirrevocable it is not a donation mortis causa, but a conveyance inter vivos.

FACTS:

Josefa Utea and other heirs of deceased Domingo Bonsato and Andrea Nacario filed a

complaint to annul the donations of several parcels of land made by Domingo Bonsato in favor

of Juan and Felipe Bonsato. The donations were embodied in two Notarial deeds which the

Josefa Utea and the heirs allege were obtained thru fraudulent inducement.

In the Notarial deeds, the donor reserved for himself a portion of the fruits of the properties and

expressed that after the death ofthe donor, the aforesaid donation shall become effective.

CFI ruled that the donation was inter vivos therefor valid. CA ruled it was mortis causa therefor

invalid for not following the required formalities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation was inter vivos?

HELD:

Inter Vivos. If the donation conveys the ownership and only reserves for himself during his

lifetime the owners share of the fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly declares the act to

be irrevocable, it is not a donation mortis causa, but a conveyance inter vivos.

The solemnities required for a donation inter vivos are those prescribed by Art. 749 of the Civil

Code. But only half of the property conveyed shall be valid since the property is conjugal andonly Domingo made the conveyance without any consent from Andrea.

Note: Many portions of the case are in Spanish.

8. SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD, petit ioners , vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUDY CRISTINA M. VALDERRAMA andJESUS ANTONIO VALDERRAMA, respondents .

Facts:

The present case is an appeal by certiorari concerning the character of a deed entitled Deed

of Donation Inter Vivos executed by Aurora Montinola in favor of her three grandchildren

Catalino Valderrama, Judy Valderrama, and Jesus Valderrama and treated of a parcel of land,

Lot 3231 of the Cadastral Survey of Panay, Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-

16105 in the name of Montinola. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in

acknowledgment of the acceptance of the donation.. The deed however provided that that the

donation shall be effective only 10 years after Montinolas death.

Montinolas Secretary, Gloria Salvilla, presented the deed for recording in the Property

Registry, and the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT (the donors title) and in its place, issued

another TCT in the names of the donees. Montinola however retained the owners duplicate

copy of the new title as well as the property itself.

In 1987, Montinola revoked the donation because of acts of ingratitude committed against her

by the Valderramas; that the Valderramas defamed her; that she overheard the Valderramas

plotting against her life (The revocation was based **on the ground of ingratitude committedby said donees against my person consisting of utterances of defamatory words ** also, the

said donees are engaged in criminal scheme to eliminate me so that they can immediately

obtain title to and dispose of the property donated which they cannot do while I am still alive

Montinola reiterated that act of renovatio in her holographic will dated November 21, 1988,

viz.: Teresita and her children (the Valderramas) are not good to me and they are in a hurry

for me to die and they want to kill me and I personally heard it in the extension of the

telephone** I am revoking all my donations to the children and grandchildren of Teresita.)

In 1990, she petitioned to have her title be reinstated and her grandchildrens title be

cancelled. She said that the donation is actually a donation mortis causa and that the same is

void because the formalities of a will were not complied with. In the same year, she sold her

property to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.

The Valderramas opposed the petition. The donees (Montinolas grandchildren) opposed thepetition. They averred that the donation in their favor was one inter vivos, which, having fully

complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly

valid and efficacious. They also expressed doubt about the sincerity of their gran dmothers

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intention to recover the donated property, since she had not pursued the matter of its

revocation after having it annotated as an adverse claim.

In 1991, the trial court rendered judgment holding that the donation was indeed inter vivos.

Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In 1993, while the case was still pending,

Montinola died. The petition was continued by the spouses Sicad.

The CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos is actually a donation mortis causa.

Held:

It is actually a donation mortis causa. A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but

withholds form the donee that right to dispose of the donated property during the donors

lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not

transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. The donation in question, though

denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa. It is further rendered void because the

essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with.

The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora never intended the donation to take

effect within her lifetime. First, she expressed that the donation take effect 10 years after her

death. Second, she inserted a prohibition on the sale or encumbrance of the property during

the 10 year period. Third, she continued to possess the property as well as the fruits and

authorized such enjoyment in the deed of donation. Fourth, she retained the certificate of title

(which she subsequently alienated in favor of the Sicads). All these are indisputable acts of

ownership. And all these circumstances lead to the conclusion that the donation in question

was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after

the donors death. In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the

deed of donation in question to Montinolas grandchildren.

The Valderramas argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that the prohibition

against their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which, if violated, would

give cause for its revocation, begs the question. It assumes that they have the right to make adisposition of the property, which they do not. The argument also makes no sense, because if

they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact dispose of it to a third person, the

revocation of the donation they speak of would be of no utility or benefit to the donor, since

such a revocation would not necessarily result in the restoration of the donors ownership and

enjoyment of the property.

The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its

language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant

upon its execution.

It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed one inter vivos

simply because founded on considerations of love and affection.

Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code to the

effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must be that

entailing the least transmission of rights and interests.

9. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLICBISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C.IGNAO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OFDECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA,represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO,respondents.

DOCTRINE

There is no need for prescription to be applied in cases where there is stipulation forautomatic reversion. Nonetheless, the stipulation is against public policy and thus, is void.

FACTS:

On August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of

donation in favor of herein petitioner Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of

land located at Cavite. The deed of donation provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell

the property within a period of 100 years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise

a violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the donation and the

property would revert to the estate of the donors.

However, on June 30, 1980 while within the prohibitive period to dispose, pe titioner executed a

deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of the petitioner-spouses

Florencio and Soledad Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000.00. Hence, privaterespondents filed a complaint for the nullification of the deed of donation. In their answer, the

petitioners filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the action has been barred by

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prescription because the complaint was filed four years after the sale, and that the complaint

states no cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation in favor of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila may

be revoked.

HELD:

No. The complaint in the case at bar cannot be barred by prescription because the applicable

prescriptive period is not the 4-year period provided in Article 764 of the New Civil Code, rather

it is the 10-year period ordinary prescription shall apply because the deed of donation provides

for the automatic reversion of the property to the original owner in case of violation of any

condition. The Court in the previous case of De Luna v. Abrigo has already settled such

prescriptive period.

However, although the action cannot be dismissed on the ground of prescription, the same

should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

The cause of action of the private respondents is based on the fact that the petitioner sold the

lot during the 50thyear of the prohibitive period of 100 years. Such prohibitive period imposed

by the respondents was unreasonable because applying in analogy Articles 494 and 870 of the

New Civil Code, the donor cannot order a prohibitive period of disposition exceeding 20 years.

As such, the said condition regarding the prohibitive period being contrary to law shall be

considered as null and void pursuant to Art. 727 of the New Civil Code but the donation shall

remain valid and subsisting. Thus, respondents cannot anymore revoke the donation, and the

sale of the property by the petitioner to the Ignao spouses shall be valid and with legal effects.

10. EUFEMIA PAJARILLO, CLAUDIO SUTERIO, JR., NYMIA SUTERIO and MARILYNSUTERIO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THIRD CIVILCASES DIVISION, SALUD SUTERIO and PEDRO MATIAS, respondents.

FACTS:

Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate in 1945 and leaving a tract of 28 hectares of land

with buildings and improvements in the Quezon Province. On May 20, 1946, perfectas siblings

Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument entitled Extra -judicial settlement of the estate

of the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero. In it they disposed that in according to Perfectas

wishes and in consideration of love and affection, the said property be donated to private

respondent Salud Suterio de Matias, Perfectas niece, who will assume the

encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P 1,000. In the same

document, the done accepted the donation in a public instrument. The instrument was never

registered nor the title transferred to Saluds name although she immediately took possession

of the land. Sometime in 1951, Salud transferred the possession of the land to her mother

Juana, who was then staying with her brother Claudio and his family. During the period they

were occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes thereon. On May 25, 1956, Juana executed

a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. Two years later, Claudio had the land

registered in his name. Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On June 30, 1965, the

private respondents Salud and Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the

property on the ground that the deed of sale in favor of Claudio was fictitious and the

registration in his name was null and void. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by

Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and the

defendants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement was a donation.

HELD:

Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of the

property in question. As such, they were free to give the land to whomever they pleased andfor whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they choose to respect Perfectas wishes and carry

out her intentions by donating the land to Salud, there was no legal impediment to their doing

so. There is no question that Felipe and Juana could have simply disregarded their sisters

sentiments and decided not to donate the property to Salud. The fact that they did not do this

speaks well of their integrity and their loyalty to their deceased sister. The extra-judicial

settlement also reflects their own affection for Salud which constituted the valid consideration

for their own act of liberality.

11. EDUVIGIS J. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

In 1973, Eduvigis Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq. m. residential lot in San Isidro,

Taytay, Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces (privaterespondents Teresita, Lydia and Cecilia, all surnamed De Leon). The property was accordingly

transferred to the names of private respondents.

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In 1974, Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she extrajudicailly tried

to revoke the donation, but the donee resisted, alleging that: (1) the property in question was

co-owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees,

hence the latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance; and (2) Eduvigis owns another

property, an agricultural land of more than two hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay,

Rizal, hence the donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of the adoptive child.

Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation, invoking Article 760,

par. 3 of the NCC. The trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation. On appal, TheCourt of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject

donation.

HELD:

Yes. In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated

some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of

the donation within 4 years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the

adopted, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the donation of the

child (Articles 760, 761 and 763 of the NCC). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of

which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged. Unfortunately, in the case at

bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime

of the adopted child. Indeed, it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the donor.

Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that

the donor has another piece of land worth P273,420 in 1977. The legal situation of petitioner-

donor is made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that the grandfather of the

donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the effect of which is to

reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion of the

estate within the free disposal of petitioner.

12. CONSTANCIO JOAQUIN,plaintiff-appellant, vs. GODOFREDO B. HERRERA, asmunicipal president of Caloocan, Rizal, LOPE K. SANTOS, as provincialgovernor, and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL and JOSEJAVIER,intervener, defendants. SILVINO LIM and JACINTO LIMJAP,applicantsfor intervention, appellants.

This controversy is concerned with the rival claims of Constancio Joaquin and Javier to theconcession for running two cockpits situated just beyond the corporate limits of the city ofManila, in the barrios of La Loma and Maypajo, in the municipality of Caloocan, Province ofRizal. It appears that in March, 1913, when the original complaint in this cause was filed, theplaintiff Joaquin owned or had obtained control of the two cockpits in question; and he hadbeen seeking for a month or more to procure a license from the municipal authoritiesauthorizing him to open these cockpits to the public.

Under the provisions of law then in force in the Philippine Islands municipal councils wereclothed with authority "to regulate and permit or prohibit cockfighting and the keeping ortraining of fighting cocks, and to close cockpits." (Act No. 1909, sec. 1.) In pursuance of thisauthority, the municipal council of Caloocan had, late in the preceding year, enacted a newordinance prescribing the conditions under which cockpits might be conducted. This ordinancecontained the following among other provisions:

SEC. 4. The municipal president is hereby authorized to issue permits for the keepingof cockpits within the jurisdiction of this municipality, pursuant to the provisionsspecified in this ordinance, for a period not to exceed four years.

Upon the 14th day in February, 1913, the plaintiff Constancio Joaquin appeared before themunicipal president and requested that a license be issued to him under said ordinanceauthorizing him to conduct the cockpits in Maypajo and La Loma. At this time there was apending an action in the Court of First Instance of the province of Rizal (Bertol et al. vs. Santoset al., No. 986) instituted by the parties who had been theretofore engaged in running thesecockpits. These persons questioned the validity of the ordinance and in that action hadobtained a preliminary injunction against the municipal president of Caloocan and otherofficials prohibiting them from molesting the plaintiffs in the conduct of these cockpits. Thispreliminary injunction was still in force at the time the plaintiff Joaquin made application for alicense for running the cockpits in the places mentioned. The plaintiff therefore in hisapplication made reference to the existence of this injunction and stated that if the licenseshould be issued to him and the plaintiffs in the injunction suit should prevail, the license orpermit granted to him would be considered as cancelled. Upon the 5th of February, 1913,Godofredo B. Herrera, municipal president, issued a license pursuant to this application, inwhich it was stated that the same should be considered cancelled and of no effect if theplaintiffs in the then pending action for injunction should prevail. Upon February 13, 1913, themunicipal council of Caloocan adopted a resolution in which it revoked this license, the reasonalleged being that Joaquin had not made the requisite deposit to secure the payment of thefees and taxes. Ten days later, however, to wit upon February 23, 1913, the municipal councilpassed another resolution whereby its prior resolution revoking Joaquin's license was itselfannulled and the license in question reinstated. The reason for this step seems to have beenthat the previous resolution had been passed under a misapprehension with respect to thedeposit made by Joaquin; and it is a fact that the requisite deposit had already been made byhim. Five days later, to wit, on February 28, 1913, Godofredo B. Herrera, as municipalpresident, vetoed the last mentioned resolution and returned it to the council without hi

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approval. Meanwhile, upon February 24, 1913, the injunction which had been obtained by theparties who had conducted the cockpits up to that time was dissolved. The plaintiff, ConstancioJoaquin, thereupon again appeared before the municipal president and upon March 1, 1913,applied anew for a license permitting to conduct the cockpits in question. This application wasdenied.

Matters having reached this point, the plaintiff Constancio Joaquin filed his original complaint inthis cause, upon March 1, 1913, in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal. Hispurpose in instituting this action was to compel the defendant, Godofredo B. Herrera, asmunicipal president, to issue a license authorizing him to conduct the cockpits in question for aperiod of four years, and incidentally to enjoin the defendant, his successors in office, hisagents and servants, as well ass all others who might aid or assist him therein, from hinderingor molesting the plaintiff in the conduct of said cockpits. The plaintiff also prayed for atemporary mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to issue a license as contemplated inthe complaint for the period during which this litigation should be pending in the court. Fromthe foregoing statement of the nature of the relief sought it is evident that the present action isin the nature of an application for a writ of mandamus and incidental injunctive relief.

Upon the filing of this complaint, the judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province ofRizal issued a preliminary mandatory injunction requiring the aforesaid Herrera to issue thelicense in conformity with the prayer contained in the complaint, upon the execution of a bondwhich was duly approved by said judge. These steps were accordingly taken, and the licensewas issued pursuant to said order.

Turning our attention again to the wrangles of the municipal authorities of Caloocan over thegranting of the license sought by Joaquin, we find that after Herrera vetoed its resolution ofFebruary 23, 1913, the municipal council passed it again, with the necessary majority, over thisveto. This occurred upon March 10, 1913. The resolution was then suspended by themunicipal board of the Province of Rizal upon the ground that the resolution was invalid andthat the opinion of the fiscal was desired thereon. The resolution seems thereafter to haveremained undisturbed and nothing has since been heard of it.

In the month of April, 1913, it happened that the defendant Herrera temporarily ceased todischarge the functions of municipal president in Caloocan, and his duties were performed fora few days by Leopoldo Ponciano, the municipal vice-president. This official was a friendly tothe designs of Joaquin, and the latter accordingly at once made application to him for theissuance of another license covering the desired privilege. The plaintiff's purpose was ofcourse to cure the defect in his title to the concession and thereby put himself beyond thedangers and vicissitudes of litigation. In this, however, he was disappointed, for within a few

days Herrera returned to duty and revoked the license which had been issued by Ponciano. Inhis amended complaint the plaintiff Joaquin relies upon the license issued by Ponciano andinsists that the revocation of the same by Herrera was invalid.

The foregoing statement embraces every fact necessary to the determination of the rights ofthe plaintiff to the license upon sought by him. The question of law arising thereupon will bediscussed later.

The rival pretensions of Jose Javier as conductor of these cockpits have their origin in anapplication, dated December 28, 1912, and directed by him to the provincial board of theProvince of Rizal wherein he indicated a desire to acquire the privilege of running five cockpitsin the environs of Manila, located in the four municipalities of said province which are inimmediate proximity to the city. The barrios of La Loma and Maypajo, in the municipality ofCaloocan, were two of the places contemplated in his application as cockpit sites. Thisapplicant appears to have been desirous of securing a monopoly of all the cockpits around thecity, and as they were located within the jurisdiction of four municipalities, he thought well toaddress his application in the first instance to the provincial board. The board immediatelyendorsed the aforesaid application to the municipal council of Caloocan for action thereuponwith respect to the two cockpits located within the jurisdiction of the latter body. In varioussessions held near the end of December and in the first half of the month of January themunicipal council had this application under consideration; and while the body manifested afriendly attitude towards the applicant, the desired concession was not obtained, apparentlybecause of the failure of the applicant to put up the requisite bond. Finally, upon January 30,1913, Jose Javier deposited with the provincial treasurer a bond, signed by two sureties,Silvino Lim and J. Limjap, for P54,000 to secure the payment of all licensee fees and impostswhich might become owing by him as licensee or concessionary of the cockpit privilegesaforesaid. On the same day, in order apparently to secure his bondsmen against loss fromtheir obligation as sureties, Jose Javier executed as assignment of any of rights possessed by

him as concessionary of said privileges to his sureties Lim and Limjap. Later (March 10) thisassignment was substituted by another document executed by Javier by which it was declaredthat for exploitation of said concession the two sureties aforesaid would have the character ofcapitalists while Javier would act as an industrial partner. Prior to March 11, 1913, the rivalapplicants, Joaquin and Javier, had not directly crossed swords with each other, their effortsbeing directed toward procuring the requisite license from the municipal authorities; upon thisdate Javier made a motion in the present cause asking leave to intervene, alleging that he hada legal interest in the subject ma tter of the litigation. Leave to intervene was granted and Javierfiled his petition of intervention in which he asserted a right to the cockpit license superior tothat of Joaquin and prayed that the preliminary injunction already granted in favor of the latterbe dissolved and that the court should further require the municipal president to issue a licensein favor of himself.

It should be noted that up to this juncture in these contentions Joaquin had in his favor the factthat he owned or controlled the only existing pits in which the cockfighting could be conducted.Where or how he acquired that control does not appear. Therefore, all he needed was the

requisite license permitting him to open the pits in question to the public. His opponent Javier,on the other hand, was apparently handicapped by the fact that he had no places ready toopen for business. It is evident that at no time did this litigant have any control over theparticular cockpit sites controlled by Joaquin.

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We deem it well, before passing to other complications of the case, here to indicate our opinionupon the merits of the claims of the respective contestants as thus far developed. To beginwith, the cockpit ordinance mentioned at the beginning of this opinion was entirely valid, beinga proper exercise of the regulative authority over the subject of cockfighting conferred uponmunicipal councils by Act No. 1909-1, amendatory of Act No. 82-40 (j).

Article 4 of said ordinance, quoted at the beginning of t his opinion, is also in our opinion, aproper and reasonable provisions; and it is not subject to criticism as an authority which is bylaw vested exclusively in the council. The licenses must be issued by somebody; and therewould seem to be no more suitable personage upon whom the duty of emitting suchdocuments could be imposed than the municipal president, who is by law the presiding officerof the council. The duty in question, it will be observed, is partly ministerial and partlydiscretionary. The period of time during which the license mat run may extend to the limit offour years, and within the limits of that period the municipal president would undoubtedly havea discretion as to the duration of the license. He might, for instance, be aware that themunicipal council was contemplating the closing of the cockpit for which a license was desired;and he might, for this or other reasons, think it inadvisable to issue a license for the null periodof four years. The licensee, on the other hand, might no be willing to undertake to conduct thecockpit for the whole period. The discretion of the president, furthermore, obviously extends tocertain other matters. It is his duty to inform himself as to whether the licensee is in a positionto comply with all the conditions prescribed in the ordinance. For instance, the ordinanceprescribes that cockpits can not be established nearer to each other than a fixed distance. It isalso provided that there shall be only one cockpit in the poblacion. The president shouldascertain the willingness or ability of the assignee to fulfill all such conditions.

It will be noted also that the ordinance in question does not peremptorily declare that thepresident shall issue the cockpit license to proper applicants, but merely vests in him anauthority to emit such license. The president, as an executive officer, is charged with the dutyof seeing that all laws and ordinances are carried into effect. As the presiding officer of thecouncil he participates in its deliberations, and when occasion arise he may convene the bodyin special session. It results that in our opinion the faculty vested in the president by thisordinance clearly involves, as has already been stated, an element of discretion. It is true thatthe president is not clothed with the power to regulate or suppress cockpits. That matter isconfined by law to the council and the general policy to be assumed with regard to theseplaces of entertainment must be determined by that body.

In the light of what just been stated, it is obvious that the plaintiff can not maintain the writ ofmandamus to compel the issuance to him of a cockpit license on the facts which existed onMarch 1, 1913. The most important principle to be observed in the exercise of the jurisdictionby mandamus, and one which lies at the very foundation of the entire systems of rules andprinciples regulating the use of this remedy , is that which fixes the distinction between duties ofa peremptory or mandatory nature and those which are discretionary in their character,involving the exercise of some degree of judgment on the part of the officer or body againstwhom the mandamus is sought. Stated in general terms, the principle is that mandamus will lie

to compel the performance of duties purely ministerial in their nature and so clear and specificthat no element of discretion is left in their performance; but that as to all acts or dutiesnecessarily calling for the exercise of judgment and discretion on the part of the officer or bodyat whose hands their performance is required, mandamus will not lie.

It may also be said that the discretion vested in the municipal president with respect to theissuance of cockpit licenses is of an executive and political nature; and we believe that it wouldbe violative of sound principle and injurious in its practical results for the courts to undertake tocontrol this officer in the exercise of the power conferred upon him by this ordinance. It is truethat the applicant Joaquin had complied with every prerequisite specified in the ordinance; hehad pits in which cockfighting could be lawfully conducted; and there is no suggestion that hispersonality as the manager of such a business was objectionable, or that there was anydanger that cockfighting would be there conducted in improper ways. It cannot be admitted,however, that the individual interest is greater than that of the public welfare of which thepresident is supposed to be the guardian when acting within the limits of his lawful powers. Butit will be said that if the president cannot be coerced by the writ of mandamus, he will be inposition to thwart the will of the council and practically to put an end to cockfighting by refusingto issue a cockpit license to any person. We do not think that this argument is by any meansconclusive, for we must remember that the council remains in existence, with its statedmeetings; and if it should find that the president is presuming to beyond the proper limits of hisfunctions, the council would have the power, by its own resolution or ordinance, to override hiswill and to grant a concession to any suitable person, for it is not to be supposed that thedelegation to him of the authority to emit cockpit licenses has stripped the counsel of its facultyof determining the matter for itself.

The doctrine is well accepted in the United States that generally speaking, mandamus will notlie to compel the issuance of a license to exercise a privilege. (Adams vs. Stephens, 88 Ky.,443; State ex rel. Campbell vs. Cramer, 96 Mo., 75, 83; State ex rel. Daboval vs. Police Jury,39 La. Ann., 759, 765; People ex rel. Schwab vs. Grant, 126 N. Y., 473; Schlaudecker vs.Marshall, 72 Pa. St., 200, 207.) No case has come to our attention in which the writ ofmandamus has been sustained in a situation such as is now before us. It is, however,undoubtedly true that the remedy could be used to restrain gross abuse in an exceptionalcase. Thus, writ has been allowed in a case where the municipal authorities refused to grant alicense to a brewing establishment, where the applicant had complied with all statutoryrequirements. (Prospect Brewing Co.'s Petition, 127 Pa. St., 523.) It was admitted that actioncould not have been maintained if the question had been over the issuance of a license to sellliquors at retail, since the selling of liquors at retail is much more closely connected with themoral health of the community. It must be conceded that cockfighting is on about the sameplane as the conducting of dance halls and the selling of liquor; and it is generally recognizedand police supervision over these forms of entertainment and diversion can be much more

strict than over activities of a harmless nature. We are therefore of the opinion that the Court ofFirst Instance committed no error in denying to the plaintiff at the final hearing the writ ofmandamus which was the object of this action, in so far as relief was sought upon the factswhich existed upon March 1, 1913.

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In the preceding discussion we have considered the pretensions of the plaintiff ConstancioJoaquin solely with reference to the situation which existed upon March 1, 1913, withoutregard to license originally issued in his favor by president Herrera on February 5, 1913. Butwe are of the opinion that the applicant acquired no rights under that license for two reasons:In the first place, the preliminary injunction was still in force in the case of Bertol et al. vs.Santos et al., whereby the president of the municipality of Caloocan and others were requiredto abstain from impending the plaintiffs in that action in the exploitation of their cockpits andfrom requiring them to close the same. The license in question could not therefore actuallytake effect until that injunction should be dissolved; and the issuance of said license on

February 5 was to say the least premature. In the second place, this license was, as we havealready stated, subsequently revoked by the municipal council; and though an attempt wasmade by the council to get it reinstated by resolution, this effort was in the end unsuccessful,owing, first, to the veto of the president, and secondly, to the action of the provincial boardsuspending the resolution. Although under the law as it then existed the veto power of thepresident extended only to the veto of "ordinances" (Act No. 82, sec. 18, k), we are of theopinion that the resolution of the council by which it undertook to reinstate its previousresolution and thereby revive the concession or license, in favor of the plaintiff was anordinance within the meaning of the law. This resolution was an expression of the legislativewill of the council and derived its validity from the authority to regulate cockpits which isconferred on the council by law. It is clear that the council could not defeat the veto power ofthe president merely by putting a proposition in the form of a resolution; and it is the substanceof the provision which determines its character. We note that in the Administrative Code now inthe force the codifiers have removed all doubt as to the extent of the veto power of themunicipal president by placing restrictive definition upon the word "ordinance," as therein used,and expressly extending the veto power of the president to resolutions. (See Administrative

Code, secs. 2227 and 2229.) These provisions practically have the same effect as the formerprovision, as now interpreted by us.

The action of the provincial board in suspending the resolution in question after it had beenpassed over the presidential veto was doubtless a partisan act intended to obstruct the plaintiffand assist the rival claimant; but the board was acting within the scope of its lawful powers,and it is not for us to scrutinize the motive of its action. If the plaintiff had chosen to prosecutehis rights under that resolution to the end, it would have been necessary for him to secureaction upon it by the official authorized to pass upon its validity. As he did not do so, theresolution must continue to repose in the pigeonhole where it had been placed. It follows thatas the plaintiff had acquired no right under the license of February 5, the merit of his claim atthe time of the institution of this action must be determined without reference to that license.

When we come to consider the rights of the plaintiff Constancio Joaquin under the licenseissued upon April 18, 1913, by Leopoldo Ponciano, he appears to be much stronger position;

and we are of the opinion that this license constitutes a valid source of title. Of this license theplaintiff has properly availed himself by setting up his rights thereunder in his amended orsupplemental complaint. The action of the president, Herrera, in revoking this license uponApril 25, 1913, was our opinion an unauthorized act and by no means destroyed the privilege

which the plaintiff had acquired thereunder. To revoke a cockpit license is to close a c