Peacebuilding and PostconflictRecovery: What Works and WhatDoes Not?

JUNE 2014

The fourth International Expert Forum (IEF), “Peacebuilding and PostconflictRecovery: What Works and What Does Not?” was focused squarely on thechallenges of rebuilding peace in countries and societies emerging from conflictand the role of external actors in supporting these processes. The IEF was heldat the International Peace Institute (IPI) on May 23, 2013, and participantsconsidered the track record of peacebuilding, political and economic transitionprocesses, as well as rule of law and transitional justice. The goal was to distillinsights and identify policy implications. This IEF was the fourth meeting in aseries of high-level seminars dealing with the conflict cycle. Previous forumsconsidered conflict prevention, the mitigation of consequences of conflict, andpeacekeeping. The IEF serves as an informal platform for exchange and dialogueamong researchers, practitioners, and decision makers on issues related toconflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. The IEF convenes one-dayworkshops at IPI in New York and is a joint initiative by IPI, the FolkeBernadotte Academy (FBA), the SecDev Foundation, and the Center forInternational Peace Operations (ZIF).

Introduction

The fourth International Expert Forum (IEF) focused on the question of whatworks and what does not in peacebuilding. In the process, it considered notonly UN activities over the past two decades but also initiatives undertakenindependently by governments alongside multilateral, bilateral, and non-governmental entities. A key question posed by the organizers was whetherpeacebuilding writ large has contributed empirically to improving safety,security, justice, democratization, and economic recovery, and thuscontributed to positive development. Peace, defined narrowly as the decline of armed conflicts, is spreading.Today, there are an estimated thirty-three conflicts. Despite an increasecompared to previous years, this number still marks a strong declinecompared to the 1990s. While there are very real challenges in Syria, Iraq, theSahel, and Central Asia, the facts show a reduction in lethal violence associ-ated with warfare.1 Additionally, the character of violence and its context aretransforming. Organized crime and urban violence are increasingly viewed asthreats in many parts of the world. Internationally, new norms and principlesare emerging regarding the protection of civilians, the role of women and girlsin conflicts, human security, the responsibility of governments to protect their

This meeting note was drafted by

Robert Muggah, research and policy

director of the SecDev Foundation

and research director at the Igarapé

Institute, and Christian Altpeter,

research assistant at the Folke

Bernadotte Academy. It reflects the

rapporteurs' interpretation of the

discussion and does not necessarily

reflect the view of all participants.

The International Expert Forum was

originally launched at IPI in New

York on December 15, 2011. It is a

joint collaboration of the Folke

Bernadotte Academy, IPI, the

SecDev Foundation, and the Center

for International Peace Operations

(ZIF). The fourth International Ex -

pert Forum was held at IPI on May

23, 2013.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its

many generous donors, whose

support makes publications like this

one possible.

TheSecDevFOUNDATION

1 See Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Program (UCDP), “Two Out of Five War Fatalities Occurred in Syria,” press release, June 12, 2014, available at www.uu.se/en/media/news/article/?id=3514&area=2,6,10,16&typ=artikel&na=&lang=en .

2 PEACEBUILDING AND POSTCONFLICT RECOVERY

citizens, and the prosecution of individuals forcommitting war crimes and atrocities. Macro-level data show the positive effect ofincreased UN involvement and the expansion ofpeacemakers, peacekeepers, and peacebuilders onmanaging conflicts and building peace. Peacescholars such as Joshua S. Goldstein, AndrewMack, Peter Wallensteen, and Thomas G. Weisshave shown that the United Nations and theevolving peace architecture do play a key role.2

Even if this might sound self-congratulatory, andhas been criticized as such, research and “big data”support this view, showing that there is an associa-tion and in some cases a correlation.3

In previous IEFs, we heard that there have beenmore than 600 peace agreements since the 1990s.Scholars explained that these tend to be more oftenthan not connected with conflict reduction andpeace. Also, we learned that there were as many as120,000 peacekeepers by the late 1990s and into the2000s, and that interventions based on Chapters VIand VII correlate with reductions in violence andconflicts. Yet our knowledge is still very limited about why,how, and which of the instruments and toolsavailable to peacebuilders work on the ground.This holds true despite the fact that the newpeacebuilding architecture that is in place since2005 is better at organizing and coordinatingresponses. Therefore, the major challenge forpeacebuilding is to find out what works and whatdoes not. More than only getting the facts right,this is about introducing an evidence-basedapproach to a fast-growing field. The fourth IEF dwelled on these questions—what works in peacebuilding, and how is thisconnected to early and longer-term recovery?What does peacebuilding entail? While the UNarchitecture to build peace is evolving and consistsof many institutions, how does it work in everydayterms? Is it a generic category for a range of prac -tices? Is it a set of activities that are temporallybound? Is it something that can be institutionalizedand replicated? The 2009 report of the secretary-

general on peacebuilding defined it as at least fivemajor activities—the provision of security andsafety, support for political processes, basic servicedelivery, restoration of core state functions, andeconomic revitalization—virtually everything.4 Arelated conundrum is determining who is involvedin peacebuilding and who is not. Identifying answers to these questions is criticalto inform and improve future peacebuilding.Knowing what works will help to makepeacebuilding more successful and field morerealistic expectations in terms of what can beachieved and what cannot.

Session I: The Track Recordof Peacebuilding

There has been an impressive growth in data-driven research on peacebuilding in the pastdecade. This complements a very large body of casestudy work. However, there are comparatively fewactual evaluations of what works and what doesnot. There is a clear need to apply multiplemethods to start testing impacts. Academics andpolicymakers agree that in all cases an evidence-based approach is required. To this end, the firstsession focused on the track record of past peace -building efforts and shed light on the difficulties ofdefining successful peacebuilding and its end point.Without a commonly accepted definition of peace -building, its goals, content, success, and failureremain contested. Defining success in peacebuilding is far lessstraightforward than it may seem. Is the end pointof peacebuilding the absence of violence or a stateof positive peace? When does peacekeeping endand peacebuilding begin? What is the differencebetween peacebuilding and development assist -ance? Generally, peacebuilding is closely connectedwith liberal and democratic values. Many of thecontemporary constructs of liberal and democraticpeace build on values and ideas put forward bythinkers such as Kant, Locke, and Rousseau. Thisapproach has been criticized for representing

2 See, for example, Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (New York: Penguin, 2011); and Human Security ReportProject, Human Security Report 2013: The Decline in Global Violence (Vancouver: Human Security Research Group, 2014), available at www.hsrgroup.org .

3 For trends and data on armed conflict, see Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/, and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO),www.prio.org/Data/.

4 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304, June 11, 2009.

Western ideas and agendas while lacking anunderstanding of the challenges met by peace -building on the ground. Since the 1990s, we have witnessed an increasinginstitutionalization of the field, with a range ofactors, aspects, and programs added to the idea andpractice of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is nowwidely understood to consist of severaldimensions—beginning with the first phase thatmight include disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration; extending into the second phase thatcan include efforts to establish the rule of law andbuild critical services and democratic institutions;and to the third phase dealing with transitionaljustice, community dialogue, and economicdevelopment, etc. Such a broad concept makes itdifficult to discern the contents and limits ofpeacebuilding, as well as to assess what successfulpeacebuilding is. A usual starting point is JohanGaltung’s approach, describing peace building as allthose activities that help prevent and reduceviolence. According to this interpretation, successentails the reduction of violence, including struc - tural and indirect violence. Defining success in peacebuilding thus requiresclarity on the end point: whether it aims atachieving the absence of direct violence orimproving the access to basic rights and reductionof injustices, i.e., positive peace. At the UnitedNations, peacebuilding was introduced as a tool byformer secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’sAgenda for Peace in 1992. Since then, the concept ofpeacebuilding has evolved and grown in line withthe changing nature of conflicts and the need forthe United Nations to develop appropriate andcomprehensive approaches for building self-sustaining, durable peace. This includes, amongother things, reconciliation, the prevention ofrenewed violence, integration of civil society, ruleof law, and the resolution of underlying structuraland societal issues. Reflecting this development, theBrahimi Report thus defines peacebuilding as“activities undertaken on the far side of conflict toreassemble the foundations of peace and providethe tools for building on those foundationssomething that is more than just the absence ofwar.”5 Raising the bar to positive peace not only

represents a very ambitious goal, but it also makesit hard to measure impact and raises the question ofwhat can be attributed to peacebuilding activities.How, practically, can we measure whether it issuccessful or whether there is value for money? Finally, the recent years have witnessed a turn tolocal peacebuilding, which not only takes intoaccount external actors but also considers localactors and the demands and expectations from thelocal communities. To those who have sufferedfrom conflict and who are struggling with itsaftermath, peace and successful peacebuildingmight mean different things than external actorspresume. In his contribution on the track record ofpeacebuilding, Richard Gowan stressed that onlylittle is known about the success factors ofpeacebuilding. Rather than due to a lack of interest,this is mainly due to the challenge of measuring theeffects of peacebuilding when dealing with today’scomprehensive mandates of peacebuildingmissions to build positive peace. As an example, herecalled the attempts of a Swedish general todetermine the success of a political mission inYemen in the 1960s. Success was evaluated on thebasis of the number of heads on pikes found eachmorning. Although crude, it exemplifies a straight-forward way to measure negative peace. In addition to rising expectations, the trackrecord of peacebuilding shows areas needingimprovement, particularly when considering pastUN-led peacebuilding missions. Coups, continuingor recurring conflicts, and failure to fulfill theirmandates characterized the missions in Timor-Leste, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and the CentralAfrican Republic. More than half of the countrieswhere peacebuilding offices had been establishedwitnessed a return of mass violence or experiencedviolent coups. The picture becomes more nuanced whenincluding a wider range of peacebuilding measuresand political missions. This broader understandingof peacebuilding encompasses a total of sixty-sixcivilian missions in postconflict countriesundertaken by the United Nations, the EuropeanUnion (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-

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5 Brahimi Report, also known as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, para. 13, available at www.unrol.org/files/brahimi%20report%20peacekeeping.pdf .

4 PEACEBUILDING AND POSTCONFLICT RECOVERY

operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union(AU), the Organization of American States (OAS),and other actors. Africa is the center of gravity forpeacebuilding efforts including the AU’s civiliancapabilities, often in close cooperation with UNefforts. The OSCE has fifteen missions in Europeand Central Asia. However, the OSCE is no longerthe vibrant actor it was during the 1990s. That rolehas been assumed by the EU, which is an atypicalactor covering the entire range of civilian missionsfrom specific and targeted engagements tostrengthen rule of law or the police sector to delega-tions dealing with the full range of postconflictrecovery. As stressed in the World Development Report2011, one of the major difficulties with measuringthe success of these missions is that they are long-term processes.6 For instance, to rebuild a justicesector after conflict takes on average two decades.Institutional processes not only take time, but theyoften risk falling victim to political dynamics.There will always be a tension between technicalmeasures and the political dimension. Accordingto Richard Gowan, it is the duration and thevulnerability of these processes that explains whyefforts to measure success on an institutionalmatrix are bound to fail. Mali represents a serioustest case for the limits of peacebuilding. There aregood efforts by the international community tobuild up and train a new army, but the real test willbe whether the political elites will cooperate. In light of these challenges, a focus on achievableshort- and mid-term goals seems more feasible.The political dimension needs to be put back intothe center—that is, how political elites, parties, andlow-level actors cooperate and commit to theprocess. In this context, big data analyses only takeus so far. Qualitative assessments, human rightsreports, and the like are important tools to assesspeacebuilding efforts. Political analyses remaincentral to understanding what peacebuildingmissions do. The policies and politics ofpeacebuilding represent the core of these missions.

In her intervention, Mercedes García Pérez,representing the EU Civilian Planning andConduct Capability of the European ExternalAction Service (EEAS), highlighted the EU’shistory as a peacebuilding project aimed atreconciling countries and societies after conflict. Asa reminder of that role, she referred to the experi-ence of the EU as a facilitator for the agreementreached between Kosovo and Serbia on April 19,2013.7 García Pérez alluded to the eleven civilianmissions currently conducted by the EU that fallwithin the peacebuilding domain and whosemandates range from specific operations to rebuildrule of law or the security sector to missions with abroad, comprehensive mandate such as theEuropean Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo(EULEX Kosovo).8

To assess the missions, regular strategic reviewshave been put in place and impact assessment willbe introduced as another tool to evaluate missions.Moreover, a system of benchmarking is included inthe planning period, which is implemented whilemissions are underway. These tools have beenintroduced only quite recently, and while thesequantitative and qualitative assessments are useful,García Pérez agrees with Gowan that decisionmaking about peacebuilding is political, and assess-ments are secondary to the political decision. Dueto the political nature of peacebuilding, exit strate-gies and drawdown of missions represent keychallenges. To prevent jeopardizing what has beenachieved and to ensure long-term stability,continued commitment also is needed after the endof a peacebuilding mission. From the perspective of the EU, peacebuildingmissions have proven to be quite cost-effective,with the yearly budget of 300 million Eurosrepresenting only a small proportion of the EEAS’total budget. Considerable work needs to be doneto spread information and to engage the public in adebate about peacebuilding. Ayaka Suzuki called on the United Nations andother actors to be humble in their endeavors to

6 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org/QLKJWJB8X0 . 7 European External Action Service, “Serbia and Kosovo Reach Landmark Deal,” April 19, 2013, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-facilitated_dialogue_en.htm .8 In 2012, new missions were launched in South Sudan (the EU Aviation Security Mission [EUAVSEC]), the Horn of Africa (the EU Regional Maritime Capacity

Building Mission in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean [EUCAP Nestor]), and Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger). In 2013, two further missions werelaunched in Libya (the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya [EUBAM Libya]) and Mali (the EU Training Mission in Mali [EUTM-Mali]).

build peace. External actors are not the drivers ofsocial change and will not be able to bring sustain-able peace without the support, the commitment,and the ownership of national leaders and localactors. According to Suzuki, a major reason whymeasuring the success of peacebuilding has becomea challenge is the sheer size of the peacebuildingindustry that has emerged in recent decades. The1992 Agenda for Peace included six articles onpostconflict peacebuilding.9 Since then, peace build -ing has evolved considerably in scope and scale.Peacebuilding missions are now one among manybodies comprising peacekeepers, UN agencies,regional organizations, civil society, and manyothers. Assessing success requires clear bench -marks based on the missions’ mandates. Far toooften, peacebuilding is still done in a way whereresources are allocated and activities are carried outin the hope that something will stick. Burundi marks a more hopeful example asbenchmarks were established in cooperation withthe government. Assessments were carried outjointly by the United Nations and the governmentand provided an accurate inventory of the progressof the peacebuilding efforts. However, the indica-tors had a tendency to measure activities that wereeasily quantifiable instead of dealing with impact.There is a risk of becoming dependent on thesemetrics, leading to a prioritization of programs atthe expense of political work, mediation, and otheractivities that are crucial for postconflict societies,but which are less tangible and more difficult tomeasure. The focus needs to remain on what helpsto build peace, not on what is easy to quantify andto report. The United Nations needs to fine-tunethe approach and tools to assess the effects ofpeacebuilding and acknowledge that the coreaspects of every peacebuilding endeavor are of apolitical nature. Other participants stressed the importance ofincluding local communities in the process toprevent peacebuilding from remaining a purelyforeign intervention. If peacebuilding is aboutstrengthening societies and increasing theirresilience and capacity to manage crises, then thelocal residents need to be part of an inclusiveprocess that does not only focus on the elites. Some

missions do address this broader picture, butparticipants agreed that more work needs to bedone. Also, in addition to dealing with institutionsof the host country, peacebuilding has to pay moreattention to external factors such as internationalorganized crime, trade policies, external securityagendas, and the like. These factors are oftenoverlooked although these dynamics can easilyjeopardize peacebuilding projects. Therefore,peacebuilding needs to be seen much more as apartnership with a stronger focus on collaborationand dialogue. Cooperation is often compromisedby turf battles and high transaction costs.Peacebuilding actors need to live up to thepromises made in this regard. Participants recognized that peacebuilding is along-term process and involves many actors,making it difficult to assess the effects of certaintools and instruments. Nonetheless, there aretechniques to identify trends and developments inthe short term, allowing for adjustments ifnecessary. Perception surveys can be used to collectdata and are an easy tool to assess certain aspects,e.g., whether or not people feel that the overallsituation is improving or how the security forces’behavior is seen. As important as collecting data istranslating findings into actions when necessary,but this is often not the case. Generally, morehonesty is needed when it comes to acknowledgingfailure and poor performance. Closely related aremethodological questions. Are measurementsundertaken against an ideal-type of outcome orhave benchmarks been established? If causal linksand successes of particular operations andprograms have been identified, then how can theybe isolated in the larger context? To what degreeshould the efforts to measure the success ofpeacebuilding take into account where intervenersgo and whether they deal with the hardest or theeasiest cases? And how can we deal with normativecomponents such as stability? For the future, aninternationally agreed set of indicators similar tothe Millenium Development Goals is needed tomeasure progress in a consistent and comparableway. The first session gave an idea about the universeof peacebuilding and what it entails. When

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9 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992, available at www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf .

discussing the success and failure of peacebuilding,we have to take into account that the UnitedNations has to engage the hardest and mostintractable cases. Also, we need to carefully differ-entiate between correlation and causation andmight have to accept that causal effects are exceed-ingly difficult, if not impossible, to isolate.However, the discussion also gave a clearer ideaabout the dependent variables: politics, institu-tions, and resilience. There is today an abundanceof data, and good data that are needed for analysiscan be generated and might help to answer some ofthe questions.

Session II: Economic andPolitical TransitionProcesses

The second session dealt with two core expectedoutcomes of peacebuilding—economic recoveryand the political transition to democracy. Whatlessons can be learned from experiences abouteconomic recovery? And what can be expectedabout the transition to democracy? Doesdemocracy depend on certain requirements or canit arise from any condition? Does democratizationrequire international democracy promotion fromthe outside or does it succeed best when it is drivenfrom the inside? How can external actorscontribute, and what is the role of mechanismssuch as elections? Jan Teorell discussed wider theories on demo -cratization processes and what empirical findingscan tell us about the driving factors of democratiza-tion. He presented four schools of thought puttingforward different explanations of democratiza-tion.10 The structural approach or modernizationtheory claims that economic development is theprimary factor leading to democracy. The strategicapproach focuses on the role of the elites whotrigger democratization, a voluntary move fromabove without structural preconditions. Anotheractor-centric or social forces approach stresses therole of popular mass mobilization from below.Finally, the economic approach combines severalof the factors singled out by the other schools. It

focuses on structural issues leading masses to callfor democracy. How elites react to these demandsis crucial for the process of democratization. In thisapproach, distributional conflicts within societiesdetermine the extent to which these factors playout. Empirical analyses, based on a large set ofdeterminants covering the years 1972–2006, weredeployed to test these approaches. The dataindicate that structural determinants are useful toshow long-term trends of several decades andperform well, explaining up to 60 percent of thecases of democratization processes over the pastforty years. Yet eruptive, sudden changes are moredifficult to understand. Socioeconomic moderniza-tion does not cause democratization, but economicdevelopment supports democratization andreduces the risk for de-democratization andbacksliding. Furthermore, short-term economicgrowth is potentially detrimental to democratiza-tion. Sudden, short-term economic crises, on theother hand, can undermine a non-democraticregime’s legitimacy. The strategic approach isfurther supported by the unpredictability of short-term events that arise from, for example, splitswithin regimes that can initiate democratizationfrom the top. In addition, peaceful mass mobiliza-tion remains important, whereas income distribu-tion is not systematically connected to democrati-zation. Finally, the type of authoritarian regimealso matters. According to the findings, multipartyautocracies, i.e., regimes that allow elections withseveral parties while barring the opposition frompower, are most likely to democratize. Overall, the empirical findings stress theimportance of internal factors over external factors.To what extent international determinants, such astrade dependence or the diffusion of democracy,have an effect remains largely unexplained. Basedon these findings, there are several crucial implica-tions for policy. First, democracy promotiontargeted toward domestic actors may pay off in theshort term. Of particular importance is support tomultiparty elections, even if they fail to meet allstandards, as well as nonviolent protest move -ments, which have proven to be more successful

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10 In this context, democracy is defined along the basic criteria, i.e., universal and equal suffrage; free, fair, and effective elections; and continuously upheld civil andpolitical liberties.

than violent movements. Also, the internationalcommunity needs to be aware of the paradox thatdevelopment assistance, to the extent that it boostseconomic growth in authoritarian regimes, may becounterproductive for promoting democraticchange. In her presentation, Vally Koubi discussed thecomplex relationship between armed conflicts andeconomic performance. She highlighted a numberof key policies to promote economic recovery inpostconflict settings. The effects of armed conflicton economic performance are manifold. Inaddition to inflicting suffering and destruction,armed conflicts on average reduce the grossdomestic product (GDP) of affected countries by15 percent. Outputs are affected through thenegative effects of conflict and instability on theinputs of production, e.g., when supply chains aredisrupted. At the same time, war can acceleratetechnological progress, a result that is oftenbalanced by negative effects. Conflicts also affecteconomic performance in the long term bychanging political and distributional structures.After conflicts, policies to promote recovery anddirect interventions such as peacekeeping thatrestore security are important stimuli for spendingand investments as found by Virginia Page Fortna(2008).11 Likewise, economic assistance can raiseproductivity through humanitarian aid or thereconstruction of infrastructure. Yet all of these strategies have mixed effectsowing to the limited capacity of postconflictsocieties to absorb assistance. Moreover, peace -keeping and foreign aid provide only a jump startto economies but cannot sustain entire economiesin the long run—long-term growth depends on thequality of policy, governance, and institutions. Tothis end, the political equation must change andgive more power to those actors who arecommitted to reforms that are favorable foreconomic growth and that attract capital.Currently, the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libyaillustrate the challenges related to changing thisequation so that it provides a basis for economicrecovery. While the economic effect of peace -building alone is insufficient for long-termeconomic recovery, peacebuilding is a buildingblock for national policies and institutions needed

for economic growth by providing a peaceful andstable environment and a jump start to theeconomy. Discussant Eugenia Piza-Lopez pointed to theimportant lessons the United Nations has drawnfrom the experience with democracy assistance inthe past. United Nations interventions today arebased on a more sophisticated understanding oftransition and what conditions are favorable andpresent windows of opportunity. There is a need topromote transition with stabilization to ensuresuccess. Also, it is the responsibility of interna-tional actors to support inclusive political settle-ments that give voice to potential spoilers in thepolitical process. Often, external interventions tend to treatpolitical institutions too narrowly and with anexclusive focus on technical aspects. For example,election support often deals with the institutionsalone, whereas little attention is paid to factorsempowering the population to take part in theprocess or conveying legitimacy and capacity. As aresult, there are numerous examples of perfectelection processes resulting in illegitimate govern-ments consolidating fault lines and societaldivisions. To prevent the transition to democracy fromtriggering renewed violence, political institutionssuch as parliaments and constitution-makingprocesses need to be perceived as open and respon-sive. The United Nations needs to identifyprocesses and institutions that can enable transi-tion in highly fragmented contexts based on athorough understanding of the core drivers ofconflict and change. This is often compromised bytight timelines and external interests. Instead ofjust building institutions, the internationalcommunity needs to put more emphasis on howinstitutions can be put to use. This requires moreresponsiveness and bridges between institutionsand people as well as among people in societiesemerging from conflict. This also includes informalinstitutions and the subnational level. Politicaltransitions are one of the most critical elements forsocieties emerging from conflict and have far-reaching consequences on the course of postcon-flict reconstruction. Measuring the impact of

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11 Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

peacebuilding in the short, medium, and long termin this area is necessary to ensure a successfultransition. Henk-Jan Brinkman highlighted the need tolook beyond economic growth alone and to takeinto account the manifold effects of violentconflicts, such as, for example, the fact that 77percent of children who are not attending schoollive in conflict-affected countries. Also, while war isknown to have a negative effect on economicgrowth, little is known about the reverse relation-ship. It still is an open question if and to whatextent economic growth reduces the risk of war.Many experiences point out the horizontal inequal-ities within societies as crucial drivers for violence.The question of distribution needs to be includedwhen discussing economic growth and armedconflict. The way assistance is provided matters asmuch as the scale of development. Regarding democratization, Brinkman recalledthe many experiences showing that transitions todemocracy are long term and messy processes thatgo far beyond organizing elections. Ideally, andrather than holding elections quickly, the rule oflaw and institutions such as an independentjudiciary, as well as independent media andpolitical institutions, need to be in place. Theaftermath of the 2007 elections in Kenya exempli-fies this challenge. To prevent violence, inclusiveprocesses that embrace minorities and marginal-ized groups are needed.12 In this regard, it isimportant to not only focus on vertical inequalitiesbut also horizontal inequalities among regions,educational systems, and the like. How education,employment, and markets contribute to peace -building is still only poorly understood. A peace -building approach can help economic recovery toensure equal distribution and prevent marginal -ization. Participants discussed to what extent democrati-zation can be seen as an end in itself and whetherdemocratized states per se are more peaceful. Therewas agreement that the quality of democraticinstitutions is a major issue, as installing institu-tions is different from making them fulfill theirrole. How can democratization take root insocieties where neither the elite nor the populationhave experience in democracy? Finally, the findings

that economic development can hinder democrati-zation raises the question whether a different takeon development and postconflict reconstruction,such as the New Deal for Engagement in FragileStates and the g7+, is needed. In many respects,expectations of fast democratic transitions are toohigh. This concerns the young generation inaffected societies as much as external actors thathave high expectations regarding, for example,more peaceful regimes and less corruption.However, democracy is no panacea and muchdepends on the social fabric. Thus, in addition towhat leads to democracy, another question waitingto be answered is what democracy leads to. While the participants agreed about theimportance of democratic institutions and thatbuilding these institutions does take time, othersalso warned of potential trade-offs, e.g., whenelections are delayed to allow democratic institu-tions more time to become part of the society.

Session III: Rule of Law andTransitional Justice

The final session dealt with rule of law and transi-tional justice as two crucial elements ofpeacebuilding and postconflict recovery. LeighPayne stressed the role of transitional justice andits positive effects on democracy and human rightsin societies emerging from conflict. Nevertheless,certain practices bear risks and can hamperdemocratization and human rights. For example,research has shown that truth commissionsintroduced as singular measures have negativeeffects on human rights. Amnesties have becomethe most frequently applied transitional justicepractice in postconflict environments worldwide.Amnesties also serve as incentives to bring partiesto the table and are valuable bargaining tools.Nevertheless, amnesties can only promote transi-tional justice as long as they do comply withinternational human rights standards. An inherentchallenge is the trade-off between amnesties andaccountability. Conditional amnesties prevent thistrade-off by combining trials, material compensa-tion, and restitution for victims. Instead of wipingthe plates clean even for perpetrators of serioushuman rights violations, conditional amnesties that

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12 United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, 2012 Annual Report, available at www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/2012PBSO-AnnualReport-Final.pdf .

exclude war crimes, atrocities, and crimes againsthumanity can provide meaningful tools by offeringreduced sentences for those who comply with theconditions, while at the same time recognizing thevictims’ rights. A potential, though controversial, model of aconditional amnesty is the case of Colombia and its2005 Justice and Peace Law. The law reducessentencing, assures the victims’ right to know, andprovides material compensation or land restitu-tion. Ten percent of the armed groups accepted theconditions, and trials resulted in twenty-four guiltyverdicts. Along with the peace law, national histor-ical memory processes, a new victims’ law, andother transitional justice activities were put inplace. Ideas to extend the conditional amnesty tothe Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC) met much resistance. There also has beenbroad criticism among national and internationalactors of the way in which issues such as childsoldiers and drug trafficking are addressed. The lawhas been described as a gift to paramilitaries. Eventhough the context in Colombia is favorable for theimplementation of a conditional amnesty, theprocess faced considerable difficulties. Nonetheless, the case provides important lessonsabout how conditional amnesties can contribute toviolence reduction and peacebuilding. Conditionalamnesties may be a necessary evil that is better thanthe alternatives at hand. Major challenges are thelack of international recognition and the questionconcerning how conditional amnesties can beenforced. Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm raised questionsregarding how transitional justice informs stabilityand democratization. Generally, transitional justicecan serve as a stabilizing factor in a societyemerging from conflict. It signals costly conse -quences by the authorities and a commitment tostability and rule of law. That way, transitionaljustice can become a tool to build trust in thegovernment and among fellow citizens and formeropponents and adversaries. However, the notion is not without controversiesand it remains unclear to what extent transitionaljustice—or the lack thereof—impacts stability andpeacebuilding. Research on the relationshipbetween transitional justice and democratizationhas not resulted in a clear picture. Generally,

transitional justice has proven to be moresuccessful in democratic countries, raising thequestion regarding what effect it has on democrati-zation. The effects also depend on the instrumentsused. Trials held during a period of democratiza-tion can serve as signals of the government’scommitment to rule of law and can help to isolateanti-democratic forces and potential spoilers. Atthe same time, other research found that trials canundermine democratization. Truth commissionscan have a positive effect and help deal with thepast by uncovering myths and naming perpetra-tors. Yet critics point to the lack of accountability ofthese processes and the risk of partial outcomesand limited effects of the commissions. Otherfindings show that markets are increasinglypositive to transitional justice, which thus can helpeconomic recovery. For example, countries withtruth commissions have attracted more foreigndirect investment, and the perception of them bythe international financial institutions is morepositive. However, the relationship between transi-tional justice and economic development alsohighlights socioeconomic inequalities as transi-tional justice is typically concerned with violationsof political and civil rights, but disregards thesocioeconomic roots of violence and repression. Overall, research on transitional justice is strug -gling with a lack of indicators to measure the effectsand to test the assumptions, and existing evidencecalls for modest expectations. Wiebelhaus-Brahmagrees with Payne that amnesties should not bedismissed as some findings indicate that thecombination of trials and amnesties has yieldedpositive effects. Finally, the relationship betweentransitional justice and economic growth is notnecessarily a trade-off as stated by critics. Rather,both require a stable environment to yield syner -gies and long-term effects. According to Annika Hansen, the presentationsunderlined the tension arising from the increasingcomplexity of mandates and growing expectationson the one hand and the need to focus on the basicsof peacebuilding on the other hand. Also, thegrowth in the number of political missions showsthat peacebuilding is moving into the center ofattention next to peacekeeping. The intense workwith rule of law as an important part of postconflictrecovery has led to remarkable improvements in

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identifying suitable indicators to assess suchprojects, while also underlining the difficulties ofmeasuring progress. For example, the UN Rule ofLaw Indicators Project is measuring progress basedon 138 indicators.13

Despite an emerging consensus that transitionaljustice should begin early, it remains unclear whatcan be achieved in the immediate aftermath of aconflict. Both resources and attention seem to bedevoted to planning rather than implementation,with the latter in many cases being impeded bydysfunctional state institutions. Transitional justicealso needs to include elements of reconciliation torebuild trust and the social fabric after conflicts.Without reconciliation, transitional justice runs therisk of turning into a tyranny of the majority,making it impossible for peacebuilding efforts tosucceed. Peacebuilding and transitional justice arepolitical processes, and they have to be treated assuch. Roger Duthie addressed further challenges oftransitional justice in postconflict contexts, such asorganized crime and fragile state institutions.Fragile states often lack resources and capabilitiesto carry out transitional justice, for example, whenit comes to distribution of reparations to victims.Reparation schemes furthermore carry the risk tobe conflated with reconstruction and humanitarianassistance whereas they are different in nature andshould be treated as such. Despite these challenges,transitional justice offers opportunities tostrengthen peacebuilding. It is an opening to shareknowledge and information about the past and, inaddition to rebuilding trust, it can reinforce legiti-macy of institutions and strengthen civil society. In the ensuing discussion, participants consid-ered the role of the International Criminal Court inrelation to conditional amnesties and the criticalrole of external interventions. Many participantscalled for realism and a lowering of expectations.Even if justice and democracy after conflict mightnot be perfect, both will still contribute to lessviolence. While these processes take time and arevulnerable to spoilers, external actors need toaccept that justice and democracy, if not

homegrown, will not work in the long run and thatrebuilding local capacities is a long-term process.

Concluding Remarks

The fourth IEF underlined the vast landscape ofpeacebuilding. Discussants and participants notedthat peacebuilding can be promoted from aboveand from below. Some contributors emphasizedthat it constituted a political intervention andfocused on political elites. Others saw it as a set ofpractices articulated from below as a means ofstrengthening community resilience to stresses. Akey theme was the role of both internal andexternal factors. No community is an island—a bigpicture is needed. The focus of the IEF nevertheless turned to theprinciples, practices, and impacts of “externalactors” in relation to peacebuilding. This is hardlysurprising. There is a growing emphasis onmeasuring what has been accomplished by theUnited Nations, EU, OSCE, and other actors. Forthe past few years, the discussion has focused onbenchmarks to assess impacts and determine exitstrategies. Assessing the impact will remain a coretask and challenge. For that, we need clear andmeasurable S.M.A.R.T. goals that take into accountthe needs of peacebuilding.14

Ultimately, determining what works inpeacebuilding requires ensuring clarity on itsparameters. Some participants equated peace -building narrowly as a set of specific peacebuildingoperations. Others described it as political missionsthat increased in number from seven to sixty-sixmissions. Still others described peacebuilding as awide spectrum of activities encompassingdemocracy promotion and transitional justice.Irrespective of how democracy is defined, itsprocess seems to have had a progressive institu-tionalization, including in relation to mediators,political missions, and a wider set of institution-building. All participants conceded that peacebuilding hasa strong or even central political component. Mostalso agreed it consisted of a distinctly “civilian”

10 PEACEBUILDING AND POSTCONFLICT RECOVERY

13 United Nations, The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation Guide and Project Tools, 2011, available at www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2011/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf .14 S.M.A.R.T. = smart, measurable, accepted, reasonable, time-bound.

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activity. Practically, it was agreed that it consistedof narrow and broad tasks (from security torecovery) that were often, though not necessarily,mandated by political actors (EU, AU, UN, OSCE,etc.). It was agreed that peacebuilding is a long anddelicate process. It is an exercise in engineering andin some cases implies reshaping and learning therules of the game. There were many examples of how research caninform practice. However, measuring successremains a challenge, as does the identification ofcausal relations. But there is a need to know moreabout what works and the role of external actors.The discussions generated a number of possiblecore dependent variables for future researchfocusing on three key areas. These concern theimportance of political signals and the commit-ments of elites and local actors to peace.Participants agreed that peacebuilding only worksin cooperation with local actors. This requiresfinding ways to measure confidence and trust. Asecond area concerns institutional changes. Amajor challenge here is the time period given that itcan take ten or twenty years for institutionalchanges to show results. Also, informal institutionsneed to be taken into account. The third areaconcerns resilience and ways of assessing socialcohesion and social capital. In conclusion, participants offered the followingrecommendations:Clarify the referent: Policymakers and researchersneed to be clear on what is included in the

“universe” of peacebuilding. There are narrow andbroad interpretations. Review internal and external types of peace -building: Be mindful to external and internallydriven peacebuilding processes—foreign versuslocal actors. Recognize varied temporal and spatial scales ofimpacts: There are short-, medium-, and long-term goals of peacebuilding. There are also impactsat the aggregate and disaggregated levels. Be awareof multiple impacts and adjust expectationsaccordingly, since some interventions yield genera-tional outcomes. Ensure that metrics are focused on objective andsubjective markers of peacebuilding: Participantsemphasized the role of metrics that capture percep-tions, attitudes, levels of confidence, and the rest. Learn from some general lessons emerging frompractice: Inclusive and responsive processes at thenational and subnational level sometimes are moreimportant than the institution itself. Recognize thecentral role of politics, institutions, andresilience—but also the central role of homegrownand locally owned peacebuilding.Gain general insights emerging from academia:For example, democratization can exacerbatedivided societies (the process matters); aid toauthoritarian regimes can roll back democracy;support for mass popular movements is needed;the qualified use of transitional justice (amnestiesand trials) needs to be explored, etc.

Agenda

Peacebuilding and Postconflict Recovery:What Works and What Does Not?

The International Expert Forum

09:00–09:20 Welcome and Introductory Remarks

Mr. Francesco Mancini, Senior Director of Research, International Peace Institute Dr. Birger Heldt, Director of Research, Folke Bernadotte Academy Dr. Robert Muggah, Principal, SecDev Foundation and Research Director, Igarapé Institute Ms. Wibke Hansen, Head of Analysis and Deputy Director, ZIF-Berlin

09:20–10:50 Session 1: The Track Record of Peacebuilding

This session presents data and analysis about the track record of peacebuilding. It will lookinto the challenge of identifying benchmarks to measure success in achieving peacebuildinggoals, which are also political in nature and require long-term efforts (“positive peace”).Particular consideration will be given to the role of the many actors engaged in peace -building, including peacebuilding missions, and UN funds and programs, across time andspace, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses.

Chair Dr. Robert Muggah

PresenterMr. Richard Gowan, Associate Director, Center on International Cooperation

DiscussantsMs. Mercedes García Pérez, Acting Head of Operations Division, European ExternalAction Service Mr. Bernard Harborne, Lead, Violence Prevention Team, World Bank

10:50–11:15 Coffee Break

11:15–12:45 Session 2: Economic and Political Transition Processes

Postconflict societies are characterized by multiple transition processes. Supportingeconomic recovery and political transition are two overarching goals of postconflictpeacebuilding and reconstruction. This session surveys whether and under what conditionspeacebuilding contributes to meaningful political transition and economic recovery. Whatare the positive—and less positive—experiences of peacebuilding processes in jump-startingearly economic recovery? What lessons have been learned on the role of peacebuilding insupporting political transitions?

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ChairDr. Birger Heldt

Presenters Dr. Vally Koubi, Professor, University of Bern Dr. Jan Teorell, Associate Professor, University of Lund

DiscussantDr. Henk-Jan Brinkman, Chief of the Policy, Planning and Application Branch,United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office

13:00–14:45 Working Lunch—Session 3: Rule of Law and Transitional Justice

Support to the rule of law and transitional justice processes have become part and parcel ofpeace processes. The session examines the relationship between peacebuilding and widerrule-of-law processes, the extent to which peacebuilding supports or diminishes transitionaljustice processes, and the extent to which such efforts have contributed to durable peace.

ChairMr. Francesco Mancini

Presenters Dr. Leigh Payne, Professor, University of Oxford Dr. Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Professor, Florida State University & DePaul University

DiscussantsDr. Annika Hansen, Policy Officer, Police Division, United Nations Department ofPeacekeeping Operations Mr. Roger Duthie, Senior Associate, Research Program, International Center forTransitional Justice

14:45 Closing Remarks

Dr. Birger Heldt Ms. Wibke Hansen Dr. Robert Muggah

Hamid AbdeljaberRutgers University

Victor Casanova AbosSecurity Council Report

Tom AdalaPermanent Mission of the Republic of Kenyato the United Nations

Viviana R. ArenasPermanent Mission of Guatemala to theUnited Nations

Jerreh Badjie

Michelle BreslauerInstitute for Economics and Peace

Henk-Jan BrinkmanUnited Nations Peacebuilding Support Office

Michelle BrownRefugees International

Gabriella BuescherUnited Nations Children's Fund

Camilla CampisiQuaker United Nations Office

Elodie ConvergneParis Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po);Columbia University

Luc DockendorfPermanent Mission of Luxembourg to the UnitedNations

Hugh T. DuganUnited States Mission to the United Nations

Roger DuthieInternational Center for Transitional Justice

Leena Mari EtelapaaDelegation of the European Union to theUnited Nations

Mercedes García PérezEuropean External Action Service

Richard GowanCenter on International Cooperation

Kahraman HaliscelikTRT Turkish Radio and Television

Annika HansenUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Wibke HansenZIF-Berlin

Bernard HarborneWorld Bank

Birger HeldtFolke Bernadotte Academy

Alexandra HinikerIKV PAX CHRISTI

Astrid IrrgangCenter for International Peace Operations (ZIF),Berlin

Robert S. JenkinsCity University of New York

Ana JimenezPermanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations

Ralph KaderUnited Federation for Middle East Peace

Vally KoubiUniversity of Bern

Rousbeh LegatisInter Press Service

Volker LehmannFriedrich Ebert Foundation

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Participants

15

Roy LickliderRutgers University

Eric LordSecurity Sector Reform

Francesco ManciniInternational Peace Institute

Yoshimitsu MorihiroPermanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Robert MuggahSecDev Foundation and Igarapé Institute

Thong NguyenInternational Peace Institute

Siobhan C. Oat-JudgeUnited States Mission to the United Nations

Cyril ObiSocial Science Research Council

Sofia PalliBureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,UNDP

Tomislav PavicićPermanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia tothe United Nations

Leigh PayneUniversity of Oxford

Chris PerryInternational Peace Institute

Alexandra Pichler-FongUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs

Eugenia Piza-Lopez

Maureen QuinnInternational Peace Institute

Sylvia R. RognvikUnited Nations Peacebuilding Support Office

Rafal RohozinskiThe SecDev Group

Sorosh RoshanInternational Health Awareness Network

Enrique SánchezUnited Nations Peacebuilding Support Office

Adam SmithInternational Peace Institute

Harriet SollowayUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Kai Peter StabellUnited Nations Development Programme

Ayaka Suzuki

Kristoffer Nilaus TarpUnited Nations Peacebuilding Support Office

Jan TeorellUniversity of Lund

Andrew TomlinsonQuaker United Nations Office

Josiane ToundziFemmes Africa Solidarite

Eric Wiebelhaus-BrahmFlorida State University and DePaul University

Sergey P. YakushevPermanent Mission of the Russian Federation tothe United Nations

Caleb ZimmermanUnited Nations Democracy Fund

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