Patrick D. Webb, Esq. State Bar No. 82857 WEBB & … 09, 2016 · v. AMY DUTSCHKE, Regional...

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Patrick D. Webb, Esq. State Bar No. 82857WEBB & CAREY402 West Broadway Ste 1230San Diego CA 92101Tel 619-236-1650Fax 619-236-1283

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER ROSALES AND KARENTOGGERY, ESTATE OF HELENCUERRO, ESTATE OF WALTERROSALES’ UNNAMED BROTHER,ESTATE OF DEAN ROSALES, ESTATEOF MARIE TOGGERY, ESTATE OFMATTHEW TOGGERY, APRIL LOUISEPALMER, and ELISA WELMAS

Plaintiffs,v.

AMY DUTSCHKE, Regional Director, BIA;JOHN RYDZIK, Chief, EnvironmentalDivision, BIA; KENNY MEZA; CARLENEA. CHAMBERLAIN; ERICA M. PINTO;ROBERT W. MESA; RICHARD J.TELLOW; PENN NATIONAL GAMINGINC.; SAN DIEGO GAMING VENTURES,LLC; and C.W. DRIVER,

Defendants.

)))))))))))))))))))))))

Civ. No. 15-cv-1145 KJM KJN

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OFPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES INOPPOSITION TO NON-FEDERALDEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION TODISMISS

Date: September 9, 2016Time: 10:00 a.m.Judge: Hon. Kimberly J. Mueller

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Plaintiffs State Proper Claims for the Non-Federal Defendants’ Illegal Disintermentand Removal of their Families’ Remains from Federal Property in Violation of Stateand Federal Law.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A. Plaintiffs Plead At Least 46 Particularized Actions and Inactions bythe non-federal Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

B. Plaintiffs’ Properly Plead NAGPRA Private Rights of Action againstthe Non-federal Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

C. Plaintiffs’ Private Rights of Action for Damages, Declaratory and InjunctiveRelief under California Common and Statutory Law Against Non-federalDefendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Seek Damages and an Injunction under State and FederalLaw to Redress the Illegal Disinterment and Removal of their Families’ Remainsfrom Federal Property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Case 2:15-cv-01145-KJM-KJN Document 75 Filed 08/26/16 of 30

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. The Individual Non-federal Defendants Have No Sovereign Immunity for ViolatingState and Federal Law .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4. Plaintiffs Have Properly Plead a Conversion Claim. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

5. Plaintiffs Have Properly Served Kenny Meza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

-ii-


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal.App.3d 207 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 12

Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.4th 239 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Ballona Wetlands Trust v. City of Los Angeles, 201 Cal.App.4th 455 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 13

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Big Horn Cnty. Elc. Coop. Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9 Cir. 2000).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16th

Boisclair v. Sup. Ct., 51 Cal.3d 1140 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Bonnischsen v. USDOA, 969 F.Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1065 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085 (9 Cir. 2007).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16th

Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899 (9 Cir. 1991).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16th

Center for Biological Diversity v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 2014 Cal.App. LEXIS 256 (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 13

Chatterton v. Boone, 81 Cal.App.2d 943 (1947). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal.2d 480 (1948). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 12

Christensen v. Superior Court (Christensen), 54 Cal.3d 868, 896-7 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9, 10, 11

Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 3 (1964). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

De La Rocha v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis20447 (E.D. Cal. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Eden Mem. Park v. Sup. Ct., 189 Cal.App.2d 421 (1961). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14

-iii-


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm., 2013 WL 6284359 (9 Cir. 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16th

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. B.L.M., 455 F.Supp.2d 1207 (D. Nev. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Hartelius v. Northern Burlington R.R. Co., 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 2771, *3-4 (9 Cir. 1999).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18th

Hartford Fin. Corp. v. Burns, 96 Cal.App.3d 591, 602 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Hornblower v. Masonic Cem. Assoc., 191 Cal. 83 (1923). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14

Koepke v. Loo, 18 Cal.App.4th 1444 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 11

Littlefield v. United States,No. 16-10184 (D. Mass. 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Lexmark International Inc. V. Static Control Components, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Mason v. Utley, 259 F.2d 484 (9 Cir. 1958).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20th

Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S.Ct. 2199 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Messerall v. Fulwider, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1324 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 132 S. Ct. 2024 (2015).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 16

Navajo Nation v. USDOI , Slip. Op. 13-15710, 9, fn. 7 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran (Newman), 287 F.3d 786 (9 Cir. 2002).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17th

O’Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285 (1899). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10

Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co.(Palmqist), 3 F.Supp. 358 (S.D. Cal. 1933). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 12

People v. Van Horn, 218 Cal.App.3d 1378 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10, 14

-iv-


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Poggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 372 (1914). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, 103 F.3d 936 (10 Cir. 1996).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 13th

Quechan Indian Tribe v. United States (Quechan), 535 F.Supp.2d 1072 (S.D.Cal. 2008).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 9, 10, 13, 17

Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349 (5 Cir. 2001).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6th

Ross v. Forest Lawn Mem. Park, 153 Cal.App.3d 988 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 12

Saari v. Jongordon Corp., 5 Cal.App.4th 797 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 12

Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. Lee, 672 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

San Carlos Apache Tribe v. U.S., 272 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Ariz. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 10, 11, 13

Sinai Mem. Chapel v. Dudler, 231 Cal.App.3d 190 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 12

Sinai Temple v. Kaplan, 54 Cal.App.3d 1103 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Staley v. McClurken, 35 Cal.App.2d 622, (1939). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n., 874 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 409 U.S. 209 (1972).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Vagim v. Haslett Warehouse Co., 131 Cal.App. 197 (1933). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Varela v. Wells Fargo Bank, 15 Cal.App.3d 741 (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Viall v. Scott,1991 U.S. App. Lexis 22051, *22 (9 Cir. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18th

Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U. S.( ACE)(Yankton Sioux I), 83 F.Supp.2d 1047 (D. S.D. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14

Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U. S.( ACE)(Yankton Sioux II), 209 F. Supp.2d 1008 (D.S.D. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14

-v-


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U. S.( ACE)(Yankton Sioux III), 258 F. Supp.2d 1027 (D.S.D. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14

Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal.2d 541, 550 (1946). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Statutes, Regulations and Rules

U.S. Constitution, 10 Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7th

16 U.S.C. 470aa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

16 U.S.C. 470cc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6

18 U.S.C. 1162.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 11

25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 13, 14, 15

25 U.S.C. 3001(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

25 U.S.C. 3001(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

25 U.S.C. 3001(5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

25 U.S.C. 3001(9). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

25 U.S.C. 3001(13). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

25 U.S.C. 3001(15). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

25 U.S.C. 3002.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 7

25 U.S.C. 3002(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

25 U.S.C. 3002(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 6

25 U.S.C. 3002(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

25 U.S.C. 3005.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

25 U.S.C. 3009.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

25 U.S.C. 3013.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 13

28 U.S.C. 1360.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 11

25 C.F.R. 1.4(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

43 C.F.R. 10.1-17.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 14

43 C.F.R. 10.1(b)(3).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 13

43 C.F.R. 10.2(f). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

-vi-


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

43 C.F.R. 10.2(g)(4).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

43 C.F.R. 10.3-10.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 15

43 C.F.R. 10.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5

43 C.F.R. 103(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

43 C.F.R. 10.3(b)(1).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

43 C.F.R. 10.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

43 C.F.R. 10.4(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

43 C.F.R. 10.4(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 6

43 C.F.R. 10.4(d) and (e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

43 C.F.R. 10.4(d)(1)(v). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

43 C.F.R. 10.4(d)(1)(vi). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

43 C.F.R. 10.4(e)(i)-(iv).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

43 C.F.R. 10.4(e)(iii). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

43 C.F.R. 10.4(e)(iv). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

43 C.F.R. 10.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 6, 9, 15

43 C.F.R. 10.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 6, 9, 15

43 C.F.R. 10.10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9, 15

43 C.F.R. 10.17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 13

Cal. Civil Code 1852. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Cal. Civil Code 1928. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Cal. Evid. C. 669. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9, 13

Health & Safety Code 7001. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 12

Health & Safety Code 7002. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Health & Safety Code 7003. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12




-vii-


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Health & Safety Code 7050.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 14

Health & Safety Code 7050.7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Health & Safety Code 7052. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 7, 8

Health & Safety Code 7054. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 7, 8

Health & Safety Code 7054.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 7

Health & Safety Code 7054.7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 7

Health & Safety Code 7055. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 7

Health & Safety Code 7100. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 7, 14

Health & Safety Code 7500. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 6, 7

Health & Safety Code 8011. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 9

Health & Safety Code 8012. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13

Health & Safety Code 8015-16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7, 9, 14

Health & Safety Code 8016(j). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13


Health & Safety Code 8102. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Health & Safety Code 8558-80. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 6, 7, 12

Penal Code 487. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 7, 8

Penal Code 622.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 7, 8

Public Resources Code 5097.5-5097.994. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 5, 13, 14

Public Resources Code 5097.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 13

Public Resources Code 5097.9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 9, 12, 13

Public Resources Code 5097.94. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 13

Public Resources Code 5097.94(k). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Public Resources Code 5097.98. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13

Public Resources Code 5097.98(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Public Resources Code 5097.99. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7, 8, 9

Public Resources Code 5097.991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 9

-viii-


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Public Resources Code 5097.993. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 13

14 Cal. Code Regs. 15064.5(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

14 Cal. Code Regs. 15064.5(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

14 Cal. Code Regs. 15126.4(b)(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 14

14 Cal. Code Regs. 15126.4(b)(3)(A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

14 Cal. Code Regs. 15126.4(b)(3)(B)(1) and (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11

Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 5 (b)(2)(E). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 20

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 20

Miscellaneous

30 Fed. Reg. 8722. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

National Center for Cultural Resources and the National NAGPRA Program regulations, Http://www.cr.nps.gov/nagpra/. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

-ix-


Http://www.cr.nps.gov/nagpra/

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Patrick D. Webb, Esq. State Bar No. 82857WEBB & CAREY402 West Broadway Ste 1230San Diego CA 92101Tel 619-236-1650Fax 619-236-1283

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER ROSALES AND KARENTOGGERY, ESTATE OF HELENCUERRO, ESTATE OF WALTERROSALES’ UNNAMED BROTHER,ESTATE OF DEAN ROSALES, ESTATEOF MARIE TOGGERY, ESTATE OFMATTHEW TOGGERY, APRIL LOUISEPALMER, and ELISA WELMAS

Plaintiffs,v.

AMY DUTSCHKE, Regional Director, BIA;JOHN RYDZIK, Chief, EnvironmentalDivision, BIA; KENNY MEZA; CARLENEA. CHAMBERLAIN; ERICA M. PINTO;ROBERT W. MESA; RICHARD J.TELLOW; PENN NATIONAL GAMINGINC.; SAN DIEGO GAMING VENTURES,LLC; and C.W. DRIVER,

Defendants.

)))))))))))))))))))))))

Civ. No. 15-cv-1145 KJM KJN

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OFPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES INOPPOSITION TO NON-FEDERALDEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION TODISMISS

Date: September 9, 2016Time: 10:00 a.m.Judge: Hon. Kimberly J. Mueller

Plaintiffs, Rosales and Toggery, are members of the now quarter-blood Indian community

known as the Jamul Indian Village (JIV), and along with Rosales’ daughter, April Palmer, and

former spouse, Elisa Welmas, oppose the non-federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and move to1

There are no “tribally related” defendants in this action, since the Jamul Indian Village (JIV)1

has never been recognized as a tribe under Federal jurisdiction in 1934, ECF 1, 45-92, just as theMashpee Wompanoag’s were never recognized in 1934, and were denied use of their $1 billioncasino and fee to trust land. Littlefield et al. v. United States et al., No. 16-10184 (D. Mass. July28, 2016), ECF 87. Defendants, Kenny Meza, Carlene A. Chamberlain, Erica M. Pinto, PennNational Gaming Inc. (Penn), San Diego Gaming Ventures LLC (SDGV), and C.W. Driver (Driver),will be referred to herein as the non-federal Defendants, and are not entitled to summary judgmentof the material issues of fact alleged in the TAC as to the JIV’s lack of recognition as a tribe, itsmembers’ lack of standing to seek a determination as to JIV’s status, and the undisputed admissionof its members’ desecration of Plaintiffs’ families’ human remains for which they have no sovereign


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

continue the motion until discovery has been completed on the matters outside the pleadings, upon

which the non-federal Defendants seek to have judgment of dismissal entered without a trial,

pursuant to Fed. R. C. Proc., Rules 12(d) and 56, requiring that “all parties be given a reasonable

opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”

1. Plaintiffs State Proper Claims for the Non-Federal Defendants’ Illegal Disintermentand Removal of their Families’ Remains from Federal Property in Violation of Stateand Federal Law

A. Plaintiffs Plead At Least 46 Particularized Actions and Inactionsby the non-federal Defendants

Contrary to the non-federal Defendants’ erroneous claim, ECF 62-1, 9, they are alleged to

have intentionally disinterred and removed Plaintiffs’ families’ remains from the government’s

portion of the cemetery, San Diego County APN 597-080-01, ECF 64, Exs. D and F. Plaintiffs’ very

specifically list of more than 46 separate actions, ECF 1, 27-45, summarized at ECF 64, 8:20-10:14,

they each committed in concert with the other Defendants, commencing on February 10, 2014, to

illegally disinter and remove Plaintiffs’ families’ remains from federal property in violation of the

state and federal Native American Graves Protection Acts (NAGPRA), 25 U.S.C. 3002, 43 C.F.R.

10.1-17, common law, Health & Safety Code (H.S.C.) 7050.5, 7052, 7054, 7054.6, 7054.7, 7055,

7500, 8102, 8558-80, Public Resources Code (P.R.C.) 5097.5-5097.994, and Penal Code 487, and

622.5.

According to their own admitted testimony in Jac v. Chaudhuri, No. 2:13cv1920, ECF 83-2,

3-4, Ex. A, ¶¶1-7, Defendant Meza supervised the disinterment and removal, while developer Penn

National and its subsidiary San Diego Gaming Ventures LLC paid C.W. Driver and its

subcontractors to dig up the Plaintiffs’ families’ remains and remove them from their interment on

federal property, as plead in ECF 1, 6-7, ECF 64, 8:20-10:14. As also plead in the complaint: “The

Defendants have intentionally and feloniously disinterred and desecrated Rosales and Toggery’s

families’ human remains and funerary objects, and unceremoniously dumped them on a CalTrans

highway construction site. These crimes are felonies, and Defendants have no immunity for having

committed them.” ECF 1, 4:13-17; ECF 64, 7:19-22, 9:8-10:14. “Their most recent declarations

immunity.

Pltfs. Opp to Non-Fed Def 2 MTDnd 1


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

under oath admit that they began construction, with knowledge of the interment of Rosales and

Toggery’s families remains and funerary objects on the government’s portion of the Indian cemetery,

and intentionally had them excavated and removed.” ECF 1, 4:22-25; ECF 32, 28, fn. 5, Jac v.

Chaudhuri, No. 2:13cv1920, ECF 83-2, 3-4, Ex. A, ¶¶1-7. See also, ECF 64, 7:19-22: “JIV members

have repeatedly and falsely testified concerning these crimes. They first claimed that there weren’t

any interments on the government’s portion of the Indian cemetery. They most recently admit under

oath that they have known of the interments for more than 20 years, and intentionally had them

excavated and removed.”

While the Plaintiffs dispute much of Defendant Kenny Meza’s testimony, which will require

a trial, therein he confessed that he personally observed the interment of Helen Cuerro, Dean

Rosales, Marie Toggery, and Matthew Toggery at the Jamul Indian cemetery, and that he personally

observed the location of the interment of Helen’s and Dean’s cremated remains, and that he

subsequently supervised the work of a contractor to remove the soil from the burn sites. Jac v.

Chaudhuri, No. 2:13cv1920, ECF 83-2, 3-4, Ex. A, ¶¶1-7, and ECF 40-1, Rosales Dec., ¶¶1-60, and

ECF 40-2, Toggery Dec. ¶¶ 1-56.

As set out in Plaintiffs’ complaint, ECF 1, 27, ECF 64, 7:10-22, this admission is

corroborated by more than 20 eyewitnesses who also testified in the CalTrans action that Plaintiffs’

families’ remains were interred on the 7 acre Indian cemetery, and were then identifiably and

illegally disinterred, removed, and dumped on a CalTrans’ construction site, without any of the

required consent, permits and written plans required by the state and federal NAGPRA laws. See,

ECF 40-1, Rosales Dec., ¶¶1-60, and ECF 40-2, Toggery Dec., ¶¶1-56. This testimony was also

corroborated by the Counties of San Diego and Riverside Death Certificates, and the Cal. Dept. Of

Health Permits for Disposition of Human Remains, showing the lawful interment of Plaintiffs’

families’ remains on the government’s portion of the Indian cemetery. ECF 1-2, 4-11, and ECF 64,

Ex. K. Such evidence alone, requires a trial of the facts of the disinterment and removal of

Plaintiffs’ families’ remains, to let the jury determine who is telling the truth about the desecration

and the denial of Plaintiffs’ religious freedom and due process and just compensation.

All of the non-federal Defendants, ECF 1, 6-7, 27, ECF 64, 7:22-8:7, were put on notice of



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Plaintiffs’ ownership and control of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains and funerary objects, their

interment on the government’s portion of the more than 7 acre Indian cemetery, and Plaintiffs’

religious preference as lineal descendants to leave them in place, where they were originally interred,

as required by 25 U.S.C. 3002, 43 C.F.R. 10.1-10.17, the National NAGPRA Program, P.R.C.

5097.98, and CEQA, 14 Cal. Code Regs. 15126.4(b)(3) and 15064.5(c). ECF, 1, 27-28, 33-45, ECF

40-1, Rosales Dec. ¶¶15, 35-36, ECF 40-2, Toggery Dec. ¶¶14, 34-35.

Plaintiffs have thereby become entitled to damages and declaratory and injunctive relief: (a)

preventing the continuing desecration of their families’ remains by all of the Defendants, (b)

providing a written plan of action specifically including Plaintiffs’ ownership, custody and control

of, and traditional treatment, care, handling and disposition of their families’ remains, (c)

repatriating their families’ remains, (d) preventing any further disturbance to their families’ remains,

until their preference for their preservation in place is carried out, and (e) in the event their

preference is not carried out, providing that their families’ remains will be re-interred with

appropriate dignity, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., 43 C.F.R. 10.1-10.17, P.R.C. 5097.94 and

5097.98 and H.S.C. 8015-16. See, relief requested, ECF 64, 16-17.

B. Plaintiffs’ Properly Plead NAGPRA Private Rights of Actionagainst the Non-federal Defendants

The non-federal Defendants violated NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., and its regulations,

43 C.F.R. 10.1-17, by committing the more than 46 separate actions and failures to act, which can

be generally summarized as: (a) failing to stop all forms of construction activity in connection with

an on-going activity, where there has been identification, excavation and removal of Native

American human remains and funerary objects, as here, without the required permits and a prior

written plan of action on Federal lands; and (b) failing to stop all activity in the area of the2

identification of the human remains, (c) failing to make reasonable efforts to protect the items

discovered before resuming such activity, (d) failing to provide written notice to the lineal

NAGPRA prohibits “intentional removal from or excavation of Native American cultural2

items (including human remains and objects) from Federal or tribal lands” “for purposes ofremoval” without the required “permit issued under section 470cc of Title 16.” 25 U.S.C. 3002(c);43 C.F.R. 10.3. Here, title to the government’s portion of the Indian cemetery remains in the UnitedStates. ECF 1-1, 15, ECF 64, Ex. D.



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

descendants, consultation with known lineal descendants, and (e) failing to provide a written plan

of action for disposition and repatriation, including the kinds of objects considered cultural items;

the planned treatment, care, and handling, including traditional treatment, of human remains and

other cultural items; the place and manner of delivery of Plaintiffs’ families’ human remains and

funerary objects, as required by 25 U.S.C. 3002(d) and 43 C.F.R. 10.2(f), 10.2(g)(4), 10.3(b),

10.4(b), 10.4(c), 10.4(d) and (e), 10.4(e)(i)-(iv), 10.5, 10.6 and 10.10. ECF 64, 8:20-:10:14. See,

the particularized facts alleged at ECF 1, 33-45. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U. S.( ACE)(Yankton Sioux

I), 83 F.Supp.2d 1047, 1057 (D. S.D. 2000), Yankton Sioux II, 209 F. Supp.2d 1008, 1021-22

(D.S.D. 2002), Yankton Sioux III, 258 F. Supp.2d 1027, 1032-5 (D.S.D. 2003), San Carlos Apache

Tribe v. U.S., 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 888-90 (D. Ariz. 2003), and Quechan Indian Tribe v. United

States (Quechan), 535 F.Supp.2d 1072, 1104-08, 1109-10, 1117-22 (S.D.Cal. 2008), finding

NAGPRA and the PRC and Penal Codes may be used to establish the individual defendants’ duty

of care under California’s per se negligence standards, and all finding Plaintiffs’ private rights of

action for damages and/or declaratory relief against all of the Defendants for breach of fiduciary

duty, nuisance, and negligence, due to violations of NAGPRA, H.S.C., PRC, and Penal Codes

pursuant to the APA, the Tucker Acts, Cal. Evid. Code 669, and the FTCA.

H.S.C. 8012 also makes NAGPRA’s private right of action, 25 U.S.C. 3013 and 43 C.F.R.

10.1(b)(3) and 10.17, applicable when enforcing the H.S.C., see Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon,

103 F.3d 936, 939 (10 Cir. 1996); Bonnischsen v. USDOA, 969 F.Supp. 614, 627 (D. Or. 1997);th

Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. B.L.M., 455 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1215-17 (D. Nev. 2006); San

Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F.Supp.2d 860, 886 (D. Az. 2003); and Yankton Souix

I, at 1055; all recognizing private rights of action under NAGPRA.3

There is nothing vague nor craftily worded about the non-federal Defendants admittedly

identifiable and intentional disinterment and removal of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains from the

federal property. They have confessed to knowledge of the interment, the intent to have them dug up

NAGPRA also provides that there is no federal preemption of, and expressly saves,3

Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the federal Defendants in their individual capacity: “Nothing inthis chapter shall be construed to-...(3) deny or otherwise affect access to any court; (4) limit anyprocedural or substantive right which may otherwise be secured to individuals..(5) limit theapplication of any State or Federal law pertaining to theft or stolen property.” 25 U.S.C. 3013.



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and then removed from the place of their original interment, though Plaintiffs dispute where they then

had the remains dumped. See, ECF 40-1, Rosales Dec. ¶¶1-60, and ECF 40-2, Toggery Dec. ¶¶1-56.

This admittedly included the actual discovery and identification and removal of both skeletal remains

of Rosales’ unnamed younger brother, and the cremated remains of his son, Dean Rosales, and his

mother, Helen Cuerro. Rosales, and the cremated funerary objects of Marie and Matthew Toggery.

Id. Even if these facts had not been admitted or were disputed, NAGPRA would still apply to the

jury’s determination of the material facts of Defendants’ intentional removal of Native American

human remains from federal property. 25 U.S.C. 3002(c); 43 C.F.R. 10.3.4 5

Plaintiffs’ families’ remains were interred on land owned by the United States, when the non-

federal Defendants failed to obtain the required permits and written plans from the federal

Defendants, and failed to obtain the consent of the Plaintiffs, prior to the intentional disinterment and

removal of the families’ remains in violation of NAGPRA, H.S.C., PRC and the Penal Codes. This

land was, and still is property owned by the United States as an ordinary proprietor. ECF 1, 16, 21-

27, ECF 1-1, 15, ECF 64, Ex. D. Contrary to non-federal Defendants’ misrepresentation, ECF 32,

27:3, NAGPRA does not require any tribal affiliation to protect Native American remains, since by

definition, it protects all Native American human remains of lineal descendants whether they are

members of a tribe or unaffiliated individual Indians. 25 U.S.C. 3001(9), including individual people

and culture indigenous to the United States, 3001(13), “right of possession” “with voluntary consent

of an individual,”“next of kin,” and 3002(a), “ownership and control of Native American” “human

remains and associated funerary objects”“excavated on Federal or tribal lands after November 16,

1990,”“shall be (with priority given in the order listed)–“in the lineal descendants of the Native

“Human remains means the physical remains of the body of a person of Native American4

ancestry.” 43 C.F.R. 10.3. “Human remains means the body of a deceased person, regardless of itsstage of decomposition, and cremated remains.” HSC 7001. “Cremated remains means the ashes andbone fragments of a human body that are left after cremation...” HSC 7002.

By definition this intentional removal is archeological because human remains and funerary5

objects are protected cultural items. 25 U.S.C. 3001(3). NAGPRA applies to all intentional removalof such Native American remains, whether for archeological study, or, as here, to remove them froma known historical cemetery to make way for other development. 25 U.S.C. 3002(c), “intentionalexcavation and removal of Native American human remains and objects;” 43 C.F.R. 10.3; YanktonSioux I, 1057; Yankton Sioux II, 1021-22, Yankton Sioux III, 1032-5, San Carlos Apache Tribe v.U.S., 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 888-90 (D. Ariz. 2003), and Quechan at 1104-08, 1109-10, 1117-22.



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

American;” see also, H.S.C. 7001, 7100; P.R.C. 5097.5-5097.994.

These non-federal Defendants disinterred and removed Plaintiffs’ families’ remains without

the permits and written plans of action required by NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. 3002(c), 43 C.F.R.

10.3(b)(1), 10.4(c) 10.4(d)(1)(v), 104(d)(1)(vi), 10.4(e)(iii), 10.4(e)(iv), 10.5, 10.6, and 16 U.S.C.

470cc, ARPA, 16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq., ECF 1, 33-39, and the permits required from the San Diego

Coroner under H.S.C. 7050.5-7, 7500, and 8580, and P.R.C. 5097.98 and 5097.99. ECF 1,28-33.

They also thereby violated the National Center for Cultural Resources and the National NAGPRA

Program regulations, Http://www.cr.nps.gov/nagpra/ , ECF 1-4, 6-9, Ex. W, since the U.S. is the

undisputed title owner of the land where the Native American human remains (which may be an

inhumation or cremation and in any state of decomposition or skeletal completeness) were identified,

excavated and removed, and since they have failed to stop work and ensure that the immediate

vicinity, according to generally accepted cultural or archeological standards or practices where the

Native American human remains are located, is not damaged or disturbed by further development

activity, where, as here, the lineal descendants’ preferences are to preserve the Native American

human remains and any items associated with the human remains that are placed or buried with the

Native American human remains, in place. ECF 1, 33-39, ECF 64, 8-12; ECF 40-1, Rosales Dec.

¶¶15, 35-36, ECF 40-2, Toggery Dec. ¶¶14, 34-35.

Contrary to the non-federal Defendants’ misrepresentations, neither of Plaintiffs’ state court

actions, nor Rosales IX, collaterally estop Plaintiffs’ claims here. Neither the claims, nor the parties

are the same, and the prior actions were not decided on the merits, having all been dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction. See, Pltfs. Motion to Continue Defendant’s motion to dismiss, §4. Moreover, Rosales

IX was also dismissed as premature, since the 2014 intentional disinterment and removal of Plaintiffs’

families’ remains had not yet occurred in 2007.

Contrary to Defendants’ citation of Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349 (5 Cir. 2001), ECF 33-1,th

7, it is not precedent in this Circuit, and does not hold that damages are not allowed for violation of

NAGPRA. Unlike here, in Romero, no human remains or funerary objects were alleged to be

intentionally removed from federal or tribal land, and the cultural patrimony involved was not owned

or controlled by the plaintiff. There, Romero was denied monetary damages due to insufficient



Http://www.cr.nps.gov/nagpra/

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Native American ancestry, since he was not a lineal descendant under 25 U.S.C. 3002.

C. Plaintiffs’ Private Rights of Action for Damages, Declaratory and InjunctiveRelief under California Common and Statutory Law Against Non-federalDefendants

In addition to their NAGPRA violations, the non-federal Defendants dug up Plaintiffs’

families’ remains, trucked and dumped them on a CalTrans’ construction site 20 miles from the

Indian cemetery without the necessary consent, permits and written plans of action required under

H.S.C. 7050.5, 7052, 7054, 7054.6, 7054.7, 7055, 7100, 7500, 8011, 8015-16, 8558, 8580; PRC

5097.5, 5097.9, 5097.98, 5097.99, 5097.991, 5097.993; and Penal Code 487, 622.5. Contrary to ECF

62-1, 14:7-19:22, all of the elements of the violation of these statutes are plead in ECF 64, 7-12, and

must be presumed to be true on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Navajo Nation v.

USDOI, Slip Opn. 13-15710, 9, fn 7 (2016). This includes the facts of the non-federal Defendants’

illegal disinterment and removal of both Plaintiffs’ families’ cremated and skeletal human remains

from the government’s portion of the sanctified Indian cemetery on federal property, and requiring

their repatriation from the state property where they now lie, to preserve them in place, where they

were originally interred. Throughout their motion, the non-federal Defendants ignore their liability

for the continuing desecration of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains on state property, where they now lie,

which is clearly governed by California’s HSC, PRC and Penal Codes. This includes the unlawful

taking of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains, which are Plaintiffs’ personal property, and the morally

inexcusable and intentional injury of such remains, in violation of Penal Code 487 and 622.5. There

is no law exempting or excluding the non-federal Defendants from complying with these California

statutes, on the government’s portion of the Indian cemetery or the state property where Plaintiffs’

families’ remains have now been deposited.

Contrary to ECF 62-1, 16:1, these are criminal prohibitions, which make some of the non-

federal Defendants’ disinterment and removal of Plaintiffs’ families’ human remains felonies and

others misdemeanors, under both the H.S.C. and PRC, which criminal jurisdiction exists on federal

and tribal lands, pursuant to the 10 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and Pub. Law 280, 18th

U.S.C. 1162, 28 U.S.C. 1360, and 25 C.F.R. 1.4(b), and the DOI July 2, 1965 Secretarial Order, 30

F.R. 8722, making applicable “all of the laws, ordinances, codes, resolutions, rules or other



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

regulations of the State of California,... governing...any real or personal property, belonging to any

Indian...held in trust by the United States and located within the State of California.” See, particularly

H.S.C. 7050.5, 7052, 7054, PRC 5097.98-99, 5097.993, and Penal Code 487 and 622.5. See also for

e.g., Quechan, 1100-08, 1117-23, specifically finding 622.5 governed federally owned public places

and any funerary objects of archeological or historical interest. 6

This is the same subject matter jurisdiction California exercises over the disinterment and

desecration of a veteran’s remains at any National Cemetery in California. Criminal conduct by

Indians which causes injury is within California jurisdiction under Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. 1162,

28 U.S.C. 1360, and will be deemed the proximate cause of an injury. Koepke v. Loo (1993) 18

Cal.App.4th 1444, 1449.

These statutory violations have proximately caused Plaintiffs’ damages and entitle them to

injunctive relief to prevent further desecration of their families’ remains and to compel compliance

with the required state and federal permits and written plans of action on the federal lands, whether

they are tribal lands or not. Id.; ECF 1, 39-45, 94-97, ECF 64, 8-12; 25 U.S.C. 3001(5) and (15), 43

C.F.R. 10.3-10.6. This desecration has caused, and will continue to cause, irreparable damage and

personal injury to the Plaintiffs by knowingly and/or willfully mutilating, disinterring, wantonly

disturbing, and willfully possessing their families’ remains, without Plaintiffs’ consent or any

authority of law, thereby constituting a conversion of their remains. Id.; see also, §4 infra.

Such conduct thereby also created common law “liability for the serious emotional distress

caused by such egregious, but clandestine, misconduct,” which caused “Plaintiffs to suffer physical

injury, shock, outrage, extreme anxiety, worry, mortification, embarrassment, humiliation, distress,

grief and sorrow.” “The exhibition of callousness or indifference, the offer of insult and indignity,

can, of course, inflict no injury on the dead, but they can visit agony akin to torture on the living.”

Christensen, v. Superior Court (Christensen), 54 Cal.3d 868, 887, 895 (1991). ECF 1, 41, 93-94.

“[T]he next of kin...[also] have property rights in the body which will be protected, and for

Plaintiffs’ claims for the violation of their state and federal Constitutional rights to free6

exercise of their religious burial rights and their rights to due process and just compensation for thegovernment’s having allowed the disinterment and removal of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains withoutconsent, permit, and the written plans of action required by NAGPRA, H.S.C. and PRC, areaddressed in Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a violation of which they are entitled to indemnification,” under both California common and

statutory law. Christensen, at 890, citing O’Donnell v. Slack (1899) 123 Cal. 285, 289; People v. Van

Horn (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1378, 1391-92, finding standing to contest illegal possession of remains

under P.R.C. 5097.99; Quechan Indian Tribe v. United States, 535 F.Supp.2d 1072, 1100, 1108,

1121-22 (S.D. Cal. 2008), P.R.C. 5097.9, finding Native Americans’ standing and private right of

action for interference with Native American religion and damage to ceremonial sites; and Palmquist

at 360; all finding a private right of action for per se negligence in violation of California law,

including PRC 5097.9, under Evid. C. 669.

The common law has long recognized personal injury damages arising from desecration,

mutilation or disinterment of the dead and funerary objects. Allen v. Jones (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d

207; Saari v. Jongordon Corp. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 797, 803-4; Sinai Mem. Chapel v. Dudler (1991)

231 Cal.App.3d 190, 197; Ross v. Forest Lawn Mem. Park (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 988, 993-94;

Chelini v. Nieri (1948) 32 Cal.2d 480. AA 192, 195, 197-203.

A surviving spouse, entitled to custody and possession of a deceased person for thepurposes of preservation and burial, may maintain an action for damages againstanyone who unlawfully and without authority mutilates or destroys such body.Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. (S.D. Cal. 1933) 3 F.Supp. 358, 360.

The non-federal Defendants have callously ignored this process, depriving Plaintiffs of their

most fundamental religious rights to protect their dead and causing irreparable personal injury. The

Legislative policy of the state and federal government favors repatriation of Native American human

remains and funerary objects, over the construction on public property, particularly where all of the

Defendants have had more than six years written notice to prevent this desecration, and now remain

liable for the damages resulting from the enormous personal injuries inflicted on the Plaintiffs. 25

U.S.C. 3005, 43 C.F.R. 10.5, 10.6, 10.10, H.S.C. 8011, 8015-16, P.R.C. 5097.99, 5097.991.

The non-federal Defendants also ignore Plaintiffs’ standing to enjoin desecration of human

remains on and off public construction sites. Eden Mem. Park v. Sup. Ct. (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 421,

424-25, restraining Cal. Dept. Pub. Works from condemning a dedicated cemetery to construct a

freeway; Hornblower v. Masonic Cem. Assoc. (1923) 191 Cal. 83, 91; the Yankton Sioux v. U.S.

A.C.E. trilogy, (D. S.D. 2000) 83 F.Supp.2d 1047, 1060, (D.S.D. 2002) 209 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1021-22,

and (D.S.D. 2003) 258 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1032-5, enjoining excavation and construction because there



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs’ human remains were suffering irreparable injury, Plaintiffs

had no alternative remedy, and the balance of harm was, as here, clearly in Plaintiffs’ favor; See also,

Viejas Band v. Padre Dam MWD (2010) SDSC Case No. 2010-00093203, enjoining Water District’s

$20 million pumping station to prevent desecration of the Viejas burial site in violation of California

law. ECF 1-2, 28-35, ECF 64, Ex. O.

Here, Plaintiffs are lineal descendants with ownership and control of their families’ remains

and funerary objects and therefore have private rights of action for personal injury damages against

the non-federal Defendants, when these remains were illegally dug up, trucked and dumped on a state

construction site without notice, consent, or just compensation, in violation of NAGPRA, common

law, H.S.C., PRC, and Penal Codes, pursuant to the Cal. Evid. Code 669. Yankton Sioux I, 1057;

Yankton Sioux II, 1021-22, Yankton Sioux III, 1032-5, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. U.S., 272 F. Supp.

2d 860, 888-90 (D. Ariz. 2003), and Quechan at 1104-08, 1109-10, 1117-22.

2. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Seek Damages and an Injunction under State and FederalLaw to Redress the Illegal Disinterment and Removal of their Families’ Remains fromFederal Property

Plaintiffs have standing and a private right of action to sue the non-federal Defendants as

private parties for damages and injunctive relief under the NAGPRA, the H.S.C., P.R.C., Penal Code,

and California common law. Again, the non-federal Defendants ignore the fact that Plaintiffs’

irreparable personal injuries are also “likely to be addressed” with injunctive relief against both the

federal and individual Defendants, who clearly have power to comply, since they remain personally

responsible for the disinterment, removal, and continuing desecration of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains

now on state property.

“[T]he next of kin...have property rights in the body which will be protected, and for a

violation of which they are entitled to indemnification.” Christensen v. Sup. Ct. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868,

890, citing O’Donnell v. Slack (1899) 123 Cal. 285, 289, finding violation of H.S.C. to be per se

negligent under Evid. C. 669; People v. Van Horn (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1378, 1391-92, finding

standing to contest illegal possession of remains under P.R.C. 5097.99.

These acts are felonies, and are in excess of any and all governmental authorities, including

that of a quarter-blood Indian community like JIV. As noted above, criminal conduct by Indians



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

which causes injury remains within California jurisdiction, Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. 1162, 28

U.S.C. 1360, and will be deemed the proximate cause of an injury. Koepke v. Loo, 18 Cal.App.4th

1444, 1449 (1993).

There is no dispute that Plaintiffs are within the class of individuals to be protected from the

illegal desecration of their families’ remains, proscribed by NAGPRA, the Cal. Pub. Res. Code, Cal.

Health & Safety Code, Penal Code and their regulations. Lexmark International Inc. V. Static Control

Components, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014), “In other words, we ask whether [Plaintiff] has a

cause of action under the statute[s];” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.

Patchak, 132 S.Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012), where a group of citizens, like the Plaintiffs here, have

standing to challenge the illegal acts of executive council members, and their contractors, just as any

State was held to have standing to sue the executive council members for violating the IRA, IGRA,

NAGPRA or any of the State’s laws in Bay Mills, and in the APA context, the test is not “especially

demanding.” See for e.g. ECF 1, 27-45, ECF 64, 7-12, Christensen v. Sup. Ct., 54 Cal.3d 868, 887

(1991); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. U.S., 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 888-90 (D. Ariz. 2003), and Yankton

Sioux I, 1057 Yankton Sioux II, 1021-22, and Yankton Sioux III, 1032-5 (D.S.D. 2003), finding that

the violations of these statutes and the common law was the proximate cause of severe “physical

injury, shock, outrage, extreme anxiety, moritifcation humiliation, distress and sorrow,” entitling

Plaintiffs to damages and injunctive relief to prevent further desecration of the families’ remains.

See also, Center for Biological Diversity v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 2014 Cal.App. LEXIS

256 (2014), CEQA Guidelines, 14 Cal. Code Regs. §15126.4(b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(B)1 and 4, and

15064.5(e), requiring the preservation of human remains “in place.” There, development was barred7

within a 100 foot buffer around the remains preserved in place, and there was an “immediate

cessation of grading,” and the human remains were required to be “handled or treated consistent with

§5097.98 and Guidelines §15064.5(e).” Id., *117. In Ballona Wetlands Trust v. City of Los Angeles,

201 Cal.App.4th 455, 469 (2011), a writ of mandate vacated the City’s project approvals and ordered

Though the Compacts restrict the application of CEQA on tribal lands, Plaintiffs’ families’7

remains have been dumped on state property, which remains subject to CEQA’s regulations, whichconstitute a part of the individual defendants’ standard of care under California’s negligence law,and which are not subject to administrative remedies under CEQA, but a trial under common law.



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

them revised for failure to discuss preservation “in place” as a means to mitigate the significant

effects on human remains.

Contrary to the non-federal Defendants, the JIV has not followed the Compact. The non-

federal Defendants’ removal of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains from the federal property to state

property is not preempted, nor superceded by the Compact, which expressly provides that all

construction must cease, until Section 10.8 of the Compact’s required mitigation of impacts to Native

American human remains and cultural items is amended, following Gov. Davis’ 2003 demand. ECF

1, 60-64, ECF 64, 4:13-15.

As noted above, the common law has also long recognized standing for personal injuries

arising from desecration, mutilation or disinterment of the dead and funerary objects. Allen v. Jones

(1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 207; Chelini v. Nieri (1948) 32 Cal.2d 480; Saari v. Jongordon Corp. (1992)

5 Cal.App.4th 797, 803-4; Sinai Mem. Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190, 197; Ross at

993-94. AA 192, 195, 197-203.

A surviving spouse, entitled to custody and possession of a deceased person for thepurposes of preservation and burial, may maintain an action for damages againstanyone who unlawfully and without authority mutilates or destroys such body.Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F.Supp. 358, 360 (S.D. Cal. 1933).

P.R.C. 5097.9, and H.S.C. 7003-4, 8558, 8560, and 8580, also make the federal and non-

federal Defendants liable for interfering with Plaintiffs’ free exercise of their Native American

religion and unlawfully disinterring their families’ remains and removing them from a sanctified

Native American cemetery, place of worship, religious and ceremonial site, and dumping them on

public lands at a state highway construction site. Plaintiffs have alleged facts, which must be assumed

to be true, and Defendant Meza has admitted that cremated remains were actually identified and

discovered to have been dug up and removed by the non-federal Defendants from their burial sites,

including graves and cairns, where human remains were deposited below, on, or above the surface8

of the earth, in a dedicated cemetery, and that both the San Diego County coroner and the NAHC

“‘[B]urial site’ means any natural or prepared physical location, whether originally below,8

on, or above the surface of the earth, into which as a part of the death rite or ceremony of a culture,individual human remains are deposited.” 25 U.S.C. 3001(1); H.S.C. 7004, 7009, 7013,8012.“‘Human remains’ or ‘remains’ means the body of a deceased person, regardless of its state ofdecomposition, and cremated remains.” H.S.C. 7001



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

were put on notice of these discoveries, and have failed to entertain Plaintiffs’ administrative demand

for mediation under H.S.C. 8016(j) and P.R.C. 5097.94(k). ECF 1, 10:1-2, 27-45, ECF 64, 7-12; ECF

40-1, Rosales Dec. ¶¶1-60, ECF 40-2,Toggery Dec. ¶¶1-56.

H.S.C. 8012 further provides that the terms of NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., “shall have

the same meaning as interpreted by federal regulations...” in the enforcement of the H.S.C. NAGPRA,

25 U.S.C. 3013, creates a private right of action “by any person alleging a violation” thereof, and 43

C.F.R. 10.1(b)(3) and 10.17, likewise acknowledge that there is a private right of action. Pueblo of

San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, 103 F.3d 936, 939 (10 Cir. 1996); Bonnischsen v. USDOA, 969 F.Supp.th

614, 627 (D.Or. 1997) specifically finding that “any person” could enforce NAGPRA, and not just

the NAGPRA Review Committee; Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. B.L.M., 455 F.Supp.2d

1207, 1215-17 (D. Nev. 2006); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States 272 F.Supp.2d 860, 886

(D. Az. 2003). Moreover, contrary to Defendants, HSC 8016(j) provides a further right of action for9

any party who fails to obtain relief from NAHC, after notice, as Plaintiffs allege here. ECF 64, 7:22-

8:7.

See also, Quechan Ind. Tr. v. United States, 535 F.Supp.2d 1072, 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2008),

finding the Plaintiff, and not just the NAHC, had standing and a per se negligence claim pursuant to

Evid. C. 669 for violation of CEQA, and P.R.C. 5097.9, preventing interference with Native

American religion and damage to places of worship, 5097.5, preventing excavation, removal or

destruction of historic ruins, 5097.993, making it a misdemeanor to unlawfully excavate, remove, or

destroy an eligible Native American historic site. All of which could be brought by “any person,” and

not only by the NAGPRA Progam Chairman, the Native American Heritage Commission or an

Attorney General. Id.

There simply is no language in P.R.C. 5097.5-5097.994 making the remedies therein

“exclusive” to the NAHC; it merely identifies how the NAHC is to enforce 5097.9 through the very

mediation to which Plaintiffs are entitled in 5097.94-98. Just as in Center for Biological Diversity

v. DFW (2014) 2014 Cal.App. LEXIS 256, and Ballona Wetlands Trust v. City of Los Angeles (2011)

“Any person” has long meant “any person could enforce the Endangered Species Act,”9

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,163 (1997) and “any person” could enforce the Civil Rights Act of1968. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 409 U.S. 209, 210-11 (1972).



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

201 Cal.App.4th 455, 469, further construction must be enjoined, until Plaintiffs’ preference that their

families’ remains remain in place is mediated by the NAHC or the National NAGPRA Review

Committee.

Plaintiffs also have common law standing to enjoin desecration of human remains on and off

public construction sites. Eden Mem. Park v. Sup. Ct. (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 421, 424-25,

restraining Cal. Dept. Pub. Works from condemning a dedicated cemetery to construct a freeway;

Hornblower v. Masonic Cem. Assoc. (1923) 191 Cal. 83, 91; People v. Van Horn (1990) 218

Cal.App.3d 1378, 1398; the Yankton Sioux v. U.S. A.C.E. trilogy, (D. S.D. 2000) 83 F.Supp.2d 1047,

1060, (D.S.D. 2002) 209 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1021-22, and (D.S.D. 2003) 258 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1032-5,

enjoining excavation and construction because there was a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs’

human remains and funerary objects were suffering irreparable injury, Plaintiffs had no alternative

remedy, and the balance of harm was, as here, clearly in Plaintiffs’ favor; As noted above, see also,

Viejas Band v. Padre Dam MWD (2010) SDSC Case No. 2010-00093203, enjoining Padre Dam

Municipal Water District’s $20 million reservoir and pumping station project, because it would

violate the P.R.C. and H.S.C., and was needed to prevent severe irreparable damage and desecration

to the Viejas Band’s sacred burial site. ECF 1-2, 28-35, Ex. O.

Moreover, the non-federal Defendants cite no limitation on the Court’s more than ample

authority to issue an injunction redressing and preventing further desecration of Plaintiffs’ families’

remains by any and all of the Defendants, and repatriation of those remains now on state property to

their original interment, as required by statute and regulation, ECF 1, 27-45, 91-100, ECF 64, 7-12,

16-17, citing NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., 3009, 43 C.F.R. 10.1-17, NAGPRA Program

Guidelines, Cal. Pub. Res. Code 5097.5-5097.994, Cal. Health & Safety Code 7050.5, 7100, 8015-16,

8100, and the CEQA Guidelines, 14 Cal. Code Regs.15126.4 (b)(3). There is no law providing that

the JIV may desecrate Plaintiffs’ families’ remains to construct any building, even if it were a lawfully

recognized tribe, which it isn’t, or even if it lawfully exercised governmental power over any land,

which it doesn’t.

Plaintiffs do not seek any order against the JIV, nor to stop construction. Plaintiffs only seek

to stop the federal and non-federal Defendants from further violating state and federal NAGPRA



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

regulations and to re-inter Plaintiffs’ families’ remains with the dignity required by those laws, which

requires no act by the JIV. Plaintiffs therefore remain entitled to an injunction ordering the required

permits and written plans of disposition and re-interment of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains on the

government’s portion of the Indian cemetery, with the dignity required bylaw, before the entire parcel

is paved over, as required by NAGPRA and its regulations. 25 U.S.C. 3001-3013, 43 C.F.R. 10.3-10,

and Cal. Pub. Res. Code 5097.98(e), requiring that “the landowner...shall re-inter the human remains

and items associated with Native American human remains with appropriate dignity on the property

in a location not subject to further and future subsurface disturbance.”

3. The Individual Non-federal Defendants Have No Sovereign Immunity for ViolatingState and Federal Law

Plaintiffs make no claim against the JIV, and seek no remedy against the JIV, for the illegal

acts of the individual non-federal Defendants, who have no sovereign immunity for acts in excess of

their authority. Plaintiffs make no claims against the individual Defendants arising from any official

acts of the JIV. In fact, JIV concedes it has not disinterred, removed or desecrated Plaintiffs’ families’

remains. Pinto’s declaration, ECF 62-2, fails to deny Meza’s confession that he personally supervised

the work of a contractor to remove Helen Cuerro and Dean Rosales’ cremated remains from their burn

sites. ECF 1, 4:22-25; ECF 32, 28, fn. 5, Jac v. Chaudhuri, No. 2:13cv1920, ECF 82-2, 3-4, Ex. A,

¶¶1-7; see also, ECF 40-1, Rosales Dec., ¶¶1-60, and ECF 40-2, Toggery Dec., ¶¶ 1-56. Approval,

payment, and supervision of construction does not require illegal desecration and removal of

Plaintiffs’ families’ remains. State and federal NAGPRA regulations should have been followed by

these individuals during any lawful construction, but they weren’t.

The non-federal Defendants can cite no authority under IGRA, the Compact or Indian law that

allows the JIV to disinter and remove Plaintiffs’ families’ remains in violation state and federal

NAGPRA regulations. As noted above, the JIV has no right, title or interest in Plaintiffs’ families’

remains, and the non-federal individual Defendants have no right to dig them up and remove them

from federal property, whether beneficially owned by the JIV or not, without Plaintiffs’ consent and

without abiding by state and federal NAGPRA regulations.

Therefore, the individual Defendants, who have admitted to having dug up and otherwise

supervised the removal of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains from federal property, were not acting within



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

any authority on behalf of the JIV. These actions were only committed by the individuals in excess

of any official authority. They remain liable for illegally desecrating and removing Plaintiffs’

families’ remains from the federal property, and remain liable to reinter them with the dignity

pursuant to the permits and written plans of action required by the state and federal NAGPRA

regulations. See, Pltfs. Opp. Govt. 2 MTD, and section 1 herein.nd

The individual Defendants fail to deny the facts alleged in the complaint, ECF 1, 88-92, ECF

64, 8:20-10:14, that they violated state and federal law in excess of their official authority, and

therefore have no sovereign immunity, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024,

2035 (2014), which facts are therefore admitted for this motion under Rule 8(b)(6). “Nor does []

immunity extend to members of the tribe just because of their status as members. ...When tribal

officials act outside the bounds of their lawful authority, however, most courts would extend the

doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), to allow suits against the officials, at least for

declaratory or injunctive relief.” Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 40

Cal.4th 239, 248 (2006), citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also, Boisclair v. Sup. Ct.

51 Cal.3d 1140, 1157-58 (1990). See also, Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power

District v. Lee, 672 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012). ECF 1, 88.

In sum, we hold that (1) the Navajo Nation is not a necessary party under Rule19(a)(2)(A) because the plaintiffs seek relief only against the current Navajo officials;(2) the Navajo nation is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(I) because theofficials adequately represent the tribe’s interests, and (3) the Navajo Nation is not anecessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) because its absence will not risk subjectingthe plaintiffs to inconsistent obligations.

Indeed, a contrary holding would effectively gut the Ex parte Young doctrine. Thatdoctrine permits actions for prospective non-monetary relief against state or tribalofficials in their official capacity to enjoin them from violating federal law, withoutthe presence of the immune State or tribe. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. Lee, 672 F.3d1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 2012).

“Tribal sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for prospective relief against tribal officers

allegedly acting in violation of federal law. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaugh, 509 F.3d

1085, 1092 (9 Cir. 2007), quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. V. Balckfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 901 (9th th

Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Big Horn Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944,

953 (9 Cir. 2000). Because [Plaintiffs] allege that these Defendants exceeded their authority underth



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

federal law, the Tribes’ arguments [as to any alleged sovereignty] are without merit.” Evans v.

Shoshone-Bannock LUPC, 2013 WL 6284359, *10, fn. 10 (9 Cir. 2013).th

Hence, Plaintiffs remain entitled to pursue their personal injury claims and remedies against

the individual non-federal Defendants, who remain liable for illegally desecrating and removing

Plaintiffs’ families’ remains from the government’s portion of the Indian cemetery, and remain liable

to reinter them with the dignity pursuant to the permits and written plans of action required by the

state and federal NAGPRA regulations. See, section 1 above, and Pltfs. Opp. Govt. MTD, section 6.

4. Plaintiffs Have Properly Plead a Conversion Claim

Defendants’ statutory violations also constitute conversion for preventing the Plaintiffs from

exercising their immediate right thereunder to possession, control and disposition of their families’

remains under California law. Next of kin have a temporary, quasi-property right in the body of a10

deceased for purposes of interment. See Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 69–70 (1900); Sinai Temple v.

Kaplan, supra, 54 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1110 and fn. 13; Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 231 Cal.

App. 2d 3, 4–5 (1964).

An action for conversion requires neither legal title nor absolute ownership of the property.

Messerall v. Fulwider, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1324, 1329 (1988). A party need only allege that “she was

entitled to immediate possession at the time of conversion.” Id. As the court in Cohen stated: “The

duty to bury a corpse and to preserve its remains is a legal right which courts of law will recognize

and protect; such right, in the absence of any testamentary disposition, belongs exclusively to the

next of kin.” Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., supra, 231 Cal. App. 2d at pp. 4–5. These exclusive

rights of possession, control and disposition have been codified in section 7100. Newman v.

Sathyavaglswaran (9th Cir. 2002) 287 F.3d 786, 793.

The foundation for a conversion claim “ ‘rests upon the unwarranted interference by defendant

with the dominion over the property of the plaintiff from which injury to the latter results. …’ ”

Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1065 (1998). “To establish a conversion, it is incumbent

Contrary to Defendants, ECF 62-1, 19:22, Plaintiffs’ claims for conversion are not10

preempted. See, Quechan at 1122-23, finding Plaintiffs entitled to “substantial actual damages” asa result of Defendants’ common law torts for trespass, negligence, and nuisance, based uponviolations of NAGPRA, the PRC and the Penal Code.



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

upon the plaintiff to show an intention or purpose to prevent the owner from taking possession of the

property.” Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal.2d 541, 550 (1946).

[C]onversion is any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein.'" Id., at 549. The liability of one in possession of real property for the conversion of personalproperty which he finds upon it, is clear [where] refusal of one in possession of realproperty to permit, upon demand, the owner of chattels which were left there toremove his goods, constitutes conversion." Id., at 549-550.

“In the case at bench... the evidence justifies the court's conclusion that defendants intended

to and did exercise ownership over the personal property herein involved in order to preclude the

plaintiff from taking possession of it.” Hartford Fin. Corp. v. Burns, 96 Cal.App.3d 591, 602 (1979).

There, “defendants and each of them, wrongfully refused plaintiff's request to take possession of the

personal property...pursuant to its right to immediate possession thereof, and defendants, and each

of them, thereby converted said personal property, and are therefore liable to plaintiff for damages."

Id., 601. “Defendants... thereafter, exerted dominion and control...by refusing plaintiff’s demand for

surrender of such property...” Id., 601-602. The Ninth Circuit also holds that the breach of an

obligation to protect a property interest over which the defendant has exercised dominion and control,

sufficiently supports a cause of action for conversion, reversing summary judgment, and entering

judgment for the plaintiff. Hartelius v. Northern Burlington R.R. Co., 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 2771,

*3-4 (9 Cir. 1999). th

Having possession of certain personal property containing the Plaintiff’s property within it,

the possession of which property Defendant had no right even temporarily, it was the Defendant's duty

to protect the Plaintiff’s property. Having Plaintiff’s property without right and having failed to return

Plaintiff’s property on demand, defendant is guilty of conversion. Varela v. Wells Fargo Bank, 15

Cal.App.3d 741, 750 (1971). “The intent required [to constitute conversion] is not necessarily a

matter of conscious wrongdoing. It is rather an intent to exercise a dominion or control over the goods

which is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights." Id., 749-750. Thus, despite the fact that Wells

Fargo had no actual knowledge that it possessed the diamond rings when it took possession of the car,

the bank had the intent to exercise dominion over the car and, necessarily, everything in it, and was

therefore liable to the plaintiff for conversion of the rings. Similarly, in Viall v. Scott,1991 U.S. App.

Lexis 22051, *22 (9 Cir. 1991), the appellants were responsible for the conversion by NACC ofth



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Viall's silver, as a result of their negligent supervision for failing to prevent the conversion. The mere

good faith of the defendant in refusing to deliver the goods to the owner, upon demand, is no defense

to the action of conversion. Poggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 375 (1914); Staley v. McClurken, 35

Cal.App.2d 622, 628 (1939); Vagim v. Haslett Warehouse Co., 131 Cal.App. 197 (1933).

“An action for conversion of personal property lies against a bailee, who, upon demand,

wrongfully refuses to deliver possession thereof to the owner and exercises dominion over the

property to the owner's detriment.” Chatterton v. Boone, 81 Cal.App.2d 943, 945-46 (1947). Plaintiff

need only prove “ownership of the property, the right of possession and a demand therefor [to]

establish a prima facie case of conversion against the bailee.” Id. After coming into possession and

control of Plaintiffs’ families’ remains lawfully interred on the government’s portion of the cemetery,

Dutschke, Ryzdik and the government had the duty of a bailee to use ordinary care "for its

preservation in safety and in good condition," and “to prevent further loss and deterioration... Civ.

Code, §§ 1928, 1852. This they failed to do.” Id.

5. Plaintiffs Have Properly Served Kenny Meza

Kenny Meza was served with all of the amended complaints upon electronic filing on May

20, 23, and July 5, 2016. ECF 50, 52, & 64. The Court’s May 3, 2016 Order, ECF49, found: “The

defendants received actual notice of this lawsuit, retained counsel, and moved to dismiss.” Local Rule

135(f) provides: “Service of all documents authorized to be served in accordance with Fed. R. Civ.

P. 5... shall be complete when served upon the attorney for the party, if the party has appeared and

is represented by an attorney.” Local Rule 135(a) provides: “Service via this electronic Notice

constitutes service pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E).” Local Rule 135(g) provides: “Admission

to practice in the Eastern District of California includes the requirement that the attorney complete

an e-filing registration...and, unless an attorney opts out, will authorize acceptance of service by

electronic means.” Local Rule 135(g)(1) provides: “Unless an attorney opts out...registration as a

filing user constitutes: (1) consent to receive service electronically pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

5(b)(2)(E)... and waiver of the right to receive service by any other means; ...Service by electronic

means is complete upon transmission of the Notice of Electronic Filing.” Meza’s original motion to

dismiss constitutes an appearance, and since represented by counsel, Local Rules permitted Plaintiff



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to serve the amended complaints electronically on his attorney of record. See, Sun Bank of Ocala v.

Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n., 874 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1989), citing Mason v. Utley, 259 F.2d

484, 485 (9 Cir. 1958); De La Rocha v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis20447, *4th

(E.D. Cal. 2012).

Conclusion

For all of these reasons, the non-federal Defendants’ second motion to dismiss should be

denied, or continued until the conclusion of trial under Fed. R. Civ. P., Rules 12(d) and 56.

Dated: August 26, 2016 WEBB & CAREY APC

/s/Patrick D. WebbPatrick D. Webb



Patrick D. Webb, Esq. State Bar No. 82857 WEBB & … 09, 2016 · v. AMY DUTSCHKE, Regional...

Documents

Transcript of Patrick D. Webb, Esq. State Bar No. 82857 WEBB & … 09, 2016 · v. AMY DUTSCHKE, Regional...