ParticiPatory DeveloPment anD the WorlD Bank

Participatory Development and the World Bank · 171

ParticiPatory DeveloPment anD the WorlD Bank

RobeRt D. Lamb, biLL VaRettoni, anD ChunLi Shen

TheWorldBankhasofficiallysupportedthenotionofparticipa-torydevelopmentforoveradecade,arguingthatdevelopmentprojectsare

moreeffectivewhenbeneficiarieshavearoleinthewayprojectsarechosen,planned,implemented,andevaluated.Inpractice,however,theBank’sprimarymodelofdevelopmentcontinuestobebasedonexpertiserather

thanparticipation.ThisispartlybecausetheparticipatorymodelhasnotbeendefinitivelyproventobeeffectiveinallBankprojects.Thispaper

criticizesthetheoryandpracticeofparticipatorydevelopmentinlightoftheBank’sexperiences,andrecommendsthattheBankmakeastronger

effort,notjusttopromoteorencourageparticipatorydevelopment,buttostudywhatspecificparticipatorymechanismshavebeenshowntoworkin

whatkindsofprojectsandunderwhatcircumstances,andthentoidentifythespecifictasksthatstaffonthoseprojectswouldneedtoaccomplishto

incorporatethosemechanismsintotheirwork.

IntroDuctIona

In 1970, the year Carol Pateman’s Participation and DemocraticTheoryadvocatedagreaterroleforcommonpeopleindemocraticself-rule,bPauloFreire’sPedagogyoftheOppressedwastranslatedforthefirsttimeintoEnglish.Freirearguedthatthepoorandmarginalizedofanysocietyarecapableofmorethanpassivelearning,andthat,giventheop-

robert Lamb, Bill Varettoni and chunli ShenarePhDstudentsintheSchoolofPublicPolicyatMaryland.RobertLambisstudyingInternationalSecurityandEconomicPolicyandisaGraduateResearchFellowattheCenterforInternational&SecurityStudiesatMaryland(CISSM).BillVarettoniisstudyingInternationalDevelopmentandEnvironmentalPolicyandisaGraduateResearcherattheCenterforInstitutionalReformandtheInformalSector(IRIS).ChunliShenisstudyingManagementandFinanceandisaconsultantfortheWorldBankInstitute.

©InternationalAffairsReview.Volume14,No.2.Fall2005.

172 · International Affairs Review

portunity,theycanthinkcriticallyaboutandengagetheworldaroundthem in a way that can transform both themselves and their world.cBothauthorswereinfluencedtodifferentdegrees—inFreire’scaseitwasindirectly,viaMarx—byRousseau’scriticismsdofsocialstructuresthatencouragethinkingaboutinterestsinindividualisticandcompeti-tivetermsratherthanaboutcommoninterests,andbyhisadvocacyofparticipationincollectivedecision-makingasawayoftransformingat-titudesofself-interestintoageneralwillthatservesbothindividualandpublicinterestsequallyandjustly.Thesebooks—andothercontem-poraryworksondevelopment,ecolonialism,fandrelatedtopics—grewoutoforcontributedtothevariousdiscoursesofthesocialmovementsthat were calling attention to issues of power and justice worldwide,movementsthatstronglycriticizedelitisminboththeoryandpracticeanddemandedgreaterrespect for theneedsandperspectivesof thepoorandthemarginalized.

Itwasduring thisperiod that anumberofnon-governmentalor-ganizations(NGOs)doingsmall-scaledevelopmentprojectsinvariousplacesaroundtheworldbegantoputideasaboutparticipationandem-powermentintopractice,self-consciouslyshiftingtheirworkawayfromthethen-dominantmodelofdevelopmentaidassomethingtobedeliv-

eredtothepoorbytechnicalexpertshiredbywealthybenefactors—amodelthatwasbeginning to be seen, even by larger de-velopment agencies, as inadequate to theneedsoftheworst-offpopulationsofpoorcountries.g,hThepointwastogivethebene-ficiariesofdevelopmentworkagreaterroleinthewayprojectswerechosen,planned,implemented,andevaluated;insomecasesthisalsomeanthelpingpoorcommunitiesorganize and operate their own projects.Intheprocess,thesedevelopmentgroupsadopted a variety of mechanisms for par-ticipation.i,j“Participatoryactionresearch”

was meant to “engage the poor in research through which they canlearnaboutaproblem,andthen,armedwiththeknowledge,takeac-tiontosolveit.”kConsistentwiththeideathatlocalcommunitiesknow

The point was to give the beneficiaries of develop-ment work a greater role in the way projects were chosen, planned, imple-mented, and evaluated; in some cases this also meant helping poor com-munities organize and operate their own projects.


what’sbestforthemselves,theseandothermechanismstookshapeandevolvedindifferentwaysindifferentplacesandfordifferentprojects.

Bytheendofthe1980s,NGOswereproliferatingworldwide,andadvocacyonbehalfofpublicparticipationindevelopmentprojectsbe-gantohaveaneffectonthewaysomeofthelargerdevelopmentagen-ciesviewedtheparticipationof“beneficiaries.”Theseagencieswerein-fluencedaswellbyagrowingliteratureontheinadequaciesofexistingapproachestodevelopment.l,m Moreover, during the late1980sand1990s, anumberof studiesun-dertakenbybothdevelopmentagenciesandindependentscholarsdocumentedpositivecorrelations of varying strengths betweenpublic participation and project effective-ness or sustainability.n,o,p In response, theWorld Bank (the Bank) created a Learn-ing Group on Participatory Developmentin1990tostudyways to“mainstream”theparticipationofthosewhotodayarecalled“primarystakeholders,”“thosewhomaybeexpected tobenefitor lose fromBank-supportedoperations;orwhowarrantredressfromanynegativeeffectsofsuchoperations,particular-lyamongthepoorandmarginalized.”qTheBankimplementedseveraloftheLearningGroup’srecommendationsforincreasingparticipationofprimarystakeholders,andbytheendofthedecadetheseandotherinitiativesr,shadsucceededinincreasingboththenumberofprojectsinwhichsomedegreeofparticipationtookplace,andthedegreeofpar-ticipationinsuchprojects.

Advocates of participatory development generally agree that theBankhasmadesomeprogress towardgreaterpublicparticipation intheprojects it fundsoverthepast20years,particularlyduringJamesWolfensohn’stenureasPresident.Thispaperwillreviewaportionofthis record.At the same time,manyparticipatory initiativeshave fal-teredandfewprojectstodatehaveactuallybeendeeplyparticipatory,leadinganalyststoquestiontheviabilityofparticipatorydevelopmentasareal-worldmodelofinternationaldevelopment.t,u,v,wInthepastthreedecades,philosophers,economists, and social criticshavecreatedan

At the same time, many participatory initiatives have faltered and few proj-ects to date have actually been deeply participatory, leading analysts to ques-tion the viability of partici-patory development as a real-world model of inter-national development.


entirefieldofinternationaldevelopmentethics,x,ymuchofwhichiscon-cernedwithparticipationofthepoorandmarginalized in their own development.z,aaInpractice,NGOshavebuiltworldwidemovements dedicated to global justice,social development, and environmentallysustainable development.ab,ac These NGOmovements have helped put these con-cernsontheagendasofinternationalandregional development agencies. Likewise,theseagencieshaveexpandedtheir focusbeyondaggregatedper-capitagrowthmea-sures,tovariousindicatorsofwell-beingattheindividualandcommunitylevels.ad

Despite these changes, the primarymodelofdevelopmentusedbytheWorldBanktodayisnotparticipa-toryinanydeepsense.Itremainsaneliteventure:aiddeliveredbytech-nical expertshiredbywealthybenefactors, allwith thebest interestsofthepooratheart.Contrarytothesuspicionsoftheircritics,many—perhapsmost—oftheBank’sstaffviewtheirworkasanattempttoreducepovertyandamelioratesuffering.ItmaybethatthedominantviewwithintheBankaboutthebestmeanstoachievethoseendsisonethatvaluesexpertiseoverparticipation—forwhatmayormaynotbeperfectlygoodreasons.

ThispapernotonlyreviewstheprogresstheBankhasmadetodatebutalsoevaluatesthevariousreasonsonemightgiveforvaluingornotvaluingpublicparticipationinitsdevelopmentefforts,anditendsbyofferingacriticismofthewayparticipatorydevelopmentisbothcon-ceived and practiced. The first section, Participation and the WorldBank Project Cycle, reviews the basic operations of the World Bank,focusingonitstypicalprojectcycleandthemechanismsthroughwhichvarious formsofparticipationdoormay takeplace.Thesecondsec-tion,ParticipationinStrategyFormulationandProjectEvaluation,ap-praisesthedegreetowhichprimarystakeholdersarepermittedtoandactuallyparticipateintwostagesoftheprojectcycle:thepreparationofpovertyreductionstrategiesatthebeginningofthecycle,andevalua-tionsofcompletedprojectsattheend.Likethefirstsection,thissection

The primary model of development used by the World Bank today is not participatory in any deep sense. It remains an elite venture: aid delivered by technical experts hired by wealthy benefactors, all with the best interests of the poor at heart.


isbasedonareviewofrelevantBankpublicationsandreports,indepen-dentstudiesofBankprojectsandpractices,interviewsofBankstaffinavarietyofdepartmentsregardingtheirexperiencesinorknowledgeofrelevantBankpracticesandtheirsenseofculturalattitudeswithintheBank.ae The third and final section of thepaper,ParticipatoryTheoryandParticipa-toryPractice,isacriticalreflectiononthetheoryandpracticeofparticipatorydevel-opment in the light of the Bank’s experi-encestodate.

First,however, it isnecessary todefineparticipatory development. The LearningGroup defined six “participatory mecha-nisms” that summarize what participatorydevelopmentmeansinpractice,afandthesewillbeusedtodefinethetermthroughoutthispaper.Inorderfromleasttogreatestdegreeofparticipation,participatorymechanismsin-clude:

1. Information-sharing. This includes, among other things, publicdisclosureofactivitiesandintentionsrelatedtoBankprojects,govern-ment development policies, and poverty-reduction strategies; transla-tion and public dissemination of written materials; and public meet-ings.

2. Consultation.Thisgenerallydenotesfield visits,household sur-veys,andinterviewsofprimarystakeholders.

3. Joint assessment. Beyond consultation, this mechanism involvesthepublic in identifyingprimarystakeholders,discoveringproblems,andevaluatingprojects.

4. Shareddecision-making.Here,primarystakeholdershelptodeter-minepriorities,planprojects,defineroles,resolveconflicts,andreviewandcriticizedraftdocuments.

5. Collaboration.Primarystakeholdersarerepresentedonjointcom-mittees,workinggroups,andtaskforceswithfullvotingrights,oraregivenprincipalresponsibilityforimplementingprojects.

6. Empowerment. This mechanism includes building capacity andprovidingfinancialandlegalsupporttostakeholderorganizations;giv-

It may be that the domi-nant view within the Bank about the best means to achieve those ends is one that values expertise over participation — for what may or may not be per-fectly good reasons.


ingthemfullownershipormanagerialcontroloveraproject;andpro-vidingdirectsupportforstakeholderinitiatives.ag

1. PartIcIPatIon anD the WorLD Bank Project cycLe

TheWorldBankismadeupoftwodevelopmentagencies:theIn-ternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment(IBRD),whichlends money to middle-income countries and poorer countries withgoodcreditratingstofunddevelopmentprojects;andtheInternation-alDevelopmentAssociation(IDA),whichlendsdevelopmentfundstotheverypoorestcountriesonsomewhatmorefavorabletermsandocca-sionallyoffersdebtreliefto“HeavilyIndebtedPoorCountries”(HIPC).TheWorldBankGroupismadeupoftheWorldBankandthreeoth-eragenciesspecializingindifferentareasofdevelopment.TheWorldBankGroupandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)areboth“in-dependentspecializedagencies”oftheUnitedNations(UN)andworkinclosecoordinationwitheachother,donorcountries,andrecipientcountries (or “borrowers”) on the overall goals of development andeconomicstabilitywithineachcountrythatrequeststheirassistance.ah

Since1999, theBankhas required,aspartofanewComprehen-siveDevelopmentFramework(CDF),thatthenationalgovernmentofaborrowingcountrydevelopanoverall“povertyreductionstrategy”forrespondingtotheparticularchallengesitspopulationfaces.aiTheBankrecommendsbutdoesnotrequirethatthegovernmentuse“participa-toryprocesses”todevelopitsstrategyandasksittoincludeadescriptionofanysuchprocessesinitsPovertyReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP),whichdetailsitsgeneralstrategy.aj,ak,al“APRSPneedstodescribethefor-mat,frequency,andlocationofconsultations;summarizethemainis-suesraisedandtheviewsofparticipants;giveanaccountoftheimpactoftheconsultationsonthedesignofthestrategy;anddiscusstheroleofcivilsocietyinfuturemonitoringandimplementation.”amNotallbor-rowersemployparticipatoryprocessesordescribetheminthePRSP;thisissuewillbeaddressedinthefollowingsection.

TheBankusestheborrowergovernment’sPRSPasthemainsourcefortheCountryAssistanceStrategy(CAS)thatBankstaffdevelopsforthatparticularcountry.Insomecountries,Bankstaffhavealsoconsult-


edwithprimarystakeholdersandcivilsocietyorganizationstodeveloptheCAS,but thispracticehasnotbeenadopteduniversally,as therearefewdirectincentivesforBankstafftodoso:“thepredominantin-centive foradvancementandsalary increasescontinues tobegettingloanproposalspreparedandapprovedandgettingmoneydisbursedtoclientgovernments.”anSomestaffmaybeconcerned that “too much” consultationwith sectors other than the governmentborrower simply slows down the approvalprocess.ao

Theprojectcyclebeginswithajointre-viewof thePRSPand theCAS.Bank staffand the borrower government performthis review to identify projects that mightachieve thegoals set forth in those strate-gies. They may undertake household sur-veysandother studies to identifywho theprimarystakeholdersinaprojectmightbeor what their needs are, and may consultthoseidentifiedasprimarystakeholdersingreaterdetailtoassistinidentifyingprojectsthatmightbehelpful.Atthisstageinmostcases theprimaryparticipantscontinuetobetheBankandthegovernment,not thepublic.ap,aq

Nevertheless,theBankexpectsanypro-posed project to comply at least with theBank’s policy on information disclosureandwithitstenkeyenvironmental,social,and international lawpoliciesarknowncol-lectivelyasthe“10plus1”policiesorSafe-guard Policies. Because the governmentborrower is responsible for designing theprojects,however,thequalityanddegreeofdisclosuretothepublicandofcompliancewiththesafeguardsvaryfromcountrytocountry.Thevariationsdependnotonlyonthegovernment’sabilitytocomplywiththeSafeguardPolicies,butalsoonthepoliticalpreferencesofthegov-

Bank staff have also con-sulted with primary stake-holders and civil society organizations to develop the CAS, but this practice has not been adopted universally, as there are few direct incentives for Bank staff to do so: “the predominant incentive for advancement and salary increases continues to be getting loan proposals prepared and approved and getting money disbursed to client governments.” Some staff may be con-cerned that “too much” consultation with sectors other than the government borrower simply slows down the approval process.


ernment.Forexample,ifthe“10plus1”safeguardsservetheinterestsofthepartyinpower,theyaremorelikelytohappen;otherwise,com-pliancecanbegrudgingatbest.AlthoughtheBank’sadoptionoftheSafeguardPolicieshasbenefitedmanyofthecountrieswhoseleadershaveembracedthem—andevensomewhoseleadershavenot—evi-dencesuggeststhatthesepoliciesareobservedinfrequentlyenoughtohaverequiredrepeatedattempts tostrengthenandadapt them,withmixedresults.as,atEventheBank’sInspectionPanel,whichinvestigatescomplaintsfrompeoplewhobelievetheyhavebeenharmedbyaviola-

tionoftheseandotherpolicies,servespart-lyatthepleasureofthegovernmentofthecountry where the alleged violation tookplace,anditspurviewistooconstrainedinanycasetohavea“sustainableimpact”oncompliance.au

Oncetheprojectproposalissubmitted,theBankappraises itwithout anyoutsideconsultationand,ifsatisfied,approvestherequested loans or credits. Once the bor-rower government gives final approval tothe terms, it discloses the full agreementtothepublic,andthefundsaredisbursedaccording to the approved procurementguidelines. Implementation may then be-gin.av During this process “supervision of

theproject is theresponsibilityof theBank”and“implementation istheresponsibilityoftheborrower.”awTheresponsibilityoftheprimarystakeholders is defined by the borrower government. Consequently,opportunitiesfortheirparticipationareagainatthemercyofthecapa-bilitiesandpreferencesofthecountry’spoliticalleaders.

Further, these political leaders may be discouraged by Bank stafffromsolicitingparticipation,asmanystaffquestiontheusefulnessofpublicparticipationduringtheimplementationphaseforcertainkindsofprojects.OnestaffercitedacontrolledstudyinIndonesiadesignedtotestdifferentmethodsofreducingcontractorcorruption:onegroupofcontractorswasmadetoattendandanswerquestionsatcommunitymeetings;theothergroupofcontractorswastoldtheywouldbeaudit-

Although the Bank’s adop-tion of the Safeguard Poli-cies has benefited many of the countries whose lead-ers have embraced them evidence suggests that these policies are observed infrequently enough to have required repeated attempts to strengthen and adapt them, with mixed results.


ed.Thisstudyfoundthethreatofauditstobefarmoreeffectiveinre-ducingcorruptionandaccordingly,thecostoftheproject;bycontrast,communitymonitoringdidlittletoreducecorruption and cost.ax Nonetheless, someservice-deliveryprojects,suchashealth,ed-ucation,andwaterextensionprojects,haveclearlybenefitedwhenmanagerialcontrolisdelegatedtolocalgovernmentsandcivilsociety, particularly when paired with ca-pacity-buildingeffortsandcitizenmonitor-ing to guard against corruption and elitecapture.ay,azStill,Bankandborrower-coun-try staff often hesitate to encourage com-munityparticipationinprojectswherelocalprejudicesorunresolvedintracommunityconflictscouldunderminetheproject’seffortstoem-poweroraiddisadvantagedgroups.ba,bb

Theprojectcycleendswhenthecompletedprojectisevaluated,aphasethatwillbeexaminedinthenextsection.

2. PartIcIPatIon In Strategy FormuLatIon anD Project eVaLuatIon

2.1 Strategy FormulationBankstaffhaveoftencitedTanzaniaasamodelofparticipatoryde-

velopmentintheformulationofpoverty-reductionstrategies.WhenitwaspreparingitsPovertyReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP)inthelate1990s, it solicited public input at a series of district and zonal work-shopscoveringallregionsofthemainland.Eachdistrictinthecoun-trysentfourvillagers,onedistrictcouncilor,onetowncouncilor,onedistrictexecutivedirector,andfiveNGOrepresentativestoeveryzonalworkshop.There,theydeliberated,amongothertopics,overthedefini-tion,causes,andcharacteristicsofpoverty.Attheend,eachworkshoprankeditsprioritiesforgovernmentactionandsentthemtothecapital,wheretheywereaggregatedat thenational levelandfoldedintothefinalPRSP.Intotal,804citizens—22percentofwhomwerewomen—participatedintheprocess.AftercompletingthePRSPinOctober

The threat of audits to be far more effective in reducing corruption and accordingly, the cost of the project; by contrast, community monitoring did little to reduce corruption and cost.


2000, the Tanzanian Vice President’s office, in what has been calledoneofthemostcomprehensivePRSPdisseminationeffortseverunder-taken,publishedsummariesofthepaperandannouncedplanstosetupamonitoringwebsiteanddocumentationcenter.bc

Thiswouldindeedbeafairlyimpressiveexampleofprimary-stake-holderparticipationinthecrucial,earlieststagesofdevelopmentpoli-cy-makinginapoorcountry,butthismaynotbethewholestory.Astaff

sourceatanon-BankmajordonoragencywithdirectknowledgeofTanzania’sPRSPprocess indicated that this was an exam-ple of participatory development in formonly, that political party elites dominatedtheprocess,and thatwhat looked likeaninclusive and participatory process was infact exclusionary and government-domi-nated. The villagers sent to participate inthedistrict-levelandzonalworkshopswerechosenonthebasisofpartyaffiliation,buteventheydidnotreceivethesamelevelofremuneration as the government officialssentfromthesamedistrict.Moreover,thePRSPwaswritteninEnglish,whilethepoorinTanzaniaspeakKiswahili,afactthatef-fectivelyexcludedthemfromanyrealdia-logue about its content. The Vice Presi-

dent’s office translated the first PRSP progress report into Kiswahili,butfailedtodosoforsubsequentreports.Finally,thissourcequestionsthedegreetowhichtherulingeliteofTanzaniaevenusesthePRSPtoguidedevelopmentpolicyandprojectimplementationthere.Evenifitdidreflecttheinterestsoftheprimarystakeholderswhohadahandinitsformulation,itmaynotactuallyserveasaguidetoimplementation,andtheinterestsoftheprimarystakeholdersmaynotinfactbeserved.bdIfthisisamodelofparticipatorydevelopment—assumingthisaccountiscorrect—thenitstandsasanargumentinfavorofalternativemodelsofparticipatorydevelopment.

IthasbeenonlyfiveyearssincetheBankinitiatedtheComprehen-siveDevelopmentFramework(CDF)thatencouragescountriestotake

A staff source at a non-Bank major donor agency with direct knowledge of Tanzania’s PRSP process indicated that this was an example of participatory development in form only, that political party elites dominated the process, and that what looked like an inclusive and participatory process was in fact exclu-sionary and government-dominated.


Participatorydevelopmentaimstogivelocalbeneficiariesakeyroleinchoosing,planning,implementing,andevaluatingtheirprojects.However,thismodelhasnot

alwaysproveneffectivewithWorldBankprojects.PhotobyKyraRice


ownershipoftheirowndevelopmentbydefiningtherelevantstrategiesinthePRSPandimplementingthosestrategieswiththehelpofBankfundingandadvice.TheBank’shopeisthat,byencouragingcountriesto“own”theirowndevelopmentandadoptparticipatoryprocesses,theCDFwilleventuallyimprovethetransparency,accountability,andcapa-bilitiesofthegovernmentandtheefficiencyandoutcomesofdevelop-mentprojects.ItmaysimplybetooearlytojudgewhetherortowhatdegreetheCDF,anditsPRSPprocessinparticular,willeventuallybeembracedbytheentirerangeofdevelopmentactors,fromthelocaltotheinternationallevels.

Likewise, primary-stakeholder participation in the formulation ofthePRSPhastakenplacetooinfrequentlytojudgewhetheritiscapableofbeingdoneinawaythatisnotsubjecttoabusebyentrenchedinter-ests,asmayormaynothavehappenedintheTanzaniacase.Through2002,onlyfourcountrieshadcompletedfullPRSPs,while34hadcom-pleted“interim”PRSPs.beSincetheguidelinesfortheinterimPRSPsdonotrequireextensivepublicparticipation,governmentssolicitedlittle.Despitetheselaxguidelines,28outofthetotal38countriesundertookatleastoneparticipatoryprocess,suchasdirectconsultationwiththepoor,whilepreparing thepovertyanalysis for thePRSP.Of these28,however,only10invitedthepoortoparticipateintheactualformula-tionofthatanalysis,andonly14evencitedtheresultsoftheparticipa-torypovertyanalysisinthefinalPRSP.bfTheextentofparticipationinthedevelopmentofthePRSP,then,evenamongthecountriesemploy-ingparticipatoryprocesses, remains fairlyminimal.This suggests theBankneedseithertoundertakemorecapacity-buildingefforts,sothatgovernmentscanbetteremployparticipatoryprocessesinPRSPdevel-opment,ortoputmorepressureoncountriesthathavethatcapacitybutlackthepoliticalwilltouseit.

2.2 Project EvaluationAttheotherendoftheprojectcycle,theprojectevaluationphase,

participatorydevelopmentfacessimilarlycriticalchallenges.WhiletheBank has embraced participatory evaluation in word, it has not fullybackedupthatembraceindeed.Thereisnoinstitutionalmandatere-quiringevaluatorstosolicitprimary-stakeholderparticipation,justnon-bindingguidancerecommendingit,andBankstaffreportthatpartici-


patoryevaluationtakesplaceonlyattheinitiativeofcertainstaff.bgAsonestaffmemberexplained:

TheOperationsEvaluationDepartmentdoesfieldvisitsandindepthevaluations,calledprojectassessmentsoraudits,inabout25percentof completed Bank projects. Usually beneficiary groups are visited,butitdependsontheindividualevaluatorastohowmuch[commu-nityparticipation]isdone.Also,whenlargesectorstudiesaredone,thecasestudiesusuallyincludesomemeetingswithbeneficiariesandsomesurveys,usuallyverbal,occasionallywritten.bh

The few studies that have been done on participatory evaluationfound very low levels of primary-stakeholder participation, around 9percentbetween1994and1998,forexample;bisomeBankstaffhada“gutinstinct”thatthelevelshaverisensig-nificantly since then, though theyhadnoempiricalevidencetosupportit.bj

Not everyone views such increases asa good thing. Many within the evaluationcommunity are concerned that primary-stakeholderinvolvementinevaluationpro-cessesmaydamagetheobjectivityandim-partialityof theevaluators.bkThis concernhassomemerit,butthedegreetowhichitisaprobleminBankprojectevaluationsisunknown.Itisequallyunclearhowwidespreadthecon-cernisamongBankstaff,orwhatitseffecthasbeen,ifany,ontheinsti-tutionalizationofparticipatoryevaluation.

Thereareotherobstaclestoparticipatoryevaluationwithinthebor-rowercountries themselves.A1998surveyofaidrecipients’attitudestowardevaluationingeneral—excludingparticipatoryevaluation—concludedthat“theycontinuetoregardevaluationasadonor-drivenactivityprovidingthemwithfewbenefits”blratherthanasamethodforimprovingexistingand futureprojects.Thisofficialpessimismaboutevaluation can trickle down to the communities where projects havebeencompleted,whichmay in turndiscourageprimary stakeholdersfromparticipatinginevaluationseveniftheyarespecificallyinvited.

TheBankhastakenanumberofstepstopromote—thoughnotrequire—participatoryevaluation.Onthestandardformthatprojectevaluatorsfillout, theBank includes threequestionsrelated tocom-

There is no institutional mandate requiring evalu-ators to solicit primary-stakeholder participation, just non-binding guidance recommending it


munityinvolvement:(1)Werebeneficiariesconsulted?(2)Whatstagesoftheprocesswerethey involvedin?and(3)Whatwastheextentoftheirparticipation?bmItisintendedthattheverypresenceoftheseques-tionsontheevaluationformwouldbeanincentiveforstafftoinvolvethecommunity,butbecausethesequestionsasktheevaluatortocom-mentonhisorherownperformance,onemightreasonablyquestionwhethertheincentivesucceeds.bn

Other Bank-driven initiatives have included citizen report cards,public-expendituretrackingsurveys,participatorysocialauditing,andindependentbudgetanalysis,amongothers.boForexample, theBankinitiatedapilot“citizen’sreportcard”programinsectionsoftheIndo-nesianforestrysector,primarilytodemonstratethefeasibilityoflarge-scale stakeholder involvement in evaluating public services, but alsopartlytoevaluatetheeffectofaid.Anotherprogram,calledGroupware,usedcomputerstogatherstakeholderinputinrealtime.Theeffective-nessofthisprogramwaslimitedbyparticipants’computerskills,andtheBankhasattemptedlow-techversionsoftheprogram(i.e.,withoutthecomputer)aswell.bpItisdifficulttodeterminehoweffectivetheseandothereffortshavebeeninpromotingparticipatoryevaluationorwhateffecttheyultimatelywillhaveonexistingandfutureBankproj-ects,primarilybecausetheBankdoesnothavearobustsysteminplacetosystematicallytrackparticipation.AfairevaluationoftheseinitiativeswouldrequireaccesstodatathatiscurrentlyunavailableandamandatefromtheBanktodointernalresearch.bq

3. PartIcIPatory theory anD PartIcIPatory PractIce

3.1 Challenges to PracticeWhyhastheBankbeensoresistanttoeffortstoimplementitsown

president’sstatedpriorityof“mainstreaming”participation?AnumberofexplanationshavebeenofferedforthelimitedprogresstheBankhasmade,asanorganization,towardthatgoal,includingthefollowing:br

• aninadequatetop-levelstrategytoimproveparticipation;• insufficientbuy-inbyBankseniormanagementandmainstream

economists;


• staff-leveldisincentivestoparticipationandinadequateparticipa-toryskills;and

• aprojectcyclenotdesignedtofacilitateparticipation.Otherexplanationsfocusonconcernsabouttheimpracticality,ef-

fectiveness, and risks of implementing participatory processes, or onobservationsaboutcountryandprojectspecificfactorsratherthanonorganizationstructure.ThesearenotsomuchexplanationsofwhytheBankhasnotincorporatedparticipatorydevelopmentintoitspracticesastheyareexplanationsofwhyparticipatorydevelopmentdoesnotal-waysworkwhenattempted,orargumentsforwhytheBankshouldnotembrace participatory development at all. Some of these challengeshavebeendescribedinthispaper,buttheybearrepeatinghere,andothersdeserveatleasttobementioned:bs,bt,bu,bv,bw,bx,by

• borrower-governmentoppositiontoormanipulationofparticipa-toryprocesses;

• government,staff,community,orprimary-stakeholderdeficitsofcapacity;

• projectstoolargeortoodiffusefordeepparticipationtobere-alistic;

• elitecaptureofparticipatoryprocesses;• weak traditions of civic and political participation, especially by

women;and• primary-stakeholderdoubtsthattheirparticipationwillmakeany

difference.Perhapsthebiggestimpedimenttopar-

ticipatorydevelopmentat theBank is thefactthataverylargenumberofBankstaffatalllevelsareskepticalaboutthevalueordesirability of participatory development.bz Many claim that participation does notcontribute to project effectiveness; that itcaninfactundermineprojecteffectiveness;thatevenifitiseffective,itscostsoutweighits benefits; and that it creates falsehopesorunrealisticexpectationsamongprimarystakeholders in a way that can ultimatelydamagethelegitimacyofdevelopmentwork

Many claim that participa-tion does not contribute to project effectiveness; that it can in fact undermine project effectiveness; that even if it is effective, its costs outweigh its ben-efits; and that it creates false hopes or unrealistic expectations among pri-mary stakeholders.


inthosecommunities;orthatitinvolvestheBankinpoliticsinborrowercountriesininappropriateorunacceptableways.ca

3.2 Challenges to TheoryThesechallengestothepracticeofparticipatorydevelopmentare

alsochallengestoparticipatorydevelopmentasanormativetheoryorgoal.Whydoparticipatorytheoristsbelievethatparticipatorydevelop-mentisdesirable,andhowmighttheyrespondtothesecriticisms?Onemightgivethreegeneralreasonsforvaluingparticipatorydevelopment:itstransformativevalue,itsinstrumentalvalue,anditsintrinsicvalue.cb

3.2.1 transformative value. As noted in the Introduction to thispaper,theinitialattractionofparticipatorydevelopmentinthe1970samongmanyNGOsandsocialcriticswasitspotentialtotransformandempowerthepoorandmarginalizedtoimprovetheconditionsoftheirlives. The literature on civic engagement suggests that participationprovidesthecivicskillsandsocialcapitalthatsocietiesneedtosustaindemocracy.Criticscitetwoobjectionstothisconclusion:

•Itisnottrue.Whileitmaybedifficulttomeasure,itmaynonethe-less be the case that participation has little or no effect on the con-sciousness, values, or capabilities of primary stakeholders. Response:Onemustconcedethatnoteverybodywouldrespondtoopportunitiesto participate in the way participatory theorists might expect: differ-entpeoplerespondtosocialstimuliindifferentwaysunderdifferentcircumstances.Thetransformativevalueofparticipatorydevelopmentmaybeconstrainedaswellbypoliticalandculturalcircumstancesinthecountriesandcommunitieswhereprojectsareundertaken.AssumingthecritiqueoftheTanzanianprocessisvalid,itisunlikelythatthePRSPprocess there transformed all of those who participated, since mostparticipants were chosen on the basis of what they already believed.Nonetheless, there isnogoodreason tobelieve thatparticipation insomephaseofdevelopmentwouldhavenoeffectwhatsoeveronpar-ticipants:attheveryleastparticipantslearnmoreabouttheprojectandhow itmightaffect them,andwithdeeperor repeatedparticipationtheywouldbelikely,atleastmarginally,toexpandtheirsocialnetworks,learnsomethingabouttheircommunityorgovernment,developtheircivicskills,orincreasethesocialcapitaloftheircommunity.

•It’snotdesirable.Thereissomeconcernthattheconsciousness-rais-ingefforts thatFreire,Fanon,andotherMarxistsadvocatemayhave


therevolutionaryeffectsthoseauthorsdesire.Asthelivesofpoorandmarginalizedpeoplebegintoimprove,itisoftenthecasethattheybe-comelesscontentwiththestatusquoandwiththeirlives,ccandinsomecasesthisdisruptssociety.Response:Itisdesirableforthelivesofpoorandmarginalizedpeopletoimprove,anditisrarelythecasethattheraisedexpectationsthatsuchimprovementscauseleadtorevolutions.Morecommonly,effortsthatsucceedinraisingconsciousnessleadsim-plytodemandsforrightsandtheredistributionofsocialandeconomicgoods.

3.2.2 Instrumental value.Muchofthemorerecentadvocacyofpar-ticipatorydevelopmentbyeconomistsandBankstaff isbasedon thebeliefthatprimary-stakeholderparticipationinplanning,implementa-tion,andevaluationcanimprovetheeffectivenessandsustainabilityofdevelopmentprojects.Thereisonemainobjectiontothisargument:

•Itisnottrue.ThisistheobjectionnotedattheendofSection3.1.Response: It isofcoursetruethatprimary-stakeholderparticipationatanyphaseoftheprojectcycledoesnotinvariablyimproveeveryproj-ect:differentmechanismsofparticipationareappropriatetodifferentkindsofprojects,differentphasesof theproject cycle, anddifferentsocialandpoliticalcircumstancesunderwhichstakeholderslive.cdIfthisisthecase,thenonecannotreasonablyclaimthatparticipatorydevel-opment“works”withoutalsospecifyingtheconditionsunderwhichitsucceedsandprovidingevidencetosupportthecontention.Infact,asnotedintheintroductiontothispaper,therehavebeenanumberofBankstudiesthatprovidesomesuchevidence,andscholarswhostudyparticipatory development are generally quite careful not to overselltheconcept,thoughsomeadvocatesmaybeguiltyofoverselling.

3.2.3 Intrinsic value. Philosophers, NGOs, and even some econo-mistsclaimthatparticipationintheimprovementofone’sownlifeisabasicright,anexpressionofdignity,anexemplificationofdemocracy,oranycombinationofthese.Thisisalittlemoredifficulttoobjectto,sinceitgoestotheheartofthedemocraticconcernfortherightofallhumanstohavesomedegreeofinfluenceoverthingsthataffecttheirlives.Developmentprojectsdesignedtoimprovethelivesofthepoorand marginalized are likely to have an effect — positive or negative—onthelivesofthepoorandmarginalized.


Nonetheless, there are minimalist and elitist conceptions ofdemocracyce,cf,cgthatfavorallowingaminoritytomakedecisionsonbe-halfofamajorityaslongasthemajorityhasregularopportunitiestovotethemoutofoffice,thetheorybeingthatthethreatofelectionsisenoughtodeterleadersfromharmingthemajority.Anextensionofthis

approachwouldbetoarguethatthethreatofelectionsisanincentiveforleaderstore-specttheinherent“righttodevelopment”chthatisbeginningtobeembracedbysomeintheinternationaldevelopmentcommu-nity.

Thisargumentwouldhavemoreforceif all development projects took place incountrieswherethepoorandmarginalizedcould vote in elections that are free and

fair,butthisisrarelythecase.TheBank’sarticlesofagreementprohibitany political interference within a country, but a strong case can bemadethattheBankis,infact,permittedtopromotehumanrightsandfreedom.ciAnequallystrongcasecanbemadethatitmakesnosensetoconceiveofdevelopmentwithoutincludinghumanrightsandfreedomasinherentintheconcept.cjTherefore,theBankismorallyobligatedatleasttotrytosolicitparticipationincaseswhereborrowergovernmentsfailtogivecitizenstheopportunitytoinfluenceitspoliciesandwhereparticipationisleastlikelytohaveperverseeffectsonthoseitistryingtohelp.

3.3 RecommendationsTochangeanorganizationsuchastheBankwhosemissionaffects

andis influencedbythepublic, theorganization’s leadershipcannotsimplyredefinethestrategicvisionorthemissionoftheorganization,importunestafftosupportit,andlaunchafewinitiativeswithoutalsomakingdeeper,moredifficultchangestothewaytheorganizationop-erates. Successful change requires clearlydefinedadjustments to theeverydaytasksthatstaffatalllevelsundertake,pairedwithappropriateresourcesandincentivesthatdirectlylinkthesuccessfulcompletionofthosetaskstosuccessfulcareeradvancement.ckAttheBankthesetasksareproject-related,andthoseshouldbeclearlydefinedinsuchawaythatstaffcannotmisunderstandthattheyshouldbeincorporatingpar-

The Bank is morally ob-ligated at least to try to solicit participation in cases where borrower governments fail to give citizens the opportunity to influence its policies.


ticipationintotheirwork.Thissuggests,ofcourse,thattheBankmustidentifythetasksthatwillfurtherthemissionbyanalyzingthetypesofprojectsandcircumstancesinwhichparticipationismostlikelytomakea difference in the projects’ effectivenessand their impacts on the lives of primarystakeholders

TheseniorleadershipoftheBank,pri-marily inthepersonof itserstwhilepresi-dent,JamesWolfensohn,hasmadeitclearthat incorporating participatory develop-mentintotheBank‘sworkisapriority.clIftheBankwantstosucceedinputtingittopractice,theBankshouldmakeastrongereffortnotjustto“promote”or“encourage”participatory development but to learnwhere it ismostappropriateandeffectiveandthendefinespecifictasksthatstaff indifferentrolesneedtoaccomplishto(1)incorporateparticipationintotheirwork,and(2)advanceintheircareers.

Theprimaryrecommendationoftheauthors,then,isfortheBanktoreviewprojectreports,studies,andevaluationstoidentifywhatspe-cificparticipatorymechanismscmhavebeenshowntoworkatwhat spe-cificphasesoftheprojectcyclecnforwhatspecifickindsofprojectsunderwhatspecificcircumstancesco;thentoidentifyspecifictasksthatBankstaffwouldneedtotaketoincorporatethosemechanismsintotheirwork;then to identify and make available the appropriate resources thosestaffwouldneedtocarryoutthosetasks;andfinallytoaddthosetaskstothoseemployees’jobdescriptionsandmakethemthesubjectoftheemployees’annualreviews,withtherequirementthattheymaynotbepromotedwithouthavingaccomplishedthosetasksinanappropriateandeffectivemanner.

Giventhechallengesparticipatorydevelopmentfacesfromallquar-ters, it isalmostcertainthataveryfewnumberofstaff,projects,andstakeholderswouldbedirectlyaffectedby these steps.This impliesaverymodestroleforparticipatorydevelopmentattheWorldBankinthe short term. This is as it should be, as participatory developmenthasnotyetbeendefinitivelyproventobeeffectiveinallBankprojects

the organization’s leader-ship cannot simply redefine the strategic vision or the mission of the organiza-tion, importune staff to support it, and launch a few initiatives without also making deeper, more dif-ficult changes to the way the organization operates.


underallcircumstances.Toforceparticipatoryprocessesintocircum-stanceswheretheyarelikelytofail,tobackfire,ortobeundertakeninformratherthansubstanceistoriskcreatingevenmoreoppositiontotheconceptthanalreadyexists.Amodestbutfocusedeffortmayhelptoillustratethepotentialofparticipatorydevelopmenttoskeptics,as-sumingitsucceeds.


aTheauthorswouldliketothankBenja-minR.BarberandDavidA.Crockerfortheircommentsonanearlierdraftofthispaper. Responsibility for any errors oromissionsbelongssolelytotheauthors.bPateman,Carole,ParticipationandDemo-craticTheory(Cambridge,UK:UniversityPress,1970).c Freire, Paulo, Pedagogy of the Oppressed(New York: Herder and Herder, 1970),ch.1-2.d Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, “The SocialContract.” in Social Contract: Essays byLocke, Hume, and Rousseau, (New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1960),bk.II.e Goulet, Denis, The Cruel Choice: A NewConcept in theTheory ofDevelopment (NewYork:Atheneum,1971).fFanon,Frantz,1965.TheWretchedof theEarth(NewYork:GrovePress,1965).g Crocker, David A, “Development Eth-ics,”inRoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,editedbyE.Craig.(NewYork:Routledge,1998).hTownsley,Philip,RapidRuralAppraisal,ParticipatoryRuralAppraisal andAquacul-ture.(FAOFisheriesTechnicalPapersNo.358,1996),Appendix1.iLong,Carolyn,ParticipationofthePoorinDevelopment Initiatives:TakingTheirRight-fulPlaces (Sterling,Va.:EarthscanPubli-cations,2002),16.j World Bank, The World Bank and Par-ticipation (Washington, DC: The WorldBank,1994),12.kLong,7-8.

l Sen, Amartya Kumar, Resources, Values,andDevelopment(Cambridge,Mass.:Har-vardUniversity,1984).mStreeten,Paul,FirstThingsFirst:MeetingBasicHumanNeedsintheDevelopingCoun-tries(NewYork:PublishedfortheWorldBankbyOxfordUniversityPress,1981).n Narayan, Deepa, Jonathan Isham, andLantPritchett,“TheContributionofPeo-ple’s Participation: Evidence from 121Rural Water Supply Projects,” (Environ-mentallySustainableDevelopmentOcca-sionalPapersNo.1,1995).o Hentschel, Jesko, “Does ParticipationCost the World Bank More? EmergingEvidence,” (Human Resources Develop-mentandOperationsPolicyWorkingPa-persNo.31,1994).pFinsterbusch,Kurt,andWarrenA.VanWicklin,“TheContributionofBeneficia-ry Participation to Development ProjectEffectiveness,”inPublicAdministrationandDevelopmentVol.7,No.1(1987),1-23.qWorldBank1994,2.r World Bank, A Guide to the World BankWashington,DC:TheWorldBank,2003,119-120.sLong,ch.4.t Long, ch. 2-4. Robb 2001 pp. 1-21;Cracknell 2000 ch. 1; interviews withWorldBankstaffuRobb,CarolineM.,CanthePoorInfluencePolicy? Participatory Poverty Assessments intheDevelopingWorld,2nded.(Washington,DC: International Monetary Fund andTheWorldBank,2001),1-21.vCracknell,BasilEdward,EvaluatingDe-velopmentAid:Issues,ProblemsandSolutions

Notes


(Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publica-tions,2000),ch.1.wInterviewswithWorldBankstaff,2004.SeeNote31.xseeCrocker1998.yInternationalDevelopmentEthicsAsso-ciation(IDEA).Availableat:http://www.development-ethics.org/.z e.g. Drèze, Jean, and Amartya KumarSen, India: Development and Participation,2nd ed. (New York: Oxford UniversityPress,2002).aa e.g. Narayan, Deepa, and Patti L. Pe-tesch, eds., From Many Lands, Voices ofthePoor (Washington:OxfordUniversityPressandTheWorldBank,2002).ab see Mertes, Tom, ed., A Movement ofMovements:IsAnotherWorldReallyPossible?(NewYork:Verso,2004).ac De Greiff, Pablo, and Ciaran Cronin,GlobalJusticeandTransnationalPolitics:Es-saysontheMoralandPoliticalChallengesofGlobalization (Studies in ContemporaryGerman Social Thought, Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,2002).adCrocker,David,DeliberatingGlobalDevel-opment: Ethics, Capabilities, and Democracyforthcoming.aeAllintervieweeshadrequestedanonym-ity,andthoserequestsarehonoredhere.Asonlyasmallandpresumablynon-ran-domsampleofBankstaff(andasmallersampleofnon-Bankdonoragencystaff)were interviewed for this study(Novem-ber-December2004),theauthorsdonotclaim that the results are representativeofBankstaffingeneral,northatthein-terviewees’ comments represent officialBank policy concerning the issues dis-cussed; any misinterpretation of thosecomments,andanyothererrorsoromis-

sions, are the sole responsibility of theauthors.afWorldBank1994,12.agWorldBank1994,12.ahWorldBank2003,10-31.ai Shah, Parmesh, and Deborah Youssef,VoicesandChoicesataMacroLevel:Partici-pation inCountry-OwnedPovertyReductionStrategies (Washington, DC: Participa-tionandCivicEngagementTeam,SocialDevelopment Department, The WorldBank,2002).ajWorldBank2003,36-39.akRobb,87-105.al World Bank, and International Mone-taryFund,PovertyReductionStrategyPapers:OperationalIssues(Washington,DC:Inter-nationalMonetaryFundandInternation-alDevelopmentAssociation,1999).amWorldBank2003,37anLong,85-86,102-105.ao Interviews with World Bank staff, No-vember2004.apLong,65-68.aq Interviews with World Bank staff, No-vember2004.ar Environmental assessments, naturalhabitats, pest management, involuntaryresettlement, indigenous peoples, for-estry, safety of dams, cultural property,projectsoninternationalwaterways,andprojectsindisputedareas.as Freestone, David, “The Environmen-tal and Social Safeguard Policies of theWorldBankandtheEvolvingRoleoftheInspectionPanel,”inCanPublicDiscussionEnhanceProgramOwnership?(IMFWorkingPaperNo.WP/04/163) byA.DrazenandP. Isard, eds., (Washington, D.C.: Inter-


nationalMonetaryFund,2003),139-145.WorldBank2002pp.3-9at World Bank, Safeguard Policies: Frame-work for Improving Development Effective-ness(Washington,D.C.:Environmentallyand Socially Sustainable Development,andOperationsPolicyandCountrySer-vices).auFreestone,149-156.avWorldBank2003,56-57.awIbid.,57.ax Interviews with World Bank staff, No-vember2004.ay World Bank 2004a, Good Practice Note:Supporting Participation in DevelopmentPolicyOperations,(Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank,2004),7-8.az World Bank 2004b, World DevelopmentReport:MakingServicesWorkForPoorPeople,(Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group,2004).baWorldBank2004a,3.bb Interviews with World Bank staff, No-vember2004.bc Alonso, Rosa, and Robert Utz, FiscalAspects of PRSP Implementation in Tanza-nia(Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank,2004).bdInterviewwithdonoragencystaff,De-cember2004.beThedistinctionbetweenfullandinter-imPRSPs isdefined inWorldBankandInternationalMonetaryFund1999.bfRobb,97bg Interview with World Bank staff, No-vember2004.bh Interview with World Bank staff, No-vember2004.

biCitedinLong,69-71.bj Interviews with World Bank staff, No-vember2004.bkCracknell,339-352.bl Khan, M. Adil, “Evaluation CapacityBuilding:AnOverviewofCurrentStatus,IssuesandOptions”inEvaluationVol.4,No.3,1998,310-328.CitedinCracknell,302.bm Interview with World Bank staff, De-cember2004.bnCracknell,320.boWorldBank2004a,10.bpInterviewwithWorldBankprojectstaff,December2004.bq Interviews with World Bank staff, No-vember-December2004.brLong,64-105.bs InterviewswithWorldBankandotherdonoragencystaff,November-December2004.btWorldBank2004a.buLong,ch.4.bvShahandYoussef.bwCracknell,302-339.bx World Bank and International Mon-etaryFund.byWorldBank1994,24-26.bz Interview with World Bank staff, No-vember2004.ca Interviews with World Bank staff, No-vember-December2004.cbSen,AmartyaKumar,DevelopmentasFree-dom, 1st. ed., (New York: Knopf, 1999),ch.6.


ccGraham,Carol,andStefanoPettinato,“Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers,andSubjectiveWell-BeinginNewMarketEconomies”inJournalofDevelopmentStud-ies(2002).cdWorldBank1994,21-27.cePrzeworski,Adam,“MinimalistConcep-tionofDemocracy:ADefense”inTheDe-mocracySourcebook,editedbyR.A.Dahl,I.ShapiroandJ.A.Cheibub,(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,2003).cf Zakaria, Fareed, The Future of Freedom:Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad,1st ed., (New York: W.W. Norton & Co,2003).cg Schumpeter, Joseph Alois, Capitalism,Socialism, and Democracy, 6th ed., (Lon-don:UnwinPaperbacks,[1942]1987).chMarks,Stephen,“ObstaclestotheRighttoDevelopment.”PaperreadatTheOsloWorkshop: Human Rights, Equity, andDevelopment, (Oslo: The NorwegianCentre for Human Rights, October 12,2004).ci Interview with World Bank staff, No-vember2004.cjSen1999.ck Wilson, James Q., Bureaucracy: WhatGovernmentAgenciesDoandWhyTheyDoIt(NewYork:BasicBooks,1989).cl Mallaby, Sebastian, The World’s Banker:A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises,andtheWealthandPovertyofNations(NewYork:PenguinPress,2004).cm World Bank 1994, 12; cf. Intro-ductiontothispapercn WorldBank2003,55-59;cf.Sec-tion1ofthispapercocf.Section3.2.2ofthispaper

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