Part XII: Philo’s ‘reversal’• Cleanthes: Philo, you really push things too far.• Philo

– Well, with religion, there’s no real danger.– It’s really obvious that there’s a purpose to nature.– In science, we use the rule nature does nothing in vain;

we look for the purpose of things.– We also use the rule nature uses simple and proper

techniques.– Science is silently acknowledging a God.– Galen showed us how amazingly complicated the human

body is; and today we know even more of the same.– What more could God do to make his existence clear in

nature?– When all the admissible arguments support a conclusion

(especially when there’s so many arguments), we should accept the conclusion.

Philo’s ‘reversal’

• Cleanthes– Also, theism is the only theory that’s at all workable.– Skeptics have no other theory to offer; all they can do

is raise doubts.– Without a better theory available, it’s impossible to

suspend judgment.

• Philo– There’s something of a merely terminological dispute

here.– We establish God’s existence by analogy with design

and artifacts; any doubts on whether God should be called a mind are of mere terminological concern.

– The analogy’s there, so the term fits.

Downplaying thetheism-atheism dispute

• Terminological disputes can be cured only by being clear and consistent.

• But ‘matter of degree’ disputes are impossible to clear up.– There’s no precise standard available.

• Theism-atheism– The theist will admit that there’s a big difference

between the human mind and God’s mind.– The atheist must admit that the operations of nature

are similar to each other, and that therefore the cause of the universe is (in some way) similar to human thought.

– So the only point of dispute is a matter of degree.• Switching sides

– Sometimes the theist will exaggerate the differences.

– And the atheist will exaggerate the similarities of nature.

Shift to morality• Philo:

– Admittedly, the natural world fits the analogy to our intelligence better than any analogy to our benevolence.

– But all that follows is that our benevolence is “more defective in [its] kind” than our intelligence.

• Philo: I love “true religion”; I just get carried away when bashing “vulgar superstition”

• Cleanthes: But surely we need people to believe in an afterlife; otherwise, society would fall apart—we couldn’t rely on them to behave morally.

• Cleanthes: After all, “finite and temporary rewards and punishments” clearly work; so “infinite and eternal” ones must work even better.

Social order and religion

• Philo: But whenever religion shows up in history, bad things always happen. Why is that?

• Cleanthes: Because religion is supposed to operate silently, making people good. When it ‘stands out’, making itself known, it’s gone too far, and it’s “a cover to faction and ambition”

• Philo: But then the only safe religion is the “philosophical and rational kind”. All other religion is dangerous.

Social order and religion

• Eternal sanctions– Infinite and eternal sanctions might well be

ineffective.– After all, people are attached to “present

things”.– Preachers say this all the time, but then they

overlook it when they say society would fall apart without religion.

• Natural inclination vs. religious motives– A more effective motive to moral behavior:

“natural honesty and benevolence”.– Natural inclinations work steadily and non-stop.– Religious motives come and go.

Social order and religion

• Natural inclination vs. religious motives– Religious motives can always be avoided by

rationalization and “excuses”– Any time natural inclinations and religious

motives come into conflict, natural inclinations will win.

– So religious motives aren’t very reliable.– This is why “none but fools” mistrust

religious skeptics.– And this is why it might well make sense to

mistrust those who claim to be religious.

Social order and religion• True religion vs. vulgar superstition

– Intellectuals have less of a need for external motives to be moral.

– But the masses are incapable of true religion (which is good for morality).

– They always go in for vulgar superstition (which is bad for morality).

• How vulgar superstition is bad for morality– Some today directly criticize any reliance on morality, as

a dangerous temptation.– Superstition also creates “a new and frivolous species of

merit”, which undermines serious morality.– Because it’s impossible to keep up your religious fervor

all the time, you have to fake it—this encourages dishonesty.

– Zealots are unwilling to submit to morality—their cause is too sacred to be compromised.

– The focus on eternal salvation encourages selfishness.

Social order and religion• Religion in politics

– There’s a rock-solid rule: keep political power away from religious leaders.

– But why is that, if religion is so good for public morality?– If one religion is privileged, everything else (science,

industry, ...) ends up under the religious authority.– If all religions are allowed, the government has to

constantly check “the pretensions of the prevailing sect” to avoid unending disputes.

– True religion doesn’t have these problems—but religion in the real world does. And philosophical theism is confined to intellectuals.

• Oaths– What makes oaths effective is “the solemnity and

importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and the reflecting on the general interests of society”. Not religion.

– Oaths outside of the courthouse don’t work. We accept Quaker commitments, even though they won’t make oaths.

Comfort and terror• Cleanthes: Be careful. Don’t take away the main “comfort in

life”. “[G]enuine theism” is a great reassurance and consolation.

• Philo: This is fine for true religion and philosophers. But the masses have a different kind of religion, where terror prevails.

• Philo: People seek religion when afflicted; religion goes with sorrow.

• Cleanthes: They’re seeking comfort.• Philo: Sometimes.

– But unhappy people tend to make their Gods out to be terrifying.

– Religions emphasize the terrors more than the comforts.– We (English Protestants?) say there are more people in

hell than in heaven.– No popular religion has ever had an afterlife fit for

humans. Our fear of death leads us to describe it as hellfire and demons.

Comfort and terror• Fear and hope

– Both enter into religion.– But when a man is happy, he does work or sees

friends and ignores religion.– When unhappy, he dwells on hellfire and demons

and makes things even worse.– Maybe when things get better, he’ll have a bit of

happy hopeful reflection on heaven.– But terror is the main emotion; hope lasts for only

a bit.– And the fits of joy are exhausting, paving the way

for depression and terror.– True happiness involves calmness, but this is

impossible with heaven and hell at stake.

Comfort and terror• Worship

– It’s silly to fear thinking for yourself.– It’s absurd to think God has low human passions,

like a “restless appetite for applause”– And it’s inconsistent to think he doesn’t have other

passions, like “a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior”

– The masses worship with “entreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery”, which “degrades [God] to the low condition of mankind”.

– The masses make God out to be “a capricious Dæmon”

– If God even cared about our opinions, he’d favor the “philosophical theists”, he’d have compassion for the “philosophical sceptics”, and he’d be offended by “the votaries of most popular superstitions”

Conclusion“If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie against it?”

Questions

• Would society fall apart without religion (e.g., belief in an afterlife)?

• Do individuals need religious motives to behave morally?

• Is it rational to behave morally without accepting religion?

• Can we know what’s right and what’s wrong without religion?

• Can life have meaning without an afterlife? Should a nonbeliever find life pointless and bleak?

Craig’s moral argument

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.

2. Objective moral values do exist.3. Therefore, God exists.

Objective moral values = “moral values that are valid and binding whether anybody believes in them or not”

Does moral objectivity require God?

• Premise 1: “If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.”

• Russell quote, Ruse quote, Nietzsche• Pinpointing the issue

– It’s not “[m]ust we believe in God in order to live moral lives?”

– It’s not “[c]an we recognize objective moral values without believing in God?”

– It’s not “[c]an we formulate an adequate system of ethics without reference to God?”

– Instead, it’s “[i]f God does not exist, do objective moral values exist?”

Does moral objectivity require God?

• Human morality– On atheism, why think our morality is

objective?– After all, why think human beings are

special?– Admittedly, rape (say) might be taboo due to

its social disadvantages, but that doesn’t mean it’s wrong.

• Atheism takes away moral objectivity– “[W]ithout God there is no absolute right and

wrong that imposes itself on our conscience”

Is morality objective?• Obviously yes

– “[D]eep down we all know it”– It’s just as clear as “the objective reality of

the physical world”– Rape (say) isn’t just socially unacceptable,

it’s wrong, a “moral abominatio[n]”• So the argument goes through:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.2. Objective moral values do exist.3. Therefore, God exists.

Atheistic moral realism

• Moral objectivity without God?– “moral values and duties do exist in reality

and are not dependent upon evolution or human opinion, but... they are not grounded in God... [instead having] no further foundation”

• Craig’s replies: Free-floating-ness?– It seems incomprehensible for moral values to

exist “as an abstraction”– Justice is a property of persons, not a free-

floating abstraction.

Atheistic moral realism

• Craig’s replies: Obligations & persons– Even if moral values exist, how does

this put moral obligations on us?– Obligations are owed to persons—there

can’t be a bare obligation.• Craig’s replies: Design redux

– What are the odds that evolution would produce creatures that just happen to correspond to moral values?

Eliminating moral objectivity?

• Genetic fallacy– Even if a belief originated in some unsavory

way, still it might be true.– So even if our moral judgments come from

cultural conditioning, still they might be true.

• Moral knowledge– Our moral knowledge is grounded in the fact

that we sometimes clearly see the truth.– Anyone who fails to see it “is simply morally

handicapped”.

Sinnott-Armstrongon Craig’s moral argument

• There are objective moral values.• But why think they depend on God?• Is it that “atheists see morality as a

biological adaptation”?– Sure, atheists might see moral codes

held by groups of people as a biological adaptation.

– But that doesn’t mean they see objective morality as a biological adaptation.

Why think moralitydepends on God?

• But what makes rape wrong, if not God?– It’s not (as Craig offers) the cost to the rapist

or to society.– It’s that rape “harms the victim in terrible

ways”.– But what’s immoral about harming people? It

just is.– You don’t need to say that moral values exist

apart from people, as abstractions.– And obligations are still owed to people—to the

would-be victims.• But what’s so special about human beings?

– Human beings are moral agents: they make decisions and can be held responsible.

Why think moralitydepends on God?

• But isn’t there a deeper explanation for why (say) harming people is wrong?– Sure, maybe.– There are lots of accounts out there.– But even if atheists didn’t have any

deeper explanation (“It just is”), that would be no big deal.

– This is because theists have nothing better to offer.

Can theism do better?

• Craig himself ends up saying those who don’t see certain moral truths are just handicapped.

• Almost any account the theist provides can be borrowed by the atheist.

• The only exception: divine command theory.

• Divine command theory: “what makes rape immoral is that God commands us not to rape”

• But divine command theory faces serious problems.

Divine command theory

• Why obey God’s commands?• Is it because God might punish us?

– That’s not a good reason (runaway slaves example)

• Is it because God gave us life?– That’s not a good reason (parents example).

• Is it simply immoral?– That’s not a deeper explanation.

• Does God have good reasons for his commands?– But then those good reasons are doing all

the work; rape is wrong not because God said so but because of the reasons why God said so.

– In that case, God becomes unnecessary.

Divine command theory• The Euthyphro dilemma

– Is rape immoral because God commanded us not to rape?

– Or did God command us not to rape because rape is immoral?

• Second horn (who needs God?)– In that case, rape is already immoral prior to God’s

command, which makes God’s command unnecessary.• First horn (arbitrariness)

– In that case, God could have decided to make rape okay.

– Objection: God couldn’t have done that, because God is good and rape is bad.

– Reply: But that means rape is bad prior to God’s command, and again God’s command is unnecessary.

Craig onSinnott-Armstrong’s response

I. ‘Unjustified harm’ standard• Reply 1

– Why think unjustified harm is wrong on atheism?

– On atheism, humans are just animals.– The ‘moral agents’ reply fails.

• Reply 2– This standard is circular.– ‘Unjustified’ refers to moral justification.

Craig onSinnott-Armstrong’s response

II. Theism can do no better• Sophisticated divine command theories

can avoid the Euthyphro dilemma.• God’s commands give us obligations

because God is, by nature, good.• His nature is definitive of the good.• Why pick God as the standard of

goodness? Because God is worthy of worship.