Parikalpana [The KIIT Journal of Management]Parikalpana [The KIIT Journal of Management] [ISSN #...

Parikalpana [The KIIT Journal of Management]

[ISSN # 0974-2808]

Volume-6 (2009)

Contents

About the Journal

-- Peer Reviewed Section

-- An NGO Accountability: Issues and Possibilities

SN Biswas 1-25 --A Study of Customer Delight in the Indian banking sector based on Kano’s Model of Product Quality

SS Debasish &Sarmistha Sarma 26-41

--Demographics and differential cadresand its influence on organizational ethics: A study among bank

personnel in Kochi

Hari Sunder G. &Prashob Jacob 42-55

--Perspective/ Practioners Section

--Concept of Unique intrinsic nature and its implications for human & organizational development

MS Srinivasan 56-64

--Relationship between emotional intelligence and performance of employees in corporate sector

AK Mohapatra 65-7926-41

--360 Degree feedback: tool for leadership development

Swati Agarwal 80-89

--Case Study Section

--SugarFree: The Brand Image Makeover

Saikat Banerjee 90-100

-- Review Section

-- Portfolio Theory and Performance Analysis

Ananddeep Mandal 101-103

--Notes for Contribution 104

For any query, contact Editor at: [email protected]

Details available at: http://ksom.ac.in/pages/others/ejournal.htm

School of Management, KIIT University Bhubaneswar, India

mailto:[email protected]://ksom.ac.in/pages/others/ejournal.htm

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NGO Accountability: Issues and Possibilities

S. N. Biswas,Professor,

Institute of Rural Management,Anand (IRMA), India.

Email: [email protected]

In recent years, NGO accountabilityhasemerged as a major point of debatewhich ranges froma strict state controlto self regulation (Jordan and Tujil,2006). This interest can partly beattributed to the burgeoning presenceof NGOs in the development scene,often replacing the state’s welfareactivities, and partly to their dominantpresence in the rights based activitieswhich come in direct conflict with manyon the state policies. Accountabilitygathered salience as the NGOs movedfrom small private charity to the publicdomain. In order to make a strongpresence in the public domain NGOshad to grow which also incorporatedthe organizational desire to open up tonew projects and initiatives that needed

sustained funding for a longer duration.Therefore, they needed to open up tomultiple funders, includinggovernment, and make efforts for fund-raising avenues, this necessitatedseeking official status and recognition.Another factor that affected was theirvery presence in the public domain.Many NGOs by touching lives ofordinary citizens slowly move towardsbecoming a public institution controlledand managed privately. The presencein public domain is further strengthenedby having access to funds from thegovernment, public foundations, etc.Thus, the question of accountabilitybecomes more salient (Plumptre, &Laskin, 1993) and slowly gains publiclegitimacy.

The paper posits that for development NGOs, engaged inimplementing projects at local or national level, there is a need to developsystem for accountability. However, it is argued that the system of accountabilitydevelops not through the prescriptions handed out by powerful outsiders butdevelops as a result of consensual negotiation between different strategicstakeholders and consensual negotiation is possible only when all the strategicstake holders are high on both stake centrality and their efficacy beliefs.

KIIT Journal of Management, Vol-6, No.- 1 & 2, Jan-Dec,2009

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Edwards and Hulme (1994) definedaccountability “as the means by whichindividuals and organizations report torecognized authority or authorities andare held responsible for their actions”.Lack of transparency meansorganizations exhibiting tendency to besecretive in their decision makingprocess, reluctant to be evaluated byother NGO partners, and obscuringreal objectives. Brett (1993) in a paperdiscussing accountabilityand efficiencyof NGOs suggested that accountabilityfalls into three categories; (a)commodities NGOs; for example,producer cooperat ives whereaccountability is intimately related tothe functioning of the organization andmembers can exercise their powerthrough exit, (b) all other types ofNGOs, where accountability is notdirectly related to the functioning of theorganization. In the later type of NGOs,accountability is to various principals(donors and governments), which haveleverage through the funds theyprovide. In these NGOs, accountabilityto their beneficiaries is generally weaksince the latter have no other alternativeto procure the goods and services beingoffered, (c) the third is internalaccountability, specificallyaccountability to the board. Hesuggested that accountability in thisarea is fairly weak depending uponfactors such as leadership, size,organization structure, etc. - smallerNGOs dominated by their founders will

have lower accountability. Howeverthis still remains a relatively unexploredarea of research.

What happens when the accountabilityis not demanded by the stakeholders orit is not built-into the systems andprocesses of the organization? In arecent paper Weidenbaum (2009)observed that NGOs attempt to holddifferent constituents of the society(e.g., government, large corporations,etc.) accountable. However, they rarelyestablish governance mechanisms orsystems whereby their stakeholders canhold them accountable (Weidenbaum,2009). The demand for accountabilityarises mainlydue to the nature of stakesthat are involved. For example, in acorporate organizat ion theshareholders have a direct pecuniarystake in the organization and becauseof the nature of stake they continuouslydemand the organization to beaccountable to them. Moreover,because they also form a large pressuregroup, appropriate laws are enacted toprotect their interests so that by lawthe organization becomes accountableto them. This is the concept ofaccountability that Edwards and Hulme(1994) articulated when they observedthat accountability is the means throughwhich individuals and organizationsreport to an authority or authorities andare held responsible for their actions.Here we have emphasized the termrecognized, because from whom suchrecognitions should arise and what are

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the consequences for not recognizingsuch authorities. – is it the government,or any other agencies?

NGO’s have become a major ‘growth’industry in developed and developingcountries alike to fill the policy vacuumand to provide practical and efficientalternatives in field of development andsocial welfare (Eade, 1993). So far, inIndia the state was considered to be thesole public service provider but withthe slogan of ‘shrink the state’, thepublic services were the first to be axed.At the same time the market mechanismfor public service delivery is yet todevelop and in the interregnum NGOswere found to be good partners indelivering such services. The trendsindicate, that NGOs are gradually beingcharged with responsibility of providingservices that are previously providedby the state/public sector. Under thechanged regime, NGOs are expectedto enter a contractual agreement withdonors or government to providepublic services as state withdraws fromsuch services. NGOs, which providesuch services, are broadly referred toas ‘public service contractors’ (Korten,1990).

In this paper we focus on the donordependent (external agencies,government, etc.) non-governmentaldevelopment organizations working ina local context for implementation ofvariet ies of projects. Theseorganizations are local in the sense that

they are embedded in the local milieuin their respective area of operationsdespite their geographical spread. Thechief characteristics of these NGOs arethat they operate at local levels (withindistrict, state, or at most nationalboundaries), implement projects at thegrass roots, are dependent primarily onexternal donors or the state forresources, and are not membershipbased organizations. To operate, theseNGOs use resources largely from theexternal agencies (as opposed to self-generation or membershipsubscription) for public domain(community development as opposedto self-help). The issue of governanceand accountability of theseorganizations become more importantas the domain of operat ion andresource generation is largely in thepublic sphere and not in a ‘private’sphere as the case may be for a mutualbenefit society. Amutual benefit societylike a producers or consumer co-operative largely draws its resourcesfrom within and is set-up with theexplicit purpose of helping its members.This can be construed as truly private,whereas, the NGOs are publicinstitutions controlled in a ‘private’manner. In the literature on NGOgovernance, the concept ofaccountability is integrally related.

Because of growing trend of statewithdrawal from developmentprogrammes in the third world,questions related to evaluative

NGO Accountability : Issues and Possibilities

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attributes of NGOs as accountability,efficiency, values, control overresources, gender equality and levelsand types of participation have movedcloser to forefronts of discussion.NGOs themselves have been more thanaware of the importance ofaccountability. Towards the second halfof the 1990s, as period of rapid growthmany NGOs found themselves inincreasing difficulties. The renowned1994 Manchester Conference on NGOaccountability was seen as a key turningpoint. But it would be true to say thatthere was a wave of changes thatstarted in the mid-1990s.

BALANCINGACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is the only way to ensurethat a line remains drawn betweentransparent compromise and blindcooption (Eade, 1993). There has beenconsiderable discussion, training andcodification of resources with respectto NGO governance in many countriesin the North. But this has been aneglected area of attention and debatein most of the countries. Thegovernance of NGOs focuses on issuesof policy and identity, rather than issueof day-to-day implementation of NGOvision, mission and strategy. NGOgovernance requires the creation ofstructures and processes which enablethe NGO to monitor performance andremain accountable to its stakeholders(Edwards and Hulme, 1995).

Development programmes atgrassroots level focuses onaccountability related to the widerprocess of information exchange,decision-making, management,negotiation and bargaining that takesplace between different stakeholders.Accountability exists between peergroups and operates at many levels; ithas been used to introduce controlmechanisms linked to hierarchy andauthority. However, accountability hasto be a reciprocal process in whichmultiple actors are accountable to eachother. Accountability does not justmean reporting. It is a process ofinformation exchange, consultation andjoint decision-making. In this complexweb of multiple stakeholders one aspectof NGO accountability that is oftenneglected is that which relates to NGOsown governance.

The Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project (CNP) researchsuggested that while non-profits aremaking important contributions to thequality of life in many countries,accountability ‘lapses’limit the sector’sability to make best use of itscapabilities. Like State agencies theyalso have formidable challenges bothinternal and external. Theseshortcomings usually originate fromNGOs’ perpetual shortage of funds andother resources (Babbington &Farrington 1993), specifically becauseof the funding cycle followed bydifferent donors. The donor funding is


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usually related to a particular projectand the time horizon is limited. Theproject funding varies from a coupleof years to a period of five years thoughthe NGO intervention in an area is doneusually keeping a much longer timehorizon in mind. This is largely becauseof the slower take off of developmentalprocesses among the poor andoppressed. The gestation period of theproject becomes longer particularly ifthe NGO is following a participativeapproach. In most cases, thus theshortage of funds maybe attributed tothe mismatch between the time horizonfixed by the donor and the overalldevelopmental plan and perspective ofthe NGO.

The fact that the development NGOsare largely funded through grants andaids by external donor agencies or thegovernment agencies, they employpeople who are paid for their services,and voluntarism may be restricted tofounders or well wishers who largelyremain outside the day-to-daymanagement of the organization. Butthe spirit of voluntarism is sometimesused to obscure exploitation andmanipulation. Structures for redressingemployee grievances, mandatory inmost formal organizations are oftenabsent in NGOs where personalizedmanagement practices tend to prevailover more impersonal rule basedprocedures. In most practical situationsNGO accountability boils down to the

domain of finance. It is partly due tothe fact those donors and otherresource providers have been mostvocal commentators on this issue. Thecurrent regulatory framework,however, has elements that areconspicuous by their absence; there areno ‘Generally Accepted AccountingPrinciples’ (GAAPs) for non-profitorganizations to comply with, andreporting and disclosure requirementsare minimal. Private companies areaccountable to shareholders.Membership organizations, like co-operatives are accountable to theirmembers. Government (the executive)is accountable to the legislatures, andlegislatures are accountable to thecitizens (in elections of course!).Where, how, and to whom the NGOsare accountable?

Leaders are often reluctant to discussthe matters relating to funding openly.When Bunker Roy of SWRCannounced open scrutiny of thefinances of his organization, it madeheadlines. He offered to open theaccounts in public meetings and answerany questions relating to them sparkedoff controversy by suggesting a codeof conduct for NGOs. This move wasopposed by several quarters and wasconsidered as an attack on freedom ofNGOs and an attempt to control themthrough regimentation.

Systems and Processes a steptowards continuity


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One policy that sparked of anti statesentiments amongst NGOs wasproposal to establish national and statecouncils, which would function as anumbrella organization that rural NGOscould join (Kothari, 1986). NGOsjoining the council had to abide by acode of ethics consisting of 19 rules.Besides this proposal for National andstate councils for rural NGOs, the stateinstituted other policies in 1980’s toincrease its control over the NGOsector (Fernandes, 1986; Kothari,1986). These included, Kudalcommission to look into activities,sources and alleged misuse of funds;amendment of FCRA which meant thatall NGOs receiving foreign funds wereobliged to register with Ministry ofHome Affairs, open a foreignContributions account into which alldonations will go, and notify ministryof number of that account. These stepswhich were initiated, partly as a wayto put NGO accountability in place, andpartly as a political strategy by theCongress party to neutralize thedissidence that was rising in thecountry. Most NGOs were mobilizedinto protest against such directintervention of the state in their affairs.But one unintended consequence of theKudal commission was that NGOscame under scrutiny by the state andthat led to more professional handlingof at least the NGOs’ financialtransactions. This change also broughtabout a fair amount of routinization in

a large number of NGOs. But thedanger of state intervention loomedlarge over NGO activities.

HURDLES TOACCOUNTABILITY

As actors within the civil society, NGOsare autonomous institutions inspired bya particular vision. Often NGOs findthemselves in a web of complexinteractions in a particular context.Donors and other resource-providershave a stake in the outcomes of NGOperformance. Many NGOs areconcerned to avoid being co-opted intothe gradual –and not so gradual-privatization of public sector. Theyrightly fear that they might cease to benon-governmental in anything butname. What is at stake is not simply aquestion of political or economicideology; it is also one of moralauthority. Development NGOs cannotderive a mandate from supposed virtuesfor which they are currently in vogue -efficiency, cost-effectiveness, slim-linebureaucracies, and operationalflexibility. The legitimacy of NGOscomes from its founding principles andthe ways in which it gives practicalmeanings to its commitment, throughits day to day interaction with thepeople whom the NGOs aim to serve(Eade D., 1993). The thicker theengagement of the NGO with thepeople the less would be demand forits accountability as the support of itsconstituents, which may exert member-


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like influence on its functioning andmay gradually lead the NGO into amembership based organization. In realworld, this jump from a non-membership organization to amembership one is rarely found. Thepromoters of non-membership NGOsmaybe going through the same dilemmathat many private company promotersface when they go public – that is thefear of loss of control rather than theforce of mission, values, etc.

The above problemis also compoundedby the vastness of the stakeholders.NGOs have multiple accountabilities,which any organization with problems,particularly the possibilities of havingto ‘over account’, or being able to‘under account’ as each overseeingauthority assumes another authority istaking close look at action and results(Edwards, & Hulme, 1995). Legallymost NGOs are accountable to theirtrustees. They have the obligation toaccount to the governments of thecountries in which they operate, thoughin practice this often means little morethan a brief annual report and audit(Tandon, 1995). Morally they areaccountable to other constituencies,most obviously the target groups, thecontributors, and the staff, for whom areal stake in the organization is oftenan important quid pro quo for salarieswhich are lower than their commercialsector counterparts (Hodson, 1992).Developing a range of mechanismstailored to the requirements of these

different functions would help to createa genuine system of accountability inplace of the patchy provision, whichcurrently exists. Externally it mightentail the appointment of a moreprofessional and active board.Internally it might be desirable to createclearer roles in research, policy andinformation.

ROLE OF SOCIAL AUDIT

Social Audit offers a method ofaccountability that involves allstakeholders and is neither prescriptivenor bureaucratic. Buzz word that arein the vogue at the moment, such astransparency’ and ‘good governance’are easy to use but difficult toimplement. For any organization tohave ownership of its outputs, theindicators by which it is measured mustbe relevant to everyone involved, notjust to the key players such as Directorsand Senior Management. Theindicators must be set at the lowestpoint in the organization. Bydeveloping a methodology for social aswell as financial audit ing, anorganization is able to set its ownindicators and respond to changeswithin its social structure. Allstakeholders have a say in developingindicators as methodology evolves, aswell as in applying the indicators.Managers have regular access toinformation regarding social as well asfinancial developments which enablesthem to respond in a timely manner,


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rather than when it’s too late to doanything.

Another way of bringing together themajor facets of NGO performance isto use the concept of organizationalcapacity. Neither NGOs nor donorshave uniform definition of ‘capacity’(James 1994). NGOs have usedmethods like Participatory RuralAppraisal (PRA) to increase theaccountability of office bearers andleaders in community institutions tomembers, and of members to eachother. However these methods haverarely been used by NGOs to developaccountability mechanisms to localinstitutions they support. NGOsinvolve community institutions inprogramme monitoring and evaluation,but less active when it comes toevaluating the performance of the NGOitself. Though use of participatorymethod results in change in powerrelationships, change in managementstyle, undertaking risks, it results indeveloping ‘reciprocal accountability’to community members. Any externalevaluation by an external donor, orteam should be preceded by areciprocal evaluation by the recipientof the fund. Many NGOs continue touse hierarchical, top down controlsystems to exert authority and todemand accountability in their owninstitutions and in the process maybecome as bureaucratic as theircounterparts in the government.Participatory methods could be an

important step in introducing moreappropriate accountability mechanisms.However, the use of this method alonedoes not guarantee increased orreciprocal accountability. NGOs needto make major reversals in their owninstitutions and be prepared to carryoutstructural changes in the long run.

Informal mechanisms in maintaininglegitimacy and accountability can alsobe very effective more so than formal(democratic representative)mechanisms introduced from outside.Caroll’s (1992) conclusion that anopen, collegial style, and attitudeswhich encourage bot tom-upparticipat ion, can help to buildorganizations which are responsive andaccountable to grassrootsconstituencies. The key issue for NGOis not only how to preserve theirautonomy but also how to strengthenmultiple accountabilities and negotiatetheir role in the development canvasmore effectively. If the NGOs do notimprove significantly on the questionof accountability they run the risk ofbeing sidelined in the search oflegitimacy.

ACCOUNTABILITY ANDGOVERNANCE

There emerges another stream ofthought that argues whetheraccountability is synonymous withgovernance of NGOs? Accountabilitymay be defined as the means throughwhich the authorities are notified but


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determining the authority or authoritiesis an issue of governance. Certainstructures within and without theorganization determines the existenceand importance of such authority andconforms to the demand for an accountof their work. Tandon (1995) on similarlines suggest that the governance ofNGOs implies the totality of functionsthat are required to be carried out inrelation to the internal functioning andexternal relations of the organization.Therefore, governance is a muchbroader term and implies addressing theissue of not only identifying the criticalstakeholders but the vision, mission andstrategy. It is also futuristic and needsto focus on future directions and long-term strategic considerations. Anotheraspect of governance is the internalfunctioning of the organization. Theissue of staffing, internal programming,employee relations, capacity buildingwithin the organization, etc. definesnorms and values that are the basis ofinstitutional functioning. Consequently,governance goes beyond the minimalistobligat ions entailed in fulfillingstatutory requirements applicable to theNGOs. Rather it focuses on definingthe external positions that areconsistent with overall thrust of theNGO as an inst itut ion. Mostimportantly, the governance of an NGOis concerned with its effectivefunctioning and performance in thesociety. Therefore, governance entailsestablishment of structures and

processes which enable the NGO tomonitor performance and remainaccountable to its stakeholders(Tandon, 1995).

THE STAKEHOLDERPARTICIPATION

The question in relat ion to thegovernance aspects of these categoriesof NGOs leads us to the problem ofidentifying the stakeholders. In amembership organization it is easy toidentify the primary stakeholder (e.g.members of a co-operative society), butin the case of non-memberorganization, who are the primarystakeholders. Freeman and Reed(1983) in their seminal paper on“stockholders and stakeholders: Anewperspective on corporate governance”suggested two broad categories ofdefinitions of stakeholders; (a) thebroad definition of stakeholders wouldinclude any individual, group ofindividuals, organizations, andinstitutions who are directly impactedby the organization or have the powerto impact the organization. The narrowdefinition of stakeholder is, accordingto him, is any identifiable group orindividual on which the organization isdependent for its continued survival. Ifwe follow, the wider definitionidentification of stakeholder would besomewhat arbitrary and hence thecriticality of the stakeholder existencecannot be examined. The first definitiondoes not indicate the importance of the


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stake or the nature of the stake. Thesecond definition looks from the pointof view of the organization – thecriticality of the stakeholders continuedsupport for its existence. From theresource dependency framework(Peiffer and Salancik , 1978) it isimportant to note that the organizationbecomes accountable to suchstakeholders automatically, providedaccountability is demanded. Slinger andDeakin (1999) define stakeholders asthose whose relations to the enterpriseis not solely contractual, because inmost cases such contract cannot bedrawn, but upon whose cooperationand creativity it depends for its survivaland prosperity. Donaldson & Preston(1995) provided a functional definitionfor the word ‘stakeholder’. Theypointed out that the stakeholders canbe identified by mapping the extent ofactual or potential harms and benefitsthat different groups or individualsexperience or anticipate to experienceas a result of the organization’s actionsor inactions. The Stanford ResearchInstitute defined as stakeholders ‘thosegroups without whose support theorganization would cease to exist’(Freeman 1984:31).

ACCOUNTABILITY IN THECONTEXT OF MULTIPLESTAKEHOLDERS

Stakeholder perceptions inevitablydiffer. NGOs are subjected to so manyconflicting pressures; the dilemmas of

accountability identified can not besolved entirely but has to be managedin many cases. In the literature ongovernance of NGOs the treatment ofmultiple stakeholder perspective isperfunctory. Most models take intoconsideration only one of thestakeholders –that is the Board. It isoften assumed that NGO boards, as anentity, have equal legitimacy and powerthat a representative and elected boardin a company or membershiporganization enjoy. Secondly, thetreatment of the topic is as if the boardis a closed system which on its ownvolition would take up the issue ofgovernance and design a system ofgovernance Therefore, mostprescriptions for governance havelargely remained board-centric. Theproblem of board-centric governancemodels came up due to the problemsin conceptualizing governance systemof NGOs. The ‘enterprise’ model ofgovernance system propagated byCraver in his ‘policy governancemodel’. In the context of multiplestakeholders’ framework governancesystem is viewed as a dynamic systemresult ing out of the consensualnegotiation between different strategicstakeholders Based on the definition ofstakeholder concept provided byFreeman, & Reed (1983) a model isproposed in which the strategicstakeholders are listed and their natureof stake is analyzed subsequently.


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In the above conceptualizat ionemployees and board are considered asinternal stakeholders and the otherthree main stakeholders are the fundingagencies, the state, and the targetcommunity.

In this case the rationality ofgovernance is, pluralistic rather thanmonolithic. It is best described asconsensual negotiat ion andcoordination in which different actorsbring their interests to the organizationand the organization responds to theinterests in creating policies anddrawing up strategies. Thus,Governance is all about a process ofnegotiated settlement between differentstakeholders who are vigilant inprotecting their rights.

A FRAMEWORK OF STAKECENTRALITY

It is not enough to know and identifythe stakeholders but is pertinent in thecase to understand and appreciate thenature of stake that these stake holdershave. The issue of “member centrality”

(Shah 1995) is important in thiscontext. Member centralityrefers to theextent to which members of a co-operative organization believe that theorganization’s success is central to theirexistence. In other words, if theorganization incurs heavy losses or atworst is liquidated, what could then bethe negative consequences for itsst rategic stakeholders? Thestakeholder centrality framework isbased on the theoretical perspectivebuilt around Trevsky’s and Kahneman’s(1991) work on heuristics and biasesin human judgment. They pointed outthat there is an asymmetric relationshipbetween losses and gains. In thisconceptualization it is envisaged thatgreater the perceived loss in the eventof exit of the NGO, the greater will bethe stakeholder centrality. In thisframework, a stakeholder will have apotential to exhibit active involvementin the process of negotiation only whenthe focal organization, which is theNGO, is perceived to be central in theirdomain of existence. When the chancesof any perceived loss due to failure isextremely low, the stakeholders’relationship may range from a neutralto apathetic attitude towards the NGOwhereas; when the perceived loss isextremely high in the event of failureof the NGO, the relationship of thestakeholders towards the NGO will bestronger. The stronger this relationshipthe greater will be proactive behaviouron the part of the stakeholders to playa role in the negotiation process.


Figure 1: Internal and externalstakeholders critical to thecontinuity of the development NGOs

Development NGOsFundingAgency (S)

��

The targetCommunity

Employees

Board

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THE STAKEHOLDERS’EFFICACY BELIEFS

It is not only the centrality of the stakethat would propel the stakeholders tojoin the process of negotiation or forcethemselves to the negotiating forum butit is also the stakeholders’ efficacybeliefs which refers to the extentdifferent stakeholders believe that theyhave the necessary resources (bothinternal and external) to act and bringabout a change in the desired direction.Stakeholders’ efficacy belief is drawnfrom the classic work of Bandura(1997) on the construct of collectiveefficacy which he defined as “a group’sshared belief in its conjoint capabilitiesto organize and execute the courses ofaction required to produce given levelsof attainments” (Bandura, 1997:477).According to him collective efficacywould refer to basically to theoperative capability of the groupcoupled with the elements of perceivedstrong interdependency in the group,belief in one’s own capability tocomplement others’ effort, and sharedbelief in the capability of the group inproducing the desired levels ofattainments. The extent to which thestakeholders believe that they have thenecessary resources and capabilities toexecute the actions for the desiredoutcomes is the extent to which theywill be activated. When such efficacybeliefs are absent the stakeholders areunlikely to take the positive step

forward the negotiation process ofbuilding a system of governance.

The extent of pluralistic and at the sametime, consensual negotiation forgovernance is possible when all thestrategic stakeholders are high on boththe dimensions (stake centrality andefficacy beliefs). It is important to note,at this point is that the stake centralityconcept and stakeholders’ efficacybeliefs are orthogonal to each other.

THE STAKE OF THE BOARD

As already has been pointed out thatthough the Board is supposed to havea high stake in the organization, inNGOs the stake of individual Boardmember is limited to the conscience,and personal integrity. Beyond this theBoard members are not required by lawor through personal financial stake (asit is true for many Board members infor-profit -organizations andmembership organizations like co-operatives) to bear the burden of failureof the organization to discharge itsfunctions.

In some cases, given the individualstanding of the board members in thelocal/national context, the loss oflegitimacy by the organization may getequated with the loss of legitimacy bythe individual board member andthereby the individual board membermay take an act ive interest indeveloping policies that govern theNGO. In reality, this may be far-


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fetched. When such board memberswhen sense that the organization isgoing downhill maystep down from theboard and disassociate them with itsfunctioning and bear no ‘guilt ofassociation’. They just press the “eject”button and land themselves without anyscratch as there is no consequentliability arising out of such action. Atthis point we would like to depart fromthe usual economic model of rationalitywhich tries to discover the pecuniaryinterest in the concept of centrality. Theconcept of centrality revolves aroundthe belief system of the individual andthis belief system may not be solelyguided by the concept of rationality, butby the overall psychologicalunderpinning of individual actorsinvolved. Active participation of theboard members emanates from suchbelief in the centrality of the NGO intheir lives. In the mailed survey that weconducted we found about 27% of theorganizations report that the boardmembers do not spend enough time onpolicy issues (Biswas and Aggarwal,2005). The result is surprising becausethis was based on self-report and weconjectured that all organizations willreport that they have an ‘active’ boardwhich is interested at least in the policymatters of the organization. The stakesof the members of the board, whateverit is may not be central to theirexistence. On the other hand, theefficacy beliefs may be high, at least inprofessionally managed boards, as they

are the ‘strategic’ decision makers ofthe organization.

THE STAKE OF THE STATE

The nature of stake of the state ismarked by interaction of a set ofcomplex parameters such as, thecentrality related to its economic,social, political, and of courseemotional function. The state asstakeholder may have multiple interestand none of these interests maybe ofcentral concern to the state. But if theNGO is involved in an activity whichis a central concern and its impact willbe large in terms of political, economicor social fall-out then it may come toacquire a major stake otherwise itbehaves as an onlooker though invisiblestakes maybe very high. The state isrepresented by its executive. And inreality the decision of the executive isoften based on the overall politicaloutcomes rather the economic andother social outcomes of a particularent ity. For example, demise orliquidation of a large economicenterprise is fraught with trepidation,not merely because of the economicdebacle it can create that it maytranslate into loss of votes in theelections. The perceived loss occurringdue to the failure of a non-governmentorganization engaged in implementingpoverty alleviation project if minimal,then the state in all probability, will benot be vigilant. On the other hand, ifthe positive activities done by NGOs


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conflicts with the interests of the stateand the gains of the NGO is perceivedas threatening future election prospectsof the ruling political party than thestate becomes “over vigilant” andmakes effort to curtail all negotiatingpower of other actors so as toneutralize the pluralistic edifice andengages in making the NGO aninstrument of itself.

In fact, from the point of view of thestate the most important partner in theNGO sector is not the one which hasthe most use value in terms ofdelivering services (a professed welfareand democratic state is also acompetitor in this area) but which posesthe least threat to its existing interests.Therefore, the vigilante function of thestate as a stakeholder often vacillatesbetween the extremes of apathy todirect control and intervention. Inorder to neutralize or minimize thefuture losses the state also takes anactive interest in ‘supporting’ the workof NGOs through allocation of ruraldevelopment projects Thus, we can sayin terms of centrality of the stake forthe state is a dynamic one and in theabsence of ‘rule of law’ and clear cutstate policies it can be the mostuncertain stakeholder. From the pointof view of stakeholders’efficacybeliefs,the actors within the state seem to havehigher efficacy beliefs. On the otherextreme it can throttle the existence ofthe NGO by negative sanctions (caseofAgragamee in Orissa). Thus this role

is not of a vigilante stakeholder but ofan arbitrator of delivering ‘rewards’ and‘punishment’.

THE STAKE OF THE DONOR/FUNDING AGENCY

This is one of the most interesting ofall relationship between the donors/funding agencies. The mutuality is anestablished one. The donor/fundingagency has a major stake in the NGOas its money is involved and it isanswerable to its constituents. Thecentrality applies to the donors as itsexistence is partially determined by theeffectiveness, and legitimacy of theseorganizations. If these NGOs loselegitimacy the donor or funding agencyis also likely to lose legitimacy in theeyes of its benefactor. By very nature,these agencies have to operate throughthe local/national NGOs forimplementing projects and it does nothave an option of allocating resourcesto other agencies such as a ‘privatefirm’.

The perceived loss for the donor in theevent of the NGO ‘faring’ badly is veryhigh. The stake centrality is very highfor the donor. Therefore, it emerges asthe most vigilant of all the stakeholders.Secondly, it seems to be having a largedegree of efficacy beliefs and has beentrying to push the agenda ofgovernance in the development NGOsector. In fact, the whole area of‘governance of NGO’ as a discourse inthe field of development emerged due


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to constant engagement of largeInternational NGOs which fund theDevelopment NGOs particularly in thedeveloping countries. There are twoaspects to it; range of decision of anyentity is limited by the alternatives thatthe entity enjoys. In the case of donorsit is limited by the choice it has at thelocal level. Another aspect that is notwell discussed is the lack of centralityof stakes for other stakeholders whichhas resulted in a consensual negotiationvacuum and the resultant governancestructure get relegated to thebackground. Therefore, it acts more asa supporting organization in improvingthe performance of the NGO in itsinternal functioning rather than the roleof vigilante in its overall ‘policygovernance’. The choice is furtherlimited by the fact that the NGOs alsocountervail the power relationship byhaving multiple donors for differentprojects whose attention then can bedrawn towards the performance ofindividual projects than the overall‘governance structure’ of the NGOs.Thus, the major focus becomeseffective performance assessment froma managerial standpoint of individualprojects, which translates down todeveloping strong accountabilitymechanisms more from the financialaudit point of view. The weak and uni-dimensional accountability becomesmore often a reporting relationshipbetween the development NGO and thedonor agencies.

THE STAKE OF THE TARGETCOMMUNITY

Most operational NGOs in the field ofdevelopment often swear that theyexistbecause of the target community.Members of the target community whoare mostly poor or the most oppressedsections of the society often looktowards the NGOs as another externalintervention (despite all the fanfare ofparticipate development jargon) inwhich they are the recipients of lowcost or no cost services but do not havea means of controlling their activitiesas they might do in a membership basedorganization like a co-operative. Thenon-membership based NGOs canrarely achieve the member-centralitythat many high performing co-operatives enjoy. But at the same time,the NGO activities which positivelyaffect their life build a stake in itscontinuation. The scenario of the NGOmoving out of the scene is hurting, inorder to avoid such future losses it‘helps’ the NGO to cont inue itsactivities but bynever being an integralpart of it and hence does not take thevigilante approach in scrutinizing thegovernance function of the NGO. Thus,the stakes of the target community isvery high (particularly, in the case ofhigh performing NGOs), but this stakeis never translated into peeking into thegovernance system. This is because inspite of stake centrality being high it isvery low on efficacy beliefs that it canaffect the structures and strategies of


16

the NGO. In a market economy, thecustomers often have a choice inselecting a service provider. The fearof customer moving away from its foldoften leads the organization to devisesystems and procedures to involve thecustomers, as in many membershiporganizations it becomes important thatmembers are given their due place inthe consensualnegotiation process, thelack of it results in the loss ofmembership.

STAKES OF THE EMPLOYEES

The development NGO sector, at onepoint in time have been referred to asvoluntary sector, when a group ofvolunteers got together to engage incharitable work for the poor and thedowntrodden. Today the developmentNGO sector implementing projects inthe rural areas are largely modeled afterenterprises and the bulk of its workingforce are employees and not volunteersin the true sense of the term. Somepeople often refer it to as‘corporatisaton’ of NGOs which alsoevolved due to the high premiumattached to the concept of‘accountability’ of NGOs by their donoragencies, as discussed earlier this hasled to developing management systemsand process in the lines of corporateorganizations. The employees of thedevelopment NGOs have a direct stake.This is because the loss that they wouldhave to bear in the case of theorganizations closure will be direct andhard-hitting, primarily the loss of job

but secondarily a loss of profession.The stake centrality may be high foremployees but there has been very littleeffort that is made to develop efficacybeliefs among the employees, except inrare cases ofdevelopment NGOs wherethe employees are also part of thegoverning board.

CONCLUSION

In order to develop a framework ofgovernance in developmental NGOs,the pluralistic and dialogic nature ofgovernance has to be brought to theforefront of this discourse. This can beachieved when the aforementioned fivestrategic stakeholders’ stake centralityand efficacy beliefs are raised to ahigher level.

In the case of the board, as we havediscussed the stake centrality has to beincreased. There can be differentalternative ways of doing this. In thecase of corporate governance,directors’ individual accountability is anissue which has been dealt vigorously.The board members maybe individuallyand severally responsible for certainactions of the organization. In the casedevelopment NGOs, a time has come,where the means and ways of fixing theboard members’ responsibility to otherstakeholders will have to ascertain. Bydirectly fixing the nature and type ofresponsibility the centrality of the stakemay be increased.

The state cannot be allowed to vacillatein the dimension of centrality concern.


17

It has to accept that it has a central stakein the governance of the NGOs at thesame time though the establishment ofrational ‘rule of law’ it has to become aresponsible partner and not anarbitrator of ‘rewards’ and punishment’through executive orders rather itshould be based on principles of justiceand fair play. The state’s interventionas executive is hastened by the lack ofany ‘law’ that should govern itsrelationship with the NGO. Law shouldbe used to curtail the vacillating natureof the state than to make the NGOs aninstrumentality of the state, thoughmost of the NGO leaders oppose any‘law’ on NGOs, fearing that the lawmaybe used to convert them into aninstrumentality of the state rather thenregulate its relationship with the state.

The donors/ and funding agencies whohave both high centrality in terms ofthe stake and are also high on theirefficacy beliefs will have to focus moreon the nature of relationship of NGOswith its strategic stakeholders than onlyon the internal ‘efficiency’approach. Itis also possible for the donors to helpincrease the stake centrality of theBoard and at the same time increasethe efficacy beliefs of two otherstrategic stakeholders; the employees,and the target community.

In order to develop the structures forgovernance, the efficacy beliefs of thetarget community and the employeeswill have to be increase. Participationand empowerment are the two buzz

words that do the rounds indevelopment discourse. In thepluralistic context it becomes moreimportant that how the efficacy beliefsof these two groups of stakeholders canbe increased that they become twopillars n the consensual negotiationprocess for developing structures forgovernance.

The multiple constituency frameworksto the development of governancestructure for accountability is adeparture from the existing boardcentric prescriptive system. In futureempirical research work it needs to beassessed the extent to which differentstakeholders lie on the dimensions ofstake centrality and efficacy beliefs.


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A Study of Customer Delight in the Indianbanking sector based on Kano’s Model of

Product QualitySathya Swaroop Debasish,

Senior Lecturer, Department of Business Management,Fakir Mohan University, Balasore, Orissa.

Sarmistha Sarma,Lecturer in Marketing, Delhi College of Advanced Studies

(Affiliated to GGSIP University), New Delhi.

Banking sector in recent times have been faced by numerouschallenges of constantly providing better services towards achieving customerdelight. Past research in customer satisfaction and service quality has resultedin increasing research efforts to look at new ways to evaluate these concepts.In the present era , the emphasis is on Customer Delight(CD) so as to exceedcustomer’s expectations. The objective of this study is to identify the factorsthat create ‘customer delight’ and to measure the level of such ‘delight’ inthe sample banks studied. This study has employed Kano’s model of customersatisfaction in measuring level of ‘delight’ factors in the Indian bankingsegment. The total sample size of the study is 200 customers with 50 fromeach of the 4 selected banks under study and our study area is New Delhi. .In case of SBI it is seen that quick service, parking space and add on facilitieslike services for senior citizens , differently abled are ‘Must-be’ featureswhereas in case of Bank of Baroda ,it is Quick Service, Parking space andlow paper work that are ‘Must-be’ . It is found that among the ICICI Bankcustomers that they are largely indifferent to working hours and add onfacilities for senior citizens and differently abled. Further, it is found thatPrompt reply, Branch availability, wide acceptability of debit and credit cardsand longer working hours are the delighter factors which when fulfilled delightthe customer and on their non-fulfilment dissatisfy them.

KIIT Journal of Management, Vol-6, No.- 1 & 2, Jan-Dec,2009

Social psychologists, marketingresearchers and students of consumerbehavior, have extensively studied theconcept of consumer satisfaction anddissat isfaction. The increasingimportance of quality in both serviceand manufacturing industries has

created a proliferation of research withmore than 15,000 academic and tradearticles having been published in thepast decades (Peterson and Wilson1992). Customer Satisfaction is apsychological concept that involves thefeeling of well being and pleasure that

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results from obtaining what one hopesfor and expects from an appealingproduct or service(WTO 1985).Whilethere are a variety of approaches to theexplanation of customer satisfaction /dissatisfaction ,the most widely usedone is proposed by Richard Oliver whohas developed the expectancydisconfirmation theory. According tothis theory which has been tested andconfirmed in several studies. Customerspurchase goods and services with pre-purchase expectat ions aboutanticipated performance. Once theproduct or service has been purchasedor used , outcomes are comparedagainst expectations . When outcomematches expectations, confirmationoccurs. Disconfirmation occurs whenthere are differences betweenexpectations and outcomes. The resultson the research on customersatisfaction has lead to the developmentof nine theories of customer satisfaction. Amajority of these theories are basedon cognitive psychology , some havereceived moderate attention ,whileother theories have been introducedwithout any empirical research . Thenine theories are Expectencydisconfirmation, Assimilat ion orcognit ive dissonance, Contrast,Assimilation and Contrast, Equity,Attribution, Comparision Level,Generalised Negativity and ValuePercept(Oh and Parks).

Satisfaction is not a universalphenomenon and not everyone gets the

same satisfaction out of the samehospitality experience. The reason isthat customers have different needs,objectives and past experience thatinfluence their expectations. To astudent on a limited budget, a lunchcomposed of fast food items at thecrowded and noisy school cafeteriamay be highly satisfying experience ,while the same experience may beperceived as totally dissatisfying to anaffluent executive discussing a businesstransaction . The same customer mayalso have different needs andexpectations on different mealoccasions or at different times of theday (Davis and stone)

To recapitulate what we haveestablished by now is that anindividual’s satisfaction with outcomesreceived from a hospitality experienceresults from a comparison of theseoutcomes with expectations.Expectations can be described as amutable interval standard which isbased on a multiple of factors includingneeds objectives, past personal andvicarious experiences with sameestablishment restaurant with similarestablishments and the availablealternatives. Past research in customersatisfaction and service quality hasresulted in increasing research effortsto look at new ways to evaluate theseconcepts. Historically, the assumptionhas been that a linear relationship existsbetween satisfaction and dissatisfactionand disconfirmation or performance

A Study of Customer Delight in the Indian banking sector based on Kano’s Model of Product Quality

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evaluations. Unlike material productsor pure services most services are anamalgam of products and services.Therefore it is possible to say thatsatisfaction with service experiencesuch as bank or airport is a sum totalof satisfaction with the individualelements or at tributes of all theproducts and services that make up theexperience.

In service organizations , theassessment of the quality of a serviceis made during the actual delivery ofthe service –usually an encounterbetween customer and a service contactperson.(Parsuram et al.)identified thefollowing five generic dimensions ofservice quality (SERVEQUAL) thatmust be present in the service deliveryin order for it to result in customersatisfaction:—• Reliability—the ability to perform

the promised services dependentlyand accurately.

• Responsiveness—the willingnessto help customers and provideprompt service.

• Assurance—the knowledge andcourtesy of employees as well astheir ability to convey trust andconfidence.

• Empathy—the provision of caringindividualized at tent ion tocustomers.

• Tangible –the appearances ofphysical facilities, equipment,personnel and communicationmaterials.

The companies in the present timeshave to meet all the above parametersto be able to deliver satisfaction. Thuswith ever escalating customerexpectations , companies have to offeradditional values to make an everlasting impression in the minds of thecustomers because mere delivery ofsatisfaction as the confirmation ofexpectations is considered as aminimum threshold. Therefore in thepresent era ,the emphasis is onCustomer Delight(CD) so as to exceedcustomer’s expectations (Yeng,Gingand Ennew, 2002). Delightedcustomers are those where youanticipate their needs, provide solutionsto them before they ask and where youare observing to see if new and /oradditional expectations are about readyto be required. What is wrong withproviding just customer service?Simply providing customer service isnot cost effective .It misses theopportunity to provide the reward.When we creat a special “WOW”effectwe have planted a very special peg inthe memoryof the customer that is easyto recall . It creates the possibility ofthe customer telling the story abouttheir “WOW” experience to manyfriend associates and strangers.Customer delight brings customersback for more. It causes newcustomers to come .

For managers deciphering customerdelight data is akin to trying to makesense of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs.


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The importance of the information iswidely acknowledged ,but mostcompanies lack a “satisfaction Rosettastone”. As a result managers struggleto create improvement programs andare provided virtually no help inestimating the returns for their efforts.Many firms have watched theirperformance improve in key driverattributes only to discover that theiroverall delight scores have failed toshow a corresponding increase. Atother times improvement in overallsatisfaction scores have failed to havea demonstrable positive impact oncustomers retention or corporateprofits.

Unfortunately there has been noseminal discovery of a single Rosettastone for interpreting customersatisfaction data. But thanks to thework of many different researchers, therelationship between customer delightand customer behavior is becomingclearer. In effect ,we have the “code”forbehavior and can now beginning todecipher the hieroglyphics of customerdelight.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The primary objectives of the study are:

1. To identify the motivating servicesgenerally considered by thecustomers of banking services.

2. To study and analyze the basic,Linear and Delighter factors inbanking services

3. To measure the level of such delightfactors among the sampled banks.

4. To measure and analyses the degreeof co-relation between such‘delight’ factors.

LITERATURE REVIEW &KANO’s MODEL

On a review of literature we have seenthat many researchers have studied thefact that one has to go beyond simplysatisfying customers to delighting them.Products and services that only satisfyfail to encourage loyalty among theirpurchasers. the concept of customerdelight receive a large amount ofattention in the business and customerliteratures but have received littleacademic considerations outsidepsychology. Oliver has conductedseveral empirical studies into the delightseen in purchasers of services andproducts. Oliver’s views delight withinan ExpectancyDisconfirmation Model,where delight occurs when customer’sexpectations are exceeded. Oliver’sapproach considers the effects ofproducts performance duringownership on customer delight, whilstdelight during product evaluation maybe more important in capturing newcustomers at the point ofpurchase(Mittle). (Kano N. andMacmillan et al) describe models thatconsider the evaluation of products interms of customer needs and introducethe idea of delightful or differentiatingproduct attributes. “Delight your


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customers” is the current USP of allthe business houses. Companies arebeing advised by the consultancies thatto succeed in business they have toadopt delighting customers as theprimary objective .Several definitionsof delight are used ,generally associatedwith exceeding customer ’sexpectations to deliver the pleasantsurprise that results when a product orservice answers an unvoiced need(Burns , Evans, Jossan et al.). Variousmodels are presented to help companiesevaluate their products in terms ofcustomer needs and these introduce theidea of delightful or differentiatingproduct attributes. The most widelyused of these is the Noriaki Kano’sModel of product qualities.

The Model was developed by NoriakiKano through work within variousJapanese and American industries, theKano model categorises productattributes into three groups accordingto customer needs. By contrastingcustomer’s reactions to bothe thepresence and absence of each productattribute Kano describes the followingtypology of product features.(Kano N,Matzler,Bailom et al.)

The customer expects “basic”qualitiesto be present in the product and as suchhigh levels of customer satisfaction arehard to achieve by excelling in theseareas .The teller in the bank hands overcash this is a basic service and anycustomer expects from a bank. But iffor some reason the teller does not giveout cash the customer is bound to bedissatisfied. The presence of a tellerdoes not satisfy a customer but hisabsence will definitely dissatisfy him.“Linear” qualities are those for whichthe level of customer satisfactionincreases with the level of achievementof these qualities.(Burns,Evans et al.)The handing out of an investment tipby the teller might be a linearquality.The customer is satisfied by theimprovement in these benefits but isonly excited at extremely high levels ofachievement. For examples, a veryvaluable investment tip from the tellerthat enables the customer to earnexceptional profit which he would nothave got had the teller not advised him.The delighter feature excites thecustomer even at low levels ofachievement . The absence of thefeature does not dissatisfy the customersince it was not expected . “Delighter”feature tends to be novel and as suchcan differentiate a product from itscompetitors.

The advantages of classifying customerrequirements by means of the Kanomethod are as below (ElmarSauerwein, Franz Bailon et al)


Fig 1: Kano’s Model

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• Priorit ies for productdevelopment—The modelhighlights the fact that it is not veryuseful to invest in improving mustbe requirements or Basicrequirements which are already at asatisfactory level but better toimprove “Linear” or onedimensional requirements as theyhave a greater influence onperceived product quality andconsequently on the customer’slevel of satisfaction.

• Product requirements are betterunderstood – The product criteriawhich have the greatest influence onthe customer’s satisfaction can beidentified. Classifying productrequirements into must be “Basic”,one dimensional “Linear” andattractive dimensions “Delighters”can be used on the focus.

• Kano’s model of customersat isfaction can be opt imallycombined with quality functiondeployment .A prerequisite isidentifying customer needs,theirhierarchy and priorities(Griffin/Hauser 1993).Kano’s model is usedto establish the importance ofindividual product features for thecustomer’s satisfaction and thus itcreates the optimal prerequisite forprocess oriented productdevelopment activities.

• Kano’s model provides valuablehelp in trade –off situations in the

product development stage. If twoproduct requirements cannot be metsimultaneously due to technical orfinancial reasons, the criterion canbe identified which has the greatestinfluence on customer satisfaction.

• Must be , one –dimensional andattractive requirements differ as arule, in the utility expectations ofdifferent customer segments. Fromthis starting point , customer tailoredsolutions for special problems canbe elaborated which guarantee anoptimal level of satisfaction in thedifferent customer segments.

• Discovering and fulfilling attractiverequirements create a wide range ofpossibilities for differentiation. Aproduct which merely satisfies themust be and one dimensionalrequirements is perceived as anaverage and thereforeinterchangeable.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In the present study we are trying toestablish the banking services of 2private banks (ICICI,HDFC) and 2public sector banks (SBI and BOB ) inthe backdrop of the Kano’s Model ofcustomer satisfaction .Here we havetaken the whole gamut of bankingservices as the product under study.The study starts with identification ofproduct requirements. Theserequirements have been listed bystudying the products of the banks and


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the nature of their services and byconducting focus group interviewamong the teachers and the students ofDelhi College of Advanced Studies.

The product requirements identifiedare:

1. Quick Services.2. Parking Space.3. Prompt Reply.4. Branch Availability.5. ATM availability.6. Acceptability of Debit and Credit

Cards.7. Processing Time.8. Involvement of Paper Work.9. Working Hours.10. Add On facilities for senior

Citizens and Differently Abled.

The second step in the study is theconstruction of the questionnaire. Foreach product feature a pair of questionsis formulated to which the customer cananswer in one of five differentways(Kano 1994).The first questionconcerns the reaction of the customerif the product has thatfeature(functional form of thequestion), the second concernscustomers reaction if the product doesnot have that feature(dysfunctionalform of the question).(See Annexure1).When formulating the questions, the“voices of the customer”(Hauser/Clausing 1988) is of prime importance.The “voices of the customer” is adescription of the problem to be solvedfrom the customers viewpoint.

The product features are then evaluatedfrom the findings based on the answersfrom the following table (Table-1)


Table-1:Kano’s Evaluation tableDysfunctional(negative questions)

Functional(positive question)

Customerrequirements like must neutral live with DislikeLike Q A A A Omust be R I I I MNeutral R I I I Mlive with R I I I MDislike R R R R Q

If the customer answers for eg “I likeit that way “ for the question “If theservices in the bank are very fast andyou are very politely dealt with”—thefunctional form of the question andanswers “I dislike it” for thedysfunctional question “ If the services

in the bank are not fast and you are notpolitely dealt with how do you feel?”the combination of the question as perthe evaluation table is “O” Category.This result indicates that this feature isin “One dimensional characteristic fromthe customer’s viewpoint”. The

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customer is having a strong view of theneed of this feature. If as per the tablethe answer of any question is categoryAthe feature is Attractive in nature andcan cause delight when fulfilled. If theanswer is in category R this feature isnot only not wanted by the customerbut he even expects the reverse.

Study Area

In studying the Kano’s Model ofCustomer Delight in the backdrop ofbanking sector of India we have studied4 banks, 2 in private sector (ICICI Bankand HDFC Bank)and 2 in publicsector(SBI and BOB).Our study areais the banks in Delhi and NCR.

Sample Size:

The total sample size of the study is200 customers with 50 each from eachof the banks under study.

METHODOLOGY OF THEANALYSIS

A frequency table is prepared based onthe Kano’s evaluation table. To analysethe Attractive, Must-be , one –dimensional , indifferent, reverse andquestionable features. After frequencyinterpretation the CustomerSat isfaction Co-efficient (CSCoefficient) are analysed. The customersatisfaction c

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