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Jointly undertaken by

• the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)

• the World Bank

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Te ollowing individuals contributed to the writing o this report: Alessandro Motter and Karin Riedl (IPU); Nayé Bathily and Jakob Kopperud (World Bank). Karina Manasseh and Elliott Harris (IMF) helped to acilitate survey responses rom IMF resident representatives. Karin Riedl was also responsible or the collection and processing o the survey data. Alessandro Motter andNayé Bathily were also responsible or the overall survey design and implementation.

A

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Original version: EnglishCover design by: William Ursenbach, World Bank

Tis paper has not undergone the review accorded to ocial World Bank publications or to IMF publications. Te ndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those o the author(s)and do not necessarily reect the views o the International Bank or Reconstruction and Development / Te World Bank and its aliated organizations, or those o the Executive Directors o Te WorldBank or the governments they represent. Likewise it does not reect the views rom the International Monetary Fund and its Executive Directors or the governments they represent.

Te World Bank and the IMF do not guarantee the accuracy o the data included in this work. Te boundaries, colors, denominations, and other inormation shown in this work do not imply any judgment on the part o Te World Bank, IPU and IMF concerning the legal status o any territory or the endorsement or acceptance o such boundaries.

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TABLE OF CONTENT

INRODUCION

MAIN FINDINGS

1. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PARLIAMENARY OVERSIGH OF BORROWING ARE COMMON, HOUGH FAR FROM UNIVERSAL

2. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS CANNO BE EASILY BYPASSED BY HE EXECUIVE

3. HE LEGAL AUHORIY OF PARLIAMEN O REQUES AMENDMENS IS OFEN LACKING

4. PARLIAMENS’ OVERSIGH PRACICES APPEAR O BE WEAK

5. PARLIAMENARY INVOLVEMEN IN IMF MACROECONOMIC SURVEILLANCE IS LIMIED

6. A LEGAL FRAMEWORK CORRELAES WIH SRONGER OVERSIGH PRACICES

CONCLUSION

APPENDICES

ANNEX I: AGGREGAE FINDINGS

ANNEX II: COUNRY OVERVIEW

ANNEX III: REGIONAL GROUPING

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evelopment eectiveness depends on strong country

ownership. Representative, transparent and accountablepolicymaking with the active and inormed engagement

by parliament is critical to ensure national ownership o development programs. Against this background, the IPU and the WorldBank agreed to undertake a joint survey o legislative rameworksand practices regarding the ratication o World Bank and/orIMF programs; the IMF helped acilitate survey responses romIMF resident representatives. Te unds and advice provided by international nancial institutions (IFIs) – whether or development purposes or or macroeconomic adjustment – constitute animportant tool o government policy. Indeed, many developingcountries depend critically on external unds, including loans, to

complement national revenues.

In those countries where parliaments play an oversight role withrespect to budget processes and the design and implementation o national development strategies, parliaments can also be expected to scrutinize loans or advice rom IFIs. Tere are a number o reasons or this: reorms agreed between the government and theIFI may have wider budget or policy impacts; support to a speciic sector might ree up resources or another sector; investmentloans may have environmental or social consequences; and uturebudget cycles will have to take into account loan repayments andthe expected returns on the investments.

Oversight can be exercised in a number o ways, rom the in

ormal be it through meetings, briengs or consultations tothe structural, through ormal legislation. o exercise eectiveoversight o public nances, parliament including both electedrepresentatives and support sta are dependent on being ully inormed: transparent and public budgets are key. echnicalknowledge is also important to enable elected representatives toeectively exercise their oversight, making capacity building animportant element o strengthening the role o parliaments.

Te present survey report ocuses on the extent to which parliaments around the world possess proper legal authority to ratiy loans as well as eective oversight practices o the loan approv

al process. While the World Bank and the IMF surveyed theirrespective country oces and representations, the IPU surveyednational parliaments with a view to explore parliaments’ inuenceon governments’ borrowing rom IFIs, and – to a lesser extent –on the parliaments’ inuence on developmentrelated policy decisions. Te ndings draw on responses rom some 100 countriesbased on a survey completed in December 2011 and constitutethe rst attempt at a global mapping o parliamentary oversightrelated to World Bank and IMF lending.

Overall, the study indicates that there is plenty o room or parlia

ments to exert inuence in the loan approval process by instituting legal rameworks or by strengthening existing ones, as well asby improving a number o oversight practices. A common threadthroughout the study is that these legal rameworks are ofen underutilized. More specic ndings suggest that:

• Legal rameworks or parliamentary oversight o World Bank and IMF lending are common, though ar rom universal;

• Legal rameworks cannot be easily bypassed by the executive ;• Te legal authority or parliaments to request amendments is

ofen lacking;• Parliaments’ oversight practices appear to be weak;

•

Parliamentary involvement in IMF macroeconomic surveillance is limited;

• Tere is, however, a positive correlation between the existence o legal rameworks and more eective parliamentary oversight practices.

Tese ndings, as well as the country data collected, constitutean important source o inormation to help guide the IPU, theWorld Bank and the IMF in their respective eorts to strengthendevelopment eectiveness and country ownership.

Te 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Eectiveness and its subsequent 2008 Accra Agenda or Action and the 201 1 Busan Partnership or Eective Development CoOperation all emphasize this point. For an example o World Bank engagementwith the parliament o a client country in the context o governance reorms, see case study on Mongolia on page 13.

Parliamentary oversight consists o reviewing, monitoring and supervising the exercise o executive authority. It is a measure or holding the executive accountable or its actions and or ensuring that it implements policies in an eectivemanner. Te parliamentary oversight unction is one o the pillars o democracy and an indicator o good governance, through which parliament can ensure a balance o power and provide a public arena where all o s ociety’s interests canbe airly represented. Most critically, parliamentary oversight helps ensure transparency and openness o the Executive’s setting o priorities and management o public unds.

Te survey was conducted rom May to December 2011. Responses were received rom 49 parliaments (acilitated by the respective oces o the speaker); 78 World Bank country oces; and 19 IMF representatives, rom 99 dierentcountries. Only developing countries and tr ansition economies were canvassed. Where there is inconsistency in the responses rom the dierent sources, the result is either discarded or, where the questions reerred to parliamentinternalpractices, the parliament’s response is taken as the deault response [see Appendices or urther detail].

INTRODUCTION

Te World Bank and IMF are governed by and are accountable to t he governments o their member countries. According to their charters, the Articles o Agreement, their main interlocutors are the nancial authorities—in most cases the nance ministry or central bank o the member countries. Recognizing that theprincipal responsibility or communication to legislators rests with the national authorities, the World Bank’s and IMF’s interaction with legislators is tailored to the

specic country circumstances, and closely coordinated with each country’s respective nancial authorities and representative on their Executive Boards.

*

*

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4 1 %5 9 %

ore than hal o the 99 countries (59 percent) orwhich data are available rom any o the three

sources – parliaments, the World Bank, and theIMF – have laws that require parliaments to ratiy loan agreements beore they become eective [appendix I: chart 2]. Inthe remaining 41 percent o countries, parliament does nothave a clear legal mandate to ratiy loans.

A breakdown o the data by regional groupings and incomelevels shows that legal rameworks or loan approval can beound across a large spectrum o countries. However, countries in Eastern Europe, Central and South America, andsubSaharan Arica are more likely to have a legal ramework in place [appendix I: charts 3 and 4]. In these threeregions, approximately 60 percent o the countries requireparliaments to ratiy international loans. In comparison,only 1/3rd o the countries in the AsiaPacic region havesuch a law in place.

Similarly, a breakdown o the data by income levels suggestsa possible correlation between national income levels and the

existence o legal rameworks [appendix I: chart 5]. Lowincome countries are most likely to have a legal ramework that gives parliaments a role in loan ratication: 61 percento lowincome countries have such a law in place comparedto 50 percent o lowermiddle income countries and 43 percent o uppermiddle income countries.

• Why are some regions more likely to have a legal ramework in place? Possible hypotheses include dierentdemocratic traditions; colonial heritage; and number o constitutional changes and reorms.

• What explains the possible correlation between nationalincome levels and the existence o legal rameworks orthe ratication o loans?

• Is having the legal authority to ratiy loans particularly important or highly aiddependent countries?

MAIN FINDINGSTe ollowing sections review the main ndings o the survey based on a close reading o the data collected. At the end o each section a ew questions or discussion are suggested to expand on the

implications o the ndings.

Te overall response rate is 72 percent.Te survey dierentiated between World Bank and IMF loans, but only Georgia has dierent laws covering loans rom the two institutions.

Tereafer, any data examined in this report reers to the data that are available or each subsection.

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mong the countries requiring parliamentary ratication,83 percent do not allow or any exceptions to the law,meaning that – in principle at least it is not easy or the

executive to override parliament’s ratication authority [appendix I: chart 7]. In some cases where exceptions to the law are allowed they appear to be intended to minimize the institutional

burden, with loans below a certain amount not requiring parliamentary ratication .

In the case o Ethiopia and Tonga only loans above a cer tain threshold – approximately $5 million and $8.5 million, respectively – must be ratied by parliament. In Poland, the parliament is not giventhe legal authority to ratiy loans, but international agreements that have considerable nancial responsibilities imposed on the State nevertheless require prior parliamentary approval.

I n Lebanon , the executive can override parliament’s legal authority to ratiy loans when it deems the loan approval process particularly urgent. In Benin, the parliament’s decision to reject a loan agree-ment may be overruled by executive decree. In Uruguay, parliament is required to authorize the Executive power to take on public debt, but leg islative ratication is not required or contracts or agree-ments between the Executive and international organizations o which Uruguay is a member country.

In other cases, the rules under which exceptions tothe law are granted are very vaguely ormulated.

Te majority o the surveyed countries (61 percent) have thesame legislative process in place or the ratication o loans as orprojects nanced by grants [appendix I: chart 9]. In 74 percent o

the surveyed countries the law requires parliaments to ratiy eachloan onebyone rather than grouping them as part o government programmes [appendix I: chart 8]. Even where the legisla

tion allows or loans to be ratied as a package, the general practice in many countries is to ratiy loans separately or to examineloans individually beore they are bundled.

In Mauritania , the usual practice is that each loan is reviewed by the responsible committee beore it is brought to the plenary or ratication together with other loans.

• Is there a correlation between eective legal rameworks or loan ratication, and the generalbudget oversight and inuence o parliament?

• What should be the key eatures o a strong legal ramework?

• Is parliamentary oversight stronger when loans are ratied as a bundle or onebyone?

• Does it make sense to exempt loans below a certain amount rom having to be ratied by parliament?

• Should legal rameworks require that loan agreements conorm with government programs?

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arliament’s right to amend loan agreements constitutes astrong tool to inuence the outcome o loan negotiations.However, among the sur veyed countries with a legal rame

work or ratication o loans rom IFIs in place, almost hal (47percent) o the parliaments are limited to accepting or rejectingloan agreements in their entirety, and only 29 percent are able torequest actual amendments to the loan agreement. For another

24 percent, the law is not specic as to whether parliament canrequest amendments [appendix I: chart 6].

Looking at other dimensions o the development process, thestudy indicates that ew parliaments are able to inuence the naladoption o the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) or o the Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) discussed between the

government and the World Bank. A total o 85 percent o parliaments do not have legal authority to approve PRSPs beore they are adopted by the government [appendix I: chart 19]. Parliaments’ legal authority to adopt CAS and similar strategies wasreported by only 2 percent o respondents [appendix I: chart 18].

It should be understood that the authority o parliament to amend a loan agreement may well be established by t he law but that it may still be limited inpractice to only some parts o the agreement, depending on the nature and legal characteristics o the agreement itsel. For example, the general provisionso the loan agreement cannot be negotiated even by the government, as these have already been agreed to by the member countries in the Board, in thecase o the World Bank.

It should be noted however that this does not reect parliaments’ ull engagement on the CASes: 75 percent o World Bank country oces in a 2009survey reported to have undertaken inormal consultations with parliamentarians when introducing a new CAS.

Te authoritative 2010 Open Budget Survey o the International Budget Partnership documents a number o reasons why in many parliaments budgetoversight remains weak. Among other issues, the report establishes that a large number o parliaments lack sucient time to examine adequately the

Executive’s budget proposal.

Montenegro’ s parliament does not have legal authority to approve PRSPs, but this has not precluded the parliament rom involvement during the process. During the preparation and implementation o the 2003 PRSP, the Parliamentary Advisory Committee, comprised o representatives rom a number o portolio committees, was responsible or addressing sensitive issues. Te Committee also consulted with representatives o vulnerable groups.

However, it should be noted that 94 percent o parliaments reportto have the ormal right to request amendments to the budget billbeore adopting it [appendix I: chart 23]. In those cases whereloan ratication occurs as part o the budget approval process, itis possible that amendments to the loan can be made. Te likeli

hood o this happening in actual act, however, may depend ona number o actors, including the extent to which budget documents are made public and the time allowed or budget review (both o which are generally inadequate), or the number o loanagreements that are attached to the budget document (the higher

the number the less stringent the parliamentary review is likely to be). In some cases, loan approval through the general budgetprocess may allow parliaments to set debt ceilings or other parameters or loan agreements.

In Cameroon the government proposes a debt strategy that includes the prole, the amount, and potential lenders through the nance law that parliament is required to approve.

• Is parliamentary oversight o programs supported by loan agreements weakened when parliaments do not have the authority to amend such agreements?

• How eective is parliamentary oversight o loan agreements when it occurs as part o thebudget approval process?

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2 7 %

2 0 %

3 5 %

7 %

1 1 %

egardless o the legal rameworks that may or may not bein place, the survey urther assessed the strength o the

institutional practices o parliaments in the actual loanapproval process by looking at the kind and number o parliamentary committees involved, the stage o the process whereparliaments are involved, and other such “proxy” indicators. Tendings suggest that a number o actors related to capacity and

institutional issues lead to a relatively weak ability o parliamentsto properly scrutinize loan agreements, including in cases where

parliaments enjoy ample legal authority.

A total o 64 percent o parliaments in the surveyed countriesare not involved in approval o World Bank and IMF loans atany stage o the process [appendix I: chart 10]. Parliamentary

involvement in policy discussions held between World Bank ocials and the government prior to the actual loan negotiations,

is even less common, with 68 percent stating that they do nottake part in such discussions [appendix I: chart 13]. However, itshould be noted that 46 percent o parliaments that are involvedon some level during the loan approval process are also consultedor involved prior to loan negotiations [appendix I: chart 14].

In Georgia , the law gives parliament the authority to participate in the entire loan approval process, i.e., rom the very early stages until nal ratication. In practice however, the parliament does not utilize this authority to perorm its oversight role to the extent allowed. In Nigeria , the Aid, Loans and Debt Management committee was set up specically to examine loans that have conditionsattached. Te committee, however, was mostly inactive or the rst ew years.

When involvement prior to loan negotiations does occur, itis rarely within a ormal setting. Governments seldom initiate or organize consultations between parliaments and theWorld Bank: only 9 percent o parliaments have been invited by their governments to such consultations [appendix I:chart 13]. While low, this number sends a positive signal thatit is possible or parliaments to be included at this criticalstage o consultations under the appropriate conditions. Temajority o interactions between parliaments and Bank ocials seem to be o an inormal nature, such as through work

shops or meetings with individual MPs, and in a majority o cases the IMF or the World Bank is the party initiating theseinteractions [appendix I: chart 13; chart 22].

According to the responses rom parliaments only (encompassing 43 parliaments), in the majority o parliamentspolled (65 percent) the loan approval process is designed togo through the committee system. Tis may suggest a airly high level o scrutiny, since committee review normally aords more time and interaction or inormed debate thanplenary meetings. wenty percent o parliaments rely only on a single committee, primarily the nance, budget, or economic committee, while 45 percent have two or more committees involved, with the additional committees ocusing on

specic areas (inrastructure, agriculture, health, transportetc.) [appendix I: chart 15].

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In Malawi , ollowing, the rejection o an IDA loan or an Energy Inrastructure project by the Budget and Finance Committee, Bank ocials began working more closely with MPs in various inormal settings, such as workshops and joint eld visits, which has since helped create more awareness in parliament o the Bank’s development work. As a result o this closer cooperation, the parliament ap- proved a bill or additional World Bank nancing to the Malawi Social Action Fund to rebuild schools in an area that was aected by the 2009 earthquake aer an MP visited the area with the World Bank Country Manager.

It is noteworthy that, despite these apparent weaknesses in practice, 26 percent o World Bank and IMF ocials report delays orblockages in the loan approval process as a result o parliamentary involvement [appendix I: chart 21].

In Uganda, most projects are delayed between three to nine months as a result o the parliamentary approval process. In one case, the Public Service Perormance Enhancement Program was rejected and restructured into a smaller project as a pre-condition or parliamentary approval, which delayed the process by more than one year.

• Does the involvement o more than one committee strengthen parliamentary oversight, and how?

• Do inormal consultations allow or sucient indepth parliamentary scrutiny o loannanced projects and the like?And are they suciently utilized?

• What can governments, parliaments and World Bank do,respectively, to ormalize consultations?

• What are the respective merits o inormal and ormal consultations?

• What circumstances lead to parliament not ratiying loans,

projects or policy advice?• What is more likely to be the cause o parliamentary delays

or blockages o loans?

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54%

36%

23%

8%

side rom its role as a lender, the IMF’s unique mandate is

to provide advice to governments with the aim o helpingthem maintain or achieve macroeconomic stability. Tisadvice, commonly reerred to as surveillance, is ofen translated

into government policy, including through the budget process.

In many countries, parliaments are interested in being inormedo the IMF policy advice to the government beore it leads to theadoption o a new policy course. Ideally, the involvement o par

liaments in IMF surveillance should take place through a ormal

process with both government and IMF ocials present. However, only 8 percent o countries surveyed appear to have such ormal processes in place. It is more common (23 percent) or IMF

ocials alone to prompt meetings, most likely with the relevantparliamentary committee, to provide background inormation orurther clarication. Relatively more common still (36 percent)is the practice o inormal meetings between IMF ocials andindividual MPs.

As previously noted, in most cases (94 percent), parliaments areallowed by law to amend the budget proposal. Tis gives parliaments an indirect way to question decisions that result rom IMFsurveillance. However, in many developing countries involve

ment o parliaments in the budget process remains weak, due tolimited resources and insucient time to conduct an indepthreview o the budget document. Parliamentary input in IMF sur veillance through the budget process is likely to be more eectivewhen parliaments are kept abreast o the discussions at an early stage.

• How do governments include parliaments in surveillancetalks with the IMF?

• How could parliaments be involved in such talks at an earlierstage?

• How eective is parliamentary input into IMF surveillancethrough the budgetary process?

It should be noted that while the IMF’s mandate and accountability rests with thegovernment o its member countries, it makes every attempt to also engage with parliamentarians and other constituencies. When such consultations occur, they are almostalways voluntary or by mutual agreement. In many cases, IMF ocials will address parliamentary briengs or committee meetings only upon permission by the governmentor in the presence o government representatives.

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0

20

40

60

80

100

83%

42%

58%

17%

s noted, 64 percent o parliaments in the countries sur veyed are not involved at any stage o the loan approvalprocess. However, an important distinction must be made

between those countries with legal rameworks (59 percent) andthose without (41 percent). Among the countries where the law gives parliament ratication authority, a large number, 58 percent, are also involved in the loan approval process at some stage(i.e., either beore, during, or in the nal stages) [appendix I: chart12]. Tis group is also more likely to have a stronger committeesystem in place, with 90 percent o the parliaments having one ormore committees involved in the loan approval process [appendix I: chart 16]. In comparison, a mere 17 percent o parliamentsin countries without such laws are involved at any stage o the

process; and only 47 percent o those parliaments have committees involved in the loan approval process.

Finally, while ew parliaments are required by law to approvethe executive’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), thereappears to be a weak correlation between that process and theparliament’s loan ratication authority. As noted, a strong ma jority o countries, 85 percent, have no laws giving parliamentthe authority to approve the PRSP beore it is adopted [appendixI: chart 19]. O the 14 countries surveyed where parliament isrequired by law to approve the PRSP, 12 also require parliamentto ratiy loans [appendix I: chart 20]. Tis suggests that in these

countries at least a legal culture o parliamentary oversight o de velopment processes has taken root.

Te making o a PRSP constitutes another important process involving discussionsbetween the government and the development partners in the country. While PRSPsare not directly related to loans, the study asked a question about them as a gauge o parliamentary ownership o developmentrelated processes.

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0

20

40

60

80

100

53%

47%

90%

10%

In Mongolia , the government has no power to negotiateloans with the Bank without the authorization rom at least three standing committees o the parliament. Aer the Board

approval and signing o the legal agreement between the government and the Bank, the parliament has to ratiy the

loan agreement. Without ratication the loan cannot becomeeective.

• Should parliamentary budget oversight include involvementin PRSP discussions or approval?

• How can parliaments improve actual loan oversight practicesshort o acquiring ulledged ratication authority? Whichormal or inormal mechanisms could be used?

• How dicult is it or parliaments to acquire the legal authority to ratiy loans?

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his study provides additional inormation about the extentto which parliaments may assume ownership over development processes in their countries. Te ndings indicate

that a slight majority o parliaments are charged with ratiyingloan agreements, and that existing legal rameworks are generally applied. Such laws appear to support a stronger involvement o parliaments throughout the loan approval process.

However, the data also indicate scope or considerable improvement to both legal rameworks and their application in practice.Almost hal o the countries surveyed have no law requiring parliaments to ratiy loans and related activities, and oversight prac

tices in those parliaments are signicantly weaker than in countries where a legal ramework exists. In those cases especially,more requent and structured dialogues between Bank ocialsand parliamentarians may go a long way toward strengtheningownership. Governments and parliaments themselves play thekey roles in strengthening the oversight role o parliaments, and

should look to best practices in other countries. Best practiceswould likely include a strong legal ramework or ratiying WorldBank projects or implementing IMF macroeconomic recommendations, as well as or inuencing other key policy or budgetdecisions; early involvement o parliament in these processes;the engagement o multiple committees; and the ability to makeamendments to government propositions.

IFIs can also take actions to strengthen the oversight processes,technical capacity and knowledge level o parliaments, by proactively engaging in policy discussions and consultations with parliaments; and by working towards more openness and account

ability in both their own projects and lending, and in budgetprocesses in general. Te recent World Bank decision to only provide budget support to countries publishing their budgets (orin exceptional cases, promising to do so within 12 months) goes very much in that direction. Te IPU, or its part, will continue tosupport the capacities o parliaments to play their oversight, leg

islative and representational roles in all areas o development policy, including the negotiation and approval o loan agreements.

Te picture that emerges rom this study suggests a situation inux, with many parliaments clearly making progress in someoversight areas while lagging behind in others. More studies willbe needed to dig deeper into the ndings o this rst survey. Inparticular, there is a need to better understand how parliamentary loan ratication authority is ormulated in the various countries, as well as how parliaments actually apply their oversight. Asecond global survey may also be useul a ew years rom now tomonitor progress in each parliament and better identiy overall

trends.

CONCLUSION

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22%

20%

35%

17%

6%

APPENDICES

Methodology : In case o signicant response discrepancies among sources, attempts were made to reconcile the discrepancies. Whenever that was not possible, responses are dealt with as indicated in italic below each graph

otal number o country responses: 99

Overall response rate: 72%Te survey was sent to a total o 137 countries, which havereceived World Bank or IMF loans and/or are subject to IMFsurveillance activities (see appendix III or regional groupings).

Te regional response rates are as ollows:

• Americas (67%)

• Arab states (55%)• Asia Pacic (75%)

• Europe (77%)

• SubSaharan Arica (76%)

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A majority of MPs are required to ratify loans

4 1 %5 9 %

IS PARLIAMEN REQUIRED BY LAW O RAIFY LOANS OR CREDIS NEGOIAEDBY HE GOVERNMEN?

(otal number o country responses: 99. Responses were solicited rom parliaments, the World Bank, and the IMF)

Tis number includes the West Bank, which has not had a unctioning parliament since 2006, and Somalia, which has a nonelected ransitionalFederal Parliament.

It should be noted however that some discrepancy was evident in the data provided by the three institutions. Only data that could be reconciled isreected in Chart 2.

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B e n c h m a r k I : B r e a k - d o w n o f Q 1 b y r e g i o n :

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B e n c h m a r k I I : B r e a k - d o w n o f Q 1 b y i n c o m e l e v e l s :

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2 9 %

2 4 %

4 7 %

DOES HE LAW LIMI HE ROLE OF PARLIAMEN O EIHER ACCEP OR REJECHE LOAN AGREEMEN, OR CAN HE PARLIAMEN REQUES AMENDMENSO HE LOAN AGREEMEN?

(otal number o country responses: 55. Responses were solicited rom parliaments and the World Bank)

Note: In nine cases inconsistencies could not be reconciled. Tus,the pie chart illustrates the valid data or the remaining 46 coun-tries.

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8 3 %

1 7 %

ARE HERE EXCEPIONS O HE LAW WHICH ALLOW LOANS O BECOME EFFECIVEWIHOU HAVING BEEN SUBJEC O PARLIAMENARY RAIFICAION?


Note: In one case, inconsistencies among sources could not be rec-tied. Te responses or that case are not refected in this pie chart.

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IF HERE ARE EXCEPIONS, ARE HEY OFEN INVOKED?


Four state that exceptions are invoked regularly .Tree state that exceptions are not ofen invoked.One states that exceptions are never invoked.In one case, the responses rom the dierent resources could not be rectied.

Malawi and Mali state that exceptions are invoked ofen, but stated in 1b/1a that there were no exceptions in place.

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7 4 %

1 3 %

1 3 %

DOES HE LAW REQUIRE PARLIAMEN O RAIFY EVERY LOAN AGREEMEN SEPARAELYOR CAN PARLIAMEN RAIFY ALL PROJECED BORROWING AS A PACKAGE?


Note: In one case, inconsistencies among sources could not be rectied. Te responses or that case are not refected in this pie chart.

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6 0 %

4 0 %

ARE ALL LENDING INSRUMENS SUBJEC O HE SAME LEGISLAIVE PROCESS?(GRANS VS. LOANS; DPLS VS. INVESMEN LENDING; IN BLEND COUNRIES: IBRD VS. IDA)

(otal number o country responses: 45)

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6 4 %

7 %

2 %2 %

1%

2 4 %

IS PARLIAMEN INVOLVED A ANY SAGE OF HE LOAN APPROVAL PROCESS?(CHECK AS MANY AS APPLY)


Note: In nine cases inconsistencies among the sources could

not be rectied. Tus, the graph illustrates valid data or 86 countries.

In cases where the dierent sources indicated several types o involvement, only those types o involvement all sourcesagreed on were incorporated.

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B r e a k d o w n o f r e s p o n s e s b y s o u r c e( P a r l i a m e n t , W B r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , I M F r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ; a l l 1 3 4 r e s p o n s e s a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d )

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B r e a k d o w n o f i n v o l v e m e n t ( a t a n y s t a g e v . n o i n v o l v e m e n t )b y c o u n t r i e s w i t h a n d w i t h o u t l e g a l f r a m e w o r k( h e g r a p h b e l o w i s b a s e d o n a n a n a l y s i s o t h e d a t a r e c e i v e d o r Q 2 a n d Q 1 )

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68%

27%

8%9%

IF HERE IS A PROCESS IN PLACE WHICH ALLOWS FOR PARLIAMENARY INVOLVEMENIN POLICY DIALOGUE PRIOR O LOAN NEGOIAIONS, PLEASE INDICAE WHICH OFHE FOLLOWING APPLIES (CHECK AS MANY AS APPLY)


Note: In nine cases inconsistencies among the sources could not berectied. Tus, the graph illustrates the valid data or 78 countries.

In cases where one o the dierent sources indicated several types o involvement, only those types o involvement that all sources agreed on were incorporated.

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B r e a k d o w n o f i n v o l v e m e n t ( a t a n y s t a g e v . n o i n v o l v e m e n t )i n p r e - n e g o t i a t i o n p o l i c y d i a l o g u e b y p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n v o l v e m e n ti n l o a n a p p r o v a l p r o c e s s ( a t a n y s t a g e v . n o n e )( h e g r a p h b e l o w i s b a s e d o n a n a n a l y s i s o t h e d a t a r e c e i v e d o r Q 2 a n d Q 3 )

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2 7 %

2 0 %

3 5 %

7 %

1 1 %

WHICH PARLIAMENARY COMMIEE(S) IS NORMALLY INVOLVED INLOAN APPROVALS A ANY SAGE OF HE PROCESS?


Committees that are generally involved in loan approvals are nance, budget, oreign aairs, but portolio committees (e.g., health, education) may also be involved.

B r e a k d o w n o f r e s p o n s e s b y n u m b e r o f c o m m i t t e e si n v o l v e d i n t h e l o a n a p p r o v a l p r o c e s s

Note: Although WB and IMF ocials responded to this question,only parliamentary responses are taken into consideration here given that committee systems are parliament-internal processes.

wo responses were inconsistent with the answers given or Q2,so the pie chart illustrates the responses o 43 parliaments.

Te 65% o parliaments where committees are involved in the loan approval process indicates a higher in

volvement rate than indicated in the previous paragraph [chart 10]. Indeed, the responses rom the three dierentinstitutions to the question whether parliament was involved in the loan approval process at any stage dieredsignicantly: 48% o parliaments, 40% o WB representatives, and 31% o IMF representatives stated that parliaments were involved. Te reasons or these inconsistencies, where they could not b e rectied, have to be add ressedin uture studies. In order to provide the most accurate picture o committee involvement, only the responsesrom parliaments are reected here, as committee involvement is an internal process o parliament which outsideinstitutions may not be intimately amiliar with. Tus, the 65% committee involvement reects the responses romparliaments only. It should be noted that all but one o the parliaments that stated t hey were involved at some stageo the loan approval process also indicated committee involvement, and all parliaments that stated they were notinvolved in the loan approval process also stated that no committee was involved in the process (the inconsistency in the percentage o parliaments that indicated involvement and parliaments that indicate committee participationis a result o the act that less parliaments responded to the question pertaining to the latter).

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B r e a k d o w n o f p a r l i a m e n t s w i t h c o m m i t t e e s y s t e m s i n p l a c e f o r l o a n a p p r o v a l s( a t l e a s t o n e v . n o n e ) b y c o u n t r i e s w i t h a n d w i t h o u t l e g a l f r a m e w o r k( h e g r a p h b e l o w i s b a s e d o n a n a n a l y s i s o t h e d a t a r e c e i v e d o r Q 4 – t o t a l # o c o m m i t t e e s v . n o n e – a n d Q 1 )

Note: Only parliamentary responses regarding committee involvement havebeen incorporated

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B r e a k d o w n o f p a r l i a m e n t s w i t h c o m m i t t e e s y s t e m s i n p l a c e f o r l o a n a p p r o v a l s( a t l e a s t o n e v . n o n e ) b y p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n v o l v e m e n t ( a n y t y p e o f i n v o l v e m e n t v . n o n e )( h e g r a p h b e l o w i s b a s e d o n a n a n a l y s i s o t h e d a t a r e c e i v e d o r Q 4 – t o t a l # o c o m m i t t e e s v . n o n e – a n d

Q 2 ; o n l y p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e s p o n s e s a r e t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n )

Note: Only parliamentary responses regarding committeeinvolvement have been incorporated

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9 8 %

2 %

9 8 %

DOES HE LAW ASSIGN PARLIAMEN HE AUHORIY O APPROVE HE BANK’SCOUNRY ASSISANCE SRAEGY (CAS), COUNRY PARNERSHIP SRAEGY (CPS)OR INERIM SRAEGY NOE (ISN), AS HE CASE MAY BE, BEFORE I ISADOPED BY HE GOVERNMEN?


Note: Since this question reers to parliamentary processes, parliamentary responses were taken as the deault answer or the three cases where inconsistencies between the two

sources could not be rectied.

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9 8 %

1 5 %

8 5 %

DOES HE LAW ASSIGN PARLIAMEN HE AUHORIY O APPROVEPOVERY REDUCION SRAEGY PAPERS (PRSP) BEFORE HEY ARE ADOPED BY HE GOVERNMEN?


It should be noted that only 47 o the 92 countries orwhich data is available actually have a PRSP in place.

Note: Since this question reers to parliamentary process-es, parliamentary responses were taken as the deault an-

swer in the six cases where inconsistencies between the twosources could not be rectied.

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B r e a k d o w n o f c o u n t r i e s i n t o t h o s e w h e r e p a r l i a m e n t d o e s o r d o e s n o t h a v e l e g a la u t h o r i t y t o a p p r o v e P R S P s b y c o u n t r i e s w i t h a n d w i t h o u t l e g a l f r a m e w o r k( h e g r a p h b e l o w i s b a s e d o n a n a n a l y s i s o t h e d a t a r e c e i v e d o r Q 6 a n d Q 1 )

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9 8 %

2 6 %

7 4 %

HAS YOUR COUNRY OFFICE EVER EXPERIENCED ANY DELAYS OR BLOCKAGESDURING HE NEGOIAION AND/OR RAIFICAION PROCESS BECAUSE OF PARLIAMEN?

(otal number o oce responses: 90. Responses were solicited rom the World Bank and the IMF)

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54%

36%

23%

8%

IF HERE IS A PROCESS IN PLACE WHICH ALLOWS FOR PARLIAMENARY INVOLVEMENIN HE CONEX OF REGULAR IMF SURVEILLANCE ACIVIIES OF GOVERNMENMACROECONOMIC POLICY, PLEASE INDICAE WHICH OF HE FOLLOWING APPLIES

[CHECK AS MANY AS APPLY]:(otal number o country responses: 56. Responses were solicited rom parliaments and the IMF)

Note: In seven cases inconsistencies between the sources could not bereconciled. Tus, the graph represents the valid data or 49 countries

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4 %2 %

9 4 %

DOES HE LAW LIMI HE ROLE OF PARLIAMEN O EIHER ACCEP ORREJEC HE BUDGE LAW, OR CAN HE PARLIAMEN REQUES AMENDMENS O HE BUDGE?

(otal number o country responses: 59. Responses were solicited rom parliaments and the IMF)

Note: Since this question reers to parliamentary processes only, parliamentary responses were taken as the deault answer in thethree cases where inconsistencies between the two sources could not be rectied.

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#QUESION

[For complete questions, as stated on the survey, please reer to the corresponding questions in Appendix 1 ]RESPONSE COLOR SCHEME

Inconclusive Not Applicable

1 Is parliament required to ratiy loans or credits negotiated by the government? YES NO

1a Does the law limit the role o parliament to either accept or reject the loan agreement, or can the parliament request amendments?

Amend Loan Accept or reject Law does not speciy

1b Are there exceptions to the l aw which allow loans to become eective without having been subject toparliamentary ratication?

NO YES

1c I there are exceptions, are they ofen invoked? NeverRarely Ofen

1d Does the law require parliament to ratiy every loan agreement separately or can parliament ratiy allprojected borrowing as a package?

Loan by loan As a package Law does not speciy

1e Are all lending instruments subject to the same legislative process? YESNO

2 Is parliament involved at any stage o the loan approval process? [ check as many as apply ] Beore negotiationsstart

Duringnegotiation

At thenal stages

None

3 I there is a process in place or parliamentary involvement prior to loan negotiations? [check as many asapply]

Joint meeting withWB and govern

ment

WB promptsmeeting

Inormalmeeting

None

4 Is at least one committee involved in loan approvals at any stage o the process?YES NO

5 Is parliament authorized to approve the Bank’s development strategies? YESNO

6 Is parliament authorized to approve the PRSP? YESNO

7 Has your country oce experienced any delays or blockages because o parliamentary intervention?

YES NO8 Is there a process in place which allows or parliamentary involvement in the context o regular IMF

surveillance activities o government macroeconomic policy? [check as many as apply ]Joint meeting with

IMF andgovernment

IMF promptsmeeting

Inormalmeeting

None

9 Does the law limit the role o parliament to either accept or reject the budget law, or can it requestamendments to the budget?

Amend law Accept or reject Law does not speciy

1, 1b, 1c, and 2: responses were solicited rom all three sources;1a, 1d, 3, 5, and 6: responses were solicited rom parliaments and the WB only;1e: responses were solicited rom WB ocials only;4: only parliamentary responses are reected in the data;7: responses were solicited rom WB and IMF only;

8 and 9: responses were solicited rom parliaments and the IMF only.

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For the purpose o this study, countries were assigned to the ollowing regional groups in keeping with IPU practice. Countries whose parliaments and WB/IMF ocials were asked torespond to the survey are indicated in bold. Countries, or which responses are available are indicated in orange.

AMERICAS:Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras , Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay , Peru, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadine, Suriname, rinidad & obago,United States o America, Uruguay , Venezuela

ARAB SAES: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, unisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen,Palestine (West Bank Gaza)

ASIA-PACIFIC:Aghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Democratic People’s Republic o Korea, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic Republic o, Israel, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia Federates States o, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea,Philippines, Republic o Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tailand, imorLeste, onga, uvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam

EUROPE:Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia,Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic o Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ajikistan, Te Former Yugoslav Republic o Macedonia, urkey ,urkmenistan , Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central Arican Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic o the Congo, Djibouti,Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao ome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Arica, South Sudan, Swaziland, ogo, Uganda, United Republic o anzania, Zambia,Zimbabwe

West Bank Gaza, as a recipient o international loans, has been included in the list

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