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Political Parties and Violence in Nigeria: The Case of Sokoto

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Research Line

Parties, Passions, and Politics

Political Parties and Violence in Nigeria: The Case of Sokoto State (2007-2013)

Yahaya Tanko Baba

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers

No. 10

Political Parties and Violence in Nigeria: 2013)

Papers

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 10

International Center for Violence Research – ICVR A Project of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence – IKG Universität Bielefeld Universitätsstraße 25 33615 Bielefeld Germany Project Webpage http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/ Violence Research and Development Project | Papers http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/publications.html Contact [email protected] The Violence Research and Development Project Papers are a medium for circulating research within the Violence Research and Development Project of the International Center for Violence Research prior to publication in order to encourage discussion. The Violence Research and Development Project Papers represent work in progress. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author(s). Any opinions expressed in this paper are the author(s) and not necessarily those of the International Center for Violence Research and the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University. If you want to be informed about new publications of the International Center for Violence Research please send an e-mail to: [email protected] The copyright of this Violence Research and Development Project Paper is held by the author(s).

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 10 1

Acknowledgements The Violent Research and Development Project series of papers documents the preliminary

results of a pilot project that was established to integrate higher education training in social

science research with cross-regional comparative research on violence. The overall aims of

the project, which has been generously supported by the German Federal Ministry for

Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is to empower young academics in Africa,

Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, so that they can contribute to international violence

research, publish their findings both nationally and internationally, and ultimately develop

scientifically grounded political and civil-society responses.

For that purpose, the Bielefeld University’s International Center of Violence Research (ICVR)

entered into cooperative agreements with five partner Universities in Asia, Africa, Latin

America, and the Middle East: the American University in Cairo (Egypt), the Universidad

Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador (El Salvador), the University of Benin

City (Nigeria), the University of the Punjab in Lahore (Pakistan), and the Pontifical Catholic

University of Peru in Lima.

The empirical research carried out in the pilot project was structured in five research lines:

“Parties, Passion, and Politics”, “Justifications and Legitimacy of Police Violence”, “Violent

and Non-Violent Neighborhoods”, “Violence in the Twilight Zone”, and “Violence against

Women”. These topics were chosen to cover intra-societal conflict and violence by looking at

aspects such as political violence, violence perpetrated by state institutions, violent events,

violent and non-violent locations, violence and gender, and forms of self-defense and

vigilantism.

This chapter documents research that was conducted in the Research Line “Parties,

Passions, and Politics”. Within the context of the Global South, most research on political

orders and their transformation rigorously opposes democratic to authoritarian regimes,

assuming that political violence has its place in the latter but not in the former. However, this

research, which was carried out in El Salvador, Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan, shows that

political violence is not just a transient phenomenon confined to the early stages of

democratization – it is often part and parcel of contentious politics today. In Yahaya Tanko's

intriguing study we can learn how the framing of political discourse by the power elites

manipulates the youth who then become the driving forces of violent contention in Nigeria's

Sokoto State.

Bielefeld, April 2015

Rosario Figari Layús, Sebastian Huhn, Boris Wilke, Ciaran Wrons-Passmann


Research Line

Parties, Passions, and Politics: Violence in Processes of Political Transformation

Political Parties and Violence in Nigeria: The Case of Sokoto State (2007-2013)

Yahaya Tanko Baba

Abstract

In this article I examine how political parties in Sokoto state, Nigeria, used violence in

electoral processes from 2007 to 2013. Using Tilly and Tarrow’s concept of contentious

politics, the concept of neo-patrimonialism and Schlichte’s model of armed groups, I find that

violence mostly assumed the form of clashes between rival party youths. While party elites

manipulate youths, religious and traditional institutions are also dragged into partisan politics

by the elites. However, I also find that as a result of changes in party platforms, intraparty

conflicts instigated large-scale interparty violence. In conclusion it can be said that party

elites make use of violence as a tool for mobilization either to wrestle power from the

governing party or to defend the status quo.

Key Words: Political Parties; Violence; Elections; and Democracy

Yahaya Tanko Baba

Yahaya Tanko Baba holds a PhD in Political Science from the Usmanu Danfodiyo University

Sokoto, where he has been teaching since 2002. His areas of interest include but are not

limited to democracy and democratization, political institutions and Middle Eastern politics.

His doctoral thesis is on the Nigerian Legislature. He is currently the National Secretary of

the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), the National Auditor of the Nigerian

Society for International Affairs (NSIA) and a Fellow of the Council for the Development of

Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) in Senegal and the Centre for Research and

Documentation (CRD) in Kano. He also worked as a consultant for both governmental and

non-governmental National and international development agencies in the areas of

governance and political leadership, human capacity development, public service, education,

health and sanitation amongst others.


1. Introduction

According to normative political theory (Dahl, 1973; Diamond, 1997), political parties are

important institutions for good and democratic governance. One of the key promises of

democracy is the peaceful resolution of societal conflicts. However, there is much evidence

that political parties in emerging democracies are also associated with violence (Fischer,

2002; Bratton, 2008; Chaturvedi, 2005). Thus, in their quest for office and influence, party

organizations can engage in systematic and spontaneous violence affecting each other as

well as voters. There is consensus among scholars that in Africa, unhealthy competition1 for

power by actors within and between parties can lead to violence. Violence is considered to

be one of the major features of multiparty politics in Africa (Basedau, et.al, 2007; Cowen and

Laakso, 2002; and Lindberg, 2006; Kanyinga and Okello, 2007). It is perceived as one of the

major challenges of multiparty democracy. Instead of promoting a smooth and peaceful

transition of power at regular intervals, multiparty elections in Africa often lead to violent

conflicts. However, the way in which elections are managed can make a difference, namely

that between peaceful elections and violent ones (Bekoe, 2010). Many scholars attribute the

frequency of violence within and between parties to weak institutionalization. One can argue,

however, that it is not weak institutionalization as such, but the importance of parties as

arenas of claim making and coordinated action (Tilly and Tarrow) which accounts for political

violence (Ross, 2004; Arias and Daniel, 2010; Bosi et.al, 2014).

In sub-Saharan Africa, colonialism influenced the political culture and systems of many

societies. As a violent venture, colonialism transformed the political landscape of Africa. It

was, however, greeted with violent reactions (resistance and liberation movements).

Nonetheless, it created modern nation-states and established political, social and economic

structures and institutions that facilitated the political domination, economic exploitation and

social subordination of the colonized. In particular, political parties in colonial Africa played a

leading role in the decolonization and liberation struggles. One can argue that their

inclination towards violence is rooted in their history. Scholars like Salih and Nordlund (2007)

have pointed to their roots in a non-democratic setting of colonial rule. Arguably, the short life

span of democratic regimes and the violent conflicts that inflict such damage on post-colonial

African states can be attributed to the elite’s political origins in non-democratic settings

(Kanyinga and Okello (2007; Ntalaja, 1997; Salih and Nordlund 2007). Bartlett (2012) has

added that the African nations’ democratization attempt to follow the third wave of the 1980s

and 1990s largely boiled down to a “copy and paste” of Western institutions. In contrast to

Western Europe, where political parties evolved over a period long enough to develop strong

1 This implies confrontational and unprincipled pattern of intra and inter-party relations in the quest for power, influence and resources.


linkages to civil society, African political parties were quickly created. The result is a system

of parties that is largely characterized as clientelistic. Even though clientelism has brought

short to mid-term stability in some cases, the emergence of clientelistic parties has

undermined the capacity of African states to conduct free, fair, and credible elections, and to

stabilize political systems in the long run (Kanyinga and Okello, 2007).

Nigeria is a typical African democracy that is frequently plagued by intra and interparty

violence. The first, second and the aborted third republics were truncated by the military,

largely as a result of the amount of violence generated by intra and interparty violence

(Adele, 2012)2. And, even though Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has not seen any coup, it is seen

as the weakest and most fragile in the country’s democratic history. Liebowitz and Ibrahim

(2013:18) describe today’s parties as “run by godfathers and barons rather than members.”

Parties in Nigeria are thus to be understood within the context of neopatrimonialism, where

parallel unofficial structures may well hold more power and authority than the formal

administration (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 62).

The violence often attributed to political parties in Nigeria is mainly associated with

electoral gains or as a means of undermining the victory of party opponents (Lewis, 2003;

and Nwolise, 2007). Party violence can be spontaneous and include riots, demonstrations,

and strikes in protest against certain kind of perceived injustice. Planned and organized

violence is also very common. Party violence sometimes takes the form of assassinations of

opponents and particularly coups, which truncated democracy on three occasions. Parties in

Nigeria are mostly elite-centered and merely seen as vehicles that guarantee access to

power and state resources for personal (particularistic) gains (Alemika, 2011). In the past,

violent party contestations truncated democracy in Nigeria (Adele, 2011). Nigeria’s longest

period of democratic governance (1999-2015) has also been laden with party violence. This

therefore calls into question the possibility of democracy and violence co-existing in Nigeria.

Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to the dynamics of political violence in

Nigeria’s democratization, focusing mainly on political parties as both the context and actors

in these discourses (Dudley, 1965; Yaqub, 2001; Egwu, 2003; Kurfi, 2005; Alemika, 2011).

These studies reveal that party violence in Nigeria is mostly associated with the quest for

power, influence and state resources. However, relationship between party violence and

strategies of violent mobilization as well as violence framing discourse by political parties has

not been systematically explored.

Given that the phenomenon of party violence has been widely discussed with an

emphasis on the normative dimension of the phenomenon, this study rather focuses on an

2 The Fourth Republic is refers to the government constituted by the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, which came into effect on May 29, 1999. It is the fourth in the series of Nigeria’s democratic transition after the truncation of three previous democratic governments by the military in 1966, 1983 and 1993.


empirical case. It is also to be noted that systematic studies on party violence in Africa are

mainly country-specific or cross-country. Thus sub-national units do not seem to attract

scholarly attention. There are very few in-depth studies of party violence at the sub-national

level. This study therefore focused on one of the sub-national units (state) of Nigeria. Sokoto

State has not been of interest to scholars of violent conflicts, particularly intra and interparty

violence. Perhaps this is because of the relative peaceful party relations in the past. The

emergence of violent party contestations in recent past thus demands more systematic study

of the phenomenon. This study examines political parties and violence in Sokoto State from

2007 to 2013. Sokoto State has been one of the more politically peaceful states in Nigeria’s

past, so recent party-related violence is of particular scholarly interest.

This study found that party violence in Sokoto State manifests itself in the form of fierce

conflicts for power and influence either within or between parties. It further reveals that the

patron-client nature of politics in the state instigates and fuels party violence around

elections. The youth are especially manipulated by the elite (patrons) into believing that they

are defending or advancing certain shared interests using acts of violence. It is also clear

from the study that party violence reflects the deep seated societal and communal conflicts,

which become heightened during elections. This makes violence framing by political parties

possible thereby leading to the legitimization of various forms of party violence.

2. Understanding Party Violence in Sokoto State: Methodological and

Theoretical Approach

This study involved the use of qualitative techniques (In-depth Interviews, Focus Group

Discussions (FGDs), Key Informant Interviews (KII) and documentary sources. Thirty-five

interviews were conducted with a number of identified respondents. The interviews are

categorized into expert interviews and stakeholder interviews. The expert interviews involved

local scholars in the various locations of the project as well journalists. The stakeholder

interviews on the other hand mainly involved practitioners in the field. They included party

leaders and stalwarts, ‘party godfathers’ and activists from a cross section of the Civil Society

Organizations (CSOs). Two FGDs were also conducted in both urban and rural locations of

the state. About ten KIIs were equally conducted with youth and gang leaders, security

officials and party leaders. The KIIs are supplement of the IDIs. All of the respondents were

carefully selected.

Party violence has been defined by Nawreen (2008:1) as “any incident where political

party functionaries engage in violent acts with the aim of short and long term political gain

against workers of opposing parties, members of different factions of their own party, against

state agents, and against civilians (citizens who are not party members or activists), resulting


to death, injury or destruction of property.” It is not limited to low-level skirmishes or short-

term unrest. In some cases party violence has escalated into civil war or military coups.

In order to understand political parties and violence, some theoretical perspectives are

required. Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007) concept of contentious politics is used here to understand

the conflictive nature of politics. They define contentious politics as “interaction in which

actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on

behalf of shared interests or programs, in which government are involved as targets,

initiators of claims, or third parties”(Tilly and Tarrow, 2007:4). This definition provides the

lenses through which political parties-related violence can be contextualized. Claims are

usually made in terms of office seeking (electoral and appointive) by individuals and groups,

within the party and in government circles. Failure to actualize their claim often leads to

collective action by and/or on behalf of the aggrieved persons and their sympathizers. In this

case the government is involved directly or indirectly. The power contestations may be within

the government (for ruling parties) or outside government (for opposition parties), yet in the

quest for government position in the long run. According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007)

repertoires vary from place to place, from time to time and pair to pair. Thus, when people

make claims, they tend to invent repertoires within certain limits that already exist for their

place, time and pair. Tilly’s (1985) model of war making and state making as organized crime

may be useful in explaining violent parties’ contestations: Eliminating or neutralizing their

own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders

of force (war making), eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories (state

making), eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients (protection) and acquiring the

means of carrying out the first three activities are the activities attributed to states by Tilly.

The question whether the two last forms are somewhat related to the phenomenon of party

violence in Nigeria, particularly. For instance, neutralizing the enemies of state clients means

suppressing the opposition parties, which largely instigates party violence.

Schlichte (2009) identified three different mechanisms through which armed groups come

into existence: violent repression by government forces (mechanism of repression),

frustration as a result of exclusion of certain individuals and groups from the neopatrimonial

settings (the ad-hoc mechanism), and open political violence (spin-off mechanism). In some

instances, party violence can take the form of a combination of these mechanisms.

As seen from Schlichte’s conceptualization, reference to the neopatrimonial nature of

politics remains an important conceptual underpinning of the study (Erdmann, et. al, 2007).

Most parties in sub-Saharan Africa cannot live on membership dues and have to rely

extensively on private donations from businessmen and sometimes politicians in power.

Some parties are funded by a single ‘big man’ others by group of ‘big men’ to fund elections

and run bureaucratic organizations (offices, staff, vehicles and communication). The


phenomenon of ‘big men’ is associated with the ability to distribute resources (Medard,

1987), which explains the nature of patronage and neopatrimonial governance in Africa

(Medard, 1982). So they resemble armed groups more than Western political parties.

3. A Short Political History Sokoto State

Like most modern African states, Nigeria is a colonial creation. It is the Africa’s most

populous country, with rich diversity in ethnicity, religion and culture. There are about 250

major ethnic groups in Nigeria. In terms of religion, the country’s population is somewhat

evenly divided between Muslims and Christians with small percentage of people adhering to

traditional religions. There are three major cultural groups: Hausa/Fulanis in the Northern

region; Yorubas in Western Region; and the Igbos in eastern region. There are however,

considerable portion of Nigeria’s population that are regarded as small cultural groups.

Nigeria had undergone a series of political restructuring phases. It began as federal states

with three regional governments in the North, East and West (from 1960 to 1964) and the

creation of the MidWestern Region in 1964. The outbreak of the civil war led to the

dismantling of the regional governments and the creation of 12 states across the country

(Bricks, 1978) to reduce the level of ethnic and regional loyalty (Yahaya, 1987). By 1975

seven additional states were created and local governments recognized as the third tier of

government. Between 1975 and 1996 seventeen additional states were created, which

makes Nigeria’s federation a configuration of 36 states, 774 local governments and the

federal government. This study focuses on Sokoto State, one out of the current thirty-six

states in Nigeria.


Map of Nigeria, Showing Sokoto State

Figure 1

Sokoto has a history of pre-eminence that predates Nigeria. It was the headquarters of

Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th c

in 1976 when the North-western State of Nigeria was divided into

States.

Map of Sokoto Caliphate before Colonial Conquest

Figure 2


Map of Nigeria, Showing Sokoto State

eminence that predates Nigeria. It was the headquarters of

century prior to colonial intrusion. Sokoto was created as a state

western State of Nigeria was divided into the

Map of Sokoto Caliphate before Colonial Conquest


eminence that predates Nigeria. It was the headquarters of the

was created as a state

the Sokoto and Niger


Sokoto City has maintained its status as state capital and headquarter

Nigeria, in spite of subsequent states' creation exercises by the military in 1991 and 1996,

when Kebbi and Zamfara States were carved out of Sokoto State. This is because the city

remains the seat of the Caliphate

North-Western Nigeria near the confluence of Sokoto and Rima Rivers.

Republic of Benin to the West and the Niger Republic to the North.

government areas (LGA) and three senatorial District

The front view of the Sultan’s

Figure 3

Nigeria’s colonial history had considerable

in post-colonial periods. For instance, the success of indirect rule system in

made Sultan and Emirs very influential in political processes of Nigeria even after colonial

rule. In contrast, the failure of indirect rule in the eastern and

different sets of elite in those regions. Political cult

been progressive and volatile, particularly party politics, whereas politics in

has been conservative, with

Progressive Union (NEPU) and

few other places. The influence of the traditional rulers in politics largely explain

For instance, the biggest party in

which existed even before independence

of Sokoto), a member of the royal family of the Sultanate. He was also the Premier of

Northern region. Similarly, the first executive President of Nigeria in the

(1979-1983) under the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was also a senior Councilor in the

Sokoto Sultanate Council (Turakin Sokoto

influenced by notable figures. In


Sokoto City has maintained its status as state capital and headquarters



remains the seat of the Caliphate (Sultanate) The State is located at the uppermost part of

estern Nigeria near the confluence of Sokoto and Rima Rivers.

Republic of Benin to the West and the Niger Republic to the North. There are 23 local

government areas (LGA) and three senatorial Districts in the State:

Palace in Sokoto

had considerable impact on the political structures and institutions

colonial periods. For instance, the success of indirect rule system in


rule. In contrast, the failure of indirect rule in the eastern and Western regions created

different sets of elite in those regions. Political culture in eastern and W

been progressive and volatile, particularly party politics, whereas politics in

has been conservative, with the exception of the radical postures of the

Progressive Union (NEPU) and the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) in

places. The influence of the traditional rulers in politics largely explain

For instance, the biggest party in the Northern region in the First Republic

ed even before independence –was led by Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello (

), a member of the royal family of the Sultanate. He was also the Premier of

Northern region. Similarly, the first executive President of Nigeria in the

1983) under the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was also a senior Councilor in the

Turakin Sokoto). In reality thus, Nigerian politics

influenced by notable figures. In Southern Nigeria, in contrast, educate


s of Islamic faith in



located at the uppermost part of

estern Nigeria near the confluence of Sokoto and Rima Rivers. It borders the

There are 23 local

impact on the political structures and institutions

colonial periods. For instance, the success of indirect rule system in Northern Nigeria


estern regions created

Western Nigeria has

been progressive and volatile, particularly party politics, whereas politics in Northern Nigeria

the Northern Element

People’s Redemption Party (PRP) in Kano State and a

places. The influence of the traditional rulers in politics largely explains this trend.

First Republic (1966-1966) –

was led by Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello (the Sardauna

), a member of the royal family of the Sultanate. He was also the Premier of

Northern region. Similarly, the first executive President of Nigeria in the Second Republic

1983) under the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was also a senior Councilor in the

). In reality thus, Nigerian politics has been greatly

outhern Nigeria, in contrast, educated elites have had


more influence on politics. This was the case with Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the

Action Group (AG) and the Premier of the Western Region as well as presidential aspirant

under Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) in the Second Republic. The same applied to Dr. Nnamdi

Azikwe the leader of the National Council for Nigeria Consensus (NCNC) who was the

Premier of the Eastern region and later President of Nigeria in the First Republic.

For decades, Sokoto State had a one-party dominant party system. In the First Republic

the Northern People’s Congress was the dominant party. In the Second Republic the NPN

became the dominant party. The situation was the same in the ‘aborted third republic’ in

which the National Republican Convention (NRC) established itself as the dominant party in

the state. The Fourth Republic brought a change, when different elite groups emerged under

different party platforms competing for power and influence in the state and at the center.

From 1999 to 2007, it was for the first time that the party that governed in the state was in the

opposition at the center. This may be responsible for the emergence of fierce intra and

interparty conflicts in the state.

4. Study Findings

4.1. Party Violence in Sokoto State: Facts & Figures

Historically, Sokoto State has been home to dominant/ruling parties in the First and Second

Republics. The leader of the NPC (the party that controlled the federal government in the

First Republic), Sir Ahmadu Bello was indigenous to Sokoto State. In the Second Republic,

too, Alh. Shehu Aliyu Shagari, who won presidential elections under the platform of the NPN,

also came from Sokoto State. However, in the Fourth Republic, the party that controlled

Sokoto State after the 1999 general elections and until 2007 was an opposition party at the

center. The 2007 elections in Sokoto State were one of the most volatile and vicious in

recent times, as can be seen from Table 1 below, which shows some of the manifestations of

party violence in the state since 2007.

Table: 1 Some of the Manifestations of Party Violence in Sokoto State 2007-2011

S/N Year Description of Party Violence in Sokoto State

Consequences of the Violence

1. 2007 Violent clash between youth supporters of DPP and PDP in the state

Campaign offices torched and vehicles destroyed.

2. 2008 Violent clashes in electioneering campaigns between thugs of the DPP and PDP within Sokoto metropolis

More than 27 Vehicles and motorcycles of the two parties destroyed and two people killed.


3. 2008 Clash between political thugs of the DPP and PDP in campaign rallies at Illela Local Government Area of Sokoto State

3 Vehicles and properties destroyed

4. 2008 Clash between political thugs of the DPP and PDP in campaign rallies at Ummaruma village in Wurno Local Government area of the state

Houses and shops destroyed and two cars burnt down.

5. 2010 Supporters representing the Wurno/Rabah Federal Constituency attacked rival group at a political rally

The left wrist of a 15-year-old boy was cut off in the clash.

6. 2010 Supporters of member, representing Sabon Birni/Isa Federal Constituency clashed with supporters of the Senatorial Aspirant of the Sokoto East Senatorial District

Vehicles destroyed, shops and buildings belonging to the two politicians destroyed.

7. 2010 Clash between rival thugs of PDP and ANPP at Gidan Kaya in Wamakko Local Government

About 12 people were injured.

8. 2011 Clashes between thugs loyal to Bafarawa (former Governor) and PDP supporters at flyover bridge within Sokoto metropolis

One person killed, 10 vehicles destroyed and more than 20 people injured.

9. 2011 Intra-party violence in the PDP primary elections among supporters of different gubernatorial aspirants: incumbent Governor; Alh. Yusuf Suleiman; and Senator Abubakar Umar Gada

Campaign office of Yusuf Suleiman torched billboards and posters of aspirants destroyed.

Source: The Sun, 2007 Sunday Trust, 2011, Leadership Newspaper, 2012; and Interviews with Respondents

The violence documented above is merely in the form of clashes between rival party youths.

The following table show deaths, injuries and property destruction recorded within the period

of study across the various locations (local governments) in the state.

Death and Injuries as a Result Parties-related Violence across the 23 Local

Government Areas in Sokoto State Between 2007 and 2011

LGAs 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 No. of Deaths

No. of Injuries

Death Injuries Death Injuries Death Injuries Death Injuries Death Injuries

1. Binji 02 10 03 15 01 10 00 00 00 15 06 62

2. Bodinga 01 10 01 15 00 10 00 00 00 05 02 61

3 Dange/Shuni 03 20 04 20 00 15 00 00 00 10 07 75

4. Gada 01 10 02 15 00 10 00 00 00 05 03 45

5. Goronyo 01 10 01 15 00 05 00 00 00 05 02 35

6. Gudu 00 05 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 20

7. Gwadabawa 02 15 02 20 00 10 00 00 00 00 04 55


8. Illela 01 20 01 15 00 10 00 00 00 05 02 60

9. Isa 01 05 01 10 00 10 00 00 00 00 02 25

10. Kware 01 10 01 15 00 05 00 00 00 00 02 20

11. Kebbe 01 10 01 20 00 05 00 00 00 00 02 35

12 Rabah 01 05 01 15 00 10 00 02 00 00 02 32

13. Sabon Birni 02 10 01 10 00 05 00 03 00 03 04 31

14. Shagari 01 10 02 15 00 05 00 00 00 05 03 36

15. Silame 00 05 01 10 00 05 00 00 00 05 01 22

16. Sokoto North 08 20 10 30 00 15 00 00 00 15 23 123

17. Sokoto South 09 25 12 27 00 20 00 00 00 20 24 114

18. Tambuwal 02 10 03 20 00 10 00 00 00 10 06 60

19. Tangaza 03 15 02 10 00 03 00 00 00 03 05 39

20. Tureta 01 10 01 05 00 05 00 00 00 05 02 30

21. Wamakko 04 19 06 20 00 15 00 12 00 15 12 86

22. Wurno 01 10 01 15 00 03 00 00 00 03 02 36

23. Yabo 01 15 02 10 00 03 00 00 00 05 03 36

TOTAL 119 1,130

Source: Security Agencies, Sokoto State

This table shows the prevalence of party violence in Sokoto from 2007 to 2011. These

incidents occurred in different parts of the state. The records show the distribution of the

incidents across the 23 Local Government Areas of Sokoto State. From the data in the table,

it is clear that party violence is mainly common within the metropolis. The two metropolitan

Local Governments: Sokoto North and Sokoto South have the highest frequency of party

violence.

In Sokoto State, intra and interparty tension and conflicts heightened with the emergence

of two rival parties in 1999. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All People’s Party

(APP) competed in Local elections in 1998, in which PDP won 12 out of the 23 Local

Governments and APP cleared the remaining 11 Local Governments. This set the pace for

fierce competition between the two dominant parties. In the April 1999 General Elections,

APP won the gubernatorial elections in the state, while PDP won the presidential election at

the center. This gave the parties a good standing in terms of strength to compete for


electoral victory in the subsequent elections. For eight years (1999-2007) APP/ANPP held

power in the state, until it was dislodged by the PDP in 2007.

At every election, violence has been employed by both parties, either in an attempt to hold

on to power or to wrestle power from the opposition. In order for the parties to be effective in

the use of violence, each party maintains a youth gang, who are mostly armed with local

weapons (machetes, knifes, cutlasses, axes, swords, etc.) to counter or subdue rival party

violently. This is consistent with Schlichte’s (2009) ad-hoc mechanism of armed groups. The

frustration generated by the exclusion of certain groups of elites or the fear of being excluded

in the neopatrimonial setting degenerates into violence. In Sokoto State this trend continued

unabated to the extent that violence becomes an effective strategy for political mobilization.

Thus violent mobilization by parties takes different dimensions, in some instances

manipulating the existing local and primordial divides of the people (See Nnoli, 1980). The

exploitation of local conflicts of the people by political parties that are desperate for power

makes violence even more fierce and unending. In Sokoto State, the manipulation of the

people by parties using traditional and religious institutions exacerbates party violence.

However, this is only as per the official records of the security agencies. Many incidents of

party violence are not officially reported. In addition to rallies and campaigns, there are also

spates of political assassinations that are related to party violence in the state. This is,

however, not a common phenomenon in Sokoto State. There are some assassinations of

party figures, but a linkage is hardly established to political assassination. Most of these

killings are described as crimes related to armed robbery.3 However, the security agencies

do not seems to be vigilant and effective in tracking and prosecuting violence related to

political parties. The role of patrons in shielding perpetrators of party violence only reveals

the extent of the neo-matrimonial nature of politics in Nigeria. Most often party violence

reported is not prosecuted and youth arrested for high level crimes related to political parties

are released on the orders of patrons and highly placed people in government.4

4.2. The Party against Itself: The Advance of Election-related Violence in Sokoto State

As one of the few states controlled by one the opposition parties in the country, the state

chapter of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) was embroiled in a conflict with the national

body of the ANPP. The then State Governor, Attahihu Bafarawa, who was one of the major

financiers of the party and at one time its Caretaker chairman, had a major disagreement

with the national executive council of the party5. This was in addition to the internal cracks

within the government of the state. In particular, the Governor and his Deputy parted ways,

3 Interviews with Party Stalwart between the ages of 35 to 60 4 Interaction with Key Informant 5 Interview with Party Stalwart between the ages of 35 to 50


largely on account of the political ambition of the latter. The then Deputy Governor, Aliyu

Magatakarda Wamakko had strong backing from major stakeholders in the state. These

include traditional rulers, seasoned civil servants (both serving and retired), local

businessmen, “godfathers6”, “political thugs”7, party stalwarts across the major parties in the

state and some local-based groups and organizations8.

Among these groups, the youth were the most important agents of the conflict. The youth

in the state, who are mostly poor, uneducated, underemployed and displaced9, are mostly

used by politicians as guards and thugs for the advancement of the latter’s political career.

The youth groups in the state are the category of people mostly involved in political rallies,

demonstrations, protests, display of posters, billboards and signposts of parties and

candidates, from which they make some income for sustenance10.

On the other hand, the Governor was using all of the powers and resources at his

disposal to curtail the political ambition of his deputy. This degenerated into open conflict

between them. The attempt by the Governor to solely control the ANPP and the House of

Assembly was greeted with fierce opposition within the party and the state legislature. Thus

the struggle between the two major political heavy weights from the same party to control

party machineries to their political advantage led to the use of intimidation and violence of

various sorts to subdue opponents.11 The scenarios in the political theatre of the state

depicted a picture of tough confrontations, with claims by the two groups leading to some

sorts of coordinated efforts manifesting in different forms of violence. It was argued that the

national executive of the party is involved in a conspiracy with the ruling PDP to dislodge the

Governor from the party, which will give the party the opportunity to win elections in the

state12. This fact was corroborated by many informants and respondents, particularly

because the deputy governor finally defected to the ruling party even after the ouster of the

Governor from the ANPP.

6The term ‘godfathers’ in Nigerian politics is used differently by various scholars. For instance Isaac, (2005) argues that the word 'godfather' represent the patron-client relationships in Nigerian politics, which also have cultural roots among many Nigerian peoples. It has been part of the sociology of the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo for people to have one or other type of 'godfather'. For example, the word 'godfather' has local equivalents in the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo languages and these words have been in use since the pre-colonial era. For Ibrahim (2003) godfathers refer to individuals who are able to dominate public institutions by manoeuvring their protégés into elected offices and other important government positions. Albin-Lackey, (2012) on the other hand posits that Nigeria’s godfathers might be thought of as a distinct outgrowth of the phenomenon of violent strongmen who have risen to challenge the dominance of ‘big men’ in many parts of Africa (Albin-Lackey, 2012) 7 These concepts are loosely used by scholars of Nigeria Government and Politics to refer to Patrons (godfathers) and armed party youth as thugs 8 Interview with Party Youth Leader in Sokoto State between the ages of 30 to 45 9 According to National Bureau of Statistics, Sokoto State has the highest poverty rate in Nigeria with about 86.4 per cent in 2004. 10 Interview with Youth in Sokoto State between the ages of 25 to 35 11 The use of violence to intimidate party rivals is a common phenomenon in Nigerian politics. For instance, see Chris Ngige: My Problem with Uba, Tell Magazine, 28 July, 2003 12 Interview with a Prominent politician in Sokoto State between the ages of 40 to 60


However, what is central to our discussion here is the manner in which the conflict between

the Governor and his deputy degenerated into fierce competition, leading to an

unprecedented level of violence in the build-up to the elections, during and even after the

elections. Thus because of the high stakes involved in the competition, the key actors,

parties and other stakeholders were relentless in their drive to woo supporters. Thus rallies,

demonstrations, display of billboards, signposts, posters of parties and candidates were

major source of confrontations and clashes between these two opposing camps. Within a

short of period of time, members of the same party parted ways and engaged one another

through a number of mobilization strategies. What is more, the national headquarters of the

ANPP waded into the conflict and pronounced the then deputy governor as the legitimate

gubernatorial candidate of the party against the interest of the then Governor. The resolution

of the party hierarchy in favor of the deputy governor led to the ouster of the Governor and

the establishment of a new party Democratic People’s Party (DPP), which he built up from

the scratch. One of the respondents argues that “it was obvious that there was a grand

conspiracy to undermine the political goodwill of the state government by the ruling PDP in

collaboration with some members of the ANPP, particularly the national leaders of the

party”13.

Thus, while the State Governor was nurturing a new party, the deputy governor was

already riding on party structures that were well established. As the major financier of his

new party, the Governor committed a lot of time and resources to rigorous mobilization

campaigns to advertising the newly registered party. One of the strategies used was the civil

servants and political office holders within the state service. The civil servants were dragged

into plain partisan politics, which became the yardstick for performance evaluation. This led

to the victimization of civil servants who were reluctant to participate in the mobilization

campaign for the newly registered party in the state14 . This is also against the background

that the deputy governor also had his sympathizers within the government. Thus real,

perceived and imaginary supporters and sympathizers of the deputy governor were isolated

and victimized by the Governor. Some key state officials were posted and/or demoted, some

political office holders removed from government and others greatly undermined in their

various designations15. Thus the battle lines were clearly drawn and the pace set for intense

conflicts and confrontations between these two groups.

In the build-up to the elections or even before electioneering campaigns began officially,

posters, billboards and party symbols were in display everywhere in the state, particularly

within the city capital. Public buildings and strategic locations were littered all with posters

13 Interview with a party official in Sokoto State between the ages of 35 to 50 14 Interview with a journalist in Sokoto State between the ages of 35 to 50 15 Interview with a party stalwart in Sokoto State between the ages of 35 to 50


and party signposts. One of the major manifestations of party violence during this period was

competition for space to display posters and sign posts. Thus violence sporadically erupts

when youth of the two groups compete for space spontaneously or planned beforehand. One

of the major sources of party violence – according to a security source – was a lack of

coordination in the manner in which parties advertise themselves to the people. Another

manifestation of party violence in the state has been through rallies and demonstrations

organized by parties. At different points of the electioneering campaigns, parties are bent on

mobilization for votes. These rallies and campaign trains move from one location to another

chanting slogans and making a mockery of rival parties. Because of the provocative nature of

these outfits, violence usually erupts between parties opposed to each other (The Sun

Newspaper, 2007). It is very normal to see a gang of youth well-armed with machetes, axes,

cutlasses, knives and sticks sponsored in vehicles as escorts during rallies and campaigns.

The frequency in the use of arms by youth during campaigns and rallies is motivated by the

principle of self-protection and defense. The conventional security forces simply cannot

protect you against rival party youths, so you need to provide protection yourself16.

Obviously, the youth wing of parties in the state occupies an important place in

electioneering campaigns. Because large chunk of youth in the state are unemployed, poor

and ignorant, they are found cheap for politicians to manipulate. For the youth, party

engagement is a source of employment and prestige, especially when they are given

positions in government or party.17

4.3. Interpreting Parties and Violence Framing Discourse in Sokoto State

4.3.1 The Youth and Party Violence

For the youth who act as party militants, their participation in party violence is also

associated with certain incentives. Soon they are given resources as reward for their ruthless

and violent behavior on political opponents. This category of people who are poor, illiterate,

displaced and deprived sees party militancy as an occupation (Bratton, 2008). In addition to

the immediate benefits they receive from party leaders, patrons and candidates they also

stand the chance of being elevated to higher political status. Materially, they can benefit

enormously if their party constitute the government. They can be given contracts and

important party and government positions regardless of their educational attainments. Party

thugs now rise through the ranks and become important political figures in their society. This

incentive is a clear motivation for the involvement of the youth in party violence. In Sokoto

from 2007 until now a number of party thugs have crossed the threshold of militancy and

16 Interview with Party Youth Leader from the ages of 25 to 35 17 Interview with a journalist in Sokoto State between the ages of 30 to 45


assumed high places in party and in government18 . There are party gang leaders, who have

had or still have influential positions within their parties and in the government and some

have since begun to assume the status of patrons who are widely consulted by politicians for

favors of various kinds19.

Similarly, candidates and politicians also benefit from party violence. To some extent, the

volatile nature of party politics in the state since 2007 has made it necessary for candidates

to rely heavily on violence as means of making a mark in the politics of the state. Some of

these notable party youth leaders are coopted into formal party hierarchy and rewarded with

various political appointments, which serves as a source of personal uplift. Some of these

are members or chairs of party security committees, particularly the governing party as well

as members of Boards and Commissions within the state bureaucracy. They are also given

personal benefits in the form of contracts, which enriches them suddenly. These youth

elements are of different grades. They include those who are mainly involved in the

coordination of armed youth for the party and even those who are actually involved or

provide leadership to violent youth in the field.20

Politicians in the state thus rely on the youth for political advertisement, at times through

violent ventures. Youth groups have fun removing the posters and billboards of opponents

and replacing them with those of their own parties21. This was done perpetually and with no

regard to established codes of conduct for electioneering campaign. Thus, in an utter show

of might and popularity, youth groups of various parties are daily and routinely involved in the

business of displaying party symbols and posters of their party favorites publicly. Only armed

youth can boldly be involved in this exercise of poster billboards display, because they can

be attacked by rival group in the process22. Thus clashes between rival youth groups were

very common, especially when each group is determined to protect the image and popularity

of their parties and candidates (See Nwolise, 2007). Thus spaces for display of posters and

billboards of parties are important scenes of party violence in the state. Though,

spontaneous, eruption of violence in this kind of scenarios does not catch the youth off

guard. As party foot soldiers, they are always armed and ready for a clash. It also became

clear that party youth are vehemently involved in the clashes because of the immediate

rewards they receive from the party sponsors and candidates contesting for elective

positions.

18 Interview with an expert between the ages of 35 to 50 19 Interview with journalist between the ages of 25 to 40 20 It is difficult to mention names of party youth leaders that rise to formal party and government position because most will decline being associated with being leaders of armed youth. Most of them spoke under conditions of anonymity 21 Interaction with a party thug between the ages of 20 to 30 22 Interaction with a party thug between the ages of 20 to 30


The youth are not stable within parties. They move across parties in search of higher payouts

(incentives) to violently provide protection and intimidate rival parties.23 In some instances

the youth may appear in the rallies, demonstrations and protests of two different parties that

are rivals. This depends on which party pay high or at best for the youth to earn double pay

in different scenarios. 24 The poverty and illiteracy level of the youth who are involved in

various forms of party violence is usually high. Most of the youth involved are uneducated

and poor. They suffer a great deal of deprivation and are thus compelled by their hard

economic condition to trade around with their lives for material rewards from party leaders,

candidates and patrons.25

During electioneering campaigns the youth wing of parties are the most important party

instruments that guarantee the movements of party from one location to another. The display

of dangerous weapons by party youth during rallies and campaigns is enough to deter rival

party youth; otherwise attacks seem eminent26. Many respondents and informants argue that

these kinds of scenarios are merely for deterrence and self-protection. However, in some

occasions large scale violence erupts out of these scenarios (See Tamuno, 2003). In the

event of two rival parties crossing the same path or highway, violence can erupt

spontaneously. Sometimes youth who are usually under the influence of drugs can attack

rival party offices, signposts, mutilate posters of rival candidates, which leads to violence

(The Guardian, 2011).

4.3.2 Religious and Traditional Authorities

Party violence in a neopatrimonial polity largely benefits the patrons. Depending on the

circumstances, patrons who are mainly party financiers are responsible for the violent

activities within and between parties27. The patrons may not directly be involved in violence

framing discourse but are mainly the sponsors of these discourses28. The chief aim of

framing violence discourse is to legitimize violent actions by political parties with view to

achieving certain political goals. Sokoto State since 2007 witnessed an unusual level of party

violence as a result of violence framing discourses that preceded political contestations. The

state, as noted earlier, is distinct from other states in many respects. It is the seat of the

caliphate (the headquarters of the defunct Sokoto Caliphate founded in the early 19th

century). Thus religion is an important institution that widely influences social relations.

Religious leaders are also recognized and respected widely among the population. However

23 Interview with a party official between the ages of 25 to 40 24 Interaction with a party thug between the ages of 20 to 30 25 Interview with a politician between the ages of 45 to 60 26 Interaction with a party thug between the ages of 20 to 35 27 Interview with an expert between the ages of 35 to 50 28 Interview with an expert between the ages of 35 to 50


a distinction must be made between the traditional rulers and religious scholars in the state.

The traditional leaders are the custodian of the traditions and values of the people who are

rooted in the religion of Islam. Religious leaders on the other hand, are scholars who are

trusted with guidance of the people. Both groups of people are not expected to be in partisan

politics. Thus both of them wield tremendous influence and power over the people. Though

not partisan politicians, in a state like Sokoto their blessing is paramount for a successful

political career.29

In 2007 elections both the traditional and religious institutions were sympathetic to one

party or the other. Thus this sympathy gave the people the courage to confront the seating

government with ease and confidence that the government will be overturned. Under normal

circumstances the traditional and religious leaders are always in support of government in

power. This is largely because the traditional rulers are employees of government and paid

for the leadership services they offer to the people, while the religious leaders mostly

supported by the government. But in 2007 there appears open friction between the party in

power and the traditional and religious institutions on the other hand. In order for these

institutions to out rightly criticize the government’s support of the opposition a local sectarian

crisis was instigated between the dominant Sunni sect and the minority Shi’a sect. The

handling of the crisis by the government way back in 2006 formed the basis for violence

framing discourse around political parties. It was clear from the opinion and position of both

religious and traditional institutions that the minority Shi’a sect be crushed by state. However,

the state government insisted on due process and legal procedure to be followed in the

resolution of the crisis. This stance of the government forms the basis for its unpopularity

among the people guided largely by the opinion of the traditional and religious institutions30.

Thus given that the opposition were keen to wrestle power from the ruling party, additional

pressure from the patrons and party leaders on the traditional and religious leaders dragged

these respected institutions into various sorts of partisan engagements. Mosques in

particular became campaign grounds for the opposition parties with religious leaders leading

the campaign with hate speeches against the ruling party and its elite. The central argument

of the religious leaders had been that the government protected the minority Shi’a groups

who are seen by a majority groups as outcast31. In different religious foray, Islamic scholars

with the backing of the traditional institution legitimized the use of violence against the

29 The distinction between traditional and religious leaders stem from their assigned roles in the pre-colonial political system of the Sokoto Caliphate. The former being the political leaders were responsible for governance and administration of their respective territories while the latter are scholars with expertise in various field of Islamic knowledge who were responsible guardianship administration of the justice system under the Sharia legal system. These roles somewhat persisted under colonial rule using the British Indirect Rule System. The post-colonial Nigeria’s political system, however, undermined the formal roles of these groups, particularly the religious leaders, and assigned the traditional rulers some informal roles that are not protected by the constitution. 30 Interview with a party and government official between the ages of 35 to 50 31Interview with a party and government official between the ages of 35 to 50


minority Shi’a group. There are a number of religious scholars who joined the violent

campaign train of the opposition party and encouraged the supporters of the opposition to

carry weapons and ensure the elimination of the not only the Shi’a but also the supporters of

the opposition party who were reluctant in using state power to eliminate this much hated

group of minority people. One of the scholars ordered the massacre of this group32. Another

scholar demonstrated by joining the campaign team with his weapon and encouraged other

people to follow suit (recorded speech, 2007). Thus violence was not only directed on this

minority group but also on the members of the ruling party on the pretext of supporting them.

Accordingly, many lives were lost and properties destroyed and fear was instilled among

supporters and sympathizers of the ruling DPP at the time to the extent that on the eve of the

elections the voice of the ruling DPP was overtly suppressed. During this period, many

unemployed youth were motivated into violent activities as a result of the position of religious

and traditional leaders in the state. The positions of these groups (religious and traditional

leaders) were perceived by the youth as being sympathetic to one party against another.33

On the eve of the 2007 gubernatorial elections, security operatives stormed the residence

of the then incumbent Governor and intimidated him, his family and supporters34. The news

about this incident spread widely among the people and this further strengthened the

opposition in their violent crackdown on members of the ruling party and their sympathizers.

It should, however, be noted that on the eve of the elections, the then deputy governor

defected to the dominant PDP and fielded as the aspirant for the party, a decision that led to

the removal by the court the Governor who was declared winner on account of irregularities.

The court ordered for a re-run and the PDP candidate won again but not without protracted

legal battle. In fact, the court case lingered for almost four years stretching until the end of

the tenure of the Governor. The prolong court case had also made party violence recurring

beyond election period. The enthusiasm by both groups to win court case and retain or

regain mandate was also a source of party violence long after elections were concluded35.

The traditional and religious institutions also played a key role in influencing the outcome of

the court case in favor of the PDP. This was done through excessive lobby and gratifications.

The case was responsible for a feud between the Chief Judge of the Federation and the

President of the Court of Appeal, which led to the suspension of the latter on the influence of

the lobby by the traditional and religious institutions36

32 This information is from a recorded speech of one of the religious leaders in the state, who gives interpretation of different political happenings in the state. The recorded sermons are widely circulated through electronic devices for public consumption. 33 Interview with an expert in Sokoto State between the ages of 30 and 50 34 Interview with a party and government official between the ages of 40 to 60 35 Interview with a party and government official between the ages of 40 to 60 36 Interview with a party official between the ages of 40 to 60


It is clear from the foregoing that religious and traditional institutions played a leading role in

the framing of violence discourse around political parties in Sokoto State. However, the

patrons are the major financiers of the propaganda. A great deal of money was invested by

the patrons, which influenced the position of these institutions to play active role in violence

discourse framing including creating an impression that if the court were to reverse the

mandate of the PDP in favor of DPP, the whole state would be thrown into turmoil and

violence. The youth groups also played a leading role in the propagation of the stereotypical

messages about the party spread by the former Governor of the state and his followers. This

is to the extent that people are convinced that they deserve some measure of violence.

4.3.3 Violent Neopatrimonialism and Youth in Sokoto State

Party youth are maintained on the basis of patron-client relationships. The youth are

sometimes immediately rewarded with cash and other material benefits for bravely defending

parties and their candidates. Sometimes exceptionally violent youth are elevated to high

status when new governments are constituted.37 They are given contracts and influential

positions in government even if they do not have the requisite qualifications. The big party

patrons rely heavily on brave youth who are capable of intimidating, maiming and even killing

of members of the opposition parties. The party youth are very bold only because they know

they are well protected by patrons who are highly connected in government.38

This posture reflects Schlichte’s (2009) three mechanisms of armed group formation: The

violent repression, ad-hoc mechanism, and open political violence. Violent repression of the

opposition by the government instigates violent reactions. Those who feel excluded from

patronage networks resort to the use of violence to make neopatrimonialism work for them

again. These dynamics show the excessive control of party structures by patrons, who are

the major party sponsors.39 The more or less political entrepreneurs, who invest in

candidates, party officials and youth with the view to influencing electoral outcomes in their

favor for tangible benefits. This is typical of party politics in Nigeria (See Ibrahim, 2003;

Olusopo, 2003; Godwolli, 2003; Isaac, 2005). Thus during the period under review, both

parties had been involved in the use of inducements to ginger youth for clashes or attacks on

rival parties as a means of suppressing them politically.

In the build-up to 2007 elections in Sokoto State, the incumbent Governor used the

advantage of state resources to maintain gang of youth. On the other hand, the then deputy

37 Interview with politician between the ages of 40 to 60 38 Interaction with key informant between the ages of 30 and 45 39 For detail gist of the powers of godfathers in Nigerian Politics, see interviews with some notable political figures in Nigeria that are either involved or affected by the phenomenon in Tell Magazine 28 July, 2003; The Source, 2 June, 2003; Sunday Champion 8 June, 2003; The Punch, 28 November, 2004; Saturday Punch, 11 December, 2004


governor relied on support of patrons and good will from the neighboring states of Kebbi and

Zamfara, whose governments were ANPP. This was, however, not enough to match the

resources of the incumbent, a situation which largely informed the decision of the then ANPP

aspirant to decamp to the ruling PDP as a strategy to benefit from the resources of the ruling

party at the center. This in addition to the deployment of the federal might in the state

undermined the powers of the incumbent.

Violence benefits some people. If one considers both Tilly & Tarrow’s (2007) concept of

contentious politics and neopatrimonial politics, party violence clearly has some incentives.

For instance, it can be argued that people involved in contesting power can make use of

various repertoires in coordinated efforts to make claims which may involve government in

some ways. These coordinated actions can be violent yet effective in achieving the goals of

individuals and groups.

Power, access to state resources and patronage networks are some of the major

incentives that motivate party violence. In Sokoto State, for instance, the patrons are very

keen to hold on to state power, which is the easiest and fastest means of enrichment and

self-aggrandizement. The mobilization of the youth and the sponsorship of violent relations

make the political environment favorable to their extended political goals. For the patrons,

violence is needed to seek power, retain power, or even leave power. In seeking for power a

great deal of resources needed to be deployed and invested in the youth to unleash violence

and terror on real, perceived and/or imaginary political opponents40.

5. Conclusion: Reflections on Major Findings

This study on party violence in Nigeria, with particular reference to Sokoto State in the North-

west Nigeria, documented the incidences, manifestations, actors in violence framing

discourse, the platforms for violent mobilization by and on behalf of the parties and the

incentives and consequences of party violence in the state from 2007 and 2013. What came

out is that violence involving political parties in the state is both spontaneous and organized.

The spontaneous nature of party violence revolves around competition within and between

parties for spaces to advertise parties and candidates. Patrons appear to be the leading

agents promoting the culture of violence in the state. Because of their self -centered

interests, which are often manipulated and presented as party interests, youth groups are

mobilized and financially induced to engage in various forms of violence against their rivals.

This trend is best captured by the neopatrimonial nature of politics in Africa of which Nigeria

is no exception. The poverty condition of the youth, who are mostly illiterates, deprived and

40 Interview with an expert between the ages of 35 to 50


displaced are strongly motivated by the material rewards offered by patrons, party leaders

and candidates to display and defend party symbols at all costs.

It is also gathered that religious and traditional institutions are platforms for violent

mobilization around parties. Given the strong attachment of the people with these institutions,

particularly in Sokoto State, which is an ancient Islamic city, the framing of violence

discourse influences the behavior of people into being engaged in violence or legitimizing

various forms of party violence. The youth gangs involved in various forms of party violence

from 2007 through 2013 are mostly influenced by the position of the traditional and religious

institutions regarding the parties competing for power in the state. This is related to the

sectarian divide in the state, in which Sunnis are the majority and Shi’as the minority.

The study shows that a number of actors are beneficiaries of party violence in the state.

The patrons sponsor violence for favorable electoral outcomes, which are often using to

perpetuate patronage networks within government circle. The youth receive allowances from

party leaders, patrons and candidates to some extent relieve them temporarily of their

economic hardship. They also have opportunities to rise through the ranks and some

instances incorporated into the ruling class. If this happens, and it does happen with some

few youth leaders, this becomes an incentive for the youth to be active in party violence with

the view to clinching such milestone.

It is thus clear from the findings of this study that political parties are not only drivers and

instruments of violent conflicts in Sokoto State; parties are also used as platforms for violent

activities in the state. Thus lack of political ethics within parties makes them susceptible to

violence. Codes of Conduct for parties are not adhered to, where they exist, which makes

conflicts within and between parties fierce and violent. Because of lack of ethics in parties, it

is very difficult for parties to stay clear off communal conflicts or at best help in the resolution

of such conflicts. Parties rather identify with such conflicts for political payoffs. It is therefore

essential to evolve strategies for institutionalizing political ethics within parties as a panacea

to parties’ active involvement in violent conflicts in Sokoto State.


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