paperN

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29

RE L I E F A N D RE H A B I L I T A T I O N N E T W O R KMarch 1999

by Koos Neefjes

Participatory Review inChronic Instability:The Experience of theIkafe Refugee SettlementProgramme, Uganda

RRN

Abstract

This paper presents the participatory review of theIkafe settlement programme in northwest Uganda.Set up in 1994, the Ikafe project allocated land toSudanese refugees so that they could become self-sufficient in food supply, attempt to reach self-management and representation, as well as somemeasure of integration with the host population.Those involved in the project included theUgandan authorities, multilateral aid agencies andinternational NGOs.

Leaders of the host population, refugees, andagencies Oxfam, Action Africa in Need and JesuitRefugee Service, all participated in the review.Attempts were undertaken to reach a deeperunderstanding of the conflicting interests, and toformulate ways forward. The review set out to use

methodologies previously employed incomparatively stable situations, but wasinterrupted by violence. Inspite of this it continuedto engage with all stakeholders, adapted to thechanging context, and effectively developed ideasfor participatory review in situations of instabilityby ‘doing’.

The conclusions were unfortunately overtaken byfurther violence and evacuation of staff from theproject site. Most refugees also moved away andthe bigger settlement of the project is now closed.However, the methodology of the review has manypositive lessons in terms of encouragingcooperation, increased transparency of interveningagencies and, above all, lessons for improving theplight of refugees and poor host populations.

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○ PART

ICIP

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he I

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Ref

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Please send comments on this paper to:Relief and Rehabilitation NetworkOverseas Development InstitutePortland HouseStag PlaceLondon, SW1E 5DPUnited Kingdom

Tel: (+44) 171 393 1631/1674Fax: (+44) 171 393 1699

Email: rrn@odi.org.ukWebsite: www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/

A copy of your comments will be sent to the authorComments received may be used in future RRN Newsletters

ISBN: 0-85003-407-8

Price per copy: £5.00 (excluding postage and packing)

© Overseas Development Institute, London, 1999

Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing that the source is acknowledged.Requests for the commercial reproduction of RRN material should be directed to the ODI as copyrightholders. The Network Coordinator would appreciate receiving details of the use of any of this material intraining, research or programme design, implementation or evaluation.

The main source of this paper is the report of the Ikafe review: Neefjes & David (1996)

Notes on the AuthorKoos Neefjes has been Oxfam (GB)�s policyadvisor on environment and development forseven years, and was one of the lead reviewersof the Ikafe refugee programme in northeastUganda. Previous to Oxfam he worked in GuineaBissau and Bangladesh, did teaching and appliedresearch in the Netherlands, and worked as aninternational consultant. In his work Koosaddresses questions of poverty, food security,environmental resource management, andparticipation through, for example, training andprogramme review.

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○PARTIC

IPATORY REV

IEW: The Ikafe Refugee Settlem

ent

Contents1. Introduction 1

Helping Refugees 1Review Objectives 1

2. The Ikafe Project and its Context 3An Area of Insecurity 3Refugee Movements In and Out of Ikafe 4The Ikafe Project and Structures of Governance 4Stakeholders in Ikafe and in its Review 5

3. Outcomes of the Review 8Stakeholders’ Perspectives on Project Impact 8Land, Agriculture and Trees 9Food for Refugees 10Lack of Livelihoods Diversity 11Insecurity 12Communication, Integration, Representation 12

4. Review Methodology 15The Review Process 15Methodological Principles of the Review 19

5. Lessons from Ikafe 21

Lessons Concerning the Management of a Large Review Team 21Lessons Concerning the Management of a Review Process in a Conflict Situation 22Lessons Concerning the Particpatory Approach of the Review 23Lessons Concerning the Review’s Objectives 23Lessons Concerning Ikafe’s Key Project Strategies 24

6. Final Thoughts 25

Appendix 26Endnotes 28Glossary of Terms 29Abbreviations 29References 30Acknowledgements 31

Index of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: The Ikafe Refugee Settlement 4Figure 2: Governing Structures 6Figure 3: Venn Diagram of Relationships According to Oxfam Managers 7Figure 4: Impact of Refugee Arrival, Local Ugandan Perspective 13Figure 5: Impact of Move to Ikafe, Refugee Perspective 14Figure 6: The Ikafe Review Process 16

Table 1: Well-being Ranking of Refugees 11Table 2: The Actual Review Programme 17Table 3: Objectives and Participation of Main Stakeholders 18

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PART

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Uganda

Arua

Gulu

Masindi

Moroto

JinjaKampala

Entebbe

Masaka

MbararaLake Victoria

Lake Kyoga

Lake Kwania

Lake Albert

Lake George

Lake Edward

Lake Bisina

ARUA MOYO KITGUM KOTIDO

NEBBIGULU

APAC LIRAMOROTO

MASINDISOROTI

LUWEROHOIMA &

KIBALE

MUBENDE

& KIBOGAKABAROLE

& KIBALE

BUNDI-BEGYO

KABALE &KISORO

RUKUNGIRI

BUSHENYI

MBARARA

RAKAI

MASAKA

MPIGI

MUKONO

JINJAIGANGA

KAMULI TORORO

& PALLISA

KUMI KAPCHORWA

Sese

D. R. CONGO

RWANDA

SUDAN

KENYA

TANZANIA

KASESE

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○PARTIC

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IEW: The Ikafe Refugee Settlem

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1

Introduction

Helping Refugees

The plight of the south Sudanese refugees innorthwest Uganda was and is precarious, inparticular because they have suffered

violence and poverty both sides of the border. InSudan, a war between separatist forces in the southand the government forces which control the restof the country has raged for many years. The hostpopulations of Aringa and Terego counties in Aruadistrict, northwest Uganda, have also been victimsof violence over the past decades. Many weredisplaced to Sudan earlier, as a result of civil war,and they still suffer the consequences of politicalinstability in Sudan and parts of their own country.But refugees and host populations are not onlyvictims. Some play a role in the complex politicsthat fuel much of the violence; others are falselyaccused of being involved.

Violence makes it almost impossible to achieveindividual livelihood improvements and regionaleconomic development. However, in 1994 whenthe violence in Uganda seemed to be decreasing(though the situation in the refugee camps near theborder town of Koboko was still far from ideal,especially in terms of security and public health)international agencies and Ugandan authorities

agreed to provide refugees with land so that theycould provide food for themselves and become lessdependent on (international) food deliveries. Oxfamwas the lead agency in this large-scale project, andit set up a participatory review that ran from Aprilto October 1996, about one-and-a-half years afterthe refugees started arriving.

The project, called Ikafe after the larger part of thesettlement area that falls in Aringa county, was alsodesigned to communicate with and support the localhost population. Some local people actually livedin the refugee area or claimed part of the land thatwas set aside for the refugees. It was this that ledOxfam to realise the importance of making thereview as participatory as possible.

Review Objectives

Reviews and evaluations of emergency responsesare not often participatory, even if participatory isinterpreted merely as ‘consultative’. They arenormally done quickly and are led by (external)experts in logistics, nutrition, water supply or othersectoral concerns and not by experts in facilitation,consultation and social development. This may beexplained by the nature of aid efforts: short-term,logistics-oriented, dominated by external and

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PART

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tforeign agencies, and usually totally over-stretched.They are usually achievement or output-oriented,and sometimes involve generally agreed primaryimpacts like ‘lives saved’.1

While the Ikafe project had immediate objectivesrelating to the settlement and survival of refugeesit also had longer term, developmental aims: foodand economic self-sufficiency, ‘representation’ ofrefugees, and a level of integration of refugees withthe host population.2 The review intended to assessthe work and its impact, so had to relate to theseobjectives but also look beyond them. ‘Impact’ isdifferent from ‘achievements’ in the sense that itassesses the more structural and fundamentalchanges in lives and livelihoods3 that can beattributed to a project or set of activities. Impactscan be positive or negative, expected or unexpected,and are normally dependent on the specific contextand the actors and activities involved. The Ifakereview was also to be done with the project team,refugees and host population. Working ‘with’implies the involvement of stakeholders in a processof learning.4 It could not be a conventional reviewor evaluation ‘against set objectives’ because thatwould have been contradictory to the idea ofparticipation of stakeholders in impact assessment.

The Ikafe project’s review consisted of two mainstages: April 1996 saw a three week data collectionand meeting exercise; the second, shorter stage, ranfrom August when conclusions were discussed ina large joint meeting with most of the stakeholders.The final report was published in October 1996.

The review had four objectives as formulated bythe Oxfam managers of the settlement and otherOxfam staff in Kampala and Oxford:

1. To support the project team, representativerefugees and members of local communities toreview the work and impact of the project overthe last year and think about the future directionof the project.

2. To help the project team develop systems andcommunity indicators for the monitoring of theimpact of Oxfam’s work on the communities.

3. To facilitate the development of long-termobjectives and plans involving a broad range ofstakeholders.

4. To recommend to Oxfam improvements onprogramme management.

These objectives reflected the idea of impact,participation, the developmental approach, and thelong-term outlook of the project and its review.

The review process was premised on a relativelystable political situation in Uganda which wasconducive to participatory research and aprogressive attitude to refugees (they were givenland to cultivate!). However, the political situationdeteriorated and became very unstable during thereview period and thereafter which meant that thereview process and its recommendations had torespond to a rapidly deteriorating situation.Violence and confusion thus affected themethodology of the review, which is essentially themain topic of this paper.

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○PARTIC

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An Area of Insecurity

The Ikafe project was developed in order tosupport approximately 55,000 Sudaneserefugees relocated from transit camps in

Koboko town at the Uganda/Sudan border frommid-1994 onwards, following security problems.The settlement area is large (more than 50,000hectares (ha) or more than 120,000 acres) andcovers the area called Ikafe in Aringa county andImvepi in Terego county – the latter being smallerthan the former. It is further away from the Sudan(and DRC) border than Koboko, though stillrelatively close albeit less accessible. LocalUgandans occupied small parts of the refugeesettlement area at the start of the project, and theyand others from the district used the area as ahunting ground. The land is rocky and large partsare not suitable for agriculture; most of the landwas covered with bush and was infested with tsetsefly and poisonous scorpions and snakes.

South Sudanese had been fleeing to Arua districtin Uganda since 1993 because of the fightingbetween the government of Sudan (GoS) andfactions of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army(SPLA), the rebel forces. The SPLA allegedlyinfiltrated the refugee camps in Uganda and the GoS

The Ikafe Project andits Context

2

went as far as bombing Koboko – for example, inearly 1996 when the review was about to start. Thegovernment of Uganda (GoU) has often beenaccused of supporting the SPLA and in turn hasaccused the GoS of supporting Ugandan rebels withbases in southern Sudan. The GoU was keen toavoid further deterioration of relations with the GoSand stopped fuelling rumours that it supported theSPLA. It was this situation that led to the pressureon the GoU and international agencies such asUNHCR to establish the Ikafe and Imvepi settlements(referred to as ‘Ikafe’ in the rest of this paper).

The north and west of Uganda are plagued by anumber of Ugandan rebel forces, one of which isthe West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). At the time ofthe review WNBF had bases in south Sudan andZaire (now the DRC). They were, and are, allegedlysupported by the GoS, the former regime of Zaireand other political groupings in the DRC. They aresaid to have many supporters in Arua district, andmore specifically in Aringa county. People in thispart of Uganda suffered from the fighting andinsecurity before and immediately after the fall ofIdi Amin in 1979 and many stayed in south Sudanuntil the early 1980s. There is resentment amongsome of these former refugees regarding theirtreatment in Sudan during their exile, and it is

4

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PART

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tFigure 1: The Ikafe Refugee Settlement

alleged that much of the population has remainedloyal to Amin and his sympathisers, including therebel WNBF.

The activity of the WNBF increased in early 1996in the run up to national elections in Uganda andthere were reports from refugee camps in Ugandathat the WNBF was attacking members of theDinka, a nomadic people in south Sudan who areseen to support the SPLA. On 18 April 1996, duringthe first stage of the review, Oxfam staff andvehicles were targeted and held at gun point byWNBF rebels who forced them to help with armstransports. Ugandan soldiers were subsequentlymoved in for protection, but in September 1996 agroup of them who were accompanied on aninvestigation by a key informant to the review (thecamp commandant, an official of the ministry oflocal government, MoLG) were killed in an ambushbefore the review report was finalised.5

Refugees Movements In and Out ofIkafe

The Ikafe project is now closed following the returnto Sudan of many refugees. However, the Imvepisettlement still exists as a project for a smallernumber of refugees and carries with it some of theideals and learning from the larger Ikafe project.

From the beginning of the review in April 1996 thestaff of international agencies and also localofficials had to evacuate the project a number oftimes, and refugees have continually moved backand forth following threats, actual attacks, rapes,and other violence. The review was initiated in theperiod when violence was on the increase. Preciselybecause the future cannot be known and becausethe situation was so volatile, there are importantmethodological lessons for a participatory reviewapproach in complex emergencies.

The Ikafe Project and Structures ofGovernance

UNHCR and local authorities started the transferof refugees from Koboko to Ikafe in the summer of1994 before the tri-partite agreement with Oxfamas the third party and ‘main implementing agency’was signed. From late 1994 Oxfam took on taskssuch as infrastructure development (roads andbuildings), refugee registration and fooddistribution, part of the healthcare provision (inImvepi), land allocation, food and waterdistribution, aspects of community development,distribution of agricultural inputs and a forestryprogramme, and income generation. To ensure thesmooth running of the project Oxfam set up astructure of sectors into which the aforementioned

Lodonga

Kuru

YumbeKoboko

Nyadri

KeriOraba

Arua

Maracha

Wandi

Lomonga

Kulikulinga

Okpotani

Arua

Kampala

UGANDA

SUDAN

DRCONGO

KENYA

IkafeSettlement

ImvepiSettlement

NorthernExtensionSettlement

KOBO

NKO

COU

NTY

MARA

CHA CO

UNTY

TEREGO COUNTY

ARINGA COUNTY

ARI

NG

A C

OU

NTY

(ARU

A)

OBO

NG

I CO

UN

TY (M

OYO

)

Source: L Payne (1998) p8. See references.

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○PARTIC

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IEW: The Ikafe Refugee Settlem

entfunctions were divided, with a central managementteam and accounting/administrative unit.6 Twoother international NGOs were also active in Ikafe:JRS (Jesuit Refugee Service) in the educationsector, and AAIN (Action Africa in Need)7 in thehealth sector in the main Ikafe settlement.

Oxfam’s response to the refugees’ move to Ikafewas unique because it attempted to follow adevelopmental approach in an emergency situation:it settled refugees in small dispersed groups andallocated agricultural land to them to enable themto develop a level of food self-sufficiency. The landallocation was temporary. Based on discussionsbetween Ugandan authorities and UNHCR theprocess of land registration was managed by adepartment of the MoLG with nationalresponsibility for refugees (a process called‘gazetting’).8 Discussions about land use were heldwith local authorities and traditional leaders whowould formally loose their control of the landthrough gazetting.

The project was also unique within Oxfam as theagency rarely takes on so many diverse tasks inrelief operations. Generally it focuses on water,sanitation and health, and is sometimes involvedin the distribution of food and non-food items. Asmentioned earlier, only two other NGOs operatedin Ikafe in education and health respectively. Theremainder of the project was implemented byOxfam and the different project sectors wereexpected to be well managed and mutallysupportive as a result.

Refugees were settled in small units known as‘blocks’: groups of about 24 households. Three tofour blocks made up a ‘village’, and on averagefive villages made up a ‘point’. The Ikafe/Imvepisettlement was made up of five zones, eachcomprising an average of nine points. The refugeeswere allocated small plots of land for housing andagriculture, the size of which depended ondiscussions between Oxfam, UNHCR and Ugandanauthorities, and on soil quality and pressures toallocate land. Total size allocated to refugees rangedfrom a minimum of 0.2ha per family (in most caseslater increased to 0.4ha/family) to a maximum of0.33ha per capita9 which was thought to providethe means for minimal survival.

Oxfam made a major effort to establish refugeerepresentation to the project managers and to thelocal political and administrative structures.

However, the refugees could not vote or take partin the local political structures of Uganda, knownas local councils (LCs). This structure starts withelections at the sub-parish level (LC1) andprogresses to involve elections to nominate citizensto represent the population at the county level inLC4 and at district level in LC5. The refugee projectdeveloped representative refugee bodies which ranparallel to the lower levels of the LC structure, asexpressed in Figure 2.10 However, this had no legalstatus and was only based on discussion withrefugee leaders. The refugees did not really relateto the LC structure, however, and there were reportsof Ugandan and Sudanese elders working togetherto resolve local disputes independently. Theseelders are often closely related to representativeson the elected bodies. They have formal meetingsand a hierarchy, and form a separate and‘traditional’ system of governance.

The solid arrows in Figure 2 suggest the formallinks and lines of authority and representation; thedotted lines show some of the relations andhierarchy of Ugandan administrative structures withrespect to the presence of the refugees. The figuresuggests that confusion about responsibilities andreporting lines are all too possible. Differentdepartments of the MoLG are responsible for localadministration and for responses to the refugees,while both must somehow relate to the elected(political) structure of local councils (from thelowest LC1 level to the district LC5 level). Thenational political structure is not shown in thediagram although it obviously wields considerableinfluence over the MoLG. Neither is the military,which operates in the area in response to rebelactivity and threats from Sudan.

Stakeholders in Ikafe and its Review

At the outset of the review important decisions hadto be made with regard to who to involve, and inwhat way. The review was prepared by the Oxfamproject management team facilitated primarily bytwo Oxfam staff from the head office in Oxford,UK. A research team was formed to facilitateinterviews and meetings. This was made up ofrepresentatives of the main stakeholders, namelythe refugees, local host population and Oxfam (andother NGO) staff. The members of the team werenot mandated by the stakeholder groups to formallyrepresent the positions of those stakeholders,however they took part in much of the analysis andwere seen as able to informally voice the concerns

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of those they represented. The research team had atotal of 17 members, seven of whom were men and10 women; six were refugees, two were membersof local political structures (LCs), and the others wereNGO staff, partly from Aringa and Terego counties.

Early in the review the team formulated its own(diverse) perspectives on stakeholders’ ideas,influence and relationships, for example asexpressed by the team members called ‘Oxfammanagers’ in Figure 3. The diagram represents the

Ministry of LocalGovernment

Chief Admin.Officer (CAO)

Resident DistrictCommissioner

CampCommandant

UNHCR &Oxfam

Local AdministrativeSystem (appointed)

4+1 zones

5�10 points

some villages

3�5 blocks of 24households

Figure 2: Governing Structures

Notes:There are many more �dotted-line� contacts inpractice, for example between the administrativeand elected bodies.

LC1�LC5 and the refugee�s structure (blocks,villages, points and zones) are elected. �Boxed�positions are appointed.

PermanentSecretary and

Dep. Director forRefugees

CurrentRefugeeCouncil

District (Arua)(LC5)

Aringa County (LC4)

Terego

Zone (LC3)(sub-county)

Parish (LC2)

Sub-parish (LC1)

Refugees�representative

system (elected)

Localrepresentative

system (elected)

ELDERS

Assistant CAO forrefugees (ACAO)

various stakeholders from the perspective of Oxfammanagers who saw Oxfam as comparativelyimportant in the lives of the people affected by, ordependent on, the success or failure of the project.

The selection of the review team members wasbased on a number of criteria, including gender,fluency in English, and experience withparticipatory assessments and research. There ismore on the methodology of the review in Sections4 and 5.

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○PARTIC

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Figure 3: Venn Diagram of Relationships According to Oxfam Managers (as on 11.4.96)

UNHCRDonors

WFP

Oxfam

Ministry ofLocal

Government

District

Authorities

AAIN

JRS

LC�s &Chiefs

RefugeeCouncil

ZoneCommittees Point

CommitteesRefugeeElders

Contractors(e.g. Care,Drillcon)

Note: The diameter of the circles indicates relative(perceived) influence or importance; the overlapindicates (perceived) intensity of the relationship.

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Stakeholders’ Perspectives on ProjectImpact

The different interest groups had differentaims, though there were also some commoninterests. UNHCR and the World Food

Programme (WFP) were clear that their mandatewas to support the refugees in line withinternational standards and within resourceconstraints, while local Ugandan officials wereinterested in supporting refugees and benefitingfrom the infrastructure and services themselves.The refugees wanted to shelter from the violencein their home country, educate their children andbuild up assets to take home. Oxfam wished tosupport the refugees, work towards equalopportunities in the livelihoods of men and women,and also be fair to (vulnerable) local people. TheGoU’s prime concern was security for its ownpopulation and the refugees, and it also wished tosupport local economic development. While theseaims were not in themselves necessarilycontradictory, in practice they led to controversyand strong disagreement. This was fuelled by whatcould be called ‘context’ : the complex politicalprocesses that caused people to flee their country,in the middle of which several agencies were tryingto reduce human suffering.

Outcomes of the Review

3

Different stakeholder groups thus developeddifferent ideas about what was being achieved, whatthe main problems were, and who caused them.

Agencies’ Achievements and Perspectiveon ImpactOxfam, and also the smaller agencies of AAIN andJRS, achieved a lot. The agencies developedinfrastructure according to plans, set up food andwater delivery, as well as health and educationalservices which benefited all refugees and many ofthe local people who lived within the Ikafesettlement. Oxfam was also involved in forestry andcommunity development and distributed seeds andtools to most refugees, assisted in cultivation andallocated land to all.

Staff and managers acknowledged that theprogramme had difficulties in achieving the short-term aims of service delivery due to resourceproblems (in most sectors), and that the lack ofagricultural land and security problems preventedthem from achieving the longer term aim of self-reliance for all refugees. They also acknowledgedthat communication with the local populationshould have been better. But, according to theagencies, the impact of the project was positiveand included:

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○PARTIC

IPATORY REV

IEW: The Ikafe Refugee Settlem

ent• a strong boost for the local economy (due to the

influx of money and availability of cheaplabour);

• improved services for the refugees and manylocals;

• improved health and nutritional status of therefugees;

• the allocation of land to many refugees (womenand men alike);

• a certain degree of food security for somerefugees who managed to harvest a small crop.

Oxfam also felt that it invested a lot in developinga representative system of/for refugees, and that itmade many attempts to communicate with allparties involved. Communication blocks betweenother stakeholders actually caused difficulties forOxfam. For instance, there was a lack ofcommunication between Ugandan authorities andUNHCR, and the local population and refugees.

Impact According to the Local UgandanPopulationThe leaders of the local population in Aringa andTerego counties were, on the whole, negative aboutthe refugees and the response of the agencies. Theyclaimed to have invited the refugees and to haveoffered their land, but they expected more in return.They acknowledged that the local economy wassupported by some funds and activity, butcomplained that not enough local people wereemployed and not enough contracts were given tolocal contractors. They agreed that infrastructureimprovements benefited some locals, but wouldhave liked more infrastructure development in themain town of Yumbe instead of in the centre of therefugee settlement. They also complained about alack of consultation on the allocation of land torefugees, and violations of some sacred sites. Localwomen voiced concern regarding their daughterswho became involved with staff (some of whomwere from outside the district), and regarding thegeneral security situation (see Figure 4).

Impact According to Sudanese RefugeesIn 1994 refugee leaders had been consulted aboutthe move to Ikafe from the transit camps of Koboko,and some said that the situation had since improved.For example, infant mortality improved considerably.However, there was also dissatisfaction among manyrefugees, for example concerning the fact that waterand food provision was irregular, land was often ofbad quality, seeds and tools were delivered late (in1995), alternative livelihood opportunities wereextremely limited, and markets were far away. They

wanted a better representative system and improvedcommunication with agencies and the localpopulation.

Refugee women are often heads of households. Inthis case their particular concerns centred aroundfood and water provision (which were indeedirregular), issues related to (domestic) violence, andalso problems with the increased informalrelationships and pregnancies outside marriage:gender roles in households and communities werechanging as a result of living in a refugee settlement(see Figure 5).

The Position of Other StakeholdersThe national and district authorities wereparticularly interested in political stability and itwas their responsibility to provide security. TheWFP has stressed that food supplies were irregular,partly because of shortages ‘in the pipeline’ andpartly because of insecurity on the roads fromKampala. They also explained that supplies wereunlikely to improve due to donor fatigue in theinternational community. UNHCR representativesexplained that they were committed to achievingfood self-sufficiency through settlement, but thatthis aim had to be considered in the light of thesecurity situation and the dissatisfaction of the localpopulation. First and foremost their obligationswere to the refugees; once refugees returned toSudan the infrastructure would remain under thecontrol of the GoU (the MoLG, not the localleaders) as a contingency for the possible settlementof other refugees.

Land, Agriculture and Trees

The review found that without resolving issues ofaccess, ownership and control of land, as well asthe quantity and quality of land to be allocated tothe refugees, only some refugees would ever be ableto be food self-sufficient; also, local conflicts wouldonly be fuelled further.

The legal status of the land in the Ikafe project wasvery complex. The permanent secretary of theMoLG gazetted the demarcated area known asIkafe; once gazetted, the MoLG became the legalowners of the land until the land was de-gazetted.It is normal practice to gazette land in Uganda whena refugee settlement is created; at the same timethe Ugandan constitution recognises the traditional/collective land rights of those living in the area,and indeed local elders see themselves as therightful owners of the land. However, the

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tinternational community paid for the infrastructuredevelopment within the refugee settlement andwanted it to be retained for the use of the site evenif the refugees were to leave; officials of the MoLGArua district were of the same opinion.

The issue of land was one of the most importantsources of discontent for the host population.Leaders wanted infrastructure in the main town ofYumbe in Aringa county in return for offering landto refugees. They also wanted high level jobs forlocals in the Oxfam programme, but the nationalauthorities and international agencies were unableto respond to such demands. Legally, and as perthe tri-partite agreement between the GoU, UNHCRand Oxfam, infrastructure development had to takeplace in the gazetted area, that is, the actual refugeesettlement. Localised conflicts occurred wherenationals wanted to keep the land for cattle grazingwhere refugees were settled.

While UNHCR negotiated with the centralauthorities, Oxfam negotiated with the localresidents (elders). It was Oxfam which actuallydemarcated the land for the Sudanese refugees asper the guidelines of the Ugandan authorities andUNHCR. Oxfam disputed these guidelines onseveral grounds, mainly because it believed that theland for the refugees should be sufficient fordeveloping a livelihood and not just sufficient formere survival: there was clearly disagreement aboutthe project’s objective of self-sufficiency and whatthat entailed. Certainly no recent or detailedtopographical maps or aerial photographs were usedduring negotiation and demarcation.

The refugees were transferred from Koboko to Ikafebeginning in 1994. They were allocated agriculturalplots of varying size. This process was dependenton the changing policies of land allocation, aninability to deal with the high numbers of refugeesarriving at a particular time, and (local) landavailability.

Because a detailed soil and vegetation map of Ikafedid not exist Oxfam commissioned a soil survey,collaborated on a forestry (bio-mass) inventory,carried out a crude land use inventory, and madesome crop yield measurements. This was done toensure that the plots allocated would be sufficient.As mentioned earlier, Ikafe consists of large outcropsof rock and gravel, and soils are predominantlysandy with a low water holding capacity and lowfertility. The crop productivity of some localfarmers showed very low yields, and the review

found that some of the local people reserved thebest quality land for themselves. Local people usedthe land for a few years before shifting to new fieldsin order to cope with lowering soil fertility levels.

The review found that the available land was notsufficient in terms of food production and wouldnot support the large numbers of refugees.Furthermore, a substantial number of familieslacked skills, labour or the required health tocultivate land and achieve results similar to the localpopulation. The host population was also agrievedbecause its hunting ground was reduced and therewere reports of sacred sites being violated. Theproject made attempts to re-forest by setting up atree nursery that gave free seedlings, though inpractice mostly to the host population. This wasmeant to prevent environmental degradationassociated with the sudden increase of population,and in the medium and long term provide fuelwood.

Food for Refugees

Food was a major problem in Ikafe. Due to the lackof commitment on the part of international donors,general shortages in WFP, and insecurity thataffected food transport, food supplies from WFPwere erratic. As a result Oxfam was unable todeliver food in sufficient quantity and at regularintervals. With renewed insecurity in the regionfood was clearly an important issue. The problemof erratic food supply was exacerbated by the factthat the refugees were not told when the next rationswould arrive. Indeed Oxfam staff did not know.Delays frequently occurred, and WFP policy is notto give retrospective rations. People were bothhungry and angry. Donors such as the EU began toask why the Sudanese refugees had not achieved agreater degree of self-reliance. They were not well-informed about the causes and their lack of trust,along with other donors, was fuelled by inflatedregistration figures in the refugee camps.

The review concluded that the food shortagesactually undermined attempts at self-reliance, themain project goal. Refugees complained ofweakness, loss of energy for cultivation, and ofhaving to eat their own seeds in order to survive.Instead of cultivating their own plots, manyrefugees were forced to sell their labour to nationalsin order to earn food for themselves and theirfamilies. Others sold tools, plastic sheets and othernon-food items in order to buy food. The negativeimpact of hunger caused families to fragment asboth men and women left to seek paid employment.

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○PARTIC

IPATORY REV

IEW: The Ikafe Refugee Settlem

entLack of Livelihoods Diversity

The review team concluded that there was a lackof alternative income generating activities andpossibilities for refugees. The international andlocal response to the Sudanese refugees did notencourage refugees to develop their own form oflivelihoods, although petty trade and other activitieswere taken up even by some of the poorest refugees.The project plan assumed that all refugees werecapable agriculturists and, if given enough land,would be able to achieve self-reliance. Whileapproximately 80 per cent of refugees wereprobably former agriculturists, this left 20 per cent(some 10,000 refugees) who were not. The lowquality of land in Ikafe made it unlikely the refugeeswould manage to become self-reliant, and well-being ranking in refugee villages also showed thatthere was a whole strata of people who would beunable to farm for other reasons, such as bad health.

Table 1 synthesises well-being information collectedduring the review. Well-being is largely related toskills that refugees had prior to coming to Ugandaand their physical strength as labourers/farmers.

Research during and after the first stage of thereview suggested that a significant proportion ofrefugees had formerly been traders and/or had askill they could exploit to support their families.However, many were unable to use their skillsbecause of tools and materials shortages, insecurity,distance to markets, and problems with formalpermission to move and trade in Uganda. An Oxfamconsultant to Ikafe argued for greater efforts tolobby the national government and internationalcommunity for freer movement and the opening upof other livelihood possibilities, but this seemed toask too much from what was, after all, anoperational relief project.11 However, somealternatives were allowed: refugees were able to

High Well-being

• employed by aninternational agencyin Ikafe/Imvepi

• enough capital to runa small trade (hotel,restaurant etc) in Ikafe/Imvepi

Average Well-being

• enough labour in thefamily to farm donatedland

• small amount ofcapital to trade (sellbeer, fish, tea) in therefugee settlement

• those who have atechnical skill (forexample, a mechanic,bicycle repairer,carpenter, teacher)and can earn moneyfrom this activity

• those who own somelivestock, for example,goats, a cow, somechickens

·• those who are strong(can construct theirown house, latrineand shower shelter)and can sell theirlabour to nationals

Low Well-being

• those with no capitalto engage in any pettytrading activities

• those families who areshort of labour (due toill health, disability,death)

• those who have beentransferred to areaswhere land is infertile(rocky or waterlogged)

Very Low Well-being

• those who have soldall their assets

• those who consumedown seeds and sold allnon-food items inorder to buy food

• those who arephysically disabledand cannot sell theirlabour

• those families whodon�t have laboureven to farm the landthey have been given(unaccompaniedorphans, weakwidows, disabled etc.)

Note: This table is based on well-being ranking in four refugee communities with a range of informants, the majoritywomen. After the first stage of the review community research in May/June 1996 confirmed and refined these findings.

Table 1: Well-being Ranking of Refugees

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ttravel temporarily outside gazetted areas, and undercertain circumstances were able to initiatebusinesses. The review recommended that in orderto promote actively the diversification oflivelihoods, regulations should be revisited andOxfam would lobby the GoU to allow refugees todo more.

Insecurity

The main reason behind the GoU’s decision to moverefugees from Koboko to Ikafe was increasedsecurity. However, growing insecurity in Ikafe/Imvepi destabilised the settlement and made itdifficult to achieve project objectives (as becameclear during the review); later it was virtuallyimpossible. At the time of the review threats ofviolence and general insecurity were increasing atdifferent levels:

• Ugandan rebels, reputedly supported by theKhartoum government, increased their activityin the region in an attempt to destabilise it bothbefore and after the May/June 1996 elections.Camp staff had to be evacuated several timesand the refugees left their settlements. Undersuch circumstances Oxfam staff were unable todeliver regular food/water to refugees, let alonework towards wider and longer term goals.

• The relationship between the project and somelocal representatives of the Aringa communityalso threatened security. For example, verbal andwritten death threats were made against NGOstaff in April 1996 at the time of the review.The stated causes of dissatisfaction included thelack of infrastructure development in Yumbetown, the low numbers of Aringa staff in seniorpositions in the project, the behaviour of certainNGO staff, and the violation of ceremonial areasby refugees.

• Gun robberies and looting, carried out by bothnationals and alleged SPLA deserters, affectedboth communities.

• Inter-household and community violence amongSudanese refugees was increased in situationsof shortage.

Communication, Integration,Representation

International agencies and the national authoritieswere not clear in their communication to bothrefugees and nationals (that is, local councilrepresentatives, elders, etc) about their objectives.This created confusion, thwarted expectations andled to (threats of) aggression. Local people,including leaders, knew very little about the tri-partite agreement between Oxfam, UNHCR and theGoU. Such important information should have beentransmitted through the LCs and administrativechannels down to the county levels and below. Thatthis did not happen in a satisfactory way was partlybecause of local politics. Communication at otherlevels was also a problem. Technical staff (fooddistributors, land surveyors etc) had not beentrained to communicate with and listen to refugees/nationals, even though they were the interfacebetween Oxfam and the refugee and nationalcommunities. There were also claims of abusiveand racist staff.

Oxfam set up a refugee representative system tofacilitate refugees’ participation in decision-makingat programme level, the management ofinfrastructure, and the integration of refugees intoUgandan society (see Figure 2). Oxfam encouragedrefugee councils at all levels to elect women, albeitwithout a quota system. The councils all have aminimum of one woman member, though severalhave more. Some women members of the umbrellaRefugee Council expressed concern about the voiceof women, but they also acknowledged that therewere more female representatives in the Sudanbefore they became refugees. In general, however,the refugees complained that the system of refugeecouncils was of little use in practice, and describedit as little more than window dressing.

The refugee council system was set up to mirrorthe local council structure and encouragecommunity integration. But the structure was notofficially recognised by the Ugandan governmentand, as aliens, refugee council members did nothave the right to vote in local council meetings.The umbrella Refugee Council was only recognisedas a welfare structure for the refugees. Jointmanagement of infrastructure between refugees andthe local host population had been a goal but hadnot taken off.

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○PARTIC

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IEW: The Ikafe Refugee Settlem

entFigure 4: Impact of Refugee Arrival, Local Ugandan Perspective

INSECURITY

LAND USE

SOCIO-ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION

Oxfam AAINJRS 10

98 casuallabourers

195 contractedstaff

146 non-contracted staff

3 international 192 national

51 others(26.2%)

141 Arua(72.3%)

73 others(52%)

49 Aringa(35%)

19 Terego(19%)

22 nationals(mostly Aringa)

(15%)

124 refugees(85%)

96 nationals(mostly Aringa)

2 others

8 Aringa 2 Arua Dis 34 Ugandan4 Sudanese

EMPLOYMENT

LOCALS�PERSPECTIVE

OF IMPACT OFARRIVAL OFREFUGEES IN

IKAFE

BETTER LOCALECONOMY

materials

localcontractors

roadmaintenance

increasedtax revenue

increasedmarketrevenue

tax fromNGO staff

taxation ofrefugees?

moremoney in

circulation

improvedconsumer

market

trade

BETTER SOCIALSERVICES AND

IMPROVEDINFRASTRUCTURE

1 refugeeschool

2 nationalschools

education

2 north

2 central

2 south

79 boreholes

9 shallowwells

175 kmmanual

56 kmmachine

roads

6 grindingmills

health

AAIN

3 dispensariesupgraded to h/c

1 refugee h/c

Oxfam

2 hospital tents,2 waiting rooms

in Imvepi

inter-marriages

cheap labouravailability

violation ofcultural sites

decline inmoral standards

high productivityfor nationals

high incomefrom food

culturaldisintegration

unmarriedmothers

cohabiting

protection?reafforestation

started

environmentaleducation

soils?

bush burning

decreasingfertility

forest

tree cutting

lessreforestation

agriculture insettlements

more cropprotection

less huntingground

tree markingexercise

forest beltidentified

environmentaldegradation

hunting

SPLAmovements

crime

9 armedrobberies

refugees

accidents

socialconflicts

high ex-pectations

destruction ofcultural points

bad comm-unication

mistrust ofpolice

infrastructure

employment

water andtrees

agencies

policy-makers

nationals

theft andtraffic

traffic speed

less cultivableland for nationals

Adm

in O

xfam

JRS

AA

IN

Oxfam technical

team leader

Yumbe meetingsettlement

commandant

sour

ce: f

ield

vis

its

Yum

bem

eetin

g, fi

eld

visit

s, se

ctor

head

s

Admin/Logistics

+/-

+/-

+/-

+/-

-/-

+/-

Note: The +/+ signs represent the overall feeling of the group. +/+ relates to only positive impacts, +/- representsgains and losses and -/- mainly negative impacts

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tFigure 5: Impact of Move to Ikafe, Refugee Perspective

SOCIALBREAKDOWNDECLINE IN

SCHOOLATTENDANCE

COMPARED TOKOBOKO

DECLINEHEALTHSTATUS

REFUGEES�PERSPECTIVE

OF IMPACT OFMOVE TO

IKAFE

REFUGEES�REPRESENTATION:

NO VOICE

LIVELIHOODINSECURITY

-/-

-/-

-/-

-/-

water bornedisease

malnutrition

poor tanker-ing storage

water shortage

UNHCR fundpolicy

poor drilling

transfer toofast

poor sanitationtools

poor hygiene

traditionalbeliefs

no soap

increase mentalproblems

no counselling

no IPSA

trauma

war

insufficienthealth facilities

mothersmortality rate

no ambulance

insufficienthealth units

no contacttraditional

healers

increasedreproductive

health problems

spontaneousabortions

syphilis

educationawareness low

some TBA�snot used

TBA�s not paid

land size

too manyrefugees

govt.policy

poorUNHCRsurvey

poorconsultation

insufficientproduction

poor landquality

drought

govt.policy

purchaselocally

insufficientseeds/foods

salesassets

saleclothes

facilities

sale/seedseaten groundnuts maize

sickness

irregular/insufficient food

malnutrition

no cultivation

body weakness

people doingpeace work

Leja Leja

noemploymentopportunity

no skillsupgrading

no IGA

lackresource

lackmarket

immediateneeds

young womenincluded in more

partnership

no incomeelopement

no education

nomarriage

men can�tpay dowry

noincome

young areidle

lack offood

men/womencan�t perform

traditional roles

conflictseparationbreakdown

queuingfor water

women taketime to collect

water

lackwater

youth not goingto school

nowomenCDWs

no women groups;no social support;

no work

CDWs don�t workwith women

groups and elders

no femaleadult

education

welfareneeds not

heard

role ofRefugeeCouncil

not heard

women arenot

represented

quicktransfer ofrefugees

chairmanreport to

Oxfam notto CDWs

poorstaff

attitude

CDWs don�tcommunicatewith sectors

no control/self-

reliance

poorinformation

flows

poor shelterfacilities insome points

no incentivesfor teachers

lack offood/

hunger

drop outs

UNHCRfunding policy

idleness

some childrenreturn to

Koboko foreducation

no clothesto wear

noincome

no nutritionhealth workers

improvedinfant

mortality rateincrease inprimary schoolcompared with

Sudan

+/+

Notes: The +/+ signs represent the overall feeling of the group. +/+ relates to only positive impacts, +/- representsgains and losses and -/- mainly negative impacts. Note also that the arrows represent a causal relationship.

-/-

girlseloping

few girlsin school

children attendam; low

attendance pm

Abbreviations: CDWs: Community Development Workers, IPSA: International NGO of councillors/war victims,IGA: Income Generation Activities, TBA: Traditional Birth Atrtendant

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○PARTIC

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The Review Process

The process followed by the participatoryreview can be summarised in the followingsteps (see Table 2 on page 17).12 These steps

were not taken exactly in the sequence presentedbelow; as the introduction stressed this was not adesigned process but rather an iterative one, basedon the security situation, logistical limitations, theoutcome of previous meetings, and much more.

The review team:

1. Collected secondary data and studied existinginformation on the region/project: The purposeand timing of this step is obvious: the review teamneeded to be well-informed and to avoid re-inventing any wheels. External information andproject documents were collected and studied bythe lead reviewers and some Oxfam managers.

2. Revisited tools, behaviour and process aspectsof participatory rural appraisal, or PRA (eachteam member had previously received trainingin PRA): It was seen to be important that all hada good understanding of the tools and principlesof PRA and learning. Some time was thereforespent on this at the outset.13

Review Methodology

4

3. Reflected on the experiences and perspectivesof members of the review team itself: The teamwas split into sub-teams (of refugees, localUgandans, Oxfam managers) which formulatedtheir own perspectives on relations, problemsand achievements of the Ikafe project beforeactually starting interviews and communitymeetings. This stimulated the first discussionsand enabled the next step.

4. Formulated the hypotheses for the review andoutlined the process of learning during thereview: Without developing a very detailed planthe team agreed a process outline whicharticulated the central questions that needed tobe addressed in dialogue with the differentstakeholders. This was based on the team’sinitial understanding of the problems andrelationships, their own experiences, andsecondary information.

5. Analysed the different aims/objectives of thestakeholders: Based on documents, initial (team)analysis and the special reports written by NGOmanagers, the team’s main facilitators proposedshort formulations of the different and partlycontradictory aims of the various stakeholders.This was ‘verified’ in the team and in meetings

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with individual stakeholder groups and used forunderstanding the conflict and for formulatingopportunities for agreement and improvement.

6. Organised separate meetings with particularstakeholders and representatives: Meetings withseparate groups of refugee leaders and localpeople (youth, elders), charted the main concernsof these groups. PRA tools such as matrices wereused to chart different perspectives on problemsand their causes, and the responsibleorganisations.

7. Interviewed key informants: Some interviewswere held with officials and Oxfam staff andmanagers in order to understand and ‘map’ thediversity of the perspectives further. This workwas aimed at bringing in non-resident officialsand managers in particular; it also involvedseveral discussions with resident Oxfammanagement.

8. Facilitated focused dialogues in communities:In some refugee communities separate meetingswere held in order to learn about the perspectivesof ‘ordinary’ people. PRA tools such asvulnerability and well-being ranking were used.The main objective of this step was to learnabout the perspective on change and impact ofrefugee women who did not usually participatein the larger meetings.

9. Commissioned, studied and discussed sectorreports (of NGOs): The review teamcommissioned special reports by the managersof all the project sectors managed by Oxfam, aswell as reports from JRS and AAIN. Thesecovered basic statistics, achievements, currentproblems and possible solutions. These reportshelped the overall focus of the review in termsof assessing impact – that is, on achieving theproject’s higher level objectives and analysingthe changes in the lives and livelihoods of the

Figure 6: The Ikafe Review Process

Questions and Issues

Dialogues withPLA Tools

Formulation ofIndicators and Plans

� refreshing of particpatorylearning tools

Team

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entrefugees and local people. It was also a way ofensuring that the separational and intermediaryachievements of the Oxfam programme, as wellas the sectors covered by AAIN and JRS, weregiven due attention.

10.Wrote up the impact of the Ikafe project asperceived by different groups: The teams createdsummary diagrams and wrote up the perspectiveson impacts of the main stakeholder groups basedon the initial meetings and interviews.

11.Developed and discussed future scenarios andpotential aims: As the project developed,discussions started to incorporate new draftproject aims. These applied in particular to futurescenarios which represented varying degrees ofconflict. However, refugee members of the teamfound it difficult to see beyond the scenario oflow level conflict and staying in Ikafe.

12.Formulated key constraints that were stoppingthe Ikafe project meeting its aims: The teamanalysed the objectives from the stakeholdergroups and their different perspectives on impactas concluded from the first and separate meetingsand interviews. This was written up as asummary and diagram of the main constraintsfaced in satisfying the needs and interests of therefugees and the host population in particular.

13.Formulated strategies for overcoming thoseconstraints: The team formulated draftrecommendations regarding strategies for all themain stakeholder groups. This was discussed atjoint meetings and also in separate meetings ofOxfam staff.

14.Organised mixed meetings for stakeholders andrepresentatives: In the first stage of the reviewa large joint meeting of local stakeholders wasorganised to discuss impacts, achievements andconstraints. In August a similar meeting whichincluded officials from Arua and Kampalafocused on the recommendations for change.

15.Formulated proxy indicators for the success ofthese alternative strategies: The lead reviewersformulated indicators for success as well as amonitoring system. These were discussed withOxfam staff, including some employed refugees.

16.Written draft and final report: The leadreviewers wrote a draft report after the first stageof the review (after April 1996) and a final reportthat was based on new field research (May–July1996), meetings and discussions in July andAugust, and written comments by Oxfam staff.

Table 2 gives an idea of the timing of the mainactivities of the review.

Collected secondary data; key interviews in Kampala and Arua.

Introduction of the review. Stakeholder analysis with Ugandan nationals and refugees;team discussion; community visits with PRA tools; interviews with key informants; meetingswith different stakeholders; formulation of draft recommendations/ strategies for the future;meetings with a broad group of stakeholders; re-formulation of priority recommendations;formulation of indicators of success; debrief with Oxfam managers and Kampala-basedrepresentatives of the MoLG, UNHCR, WFP, AAIN and JRS.

Finalised the draft review report and debriefed in Oxford, UK.

Debriefed with two MoLG representatives who were visiting the UK.

Field research by the Ikafe research team.

Preparation and big meeting in project area with most stakeholders.

Discussions among Oxfam project staff and comments on draft report.

Debriefed with Oxfam staff in Oxford.

Report finalised.

Table 2: The Actual Review Programme

3�9 April 1996

10 April�26 April

29 April�2 May

17 July

May�July

30 July�3 August

August� September

4 October

6 October 1996

Date Activity

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tMembers of the team, in particular the two leadreviewers, had the important task of summarisingopinions and data from the interviews and meetings.This was presented in later meetings and verified(and sometimes amended) before further steps weretaken. This process provided fora for listening andnegotiation. The overall picture of constraints andthe formulation of draft recommendations was alsosubsequently discussed and partly amended duringlarge meetings.

A large number of groups and individualsparticipated in many different ways in this review.This meant that management of the process ofstakeholder engagement was possibly the mostdifficult task, especially given the iterative natureof the review.

Table 3 outlines the participation methods of themain stakeholder groups; it also gives a shortsummary of their objectives.

When summarising stakeholder objectives in thisway it is apparent that the review considered anumber of different perspectives, but that differenceswithin the groups of stakeholders may have beenpaid less attention. Gender-based differences areevident; there are also class and wealth differencesamong the refugees and the host population, andethnicity played an important role in the politicalcontext. The review attempted to map all thesedifferent perspectives. As suggested in the nextsection it was not fully successful in this regard.

Table 3: Objectives and Participation Methods of Main Stakeholders

Main Stakeholders

UNHCR and WFP

Local Ugandan officialsand leaders

Sudanese Refugees

Oxfam, AAIN and JRS

Government of Uganda

Objectives

To support the refugees tointernational standards andwithin resource constraints.

To support refugees andbenefit from infrastructureand services themselves.

To shelter from the violencein their home country,educate their children, andbuild up assets to takehome.

To support refugees, worktowards equal opportunitiesin the livelihoods of menand women, and be fair to(vulnerable) local people.

Security for its ownpopulation and therefugees; to support localeconomic development.

Participation Methods

• interviewed;• written communication was analysed;• spoke at the final stage of the review.

• interviewed;• meetings between themselves and the review team;• participated in several joint meetings;• sat on the review team;• demanded, and were given, special meetings with

Ikafe management.

• interviewed using PRA tools;• sat on the review team;• participated in separate and joint meetings.

• sat on the review team;• written (agency) materials were consulted;• programme sectors produced statements of

achievement;• bilateral meetings between managers and some

from the review team;• meetings of staff and some from the review team;• involved in several general meetings.

• some officials were interviewed;• data collected and studied;• some participated in joint meetings;• spoke at the final stage of the review.

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entMethodological Principles of theReview

The review focused on looking forwards whilereviewing the project’s current impact. Closelyrelated this principle of learning is the idea oftransparency and clarity in briefings and meetings.

The previous section highlighted that learninghappened in a participatory way, and that differentstakeholders participated in a different way. Theidea of bringing various stakeholders into theprocess, of enabling them to speak, listen, shareand negotiate, is a key factor when wanting toestablish ‘ownership’ of findings, conclusions andideas for improvement. However, progress in aprocess of learning requires facilitation and somesort of process management which is particularlydifficult to articulate and plan in a volatile situationsuch as a complex emergency. Process managementrequires facilitative behaviour and language, andimaginative ideas about the management ofmeetings. An example of this took place in the finalreview when almost all of the important stakeholderstook part in a parliamentary-style meeting whichenabled open and constructive dialogue.

The idea of participation – albeit in different waysfor different stakeholders and dependent uponpossibilities that may have been limited by violenceand insecurity – prompts the principle ofinclusiveness. In ensuring such participation andinclusiveness the review attempted to work withpositive biases in order to address the exclusion ofimportant groups, although it was only partlysuccessful in this respect. The review set out toconsult documentation on social differences,include women and men in the review team,interview women in (refugee) settlements, andinvite women to attend meetings despite securityand cultural obstacles. The review also made aneffort to invite representatives from particular ethnicgroups, in particular the Dinka refugees, to includeelders who held non-formal, traditional authority,and to ensure that proceedings included hosts fromTerego county as well as Aringa county.

A further aspect of process management was toensure ongoing learning within the review team.The team was large and diverse; the majority ofmembers were skilled development practitioners,including some of those recruited from among therefugee and host populations. However, only a smallnumber were experienced in consultingdocumentation, reporting, and in the management

of large and often heated meetings. None of theteam, including the two lead facilitators, hadexperience with intense learning and negotiationprocesses in such a volatile context. Because of thissomewhat experimental nature and also because thereview team was so large, it needed to spendconsiderable time on sharing and reflecting onprogress. Because sufficient time was not alwaysavailable this led to a two-tier system wheredecisions by the lead facilitators were only brieflydiscussed with some of the other team members.

Another principle was that team members shouldbe chosen from the main stakeholder groups(refugees, host population, agency staff), thoughthey were not mandated by these groups. The teamwas seen to have a primarily facilitative role: itshared its views and experiences, and was alsoexpected to be able to articulate the concerns andideas of its peers. It was also hoped that the teamwould be able to influence its peers – for example,in order to overcome controversy. To some extentthis was achieved as far as the refugees and Oxfamstaff were concerned. However, although someOxfam staff were local people with their own socialconnections the specially selected, two host-population representatives were two youngerwomen from lower LCs who had very limitedinfluence on their male and older peers.

The team collected both qualitative and quantitativedata. However, during the course of the process theemphasis became more qualitative; most of the‘numbers’ came from project files and from sectorreports produced on request by project managers.

The data, from multiple sources, was collected inmultiple ways. The predominantly qualitative datawas cross checked by the team, by the leadfacilitators, and also through the joint meetingswhere summaries were presented and discussedbefore the next steps were taken.

This cross checking increased the trustworthinessof the information and conclusions despite thestrong emphasis on the perspectives of stakeholdersand the idea of negotiation (as different from theidea of harmonious dialogue).14 Reaching a highlevel of trustworthiness of data and conclusions wasone of the most important principles of the review.Evaluation of the first stages of the review did,however, suggest that some Oxfam managers –including team members – were critical of the qualityof some of the data and the balance of opinions ofsome of the stakeholders vis-à-vis the others.

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tDiagrammatic tools were used to facilitate the semi-structured interviews; in the larger meetings theywere used as tools to present summarisedinformation and perceptions. The former originatedfrom PRA; the latter were ‘mind maps’, examplesof which were given earlier. Tools like problemmatrixes, Venn diagrams and well-being rankinghelp facilitate discussion among those beinginterviewed; they provide structure to the interviewand also deliver some sort of output – that is, theydemonstrate different perspectives on the issueconcerned.

In summary, the Ikafe review did not so muchattempt to reach a fully objective analysis, rather itstarted with mapping the diverging perspectives andworked towards increasing understanding andappreciation of achievements as well as concernsof other stakeholders. ‘Hard data’ which is difficultto dispute is important in such a process. But tomany, attributing change remained very subjectiveand, for example, acknowledging the positiveimpact of others and taking responsibility for failure(instead of accusing others) was as much a politicalnegotiation as a rational analysis.

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This paper discusses just one case study andhas referred only briefly to widerexperience, so the conclusions and lessons

learnt must be presented with great care.

Reviews undertaken in emergencies are necessarilyconcerned with the local context and can never beexpected to work as a blueprint for other projects.While the Ikafe review was structured and plannedin advance it changed over time: plans wereadjusted and the review adapted to the events andlearning that took place on an almost daily basis.However, some very broad lessons can be drawn.The first group of lessons relates to the managementof the review team, the second group is about themanagement of the review process, and the thirdrelates to the participatory approach. Thereafterfollow lessons concerning the objectives of thereview, and lessons about the project’s strategies.

Lessons Concerning the Managementof a Large Review Team

The large number of review team members/facilitators produced much information andanalysis, particularly in their sub-teams. The teamfunctioned well and was able to discuss, cross checkand reach consensus on many issues. However,

there were also disadvantages and weaknesses. Thefollowing lessons relate to the working andachievements of the team.

1. Such a large team and process, if not properlymanaged, can result in an unmanageable,unfocused amount of information from whichno consensus analysis arises. On reflection, asmaller team would be recommended for futurework of this kind, for example, a team of twolead reviewers with a maximum of six to eightmembers from key stakeholder groups.

2. The review team should be chosen carefully. Inthe case of Ikafe, team members were generallyvery skilled and experienced. Inspite of thissome important skills such as report writingwere lacking. The gender balance in the teamwas good, with slightly more women than men,but in hindsight the team would have benefitedfrom increased representation from the hostpopulation. In particular, an influential malefrom among local youth and elders would havehelped communication with this key group.

3. From the start the roles of the review teammembers were unclear. With hindsight thisshould have been spelled out more clearly.

Lessons from Ikafe

5

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t4. It was extremely useful to use two external

facilitators who were able to work on the reviewfrom start to finish. Having two facilitatorsallowed for the exchange of ideas and divisionof the workload. However, due to increasingwork pressures the two sometimes consultedparticular team members which meant a two-tier team emerged.

5. The process would have led to more agreementand firmer commitments to improvecommunication had more senior people withexperience in the analysis of complexdevelopment and emergency issues participated.

Lessons Concerning the Management ofa Review Process in a Conflict Situation

As pointed out earlier, the management of such aprocess is itself difficult without the added factorof conflict. The process became very much a‘learning by doing’ process and thus required skillsthat may have been impossible to gain otherwise.The following seven lessons suggest, however, thatthere are few fundamental differences with what isasserted in standard management literature, exceptthat the situation is more pressured and that thereis, at times, an extreme sense of urgency.

1. The importance of good management cannot beoverestimated, and good management of areview like this one requires skills, experienceand creativity. It requires, for example,experienced reviewers, sensitive behaviour,imaginative tools and ideas for meetingmanagement, constant evaluation and rethinkingof options, good communication, and theoccasional use of authority.

2. Flexibility in process management is essential.The second stage of the review was in fact notplanned due to the amount of work and the factthat, for security reasons, all stakeholders couldnot be brought together in the first stage.

3. The process was, and should be, essentiallyiterative. Statements need to be interpreted andverified, and findings and recommendationsdiscussed in wider forums and changedaccording to new information and agreementbetween stakeholders, etc.

4. The review began with the assumption thatcommunication between stakeholders was

reasonable and that participation could happenin a fairly non-conflictual way; this proved tobe wrong. The process invited stakeholders tocriticise implementers, and that is important.However, if too much discontent is allowed tosurface this could backfire: it is essential thatcriticism is challenged in a reasonable way too,and that trust is created in the sense thateverybody feels he/she is being heard. Riskswere taken that were not fully appreciated atthe outset of the review.

5. The review process was disrupted by violence.While the chosen period turned out to be adifficult time for a review, the question ofwhether an ideal moment ever presents itself ina complex emergency or volatile situation ispertinent. It should be understood that such areview needs careful preparation and planningdespite the situation on the ground.

6. The review process took a long time by thestandards of emergency projects. This impliesthat financial costs and in particular human andother resources were diverted from what wouldotherwise have been used for day-to-day projectactivities. It also implies the need for patiencein terms of getting results. The fact that thereview was itself a learning process and that theoutput (a report) was expected to have limitedinfluence on the immediate operation andstrategies of the programme emphasises the needto keep all stakeholders on board. A sense oflearning for all participants must be aimed atfor all stages of the project.

7. There was a certain advantage of having thereview led by Oxfam staff – albeit not based inUganda – rather than by external consultants.This is because external consultants usually havemore rigid time commitments and are lesscapable of responding to organisationaldemands. Preparation and follow-up was timeconsuming, including the writing of the finalreport and debriefings at various stages. Timeinvested was much more than envisaged, partlybecause of the experimental nature of theprocess. Donors demanded briefings, theresponse to which is easier for people withsubstantial institutional knowledge.Furthermore, ‘behind the scenes’ and informalcommunication in Oxfam proved to be importantin communicating the achievements and alsoweaknesses of the project in a balanced way.

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entLessons Concerning the ParticipatoryApproach of the Review

There is much literature and experience withparticipation in less turbulent developmentsituations and, interestingly, the following fourlessons about attempts to involve stakeholdersreflect much of that experience.

1. As mentioned earlier, the use of PRA tools andother diagrams greatly benefited the project.While more community-based work, whichwould have allowed for further cross-checking,had been planned during the first stage thisbecame impossible for security reasons. Thisfield-based research was, however, completedby project staff before the review was finalised.

2. Working with different ‘future scenarios’ ofcontexts for the planning and recommendationscould not be done. This was mainly because therefugee team members found it difficult toconsider ‘bad’ scenarios. During the secondphase of the review, two refugee membersconceded that this would have made sense whena ‘worse case scenario’ actually started tohappen. However, they repeated that they wouldhave found it very difficult, and possiblytraumatising, to do this initially. In this way themethodology in practice was different from thatplanned in the way that it remained responsiveto those who participated and co-determinedhow the project evolved. Indeed, a participatoryreview should be expected to show thatmethodology and the main actors or proponentsare interdependent and impact on each other.

3. The process created high expectations amongstakeholders with regard to (future) consultationby Oxfam and other NGOs which was notentirely realistic. These expectations were raisedas a result of participation. Communication inthis regard should be clear and open at all times.

4. A participatory process can throw up issues andideas not previously considered or, alternatively,already dismissed by the powers-that-be. Forexample, some ideas which came to lightchallenged accepted (international) policies andlaws on the free movement of refugees for thepurposes of the diversification of livelihoods;in addition, more land was proposed in orderthat the refugees might exist beyond a basic levelof survival. This goes against institutionalisedpolicies of national and internal agencies

working with refugees, as does supporting localpopulation and infrastructure. Agencies thatwant participation must be prepared to have theirown policies challenged and must be preparedto lobby others, including governments, as aconsequence of listening to and taking othersseriously.

Lessons Concerning the Review’sObjectives

Project reviews and evaluations normally happenin a retrospective fashion by referring back to statedobjectives; they do not necessarily look atunexpected changes irrespective of whether it is a‘development’ or ‘emergency’ under review.Project reviews also commonly assess operationalissues and activities at all levels within the project.Sometimes they leave out in-depth analysis offundamental changes that were achieved – that is,impact. The following three lessons relate to thefact that this review did pay attention to unexpectedand fundamental change. Once again the lessonslearnt suggest that, while the situation was extreme,lessons learnt weren’t necessarily different fromthose that arise from less controversial developmentprojects.

1. The review agenda was set initially by theOxfam project management, though it remainedopen to influence by the review team as well asto the concerns, perceptions and interests ofwider stakeholders – most notably the refugeesand host population. The review was thereforeindependent of the initial project objectives, butnot bound by them either. This flexibility isimportant.

2. Ideas concerning objective truth were modifieddue to the participatory and conflictual natureof the review. Likewise the notion of attribution– of being able to analyse more or lessobjectively and attribute a certain improvementin livelihoods or problems to the actions of somegroup or organisation – will be subject to debateand even controversy as the differentstakeholders make different claims that need tobe negotiated.

3. This review was forced to work with fewestablished baseline data, with unrealisticproject objectives, and without agreed (impact)indicators for the success of the project as awhole. Instead of working with predeterminedindicators or even predetermined evaluation

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tcriteria and minimum standards, the reviewworked with broad areas of concern thatemerged during the course of the review andthat were shared, to a certain extent, by thestakeholders. These constraints overlapped tosome extent with what recent literature sums upas a set of evaluation criteria.15 Within theseareas of concern the different stakeholders gavereasons for their particular concerns, whichcould be called (their) indicators. For example,an indicator for improved water supply was‘shorter queuing’ according to the refugees, butlocals did not wish to queue at all. The languageof indicators may be useful for pinpointing whata particular group says, but in participatory andconflictual processes predetermined indicatorsor even indicator themes must be handled withgreat care. Thus the process challenged the ideaof fixed or agreed indicators.

Lessons Concerning Ikafe ProjectStrategies

These lessons from the programme identify waysin which its effectiveness may have been increased:

1. The review was integrated within the overallproject. This was key and demanded that post-review, some of the momentum be maintained

and the findings followed through, especiallyby Oxfam staff.

2. The expectation of Oxfam staff was that thereview would focus on land and land usepotential as the key issue. The broad approachand the attempt to describe and work with thecomplexity of the situation resulted in a morestrategic set of conclusions and ideas for thefuture, without the marginalisation of land issues.

3. The objectives should have been less ambiguousand more realistic.16 Even if local violence haddecreased and the pursuit of some form of self-sufficiency was more realistic, the objectiveswould still have encompassed too many sectorsand would have been too ambitious. Also,interpretations of the objectives differed. TheGoU, local host population and internationalagencies – in particular WFP and UNHCR –worked on the assumption that the situation wastemporary, but the project and many refugees,quite rightly, wanted to incorporate thepossibility that they would not return in theforeseeable future. It would possibly have beenmore realistic to talk of ‘security’ instead ofaiming for sustainable livelihoods, and conceptsor objectives like ‘self-sufficiency’ should havebeen spelled out more clearly.

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The review made some strategicrecommendations to Oxfam. These mainlyconcerned ‘doing things differently’ rather

them as ‘new or more work’. They included:

• lobby and research on improved food provision;• improve work and communication on land

allocation;• make more effort to achieve self-management

of services of refugees (and host population);• improve communication styles and make more

effort to facilitate communication betweenothers;

• make further efforts to raise funds for localdevelopment projects;

• lobby for free movement of refugees andactivities to increase livelihood diversity.

Management discussions concerning revised andnew plans were initiated in August 1996 on the basisof the review, with a view to formulating moreachievable aims and objectives and improvingmonitoring of (impact) indicators. This happenedin the second half of 1996 and early 1997.17

Final Thoughts

6

However, on-going rebel activity and developmentsin the conflicts and insecurity in Sudan andnorthwest Uganda meant that Oxfam had to againevacuate staff; later most refugees moved back toSudan and Oxfam closed the main project. Oxfamis still active in the southern part of the project,Imvepi, which lies in Terego county.

A review of this nature creates the space for peopleto air their views freely and discuss openly; onlytransparency and honesty lead to real learning.Despite this openness there was the feeling that thecomplexity of the situation and of political interestsnever really surfaced. This prompts the questionhow much honesty is needed in order to achievethe goals of the refugee response and its review:saving lives, helping to build up livelihoods, andregaining dignity for of all involved.

To host a review like this is a tremendousachievement at a time when many agencies hidemost of their problems. It requires great courage toinvite such a participatory review, and the Oxfamproject management should be applauded for that.

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Objectives Before the ReviewThe following could be called general aims:

AppendixThe Changing Aims and Objectives of Ikafe

Specific objectives included the following:

1. To ensure refugee welfare in the short and longterm through comprehensive and efficientregistration that records all demographiccharacteristics, and to establish effectivemethods to facilitate the reunion of refugeefamilies.

2. The allocation of residential and agriculturalplots to assist the refugees to reconstruct familyand community life and to achieveindependence from externally provided inputs.

3. The strengthening of effective communitystructures which are representative of allrefugee opinions and concerns in order tofacilitate decision-making and self-management at all levels.

4. To ensure vulnerable groups have equal accessto basic entitlements and representation andthat their special needs are addressed withoutbeing isolated from the community.

5. The re-establishment of social and cultural lifethrough facilitating traditional culturalexpression, and through identifying andfacilitating the adoption of trends, skills, rolesand values of Sudanese communities withinthe Ugandan setting.

6. To ensure refugee welfare in the short and longterm through effective and efficient provisionof food and non-food items which ensures allrefugees are aware of and receive theirentitlements in a regular and equitable manner.

7. To control environmental degradation atsettlement sites and surrounding areas, and to

provide sustainable supply of wood productsthrough community-based natural forestmanagement and reforestation.

8. To assist refugees attain food self-sufficiencythrough crop production.

9. The contribution towards achievement ofeconomic self-sufficiency by raising householdand group productivity in smallscale enterprise.

10.The reduction of transmission of water borne,water based and water washed diseases throughthe supply of at least 10 litres/person/day.

11.[Health objectives for Imvepi: curative,preventive, integrate with Ugandan structures].

12.To ensure that the refugee services followUgandan policy, Ugandans have access tothose services, that integration, good relationsand coordination are promoted with the hostcommunities and government.

13.To establish ongoing analysis and learning inthe project to improve this and other similarprojects in Uganda and other parts of the world,and which learning could be applied to fastmoving emergencies.

14.[Administration-related objectives].

15.Enhance efficiency of programme managementas a result of adequate office and housingfacilities, and adequate provision of publicbuildings, road and other constructed facilitiesfor refugees and where appropriate Ugandans.

16.-18. [Efficient logistics related objectives](Oxfam UK&I, 1996b).18

A site in which the refugees would beagriculturally productive and economically self-sufficient with little or no outside assistance inthe long term for as long as they are in Uganda

(Oxfam UK&I, 1996a).

To ensure that all services provided within thesettlement are coordinated between all key

actors; and that services are in line withgovernment and UNHCR refugee administrativeand management policy, and within available

means and resources; that services areintegrated within the host community and

government service structures in the district.

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Objectives Formulated After the Review

The Ikafe/Imvepi settlements, managed by Oxfam since November 1994, currently accommodate 55,000Sudanese refugees: a further 15,000 are expected in 1997. The main aims of the project are to securerefugees� basic needs, to promote their self-reliance, to promote harmonious relations with the nationalpopulation and to build Oxfam�s policy capacities. (...)

The overall aims and objectives of the programme have been recently revised as laid out below. (...) Theprogramme still demonstrates a commitment towards a development approach to emergencies (newrefugees are expected in 1997) and to giving refugees a greater say in the management of activities. Thekey conclusion of the re-planning process was to work towards more realistic targets that acknowledge:

1. the constraints on land availability and quality andconsequent impact on expectations of self-sufficiency;

2. the restrictions caused by continuing insecurity;

3. the need for more deliberate and planned integrationwith the local community.

The second output of the re-planning process was to endorse the proposed restructuring of the managementteams towards a more efficient, streamlined and integrated structure. (...)

The revised main aim and sub-aims are (...) [b] By the end of 1999, to deliver effective and timely servicesthat:

Sub-Aim #1:Secure basic needs includingfood security:

Sub-Aim #2:Promote the self-reliance of70,000 Sudanese refugees:

Sub-Aim #3:Promote harmonious relationsbetween refugees and the nationalpopulation:

Sub-Aim #4:Build Oxfam�s capacity toimplement and influence policyeffectively:

1. lobbying the donor community for adequate input provision;2. strengthening curative and preventative health services;3. addressing special and gender needs among the disadvantaged.

1. promotion of representative and accountable structures;2. work towards independence from externally provided inputs;3. reconstruction of community life and cultural expression.

1. access to refugee services by the local population;2. recognise and honour cultural practices and land ownership;3. linkage between refugee and national decision-making

structures.

1. institutional learning and lobbying through documentation andM[onitoring] & E[valuation];

2. availability of adequate infrastructure and logistical support;3. improving staff performance.

Source: From Oxfam�s internal grant administration of activities in the Ikafe project

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Endnotes1 Dawson (1998) refers to Borton and Macrae (1997), who explain that few evaluations of emergency aid actually

manage to make estimates of numbers of lives saved.2 See Appendix with elaborate quotations from documents from before and after the review that spell out the

objectives of the project. As will be highlighted in the paper, different stakeholders interpreted the notion of, forexample, ‘self-sufficiency’ quite differently. Oxfam’s interpretation was to achieve food self-sufficiency andalso improve the sustainability of livelihoods, for example through environmental protection with the project’sforestry component and ‘through facilitating traditional cultural expression’. UNHCR and WFP wanted foodself-sufficiency, and possibly also economic self-sufficiency in order to reduce dependency on the internationalcommunity’s food hand outs.

3 See Roche (1999); and Dawson (1998) who writes ‘impact in relation to emergency aid is generally seen asbeing both about saving lives in the immediate term, i.e. significant change, and also about achieving long-termdevelopmental change’. See Scoones (1998) and Carney (1998) for more on ‘sustainable livelihoods’, i.e. onwhat can be considered fundamental or significant change in livelihoods.

4 See Chapter 5 in Roche (1999) who gives a characterisation of emergency evaluations, from Borton and Macrae(1998). As per that classification the Ikafe review was a ‘single project study’ with an ‘emphasis on lessonlearning’. However, towards the end of the review pressures were building up to use the outcome of the reviewalso for ‘accountability’, even though that was not spelled out in the review’s Terms of Reference. Hallam(1998) also makes a distinction between the two key goals of evaluation, accountability and lesson learning.

5 See Payne (1998) (e.g. p29–37 and p47–49) for more on the political complications and violence that exposedrefugees, local people and Oxfam staff alike; see also van der Gaag (1996).

6 The objectives from before the review reflect this sectoral set-up. See Appendix.7 AAIN changed its name to AAH, Action Africa Hilfe, but the old name will be used in this paper.8 ‘Gazetting’ is a process whereby the parliament has to allow land to be registered under a private name or a

specific department, as an exception to normal land registration and control. See also Neefjes & David (1996).9 See Neefjes & David (1996) p30; Payne (1998) p23.10 From Neefjes & David (1996).11 Harrell-Bond (1994).12 Appendix II in Neefjes & David (1996) gives a short summary of what is presented in Sections 2 and 3 of this

paper.13 Before the start of the review most team members had participated in a special PRA training too; see Osuga et al

(1996). For more on PRA tools, process and behaviour aspects of the approach see, for example, Chambers(1997).

14 For more on ‘trustworthiness’ in applied and participatory research, see Pretty (1994) and Roche (1999); ontrustworthiness and various methodologies of research see Thomas et al (1998).

15 See Hallam (1998) who sums up evaluation criteria under the following headings: (a) efficiency, (b) effectiveness,(c) impact, (d) relevance, (e) sustainability, (f) connectedness, (g) coverage, (h) coherence, and also (i) timeliness,(j) appropriateness and (k) coordination. These generic criteria overlap to some extent with the main constraintsidentified by the review, in particular with criteria, b, c, e, f, h and k: (1) insecurity, (2) insufficient food/water tomeet basic needs, (3) problems related to land, (4) a lack of diversity of livelihoods, (5) issues concerned withcommunication, representation, participation and integration. Evaluations that are non-participatory, done byexperts and with a focus on accountability, could make direct use of agreed minimum standards such as thosethat are currently being developed by a joint effort of relief agencies known as the SPHERE Project (see alsoibid.). That was not done in the Ikafe review, as it would not necessarily go well with the idea that stakeholdersthemselves define their goals, problems and ideas of impact. However, there might have been a case forcommunicating them to the various stakeholders at the beginning of the process, because it is conceivable thatminimum standards become points of reference for all stakeholders and they could form a kind of shortcut toagreement.

16 Objectives were agreed at the outset of the programme between Oxfam, UNHCR and the MoLG, that is refugeesand the host population were not really involved; objectives like self-sufficiency remained hugely controversialin their practical meaning, for example in terms of size of land allocated to refugees. See Appendix for detailsof the programme objectives before and after the review (as defined by Oxfam).

17 As witnessed by project documentation quoted in the Appendix.18 This reference contains similar specific objectives to Oxfam(UK&I) (1996a), but they are slightly reworded,

and there are more objectives.

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AbbreviationsAAIN Action Africa In Need (now: Action Africa Hilfe)

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)

EU European Union

GoS Government of Sudan

GoU Government of Uganda

JRS Jesuit Refugee Service

LC Local Council

MoLG Ministry of Local Government

PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal

SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WFP World Food Programme

WNBF West Nile Bank Front (one of Uganda’s rebel forces operating in the west and northwest ofthe country, allegedly with bases in Sudan and the DR Congo, formerly Zaire).

Glossary of TermsBlocks: Groups of about 24 households in the refugee settlement; three to four blocks make

up a ‘village’ and on average five villages made up a ‘point’.

ha: Hectare.

Local councils: LC1 is the lowest level of democratically elected local government in Uganda, LC5is the highest level of local government, at the district level. See Figure 2.

Point Committee:Elected refugees at ‘point’ level (see ‘zone’ and ‘block’).

Zone Committee:Elected refugees at ‘zone’ level. The Ikafe/Imvepi settlement was made up of five‘zones’, each comprising an average of nine ‘points’.

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Borton, J & Macrae, J (1997) ‘Evaluation Synthesis of Emergency Aid’ in Evaluation Report Ev:Ev 613(London: Department for International Development).

Buzan, T with B Buzan (1993) The Mind Map Book (London: BBC Books)

Carney, D (ed) (1998) ‘Sustainable Rural Livelihoods – What Contribution Can We Make?’ (London:Department for International Development).

Chambers, R (1992) ‘Rural Appraisal: Rapid, relaxed and participatory’, IDS Discussion Paper 311(Sussex: University of Sussex/IDS).

Chambers, R (1997) Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last (London: Intermediate TechnologyPublications).

Dawson, E L (1998) ‘Assessing the Impact of Interventions in Emergency Situations’ a discussion paper;unpublished draft paper (Oxford: Oxfam).

Gaag, N van der (1996) ‘Field of Dreams’, New Internationalist No 283, September.

Hallam, A (1998) Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies (London:RRN, ODI).

Harrell-Bond, B (1994) ‘The Ikafe Refugee Settlement Project in Aringa County – a Report to Oxfam’,unpublished draft report (Oxford: Oxfam GB).

Neefjes, K & David, R (1996) ‘A Participatory Review of the Ikafe Refugee Programme’, unpublishedreport (Oxford: Oxfam GB).

Osuga, B, Mutayisa, D & Aluma, M (1996) ‘Provisional Report on Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)Training Workshop – Oxfam Ikafe Settlement, 18–23 March 1996’; unpublished report (Kampala/Entebbe:Oxfam/Uganda CBHC Association).

Oxfam (UK&I) (1996a) ‘Oxfam Ikafe – Annual Report 1995’, unpublished report (Oxford: Oxfam).

Oxfam (UK&I) (1996b) ‘Ikafe Workplan 1996’, unpublished report (Oxfam Uganda).

Payne, L (1998) Rebuilding Communities in a Refugee Settlement – a Casebook from Uganda (Oxford:Oxfam GB).

Pretty, J (1994) ‘Alternative Systems of Inquiry for Sustainable Agriculture’ in IDS Bulletin vol 25, no 2.

Pretty, J N, Guijt, I, Scoones, I & Thompson, J (1995) ‘Participatory Learning and Action: A TrainersManual’ (London: IIED).

Roche, C (1999) Impact Assessment and NGOs: Learning for a Change? (forthcoming) (Oxford: OxfamGB).

Scoones, I (1998) ‘Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: a Framework for Analysis’ IDS working paper no 72.

Thomas, A, Chataway, J & Wuyts, M (eds) (1998) Finding Out Fast: Investigative Skills for Policy andDevelopment (London: Sage).

References

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AcknowledgementsThe work and encouragement of Oxfam managers and review team members who initiated, supportedand facilitated the review has been enormous and I want to express my admiration and gratefulness fortheir efforts. Without them and the active participation of so many refugees, local people and officialsfrom the Ugandan government and international organisations, the review would not have been possible.The initial outline of this paper was developed with the help of Ros David and Lina Payne, with suggestionsand encouragement from the RRN editor Koenraad Van Brabant. Ros and Koenraad also made extremelyhelpful comments on drafts; Izzy Birch, Sophie Bond, Tony Burdon and Chris Roche also commented onan earlier draft, for which many thanks. Without this help this paper could not have become what it is.The opinions expressed and errors made are solely my responsibility.

RRNBackground

The Relief and Rehabilitation Network was conceived in 1993 and launched in 1994 as a mechanism forprofessional information exchange in the expanding field of humanitarian aid. The need for such amechanism was identified in the course of research undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute(ODI) on the changing role of NGOs in relief and rehabilitation operations, and was developed inconsultation with other Networks operated within ODI. Since April 1994 the RRN has producedpublications in three different formats, in French and English: Good Practice Reviews, Network Papersand Newsletters. The RRN is now in its second three-year phase (1996–1999), supported by four newdonors: DANIDA, SIDA (Sweden), the Department of Foreign Affairs (Ireland), and the Department forInternational Development (UK). Over the three year phase the RRN will seek to expand its reach andrelevance amongst humanitarian agency personnel, and to further promote good practice.

Objective

To improve aid policy and practice as it is applied in complex political emergencies.

Purpose

To contribute to individual and institutional learning by encouraging the exchange and disseminationof information relevant to the professional development of those engaged in the provision of

humanitarian assistance.

Activities

To commission, publish and disseminate analysis and reflection on issues of good practice in policyand programming in humanitarian operations, primarily in the form of written publications, in both

French and English.

Target audience

Individuals and organisations actively engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance at nationaland international, field-based and head office level in the ‘North’ and ‘South’.

The Relief and Rehabilitation Network is supported by:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs SIDADANIDA

Department of Foreign Affairs,Ireland

DFID