IB-History-Revision -1 Establishment of Israel and 1948 - 49 war

Establishment of Israel and the causes of the 1948 - 49, first Arab-Israeli war: Nov 29th 1947 – UNSCOP partition plan passed by the UN assembly. The Jews celebrate,

but the Arabs were appalled and pledged to prevent the founding of a Jewish state in Palestine. This reflects the long-standing tensions, conflicts and rivalries between the two groups over these fundamental questions of right to land etc.

Nov 30th 1947 - May 14th 1948 – Civil war in Palestine between Jews and Palestinian Arabs, following violence that started with the Arab General Strike.

May 14th 1948 – Israeli declaration of independence: state of Israel declared by its first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. This was according to the UNSCOP borders in the partition plan, and the declaration was made the day before the British mandate was due to end in Palestine.

May 15th – Arab League (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan) invades Israel to “liberate Palestine”, starting the first Arab-Israeli war.

Jewish-Arab civil war had become a regional war, between the newly-formed state of Israel and the surrounding Arab states. War of independence for Israel vs. War to liberate Palestine for Arab states. ‘An Nakbah’ for the Palestinians - the catastrophe.

Course of the war: 30th Nov to June 1947 - Israeli weakness, fighting for survival. Problems with getting arms,

creating an army and supplies to isolated settlements. March 10th 1948 – Plan D (Dalet), Israeli defence strategy vs. Palestinian belief in plan for a

strategy of ethnic cleansing. April 9th – Massacre in Deir Yassin of 250 Palestinians. June 11th – Folke Bernadotte proposed ceasefire. This proved to be a turning point in the

War. IDF troops increased from 65 000 in May to 96 000 in December. (Folke was killed in Sep. 17th 1948 by the Jewish underground)

Jan 1949 – Armistice negotiations began, when Arab states realized they would not win the War.

Why Israel won the War? Israeli strengths: Motivated army (clear unified goal of survival), resources, western

sympathy, British army training and experience. Arab weaknesses: Lack of morale, ill-equipped, logistical problems, divided leadership,

divided aims (Egypt and Syria had expansionist aims rather than creating a Palestinian state)

Outcomes of the War

Palestinians: An-Nakba ('the disaster/catastrophe') lost the chance of their own state. 550 000-800 000 refugees, 150 000 to Israel, 450 000 to Transjordan, 200 000 to Egypt.

Israelis: Israeli state increased by 21%, has now defensible borders. Arab nations: Defeat in the war leads to instability as the result of domestic challenges to

the leadership who lost the war. 1952, Egyptian monarchy overthrown. Arab states increased territory: Transjordan takes West Bank and Egypt takes the Gaza Strip, showing that Arab war aims was not as simple as supporting the Palestinians.

Arab-Israeli armistice failed to achieve lasting peace Despite negotiations between 1949-1950 the two sides could not reach agreement. Israel wanted recognition and peace but would not give up any territory. Arab states wanted territory and repatriating Palestinian refugees

Historiography A question of perspective! For the Israelis, this war is called, and celebrated today as, the

'war of independence', a conflict in which Israel bravely fought against the odds and battled for survival against the invasion of hostile Arab armies from its neighboring countries. For the Palestinians, however, this war is known as 'an-Nakba', the disaster, the conflict in which they were forced out of their homes by deliberately planned ethnic cleansing from Israel in order to become a stateless people living in the permanent exile of refugee camps. It is from the fundamental incompatibility of these two separate narratives that the continued failure to find a resolution to the Middle East situation today stems.

Demographic shifts: the Palestinian Diaspora 1947 onwards, Jewish immigration and the economic development of the Israeli stateThe Palestinian Diaspora:Background:

The 1948-49 war was a massive humiliation for the Arab world and the Palestinian Arabs since a large population were forced to become a part of the new Israeli state. It is still referred to by the Palestinians as "al-Naqba"- The Catastrophe.

December 1949 the UN set up the Palestine Conciliation Commission to bring out a peace treaty but failed and only managed to secure a cease-fire agreement. Arab wanted to secure the right of Arab refugees to return but Israel insisted that the problem could only be negotiated in a wider peace settlement as so the refugee problem remained unsolved.

Palestinian Diaspora: The Palestinians living outside of historic Palestine and during the course of the Civil War 1947-48 and the Arab-Israeli war 1948-49, over 730,000 Palestinian Arabs fled into neighboring countries.

Attacks on Arab villages such as Deir Yassin encouraged Palestinian Arabs to flee Israel- deliberate policy of Israelis or a result of the Arab aggressions?

Most went into refugee camps in either the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, the remaining lived in neighboring Arab countries.

Most refugees remained in camps, turning down offers to resettlement in Arab states since they were intending on returning to Palestine. However, only Jordan granted citizenship to Palestinian refugees.

Reasons for fleeing: Violence of war. Destruction of their homes and land. Propaganda or Arab government in exaggerating fears.

The Absentee Property Law (1950): The Israeli govt ordered the destruction of 80% of the Arab village inside Israel in late

1940s and early 1950s. Provided clear land to provide the new wave of Jewish immigrants with homes.

The law stated that all displaced Palestinians were "absentees"- could not be Israeli citizens and therefore forfeited all lands and property they left behind. This constituted 80% of all land in Israel which was now put under govt, control.

Many Arabs who stayed in Israel were denied rights of citizenship. Many lived in areas near the armistice line which were placed under military control- if military authorities’ saw it fit they could banish Arab residents or confiscate their property.

Jewish immigration to Israel - a 'Right of Return': The Law of Return (1950)

Israel's population grew rapidly as government encouraged immigration of Jews worldwide.

The law granted Israeli citizenship to any Jew who wished to live in Israel. However, in 1948-51 very few American Jews took this opportunity (just under 2000) whereas 300,000 immigrated from Central and Easter Europe (later decreased partly as USSR was becoming increasingly hostile towards Israel).

In the first three years Israel's population increased by more than 100%- problem as many were poor and therefore a burden to the state's resources. This led to an amendment in the Law of Return in 1952 so that only Jewish immigrants that could be an asset to Israel (either economically or militarily) were allowed to enter.

After 1948 more Jews began to emigrate from parts of the Middle East as they were often subject to persecution in Arab states like Iraq, whereas before WW2 there had been an increase tolerance as a part of the Ottoman, British or French Empires.

There were increased tensions between European and Middle East Jews as E Jews had tended to dominate politics and business whereas M Jews had previously tended to occupy more poorly paid jobs. This started to change as more and more M Jews started to immigrate into Israel.

Economic and social development of the Israeli state after 1948: Foreign Aid:

Israel's economic growth had been dependent to a significant degree on foreign aid and investment, particularly from the US.

In 1977, total US aid amounted to $2,995,000,000. Provided Israel with loans after the first Arab-Israeli war and in addition, private donations

and loans from US Jews. However, scale of US donations dropped sharply to just $85 million in 1951 and in 1952

Israel faced severe financial problems- had to ask US govt. to reschedule their debts. Fortunately, in 1952 to Federal Republic of Germany agreed to provide compensation for

the Jewish People's sufferings in forms of a Reparations Treaty. Gave Israel for the next 14 years, 3000million Dm.

Social and Economic Developments 1956-67: The period between the Suez Crisis (1956) and the Six-Day War (1967) was characterized

by sustained economic growth in Israel. Israel's population rose from 1.7 million to just above 2.4 mills. The GNP (gross National Product) increased at an average of 6.5% p.a. The irrigation and development of the Negev Desert in Southern Israel- new towns were

created and the Israeli govt. embarked on a massive scheme to divert the waters of Lake Galile in the north and carry them to the south to Negev via a network of pipes and conduits.

Economic Problems: Defence spending- accounting for 10% of govt. expenditure which fuelled inflation. High unemployment rates because the govt. responded to the balance of payments deficit in

1965-66 by cutting back on spending. High unemployment led to more people emigrating from Israel than entering the country.

By the end of 1960s, non-European Jews constituted a majority of Israel's population and tensions between them and European Jews escalated as the formed resented the facts that they were economically and politically less influential than the latter.

The resentment of Palestinian Arabs living in Israel- comprising 12% of her population.Historiography:

"They are not returning and that is our policy"- Second Israeli Prime Minister (after Ben-Gurion) Moshe Sharett about the Palestinian problem.

The main question among historians is whether the refugee problem was a deliberate policy by the Israelis to force the Palestinians out of the territories or was it simply a product of the wars brought on, so the Israelis claim, by the aggression of the Arabs.

Deir Yassin: Benny Morris, one of the "new historians" - i.e. a new school of Israeli revisionist historians

working in the 1980s to challenge the mythic versions of nationalist history previously dominant in Israel, such as the Palestinians all leaving voluntarily in 1948 - 9! - claims that Haganah deliberately broadcasted warnings to the Arab population to evacuate women, children and the elderly, to get the Arabs to leave. He concludes that the Jewish attacks were the main cause of the Palestinian panic and that of a collective hysteria brought on by the events.

Israeli historian Ilan Pappe claims the expulsions were a deliberate policy by the Israeli govt. and refers to it as ethnic cleansing.

Arab sources, without exceptions, blame the expulsion and the ensuing crisis on the actions of the Israelis.

Suez Crisis of 1956: role of Britain, France and the United States, the USSR, Israel and the UNO

Timeline of key dates: 1952, July 23rd: Egypt's monarchy was overthrown by the Free Officers. 1954, October: Nasser replaces Mohammed Naguib as President and leader of Egypt. 1955: Nasser refuses to join the Baghdad Pact and negotiates the Czech arms deal. 1955, February 28: Israel launches the Gaza Raid as a result of an Egyptian intelligence-

gathering squad entering Israel and killing an Israeli cyclist. The raid killed 38 Egyptian soldiers.

1955: Closing of the Straits of Tiran. 1956, 26th July: Nationalization of the Suez Canal. 1956, October 30: Israeli troops reach the canal and Britain and France issues

ultimatum for both to withdraw their forces.Key causes of the war:

Long Term: Failure to conclude a peace agreement after the 1948 war: the defeat in the war left the

Arab states instable and domestic challenges to the leadership which made peace initiatives difficult to realize. Arab states might have lost the war but had not been defeated to such an extent that they were "forced" to make peace at all costs. Similarly Israel was not ready to make territorial concessions for peace. Though Israel was initially hopeful about Nasser's rise to power ("Much of their optimism centered around one man, Gamal Abdel Nasser... he had participated in the cease-fire talks with Israel in 1949 and had expressed a desire to resolve the conflict"- Oren), these hopes for a peaceful solution collapsed amid the growing suspicion and tension caused by the events outline below.

"Second Round Thinking"- Arab wishes for redeeming the Palestinians and seeking revenge on Israel. As Benny Morris has stated, "Even before the ink on the armistice agreements was dry, there arose in the Arab capitals a clamor for an avenging second round”. Israel too saw a second round as a way to establish a more defensible border as well as achieve territorial expansion.

Tensions towards a second conflict between Israel and Egypt were increased by continuous border skirmishes between Palestinian fedayeen raids based in the Gaza strip and retaliation attacks from the Israeli army - key example: Gaza raid (1955) launched by Israel and killing 38 Egyptian soldiers in response to the death of an Israeli, described by Egypt as "an action of unprovoked aggression carried out with deliberate brutality."

Short Term: Czech Arms deal 1955 - Israeli hopes for peace as a result of the change of government

gave away to distrust, decreasingly bad relations and finally war. Set in motion Israeli deliberations on a pre-emptive war as it saw Egypt mobilizing and receiving modern weapons from the USSR. Egypt turned to the USSR only after the US had refused to supply Nasser with arms. Changed the regional balance in the eyes of Israel to a much less favorable one- the deal provided Egypt with 300 tanks, 200 MiG 15 jets etc. Israel pleaded to France for help and in return received 40 tanks, 84 airplanes and 120 light tanks. These sparked Israeli considerations of a pre-emptive strike: as Ben Gurion stated, "If they really get MiGs- I will be for bombing them!" Moshe Dayan, a key figure in the Israeli military and also in favour of a pre-emptive strike, defended Israeli policy afterwards as follows: "if the Arab states .... Had not pursued a policy of increasing enmity towards her, Israel would not have resorted to arms."

Nationalization of the Suez Canal, 26th of July, 1956 - Nasser needed the nationalization to fund the Aswan Dam project (crucial to his personal pride and legitimacy), after the US World Bank had withdrawn a huge loan made to Nasser as punishment for the Czech Arms deal. This made French-Egyptian collision almost inevitable as there had been previous clashes over the Algerian war (France considered Egypt to be the main support for Algerian nationalists fighting for independence from France). France however was no longer alone but joined by Britain and France and resulted in a tripartite alliance. The Suez Canal was Britain's main trade route for oil etc. and the Czech arms deal was seen as a sign that Egypt was coming increasingly under Soviet influence. Britain and France refused to recognize Egypt's sovereignty over the canal.

Sevres protocol, 24th October 1956 - secret meeting held in France between British, French and Israeli figures, which came up with the plan to get rid of Nasser: Israel would seize the canal, Britain and France would ask both sides to withdraw, and then when Egypt fails to do so Britain and France would intervene to protect the canal. The plan has been described as "ill-conceived both in organization and purpose" (Fraser).

Outline of course of the war - what happened?

29th October, 1956 - Israeli troops launch this attack; the next day they reached the canal. 30th October - Britain and France issued their ultimatum as planned, Nasser refused this (as

hoped). 31st October - for two days Britain and France bombs Egyptian airfields and destroys

economic targets in Egypt as well as the Egyptian air force. Britain and France forced to halt their military operation as a result of US pressure based on

John Foster Dulles' beliefs that a full-scale war would result in Soviet intervention in the Middle East, their oil interests demanding an 'even-handed' policy towards both Arabs and Israelis, and Eisenhower's election campaign on a peace platform (he could not afford to be dragged into a war while claiming to stand for peace! "Tell them god dam it, we are going to apply sanctions, we are going to the United Nations, we are going to do everything we can to stop this thing"- President Eisenhower.)

2nd November - the UN General Assembly approved a US-sponsored resolution for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of all forces from Egyptian territory. Israel, under severe pressure from US was forced to accept and Britain and France agreed shortly after, with Britain having been forced by severe financial pressure from the US to end the campaign.

Major consequences of Suez:Nasser was praised as the only Arab leader able to challenge the West and expel British,

French as well as Israeli troops from Egyptian territory, establishing Egypt's claim to lead the Arab world.

Nasser was able to hold on the canal and also nationalize the remaining British and French holdings, providing funds for the Aswan Dam project and the modernization of Egypt.

He also acquired an international army, UNEF, to protect Egypt from Israeli invasions and policies.

Israel was granted freedom of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba, providing Israel with a Red Sea port.

Israel's military reputation was further enhanced, after the ease and speed with which they had conquered the Sinai Peninsula. As regional superpower, it is possible to argue that this military performance was so awesome that it contributed to the lack of a further conflict before 1967, granting Israel time to focus on nation - and state-building.

British and French were considered to be the losers- they failed to depose Nasser, who kept hold of the Suez Canal, and Eden was forced to resign. Furthermore, this defeat symbolized the loss of their colonial power in Egypt, and US and Soviet Union were able to step into this vacuum and emerged as the two 'new' dominant foreign powers in the Middle East. Suez thus brought the Cold War into the Middle Eastern conflict, though there have been debates about how far the Cold War was imposed from the outside or imported by leaders in the Middle East for their own ends.

Historiography - different interpretations of this topic?

Czech Arms Deal as instigator or Israel's longer-term security concerns? Debate amongst historians as to what extent Israeli's policy leading up to Suez was only

reactive? Conventional view sees Israeli policy and the Sinai Campaign as a result of the influx of Soviet arms and the blockade of the Straits of Tiran - i.e. that Israel was forced into the war by Nasser. This view has been challenged by historians such as Motti Golani who claims that "on the contrary, the arms deal temporarily blocked Israel's efforts to launch a war" - i.e. that hawks in the Israeli administration had long been planning war as part of a broader interventionist policy based on pre-emptive action as a way of increasing security. Moshe Dayan, a key figure in the Israeli military and also in favour of a pre-emptive strike,

defended Israeli policy afterwards as follows: "if the Arab states .... Had not pursued a policy of increasing enmity towards her, Israel would not have resorted to arms."

Most historians agree that Suez represented the end of the British Empire ('Suez became the symbol of the end of imperial destiny" - P. Vial). However, there are different views as to how far British Prime Minister Eden's policies regarding Suez were foolishly dangerous or justified given the circumstances. Those critical of Eden argue that Suez was a reckless policy that could have led to World War Three if the USA had not intervened. However, a revisionist view has emerged that judges Eden's policies to have been justified: Nasser was a threat to British interests and Eden was therefore brave to attempt to remove Nasser with a policy that would have worked had it not been for the US refusal to support it.

Possible Question 4 formulations

to what extent was Israel's action only reactive?To what extent is Egypt to blame for the start of the war? (Israel to blame?)To what extent did Egypt emerge as the winner at the end of the Suez Crisis?Zionism. Arabism and emergence of the PLO

Theodore Herzl is considered to be the father of political Zionism, who in 1896 wrote Der Judeenstat (The Jewish State), in which he called for a safe haven for Jews.

Zionism is a Jewish movement that arose in the late 19th century as a direct response to anti-Semitism with the desire to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. In particular to the Dreyfus affair in 1894; a political scandal in France which followed the conviction of treason of Captain Dreyfus a French Jewish officer. He was later found innocent.

After two thousand years of persecution of Jews, the international political movement aimed to establish a Jewish state in the ancient homeland claimed by the Jews as a gift from God. In addition, Zionism can be classed as a modern national liberation movement which achieved success with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

After the death of Herzl in 1904, Claim Weizmann succeeded him in his efforts when becoming the leader of Zionism and the first president of Israel.

By the time of the Second World War, and with it the Holocaust, the cause of Zionism had helped create an environment where the creation of a Jewish state was achievable.

Arabism:

Pan-Arabism and Arab Socialism Arabism became identified with Arab nationalism and an awakening of consciousness

among the intellectuals in the Arab world, an idea that had developed prior to the 20th century. At the heart of an Arab consciousness was a desire for self-determination and independence although there was a fundamental disagreement as to the form of government best suited for the Arab peoples – which is a continuous issue even till this day.

Politically, however, the leadership had been taken over by a pan-Arab ideology, which has unsuccessfully tried to unite the Arabs in a union of nation state. Pan-Arabism has become synonymous with Arab nationalism and, to a certain extent, with Arab socialism, particularly after the rise of Nasser.

The exchange of diplomacy between the British and the Arabs during the First World encouraged the development of pan-Arabism and the hopes for a united Arab state. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire gave further rise to those hopes, but the actions of the British and the establishment of the mandate system upset those Arabs who hoped for more out of the restructuring of the Middle East.

The frustration of the Arabs encouraged the development of Arabism in the 1930s into a more radical direction by intellectuals. Arabism naturally became closely linked to the religion of Islam: to give their nationalism a historical dimension, they linked it with the history of Islam itself.

What helped keep the Arab cause unified was their hostility to the Jews, but their lack of success in achieving Arab unity has been a major factor in the survival of the Jewish state in the Middle East.

Emergence of the PLO: The relative failure of Arabism encouraged one of the alternatives to come to the fore; in

frustration with the lack of progress made for the poor and Arab national unity, some sought representation and action through such organizations as the Palestine Liberation Organization.

A decade after the creation of the state of Israel, it seemed to some in the Arab world that the international community and their own leaders had forgotten the Palestinian people expelled from their lands.

In 1954, a small group of Palestinians who believed that the liberation of their homeland had to come in order for Arab unity to be achieved, took the name Fatah (Arabic for conquest). The organization was led by Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir and Salah Khalaf.

In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was established to represent the Palestinians in their search for a return to their occupied lands in Israel, forming an umbrella under which other resistance groups such as Fatah could operate.

In 1969, following a disastrous war for the Arabs, the leadership of the PLO was taken over by Yasser Arafat, a man who has done more than any other to bring the Palestinian cause to the eyes of the world.

Arafat came under criticism from abroad as head of the PLO because he either condoned the violence of Palestinian resistance groups on Israel or was unable to stop it. Despite that, the PLO was given a tremendous boost in 1974 when it was recognized “as the sole representative of the Palestinian people” by the Arab league.

Later that year, Arafat himself stood at the podium of the UN in New York to address the General Assembly at the PLO was granted observer status by the United Nations Organization. With his gun holster empty, Arafat urged the UN to help the Palestinians regain their land, saying, “I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”

Six Day War of 1967: causes, course and consequences

Arab cartoon: Nasser kicking Israel into the sea

Key causes of the war:

The change of government in Syria in February 1966 The rise to power of militant Ba'thists resulted in increasingly hostile rhetoric at a time

when already bad Syrian-Israeli border relations were deteriorating. Conflict embarked in August 1966 when Israel and Syria clashed in a fierce battle in the area of the Sea of Galilee.

The Syrian and Egyptian Pact of November 1966 The defence pact boosted Syria's confidence and both Syria and Egypt continued fedayeen

operations against Israel from Jordan. This increased Israel's threat perception which made Israel adopt a more hard-line security response. Consequently, Israel launched its most extensive operation since the Sinai Campaign when the IDF, the Israel Defence Force raided the West Bank villages of As-Samu, Jimba and Khirbet Karkay.

The Israeli-Syrian air clash in 1967 Israel and Syria engaged in an air battle over Syria, in which Syria lost six MiGs. This conflict

added to the tensions and an all-out military confrontation seemed almost unavoidable. The False Soviet Intelligence Report of 1967

The Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny told Nasser's aide Anwar Sadat that Israeli troops had mobilized and intended to invade Syria, yet this was inaccurate information. However, given the defence pact of Syria and Egypt, Nasser decided to act immediately. On May 14, Egyptian troops moved in to the Sinai.

The UNEF, the United Nations Emergency Force was asked to withdraw. Yet U Thant’s insistence on either “no withdrawal or complete withdrawal” left the Egyptian-Israeli border without buffer.

The Blockade of the Straits Nasser proceeded to close the Straits, later claiming that he had no choice if he wanted to

return “things the way they were in 1956”. Nasser did not believe that his action would lead to war. Rather, he would gain a political victory and deflect Arab criticism.

The Egyptian-Jordanian Defence Pact Egypt’s aggressive intent was confirmed when Jordan joined the general mobilization,

followed by the signing of a mutual defence agreement with Egypt in May 30 1967.

By that point, Israel too had started to mobilize with the overall result of 80,000 Egyptian troops and 900 tanks, 300 Syrian tanks, 300 Jordanian tanks, and some 250,000 Israeli troops, 1,093 tanks and 2003 planes ready for action. War seemed inevitable.

Bad diplomacy Israeli public anxiety and frustration increased while diplomats tried to diffuse the crisis.

Israeli attempts to negotiate the opening of the Straits with Egyptian Vice-President Zakariya Muhieddin in Washington in June 3 failed due to increasingly hostile rhetoric from all belligerents. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was forced to hand over the defence portfolio to the Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan who then took the decision to go to war. It was clear that if Israel did not strike first, the Arabs would.

Outline of course of the war - what happened? On June 5 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive attack and the Israeli air force destroyed 304

Egyptian, 53 Syrian and 28 Jordanian aircraft, mostly on the ground. The IDF crossed into the Sinai and into the West Bank. Syria, Jordan and Egypt counter-attacked the same day and the three Arab states became

embroiled in a land battle with the Jewish state, which continued until June 10. The battle on the West Bank ended when Israel captured East Jerusalem on June 7 1967 and

troops moved to the Jordan River before King Hussein of Jordan agreed to cease-fire later in the day.

Syrian-Israeli fighting did not even start until June 9, yet "shortly after the ninth, Syria, which had contributed so much to the crisis and nothing to the conflict" also agreed to a cease fire.

The war with Egypt ended when Israeli forces occupied Sharm al-Sheikh and reached the Suez Canal.

Having lost 2,000 soldiers in the fighting with Israel and another 10,000 in the retreat, Egypt had no choice but to agree to a cease-fire on June 8 1967.

The war left Israel in control of Jordan's West Bank, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, and Syria's Golan Heights. Israel's air superiority was the most important factor in Israel's victory, followed closely by the lack of Arab coordination which enabled Israel to deal separately with Egypt, Jordan and Syria rather than having to fight a genuine three-frontal war.

Major consequences of 1967: Israel emerged from the war victorious and had increased its territory threefold and

became the dominant power in the region. Nasser had been resoundingly defeated and was no longer considered as the main threat

and Nasser saw his claim to leadership of the Arab world greatly reduced. The more radical Bathe regime in Syria started to emerge as Israel’s main regional rival,

ultimately resulting in a Syrian-Israeli arms race, which in turn, provided opportunity for greater superpower involvement.

The prestige of the Soviet Union, as Egypt’s and Syria’s ally, had also been damaged, while the United States started to see Israel as a valuable asset in the region through which to counter Soviet influence.

Pan-Arabism started to decline and the Israeli victory contributed to the to the re-focusing on particularistic Palestinian nationalism as well as placing the Palestinians back on the international agenda.

The Six Day War also provided the international community once again with the opportunity to attempt the conclusion of a regional settlement. The result of numerous sessions was UN Security Council Resolution 242 which emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of the territory by war" and acknowledged "the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from acts of force."

Resolution 242 embodied all those key elements which had to be addressed for conflict resolution: recognition, inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war, freedom from acts of force, peace and the Palestinian refugee problem. The Arabs insisted that 242 called for Israel to withdrawal from all territories, while Israel insisted it had to hold onto some of the territories in order to live within secure boundaries. This created further division between Israel and the Arab states on how to proceed.

Opposition to territorial compromise was only expressed by the Israel party Herut and the National Religious Party. "The Israelis seemed increasingly reluctant to accept a formula which would require their complete withdrawal from territories occupied in war, even if their objectives of secure frontiers, non-belligerency and freedom of navigation were conceded."

The Arab Summit in Khartoum in September 1967 decided the debate in favor of the hard-liners that advocated a continuation of the conflict in order to liberate all of Palestine: No peace with, no recognition of, and no negotiation with, Israel.

Historiography - different interpretations of this topic?

Evegny Pyrlin, the Head of the Egypt Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry at that time claims that Soviet decision-makers believed "that even if the war was not won by our side - the Egyptians - a war would be to our political advantage because the Egyptians would have demonstrated their ability to fight our weapons and with our military and political support."

Possible Question 4 formulations

using the sources and your own knowledge analyse the reasons behind the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967.

Using the sources and your own knowledge, analyse to what extent was pan-Arabism responsible for the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967.October War of 1973: causes, course and consequencesTimeline of key dates: 1967-Six day war 1968-1970 War of attrition 1973-Galili documents1973-Alliance between Syria and Egypt6th October 1973-Egyptian troops broke through the Bar Lev line fortifications and war begins23th of October-Ceasefire talks begin

Key causes of the war: Long-term1967 war-Increased tension in the region as long-term disputes between Israel and Arab states were not solved. Israeli stance after 1967:Determined to keep hold of territories won in 1967 war + wanted peace negotiations not to go through third parties such as US or UNArab states' stance after 1967:Wanted to take back occupied territories in 1967 war + favored peace negotiations through third parties PLO stance after 1967:

Did not acknowledge any peace settlements that did not take into account the Palestinian question

1969-1970 War of attrition-launched by Nasser to break the military and political deadlock in the region after 1967 war. War attrition = Sporadic clashes between Egyptian and Israeli armies, which increased tension in regionFailure of peace settlements-After the 1967 war, the US peace plans Johnson's five principles (named after the current US president Johnson) and Roger's plan fail to bring stability to the region.Short-term causes: The building of Jewish settlements in occupied territories in 1973 further increased tension and let Sadat to attack Israel. The Galili documents that were issued in 1973 further increased tension (a political policy aimed at building ever more settlements in occupied territories. It was pursued by the Israeli labour party to satisfy the pressure inside and outside the government to adopt a more radical settlement policy) the alliance between Syria and Egypt- by 1973 Syria and Egypt had concluded that they would force Israel into a peace settlement by the means of war. They made an alliance as Sadat and al-Assad (leader of Syria) recognized that they could not take on the military might of Israel on themselves.

Outline of course of the war - what happened?6th October 1973-Egyptian troops broke through the Bar Lev line fortifications and war begins. 6th of October is the Jewish festival of Yom Kippur. Consequently, the Israelis were caught off guard and the Egyptian and Syrian forces enjoyed initial success. By 9th of October, Israeli army has mobilized and they start to counter Arab advances. 11th of October Israeli forces began to advance beyond the 1967 ceasefire borders into Syria. 23th of October-Ceasefire talks begin because of international pressure on all belligerents.

Major consequences of 1973:

For Israel: War cost 7 billion dollars and killed 2700 Israeli troops Early stages of war (Arab succeeds to invade Israel) undermined Israel's self-confidence as the dominant power in the Middle East. Israeli becomes more financially and militarily dependent on the US after the war.Right-wing parties (e.g. Likud party led by Begin Menachem) in Israeli government become more popular because they advocate for a though and more aggressive + militant foreign policy as a reaction to the war. For Arab states:15 000 Egyptian soldiers killed7 000 Syrian soldiers killed

Sadat prestige was enhanced in Arab worldSadat expelled Soviet advisers and open up for cooperation with the US, which he thought could

bring durable peace to the middle east.

Historiography - different interpretations of this topic?Possible Question 4 formulationsto what extent were the conditions for the October war 1973 set up by the consequences of the 1967 war?Analyze the factors causing the October war in 1973Assess the statement that "Israel was less badly affect than Egypt by the 1973 war"Role of the United States, USSR and UNO, 1973 - 77

The role of the U.S and the USSR: -Both the U.S and the USSR had a lot of influence in this conflict.

The 1956 Suez-Sinai Campaign:

U.S: Stopped the campaign because the believed that a full-scale war would result in Soviet intervention in the Middle East.

USSR: Supported Egypt with arms, (Czech arms dealers)

The Six Day War, (1967)

U.S:

USSR: Soviet intelligence gives a false report to Egypt that Israeli troops are mobilizing in the Sinai; this in turn makes Egypt mobilize and eventually both nations go to war. Historians debate over why USSR issued the report. Some say that the report was a mistake in contrast to others who argue that USSR

deliberately issued the report to provoke a war and start up the cold war in the Middle East.

The 1973 War:

U.S: The U.S did not involve in this war because: 1. did not want to antagonize one side as the aggressor. 2. Kissinger received a letter from Sadat that this was just a limited war and the Egypt only intended to retake the land they had lost in the Six Day War.

USSR: -The USSR threatened to intervene in the conflict and this made both sides stop fighting.

Egyptian-Israeli peace process after 1973 and onwards:

-they USSR + WE meet in 1973 in Geneva for peace talks and tried to solve the conflict, but failed. The American secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, emerged as one of the lay figures promoting peace in the Middle East. Kissinger undertook a series of visits (called shuttle diplomacy) in the Middle East to persuade Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories in 1973 war. The results of his shuttle diplomacy are that Israel gradually withdrew from the Suez Canal, Golan Heights, and Gaza strip and west bank.

The UN had also a hand in the peace process. The UN Security Council decided to hold a debate on the Palestinian question and invited Arafat to speak to the UN on the behalf of the PLO. However, this had a negative impact on peace negotiations as Israelis became furious with the UN (they viewed Arafat as a terrorist). Despite Israeli discontent, the UN subsequently passed two resolutions to the crisis in the Middle East. The first resolution was the 3236 resolution, which reaffirms the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The second resolution, the 3237 resolution invites the PLO into the peace process concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. This result in more Israeli anger, but the Palestinians had been internationally recognized and the Palestinian question was on the international agenda for the first time since 1948!

-American president Jimmy Carter set up the Camp David accords (peace talks in 1978) as he wanted to reconvene the stalled Geneva conferences that were started by Kissinger and intended to solve the conflict (in the Geneva conference, all sides were invited to solve the conflict, and the USSR was the mediator). The Camp David Accords led to improvements in the relationships between the Arab states and Israel.

-But these talks fail as well due to several factors. For example, in 1977, the right-wing politician Menachem Begin and his right-wing party (Likud party) win the Israeli elections and begin to advocate for a tougher foreign policy against Arab states and Palestinians. Begin's victory was a major setback for the peace negotiations and let eventually to their failure, as Israel became

unwilling to compromise in the negotiations with its enemies.

Role of the United Nations:-The British handed over the problems and issues to the UN when they withdrew from Palestine.

-UNSCOP (United nation’s special committee on Palestine) was set up in 1941 to solve the conflict.

-UNSCOP saw the Partition Plan (divide up Palestine into 2 separate states) as the only solution to the conflict. However, there were several problems with the plan.

1. The Arabs believed that the committee was biased, they believed it favored Israel.

2. Territorial fragmentation of the states, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were not connected.

3. The Palestinians felt trapped, in the Jewish state

4. The 2 sides did not receive land proportional to their population.

5. The Zionists did not like the idea of Jerusalem being an international city.

6. The Palestinians and the Israelis both believed that territorial partition was necessary but economic unity should be retained.

-The Partition Plan did not succeed to solve the problems because of the flaws in the plan and other factors. In 1948 the Jewish Agency declared its allotted territory the state of Israel. War broke out the next day between Israel and the Palestinians/Arabs. In many ways the partition plan can be seen as a crucial factor in setting up the conditions for instability and conflicts in the region.Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace AgreementReasons for the Camp David Accords:

The potential for a stalemate had become clear after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem: While Israel blocked any proposed clauses in favour of an independent Palestinian entity in an attempt to retain the West Bank; Egypt demanded Israel's recognition of the Palestinian's right to self-rule.

Carter called a summit at Camp David which neither Israel nor Egypt could reject as the invitation had been from the US president personally.

The Peace Agreement: The negotiations lasted from 5th to 17th of September 1978 and two days before the end of

the negotiations Sadat threatened to withdraw. Two agreements were concluded:1. Israel would give up the Sinai, including settlements and airfields.2. "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" based upon resolutions 242 and 338, the

resolution to the Palestinian problem, good neighborly relations as well as Palestinian autonomy in the West bank (excluding Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian autonomy was interpreted by Carter and Sadat, a Palestinian self-governing authority, freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was to replace

the Israeli military administration. However Begin interpreted this as no more than "personal autonomy"- the problems with the peace agreement had already started to take place.

During a five-year transition period the final status of the territories’ was to be negotiated. 1979, 26th of March- the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed.

Results: Sadat had cut Egypt off from the rest of the Arab world by signing the treaty and Israel was

faced with the energy of a new radical right, determined to fight against Camp David. It soon after became clear that Begin had no intentions of decreasing Israeli control over the

West Bank and Gaza Strip and as a result, the negotiations on the autonomy scheme only continued for a short period and was cancelled by the end of 1979.

US became involved in the emerging Iranian Revolution, US hostage crisis in November 1979 and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December and were unable to put pressure on Israel.

Implications of Peace: Arab leaders had to decide whether to participate in the negotiations or be left out. In the end

only Egypt preceded and the general Arab reaction to the peace settlement turned into open hostility.

The PLO became increasingly determined in its quest for Palestinian self-determination and for the West Bank Palestinians it became clear that the Egyptian-Israeli agreement confirmed continued Israeli rule.

Sadat's successor, Mubarak, upheld the peace agreement with Israel and Egypt became the first Arab state to make peace with Israel.

The Egyptian boycott on Israel was lifted and started selling oil. 1974, US President Nixon offered both Egypt and Israel help with civil nuclear power. The treaty provided Israel with security and stability along its southern border and thereby

freed-up the country's limited resources. The treaty removed the Arab country with the largest military forces from the Arab-Israeli

conflict. The Arab League imposed economic and political boycott on Egypt and membership

became suspended. The lack of rapid economic growth as had been promised to the Egyptian population left

Sadat open to criticism and eventually assassinated in October 1981. Failure of the treaty to establish Palestinian autonomy led to Israel's continued settlement

policies and annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981 as well as Israel's invasion of Lebanon 1982.

Historiography: The negotiations:

"An emotional ceremony in the East Room of the White House late on 17 September 1978"- Bailey.

The Palestinians: "You cannot expect millions of Arab Palestinians to go away, or to be content with

occupation, or to acquiesce to an Israeli, Egyptian, or an American, idea of their destiny, their "autonomy", or their physical location"- Edward Said.

Egyptian response: Sadat "had abandoned the Palestinian cause in order to recover the Sinai"- Tessler.