Panikar-Religious Symbols&Political Mobilization

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Social Scientist

Religious Symbols and Political Mobilization: The Agitation for a Mandir at AyodhyaAuthor(s): K. N. PanikkarSource: Social Scientist, Vol. 21, No. 7/8 (Jul. - Aug., 1993), pp. 63-78Published by: Social ScientistStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3520346 .

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K. N. PANIKKAR'

Religious Symbolsand Political Mobilization:The Agitationfor a Mandir at Ayodhya

The secular polity of India was considerably convulsed by themobilization of Hindus around the construction of a temple atAyodhya. Launched and led by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP),with the active support and participation of the Bharatiya JanataParty (BJP) and the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), thetemple campaign was religious only in form but political in content. Itwas a project pursued in religious idiom by the BJP and its frontorganisations, collectively called the Sangh Parivar, for politicalends. In 1991, the BJP'smain electoral plank was the Hindu demand forthe temple at Ayodhya. This nexus between religion and politicsproved to be extremely rewarding to the BJP-it won as many as 118seats in the parliament and emerged as the main opposition. Moreimportantly, it came to power in four north Indian states-UttarPradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh-andrecorded its presence in almost all other states.The Ayodhya movement enabled the BJP to expand its electoralbase rather suddenly. In the past, the BJPand its predecessors had notfound much favour with the electorate, despite their efforts tochampion the Hindu interests. In fact, when the BJP had fought theelection without allying with other parties, it had managed to winonly two seats in the parliament. The Mandir agitation accounted for arather dramatic change in its fortunes.The dispute over the Masjid, constructed in 1528 by Mir Baqui, anoble of Babur's court, had simmered for long, at least since 1885 whenlitigation had begun for the right to property in the area.1 Whatbrought about a qualitative change in the dispute was thesurreptitious installation of an idol of Ramlalla inside the mosque in1949. Ayodhya thus became a potential site of religious confrontationbetween the Hindus and the Muslims. The BJP effectively exploitedthis potential in its quest for political power. A dispute which had* Centre for HistoricalStudies, JawaharlalNehru University,New Delhi.


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64 SOCIALSCIENTISTremained dormant for about forty years was enlivened by the BJPandtransformed into a 'national' issue, imbueing it with cultural andpolitical significance. An important factor which made thistransformation possible was the mobilising potential of religioussymbols constantly brought into play by the sangh parivar.

IMuch before the sangh parivar had launched the Ayodhya agitationreligion had intruded into the domain of Indian politics. Theseparation of religion and politics evisioned in the Constitution andincorporated in the People's Representation Act of 1951 was flounderedin actual practice. The religious denominational parties like theHindu Maha Sabha and the Muslim League functioned within thesecular polity. They not only championed the aspirations and interestsof their respective communities but also invoked religion in pursuit oftheir political interests particularly during the elections. Such atendency was not confined to these parties alone. Very few could resistthe temptation to take recourse to religion for electoral gains.This departure from the secular premises of the Constitution waslinked with three important factors. The increasing religiosity inIndian society, the decreasing popular base of the Indian NationalCongress and the ambivalent nature of secularism as practised by thestate. The religious politics of the sangh parivar, although occurred inthis context, was qualitatively different from the earlier politicalpractice in its assumptions, goals and articulation.The post-independence Indian polity built around the principles ofdemocracy and secularism had nurtured the notion of territorialnationalism. Political opportunism had often led to deviation from thedemocratic and secular ideals, particularly since the primeministership of Indira Gandhi. Yet, the making of the nation throughthe integration of various nationalities and communities was notentirely given up.In contrast, the sangh parivar promoted the concept of culturalnationalism as the positive nationalism of India.3 The ideologicalinspiration for such a view was first provided by V.D. Savarkar in hisattempt to define the Hindu and the Hindutva. Quoting from theVishnu Purana, he had defined Bharat as 'the land which is to thenorth of the sea and to the south of the Himalaya mountain' in whichthe descendants of Bharata inhabited.4 The Hindus, according to himare those who considered Bharat as their punnyabhumi (holy landand pithrubhumi (fatherland). His conception of Hindutva wasintegral to this notion of Hindu, even if he held that 'Hinduism is onlya derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva'.5 This distinctionhowever, did not mean that members of other religious denominationshave space within Hindutva:


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RELIGIOUSYMBOLSAND POLITICALMOBILIZATION 65

It is clear that their (Muslims and Christians)original Hindu bloodis thus almost unaffected by an alien adulteration,yet they cannotbe called Hindus in the sense in which that term is actuallyunderstood,because, we Hindus are bound togethernot only by thetie of the love we bear to a common fatherland and by the commonblood thatcourses throughour veins and keeps our heartsthrobbingand our affectionswarm,but also by the tie of the common homagewe pay to our greatcivilization-our Hindu culture,which could notbe better rendered than by the word sanskriti,which has been thechosen means of expression and preservation of the culture, of allthat was best and worth preserving in the history of our race. Weare one because we area nation, a race and own a common sanskriti(civilization).6The sangh parivar's concept of cultural nationalism thus had itsorigins in Savarkarwhich was elaborated by Guru Golwalker in hisbook entitled, We or Our NationhoodDefined n 1939.7Arguing that inIndia culture and religion are synonymous, Golwalker had sought toestablish a connection between culture, religion and nation. He hadasserted that 'in Hindustan, the land of the Hindu, lives and shouldlive the Hindu nation .... consequently only those movementsare truely'national'as aim at rebuilding, revitalizing and emancipating from itspresent stupor the Hindu nation'.8Golwalker's dea of the assertion of'Indian nationalism', was not limited to a Hindu awakening; it alsomeant a subordination, even extermination, of non-Hindus. Hisattitudetowardsnon Hindus was:The foreign races in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu cultureand language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindureligion, must entertainno idea but those of the glorificationof theHindu race and culturei.e. of the Hindu nation and must loose theirseparate existence to merge in the Hindu race, or may stay in thecountry, wholly subordinatedto the Hindu nation,claiming nothing,deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment-noteven citizen's rights.9Abjuringthus the philosophy of universalism and respect for otherreligions which Hinduism had developed over centuries, Golwalkertried to conceptualisea Hindu Rastrabased on Hindu solidarityon theone hand and hatred of non-Hindus on the other. Despite thedistinction made by K.R. Malkani, a BJPideologue, between Hindustate and Hindu country,10the sangh parivar'spolitical programmeand goals are clearly inspired by Golwalker's ideas. According toAshok Singhal, the President of the VHP, 'A lasting government willbe a Hindu government. If people do not like it, they can go to thecountry of their choice. Otherwise they must live at the mercy of theHindus.'9A They have, during the last few years, pursued the


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66 SOCIAL SCIENTISTmobilizationof Hindus by forging internalsolidarity and externalisingnon-Hindus, particularlythe Muslims.

IIDespite the efforts of the nineteenth century reform movements toimpart a semitic character to Hinduism and to introduce ahomogeneous form of worship on monotheistic lines, an integrationofHindus did not really materialize. They remained fragmented andpluralistic. The revivalist movements also did not bring about anyappreciable change. The success of the rather aggressive efforts oflater Hindu organizations, both cultural and political, to fostercommunity consciousness have also been limited. The influence of theRSS, the militant Hindu cultural organisation, active since 1925, hasnot gone much beyond the upper caste circles. The Hindu MahaSabhaafter a long period of marginalexistencebecame defunct and JanSanghhardly made any impact on Indian polity. The Hindus were obviouslyguided by considerations other than religion in their politicalperspective. In other words, a connection between religious identityand political interest had not become part of the consciousness ofHindus.The Hindutva movement unleashed by the sangh parivarwas anattempt to create such a connection. Efforts to foster Hindu solidarityand identity were on the anvil for quite sometime;11 the RSS hadexplored several areas and employed religious symbols like trisul toarouse Hindus to action. None of them had led to a felt need to actunitedly, either for the Hindus or against the Muslims.The movement for the construction of a temple at Ayodhya toreplace the Babri Masjid, initiated by the VHP, brought about aqualitative change. It touched a sympathetic chord in the mind ofHindus, even in areas where worship of Ramawas not popular. Thiswas possible because Ayodhya was imbued with a symbolic meaning,both about the self as well as the 'other'.The necessary pre-requisitefor this was to establish Ayodhya as essentially Hindu by linking itwith the legend of Rama.Towards this end the present day Ayodhyawas identified as the Ayodhya of Valmiki's Ramayana whichunderlined its antiquity as well as its sanctity,being the birth place ofRama. That historical evidence did not bear out this claim was hardlyimportant as faith rather than reason or historical proof was invokedfor support.12 An historian of the Hindutva camp spelt out the'rationale' as follows:

In religion, it is a matter of faithand not of proof ... so by faith andfaith alone Christians embraceJesus Christ to be the son of God, byfaith and faith alone Muslims believe Muhammad to be theProphet of Allah, and by faith and faith alone Hindus believeRamajanmabhumin Ayodhya to be the birthplace of LordRam.13


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RELIGIOUS YMBOLSAND POLITICALMOBILIZATION 67The sanctity thus attributed to Ayodhya not only underlined itsHinduness but also made the construction of the Muslim-other easier.The alleged destruction of the temple by Babur was not just a

desecration of an ordinary place of worship but a grave assault onHindu faith itself.14 Ayodhya was projected as a symbol of thatassault which injured the religious feelings of the Hindus. By referringto the Muslims as Babur Ke Santan (children of Babur), the Muslimcommunity as a whole was held responsible for acting against theHindu faith. The Babri Masjid was thus embedded in Hinduconsciousness as a symbol of Muslim aggression against the Hindus andtheir religion. It also represented the collective humiliation of Hinduswhich remained unmitigated for centuries. Ayodhya therefore becamea site for constructing Hindu solidarity and avenging the Muslimwrong. The effective communication of this dual meaning enabled theHindutva to advance.The strategy of mobilisation employed by the sangh parivar was toclarify and communicate the symbolic meaning of Ayodhya through aseries of public interventions during 1989 to 1992, from Ram shila pujaon 30 September 1988 to the demolition of the Masjid on 6 December1992. The dual meaning of Ayodhya-a symbol of Hindu identity andMuslim atrocity-became socially visible through these interventions;more importantly, participation in them facilitated theirinternalisation as well, just as salt satyagraha had made nationalismintelligible to the common man. It was this intelligibility which madeAyodhya a powerful mobilising force.The Ram shila puja performed from 30 September to 6 November1988 was a turning point for the Hindutva movement. It confirmed theassumption that Ayodhya could serve as a powerful symbol for Hinducommunal mobilisation, 'a channel through which the slumberingpride of being a Hindu could be invoked.'15 The unprecedented responsethe VHP received was as much due to religious appeal as itsorganisational ability. The message of the puja, planned in everyvillage-5,00,028 in number-was intended to reach every Hinduwhose active involvement with the movement was to be soughtthrough a 'token minimum offering of Rs. 1.25'.16 Ashok Singhal, hadexpected about 250 million people to participate in it.17 Writing inOrganiser, the BJP mouthpiece, B.K. Kelkar clarified the purpose ofthe puja:

Firstly, it is a mass contact and mobilization programme whichemotionally involves and integrates the Hindu society to a nationalcause. It is a programme which connects every individual to thenational memorial of Shri Ram. In a way it is a memorial whichwill be built by mass participation brick by brick. Thirdly, thedharmacharyas of all the sects of Hinduism have come together on


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68 SOCIALSCIENTISTa common platform and are actively participating in massmobilisation of Hindus.18The Ram shila puja consisted of two distinct phases. First was theconsecration and worship of bricks, inscribed with the name of Rama.For organising the consecration the entire country was divided intoUpakhandas, Khandas and Prakhandas. An Upakhanda covered 2000people, a Khanda which consisted of five Upakhandas had apopulation of 10,000 and ten Khandas made up a Prakhanda of 100,000people.19 The cadres of the Sangh Parivar taking charge of thisstructure, the VHP was able to make the puja a national event.According to the Indian Express, the Puja was actually held in 3,50,000places.20The pujas were followed by Mahayagnas in every Prakhandawhich in effect was a site for propaganda-prachar and pradarshini,according to Nanaji Bhagwat, the all India convenor of Shila puja.21Apart from exhibitions, meetings were held at Yagnasthals for women,youth and sants. The booklets, leaflets and posters in thesepradarshinis were intended either to arouse hostility to the Muslimsor to underline the unity and militancy of the Hindus. A commonrefrain of the propaganda was that the Hindus have fought 76 battlesto recover the Ramjanmabhumi temple in which they have lost three

lakhs lives.24Once the consecration was over, the bricks were wrapped in saffronclothes and displayed in a temple or a public place. They now became'idols' of worship and aroused considerable religious frenzy. Womenwho were quite prominent in the puja danced and sang bhajans. Therefrain of one of the Bhajan was, Saugandh Ram ki khate hai/hummandir wahim banayenge (We swear by Ram. We will build thetemple there).23The second phase of the puja was processions in which Ram shilaswere carried around in different localities for eventual transmission toAyodhya. The procession was an important part of the strategy ofmobilization. It implied a transition in participation from religious toa public space, ensuring thus an open commitment to the cause. Thegreater visibility of processions could also transmit the message to alarger audience. A journalist travelling through the interior of UttarPradesh had observed:

I saw numerous small processions, with bricks displayed on the topof vehicles, winding through villages and towns rousing thereligious fervour of the Hindus and insecurity among the Muslims.Many roadside shops have sprung up to sell flowers and coconuts forpuja and many Hindus stood on the two sides of roads to pay homagewith folded hands when bricks were carried past them.24


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RELIGIOUSYMBOLSAND POLITICALMOBILIZATION 69The sense of insecurity among the Muslims was an alarmingconsequence of the puja. More dangerous, however, was the'subterranean tension' it created between the Hindus and Muslims

throughout the country.25 Even the VHP did not rule out thepossibility of communal riots.26 While riots did occur in MadhyaPradesh, the other parts of India lived in fear.27 But to the sanghparivar,it opened the road. One symbol of Ayodhya has been testedand foundrewarding;more could follow.IV

The VHP's programme of Hinduisation and anti-Muslim propagandacontinued unabated even after the shila puja.The posters, stickers andaudio-video tapes the VHP produced aplenty beseiged homes andmarket places with the Ayodhya message.28 'They swampedindividuals in their ubiquity, contriving a sense of the irresistible tideof Hindutva'.29 They prepared the ground for a more intensemobilisation undertaken by the BJPPresident, Lal Krishna Advani,through a Rathyatrafrom Spmnathto Ayodhya.The Rathyatrawhich began at Somnath on 25 September 1991 wasscheduled to end at Ayodhya on 30 Octoberaftertraversing10,000kmsthrough seven states-Gujarat, Maharastra, Andhra Pradesh,Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan,Bihar and Uttar Pradesh-apart fromthe national capital.30The yatra-'Advani's road show', as the TimesofIndia described it-covered 300 kms daily and Advani on an averageaddressed six public meetingsa day.31The choice of Somnath as the starting point of the yatra had apowerful symbolic value, made evident by repeated references to it asthe target of Muslim tyrannyagainst the Hindus.32The intention wasto contextualise Ayodhya in the historical lineage of Muslimaggression and then to seek legitimacy for Mandir movement bydrawing a parallel. The parallel the sangh parivar drew was withthe reconstruction of the Somnath temple, 'sanctioned by the UnionCabinet, presided over by JawaharlalNehru'.33Advani, in one of hisspeeches, claimed to inherit the mantle of Sardar Patel who hadbrought about a 'resurgenceof the national spirit' by rebuilding theSomnath temple.34Thus by linking Somnath with Ayodhya, the Rathyatrabecame a symbol of just not one 'historicalwrong'but a series ofatrocities committed by the Muslims. It also became the symbol of theHindu resolve to reclaim the temple at Ayodhya as they did atSomnath. In communicating these meanings, either by word or deed,the Rath yatra left nothing to chance.Advani set off on his 36-day-long dharmayuddha,as the yatra wasdescribed by the sangh parivar,on 25 September, according to theOrganiser,amidst tumultous scenes of 'frenzied religious sentimentsand militant national fervour':


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RELIGIOUSYMBOLSAND POLITICALMOBILIZATION 71fight, with Babur and his descendants replacing Ravana and histroops.The call for Hindu aggression was not limited to Advani's verbalassault, the volunteers of the sangh parivar underlined theirmilitancy through action. At Ahmedabad one of them pierced his armwith a trishul and with his blood put a tilak on Advani's forehead. AtJetpur a kalash (pitcher) full of blood was presented to him by 101volunteers of Bajrang Dal. At almost every stop he was 'armed' withinnumerable bows and arrows, discs, maces, swords, trisuls and kirpansthat Promod Mahajan, the propaganda in-charge, was so moved toobserve that. 'If we are to use all the weapons presented to us, we canliberate the Ramjanmabhumi in a day'.42 As the yatra progressed, thestature of Rama steadily grew to be 'India's greatest national hero'.43At Mandasaur, a small town in Madhya Pradesh, Pramod Mahajan,with Advani nodding in acquiescence and hundreds of youthsbrandishing their swords and trishuls asked the Muslims 'to eitherhave faith in Lord Ram or else leave the country'.44 And at BombayBal Thackeray, the Shiv Sena chief, while welcoming the yatrathreatened to wipe out the 'unholy green', if the temple constructionwas obstructed.45 The awakening of Hindus was not only in defence ofRam but also against Babur and his 'clan'.The justification of Advani to embark upon his journey to arouse 'thenational spirit', despite the repeated pleas from almost all quarters ofthe country, was that it would act as a unifying rather than a divisiveforce. The actual experience proved otherwise; Advani's Rath turnedout to be 'a chariot of fire'.46From the very beginning the yatra createdtension between the Hindus and Muslims, even in localities farremoved from its route.47 Between 1 September and 20 November, 116communal riots occurred in which 564 people died. The details are asfollows:48

State/ Number of Number ofUnion Territory riots people killedAndhra Pradesh 4 27Assam 1 7Bihar 8 19Delhi - 8Cujarat 26 99Karnataka 22 88Kerala 2 3Madhya Pradesh 5 21Maharashtra 3 4Rajasthan 13 52Tamilnadu 1 6Tripura 1Uttar Pradesh 28 224West Bengal 2 6


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72 SOCIALSCIENTISTSuch widespread incidence of communal riots, covering almost thewhole of India, was a result of religious hatred generated by the Rathyatra. Even if Advani was not able to reach Ayodhya-Advani was

arrested in Bihar-the Rath yatra ensured an unprecedentedmobilization of Hindus, with their religious passion aroused againstthe Muslims. Being a Hindu began to pervade even secular domains ofexistence, as evident from what an Army Captain told a newspapercorrespondent: 'My men are all Hindus. I may have to order them tofire on fellow Hindus in a religious procession. I do not like it'.49Enthused by the success of Ram shila puja and Rath yatra the sanghparivar tried to keep alive the connection with Ayodhya through aseries of other symbols associated with Rama-Rama Jyoti, RamaPaduka, Rama Prasad, Rama Pataka, Rama Gulal and so on. Amongthem the Rama Jyoti programme, controlled by a group of one thousandSadhus and Mahants, was particularly effective. The Rama Jyoti is atorch lit at Ayodhya, multiplied into many torches and then sent tothousands of villages where people were expected to light theirDeepavali lamps with them... The idea was similar to that of Ramashila, but in reverse gear and hence with greater sanctity, as the jyotiunlike the shila, had originated at Ayodhya. In some regions the jyoticould be easily incorporated into the traditional practice of rituallighting of evening lamp. A senior police official felt that Rama jyotiwas potentially more dangerous than Rath yatra which went througha pre-chartered route covering highways, while Rama jyoti wouldpenetrate remote villages, thus making it virtually impossible tomonitor.50 Mainly organised by the Bajrang Dal, it became aprogramme to demonstrate 'Hindu muscle and pyromania.'51For about three years the sangh parivar constantly kept in view onesymbol or the other to ensure that Ayodhya remained within focus andthus to keep the Hindus mobilised. The mobilisation, though in thename of Rama and Ayodhya was not for a religious cause, but for apolitical goal. At the time of Rath yatra Bhanu Kumar Shastri, aformer Member of Parliament, had told the Times of India: 'Theelection campaign has begun. The real question is whether or not RamBhakti will translate into votes'.52

VThe mobilisation of Hindus by invoking their religious identity andinterests deeply affected the political and cultural foundations of theIndian Republic. It also disrupted the political process which soughtto draw together people belonging to diverse cultural ambience andreligious persuasions into a nation. The historical experience duringthe anti-colonial struggle, despite the divisive tendencies within it,had set this process in motion. By basing itself on principles ofdemocracy and secularism, the Constitution imparted to this process a


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RELIGIOUSYMBOLSAND POLITICALMOBILIZATION 73tangible institutional form. The principles embodied in theConstitution were neitherhurriedlyconceived nor accidentlyadopted.They were the outcome of a conscious choice of the people, as reflectedin the prolonged deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. Thischoice is particularly significant, since it was made in the wake ofunprecedented communal violence following the partition of India.Despite this experience-or was it because of it?-the democratic andsecular legacy of the national movement as well as the plural andcomposite cultural traditions were adopted as the guiding spirit of theRepublic.The prospects of a Hindu state-a logical extension of the claimthat India is a country of the Hindus-implicit in the Hindutvamovement has noticeably undermined this spirit, creating not only achasm but also distrust and suspicion between the Hindus andMuslims.53 The mutual accommodation and respect which earliercharacterised the communitarian relations have now given way toexclusiveness and hatred.The rationale for the claim that India is a Hindu country is thatHindus form an over-whelming majorityof the population. Thattherewas no 'Hindu' before the Muslims came to India-there were only alarge number of sects, none of them eitherknown or called themselvesas Hindu-deprives this claim any historical justification.54Even ifthe origin of Hinduism is located in the Vedic and Puranictraditions,amajorityof those who are now designated as Hindus are outside theirpale, in both religious and social practices.The Hindu scripturesandtheir commentaries, though employed as instruments of castedomination and exploitation,are pertinentto the socio-religiouslife ofonly a numericallysmall sectionof Brahminsand upper castes. Inotherwords, the majorityof Hindus, even in religious terms, are not part ofthe Hindu majority.The majoritarianismas a justification for Hinduassertion is, therefore, inconsistent with the heterogeneity whichmarks the social and religious practices of those who constitute themajority.The majoritarianism-the right of 82 per cent of Hindus-isnot in conformitywith the internalreality of Hinduism itself.The majoritarianism, however, has strong alienating andghettoising impact on the Muslims. At least a good number of themseem to concede the sanghparivar's laim that Indiais a countryof theHindus.55 Although in absolute terms the Muslim population is verylarge-about 120 million-the pattern of demographic distribution issuch that they are highly vulnerable to Hindu attacks. In almostevery communal riot the casualty of Muslims is invariably higherthan that of the Hindus. The increasingincidence of riots in the recentpast has heightened the sense of fear and insecurity among theMuslims. The secular consensus which prevailed in the post-independence period, despite occasional tensions and riots, has beeneffectively fractured by the Hindutva to suggest that unless the


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74 SOCIALSCIENTISTMuslims submitted to the will of the majority, they are likely to bethe targets of the awakened Hindu militancy.The assertion of Hindutva assumed a menacing trajectory because ofthe increasing inability of Indian state to adhere to secular principlesin governance and its obvious propensity to compromise withcommunalism, either for electoral support or for overcoming a crisis.56For quite some time, the appeasement of communal forces, both Hinduand Muslim, has been a conscious policy of the state. The examples aremany: Shah Bano case, the permission granted for namaz in protectedmonuments, the opening of the Babari Masjid for Hindu worship andthe Shilanyas at Ayodhya are only some of them. None of these stepscontributed to the containment of communalism, they only helped in itsconsolidation. Moreover the communally partisan attitude of stateapparatuses, particularly the bureaucracy and the police, enhancedthe striking power of Hindu communal forces.57

VIThe strategy of mobilisation pursued by the sangh parivar marked adeparture from the norms essential for the functioning of thedemocratic polity and society. The force of public opinion being adecisive factor in a democracy campaigning for its support is alegitimate method for realising political and religious goals. Theinformation it disseminates and debate it generates enables citizens tcmake their choice. Its purpose is to enhance freedom and not to curb it.The sangh parivar's strategy of mobilisation did exactly the oppositeby incorporating an element of coercion in it. Each mobilisationprogramme-from Ram shila puja to Karsevaon 6 December-was moboriented, creating deindividualised, irrational and violentparticipants. A decision was thus pressed through force.The coercive character of mobilisation was not confined to thepolitical, it embraced the domain of religion as well. The Mandir-Masjid controversy was firmly anchored in religious faith and as suchsupporting the movement for the retrieval of the temple was projectedas a religious obligation. A believing Hindu could not easily dissociatehimself from this compulsion and thus he was unconsciously led toendorse the Hindutva programme, even if he did not subscribe tocommunal politics. This clearly implied violence to religious faith.Another trait which underlined the Hindu mobilisation was theemphasis on the irrational. By invoking faith as the only criterion forlocating the temple at the Masjid site, the Hindutva not only tried todismiss facts and evidence as inconsequential but also distanced itselffrom the rational. The principal thrust of the movement was fosteringidolatry, which the religious reformers of the nineteenth century hadrejected as irrational and inconsistent with scriptural prescriptions.


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RELIGIOUS YMBOLSAND POLITICALMOBILIZATION 75The irrational character of the movement is heightened by

isolating it from the realities of material life. None of the vital socialor economic problems facing the people figured in the campaign. Thestarvation deaths of tribals in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh,lack of drinking water in Rajasthan and cold wave deaths due toinadequate clothing in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar were outside theHindutva concern when the Rath yatra traversed through theseregions. Understandably so because focus on them might change thepriorities of the people.The twin features of Hindu mobilisation-irrationality andcoercion-are reminiscent of the fascist experience in Europe. Theobservation of Theodore Adoro is instructive in this respect.58

The fascist propaganda is psychological because of its irrationalauthoritarian aims which cannot be attained by means of rationalconvictions but only through the skilful awakening of 'a portion ofthe subjects' archaic inheritance'. . . The objective aims of fascismare largely irrational in so far as they contradict the materialinterest of great number of those whom they try to embrace... Sinceit would be impossible for fascism to win the masses throughrational arguments, its propaganda must necessarily be deflectedfrom discursive thinking; it must be oriented psychologically, andhas to mobilise irrational, unconscious, regressive processes.

NOTESAND REFERENCES1. For details of this dispute see Sushil Srivastava,The DisputedMosque,NewDelhi, 1990.2. The idol was placed in the mosque with the active connivance of the districtmagistrate,K.K.Nayar, who later became a member of Parliament on a Jana

Sangh ticket. VallabhabhaiPatel, the then home minister had described thisas a 'unilateralactionbased on an attitudeof aggressionand coercion.Yet, thestate did not act to removethe idol. A.G.Norrani,'LegalAspects of the Issue' nS. Gopal (ed), Anatomy f a Confrontation,ew Delhi, 1991,pp. 58-98, and S.K.Tripati, 'One Hundred Years of Litigation'in Ashghar Ali Engineer, Babri-Masjid-Ramjanmabhumiontroversy,Delhi, 1990.3. K.N. Panikkar, Cultureand Communalism'SocialScientist,March-April,1993,vol. 21,nos. 34, pp. 24-31.4. V.D. Savarkar,Hindutva,1989Edition,p. 13. Hindutvawas first published in1924.5. Ibid.,p. 3.6. Ibid.,pp. 91-92. Also see B.D. Graham,HinduNationalismand IndianPolitics,Cambridge,1990,pp. 44-45.7. For an analysis of Golwalkar's ideas in this book see, Sitaram Yechuri,Frontline, 12 March 1993. The Sangh Parivar claims that this highlyprovocativebook which practicallyadvocates the exterminationof non-Hinduswas withdrawn from circulation.Buta new editionwas publishedin 1947.8. Quoted in J.A.Curran,MilitantIlinduism n IndianPolitics:A Study of theRSS,New York,1951.


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76 SOCIALSCIENTIST9. Quotedin B.D.Graham,op.cit,p. 46.9A Interview, Frontline, 5 March1994.10. K.R. Malkani, The Politics of Ayodhyaand Hindu-MuslimRelation, Preface,New Delhi, 1993.

11. K.N. Panikkar, Communalism n India-A Perspective or Intervention,NewDelhi, 1991.12. These unsubstantiatedclaims have been questioned and rejectedby historiansand archaeologists.For a recent discussion of archaeologicalevidence see D.Mandal, Ayodhya:ArchaeologyAfter Demolition,New Delhi, 1991.13. K.S.Lal, 'Ramjanmabhumi-Some ssues',Organiser,October,1989.14. In projecting this idea the VHP shifted the terrain from faith to historicalfacts.In the memorandum ubmitted o thegovernment he VHPproduceda longlist of documents to prove the destructionof the temple. It also came up veryfrequently with archaeologicalevidence unearthed by Karsevaks,D. Mandal,op.cit.15. Timesof India,10 October,1989.16. Organiser, October1989.Accordingto AshokSinghal82.9million people havemade theiroffering.Interview,Frontline, 5 March 1994.17. NationalHerald,5 October, 1989.18. B.K.Kelkar, FranklySpeaking'.Organiser, October 1989.19. NewAge,8 October1989.20. IndianExpress, 1October,1989.21. Ibid.22. Organiser, Oct. 1989.Historydoes not recordany battle in Ayodhya betweenthe Hindus and Muslimsover the BabriMasjidand no lives were lost beforetheVHP came on the scene. The only armed conflictwas in 1855which was abouthe Hanumangarhitemple and not about BabriMasjid. For details see K.N.Panikkar, A HistoricalOverview'in S. Gopal (ed), op.cit, 23-33.23. IndianExpress, November 1989.24. KuldeepNayarin Tribune, 2October1989.25. NationalHerald,5 October,1989.26. HindustanTimes,5 October,1989.27. HindustanTimes,10Octoberand Times fIndia,10 October 1989.28. Fordetails sec TapanBasu et al, Khakhi hortsand SaffronFlags,New Delhi,1933,pp. 56-109.29. Ibid.,p. 60.30. Forthe actualroute of the Yatra see Appendix1.31. Times fIndia,25 Septemberand 14 October1990.32. Tribune,8 October 1990.The temple of Somnath was plundered by MahmudGazni in 1025. The motive, however was more economic than religious, astemples at that time were depositories of large quantities of wealth, in cash,gold and jewellery.33. K.R.Malkhani,op.cit, p. 12.34. Tribune, October1990.35. Organiser,4 October1990.36. For an excellent study of this change in Rama'simage see Anuradha Kapur,'Dietyto Crusader:The ChangingIconographyof Ram' n GyanendraPandey,(ed)Hindusand Others,New Delhi, 1993,pp. 74-107.37. Telegraph,4 October1990.38. Tribune, October1990.39. IndianExpress, 7 September1990.40. Telegraph,4 October 1990.41. TimesofIndia,11 October1990.42. Organiser,4 October1990.43. Telegraph, 4 October 1990.


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RELIGIOUS YMBOLSAND POLITICALMOBILIZATION 7744. Ibid.45. Ibid.46. Trnbune,October1990.47. SundayObserver,4Octoberand Tribune,2 October1990.48. Divided We Stand-A Dossier on Masjid-MandirConflict,prepared by DelhiForum,New Delhi, 1992.49. PeterHillmore n TheObserver, ondon,20 October1990.50. TheStatesman, 0 September,1990.51. Ibid.52. Timesof India,14 October1990.53. '... the auraand atmosphereof Indiawill now increasinglybe authenticIndianand not syntheticsecular'.K.R.Malkhani,op.cit., preface.54. RomilaThapar,InterpretingEarlyIndia,New Delhi, 1992,pp. 60-80.55. SeveralMuslim leaders are now eager to seek an accommodationwith Hinducommunal forces. There is an increasing trend among them to accept the

demolition of Babri Masjid in lieu of a promise to protect other mosques,particularlythose at Benaresand Mathura.56. For details see K.N. Panikkar,Communalismn India: History, Politics andCulture, ntroduction,New Delhi, 1991,pp. 1-16.57. Duringthe last few years the police force has been increasinglycommunalised.It became distinctly visible during the 1984 riots in Delhi. Subsequently, thepolicehas actedcommunallyon severaloccasions; heir role in the recentriots inAgra, Suratand Bombayare perhapsthe worst. At Ayodhya when a group ofBajrangDal volunteerstoreup an exhibitionput up by a culturalorganisation,Sahmat,on the pretextof injured religious feelings the policemen posted theredid not do anythingto preventthe vandalism.58. TheodorW.Adorno:TheCultureIndustry,London,1991,pp. 119 and 129.


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Panikar-Religious Symbols&Political Mobilization

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