Pandemic preparedness: What can epidemiological modelling offer policy? Nim Arinaminpathy Department...
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Transcript of Pandemic preparedness: What can epidemiological modelling offer policy? Nim Arinaminpathy Department...
Pandemic preparedness:What can epidemiological modelling offer policy?Nim Arinaminpathy
Department of Zoology
University of Oxford
Talk plan
Influenza: a background
From today to emergence of a novel influenza virus
Antiviral drugs for control of pandemic influenza
Influenza
RNA virus
Clinical manifestations:Headache, sore throat, chills, fever, myalgia, anorexia, malaise
TransmissionBy contact with respiratory droplets, generated by coughing or sneezing
Infectiousnesscan start a day before symptoms and continue for 3 – 5 days after symptoms developing in adults
The seasonal influenza burden Disease:
5 – 15% of population affected with upper respiratory tract infections in annual ‘flu season
Estimated 3-4,000 annual deaths in UK caused by influenza infection (mainly elderly and immunocompromised)
The Economy: Europe: flu accounts for ~10% of sick leave Costs US estimated $90bn a year
Influenza family tree
Orthomyxoviridae
Influenza
A B C
H1N1H3N2
…
Type
Subtype
From http://www.abc.net.au/health
…
Pandemic and seasonal influenza
Taken from www.en.influenza.pl
Social and economic disruption
Social and economic disruption
H5N1: Future pandemic?
Wild bird reservoir Poultry Humans Transmitted from bird to human by inhaling dried aerosolised
faeces First major outbreak in 1997, Hong Kong Resurgence in 2003 has seen virus established in poultry in
South-East Asia So far human-to-human spread is non-existent or very limited 387 human cases, 245 deaths to date Wide geographical spread, from S.E.Asia (inc. Indonesia, Viet
Nam) to Africa (Nigeria, Egypt) However, H7N7 and N9N2 are also pandemic candidates
Evolution and emergence of pandemic influenza Each human case is an opportunity for an
avian virus to adapt for human transmission
Antiviral drugs for pandemic control No vaccine for at least first 6 months Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) is main antiviral drug of choice UK stockpile:
Currently enough for 25% of population Drugs intended mainly for treatment, not prophylaxis For all clinical cases
How best to minimise epidemic size and impact with a limited stockpile?
A simple compartmental model
, 0 1T N
S
IT
IN
RT
RN
γT
γN
αλ
(1-α)λ
T NI I
( ) ( ) ( )T TU t R t I t M
A simple compartmental model
S
IT
IN
RT
RN
γT
γN
αλ
(1-α)λ
1957 ‘Asian Flu’ pandemic
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2000
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
Time (days)
Num
ber o
f dea
ths
Mortality data,1957 England & Wales
30/11/5722/02/58
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2000
100
200
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500
600
700
800
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1000
1100
Time (days)
Num
ber o
f dea
ths
Mortality data, 1957England & WalesBest fit, basic model
1957 ‘Asian Flu’ pandemic
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2000
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
Time (days)
Num
ber o
f dea
ths
Mortality data, 1957England & WalesBest fit, basic model30% antiviral coverage
1957 ‘Asian Flu’ pandemic
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2000
100
200
300
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600
700
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Time (days)
Num
ber o
f dea
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Mortality data, 1957England & WalesBest fit, basic model30% antiviral coverage70% antiviral coverage
25% stockpileexhausted
CFR 0.16%
R0
1.65
1957 ‘Asian Flu’ pandemic
How many drugs are needed?
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
AV coverage,
Min
imum
req
uire
d st
ockp
ile
R
0 = 3.0
R0 = 2.0
R0 = 1.5
‘Secondary’ effect of mass antiviral treatment is to reduce the spread of infection in the community
Its strength depends on drug efficacy and disease transmissibility
Antiviral programmes
By shortening infectious period and reducing infectiousness, antiviral drugs can influence the course of infection Broadening and delaying epidemic peak Reducing numbers of cases
If there is a risk-group for whom the drug has little protective effect, the stockpile is better deployed in the general population. Priority shifts to protection from infection rather
than from illness.
The ‘social element’
Potential wastage of drugs on the ‘worried well’
Personal stockpiles Non-compliance with treatment regime may
lead to drug resistance Pressing ethical questions, eg distributive
justice
Conclusions Mathematical models can offer valuable insights into
disease control Transmission dynamics are often fundamental to
epidemic outcomes and effects of interventions …sometimes offering counterintuitive results!
However models always entail simplifications, often about human behaviour (important factors)
Effective pandemic preparedness could involve a synergy between such models and the social sciences