Pale (Finals)

TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS 1

TOPIC: THE LAWYER AND THE MONEYS OR PROPERTIES OF HIS

CLIENTS

• CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS

PROFESSION.

• Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property

collected or received for or from the client.

• Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate

and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.

• Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

• Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless

the client's interest are fully protected by the nature of the case or

by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a

client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance

necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

• Rule 138 Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to

fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his

client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,

with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the

controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the

professional standing of the attorney. xxx

• Rule 138 Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt.

- When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client

after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as

an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official

transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar

to a criminal prosecution.

• Rule 138 Sec. 37. Attorneys' liens. - An attorney shall have a lien

upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have

lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his

lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such

funds to the satisfaction thereof.

• He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for

the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such

judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from

and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his

claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court

rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have

caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to

the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power

over such judgments and executions as his client would have to

enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and

disbursements.

LAWYER TOOK CUSTODY OF 2 CARS SUBJECT OF PRELIMINARY

ATTACHMENT

• According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead

of depositing the attached cars in the court premises, turned them

over to Atty. Frial, Lo’s counsel.


• Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking

good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the

Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did

not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the

Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them without so

much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority. -

Atty. Salomon Jr. v. Atty. Frial, A.C. No. 7820 [2008]

LAWYER WITHDRAW MONEY DEPOSITED TO THE BRANCH CLERK

OF COURT WITHOUT INFORMING HIS CLIENT

• Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent

respondent on 30 June 2003 a final demand letter for the

accounting and return of the P255,000. Respondent failed to reply.

• Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he

received the sum of money representing the monthly rentals

intended for his client, without accounting for and returning such

sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his

capacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held

the money in trust for complainant.

• Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the

trial court’s approval of the motion to withdraw the deposited

rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could have

collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his

legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. A

lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money

for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney’s

fees. In this case, respondent did not even seek to prove the

existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to retain the

money.

• Respondent’s failure to turn over the money to complainant

despite the latter’s demands gives rise to the presumption that he

had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. -

Almandrez Jr. v. Atty. Langit, A.C. No. 7057 [2006]

BUSINESS TRANSACTION BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT IS

DISCOURAGE

• As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client

but the business transaction must be characterized with

utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which

an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is

a much higher standard that is required in business dealings

where the parties trade at "arms length." Business transactions

between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged

by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these

transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over

his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his

office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the

credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of

innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an

attorney’s favor. - Chua and Hsia v. Atty. Mesina Jr., A.C. No. 4904

[2004]

ISSUING AND KEEPING OF RECEIPTS ARE PRACTICES OF

ACCOUNTABILITY

• Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and

imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to

keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too

aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by

the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability was


by issuing and keeping receipts. - Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No.

8253 [2011]

WHEN TO DELIVER FUNDS OF CLIENTS

• Thus, having obtained the funds from the [client] in the course of

his professional employment, [a lawyer] had the obligation to

deliver such funds to his clients

(a) when they became due, or

(b) upon demand. - Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011]

LAWYER SHOULD NOT DEPOSIT THE FUNDS IN HIS PERSONAL

ACCOUNT

• For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal

account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon

demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not

return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a

serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged

on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he

had spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended. -

Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011]

• Depositing it in his personal account with the consent of client is

ethical?

LENDING MONEY TO CLIENT

• Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients

as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless

the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by

independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client

except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary

expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

• The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The

only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance

necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for

transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety

bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client. -

Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009]

PURPOSE OF PROHIBITING LENDING OF MONEY TO CLIENT

• The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of

mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely

affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is

handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s

cause. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009]

Ill-effects of lending money to clients

• If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the

client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject

matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.

• Either of these circumstances may:

a. lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his

client, or


b. to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the

verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of

undivided fidelity to the client’s cause. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino,

A.C. No. 6672 [2009]

RULE 16.01 INCLUDES MONEY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CLIENT

• There is no question that the money or property received by a

lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter. Conformably

with these canons of professional responsibility, we have held that

a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and

money she has collected for her client. This obligation includes the

prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected by the

lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client. -

Bayonla v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 4808 [2011]

LAWYER AND CLIENT MUST AGREE WITH THE AMOUNT BEFORE

RETAINING LIEN IS VALIDLY APPLIED

• In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client agrees

with the lawyer in the amount of attorney's fees. In case of a

disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by

the lawyer for being unconscionable, the lawyer should not

arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of

his fees; instead, it should behoove the lawyer to file, if he still

deems it desirable, the necessary action or the proper motion with

the proper court to fix the amount of his attorney's fees. If a

lawyer were allowed to unilaterally apply the funds in his

hands in payment of his claimed compensation even when

there is a disagreement between him and his client would not

only be violative of the trust relationship between them but

can also open the door to possible abuse by those who are less than

mindful of their fiduciary duty. - J.K. Mercado and Sons v. Atty. De

Vera and Atty. Bandalan, A.C. No. 3066 [2001]

MISUSE OF FILING FEE VIOLATES THE RULE THAT LAWYERS MUST

BE SCRUPULOUSLY CAREFUL IN HANDLING MONEY ENTRUSTED

TO THEM IN THEIR PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY

• Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent

lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client

and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the

filing fee. - Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, AC No. 99-634 [2002]

APPROPRIATING THE ENTIRE AWARD IS A VIOLATION OF CANON

16 AND RULE 16.01

• The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the

legal services he has extended to his client but such right should

not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the

money intended for his clients. There should never be an

instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won

to the fees of his own lawyer. - Rivera v. Atty. Angeles, A.C. No.

2519 [2000]

OBLIGATION OF LAWYER ONCE THE MONEY OR PROPERTY

INTENDED FOR HIS CLIENT IS RECEIVED

• should be reported and accounted for promptly and

• should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own

or

• be used by him.


- Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000

MISAPPROPRIATION IS NOT REQUIRED

• The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact

appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs. Del Rosario

acknowledged that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They

do show, however, that respondent failed to promptly report

that amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his

professional responsibility.

• Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the

clients have been prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered

to the ethical standards of the bar. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr.,

A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000

AVOID KEEPING THE MONEY OF CLIENT

• Keeping the money in his possession without his client's

knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the tempting opportunity to

appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This

situation should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar.

Like judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must also appear

clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice system would

remain undisturbed. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019.

April 6, 2000

TOPIC: ACQUISITION OF PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF LITIGATION

CONTINGENT FEE ARRANGEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE

1491 (5) OF THE CIVIL CODE

• Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a

contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition under because

the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of

the litigation but only after judgment has been rendered in

the case handled by the lawyer. In fact, under the 1988 Code of

Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien over funds

and property of his client and may apply so much thereof as may

be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements. - Fabillo

and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]

LIMITATIONS OF CONTINGENT FEE

• As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his

client, that no fraud is committed or imposition applied, or that

the compensation is clearly not excessive as to amount to

extortion, a contract for contingent fee is valid and

enforceable. Moreover, contingent fees were impliedly sanctioned

by No. 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which governed

lawyer-client relationships when the contract of services was

entered into between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo. - Fabillo and

Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IF JUDGE PURCHASE PROPERTY

AFTER LITIGATION

• Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate

paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by

purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his

court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the

same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial

Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be

free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal


behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of

judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond

reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it

was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have

purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that

was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be

transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking

officers at the time of such transfer. - Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M.

No. 133-J [1982]

THE PROPERTY MUST BE THE VERY SUBJECT OF LITIGATION FOR

ARTICLE 1491 TO APPLY

• It is true that Canon No. 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics

prohibits the lawyer from purchasing any interest in the

subject-matter of the litigation which he is conducting, and

Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code prohibits him

from acquiring by purchase or assignment the property and rights

which may be the object of any litigation in which he may take

part by virtue of his profession. But in those cases where these

provisions were applied, the rights or properties purchased by

the lawyer were the very subject of the litigation handled by

him. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]

LEVIED PROPERTY IN SATISFACTION OF DAMAGES CAN BE

PROPERLY ACQUIRED BY LAWYER

• In the case at bar, the lot in which respondent acquired rights by

assignment was not the subject of Civil Case No. 2171 in which he

approved (sic) as counsel for Bernabe Flores and others. The said

case was purely one for damages and did not involve the lot in

question. The lot was simply levied upon on execution after

judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Therefore

Article 1491 of the New Civil Code did not apply. Consequently,

respondent had not violated the said provision of law. - Guevara v.

Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]

• It was not professional misconduct or unethical practice for

the respondent to acquire the rights and interests of his client to

the 439 square meter parcel of land subject of the administrative

charges because the land was not involved in the litigation he was

handling. The land was acquired by Bernabe Flores in an execution

sale conducted to satisfy the judgment secured in the course of

Civil Case No. 2171. The case handled by the respondent was for

damages. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]

WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMOUNT DEPOSITED IN ORDER TO PAY

ATTORNEY’S FEES VIOLATES ARTICLE 1491 OF THE NCC

• The withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to pay

attorney’s fees to petitioner’s counsel, Atty. De Guzman, Jr.,

violates Article 1491 of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers from

acquiring by assignment, property and rights which are the

object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of

their profession. Furthermore, Rule 10 of the Canons of

Professional Ethics provides that “the lawyer should not purchase

any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is

conducting.” The assailed transaction falls within the prohibition

because the Deed assigning the amount of P672,900.00 to Atty. De

Guzman, Jr., as part of his attorney’s fees was executed during

the pendency of this case with the Court of Appeals. In his Motion

to Intervene, Atty. De Guzman, Jr., not only asserted ownership over


said amount, but likewise prayed that the same be released to him.

- Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846 [2004]

EVEN IF LITIGANT VOLUNTARILY ASSIGNED THE AMOUNT

• That petitioner knowingly and voluntarily assigned the subject

amount to his counsel did not remove their agreement within the

ambit of the prohibitory provisions. - Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R.

No. 156846 [2004]

ASSIGNMENT OF PROPERTY VIOLATES ARTICLE 1491

• We agree with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that the

prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it and

the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal

services rendered at a time when the property is still the subject of

a pending case. - Ordonio v. Atty. Eduarte, A.M. No. 3216 [1992]

PROHIBITION STILL APPLIES EVEN IF LESSEE IS A SEPARATE

JURIDICAL PERSON

• Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease

contracts were the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and the partnership

HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as an

agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are

covered by the prohibition against any acquisition or lease by

a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes

part. To rule otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial

approval on an arrangement which, in effect, circumvents that

which is directly prohibited by law. For, piercing through the

legal fiction of separate juridical personality, the Court cannot

ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs

of Jose Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE

VILLEGAS stands to benefit from the contractual relationship

created between his client Felix Leong and his family

partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate

proceedings. - Mananquil v. Atty. Villegas, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0

February 21, 1995

MORTGAGE CONTRACT INCLUDED IN THE PROHIBITION

• To state that mortgages are not included within the prohibition is

to open the door to an indirect circumvention of that statutory

injunction, acquisition of the property being merely postponed

till eventual foreclosure.

• Respondent asserts further that Article 1491[5] does not apply to

judgment creditors of which, he claims, he was one. Under ordinary

circumstances, the argument of respondent could be considered

plausible. Unfortunately, however, as heretofore explained, the

mortgage was executed in violation of Article 1491[5] so that

this Article has a direct bearing on this case and respondent

cannot escape its provision. Having violated the same, he cannot be

considered in the general run of a judgment creditor. - Fornilda, et.

al. v. RTC Branch 164, G.R.No. L-72306 [1989]

MERE DEMAND FOR DELIVERY OF THE LITIGATED PROPERTY

DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE

• In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property

in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for

its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere

demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause

the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction


within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo

that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent's act does

not fall within the purview of Article 1491. - Ramos v. Atty. Ngaseo,

A.C. No. 6210 [2004]

CERTIORARI PROCEEDING STILL BARS PURCHASE OF PROPERTY

UNDER ARTICLE 1491

• In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting

purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a

pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in

litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it

in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to

the judicial action of the judge. - Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting,

A.M. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543 [1991]

TOPIC: CRITICISMS AGAINST THE COURTS AND JUDGES

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE

RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND

SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

• Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

• Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

• Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or

menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

• Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not

supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

• Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to

the proper authorities only.

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS

CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO

INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE

COURT.

• Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the

media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public

opinion for or against a party.

DUTY OF LAWYERS

• As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a lawyer

is expected to bring to the fore irregular and questionable

practices of those sitting in court which tend to corrode the

judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information that

anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon

him to report the matter to the Court so that it may be properly

acted upon. An omission or even a delay in reporting may tend to

erode the dignity of, and the public’s trust in, the judicial system.

– Fudot v. Cattleyla Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171008 October 24,

2008

REQUIREMENTS WHEN RAISING GRIEVANCES AGAINST JUDGES

• The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against

erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue

and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the

institution must always be maintained. - In re: Atty. Bagabuyo A.C.

No. 7006 [2007]


A SCURRILOUS ATTACK

• We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent

nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error,

boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the

judicial process. – Judge Lacurom v. Atty. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921,

March 10, 2006

OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE

• They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a “court of

technicalities” for validly dismissing their defectively prepared

petition.

• They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view,

“an incompetent judge.”

• The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the case shows

its“impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a

perceived slight on its dignity” and such dismissal“smacks

of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and

impartiality demanded of the appellate court.”- Asean Pacific

Planners et. al. v. City of Urdaneta et. al., G.R. No. 162525 [2008]

INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE

• His characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as

having been "crafted in order to fool the winning party"; as a

"hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have

sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with "perfidious

character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who

were the prevailing party in the decision did not appeal therefrom; and

by his charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused — with

that confusion which is the natural product of having been born,

nurtured and brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of

the non-propertied class. - Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No.

115932 January 25, 1995

FOUL LANGUAGE

• The loathsome epithets hurled by the complainant against the

respondent justices, e.g., "Crooks in Robe," "Swindlers in Robe,"

"corrupt justices who were only sowing ‘judicial

terrorism,’" as well as his vilification of the Chief Justice whom

he called "Chief-Swindler-in-Robe," go beyond the bounds of

acceptable behavior. – Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda

against Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005

PROSCRIBED LANGUAGE

• Proscribed then are, inter alia:

1. the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in

courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration or

2. tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the

integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the

administration of justice by this Court of offensive and abusive

language or

3. abrasive and offensive language or

4. of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious

statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge or


5. of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks.

- Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

NOT DISRESPECTFUL, ABUSIVE OR SLANDEROUS

• We cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficiently-

informed" is disrespectful, abusive or slanderous. – Francisco, Jr. v.

UEM-MARA Phil. Corp., et. al., G.R. Nos. 135688-89, October 18,

2007

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY

• “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be

privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member

shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any

speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”-

Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution

PURPOSE OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY

• Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a

fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of

the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose

“is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to

discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is

indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty

of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of

every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that

liberty may occasion offense.”

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO CASE

• Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the

Senate floor:

• x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I

am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.

And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my

middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on

the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the

Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief

Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in

another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. -

Pobre v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]

• The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in

the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to

future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose

what she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council

[JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for nomination

to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would

eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of

the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that

the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-

sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for

the position of Chief Justice.

• No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due

to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the

judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,


Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

which respectively provide:

CANON 8, RULE 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use

language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the

courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by

others.

CASE AGAINST SEN. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO DISMISSED

• Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a

disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

• In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01

and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

• WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against

Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI,

Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

STATEMENTS OF AN ACCUSED LAWYER

• Ed J. Polk was arrested and jailed and his bond revoked because of

his failure to appear for a criminal trial wherein he was charged as

a defendant with driving while intoxicated. Upon his release from

jail Polk issued to the news media from his law office the following

written statement:

I consider this one more awkward attempt by a dishonest and unethical

district attorney and a perverse judge to assure me an unfair trial.

Questionable conduct on the part of those charged with

administration of justice does little to foster respect for the law.

- Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]

STATEMENTS WERE MADE AS A CITIZEN

• The critical statements made by Polk were remarks in response to

the manner in which he was treated as a citizen and not as an

attorney. At no time was Polk an attorney of record or in any way

acting in his capacity as an attorney in the criminal

proceedings against him, nor do the remarks purport to be made

in his capacity as an attorney. - Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F.

Supp. 784 [1974]

THERE IS NO DICHOTOMY OF A LAWYER’S PERSONALITY

• There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is

committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private

life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to

be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. –

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15,

2004

VIOLATION OF RULE 11.03, CANON 11

• Judge claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the

motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent

was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge advised him to

tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at

the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for

direct contempt, the respondent shouted, “Then cite me!”.


Judge cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00.

The respondent then left.

• While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the

courtroom and shouted, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance

against you! I am not afraid of you! Judge ordered the sheriff to

escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct

contempt of court for the second time.

• A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely

disregards the latter’s role, stature and position in our justice

system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly

threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross

ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively

acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in

Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability to decide cases.

Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled

with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of

Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner

that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into

disrepute. – Judge Baculi v. Atty. Battung, A.C. no. 8920, September

28, 2011

INTENTION AND DISCLAIMER NOT A DEFENSE

• Atty. Abila's central theme in his written explanation is that he

acted in good faith and was merely motivated by his duty to defend

the interest of his client. His disclaimer of any intentional

disrespect is not a ground for exoneration. His intent must be

determined by a fair interpretation of the language employed by

him. He cannot escape responsibility by claiming that his words did

not mean what any reader must have understood them to mean. –

Borromeo v. CA, G.R. No. L-39253 November 24, 1978

MAKING THREATS

• In addition, he likewise committed a violation of Canon 11 of Rule

11.03 by threatening respondent judge that if his motions were

not granted, respondent judge would be administratively

charged. To be sure, the threat made against respondent judge

was not a threat to do him bodily harm. Nonetheless, it was a

threat. Needless to say, disrespectful, abusive and abrasive

language, offensive personalities, unfounded accusations, or

intemperate words tending to obstruct, embarrass, or influence the

court in administering justice or to bring it into disrepute have no

place in a pleading. – Prosecutor Tolentino v. Judge Cabral, A.M.

No. RTJ-00-1528, March 28, 2000

THREAT OF IMPEACHMENT

• It is reprehensible for the complainant to threaten the members of

the Court with impeachment. To threaten a judge or justice with

investigation and prosecution for official acts done by him in the

regular exercise of official duty subverts and undermines the

independence of the judiciary.

- Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against Justices, A.M. No.

03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005

OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE AGAINST COMPLAINANT PROSCRIBED

• Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive

language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her


relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified,

emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping

with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer’s arguments

whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and

opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly

addressed by one gentlemen to another. By calling complainant, a

"sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital

prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech

demanded of a lawyer. – N.H. Florido v. Atty. Florido, A.C. No. 5624,

January 20, 2004

STATEMENTS IN FORM OF QUESTIONS STILL PROSCRIBED

• While most of her statements were in the form of questions

instead of categorical assertions, the effect is still the same:

they constitute a stinging affront to the honor and dignity of the

Court and tend to undermine the confidence of the public in the

integrity of the highest tribunal of the land.

• She posed the query, "Nasaan ang katarungan? (Where is

justice?)," implying that this Court failed to dispense justice in her

case. - Bildner and Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, et. al., G.R. No. 157384, June

5, 2009

DIRECT CONTEMPT IF SUBMITTED IN THE SAME COURT

• In Ang vs. Castro, this Court held that if a pleading containing

derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is submitted

in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are

pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a

misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court

or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Direct

contempt is punishable summarily. - Re: Letter dated 21 February

2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]

POST LITIGATION CRITICISMS

• The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation

newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings

and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt

of court, even though the case has been terminated, if the

publication is attended by either of these two circumstances: (1)

where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words,

to scandalize the court; or (2) where there is a clear and present

danger that the administration of justice would be impeded. – PP v.

Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

CONTEMPT AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING ARE NOT THE SAME

• A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to

vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the

object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of

the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and

protect the court and the public from the official

ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office.

The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for

contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should

thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive

principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary

authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders

of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are

responsible for the orderly administration of justice.


• Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in

a contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a

subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same manner

an attorney's conviction for contempt was not collaterally

estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment proceeding in

which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts

leading to conviction. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to

a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for

contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why

he should not be suspended from the practice of law,

considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a

different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed

by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of

Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the Practice of law are

governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. - PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos.

115908-09 March 29, 1995

THE TEST OF ALLOWABLE CRITICISMS OF A JUDGE’S DECISION

• Whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and

does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. – Lorenzo

Shipping Corp., et. al. v. Distribution Management Association of

the Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011

DEGREE OF LAWYERS’ REMARK OR COMMENT

• Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark

or comment in the furtherance of causes they uphold. For the

felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of

phrase. – In re: Complaint against Atty. Pilar, A.C. No. 263, October

28, 1958

IS THE JUDICIARY ONION-SKINNED?

• “The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by

shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the

character of …. public opinion. For it is a prized …. privilege to

speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on

all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited,

solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would

probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much

more than it would enhance respect.”- Bridges v. California, 314

U.S. 252, 270-271 (1941)

ADMONITION TO JUDGES

• More than once in the past, we had occasion to admonish judges

not to be onion-skinned when confronted by dissatisfied lawyers

or litigants. Their power to punish for contempt is not a bludgeon

to be used for the purpose of exacting silent submission to their

rulings and orders however questionable or unjust they may be. -

Sesbreño v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. RTJ-88-272 February 6, 1990

FREE SPEECH IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

• "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it

is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea

simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or

disagreeable.“ - Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)

LIMITED FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION?

• “It cannot be seriously asserted that a private citizen surrenders

his right to freedom of expression when he becomes a licensed


attorney in this state. The Supreme Court has built a substantial

line of cases where the Constitution has been read to limit and

restrain the state's power to prescribe standards of conduct for

attorneys.” - Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]

TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATIONS IN PLEADINGS

AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

CONCEPT OF “PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION [SPEECH]”

1. Privileged communication as rule of evidence

2. Privileged communication as basis to keep confidential the secrets

or confidences of client

3. Privileged speech in congress

4. Privileged communications made in the course of juridical

proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AS RULE OF EVIDENCE

• Rule 130 Sec. 24.Disqualification by reason of privileged

communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to

matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

• (b)An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be

examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or

his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,

professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,

stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the

client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of

which has been acquired in such capacity;

ESSENTIAL FACTORS TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought

(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,

(3) the communications relating to that purpose,

(4) made in confidence

(5) by the client,

(6) are at his instance permanently protected

(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,

(8) except the protection be waived.

- Ma. Luisa Hadjula v. Atty. Roceles F. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3,

2007

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AS BASIS TO KEEP CONFIDENTIAL THE

SECRETS OR CONFIDENCES OF CLIENT

CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND

SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT

RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his

client except;


(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the

consequences of the disclosure;

(b) When required by law;

(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or

associates or by judicial action.

• Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client,

use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he

use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless

the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents

thereto.

• Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his

client, give information from his files to an outside agency

seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping,

accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose.

• Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm

to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.

• Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be

required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him,

from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.

• Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about

a client's affairs even with members of his family.

• Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been

consulted about a particular case except to avoid possible

conflict of interest.

• RPC Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. —

Revelation of secrets. — In addition to the proper administrative

action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period,

or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be

imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador

judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of

inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or

reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his

professional capacity.

• The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or

solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense

of a client or having received confidential information from said

client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party

in the same case, without the consent of his first client.

• Rule 15.02. - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege

communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a

prospective client.

LIMIT OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CLIENT AND

LAWYER

• It is well settled that in order that a communication between a

lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful

purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an

unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.

• In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the

"prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will

not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every

communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal


purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is

not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain

circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of

justice.“ – PP v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 115439-41

July 16, 1997

PRIVILEGED SPEECH IN CONGRESS

• The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the

provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which

provides:

“A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses

punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from

arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned

nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the

Congress or in any committee thereof.”

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO CASE (Dismissed but with violation)

PURPOSE OF PRIVILEGE SPEECH

• Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a

fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of

the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose

“is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to

discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it

is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest

liberty of speech and that he should be protected from

resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the

exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”- Probe v. Sen.

Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF JURIDICAL

PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING ALL KINDS OF PLEADINGS, PETITIONS AND

MOTIONS

• Well-entrenched in the Philippine and American jurisprudence is

the rule that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the

course of juridical proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,

petitions and motions are absolutely privileged when pertinent

and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false or

malicious such utterances may be. - Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R.

No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,

FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES,

AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING

COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use

language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or

menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

CERTIFICATE OF MERITORIOUS CASECERTIFICATE OF MERITORIOUS

CASE

• Rule 7 Section 3. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate

by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his

knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to

support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.


• “Honest belief”is a claim of “good faith.”- Alfonso C. Choa

vs. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. August

9, 1996

PLEADINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARE CONSIDERED PRIVILEGED

• Pleadings have become part of public record open to the

public to scrutinize, but also due to the undeniable fact that said...

• Pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions

lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of

issues ventilated before the courts for the proper administration of

justice and, therefore, of general public concern.

• Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations

substantially true because they can be supported by evidence

presented in good faith, the contents of which would be under the

scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all

improprieties and illegal statements contained therein. – Cuenco v.

Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976

COUNSEL, PARTIES OR WITNESSES ARE EXEMPTED FROM LIABILITY

IN LIBEL OR SLANDER

• It is the generally accepted rule that counsel, parties or

witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words

otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial

proceedings, provided that the statements are connected with, or

relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject

of inquiry.

• For as aptly observed in one case, while the doctrine of privileged

communication is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to

great hardships, yet to give legal sanction to such suits as the

present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships. -

Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976

Effect of privileged matters

• For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered

privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the presumption. - GMA

Network, Inc. v. Bustos, et. al., G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006

Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified

• Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of

the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged

communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no

moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action.

Examples of these are speeches or debates made by

Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in any of its

committees.

• On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged

communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise

defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express

malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine,

renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel

provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or

malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private communications"

and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks"

falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the


Revised Penal Code. - GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, et. al., G.R. No.

146848 October 17, 2006

IMPORTANCE OF DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

• The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy,

which looks to the free and unfettered administration of

justice, though, as an incidental result it may in some instances

afford an immunity to the evil disposed and malignant slanderer. -

PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

ALL DOUBTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF ITS RELEVANCY

• In order the matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it

need not be in every case material to the issues presented by

the pleadings.

• All doubts should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or

pertinency, and for the purposes of relevancy the court will

assume the alleged slanderous charges to be true, however

false they may have been in fact. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No.

L-29560 March 31, 1976

THERE IS “NO” ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE IN PLEADINGS

• Absolute privilege attached to allegations made by an attorney in

a pleading filed with the court, as long as the statements alleged to

be defamatory were relevant and pertinent to the issues in the

case. We relied heavily on our earlier decision xxx, in which we

recognized the absolute privilege of an attorney to make

statements in pleadings regardless of their truth or the existence of

actual malice on the part of the attorney so long as the

statements were relevant and pertinent to the pleadings. –

Selby v. Burgess, 712 S.W.2d 898 (1986)

ALL FORMS OF COMMUNICATIONS ARE PRIVILEGED

• The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications

made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to

information communicated by the client to the attorney by other

means. - PP v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July

16, 1997

PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE MAY STILL APPLY

• Although the privilege is absolute where it applies, we consider it

to be a privilege narrowed closely by the "relevancy" and

"pertinency" requirements, and we note that while the privilege

will prohibit an attorney from being subject to litigation it will not

make him immune from professional discipline, when it is

appropriate. – Selby v. Burgess, 712 S.W.2d 898 (1986)

• ...makes a lawyer liable for false allegations in a pleading since the

rule states that a lawyer's signature on a pleading constitutes a

certificate by him that to the best of his knowledge, there is good

ground to support the pleading. – Pogue v. Cooper, et. al., 680

S.W.2d 698 (1984)

RESTRICTION TO THE PRIVILEGE

• The Court defined the restriction to the privilege enjoyed by

pleadings thus:


• The pleadings should contain but the plain and concise

statements of the material facts and not the evidence by which

they are to be proved. ...

• If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and

alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his

privilege.

• The requirement of materiality and relevancy is imposed so that

the protection given to individuals in the interest of an efficient

administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from

beneath which private malice may be gratified. - Gutierrez v.

Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

EXAMPLE OF SLANDEROUS MATTERS IN A PLEADING

• Repeated litigations between the same parties might indeed be

tiresome, even nettlesome but this alone is not sufficient cause for

calling another "dirty-minded", and of a "limited mind", "twisted

mind" or to characterize his act as a "devise of wickedness as

earmarks of plaintiff's traits.”

• It is noted that far from being isolated statements, these

slanderous matters pervade the entire dimension of the

defendants' answer, with almost every paragraph thereof

scathing with spiteful imputations against the plaintiff. These

imputations constitute a grave reflection upon the mental and

moral character and reputation of the plaintiff, and they certainly

achieve no purpose except to gratify the defendants' rancor and ill-

will.

• The aforementioned personal opinions of the defendants, expressed

in vituperative and intemperate language, are palpably devoid of

any relation whatever to the subject of inquiry and have no

place in a pleading. - Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161

January 30, 1982

ADMONITION TO LAWYERS

• While indeed lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark

or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold such

remarks or comments should not trench beyond the bounds of

relevancy and propriety. Besides, the language vehicle does not

run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,

convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. –

Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

PARTNERS WHO SIGNED THE PLEADINGS ARE LIABLE

• In view of the derogatory implications of that observation, which

was couched in intemperate indecorous and vicious language and

which was baseless, since it was belied by the resolution itself that

stated the reason for requiring the Solicitor General to proceed

with the investigation of the disbarment case, the Court in that

aforementioned October 1 resolution required Attys. Salandanan

and Zosimo G. Linato, who signed the motion under the firm

name of "E. M. Salandanan, Aguilar, Linato & Associates" to show

cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt of court. –

Yangson v. Salandanan, A.C. No. 1347. November 12, 1975


BALANCING ACT

• While the doctrine is liable to be abuse and its abuse may lead to

great hardships, yet to give legal action to such libel suits would

give rise to greater hardships.

• Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of

pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold,

and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some

infelicities of language. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July

16, 1984

TEST TO BE APPLIED

• A pleading must meet the test of relevancy to avoid being

considered libelous. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16,

1984

METES AND BOUNDS OF RELEVANCY OR PERTINENCY

• As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make

alleged defamatory matters privileged, the courts are inclined to

be liberal.

• The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so

palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the

controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and

impropriety.

• In order that a matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it

need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the

pleadings, It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or

so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become

the subject of the inquiry in the course of the trial. - PP v. Atty.

Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

Legitimate answers to accusations are privileged

• Although the language used by defendant-appellee in the pleading

in question was undoubtedly strong, since it was made in

legitimate defense of his own and of his client's interest, such

remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged and cannot be

the basis of an action for libel (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra). - PP v.

Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

Unprofessional conduct

• Mutual bickering and recriminations between brother attorneys

detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive

any sympathy from this Court. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-

62449 July 16, 1984

Proper conduct of lawyers

• Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-

feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to

influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each

other or toward suitors in the case.

• All personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided.

In the trial of a case it is indecent to allude to the personal

history or the personal peculiarities and idiosyncracies of

counsel on the other side.

• Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and

promote unseemly wrangling should also be carefully avoided.


Lawyers owe respect not only to the courts and their clients, but

also to other members of the Bar. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No.

L-62449 July 16, 1984

DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS NOT APPLICABLE

WHEN THE COURTS ARE CRITICIZED USING ABRASIVE AND

OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE

• Greater care and circumspection must be exercised in the

preparation of their pleadings and to refrain from using

abrasive and offensive language (Yangson v. Saladanan, 68

SCRA 42). A becoming modesty is a desirable trait also of

practising attorneys. – PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July

16, 1984Privileged

STATEMENTS MADE TO THE MEDIA

• Appellant sued respondent's companies for wrongful termination,

making a number of allegations in the complaint against

respondent personally. After respondent published a response

to the allegations in the media, appellant sued him for

defamation.

• Whether or not statements made to the media regarding ongoing

or contemplated litigation are covered by absolute privilege. -

Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE

APPLIES WHEN THE MEDIA IS THE RECIPIENT OF THE STATEMENT

• These courts have concluded that the policy considerations

underlying the absolute privilege rule are not applicable to

statements made to the media. Statements made to the media

"do little, if anything, to promote the truth finding process in a

judicial proceeding.... [They] do not generally encourage open and

honest discussion between the parties and their counsel in order to

resolve disputes; indeed, such statements often do just the

opposite.“

"Communications made to newspapers and during press conferences have

been almost universally found to be excluded from the protection of

absolute privilege.”- Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

NOT RELATED TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

• We have, however, recognized that communications are not

sufficiently related to judicial proceedings when they are made to

someone without an interest in the outcome.

• We conclude that assessing the significant interest of the recipient

requires review of the recipient's legal relationship to the

litigation, not their interest as an observer.

• Moreover, the nature of the recipient's interest in or connection to

the litigation is a "case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry" that must

focus on and balance the underlying principles of the privilege.

• We conclude that the newspaper does not have a direct interest in,

or connection to, the outcome of the proceedings, other than as a

spectator. - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

A FEW JURISDICTIONS HAVE HELD THAT, UNDER CERTAIN

CIRCUMSTANCES, AN ATTORNEY'S STATEMENTS TO THE MEDIA ARE

ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED


• extending the privilege to statements made by an attorney to a

reporter after the dismissal of the first lawsuit. Other

jurisdictions have found exceptions to the majority rule based on

unique circumstances. ,

• applying absolute privilege to a statement to a newspaper when all

signs pointed to emerging litigation and the newspaper was a

potential party); ,

• applying absolute privilege to a lawyer's statements to the press

denying allegations and questioning the plaintiff's motives, where

the plaintiff publicly solicited a response; ,

• holding that an attorney's prelitigation statements to the press

are absolutely privileged if a class action lawsuit is contemplated.

– Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

COMMUNICATIONS MADE TO THE MEDIA

• We adopt the majority view that communications made to the

media in an extrajudicial setting are not absolutely privileged,

at least when the media holds no more significant interest in the

litigation than the general public.

• In order for the absolute privilege to apply to defamatory

statements made in the context of a judicial or quasi-judicial

proceeding, "(1) a judicial proceeding must be contemplated in

good faith and under serious consideration, and (2) the

communication must be related to the litigation.“

• The privilege applies to communications made by either an

attorney or a non-attorney that are related to ongoing litigation

or future litigation contemplated in good faith. - Jacobs v.

Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS NOT PRIVILEGED WHEN MADE ON RADIO

AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS

• Stating the judicial proceedings privilege protects statements by

parties and their attorneys related to litigation but does not

extend to protect allegedly defamatory statements made on radio

and television programs. – Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593

(2003)

• A privileged statement, such as one made in a judicial proceeding,

is not privileged for all subsequent publications by virtue of

initially being spoken in a privileged proceeding.

• Even an "absolute" privilege does not permit an individual to

categorically republish possibly defamatory statements without

consequence. – Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593 (2003)

WHEN PLEADINGS ARE PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPER

• We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should

be that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in court

without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed

or a decision promulgated should be covered by the privilege.

This Court ruled before that:

Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds

of pleadings, petitions and motions belong to the class of

communication that are absolutely privileged. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al.,

G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976


STATEMENTS TO THIRD PARTY

• But we have also recognized that "[a]n attorney's statements to

someone who is not directly involved with the actual or

anticipated judicial proceeding will be covered by the absolute

privilege only if the recipient of the communication is

“significantly interested” in the proceeding." - Jacobs v.

Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

TOPIC: TERMINATING AND ESTABLISHING ATTORNEY-CLIENT

RELATIONSHIP

Nature of attorney-client relationship

An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer

acquiesces or voluntarily permits the consultation of a person, who

in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer

with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance.

It is not essential that the client should have employed the lawyer

on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been

paid, promised or charged for; neither is it material that the

attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about

which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and

assistance of the attorney is sought and received in matters

pertinent to his profession. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861

[2009]

Can trigger a lawyer-client relationship

A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first

moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding

the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is

not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally

on any previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or

charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not

afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.-

Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711 - July 3, 2007

VERBAL AGREEMENT

There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient to

create an attorney-client relationship. - Urban Bank Inc. vs. Atty.

Pena, A.C. No. 4863 [2001]

Court finds that no attorney-client relationship exists

The relationship of complainant and [counsel] is mainly personal

or business in nature, and that whatever legal services may have

been rendered or given to them by Atty. Amorin for free were only

incidental to said relationship. Noteworthy also is the fact that

complainant was not able to specify any act or transaction in

which [counsel] acted as her or her husband's counsel. - Virgo v.

Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]

There are instances, however, when the Court finds that no

attorney-client relationship exists between the parties, such as

when the relationship stemmed from a personal transaction

between them rather than the practice of law of respondent or


when the legal acts done were only incidental to their personal

transaction. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]

DUTY ONCE A LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EXIST

Canon 18 of the CPR states that “a lawyer shall serve his client

with competence and diligence.”

NON-PAYMENT OF FEES DOES NOT DIMINISH A LAWYER’S DUTYNON-

PAYMENT OF FEES DOES NOT DIMINISH A LAWYER’S DUTY

Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should not be

a reason not to inform the client of an important

development, or worse, to withhold vital information from her.

- Somosot v. Atty. Lara A.C. No. 7024 [2009]

REMEDY FOR DELIBERATE REFUSAL TO PAY

It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just compensation

ensues in any transaction, the proper remedy is to institute an

action before the proper court and such actuation of the

respondent herein did not constitute deceit, malpractice or

gross misconduct. - Urban Bank Inc. vs. Atty. Pena, A.C. No.

4863 [2001]

Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients

concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action

only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.

IMPLIED DUTY TO FINISH THE CASE

Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an

attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry

it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and

executory. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an

attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly

stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.- Francisco v. Atty.

Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006

TERMINATING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION

CLIENT: The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the

absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at

anytime with or without cause.

ATTORNEY: The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the

relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably

restricted. Xxx He is not at liberty to abandon it without

reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case

before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s

written consent or from a good cause. - Francisco v. Atty.

Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR

GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE

CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the

following case:

(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of

conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; [see Rule

19.02]


(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct

violative of these canons and rules;

(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote

the best interest of the client;

(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer

renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively;

(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the

services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;

(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office [see

Rule 3.03]; and

(g) Other similar cases.

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw

from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name

unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to

influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.

Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client

has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a

person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the

same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with

such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.

CHANGING LAWYER DOES NOT NEED THE APPROVAL OF THE COURT

[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without

cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter

his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to

change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another

lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer does

not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it

require approval of the court. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty.

Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006

TERMINATION OF SERVICES WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF

CLIENT

A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written

consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court.

He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse

party - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15,

2006

A LAWYER MUST SEE TO IT THAT A NEW LAWYER IS RECORDED

BEFORE TERMINATING HIS SERVICES

An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent

of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and

hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the

name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. - Atty.

Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006

CESSATION OF LAW PRACTICE IS NOT A “GOOD CAUSE” TO

WITHDRAW

Neither is the cessation of his law practice an excuse for his

failure to file the required brief. Even if it were true that Atty.

Briones has stopped practicing law, he still could not ignore the

directives coming from the Court. It does not appear from the


records of G.R. No. 130965 that Atty. Briones has withdrawn his

appearance. Unless he has withdrawn his appearance in the case,

the Court would still consider him as counsel for the accused-

appellant and he is expected to comply with all its orders and

directives. - In Re: Atty. David Briones, A.C. No. 5486. August

15, 2001]

THE ONLY WAY TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel is to have either the

written conformity of his client or an order from the court

relieving him of the duties of counsel, in accordance with Rule

138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. - Balatbat v. Atty. Arias, A.C.

No. 1666, April 13, 2007

DUTY OF LAWYER ONCE HE IS DISCHARGED AS COUNSEL

Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject

to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and

property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperative

with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter,

including all information necessary for the proper handling of the

matter.

The discharged attorney must likewise see to it that the name of

the new counsel is properly recorded and the records properly

handed over. - Balatbat v. Atty. Arias, A.C. No. 1666 [2007]

A SIMPLE TURNOVER OF THE RECORDS DOES NOT END A LAWYER’S

DUTY

Contrary to respondent’s contention, his professional relations as

a lawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple

turnover of the records of the case to his clients. - Venterez, et.

al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

xxx and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly

transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for

the proper handling of the matter. - Rule 22.02

CLIENT REFUSAL TO GIVE HIS CONSENT IS STILL SUBJECT TO

COURT’S DISCRETION

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special

proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and

with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the

client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an

application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and

adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be

allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based

on a good cause. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421

[2007]

CONSENT TO WITHDRAW MUST BE GIVEN BY THE LITIGANT

Respondent’s defense completely crumbles in face of the fact that

Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and,

hence, had no authority to withdraw the records of the said case

from respondent or to terminate the latter’s services. - Venterez,

et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]


PENDENCY OF PETITION FOR WITHDRAWAL DOES NOT RELIEVE

LAWYER OF HIS DUTY

The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for

withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal

shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record

who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what

the interests of his clients require. He must still appear before the

court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the

proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not

terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record. -

Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

A VALID CAUSE TO WITHDRAW MUST STILL BE SUBJECT TO

FORMALITIES OF WITHDRAWING AS COUNSEL

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as

counsel, respondent remains counsel of record for the

complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he has a valid

cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot immediately do so

and leave his clients without representation. - Venterez, et. al.

v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

VERBAL SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL NOT ALLOWED

A verbal substitution of counsel, albeit impliedly granted by

respondent judge, contravenes Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules

of Court which prescribes the requirements for change of

attorneys. Said provision requires that the written consent of the

client should be filed in court and the adverse party should be

given written notice of the substitution. As correctly pointed out

by the OCA, if her intention was to obviate delay, then she should

have ordered the counsel of record, Atty. Nueva, who was present

during the hearing, to file the required comment or opposition. -

Requirme, Jr. v. Judge Yuipco, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1427.

November 27, 2000

DEATH OF A PARTNER

Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &

ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death

of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship

between said firm and petitioner.

Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have

re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have

withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of

Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new

lawyer. - B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. L-41862

[1992]

GROUNDS TO WITHDRAW FROM A CASE BEFORE ITS FINAL

ADJUDICATION

A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final

adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or

from a good cause. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155

[2006]

WRITTEN CONTRACT IS NOT ESSENTIAL IN ESTABLISHING LAWYER-

CLIENT RELATIONSHIP - A written contract is not an essential element in

the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. -

Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]


PERCEIVED INSUFFICIENCY OF REMUNERATION NOT A GROUND TO

DIMINISH PROFESSIONAL ZEAL

Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he

undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer’s

Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains

unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case

should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived

insufficiency of remuneration. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C.

No. 6155 [2006]

CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WILL NOT BAR A LAWYER-CLIENT

RELATIONSHIP

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the

close personal relationship between the lawyer and the

complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees. - Hadjula v.

Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007

HEAVY WORKLOAD

Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the

withdrawal of her services. - Ceniza v. Atty. Rubia, A.C. No. 6166

[2009]

LOST OF CONFIDENCE

Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no

longer exist[ed] the xxx confidence" between them and that there

had been "serious differences between them relating to the manner

of private prosecution.”- Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773

September 24, 1997

“HURT FEELINGS” IS NOT A VALID GROUND TO AUTOMATICALLY

WITHDRAW

Complainant's words and actions may have hurt respondent's

feelings considering the work he had put into the case. But

her words were uttered in a burst of passion. And even at that

moment, complainant did not expressly terminate

respondent's services. She made this clear when she refused

to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.“ - Orcino v. Atty.

Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997

WITHDRAWAL MUST BE GRANTED BY THE COURT

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in

terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave

complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to

presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the

court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer

remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as

by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must

still appear on the date of hearing for the attorney-client relation

does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record.-

Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997

LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITY

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE

AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to

him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.


Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of

his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the

client’s request for information.

CLIENT SHOULD NOT FILE THE NOTICE TO WITHDRAW

Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who

should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. -

Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]

HAVING AN ADDITIONAL LAWYER DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN

CONFORMITY

The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to

substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel. Mrs.

Jalandoni’s conformity to having an additional lawyer did

not necessarily mean conformity to respondent’s desire to

withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s speculations on the

professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find

no support in the records of this case.

That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminaza’s

professional engagement on her behalf despite respondent’s

withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of

his unprofessional conduct. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa,

A.C. No. 5303 [2006]

TOPIC: GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST

LAWYERS

Supreme Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP

Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound by the

findings of the IBP nor, much less, obliged to accept the same as a

matter of course because as the Tribunal which has the final say on

the proper sanctions to be imposed on errant members of both

bench and bar, the Court has the prerogative of making its own

findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather than

that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an administrative

complaint has been referred to for investigation and report. –

Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000

CONTINUOUS DISPLAY AND USE OF THE TITLE “ATTORNEY-AT-

LAW”AFTER DISBARMENT

Complainant claims that respondent misrepresented himself as an

"Atty." in the wedding invitation of his son, and a signboard

hanging outside the respondent's office display the title

"Attorney-at-Law“ under respondent's name.

Lastly, complainant informs the Court that she had received

reports that respondent continues in the practice of law by

making other lawyers sign the pleadings that he prepares for

cases involving his clients. – Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua

U. Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014


RESOLUTION

On this matter, the Court is of the view that the title "Atty."

preceding respondent's name in his son's wedding invitation, and

the signboard outside his office bearing his name and the words

"Attorney-at-Law" are not evidence sufficient to convince this

Court that respondent continues in the practice of law, in

violation Court's Decision dated April 30, 1999 that ordered his

disbarment.

Neither is the Court swayed by the complainant's allegations of

respondent's continuous practice of law based on mere "reports."

Without more, these reports are pure hearsay and are without

evidentiary value.

Nonetheless, respondent is hereby ORDERED to remove the

signboard outside his office showing his name and the words

"Attorney-at-Law.“ - Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U.

Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED IN THE MATTER OF THE LIFTING OF AN

ORDER SUSPENDING A LAWYER FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from

the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the

penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is

immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has

15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration

thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final

and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent

shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of

the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from

the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the

period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local

Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where

respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or

where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of

respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the

lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more

severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. -

Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

LIFTING OF A LAWYER’S SUSPENSION IS NOT AUTOMATIC

The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the

end of the period stated in the Court’s decision, and an order

from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is

necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his

profession. – Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30,

2010

SUPREME COURT CAN CHOOSE NOT TO REFER COMPLAINT TO IBP

In administrative cases against lawyers, the burden of proof rests

upon the complainant. Administrative complaints that are prima


facie groundless as shown by the pleadings filed by the parties

need not be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for

further investigation. They may be summarily dismissed for utter

lack of merit.

The Court normally refers administrative cases to the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and

recommendation. Considering, however, that the question being

raised is simple and that no further factual determination is

necessary, the Court resolves to dispense with such referral and to

decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings already on

record, which all show the lack of merit of the Complaint. -

Manubay v. Atty. Garcia, A.C. No. 4700 [2000]

Confidentiality

Rules of Court Rule 139-B Sec. 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings

against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the

final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its

decisions in other cases.

Rules of Court Rule 140 SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. –

Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and

Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be

private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of

the court shall be attached to the record of the respondent in the

Office of the Court Administrator. - A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC RE:

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF

COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES [took effect

on October 1, 2001]

Suspension of attorney by CA and RTC

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals

or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial

Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the

causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the

Supreme Court in the case.

Rule 139-B Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or

Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. - Upon

such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court

shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of

the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon

which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and

statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the

case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or

disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by

Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or

suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for:

1. any deceit,

2. malpractice,

3. other gross misconduct in such office,

4. grossly immoral conduct,


5. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,

6. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before

admission to practice,

7. for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case

without authority to do so.

The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,

either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes

malpractice.

Judgment of a foreign court is only prima facie evidence

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by

a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign

jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a

ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such

action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or

disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground

for disbarment or suspension. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793

[2004]

The basis of the foreign court's action must include any of the

grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction I

It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment

ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam

does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in

the Philippines.

Under Section 27,34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the

acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for

disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the

basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for

disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. - In re: Atty.

Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]

The basis of the foreign court's action must include any of the

grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction II

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension

against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not

automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the

Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds

for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.

Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute

into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the

basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for

disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held

that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima

facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera,

A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Defenses

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the

Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of

a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having

jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:


x x x x

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment

or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties

and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by

evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,

collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. - Velez v. Atty. De

Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Ex parte investigation valid

Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only

constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as

a lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be

given the opportunity to defend himself and to present

testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an

investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the

Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent

lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is

only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the

respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled

investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex

parte. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]

Misconduct pertaining to another profession

Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both

professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting

firms which carry his name. He is charged for allowing his

accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the

same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the

proceedings where these claims were presented.

Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict

of interest, he could not be charged before this Court as his alleged

“misconduct” pertains to his accounting practice.

Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his

accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from

disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a

lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct,

even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him

to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good

demeanor. - Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040 [1998]

Respondent lawyer cannot hide behind the corporate veil

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate

personality of the corporation to absolve him from exercising these

duties over the properties turned over to him by complainant. He

blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation

to his client, the complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent

conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate

fiction. - Cordon v. Atty. Balicante, A.C. No. 2797 October 4,

2002

Judgment from the RTC not needed in IBP investigation

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not

respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a matter which

apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of

Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this administrative


case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the Investigating

Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that

indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a

married woman, grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an

extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession.

This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and

undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license

confers upon him. - Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, A.C. No. 5170 [1999]

Private phone call to litigant prohibited

If at all, the judge could have only been guilty of judicial

indiscretion or impropriety when he admittedly made a private

phone call to, or sent for, the complainant, and talked to him in the

chambers.

It need not be overemphasized that making private phone calls

to, sending for and talking to the complainant in the judge’s

chambers, as in this case, undermines even more the people’s

faith and confidence in the judiciary. - Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon,

Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000

Marrying in good faith a married lawyer not immoral

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that

respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.

However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,

clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid

marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality

connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of

society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the

community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary

action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so

corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled

as to be reprehensible to a high degree. - Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, A.C.

No. 3319. June 8, 2000

A single member of a collegial court cannot be charged for rendering

unjust judgment

Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is

“unjust” cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges

against a single member of a division of the appellate court is

inappropriate. - Bautista v. Ass. Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid,

Court of Appeals, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006

Anonymous complaints

Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are received with caution. They

should not be dismissed outright, however, where their averments

may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be

substantiated and established by other competent evidence. -

Sinsuat and Paps v. Judge Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133,

August 6, 2008

Forum shopping --- Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or

proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. - Quirino Tomlin II v.

Atty. Salvador N. Moya II, A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006

Retirement from office

The Court emphasizes at this point that respondent’s retirement

from office does not render the present administrative case


moot and academic; neither does it free him from liability. Since

complainant filed the case when respondent was still in the service,

the Court retains the authority to investigate and resolve the

administrative complaint against him. - City of Cebu v. Judge

Gako Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-08-2111, May 7, 2008

Infraction committed by judge before appointment

This step finds support in Heck v. Santos where the Court held that

while the infraction was committed before the respondent’s

appointment as judge, the Court may still discipline him

therefore. RE: Application for retirement/gratuity benefits

xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret., April 22, 2008

Acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is not a bar to

administrative proceedings.

The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not

a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of

legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables

one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this

Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different

capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case

(Italics in the original). (Joselano Guevara v. Atty. Jose Emmanuel

Eala, A.C. no. 7136, August 1, 2007)

Administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not

prescribe

Indeed, we have held that an administrative complaint against a

member of the bar does not prescribe. (Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty.

Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no. 6634, August 23, 2007)

Indefinite suspension

This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence

grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even without

the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have

authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of

law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is

lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the

compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by

the fact that it will then be left to [respondent] to determine for

himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For,

at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to

this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. -

(In re: Atty Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970)

Censure or reprimand

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of

misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor

infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client. -

Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204

[2007]

Kissing complainant on the lips not grossly immoral

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed

complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by

malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the

complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the

respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent

immediately extended an apology to complainant also via


cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages

between complainant and respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where

there were several people in the vicinity considering that

Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If

respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he

could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place

where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts

are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant

disbarment or suspension. - Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto

M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]

Non-injured party can file a complaint

The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to

clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining

suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment

proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for

judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The

evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar

Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended

sanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313.

January 30, 1998

Alternative penalty not allowed

A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in

order. The dispositive portion thereof provides that:

x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed to return the Fifty

Thousand Pesos he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days

from receipt of this resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result

(i)n his DISBARMENT.

In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year

suspension or disbarment, depending on whether or not

respondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed from

another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended,

subject to the condition that he should make restitution as

prescribed therein. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD

A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of

penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the rule that the

penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the alternative, even if

the law provides for alternative penalties, not can such penalty

be subject to a condition. There is no reason why such legal

principles in penal law should not apply in administrative

disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also involve punitive

sanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313.

January 30, 1998]

Misconduct as a government official

As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may

not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in

the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if

that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as

to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral

delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar


on such ground. – Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995.

Noveernment officialmber 27, 1996

Disbarment or suspension in a foreign jurisdiction

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by

a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign

jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a

ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such

action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated

[Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court]. - Velez v. Atty. De

Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Res judicata does not apply in administrative proceeding

“The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or

quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the

[Court’s] administrative powers.”- Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C.

No. 2995. November 27, 1996

While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same

misconduct, it does not amount to double jeopardy as both

proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. - Dinsay v.

Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996

A finding of grave misconduct in the ADMINISTRATIVE CASE would

not be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in a

criminal proceeding

The issue in the FALSIFICATION CASE is whether or not the

SHERIFFS had unlawfully and feloniously made an alteration or

intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning in

violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. – Dinsay v.

Cioco and Atty. Belleza, A.M. No. R-252-P December 12, 1986

Definition of Unprofessional conduct

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the

rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a

member of that profession. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697

July 25, 2006

Indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude

The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does

not involve moral turpitude.

In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s

opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of

baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring

suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he

voiced his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently, there is no

basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of

respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality. - In re: Petition to

Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003

No final judgment yet

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent

De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he

explained that no final judgment was rendered by the

California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He

surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at

the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue


the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in

the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that

he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this

case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative

complaint affects respondent De Vera’s moral fitness to run for

governor. – In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No.

6052. December 11, 2003

Sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults

Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and

consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative

sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that

voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not

married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and

where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled

act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.

While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to

a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to

decide on matters touching on employees’ personal lives,

especially those that will affect their and their family’s future.

We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or

should not marry. - Abanag v. Mabute, A.M. No. P-11-2922, 2011

Estrada v. Escritor case

Respondent, court interpreter in said court, was investigated for

living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child

within this live-in arrangement. Complainant believes that [the

court interpreter] is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the

image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain

employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her

act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing

"disgraceful and immoral conduct“. - Estrada v. Escritor,

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.

without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago

when her husband was still alive but living with another woman.

She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a

member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses

and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted

that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their

religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.

Invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of

her congregation, she asserts that her conjugal arrangement

does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for

which she should be held administratively liable. - Estrada v.

Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct

circumstances, respondent’s conjugal arrangement cannot be

penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the

law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order

that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In

the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man

stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so

the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that

its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also

protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state


interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.-

Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Penalties imposed in administrative cases [judiciary] are

immediately executory

We stressed that when suspension is "to take effect

immediately", this Court means that the period of suspension

should commence on the day respondent judge receives notice

of the decision suspending him from office.

While this does not preclude the filing by respondent judge of

a motion for reconsideration, the filing and pendency of such

a motion does not have the effect of staying the suspension

order. – Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530.

February 4, 2002

Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of lawyers] are

NOT immediately executor

Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is

immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has

15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration

thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision

final and executory. - Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472,

March 30, 2010

“Res Judicata” applies The Investigating Commissioner properly

dismissed the complaint in this case on the ground of res judicata, it

appearing that it involves the same incident and the same cause of action

as Administrative Case No. 3825. Indeed, it appears that on August 5,

1995, the First Division of the Court dismissed a similar complaint filed in

Administrative Case No. 3835. – Halimao v. Atty. Villanueva, A.C. No.

3825. February 1, 1996

Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices

of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular

and Special Courts

AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled “Re: Automatic

Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the

Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and

Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and

as Members of the Philippine Bar.

Under the same rule, a respondent “may forthwith be required to

comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also

be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as

member of the Bar.” xxx In other words, an order to comment on

the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should

not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the

bench but also as a member of the bar.

This is the fair and reasonable meaning of “automatic

conversion” of administrative cases against justices and judges to

disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also

serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication

or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative

complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a

disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation

of the rule. – Campos, et. al. v. Atty. Campos, A.C. No. 8644,

January 22, 2014


Definition of Unbecoming conduct

Unbecoming conduct “applies to a broader range of

transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical

practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.”- ASP

Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et. al.,A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J

April 12, 2011

Unlimited grounds for suspension or disbarment

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,

even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him

to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good

demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good

condition precedent to the practice of law but also a good

qualification for all members of the bar. -Manaois v. Deciembre,

A.M. Case No. 5564, August 20, 2008

To ensure competence after reinstatement

Xxx in view of the numerous changes in the law since 1959,

respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his ability to

render adequate service to his prospective clients; the Court

resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is

hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review

classes in a recognized law school. - In Re: Administrative Case

Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City. A.C. No. 270

March 29, 1974

SC acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review the trial

court’s decision

At the outset, it should be emphasized that this Court, acting as an

administrative tribunal, cannot review the trial court’s decision.

– Belga v. Buban, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1512. May 9, 2000

Breached of promise to marry not subject to sanction

Complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent

and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was

born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated

promises to marry her.

We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his

dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should

be entered into because of love, not for any other reason. –

Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

Desistance cannot stop a disciplinary investigation

The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings

of this nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or

failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. - Section 5, Rule

139-B, Rules of Court

Ex-parte investigation allowed

An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent

fails to appear despite reasonable notice. – Cottam v. Atty. Laysa,

A.C. No. 4834 February 29, 2000

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court Sec. 8. Investigation. — Upon

joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the


Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the

investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue

subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full

opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf

and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable

notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall

proceed ex parte.

Affidavit stands in lieu complainant’s testimony

As for complainant’s failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of

no moment. Complainant’s affidavit stands in lieu of her

testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe and

re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part

of complainant’s evidence. – Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. No.

MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999

Disciplinary authority v. Judicial action

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within

the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a

proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter

involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then

it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority. However, if the

matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and

which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of

the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial

action which is understandably outside the purview of the

Court’s disciplinary authority. – Felipe, et. al. v. Atty.

Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549, December 02, 2013

WON the money should be returned to complainant

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within

the disciplinary authority of the Court OR whether the matter is a

proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. - Annacta v.

Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012

If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of

conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority.

However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or

criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into

the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper

subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the

purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority.

Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains

to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as

member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent

be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be

deemed within the Court’s disciplinary authority. Annacta v.

Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012

SUI GENERIS PRINCIPLE

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case

will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the

administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not

necessarily exculpate him administratively.

In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against

the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the


administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable

disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of

the lawyer.

The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether

different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in

the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. -

Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, A.C.

No. 4017. September 29, 1999

INDEFINITE SUSPENSION

The indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension, far from being

"cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman" has the effect of placing, as it

were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a

lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving

respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his

contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct,

exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his

willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of

conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and

officer of the courts.

Xxx the indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension puts in his

hands the key for the restoration of his rights and privileges as a

lawyer. - Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29,

2000

“Beso-beso” is merely a form of greeting, casual and customary in

nature

Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were

merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No

evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent,

only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious

connotations by the complainant. – Atty. Aquino v. Justice

Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002

QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE

“The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be

established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the

charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office,

willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in

regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.”- OCA

v. Judge Pascual, A.M. No. MTJ-93-783. July 29, 1996

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their

own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently

of civil and criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal

case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an

administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly

preponderant evidence” is all that is required. Thus, a criminal

prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the

same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative

proceedings. – Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty.

Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999

As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in

deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is


required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised

Rules of Evidence:

“Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before administrative or

quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by

substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”-

Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999

Absolute pardon

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but

removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the case of

In re Marcelino Lontok, the Court, in dismissing the disbarment

proceeding against the respondent therein, who had been

convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude, upon the

ground that the respondent had been granted plenary pardon for

his crime, applied the rule that "a person reaches both the

punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender;

and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots

out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender

is as innocent as if he had never committed the crime," and, "if

granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and

disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as

it were, a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity. - In

re:Atty. Rovero, A.M. No. 126 December 29, 1980

Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor doctrine

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its

authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face,

would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or

misconduct. – Atty. Macalintal v. Judge the, A.M. No. RTJ-97-

1375 October 16, 1997

TOPIC: JUDICIAL CLEMENCY AND REINSTATEMENT

FORMS OF CLEMENCY

Reinstatement

Commutation

Lifting of disqualification

REINSTATEMENTS TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION WERE ALLOWED

UNDER THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA

1. the person appreciates the significance of his dereliction and he

has assured the Court that he now possesses the requisite probity

and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is worthy to be

restored to the practice of law

2. the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the

application for reinstatement,

3. his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his

disbarment,

4. his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious

organizations


5. the favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, as well as the local government officials and citizens of

his community.

6. the pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of his

family. – Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No. 44 February 10, 1989

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to

reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a

pardon following his conviction, and the requirements of

reinstatement had been held to be the same as for original

admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater

degree of proof than in an original evidence.

The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is

whether applicant is 'of good moral character‘. – In re: Vailoces,

A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982

COURT LAYS DOWN THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES IN RESOLVING

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall

include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of

the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,

judges or judges associations and prominent members of the

community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent

finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar

misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-

reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the

penalty1 to ensure a period of reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he

still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use

by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual

aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal

scholarship and the development of the legal system or

administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for

public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that

may justify clemency. – Re: Letter of Judge Diaz, A.M. No. 07-7-

17-SC September 19, 2007

ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL PARDON

Thereafter, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this

Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The same

culminated in his disbarment on April 12, 1961.

On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted

petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon" and restored

him "to full civil and political rights.

True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the President

does not of itself warrant his reinstatement.- In re: Vailoces,

A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982

EFFECTS OF PARDON

"When proceedings to strike on attorney’s name from the rolls

are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of

a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held


that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar

to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the

pardon has been granted.“ In re: Disbarment proceedings

against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962

“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense

and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it

releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that

in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never

committed the offense.

EFFECT OF CONDITIONAL PARDON

The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by

the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such conditional pardon

merely partially relieved him of the penal consequences of his

act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially

so when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional

misconduct for which he had been convicted by final judgment. In

re: Atty. Jose Avanceña, A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967

Conditional pardon merely remitted the unexecuted portion of

his term. It does not reach the offense itself. - In re: Disbarment

proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31,

1962

PARDON GRANTED BEFORE CONVICTION

“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense

and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it

releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that

in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never

committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents

any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction,

from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the

penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it

makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and

capacity.”- In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty.

Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962

PARDON GRANTED AFTER CONVICTION

If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and

disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as

it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. - In

re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-

363. July 31, 1962

TOPIC: GROUNDS FOR VOLUNTARY INHIBITION AND

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES

“Judge’s family”

Includes a judge’s:

1. spouse,

2. son,

3. daughter,

4. son-in-law,

5. daughter-in-law, and


6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth

civil degree, or

7. person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who

lives in the judge’s household.

Disqualification of judges under Rule 137 section 1Disqualification of

judges under Rule 137 section 1

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall

sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily

interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is

related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or

affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed

according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been

executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which

he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is

the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in

interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify

himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than

those mentioned above.

Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it

be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above

provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing,

file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and

the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw

therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of

his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing

and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay

shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his

own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

Rules contemplate - two kinds of inhibition

1. compulsory - it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot

actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned.

2. voluntary - leaves to the sound discretion of the judges

concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons,

with only their conscience as guide.

- Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

Proof that a specific act of bias or partiality was committed

What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point

of law is the necessity of proving bias and partiality under the

second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required needs

to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being

sought for inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not even a

single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez from

where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or

appreciated. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos.

173057-74 [2010]

Evidence required

We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the

assailed Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled in

Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, that the

mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for

inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic


evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith,

malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which

may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to

be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of

arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the

stigma of being biased or partial. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice

Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

Proof of clear and convincing evidence

The bare allegations of the judge’s partiality, as in this case, will

not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to

overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble

role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and

without fear or favor. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R.

Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his

wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or

otherwise...."

The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only when

such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily interested" as heir,

legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably

failed to show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is

financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before the

Sandiganbayan. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos.

173057-74 [2010]

A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS

3.1 A judge’s conduct should be above reproach and in the

discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious,

studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just,

impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of private

influence should administer justice according to law and should

deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he

should not allow outside matters or his private interests to

interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his

office.”- Administrative Order No. 162, of the Department of

Justice, dated August 1, 1946.Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No.

106657 [1996]

Meaning of“ruling in a lower court is the subject of review” or “in

which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or

decision is the subject of review.”

Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the

court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the

decision therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in

a position where he had to review his own decision as judge in

the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to inhibit

himself from the case. - Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No.

106657 [1996]

Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and

circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his

earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge

should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or

wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is


intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the

integrity and respect for the judiciary. While he is not legally

required to decline from taking part in the case, it is our

considered view that his active participation in the case below

constitutes a “just or valid reason,” under Section 1 of Rule 137

for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval

v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]

Automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition improper

Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary

inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping,

in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more

sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the

speedy and fair administration of justice. - Kilosbayan

Foundation v. Judge Janolo, Jr. G.R. No. 180543 [2010]

“Utang na loob” per se not a ground for inhibition

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate,

associate or patron of a presiding judge appears before him as

counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang na loob", per se,

should not be a hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor

should recognition of such value in Philippine society prevent the

performance of one's duties as judge. – Query of Executive Judge

Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record is

no ground for disqualification

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or

friendship between a judge and an attorney of record of one

of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. xxx

We held that the fact "that one of the counsels in a case was a

classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for the

disqualification of said judge.” To allow it would

unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case

would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for

under a different rule, a judge would be barred from sitting in

a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could

have many) appeared." - Query of Executive Judge Estrada,

A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Personally approaching the judge to disqualify himself not contempt

We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when

petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his

chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground

which respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It is one thing

to act not in accordance with the rules, and another thing to act in

a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to the

dignity of the court or judge. - Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel,

G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

Former associate in practice of law

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his

memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in

asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that

Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law — is not

one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1,

Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While

it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify


himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate,

was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may

constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit

himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides,

pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of

the said Rule 137. – Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-

22536 August 31, 1967

Father-in-law of the judge present in the proceeding

The meat of this motion for inhibition is that the father-in-law of

the Presiding Judge, herein respondent, was conspicuously present

in the proceedings during which time he gave consultation to the

complainant who was reportedly his political leader and protégée.

In this case, however, respondent did not simply fail to recuse himself from

cases in which his relatives were either involved or interested, the record

shows he did so to favor or protect the parties. – Siawan v. Judge

Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056. May 21, 2001

Judge’s nephew is the husband of the daughter of the counsel for

the accused

It is alleged that respondent should have inhibited himself from

Criminal Case No. 207096, entitled “People v. Crisostomo Yalung,

Roy Manuel M. Villasor, SG Fernando Tagle, and SG Ronan

Guerrero” because respondent’s nephew, Atty. Cris Pascua

Zafra, is married to the daughter of Atty. P. M. Castillo,

complainants’ defense counsel in that case. Complainants’

claim that although respondent’s relationship is to the husband

of the daughter of their counsel, they did not want respondent to

try their case because they wanted “to [avoid] any stigma and/or

cloud of doubt on any order/decision” which respondent may

render on the case.

In this case, respondent judge failed to take into account the loss of

trust on the part of the complainant as to his impartiality.

When a judge exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to

perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he

has no choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. A judge may not be

legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when

circumstances appear that will induce doubt on his honest

actuation and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state

of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should

exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the

courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is

to disqualify himself. - Latorre v. Judge Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ-

00-1563 [2001]

In any event, the grounds relied upon by complainants to support

their motion, i.e., that respondent’s nephew is the husband of the

daughter of the counsel for the accused; that they lacked

confidence in respondent’s impartiality xxx have no merit.

The first is not a ground for mandatory disqualification of judges

under Rule 137, par. 1 since respondent is not even related to

counsel for the accused. - Yalung v. Judge Pascua, A.M. No. MTJ-

01-1342 [2001]

Judge was the former public prosecutor who handled the same case


The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by the

undersigned upon assumption to office as Presiding Judge of this

sala last November 12, 1996. It was only after 4 months herein

undersigned discovered and remembered that he handled the

aforecited criminal case as public prosecutor years back. Hence,

for all intents and purposes, from the time he discovered his

previous participation in the above-cited criminal case, up to the

present, the undersigned never heard nor tried nor conducted any

full-blown trial in the same. Besides the private prosecutor did not

interpose any objection.

WON respondent judge should be administratively

sanctioned.

The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a judge hears

the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases where he acts

by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas has

done in the criminal case. xxx The purpose of the rule is to prevent

not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of

impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in

a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.

In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in Criminal

Case No. 09-5668 from November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998

without securing the written consent of both the prosecution and

the defense and entering the same upon the record of the case. For

almost one and a half years, he issued various orders resetting the

dates of the hearing and of the reception of additional evidence for

the prosecution and for the defense. Undoubtedly, by these acts, he

sat in and acted on the case. - In Re: Inhibition of Judge Rojas

A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC [1998]

Justice of CA had acted as counsel for respondent but no sanction

Considering that Justice Montenegro had so represented the

National Power Corporation in CA G.R. CV No. 34524 in his then

capacity as the Acting Solicitor General, he should have really

begged off from any participation in the decision process by,

indeed from being the ponente for, the appellate court.

In all fairness to Justice Montenegro, however, he explained such

failure to promptly inhibit himself as one of mere inadvertence and

oversight on his part, and when reminded that he, in fact, had

acted as counsel for respondent NPC as the then Acting Solicitor

General, he then forthwith disengaged himself from further

involvement in the disposition of the case. - Urbanes, R. v. CA, G.R.

No. 112884 August 30, 1994

Should a judge whose decision was reversed by the appellate court

voluntarily inhibit herself when the case is remanded to her sala

The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled adversely against

petitioner in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, which this

Court later reversed in G.R. No. 160753, is not enough reason,

absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to conclude

that the judge was biased and partial against petitioner. As this

Court has emphasized in Webb v. People, the remedy of erroneous

interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not the outright

disqualification of a judge, for there is yet to come a judge with the

omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The courts


will close shop if we disqualify judges who err, for we all err. -

Barnes v. reyes, et. al., G.R. No. 179583 [2009]

Is a former assistant or associate of the judge in the practice of law a

ground for automatic disqualification

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his

memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in

asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that

Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law — is not

one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1,

Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While

it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify

himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate,

was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may

constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit

himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides,

pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of

the said Rule 137. – Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-

22536 August 31, 1967

Is being a former classmate of the judge a ground for inhibition or

disqualification?

Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified

because the counsel for plaintiffs-appellees had been a classmate

of the trial judge. Admittedly, this is not a legal ground for

disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial

judges to whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately,

confusion would result, for under the rule advocated, a judge

would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his former

classmates (and he could have many) appeared. – Vda. De

Bonifacio v. BLTB, et. al., G.R. No. L-26810. August 31, 1970

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship

between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties to

a suit is no ground for disqualification. - Query of Executive Judge

Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed against the

decision of a judge, after he had voluntarily inhibited himself from

further sitting in the case?

The administrative matter before us differs from most petitions

involving a judge's disqualification here, a judge voluntarily

inhibits himself and, instead of a party or both parties filing a

motion on the matter, it is another judge who insists that he

continue with the case.

However, as much as possible, the judge to whom a case is

transferred should not resist too much the order of recusation

unless the motives for inhibition are suspect. - Query of Executive

Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Judge attempted to make complainant and the accused settle their

dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of

the accused is his first cousin Judge attempted to make complainant

and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they

are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin

Respondent's efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot

justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant

was not willing to listen to respondent's counsel, the latter should


have recused himself from the case without further delay. He

cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance

that complainant might relent and agree at last to settle the

matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than

enough for respondent to make use of his good office. After a

reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an

amicable settlement and using his moral influence on them

without success, he should have inhibited himself from the case and

continued his peace efforts in a private capacity.

Judge is reprimanded. – Lazo v. Judge Tiong, A.M. No. MTJ-98-

1173. December 15, 1998

Would mandamus lie to compel respondent Judge to proceed with

hearing the case

On July 26, 1995, respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr. issued an order

denying the motion for inhibition but voluntarily inhibited himself

and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the

order of inhibition.

As such, mandamus would not lie to compel respondent Judge

Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to proceed with hearing the case since the

grant or denial of the motion to inhibit involves the exercise of

discretion. The right or duty to exercise this discretion has been

imposed on him by the Rules of Court with regard to any matter

brought before him. Furthermore, petitioners have no vested right

to the issuance of the motion to inhibit given its discretionary

nature. – Gutang, et. al. v. CA, G.R. No. 124760 July 8, 1998

Verbal motion for voluntary inhibition is not proper

Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the

corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt of the

Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the

accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the required

motion for inhibition, an omission which was interpreted as

abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the

respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. – Villanueva v.

Judge Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March 16, 2000

Rule 65 as remedy where the trial judge rules in favor of her

competency

Second, while the restriction in the Rule against appeal or stay of

the proceedings where the trial judge rules in favor of her

competency to sit in a case is not an absolute rule in civil cases, and

has not precluded a resort in appropriate cases to the special civil

action of certiorari before the higher courts for determination, this

will apply only in cases where the denial of the motion for

inhibition or disqualification was made ahead of the trial court’s

judgment on the merits and there is a clear showing that the case

is an exceptional one. This is not true in the case of the present

petitioner. Ong v. Basco, G.R. No. 167899 August 6, 2008

Interpretation of Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court against

appeal or stay of the proceedings when the trial judge denies a

motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor of his own competency

Rule 137 in criminal cases might give a contrary impression, that

such restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the

trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor


of his own competency does not apply in criminal cases where such

disqualification is sought by the prosecution or offended party. -

Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30,

1969

Rule 137 in criminal cases might give a contrary impression, that

such restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the

trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor

of his own competency does not apply in criminal cases where such

disqualification is sought by the prosecution or offended party. -

Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30,

1969

When the accused seeks inhibition or disqualification

Where, however, it is the accused in a criminal case who seeks the

disqualification of the trial judge, the general restriction provided

in the rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the

judge denies the motion and rules in favor of his own competency

would apply, as it does in civil cases. In such case, the accused, in

the event of his conviction, could raise the correctness of the

judge's ruling on his non-disqualification with his appeal from the

decision on the merits; and were he to be acquitted, he would have

no cause for complaint against the judge's acquittal verdict and

ruling of non-disqualification of himself from trying the case and

rendering such verdict. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-

23710 September 30, 1969

Disqualification of a judge is not a matter that affects his jurisdiction

This Court's jurisprudence, likewise contrary to petitioners'

contention, holds that the disqualification of a judge is not a

matter that affects his jurisdiction and power to act such as to

render his decision null and void, so much so that failure on the

part of a party, to timely interpose such an objection of

disqualification prior to the decision has been held to be a fatal

obstacle to raising such objection on appeal. - Paredes v. Judge

Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

When to file a motion for disqualification?

The question of a judge's disqualification, therefore, is one that

should be timely raised in the first instance, so that it may properly

be raised and considered on appeal.

At the same time, as we pointed out in the Abella case, supra, if this

Court were of the opinion upon a review of the case that the

litigant had not had a fair trial, it would grant a new trial,

although the judge may not have been disqualified under Rule 137,

not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but in the best interests of

justice. This we did in Dais vs. Torres, where we ruled that:

"Although a judge may not have been disqualified under said

section, nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant

was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's

bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it

necessary, in the interest of justice." Paredes v. Judge Gopengco,

G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

Written consent of all the parties is required in “Remittal of

Disqualification”

From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any

case in which he was a counsel without the written consent of all

the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.


The respondent alleged that since there was no objection from any

of the parties, he proceeded to preside over the case and to decide

it. This is a clear violation of the law. The rule is explicit that he

must secure the written consent of all the parties, not a mere

verbal consent much less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said

written consent must be signed by them and entered upon the

record. - Lorenzo v. Judge Marquez, A.M. No. MTJ-87-123 June

27, 1988

Definition of affinity

Affinity is defined as "the relation which one spouse because of

marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection

existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married

persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows

out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife

one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's

blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa. – PP v.

Raul Berana, G.R. No. 123544 July 29, 1999

Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal

bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity therefore are those

commonly referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother,

stepchild and the like. - PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05

February 10, 1998

Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the blood

relatives of the other spouse." It is a relationship by marriage or a

familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a

fiction created by law in connection with the institution of

marriage and family relations. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M.

OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]

Blood relatives”

Relatives by consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed the

following:

(1) an ascendant;

(2) a descendant;

(3) a legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister - PP v.

Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998

No affinity

Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one

spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by

affinity to his wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s

brother. There is no affinity between the husband’s brother and

the wife’s sister. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M. OCA IPI No.

09-3243-RTJ [2013]

Is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the

blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood

relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus

ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity?

If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the

blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the extinguishment of

marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship

by affinity?

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that

relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the


kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of

the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced

children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity

endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it

as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage.

This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent

to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the “tie of affinity” between

these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded

as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. –

Intestate Estate of Gonzales vda. De Carung cong v. PP, G.R.

No. 181409 February 11, 2010

“Common law” relationship not a relationship by affinity

The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by

common-law relations. Here, there is no blood relationship or legal

bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the modifying

circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him. –

PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998

CASE 1

Judge is respondent’s second cousin by affinity, the former’s

[judge] aunt is married to an uncle of respondent. The relationship

notwithstanding, Judge did not inhibit himself from hearing said

electoral case.

Judge, as alleged, are related within the sixth degree by affinity in

that the aunt of the judge is married to the uncle of respondent.

WON the judge is related by affinity to respondent.

Judge not disqualified

In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his

aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the

marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is

the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by

affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by

affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are

not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In

like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge

Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge

Wacas’ aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship

by affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-

laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec.

1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas

A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]

Being“magbalaes” is not a ground for automatic disqualification

Complainant contends that respondent judge is guilty of

impropriety by refusing to inhibit himself from the case despite the

fact that one of the accused, Lope Panti, Sr., is the father-in-law of

respondent judge’s daughter.

To be sure, respondent judge and accused Lope Panti, Sr. are not,

strictly speaking, relatives within the meaning of Rule 137, §1 of

the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, the close personal relations

between them as parents of their respective children, being in our

culture known as “magbalaes,” should have cautioned

respondent judge to inhibit himself from the case, lest his


impartiality be placed in doubt. – Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles,

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1236. November 25, 1999

Complainant is the judge’s wife

Respondent issued a warrant for the arrest of complainant,

knowing that the private complainant therein was his wife, Atty.

Ester Flor. – Tenenan v. Judge Flor, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1995

September 25, 2007

TOPIC: LEGAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO JUDGES AND JUSTICES

Resolution to protect members of judiciary from baseless complaints

• First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability of

A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect

Members of the Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded

Administrative Complaints, which took effect on November 3,

2003.

• Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious

administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary

for purposes of harassment, we issued said Resolution, which

provides:

2. If the complaint is

(a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a

Justice or Judge;

(b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year

before such filing; and

(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the

respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal.

• If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must

require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from

receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and

recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the

comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the

date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or, if it is not

possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without

prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount

as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the

gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

When to file administrative case against judges

• Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary

proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not

complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial

remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and

exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of

judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-

requisites for the taking of other measures against the

persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,

administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available

judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate

tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry

into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to


have opened, or closed. - Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-

1311. October 3, 2003

• Prosecution of the judge can be had only if “there be a final

declaration by a competent court in some appropriate

proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the

challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or

bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the

judge in rendering said judgment or order” or under the

stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. –

Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003

Anonymous complaint

• First, we clear the objection of respondent judge that the letter-

complaint should not be given due course because it is only

anonymous. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court

provides that the disciplinary proceedings against judges and

justices may be instituted under either of three ways:

1. by the Supreme Court motu proprio;

2. upon a verified complaint; or

3. upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public

records of indubitable integrity.

• Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Gedorio, A.M. No.

RTJ-05-1955, May 25, 2007

Lack of verification is only a formal defect

• As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not have

taken cognizance of the complaint because the letter-complaint

was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B, §1 of the Rules of

Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys, suffice it to say

that such constitutes only a formal defect and does not affect

the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the

complaint. "The verification is merely a formal requirement

intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged

are true and correct — the court may simply order the

correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict

compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be

served." (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero Jr., A.C. No. 5394, December

02, 2002)

Effect of retirement of respondent judge

• Respondent's retirement from office did not render the present

administrative case moot and academic. Neither does it free him

from liability. (Lagcao v. Judge Gako, A.M. RTJ-04-1840, August

2, 2007)

Death of respondent judge

• The dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Butacan by

reason of his demise is in accordance with Bote v. Judge Eduardo

where the Court held that in view of the death of Judge Escudero,

for humanitarian reasons, it is inappropriate to impose any

administrative liability of a punitive nature; and declared the

administrative complaint against the respondent Judge, dismissed,

closed and terminated. - RE: Application for


retirement/gratuity benefits xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret., April

22, 2008

Judge also liable if court employee fraternized with litigant

• Unfortunately, these standards were not met by respondent Judge

Alagar in this case having tolerated unknowingly his employee

to fraternize, receive or give personal favors no matter how

small, with party litigants in a case pending before his sala.

• Thus, while this Court finds the respondent Judge to have acted

with impartiality and propriety in dealing with the complainants

in Criminal Case No. 4252 , we find fault on his part in failing

to supervise the conduct and behavior of his court employee

for the latter’s improper use of his vehicle, to the detriment of the

court’s image. - Balderama v. Judge Alagar, A.M. No. RTJ-99-

1449. January 18, 2002

Having lunch with counsel

• For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrong

per se. The Canons, however, provides that as much as possible he

should be scrupulously careful to avoid any suspicion that his

social or business or friendly relationship is an element in

“determining his judicial course.” Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr.,

is counsel of the petitioner in an annulment case pending before

him, the respondent judge should have thought twice about joining

counsel for lunch, especially in the courtroom at that. - Pertierra

v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September 12, 2003

Effect of reconciliation of the parties

• The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative

proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the

administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in

administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of the

parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have

been committed against the public service. (Flores v. Judge

Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499, October 6, 2008)

Conviction in a criminal case

• Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not

necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the

respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the

dismissal of the administrative case.

• Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will not automatically

warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative case. We

emphasize the well-settled rule that criminal and civil cases are

altogether different from administrative matters, and each must

be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to it. In

other words, the disposition in the first two will not necessarily

govern the third, and vice versa. (Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G.

Angeles A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908, August 15, 2007)

Effect of resignation from office

• Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the

Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the

instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at

the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by


the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its

consequent acceptance – without prejudice – by this Court, has

ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court

retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent

or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be

fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous

implications. (Non-disclosure before the JBC of the

administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC

no. 013, August 22, 2007)

GROUNDS FOR OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL

• Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring

judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites

must concur:

(1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the

compulsory retirement of the judge or justice;

(2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such

filing; and

(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the

respondent. (Miguel Colorado v. Judge Ricardo M. Agapito, A.M. no.

MTJ-06-1658, July 3, 2007)

Warning is not a penalty

• A warning, however, no matter how stern, is not a penalty. -

Rosauro M. Miranda v. Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Sr., A.M.

No. RTJ-01-1665, November 29, 2001

Gross ignorance of the law

• To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision,

order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official

duties must not only be contrary to existing law and

jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by

bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the case before us,

the administrative complaint does not even allege that the

erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated. - Sps.

Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September

27, 2000

Rendering an unjust judgment

• Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal

and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under

Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are:

(a) the offender is a judge;

(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;

(c) the judgment is unjust; and

(d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.

• The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be

rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be

unjust. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-

1447. September 27, 2000


There is no liability at all for a mere error

• An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not

supported by evidence or both. The source of an unjust judgment

may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere

error. It is well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to

exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for

any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith.

• Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering

judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the

sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been

actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or

some other similar motive. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad,

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

• Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law

does not constitute the crime. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad,

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

When good faith will not be applied

• We need not belabor jurisprudence to accommodate

respondent’s argument which in effect posits that not every

judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if

committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative

sanction. So we have ruled and so we have acted, but only in cases

within the parameters of tolerable judgment.

• Where, however, the issues are so simple and the facts so

evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still

err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which, hopefully,

was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy purpose. – Sps.

Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September

27, 2000

Complaint for gross ignorance of the law is impermissible if case is

appealed

• The main issue for our resolution is whether the instant

administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law is

permissible in light of the filing by complainants of a notice of

appeal and a petition for certiorari assailing respondent

judge’s decision and his order of execution.

• In the present case, the complainants filed this administrative case

against respondent judge while their appeal and petition for

certiorari challenging his decision and order were still

pending with the RTC. Following our settled pronouncements

cited above, the instant complaint is impermissible. – Camacho v.

Judge Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1252. December 17, 2002

Period to decide or resolve the case submitted for decision

• The 90-day period to decide or resolve the case submitted for

decision, fixed no less by the Constitution, is a mandatory

requirement. Hence, non-compliance thereof shall subject the

erring judge to administrative sanction as this Court may deem

appropriate.

• It is only in certain meritorious cases, i.e., those involving difficult

questions of law or complex issues or when the judge is burdened

by heavy caseloads, that a longer period to decide may be allowed

but only upon proper application made with the Supreme Court


by the concerned judge.- Dr. Seares v. Judge Salazar, A.M. No.

MTJ-98-1160 November 22, 2000

Judge attended the hearing of his brother

• Judge Dojillo “sat beside the counsel of his brother” and

“actively coached, aided, assisted, and guided said counsel by now

and then saying something, handing piece of writing, reminding,

and or stopping the counsel from manifesting something to the

court, and other similar acts.”

• Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the hearing of

his brother’s election protest case just to give moral support

and, in the process, also observe how election protest

proceedings are conducted. Although concern for family

members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent,

being a judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon

to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the

entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires

a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere

appearance of impropriety in all activities. - Vidal v. Judge

Dojillo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591. July 14, 2005

Comment on Certiorari filed by public respondent judge in behalf of

private respondent

• Further, respondent judge, in signing and filing a comment with

the court on behalf of one of the parties, engaged in the private

practice of law.

• Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and Rule

5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are prohibited from

engaging in the private practice of law.

• In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the provision

in the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

“Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the

petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an

answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If either party

elevates the case to a higher court, the public respondents shall be included

therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically

directed, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. -

Tuzon v. Judge Cloribel-Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662 [2001]

Can the members of the Supreme Court be removed from office only

by impeachment?

• Justice Reyes maintains that Members of the Court may be

removed from office only by impeachment. Since removal from

office is a disciplinary or administrative sanction, it follows that

there is no manner by which a Justice of this Court may be

disciplined for acts done during his incumbency. Considering that

the power to impeach a Justice of this Court is lodged in the

legislative branch of the government, the Court is without

authority to proceed against and discipline its former Member. He

added that what constitutes impeachable offenses is a purely

political question which the Constitution has left to the sound

discretion of the legislature, and that the misconduct of leakage is

not one of the impeachable offenses. - In Re: Undated Letter of

Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and


Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11,

2009

• When Justice Reyes compulsorily retired upon reaching the

mandatory age of 70, his perceived mantle of protection and

immunity, that the mode of his removal from office can be done

only through impeachment, no longer exists. His duties and

responsibilities as a Justice having ceased by reason of his

retirement, he is reverted to the status of a lawyer and,

consequently, can be subjected to appropriate sanctions for

administrative offenses, particularly, an act of misconduct. The

fact that the Investigating Committee, created per Resolution

dated December 10, 2008 of the Court, commenced the

investigation during the incumbency of Justice Reyes is of no

moment, as he was then not yet a respondent in an administrative

matter against him. - In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Biraogo,

Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R.

No.179120 A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009

Res ipsa loquitor

• Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its



misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge The, A.M. No. RTJ-97-

1375. October 16, 1997]

• Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its



misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge The, A.M. No. RTJ-97-

1375. October 16, 1997]

Quantum of evidence

• It is likewise a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the

burden of proving the allegations in the complaint with

substantial evidence falls on the complainant. - Bautista v.

Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]

Quantum of evidence required for removal of judge from office

• Jurisprudence dictates –

“The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established

beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which

the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or

incompetence. The general rules with regard to admissibility of evidence in

criminal trials apply. - Jabon v. Judge Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-

02-1713 [2005]

Acts of a collegial court

• It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31,

2004 was not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his

individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court

whose members reach their conclusions in consultation and

accordingly render their collective judgment after due

deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a

collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. Consequently, the

filing of charges against a single member of a division of the

appellate court is inappropriate. - Bautista v. Justice

Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]


• The act of a single member, though he may be its head, done

without the participation of the others, cannot be considered

the act of the collegial body itself. – ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v.

Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010

“Rendering knowingly unjust judgment" does not apply to a

collegial court

• Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of

the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust

judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case

submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the

prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the

decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with

jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals

and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know

that said penal article has no application to the members of a

collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their

conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective

judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that

a charge of violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices

Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust"

cannot prosper. - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI

No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]

Preventive suspension pending resolution of the administrative case

• The mere existence of pending criminal charges against the

respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or

suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the door to

harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous

criminal cases against them.

• By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by

the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We

agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of the

crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same

has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the

constitutional presumption of innocence. - Re: Conviction of

Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

Existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does

not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence

• It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption

indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the

constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating

presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any

evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner,

the presumption of innocence continues. - Re: Conviction of Judge

Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

Preventive suspension not applicable

• Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that,

while it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite does not

violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the

same is not a penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of judges,

not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are

amorphous at best. – Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No.

06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008


Collegial court needs to act as one body

• Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of

the Fourth Division despite their having separately conducted

hearings, considering that the three of them were in the same

venue and were acting within hearing and communicating

distance of one another.

• The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division

would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried

before it must be made directly available to each and every one of

its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal

and full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication

of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three

members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and

communicating distance of one another at the hearings in

question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those

circumstances not all of them sat together in session. - ASP

Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J

August 24, 2010

Preventive suspension for erring lawyer

• Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court. -

After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor,

the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of the IBP

Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator,

may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession

for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the

pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by

the Supreme Court.

CA or RTC may suspend an attorney

• Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals

or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial

Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the

causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the

Supreme Court in the case.

Judge acted as lawyer for complainant and father-in-law

• Respondent acted as a lawyer for complainant and her father-in-

law when he drafted complainant’s affidavit which became the

basis of a complaint for estafa filed against Heidi Navarra. By

acting as counsel for complainant and the latter’s father-in-

law in a case filed in his court, respondent compromised his

neutrality and independence.

• Respondent’s misconduct in this case is further compounded by

the fact that he rendered the legal services in question using

government facilities during office hours. - Biboso v. Judge

Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1356 [2001]

Pale (Finals)

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