Pakistan Since Indepence

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Blackwell Publishering LtdOxford, UKMUWOThe Muslim World1478-1913 2003 Hartford SeminaryJuly 20039331000

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Pakistan since IndependenceThe Muslim World Volume 93 July/October 2003

Pakistan since

Independence:An Historical Analysis

Abdullah Ahsan

International Islamic University

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

P

akistan as an independent nation-state came into existence in August

1947, in response to Muslim demand for a separate nation for Muslims

in Hindu majority British India. Prior to the British rule in India, Muslims

had migrated from West and Central Asia and many indigenous Hindustanis,

as they were known at that time, accepted Islam; the community flourishedand established a rule over India that lasted almost a thousand years.

1

Muslims

vehemently opposed the British penetration into India, which began around

the middle of the eighteenth century.

2

They fought against the British for

almost a hundred years, which culminated in a major conflict in 1857.

3

Muslims

fought these wars not to establish a Muslim state in India, but rather to rid

India of British occupation. However, Muslims failed in their effort, and

following the war, the British began to introduce political and legal reforms

in India. Most of these reforms were led by liberal British Utilitarian scholarsand statesmen who used to work for the British East India Company the

company that had colonized India. Many of the political, social, educational,

and other reforms that were introduced in India had far reaching

consequences for the whole of India. The Muslim demand for Pakistan and

later developments in Pakistan could be explained in light of many of these

reforms. In this essay, I will analyze the history of Pakistan and examine how

and why Pakistan failed to achieve its stated goal to become a progressive,

strong and Islamic welfare state. In doing so, I will pay special attention toMawd

u

d

i

s contribution in achieving these goals.

This analysis will be divided into three chronological periods:

developments during the pre-independence period, covering major events

under the British rule; progress in independent Pakistan until 1971 when

Bangladesh was created; and developments since then. In analyzing events in


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post-independent Pakistan, particular attention will be paid to challenges

faced by the leadership in the constitution-making process, the role of political

parties, regional differences, the attempts to Islamize Pakistan in the 1980s, and

the problems of democracy there.Following the war of 1857, the British Indian government decided to

Westernize India, and expected that a strong elite of young Indians would be

equipped with a complete Western and Christian education.

4

This seemed to

have become the colonial responsibility of the Victorian Englishman because

of his commitment to the idea of the white mans burden. Indians, however,

responded positively only to the Western aspect of British education; they

totally rejected the idea of converting to Christianity. At the same time, the

British also began to introduce political and legal reforms in India by invitingrepresentatives of various communities to the Imperial Legislative Council.

This led to the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 under the

leadership of a retired British civil servant. With the introduction of these

reforms, Muslims began to note with considerable concern the growth of

Hindu dominance in government jobs and in other aspects of life. They saw

these developments as threats to their interests in India. One of their leaders,

Sayyid Ahmad Khan (18371898), declared in the Imperial Legislative Council

that because of such steps, the larger community would totally override theinterests of the smaller community.

5

Slowly, Muslims began to legitimize their

claim for a separate identity in India, which eventually took the shape of the

state of Pakistan.

Legitimizing the Claim

The Muslim perception of a separate identity in India began to appear in

the 1860s over the question of language, which was generally known as the

Hindi-Urdu controversy. This controversy originated when Sayyid AhmadKhan established a Translation Society to translate books from European

languages into an Indian language for the benefit and growth of Indian youth.

For Khan, the suitable Indian language was Urdu, but some Hindus opposed

his idea and insisted on translating them into the Hindi language.

6

For Khan,

the argument for Urdu was simple; Muslims had abandoned the Persian

language, which was the official language under Muslim rule, in favor of Urdu

for the sake of all Indians. However, some Hindus, he thought, were only

interested in wiping out the Muslim identity in India by introducing Hindi,

7

which was not extensively used by any Indian community at that time.

The concern of Muslims for safeguarding their interests in Hindu-majority

India was also reflected in the writings and activities of Sayyid Amir Ali

(18491928). Ali founded the National Mohammedan Association in 1877 in

order to promote good feelings and fellowship between the Indian races and


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creeds, at the same time to protect and safeguard Muslim interests and help

their political training.

8

Ali also argued with the British Indian government for

a proper Muslim share in government jobs.

9

Sayyid Ahmad Khan, for his part,

concentrated on the establishment of Muslim educational institutions in orderto promote Muslim interests. In December 1906, Indian Muslims established

the All-India Muslim League with a stated goal of safeguarding Muslim political

rights in India. In 1909, the British Indian government recognized the Muslim

demand and introduced a separate electorate system under which the

existence of different communities was recognized and only members of

the respective communities now could vote for their representatives to the

Legislative Council. Although this was perhaps originally intended to support

a small Anglo-Indian community, it helped Muslims acquire an independentconstitutional identity in India.

Both the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, the

two major political parties that led India and Pakistan to independence, were

established under the direct patronage of the British. The British colonial

educational policy, as defined by its formulator Thomas Macaulay (1800

1859), aimed to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the

millions whom we govern a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but

English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.

10

Indeed, the Britishsucceeded in creating this elite class in India, both among Hindus and

Muslims. It was not until World War I that Indians demanded independence

from the British. By then, Indians had extensively familiarized themselves

with the Enlightenment and nineteenth century European ideas: they did so

particularly on learning of the idea of nationalism. During the war they received

assurances from the British, and began preparing to demand independence

following the war. Hindus and Muslims also reached an agreement (Lucknow

Pact, 1916) to share power and responsibility in independent India.The achievement of independence was delayed, however, for two

reasons. First, the British, despite having made promises during the war, were

now reluctant to grant independence; second, Hindus and Muslims failed to

demonstrate their unity in achieving their goal, and the British began to take

advantage of their disunity. Soon Muslims were convinced that if Indian

independence were achieved without safeguarding Muslim interests, they

would eventually lose their identity. The poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal

(18731938), originally a supporter of Indian nationalism, now argued in favorof a separate nation-state with Muslim majority provinces in India. He defined

this new state in the following terms:

It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic

interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is

because we all believe in a certain view of the universe . . . that we are


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members of the society founded by the prophet of Islam. Islam abhors

all material limitations, and bases its nationality on purely abstract ideas

objectified in a potentially expansive group of personalities. It is not

dependent for its life principle on the character and genius of aparticular people. In its essence, it is non-temporal, non-spatial.

11

Iqbals view on nationalism might have been influenced not only by the

failure of Indian Hindus and Muslims to reach any workable agreement, but

also by the growth of extreme nationalism in Germany and Italy during this

period.

In a few years time, the All-India Muslim League adopted Iqbals idea of

an independent and separate nation for Muslims in India as its official goal. Its

leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah (18751948) further explained the demand justbefore the adoption of the resolution for a separate nation for Muslims (known

as the Pakistan Resolution) in 1940 by stating that:

It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to

understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not

religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and

distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can

ever evolve a common nationality. The Hindus and Muslims belong to

two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. Theyneither intermarry, nor interdine together and, indeed they belong to

two civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and

conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite

clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspirations from

different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are

different, . . . often the Hero of one is a foe of the other . . . To yoke

together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical

minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent

and final destruction of any fabric that there may be so as to build up forthe government of such a state.

12

Jinnah is also quoted to have argued that, the Muslims demand Pakistan

where they could rule according to their own code of life and according to

their own cultural growth, traditions and Islamic laws . . . Our religion, our

culture and our Islamic ideals are our driving force to achieve our

independence.

13

Jinnahs stand on Muslim nationalism in India came to be known as the

Two-nation theory, which the Indian National Congress rejected outright.However, many common Indian Hindus accepted this as a reality in India.

For example, one famous author said, [t]he so-called two-nation theory was

formulated long before Mr. Jinnah or the Muslim League; in truth, it was not a

theory at all; it was a fact of history.

14

In spite of such recognition of these

historical realities, it was an uphill struggle for Muslims. They continued to


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explain why they could not accept the idea of nationalism envisioned by the

Indian National Congress.

15

However, a separate nationhood on the basis of

religious identity raised the question about the relationship between the

proposed Muslim nation in India and Muslims in other parts of the world.Iqbal explained this relationship saying that:

For the present, every Muslim nation must sink into her deeper self,

temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and

powerful to form a living family of republics. A true and living unity,

according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy as to be achieved by

a merely symbolical overlordship. It is truly manifested in a multiplicity

of free, independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and

harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration. Itseems to me that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a

League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial

distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social

horizon of its members.

16

The All-India Muslim League, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali

Jinnah, succeeded in mobilizing the Muslim masses for a separate nation-state

for Muslims in India. It demonstrated their support for Pakistan in the general

elections held in 194546, and the British conceded to the demand. Pakistancame into being in August 1947. However, those who supported Pakistan were

not well-versed in Islam. W. C. Smith observed just before the emergence of

Pakistan:

A young Muslim fashionably dressed, sits with his friends in the

Lahore coffee house and talks, in English, of Marx or Lenin. He has

perhaps never studied the Qur

a

n . . . yet intensely conscious about

being a Muslim, he insists that he and his co-religionists in India are a

nation, and he is, he says, ready to fight to establish for them a freecountry.

17

Most leaders of the All-India Muslim League, which in 1947 became the

Pakistan Muslim League, came from a class of Western educated lawyers,

landowners, merchants, doctors, journalists, and civil servants. A gap existed

between these leaders and the Muslim masses. This gap, to a great extent, was

filled by scores of religious leaders and activists throughout the country.

Yet, to many of the leaders of the Muslim League, according to a Pakistani

historian, Pakistan meant a state where Muslims would constitute a greatmajority and where industries, banks, the army and the bureaucracy would

all be under the control of Muslims.

18

They had little concern about the

social philosophy or political ideology of the new state. Those with a leftist

orientation warned about the future of Pakistan. G. M. Sayed, a leader of Sind

Muslim League, is quoted to have said:


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Do not forget that Islamic society actually in existence is that in which

the religious head is an ignorant Mulla, spiritual leader in immoral Pir,

political guide, a power intoxicated feudal lord and whose helpless

members are subjected to all the worldly forces of money and influence.If the really important question about abolition of Jagirdari and Zamindari

system crops up or the prohibition of intoxicants becomes the issue,

what would not a rich Jagirdar or an aristocratic member of a sophisticated

club do to use his influence, as also that of the Mulla and the Pir, to resist

this threat to what is essentially an immoral and un-Islamic cause?

19

Political developments in independent Pakistan indicate that these

concerns were genuine because the most powerful Muslim League leaders

were trained in the British colonial model formulated by Macaulay, and hadlittle knowledge about Islam, as has been noted by W. C. Smith. They also had

little contact with common rural Muslims who constituted the majority of the

population. However, they were supported by half-educated Mullahs and Pirs

who had little or no knowledge about modern European ideas. Mainly in the

western part of Pakistan. Many Muslim League leaders mainly in the western

part of Pakistan came from land owning families who had little concern about

the well-being of the common people.

Unlike any other newly independent country of the twentieth century,Pakistan did not inherit any established government. Comparing Pakistan with

India, one historian says, India inherited a working federal capital with the

majority of the cabinet and other public servants willing to continue at their

posts. Pakistan had to create a new capital and a new government.

20

It was

a modern nation-state with an historical legacy, but without any immediate

political basis in modern European thought. The British agreed to the idea of

establishing a separate nation for Muslims only because the administration

failed to maintain law and order during the last years of its rule in India. It isalso important to note that before the coming of the British in India, the whole

of India was not a single political entity; it was by force that the British

established a central administration in Delhi with many semi-independent

states throughout India. Muslims for their part claimed to have inherited

a rich intellectual legacy of an Islamic political and legal system. The new

government of Pakistan established its seat in Karachi, which had been the

seat of a provincial government, with no established army or bureaucracy. The

government of India refused to pay the government of Pakistan its share from

the central treasury and its share of arms from the British Indian army. On top

of the responsibility of running every day affairs, the government had to address

two fundamental issues: the making of a new constitution and maintaining a

balance among the diverse groups of people in different parts of the country.

21

Let us now discuss the constitution-making process in Pakistan.


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Struggle for an Islamic Constitution

The constitution-making process in Pakistan encountered an extraordinary

challenge: its leaders made a public commitment to an Islamic constitution,

but inherited a British constitutional and legal system where the parliamentwas a sovereign institution. Could the parliament in an Islamic state be

absolutely sovereign? It was a challenging question for the Pakistani

leadership, for it needed to draw a balance between the proposed Islamic state

and the British constitutional system, which grew in reaction to the religious

control of society. The idea of an Islamic state created a lot of enthusiasm in

Pakistan, but it was difficult to translate that enthusiasm into reality. According

to a historian of constitutional development, the phrase Islamic State had

been on the lips of almost all the intelligentsia of Pakistan, and had producedan immense volume of talk and enthusiasm; yet the term had not been

precisely defined . . .

22

This also created confusion on the perceived

role of religious scholars in the interpretation of laws in Pakistan. One

Orientalist mused:

What is Islam? If Islam were but a religion, the Hindus and Christians of

Pakistan would simply be religious minorities. But Islam is not only a

religious or political unity, but an ideology, a religious or a politicalideology or both in one, the position of a religious minority must be

different . . . How can a Hindu accept an Islamic ideology? If he cannot

subscribe to it what will be his position as a citizen?

23

On examination, one would find these questions legitimate only from

the perspective of European nationalism, for an understanding of Islamic

history would have made the answers to these questions clear. Pakistan was

destined to be a modern nation-state based on a real historical experience.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah explained the position of non-Muslims in Pakistan inthe First Constituent Assembly, saying:

. . . (every Pakistani is) a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges

and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will

make . . . we are starting with this fundamental principle that we are

citizens and equal citizens of one state . . . I think we should keep that

in front as our ideal, and you will find that in the course of time Hindus

will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the

religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, butin the political sense as citizens of the state.

24

Jinnahs statement about Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims

will cease to be Muslims created a lot of confusion in Pakistan. If Muslims

were going to cease to be Muslims in the political sense, then what was the

reason to divide India along religious lines? Mawd

u

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argued:


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We have been ceaselessly fighting for the recognition of the fact that we

are a separate nation by virtue of our adherence to Islam . . . If, now,

after these precious sacrifices, we fail to achieve that real and ultimate

objective of making Islam a practical, social, political and constitutionalreality . . . our entire struggle and all our sacrifices become futile and

meaningless.

25

When the Constituent Assembly debated the framing of the constitution,

the questions of the role of Islam in the constitution and the status of minorities

in Pakistan were raised and thoroughly discussed. In March 1949, the

Constituent Assembly adopted a resolution called the Objectives Resolution

defining the nature of the future constitution. It declared Pakistans

commitments to the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, toleranceand social justice, as enunciated by Islam and that the Muslims shall be

enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in

accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, and also that

adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and

practice their religions and develop their cultures.

26

The Objectives Resolution

generally received positive response from all quarters of Pakistani society.

Mawd

udi, who actively supported the idea of the two-nation theory through

his writings, said that the Objectives Resolution had declared Pakistan anideological state; it had also, in absolute and categorical terms, identified the

ideology on which that state was to be founded.27

Based on the Objectives Resolution, a Basic Principles Committee was

formed to prepare the draft constitution. One of the recommendations of this

committee relating to the Islamic character of the proposed constitution was

the formation of a Board of Islamic Teachings to review legislations so that

nothing against the teachings of Islam was enacted. This recommendation

seems to have been relevant in view of the lack of knowledge about Islamon the part of the members of the Constituent Assembly. Yet, this was viewed

(by certain quarters) as a force outside the Parliament which could veto any

legislation.28 One fails to understand, however, why such a role for religious

scholars could have constituted a veto power when the Board could only

recommend and express their opinions on laws, while the parliament was the

only body authorized to make laws in Pakistan.

On March 23, 1956, the constitution was declared after the approval of the

Assembly. Under the constitution, Pakistan became an Islamic republic with afederal and parliamentary form of government which had a marked

resemblance to the Government of India Act of 1935. Almost all political

leaders who actively participated in the Pakistan movement welcomed the

constitution. Pakistan was expected to be a welfare state, drawing a middle

path between socialism and capitalism in the then Cold War world. Mawdudi


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expressed the hope that Pakistan would gradually move towards an Islamic

state through the parliamentary system of democracy.29 But Iskandar Ali Khan

Mirza, a military general turned bureaucrat who became Pakistans first

president under the new constitution, is reported to have said in his first pressconference after the adoption of the constitution that: [r]eligion and politics

could be, and should be, separated and held out a warning that there

would be trouble if the learned maulanas tried to dabble in politics.

He promised not to touch the Jamaat-i-Islamiif it confined itself to religion.

His views were criticized by the Jamaat al-Ulama-i Islam, and the

Jamaat-i-Ulama-i Pakistan.30

The expectation that Pakistan would become a democracy and eventually

an Islamic welfare state was shattered because of the lack of effective politicalparties. The All-India Muslim League, which after 1947 became the Pakistan

Muslim League, lost heavily in the provincial elections in East Pakistan and, as

a result, lost the credibility to form an effective government in the center. No

other party had such credibility either. A chaotic situation existed in the central

government for a while, and this provided the British trained civil and military

administrators with an opportunity to stage a coup, abolish the constitution,

and overthrow the civilian government to declare martial law in Pakistan in

October, 1958. The military government came up with a new constitution in1962 that was abolished with the restoration of the civilian government in

197071. A new constitution was drafted in 1973 with the declaration of a

commitment to an Islamic moral standard (Part II, article 2b). But the

constitutional means failed to translate the moral standards into practice. As

a result, Zulfiqar Ali Bhuttos civilian government had to concede to a number

of Islamic demands because of street demonstrations: the Qadianis (a small but

powerful religious group in the countrys bureaucracy) were declared non-

Muslim, alcohol was prohibited, and Friday was declared a weekly holiday.However, none of these demands had anything to do with the real well-being

of the common people of Pakistan. Also, no moral standard was maintained

when general elections were held in 1977. The ruling party heavily rigged the

election results, causing street demonstrations. Consequently, the military

again intervened this time it was not by the British trained officers but

by home-grown Islamicists. Before we discuss the attempts of Islamization

by General Zia ul Haq, we shall discuss the problems of regional differences

in Pakistan.

The Challenge of RegionalismDuring the debates on the constitution-making process in the Constituent

Assembly, the question of regional representation and power sharing appeared

as a challenge to the new administration in Pakistan. As early as 1948, it was


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reported in the Constituent Assembly Debatesthat, a feeling is growing among

the Eastern Pakistanis that Eastern Pakistan is being neglected and treated

merely as a colony of Western Pakistan.31 A split developed between East

Pakistani politicians and West Pakistani civil servants. Soon, East Pakistanirepresentatives in the Constituent Assembly identified two issues of

disagreement with West Pakistani representatives. Because the Objectives

Resolution contained the announcement that Urdu would be the national

language of Pakistan, East Pakistanis felt that the importance of their language

(Bengali) was being undermined. East Pakistani leaders also believed that

attempts were being made to transform the numerical majority of the Bengalis

in Pakistan to a minority status. One member in the Assembly declared:

Sir, in East Bengal there is a growing belief I must say that it is a

wrong impression that there are principles in the report which, if

adopted, will reduce the majority of East Bengal into a minority and it

will turn East Bengal into a colony of Pakistan.32

The claim for Urdu being the only national language was supported by the

fact that Urdu was the only language that was generally understood in all

regions, while it was not the language of any particular region of Pakistan. On

the other hand, the argument in favor of Bengali was that Bengali was thelanguage of the majority of the population of Pakistan and in many respects

was a more developed language than Urdu. Therefore, many Bengalis

expected their language to be one of the official languages of Pakistan.

However, most leaders seemed to have been more concerned about the unity

and stability of the new country since it consisted of two separate territories

divided by an enemy territory. They believed that a linguistic division would

only set the two geographically divided territories further apart. Unfortunately,

there was little discussion in the Constituent Assembly on the question oflanguage, and the bureaucracy-dominated central government attempted to

resolve the issue by force.

In this connection, it is relevant to briefly discuss the background of the

bureaucracy in Pakistan. One Pakistani historian describes the role of civil

servants in Pakistan thusly:

In the early years, at the Civil Service Academy in Lahore, vigilant British

administrators instilled the probationers with the sense of belonging to

a privileged group which had a major responsibility for the futuregoverning of Pakistan. The Academy, the manufacturing laboratory

created Anglicized officials true to Macaulays dream, who held political

leaders in contempt. . . . While Jinnah acknowledged the urgency of an

efficient civil service in the young country, he advised the bureaucrats to

adopt a more nationalistic and realistic attitude by functioning as the

servants of Pakistan.33


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Initially, the civil servants did try to be good servants of Pakistan, but

most of them had very little or no knowledge of Islamic history and culture.

Therefore, they had little sympathy or understanding for the ideal of an Islamic

system of government or the common peoples attachment to their linguisticheritage. These issues were not a part of their training, which was formulated

by Macaulay.34 Although these civil servants played a very crucial role in the

countrys survival (under the extraordinary situation that Pakistan was born),

one must agree with the Pakistani historian that, without understanding the

dilemma of politicians and political parties in a young country like Pakistan,

the public servants have acted as masters and king-makers, missing no

opportunity to malign them among the people.35 In this connection, one

should also note that when Pakistan was born, only about a hundred BritishIndian Civil Service officers opted for Pakistan and, out of this group, only one

came from Eastern Pakistan. This was mainly because the territories belonging

to Eastern Pakistan came under British rule a hundred years earlier than the

territories belonging to Western Pakistan. During the first hundred years of

British rule, the traditional Bengali aristocracy was ruined. This did not occur

in the territories of Western Pakistan.

By early 1950s, people in East Pakistan were already in the streets in

support of their demand for the recognition of their language, but thegovernment failed to respond positively. Provincial elections were held in

1954 in which the ruling Muslim League party was heavily defeated, yet the

government failed to recognize the gravity of the situation. One historian has

rightly pointed out:

The United Front had just routed the Muslim League at the polls, and

thus indicated that the League had lost the confidence of half the

nations population. The election had been fought to a substantial extenton the desire of Bengal to achieve greater freedom from supervision

by Karachi. This was the first opportunity to show that democracy in

Pakistan was strong enough to allow different parties to control central

and provincial governments without disrupting the state.36

However, the bureaucrats in Karachi, then capital of Pakistan, thought the

new government in East Pakistan was endangering the maintenance of good

government. The central government not only issued orders to dismiss the

newly elected government, it also dispatched a bureaucrat, a former armygeneral who became the first president of the country, Iskandar Ali Khan

Mirza, as the new governor of East Pakistan.

The constitution of 1956 recognized both Bengali and Urdu as the official

languages of Pakistan. The constitution was also able to resolve the question

of representation from East Pakistan in the central legislative assembly.


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But within a few years, the bureaucracy and military, most of who came

from West Pakistan, returned to take total control of politics. By 1971,

East Pakistan separated from Pakistan to create Bangladesh. Since then,

West Pakistan came to be known as Pakistan. Even after the separation ofEast Pakistan, regional and ethnic forces are still powerful political forces in

Pakistan today.37

Education and the Process of IslamizationIn keeping with its ideology, attempts were made to reformulate the

educational policy in Pakistan.38 Discussions on the role of education began

even before the country achieved formal independence. This indicates the

seriousness of Pakistani leadership on the subject. The first Education Minister,Fazlur Rahman, emphasized the need for an Islamic ideological foundation for

education in Pakistan.39 The Ministry of Education organized a conference of

leading experts and a number of recommendations were made. None of the

recommendations were implemented because of the reluctance showing on

the part of the Ministry of Finance, whose bureaucrats were not convinced that

the newly born Pakistan should have the luxury to spend money on

education.40 Academic institutions continued to operate under the colonial

system, which had been reformed to accommodate knowledge for economicwelfare. Without guidelines, as the Pakistani activist turned historian

academician puts it, the educational system was aimless.41 The author

continues:

It was the Pakistan Movement that weaned most [Muslim youth] from

Indian nationalism and some from Marxist materialism. The enthusiasm

for Pakistan created the feeling that all was well with the Muslim youth.

Even earlier that was the general sentiment. A generation that hadpursued the aim of economic welfare through the acquisition of the new

education and remained Muslim in sentiment because of tradition and

the influence of its parents and homes thought that what had happened

to it would happen to its children as well, forgetting that the Islamic

influence grew more and more diluted because of the ever increasing

impact of new influences percolating through literature and amoral and

religiously neutral education. The nature of the education was such that

the potentially positive influence that could have been exerted in favor

of the Islamic code of morals and beliefs was eliminated, and subtleEuropean suggestions conveyed through literature and textbooks were

permitted to play their role unhindered.42

The author maintains that the failure to construct a Pakistani identity in the

educational system led to the growth of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan,

which eventually led to the disintegration of the country.43 Responsibility for


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this failure, according to the author, squarely lay with the bureaucrats who ran

the country.44

By the middle of 1970s, it became clear that no institutional system was

going to function unchallenged in Pakistan. First, the British parliamentarysystem collapsed when the military-bureaucrats staged a coup against the

constitutional government in 1958. By the end of 1960s, the military

dictatorship also collapsed because of popular street demonstrations. The

civilian government that succeeded dictatorial rule, although democratically

elected, became involved in corruptions to the extent that it also became

subject to mass demonstrations. Its leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was

brought to politics by Iskandar Mirza and came from a feudal family of Sind,

had climbed into prominence under the dictatorial rule of Ayub Khan.Under Zulfiqar Ali Bhuttos leadership, Pakistan received its third constitution

in 1973, and he began to refer to the country,45 which by then had lost the

eastern wing as Bangladesh, as new Pakistan. Bhutto blamed his former

mentor Ayub Khan for creating the crisis that had divided the country, but he

expressed firm confidence in the future of his new Pakistan and introduced

many reforms.46 We have mentioned earlier that Bhutto conceded to some of

the demands of Islamic groups in response to street demonstrations. Yet

rhetoric within Bhuttos Pakistan Peoples Party against those who pressed forchanges based on Islamic ideas continued. One of its leaders is reported to

have said:

The anti-Pakistan mullahs and monopolists of Islam correctly foresee

that in the new Pakistan when the exploited and the oppressed classes

shall become the ruling classes they will be ruined. Since they will

be ruined, they are crying hoarse that that will be end of Islam . . .

The level of consciousness of the poor and oppressed Pakistani people

has become so high that they are paying no heed to the reactionaries

and a handful of anti-Pakistani elements.47

In order to demonstrate his commitment to Islam or, perhaps, to break the

monopoly of Islam by some anti-Pakistani elements, Bhutto declared a

program of Islamic Socialism for Pakistan. However, his idea of Islamic

Socialism was far from clear, and his fear of being rejected by the people of

Pakistan led him to rig the election results of 1977 in a massive way. This was

followed by huge street demonstrations against Bhutto that created seriouslawlessness throughout the country. As a result, the army intervened, and

Pakistan again went under military rule. The new military leader, General Ziaul

Haq, categorically expressed his strong commitment to Islamic ideas. Several

factors are responsible for such a strong expression to Islam. First, the anti-

Bhutto movement was dominated by pro-Islamic slogans; second, an Islamic


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Revolution had just succeeded in neighboring Iran (197879); and third, the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980) generated a tremendous amount of

pro-Islamic sentiment throughout the whole region. Ziaul Haq explained

his view of the role of Islam in Pakistan, saying:

The basis of Pakistan was Islam. The basis of Pakistan was that the

Muslims of the subcontinent are a separate culture. It was on the two-

nation theory that this part was carved out of the subcontinent as

Pakistan. And in the last thirty years in general . . . there has been a

complete erosion of the moral values of this society . . . These are the

Islamic values and we are trying to bring these values back.48

Ziaul Haq seems to have echoed Mawdudis ideas about Pakistan andits role in the modern world. For his part, Mawdudiis reported to have

enthusiastically endorsed Zias initiatives.49 This is an interesting observation,

for Mawdudialways favored parliamentary democracy and worked hard in

producing the constitution in 1956. Although an examination of this question

is not within the scope of this paper, it is true that Mawdudis Jamaat

responded positively to Ziaul Haqs call for Islamization (the process

of the implementation of Islamic ideas) in Pakistan. Nasr observes:

The Jamaat proved unable to deliver on the claims it had made. Aside

from abstract notions about the shape and working of the ideal Islamic

state, the party had little to offer in the way of suggestions for managing

its machinery. Its notions about the working of Islamic dicta in economic

and political operations provided Zia with no coherent plan of action.

Just as the Jamaat became disappointed with the politics of Zias regime,

so the general became disillusioned with the practical relevance of the

Jamaats ideas.50

It is clear that after Mawdudis death in 1979, Zia and the Jamaat couldno longer cooperate. They seem to have disagreed not only on the

methodology of Islamization, but also on their understanding of the role of

Islam in the modern world. It is also true, perhaps, that Jamaat failed to deliver

enough capable and committed individuals for the Islamization process in

Pakistan.51 For his part, Ziaul Haq continued to justify his dictatorial rule in the

name of Islam. He argued:

One basic point that emerges from a study of the Quranic verses andthe Prophets sayings . . . is that as long as the Amir or the head of

State . . . abides by the injunctions of Allah and his Prophet (PBUH)

[peace and blessings upon him] his obedience becomes mandatory for

his subjects or the people, irrespective of the personal dislike that

someone may harbour for the Amir or any of his actions. . . . Not only in

my opinion but also in the opinion of legal experts and scholars, my


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Government, too, is a constitutional Government, which has been acting

upon the tenets of Islam. . . . We are . . . devout Muslims. I concede, and

I am proud of it, that the present Government is a military

Government.52

The dictatorial method of imposition of Islam from above by Ziaul Haq turned

out to be counter-productive in Pakistan. One author observes:

Islamization measures introduced in Pakistan during the Zia regime

became associated with the increasing sectarian tensions because of

their emphasis on Shari ahlaws andfiqhi hair-splitting, rather than

on maqasid al-Shari ah(objectives of the Shari ah). This legalistic

approach to Islamization naturally raised the question as to which

interpretation of Islamic law is more Islamically authentic and should,

therefore, be incorporated in public policy. Islamic revival has thus

created dissension among various Islamic sects more than it has unified

different social strata of Pakistan society. A different Islamic agenda,

signifying freedom, tolerance and concern for the Islamic principles of

social equality and economic justice would certainly have received

much more enthusiastic popular response and would have enhanced

social harmony and national integration.53

The so-called Islamization efforts continued in Pakistan even afterZiaul Haq. His rule was followed by four democratically elected governments.

In ten years time, two prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto (19881990 and

19931996), and Nawaz Sharif (19901993 and 19971999) were each elected

twice, and both accused the other of corruption and vote-rigging. Both prime

ministers, however, maintained their commitment to Islam in public. According

to one author, Benazir adopted a policy of appeasement towards groups

by covering her head, wearing a chadar, visiting shrines, and avoiding

handshakes with men. She visited Makkah frequently and was shown in thenational media rolling her beads.54 For his part, Nawaz Sharif is reported to

have followed the footsteps of General Zia to work in tandem with Islamic

forces.55 Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were accused of being

involved in corruption not only by the Pakistani press but also by institutions

such as the Transparency International. Ten years of so-called democratic

rule was again followed by military rule under the leadership of Pervez

Musharraf.

In over fifty years of its history, Pakistan has not been able to develop astable political system. A European democratic system was not allowed by the

vested interests created by the British colonial administration. Pakistani Islamic

activists also failed to establish an alternative system suitable to the modern

times. Who is responsible for this failure? We shall analyze this dilemma before

the concluding part of this article.


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Who is to be Blamed?Pakistans most well-known historian, who was an activist in the Pakistan

Movement and who spent most of his life as an educator in Pakistan, Ishtiaq

Husain Qureshi, discussed Pakistans failure to achieve its stated goals a fewyears before his death in 1979:

What has gone so seriously wrong during the brief period of a quarter of

century of our existence, that we are threatened with annihilation? What

opportunities have we lost? What mistakes have we made? What follies

have we committed to be brought to the brink not of disaster but

of total destruction as a nation?56

While Qureshi blames the government bureaucracy for this failure, FazlurRahman, the most well-known Pakistani Islamicist, blames Pakistani Islamic

activists for this failure. Writing around the year 1969, he raises the question

What has been this nations experience over two decades of its existence?

Disappointing. What has been achieved by way of ushering in the new

scientific and technological era through intelligent and confidant social

adjustments under the banner of Islam? Precious little. The author continues,

A partial but genuine attempt was made in the ancien regime[a reference

to the rule of Ayub Khan from 1958 to 1969] but an orgiastic chorus of thepolitics-mongering mulla and certain Islam-mongering politicians set it at

naught. He also accused that, it sloganizes about a nizam of Islam which

has not only no trace in the real world, but neither does it exist in its mind,

nor yet in any book which it can lay before the community. 57

In another essay or few years later, Fazlur Rahman identified Sayyid

Mawdudias one of the Islam-mongering politicians of Pakistan. He says that

Mawdudi,

[d]eclared in an Urdu treatise composed in the late thirties entitled

The Political Theory in Islam (published in English in Islamic Law

and Constitution, 1959) that modern Western democracy was

incompatible with Islam; and that Muslims should rather elect a head

of state who should, through his own Ijtihad, interpret the Quran

and the Sunnah of the Prophet with the aid of an advisory council

(majlis-i-shura) appointed by himself. Some years after the creation

of Pakistan, Mawdudiadmitted the Islamic legitimacy of the

parliamentary democracy, and his party participated in elections,although many believe, probably correctly, that this shift was basically

only a political strategy on his part.58

Fazlur Rahman found contradictions mainly in Mawdudis views of the

Islamic concept of sovereignty and parliamentary democracy. However, he

does not seem to have recognized that Mawdudis earlier work on the subject


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in Urdu was written in the context of British India, while the later works were

written in the context of independent Pakistan. Mawdudiseemed to have

taken for granted the fact that when a Muslim majority committed itself to an

Islamic constitution, the rest of the government mechanism would naturallyfollow. Therefore, Mawdudis acceptance of the 1956 constitution and

Jamaat-i-Islamis decision to participate in the election might not be just a

political strategy, but a deliberate policy in accordance with his stand on

Islam. It might also be incorrect to accuse Mawdudiof sloganizing his ideas,

and not producing any literature on the subject. Again, a detailed analysis

of Mawdudis intellectual activities is not within the scope of this paper.

Yet one must note that Mawdudihas been credited not only with providing

an intellectual foundation to the movement for Pakistan,59 he has also beenwidely acknowledged to be one of the effective revivalist leaders in the

twentieth century.60 However, the issue of Pakistans failure to establish a

stable political system remains.

ConclusionPakistan has not been able to achieve its stated goal to be a modern,

progressive Muslim nation, as the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal had

envisioned. Before its creation, Pakistani leaders aspired to establish a statewhere they could integrate ideas of modern civilization and shape them with

Islamic values. It took nine years to formulate the constitution, which had a

marked resemblance to the British democratic system, but vested interests

abolished it in a military coup. Since then, Pakistan has gone through periods

of military rule and corrupt democratic regimes. The country has already been

divided into two, and the potential exists for further disintegration.

After more than fifty years of independence, many people, particularly

Indian Muslims, have raised the question, Was it wise to divide British Indiaand create Pakistan?61 After all, present Pakistan is far from the Islamic ideal

that many leaders of the Muslim League conceived before partition. So, was it

wise to establish Pakistan? This question itself deserves to be the subject of a

full-length dissertation, but any casual observer of current history cannot

ignore Pakistans role in Islamic revival in the twentieth century. Pakistan will

definitely play a significant role in the increasingly polarized Huntingtonian

clash of civilizational world politics.

Undoubtedly, Mawdudihas played the most significant role in the revivalof Muslims in the twentieth century. He couldnt have achieved this without

Pakistan. As for democracy, one must note that the system will work only if it

is guided by ethical values. Unfortunately, most modern national democracies,

like classical Greek city-states, believe in relativism. As the Greek philosopher

Socrates rightly suggested, human behavior must be regulated in accordance


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with universal values. He also suggested that the highest form of excellence is

taking control of ones life and shaping it according to ethical values reached

through reflection. But most modern democracies follow the teachings of the

Greek Sophists, rather than those teachings of Socrates. Has Indian democracybrought any better fruits than Pakistans corrupt democratic and military rules?

Hardly. Pakistan has always recorded a higher GDP income than India, even

though Pakistan did not constitute the richest provinces of British India. Any

observer of these two countries will note that in terms of income distribution

within the two countries, Pakistan has done better. According to Transparency

International reports, the scale of corruption in the two countries is much the

same. However, the situation could have been different if Pakistans 1956

constitution were allowed to function: the constitution incorporated theprinciples of modern democracy and Islamic ethical values. In analyzing the

current history of Pakistan, one must take these questions into account.

Endnotes1. On the growth of the Muslim community in India, see Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, The

Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent (6101947): A Brief HistoricalSurvey(S. Gravenhage: Mouton, 1962).

2. It should be noted here that no Indian historian considers the more than thousandyears of Muslim rule of India as colonial rule, and many Hindus joined Muslims in theirstruggle against the British.

3. This conflict has been referred as the War of independence by Pakistanihistorians, and the Mutiny by British historians. In addition to these two terms, Indianhistorians have used many other expressions such as revolt, uprising, etc.

4. See T. R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India 18571870(Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1964), 305323.

5. Quoted in M. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, 3 vols. (Islamabad:National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), 1: 3.

6. On this controversy, see Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, 246247.7. Hindi and Urdu are similar when they are spoken, but Hindi is written in

Devanagri (an old Indian) and Urdu is written in Persian character.8. Sayyid Amir Ali, Memoirs and other Writings of Ameer Ali, ed. Razi Wasti (Lahore:

Peoples Publishing House, 1968), 44.9. Sayyid Amir Ali, Memorial of the National Mohammedan Association Calcutta, in

Ameer Ali: His Life and Works(Lahore: Publishers United, 1968), 2732.10. Christine E. Dobbin, Basic Documents in the Development of Modern India and

Pakistan 18351947(London: Van Nostrand, 1970), 8.11. Quoted in S. A. Vahid, Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal(Lahore: Ashraf, 1964), 396.12. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah, ed. Jamal ud-Din

Ahmad. 2 vols. (Lahore: Ashraf, 1096), I: 138.13. See Sayyid Abul A la Mawdudi, Islamic Law and Constitution, ed, and tr.

Khurshid Ahmad, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), 1516. In fact, one finds thatmost of Mr Jinnahs statements around 1947 were full commitments to Islamic laws and


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principles emphasizing the Islamic universal principles of justice, equality, morality, piety,and tolerance irrespective of color, caste or creed. See Jamil ud-Din Ahmad, and ConstituentAssembly of Pakistan Debates(Karachi: The Government of Pakistan, 19471954.)

14. Nirod C. Chaudhuri, An Autobiography of an Unknown Indian(London:Macmillan, 1951), 231.

15. Sayyid Abul A la Mawdudi, Masalaah-i-Qawmiyat, originally published in 1937.Reprinted (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967). An English translation is available:Nationalism in India(Pathankot: Maktabah-i-Jamaat-e-Islami, 1947).

16. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Reprinted(Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1981), 159.

17. W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India(London: Victor Gollancz, 1946), 85.18. Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan(Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1967), 51.

19. Ibid. 53.20. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study(Oxford: Allen & Unwin, 1957), 14.21. Eastern and Western Pakistan were separated by a thousand miles by the enemy

territory of India.22. G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan(London: Longman,

1959), 65.23. E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern Nation State(Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1965), 70.24. Quoted in G. W. Choudhury, 6364.25. Sayyid Abul A la Mawdudi, Islamic Law and its Introduction in Pakistan, tr. and

ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1955), 56.26. For the complete version of the resolution, see Appendix 1 in Safdar Mahmood,

Pakistan: Political Roots & Development 19471999(Karachi: Oxford University Press,2000), 409410.

27. Abul A la Mawdudi, Rasa il-o-Masa il, 2 vols. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1970),II: 410411.

28. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots & Development 19471999(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2000), 41.

29. Most of Mawdudis works indicate that he favored British style parliamentarydemocracy and, in the process, he believed, Pakistan would emerge as an Islamic state.

30. These were the only national political parties in Pakistan at that time. See, RafiqAfzal, I: 251 (note).

31. Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed, 6432. This statement was made in the Constituent Assembly on November 21, 1950 by

Nur Ahmad. See, in Keith Callard, 92.33. Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority,

Ideology and Ethnicity(Oxford: Macmillan, 1997), 60.34. On the growth of local elite under colonial rule, see Abdullah al-Ahsan,

Elite-Formation Under Colonial Rule: Capable Administrators or Loyal Servants? A GeneralSurvey of Colonial Rule in Muslim Countries, in Islamic Studies37:1 (1998): 2955.

35. Iftikhar H. Malik, 61.36. Keith Callard, 161.37. On this subject see, Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements in Pakistan

(Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988).38. On education in Pakistan see the personal account of the Pakistani educator

Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Education in Pakistan: An Inquiry into Objectives andAchievements(Karachi: M aref, 1975).


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39. See his own book on the subject, Fazlur Rahman, New Education in the Makingof Pakistan(London: Cassell, 1953).

40. See, Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Educational Policies in Pakistan, in Perspectives ofIslam and Pakistan(Karachi: Maaref, 1979), 4562.

41. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Education in Pakistan, 4972.42. Ibid. 7071.43. Ibid. 122144.44. Ibid. The author, who was vice-chancellor of a leading Pakistani university, quotes

one bureaucrat as saying to him that, We should satisfy the hunger of the poor, luxurieslike education will come later. See, Ibid. 218n. Another bureaucrat suggested he abolishthe departments of Arabic and Persian in order to overcome the universitys financialburden. See, Ibid. 225 n.

45. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, New Pakistan(Washington DC: Embassy of Pakistan,

1973).46. A New Beginning: Reforms Introduced by the Peoples Government in PakistanDecember 20, 1971April 20, 1972(Islamabad: The Department of Films and Publications,Government of Pakistan, 1972).

47. See, Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Directions of Change.(New York: Praeger, 1980), 169.

48. See Tahir Amin, 171 quoting President of Pakistan: General Mohammad Zia ulHaq: Interviews to Foreign Media, 3 vols. (Islamabad: Ministry of Information, Governmentof Pakistan, n.d).

49. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: Jama at-I Islami

of Pakistan, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 189.50. Ibid. 194.51. This is based on the authors personal observation.52. Quoted in Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics,

2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 33.53. Mumtaz Ahmad, Islamization and Sectarian Violence in Pakistan, in Intellectual

Discourse, Vol. VI, No. 1 (1998), 1137: 34.54. Abdul Rashid Moten, Revolution to Revolution: Jama at-e-Islami in the Politics of

Pakistan(Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2002), 52.55. Ibid. 54.

56. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Musings of a Student of History, in Perspectives of Islamand Pakistan, 173.

57. Fazlur Rahman, Why I Left Pakistan: A Testament, (A typed manuscript at FazlurRahman Collection at ISTAC Library in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia). Only the first two pages ofthe manuscript are available. The present author acknowledges his gratitude to ISTACauthorities for letting him use their library.

58. Fazlur Rahman, A Recent Controversy Over the Interpretation of Shura, inHistory of Religions, (1981): 291301.

59. See Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics: A Study Relating to the PoliticalActivities of the Ulema in South Asian Subcontinent from 15661947(Karachi: Maaref,

1972), 339, 351.60. There are numerous works on this subject. For two personal accounts by leading

Pakistani intellectuals about Mawdudis contribution see, Altaf Gauhar, Mawlana Abul A laMawdudi A Personal Account; and A. K. Brohi, Mawlana Abul A la Mawdudi: The Man,the Scholar, the Reformer, in Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari ed. IslamicPerspectives: Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi (Leicester:The Islamic Foundation, 1980), 265312.


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61. Such a question has become relevant in the context of Pakistani attempt to winthe Miss International crown on September 30, 2002 in Tokyo, where a Pakistani organizerclaimed that, If India can have so many beauty queens, why cant we? That is like sayingif India can detonate a nuclear bomb, why cant we? See Miss Pakistans Troubles, South

Asian Womanhood in www.Islamonline.net/English/News/2002-09/28/article09.shtml

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