PAKISTANCourtingtheAbyss

TILAKDEVASHER

Tothememoryof

mymotherLateSmtKantaaDevasher,

myfatherLateAirViceMarshalC.G.DevasherPVSM,AVSM,

andmybrotherLateShriVijay(‘Duke’)Devasher,IAS

‘Presson…Regardless’

Contents

PrefaceIntroduction

ITheFoundations

1ThePakistanMovement2TheLegacy

IITheBuildingBlocks

3AQuestionofIdentityandIdeology4TheProvincialDilemma

IIITheFramework

5TheArmyHasaNation6Civil–MilitaryRelations

IVTheSuperstructure

7IslamizationandGrowthofSectarianism8Madrasas9Terrorism

VTheWEEPAnalysis

10Water:RunningDry11Education:AnEmergency12Economy:StructuralWeaknesses13Population:ReapingtheDividend

VIWindowstotheWorld

14India:TheQuestforParity

15Afghanistan:TheQuestforDomination16China:TheQuestforSuccour17TheUnitedStates:TheQuestforDependence

VIILookingInwards

18LookingInwards

ConclusionNotesIndexAbouttheBookAbouttheAuthorCopyright

M

Preface

YfascinationwithPakistanisnotbecauseIbelongtoaPartitionfamily(thoughmywife’sfamilydoes);itisnotevenbecauseofbeingaPunjabi.MyinterestinPakistanwasfirstarousedwhen,as

a child, I used to hear stories frommy late father, an air force officer, about two Pakistan air forceofficers.InundividedIndiatheyhadbeenhisflightcommandersintheRoyalIndianAirForce.TheyandmyfatherhadfoughtinWorldWarIItogether,flyingHurricanesandSpitfiresoverBurmaandalsoafterthewar.Both theseofficers laterwenton tohead thePakistanAirForce.Thoughstill inmy teens, theIndo-Pakwarsof1965and1971 furtherheightenedmy interest inPakistan. Incollegeanduniversity IstudiedthehistoryofthefreedommovementandthePartitionofIndia.AndIwashooked.MycuriositygrewateverytwistandturninPakistan.ThesophisticationofPakistaniplayslikeDhoop

KinareandTanhaiyaan that twogenerationsof Indiansstill raveabout, theexcellenceof thePakistanicricketteamsandthebrillianceofitssquashplayerscontrastedharshlywiththetrajectoryofitspolitical,economic and religious development. The difference between the democratic journey of India and themilitary dictatorships in Pakistan provoked questions as to why the two countries have developed sodifferently.Thegrowthof intoleranceandradicalizationontheonehandandterrorismdirectedagainstIndia resulting in the deaths of hundreds of innocent Indian civilians on the other lent an ominousdimension to my questions. I was determined to understand what made Pakistan such a violent andinhospitableplace,onthevergeofbeingdeclaredaterroriststateandtheworstnuclearproliferatorintheworld.Inshort,whywasPakistancourtingtheabyss?TwocoupletsbyPakistan’sgreatestpoets,FaizAhmedFaizandHabibJalib,helpedmenarrowmy

quest.WhilethecoupletfromFaizexpressedanguishatthecircumstancesofthebirthofPakistan,Jalib’sarticulatedwhattherulersofPakistanhaddonetothecountry.Combined,thetwocoupletsexpressedtheongoingtragedyofPakistan.

Faiz:‘Subh-e-Azadi’/‘DawnofFreedom’:

Yedaaghdaaghujala,yeshab-guzidasehrWohintezarthajiska,yewohsehrtonahin

Thistaintedlight,thisnight-bittendawnThisisnotthedawnwewaitedfor

JalibonthearmycrackdowninEastPakistan:

Mohabbatgoliyonseboraheho,Watankachehrakhoonsedhoraheho

Gumaantumkokeraastakatrahahei,Yaqeenmujhkokemanzilkhoraheho.

Youaresowinglovethroughviolence,smearingthefaceofthenationinblood;Youthinkyourjourneyisbeingcompleted,Iamcertainyouarelosingyourdestiny.

Beingastudentofhistory,Iwasnotsatisfiedwithjustskimmingthesurface,tryingtounderstandPakistanthrough current events and reporting. I wanted to dig deeper to know more about how Pakistan wascreatedandtheimpactofthosedevelopmentsonthetrajectorythatPakistanhadadopted.Ialsowantedtounderstandwhatwasbehindthefaçadeofahostileneighbour,whatweretherealissuesthatplaguedthecountryanditspeople.Somuchwasbeingwrittenon‘exciting’issueslikethePakistanArmy,thenuclearprogramme,terrorism,and,ofcourse,Indo-Pakrelations,thatscantattentionseemstohavebeenpaidtowhat was happening inside the country. Seemingly ‘boring’ issues like identity, the situation in theprovinces,water,education,economy,population,etc.,seemtohavebeenlargelyignored,thoughtheyarecriticaltothesurvivalandunderstandingofanycountry.I,therefore,decidedtowriteaholisticbookonPakistanthatwouldencompassthe‘exciting’issuesandthe‘boring’ones,toanalysewhyPakistanwashurtlingtowardstheabyss.ThisisabookaboutPakistan.ItisnotaboutacomparisonbetweenIndiaandPakistan.Infact,Ihave

triedtominimizecomparisonswithIndiaasmuchaspossible.ItisequallynotaboutIndo–Pakrelations.Thereisalreadyvastliteratureonthesubject.Ofcourse,nobookonPakistaniscompletewithoutIndiabecausePakistan’sperceptionof India is central to its identity, its ethos, itsworldviewandpolicies.Thus, there is a separate chapteron India and Indiadoes figure invariousother chapters too.But, thebookisessentiallyaboutPakistan.

Iwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetoafewpeoplewhointheirownwayshavehelpedmeinthewritingofthisbook.TomywifeAnjaliforherpatienceinallowingmetospendhours,daysandmonthsinmy‘bat-cave’

(mystudy)reading,researchingandwritingthisbookinsteadofdoingwhatnormalcivilservantsdo–takeupapost-retirementjob.Tomysonforhiswitandamazingsenseofhumourandmydaughter-in-lawforhercourageandquiet

strengthinthefaceoflife-changingadversity,bothofwhomhelpedmeretainasenseofproportion.To my daughter, for suggesting and digging up material that I was unable to locate, for being my

staunchestcriticasalsoapillarofstrengthandwithwhomIhadengagingdiscussionsonseveralchaptersofthebook.ToDrAjaiSahniforencouragingmetowriteabookinthefirstplaceandforaccessingsomeofthe

comparativeindices.TomyeditorsKarthikaV.K.andAntonyThomasatHarperCollins forall theireffort inbringingout

thisbook.Despitethehelp,alltheshortcominganderrorsinthisbookaremine.

T

Introduction

HEcontrastbetweenthetwoflightscouldnothavebeensharper.WhenMohammadAliJinnah(henceforthJinnah)boardedtheviceroy’sshiningsilverDakotafrom

DelhitoKarachion7August1947,helookedbacktowardsthecityandsaid:‘IsupposethisisthelasttimeI’llbelookingatDelhi’.1Astheplanewastaxiing,Jinnahsaidenigmatically,‘that’stheendofthat’.Hespokeonlyonceonthefour-hourflighttoKarachiwhenheleanedovertohisADC,FlightLieutenantAta Rabbani, and offered him some newspapers and said, ‘Would you like to read these?’2 Jinnahreceiveda tumultuouswelcome inKarachi. In thewordsof theBritishhighcommissioner, ‘Mr Jinnahfoundinthecityofhisbirthanenthusiasticwelcome.Tensofthousandsofpeoplethrongedtheairport,breakingthroughthepolicecordons;andhundredsofcarsfollowedhimtoGovernmentHouse…’3

Alittleoverayearlater,on11September1948,Jinnah,weighingbarely70poundsandsufferingfromconsumption, compounded by cancer of the lungs, was carried on a stretcher aboard the governorgeneral’sVikingfortheflightfromQuettatoKarachi.4Hewasinnopositiontoreadnewspapersortalk.Despitehiscondition,however,hefoundtheenergytoreturn,fromhisstretcher,thesalutegivenbytheflightcrew.5TherewasnoonetoreceivehimatMauripurairport(Karachi’smilitaryairport)barringhismilitary secretaryColonelGeoffreyKnowles and an army ambulance, sans any nurse. The diplomaticcorpshadnotbeeninformedabouthisarrival,whichwasthenormwheneverJinnahlandedinKarachisothat hewas received in the approvedofficialway.6 The ambulancewould break downhalfway to hisresidenceandit tookCol.Knowles twohours tofetchanother, fromthe localRedCross.7Meanwhile,Jinnahwasstrandedon theroadfor twohours inan‘oppressive’ambulance thatcompletelyexhaustedhim.Nooneknew that that Jinnahwas in the strandedambulance.Hispulsewasweakand irregular.8

Jinnahwas todie later thatnight.The tragicmannerofhisdeathwascompoundedbyhis last rites.ATwelverShia,followinghisconversionfromtheIsmailisect,Jinnahhadtohavetwoseparatefunerals–oneaccording to theSunni rituals in theopenand theotherbefore that according toShianorms inhishome.9

ThepoignancyandthedepressingcontrastbetweenthetwojourneyssymbolicallycapturesthetragedyofPakistan–fromtheblood-soakedyetenthusiasticcreationin1947tothepresent-dayexhaustionandgloom-and-doomscenarios.ItisthisjourneyfromFaiz’stainteddawntoJalib’stragicdestinythatisthesubjectmatterofthisbook.

The book aims to explain how this has happened and how Pakistan is courting the abyss. It tracesPakistan’s development not only from 1947, when the country came into being, but also looks at the

foundations–thePakistanmovement;theimpactthattheBritishreplacingtheMughalshadontheMuslimpsyche;andtherolethecolonialpowerplayedincrystallizingaseparateMuslimidentity.Itlooksattheinternal andexternaldynamicsofPakistan tounderstandwhy it is careering towards the abyss. In thatsenseit isnotaconventionalbookonPakistan.ItdoesnottracethehistoryofPakistan;neitherdoesitdetaildevelopmentschronologically.Itismoreinthenatureofaninterpretativestudy,lookingatvariouselementsofPakistan’shistoryanddevelopment toexplainwhyPakistan is suchapersistently troubledstateandwhy,withoutseriouscorrectiveactions,atragicdestinylooms.On 7August 1947, as Jinnah took off fromDelhi could he have visualized that the country that he

created would within twenty-four years be broken into two? Could he have visualized that the rumpwouldcometobevariouslydescribedas ‘deeply troubled’, ‘in terminaldecline’, ‘incrisis’, ‘failing’,‘ontheedge’,‘onthebrink’,astateunabletoprovideminimumsafetyandlawandordertoitscitizens,astateunabletosurvivewithoutrepeatedexternalfinancialsupport,aninsecurestatelookingforsecurityprimarily in narrow military terms, a hotbed of terrorism, both internal and external, a country rentasunderbysectariankillings,anuclearproliferator?Facedwithtoday’sPakistan,theobviousquestionJinnahwouldhaveaskediswhatwentwrong.What

happened to those hopes and aspirations, that ‘jazba’ and ‘josh’ of the people at the birth of a newcountry?Inshort,howdidPakistanmanage toarriveat itspresentprecariouscondition?If, indeed,hecouldhaveanticipatedthePakistanthatexiststoday,wouldhehavestrivensorelentlesslytocreateitinthefirstplace?Jinnahwould not be the only one seeking answers to such questions.Most Pakistanis are, a lot of

Indiansare,asaremanyconcernedpeopleacrosstheworld.TheanswersarenecessarybecausePakistanisaveryimportantcountry.Geographically,itspansSouthAsiaandCentralAsia,liesatthemouthofthePersianGulf,andprovideslandaccesstoChina.Thishasbeenafocalyettroublesomeregionthatoverthecenturieshas attractedgreatpowers.BorderingAfghanistan, this regionwas thepivotof theGreatGamebetweenBritainandRussia.Afteritscreation,Pakistanhasbeenafront-linestateintheWesterncoalitionagainsttheSovietUnioninthe1960sand1980sandinthewaronterrorinthefirstdecadeofthenewcentury.Demographically,itisthesixth-largestcountryintheworld.Militarily,ithastheeighth-largest standing army with reportedly the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world. It is also theepicentre of global terror, a part of which has turned against its ownmasters and it has the dubiousdistinctionofbeingtheworld’sworstnuclearproliferatorwithdoubtscontinuallybeingraisedaboutthesafetyofitsnucleararsenal.Unfortunately, the news from and about Pakistan today ismostly disturbing.Attention naturally gets

focused on the latest maelstrom and its implications for Pakistan and the region.Many analysts haveidentified the various maladies that afflict the Pakistani state and society. Some have providedprescriptionsandrecommendationstothePakistanileadershipandotherstotheWestern,especially,theUSleadership.YetitisnotjustthecurrentcrisisbutthecumulativemultipliereffectofthesecrisesandthedeepermalaisethatafflictsPakistan,whichhasputitonatragictrajectory.WhileterrorismemanatingfromPakistancapturesattention,otherissuessuchasthestateofeducation,theloomingwatercrisis,theprecipiceofaneconomicmeltdown,thedangerofanunrealized‘demographicdividend’,tonamebutafew,havethepotentialtothreatenanddestabilizePakistaninthelongerterm.While each individualmalaise is bad enough, eachmalaise actually feeds off the othermaking the

a.

b.

situation cumulatively worse. Using religion to forge unity and national identity has led to growth ofradicalism and sectarianism which, in turn, has fed into terrorism and jihadi groups leading to anincreasingly violent society. These jihadi groups have got sustenance from a state that sees securitylargely in military terms. Instead of coming to terms with its neighbours, especially India, policiesadoptedbysuccessiverulers,civilianandmilitary,havereinforcedthemilitarymindset.Theuseofnon-stateactorshasbackfiredandthecancerofterrorismisdestroyingPakistanisociety.Attentionisfocusedonmilitarysecurityandtheresultantmilitarymindsethasdivertedresourcesandattentionfromtherealsinewsofsociety–economy,education,waterandhealth.Compoundingmattersisthedeeppolarizationinthecountry.Wherepoliticianscontinuetobickerover

thevalidityofelections,longafteragovernmenthasbeenswornin,wherethedebateaboutwhoisatrue‘Muslim’ravagesevenMuslimminorities like theShiascenturiesafter Islamwasbornand inanationcreated in thenameof Islam,where themeaningofPakistananda ‘Pakistani identity’ iscontested, thestateandsocietyhaveanextremelydifficult tasktotacklethemonumentalmessthatsuccessiveleadershaveledtothenationinto.The totality of themalaise has put Pakistan today at the risk ofmulti-organ failure. The tragedy of

Pakistanisthatthehydra-headedissuesthatconfrontthegovernmentarefastgoingbeyondthecapabilityandreachofthestateandsocietytoresolve.The increasingviolence insocietywasperhapsbestdescribedby theHumanRightsCommissionof

Pakistan:

Attacks on religious minorities encroached into areas where they had been largely absenthitherto, and the government failed to take measures to reassure the citizens that it had theability or the commitment to clamp down on faith-based violence. Extrajudicial killings,unlawfulandarbitrarydetention,custodialtortureandenforceddisappearancecontinued.Wellovertwomillioninternallydisplacedpersons,mostofthemwomenandchildren,hadtoleavetheir homes in search of safety and joined multitudes of others who had been displaced inearlierboutsofarmedconflictbetweenthesecurityforcesandmilitantextremists.10

However,suchintoleranceandviolenceisnotanewphenomenon;itdatesbacktotheoriginsofPakistanitself. The trend of silencing all debate and forcing a hegemonic view harks back to Jinnah and theMuslimLeague.TheyhadstartedthepracticeofdenouncinganyonewhoopposedtheLeagueasatraitortoPakistan,at timeseventoIslamitself.This trendcontinuedafterPakistanwascreated.Amongthosedubbedastraitorsintheearlydayswere:

KhanAbdulGhaffarKhan,alsoknownasFrontierGandhi.HiscrimewasthathewasaCongressmanpriortothecreationofPakistanandeventhoughhetookanoathofloyaltytoPakistanandattendedtheConstituentAssembly,hisloyaltywasalwayssuspect.Hewasjailedformanyyearsanddiedwhenhewasstilldeemedatraitorin1988;GhulamMurtazaShahSyed,popularlyknownasG.M.Syed, thepresidentofSindhMuslimLeagueand the person who moved the resolution to make the province a part of the proposed state ofPakistan.Hiscrimewas toarticulate the rightsof theSindhis.Hespentclose to thirtyyears in theprisonsofPakistananddiedinprisonin1995,deemedatraitor;

c. Otherswhohave thisdistinctionofbeingbrandedas traitors includestalwarts likeBenazirBhutto,Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; Pakhtun leader Abdul Wali Khan and his son Asfandyar Wali; BalochleaderslikeKhairBakshMarri,SardarAttaullahMengal,GhousBakshBizenjo,AkbarKhanBugti;poetslikeFaizAhmedFaizandHabibJalib.PrimeMinisterNawazSharifisthelatesttobeincludedinthislist.Hiscrime–callingPakistana‘liberal’state.

Aspilloverfromtheintoleranceofdissentingviewshasbeenthetrendofpoliticalassassinationsordeath in mysterious circumstances. To name just a few: Liaquat Ali Khan, Dr Khan Sahib, ShaheedSuhrawardy, Hayat Sherpao, Samad Khan Achakzai, Shahnawaz Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq, Ghulam HaiderWyne,AzimTariq,HakimSaeed,MurtazaBhutto,AkbarBugti,BenazirBhutto,ImranFarooq,SalmaanTaseer,ShahbazBhatti,BashirBilour;thelistisnotexhaustive.Addtothesethenamesofjournalistsandcivil societyactivists suchasMohammedSalahuddin,DanielPearl,HayatullahKhan,MusaKhankhel,WaliBabar,SaleemShahzad,MurtazaRazvi,RashidRahman,ZahiraShahid,ParveenRahman,and,ofcourse,SabeenMahmudandnotedqawwalisingerAmjadSabri.ExceptforthekillerofSalmaanTaseer,who gave himself up on the spot andwas tried and executed, very few perpetrators have so far beenidentifiedandcaptured,letalonepunished.Thestatesecurityapparatushasbeenunwillingorunabletobringthekillerstobook.Theseandthekillingsofmanymorereflectanincreasinglyintolerantsociety,unwillingtoacceptplurality.Pakistan’s ranking in several international benchmarks over the past decade testifies to its alarming

decline.Forthelastfiveyears,Pakistanhasbeenconsistentlyrankedbetweentenandthirteen(onebeingtheworst) on theFragile (earlierFailing)States Indexout of 178 countries. In 2012 and2013 itwasranked thirteen, in 2014 it was ranked ten and again ranked thirteen in 2015. In the UN HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),Pakistanslippedfrom120in1991to138in2002to141in2009to146in2014andto147outof188countriesin2015.TheWorldEconomicForum(WEF)ratedPakistan113outof124countriesontheHumanCapitalReportin2014–15,asagainstitsscoreof112outof122countriesinthe2013–14.IntermsofHumanCapitalIndex(HCI),Pakistanrankedatthebottomamongtwenty-twoAsia-Pacific countries with a score of 52.63, far below the region’s average of 67.83. Economicparticipation,gendergap,labourforceparticipationandpoorperformanceineducationaloutcomesatallagegroup indicatorshadcontributed todrivingdownPakistan’saggregate score.11TheGlobalHungerIndex rankedPakistan 88 out of 119 countries in 2006 and 93 out of 104 in 2015, showing amarkeddeterioration in the availability of food.TheTransparency International’sCorruption Perception IndexrankedPakistan126outof175countries in2014as against127outof177 in2013.Therewas someimprovementin2015whenPakistan’srankingwas117.TheUppsalaConflictDataProgrammehasidentifiedPakistanasoneofsixcountriesthatqualifiesto

beinthecategoryof‘war’,havingcrossedtheunfortunatefigureofonethousandbattle-relateddeathsinayear’stime.12TheGlobalPeaceIndex(GPI)positionsPakistanamongthetenleastpeacefulcountriesintheworld,ranked154outof162in2015andthesecondworstinSouthAsiaafterAfghanistanintermsof the number of conflicts fought. It notes that since 2004, Pakistan has ranked among the top fivecountriesshowingthefastestdeclineinpeacefulnessglobally.Pakistanranked149outof158countriesinthe2012GPIandslippedto157outof162fortheyear2013,13and154outof162in2014.Thuswhilethearmyclaimsthatithadbrokenthebackoftheterrorists,theGPIhasanotherstorytotell.

Pakistan has been termed as the most dangerous country in the world for media for the thirdconsecutiveyearbytheInternationalFederationofJournalists.14Fourteenjournalistsandmediaworkerswere killed in 2014 alone. According to the Press Freedom Index, Pakistan ranked 150 out of 167countriesin2005,151outof178in2010,158outof180in2014and159outof180in2015.Thisdoesnotspeakmuchforfreedomofexpression,andanytalkabouta‘vibrant’mediainPakistanmustcontendwiththissoberingfact.AccordingtoAlifAilaan,aPakistaniNGO,twenty-fivemillionchildren,47percentofallPakistani

children,wereoutofschool.Oftheseout-of-schoolchildren,68percenthasneverattendedschoolwhile32percentdidgotoschoolatsomepoint.Governmentexpenditureoneducationhashoveredaround2percentofGDP,thelowestinSouthAsia.TheVisaRestrictions Indexrankscountriesaccording to thenumberofothercountries theircitizens

cantraveltowithouthavingtoobtainavisa.Asperitslatestreport,Pakistanranks103outofatotal104countries, meaning that Pakistanis face the second-most visa restrictions in the world. Since visarequirementsreflecttherelationshipsbetweenindividualnations,thelowrankingofPakistanreflectsitsrelationsandstatuswithintheinternationalcommunity.15

The above sample of surveys and reports shows that Pakistan has serious issues that are not theproducts of a fewyears ofmal-governance but have been allowed to fester for decades. Surveys likethesetakentogethershowthedepthandintensityofthemultidimensionalchallengesthatPakistanhastotackle.ThisbooktriestolookmorecloselyatsomeoftheseproblemsthatPakistanfacesinternallyandposesexternallytotheworld,problemsthathavefrequentlycalledintoquestionthetrajectoryofitsveryexistence.

I

I

TheFoundations

NHINDSIGHT,thefoundationsofPakistancanbetracedtostirringsofMusliminsecurityduetolossofpowerandofficeduringthelongdeclineoftheMughalruleinIndiaandthegrowingdominationof

theBritish.Asimportantasthelossofpowerwasthegrowingfearthattheintroductionofrepresentativegovernment,wherenumbersmattered,wouldallowthemajorityHindustodominatethem.AcombinationofthesefactorsandtheresponsesthattheyengineeredplayedacrucialroleinthecontoursofthePakistanmovement.Foritspart,Britainasthecolonialpower,soughttopreserveitsIndianempirebyplayingtheMuslimLeagueagainsttheIndianNationalCongresstillitfinallydecidedtoleaveIndiapartitioned.Thus,Pakistandidnotstartonacleanslate.ItcarriedwithitthelegacyofthePakistanmovement,the

history,cultureandlanguageofthepredominantlyMuslimpopulationsoftheareasthatbecamePakistanandthehopesandaspirationsofthosewhomigratedfromtherestofIndia.ThisamalgamisfundamentaltoourunderstandingofPakistan,notonlyitsearlyyearsandthepoliciesitadoptedthen,butthepoliciesitadoptseventoday.Italsoprovidessomeanswerstothecurrentproblemsbeingfacedbythecountry.

1

ThePakistanMovement

Thishasbeenaveryeventfulday,anepochinIndianhistory;thismorningIhavereceivedthefollowingletterfromanofficial;‘ImustsendYourExcellencyalinetosaythataverybig thing has happened today. A work of statesmanship that will affect India and Indianhistoryformanyalongyear.Itisnothinglessthanthepullingbackof62millionsofpeoplefromjoiningtheranksoftheseditiousopposition.’

—LadyMinto

THECREATIONofPakistanwasnotinevitable.Evenaslateas6June1946,Jinnahwaswillingtoputasideasovereign‘Pakistan’andaccepttheBritishCabinetMission’sproposalforafederatedIndia.1 ItwaswhentheCongressrefusedtoacceptaweakCentrethatthepointofnoreturnwasreached.Thus,itwasacombinationofcircumstancesthatincludedtheinsecurityamongtheMuslimeliteintheMuslim-minorityprovincesofBritish India, thepoliciesof the IndianNationalCongress (henceforthCongress)andthemachinationsofthecolonialpower,Britain,whichledtothecreationofPakistan.Evenifoneofthethreefactorshadnotbeenpresent,orbeenpresentinadifferentform,itisdebatablewhetherPakistanwouldhavebeencreatedatall.Allthreehadtocombineinahistoricalcontextforthisnewcountrytocomeintoexistence.Andcombinetheydid.Thefeelingof insecuritythatdevelopedamongtheMuslimelitewasduetothelossofpowerinthe

wake of the decline of theMughal Empire and the growing domination of the British since the earlynineteenthcentury.Facedwiththisreality, thestrategyadoptedbytheMuslimelite,especiallyaftertheabortive 1857War of Independence, can be summarized as sullenness and opposition to the British,giving way to the gradual adoption of Western education; the Simla Deputation pushing for separateelectorates (1906); forminga separatepolitical party– theAll IndiaMuslimLeague (AIML) in1906;comingtoanagreementwiththeCongressonseparateelectoratesviatheLucknowPact(1916);Jinnah’sbreakwiththeCongressandthefourteenpoints(1929);Iqbal’s‘imagining’andRehmatAli’sarticulationofPakistan(1930–34);Jinnah’sreturntoIndiafromBritain(1935);thedismalperformanceoftheMuslimLeagueinthe1937electionsintheMuslim-majorityareas;MuslimLeaguecapitalizingontheresignationoftheCongressministriesin1939ontheoutbreakofWorldWarII;theLeague’sdemandfor‘independentandseparate’states(1940);thestunningperformanceoftheMuslimLeagueintheelectionsof1945–46;the Muslim League’s acceptance and then rejection of the Cabinet Mission plan for a united India;violenceunleashedthroughDirectAction(1946);andPartitionofthesubcontinent.AcommonthreadinthisentirejourneywastheroleofBritaininproppinguptheMuslimLeagueastherepresentativebodyof

the Muslims and Jinnah as its sole leader in order to obstruct the march of the Congress towardsindependence.As it evolved, theBritish strategy topreserve andprotect their Indianempirehad toovercomeone

limitation and circumvent an objective reality. The limitation was that there were only a handful ofEnglishmenpresentinIndiacomparedtothehugeIndianpopulationtheyruledover.AngusMaddisonhaspointedout:

Therewereonly31,000BritishinIndiain1805(ofwhich22,000wereinthearmyand2,000incivilgovernment).Thenumber increasedsubstantiallyafter the1857mutiny,but thereafterremainedsteady.In1911therewere164,000British(106,000employedofwhich66,000werein thearmyandpoliceand4,000 incivilgovernment). In1931, therewere168,000 (90,000employed,60,000inthearmyandpoliceand4,000incivilgovernment)…nevermorethan0.5percentofthepopulation.2

ThisremarkablefactensuredthattheBritishneededcooperationfromelementsofthelocalpopulation.Theeventsof1857hadtaughttheBritishtheobjectiverealityofIndia:aunitedIndiawasadanger.

Therefore,theBritishknewtheywouldhavetokeepIndiansocietydisunitedandpittedagainsteachotherinordertopreservetheBritishEmpire.AsWinstonChurchillputit:‘Hindu-Muslimantagonismwas“abulwarkofBritishruleinIndia,”’andnotedthat,‘wereittoberesolved,theirconcordwouldresultin“theunitedcommunitiesjoininginshowingusthedoor.”’3

Takingthesetwofactorsintoaccount,thepolicyadoptedbytheBritishwasbestsummedupbyLordCanning, the last governor general and first viceroy of India, in a letter to president of the Board ofControloftheEastIndiaCompanyon21November1857attheheightoftheWarofIndependence:‘…aswemustrule150millionpeoplebyahandful[of]Englishmen,letusdoitinamannerbestcalculatedtoleavethemdivided,(asinreligionandnationalfeelingthattheyalreadyare)andtoinspirethemwiththegreatest possible aweof our powerwith the least possible suspicionof ourmotive.’4 Thiswas to beBritishpolicyrightupto1947.Cooperation from the local Indianpopulation in ruling thevast Indianempirewasachieved through

education.Macaulay,throughhisminuteofFebruary1835hadstated:

…itisimpossibleforus,withourlimitedmeans,toattempttoeducatethebodyofthepeople.Wemust at present doour best to forma classwhomaybe interpreters betweenus and themillionswhomwegovern;aclassofpersonsIndianinbloodandcolour,butEnglishintastes,inopinions,inmoralsandinintellect…5

While theHindus took toWestern education, theMuslimswere slow to do so, slow in accepting therealitythatunderthenewBritishdispensation,theirtraditionalPersian-basededucationwasoflittleuseinobtainingadministrativeposts.InnotmakingthetransitionfromPersiantoEnglishas themediumofinstruction,theulemasplayedamajorrolered-flaggingthedangerstothecommunityofWesternculture,learning,languageandsciences.6ThisinitialeducationalandintellectualimbalancecontinuedforseveraldecadesincreasingtheinsecuritiesoftheMuslimelite.Forexample,inthetwentyyearsbefore1878,ofthe1,373BAsand326MAswhoemerged from India’s colleges anduniversities, only thirty and five

respectivelywereMuslims.7

Facedwith growingMuslim resentment and even sporadic violence,GovernorGeneral LordMayo(1869–72)askedaBengalcivilservantWilliamWilsonHunteron30May1871,towriteabookontheburningquestionoftheday:‘AreIndianMussalmansboundbytheirreligiontorebelagainsttheQueen?’Healsowroteanoteon26June1871onthemeanstopersuadeMuslimstoentergovernmentschoolsandcollegesmorewillingly.8Hunter’sinfluentialworkTheIndianMussalmansandMayo’snoteresultedintheGovernmentofIndiaResolutionof7August1871,whichdrewspecialattentionto theproblemsofMuslimeducationandproposedmeasurestoattracttheMuslimgentleman’ssonintogovernmentschools.9

According toM.J.Akbar, ‘… in a remarkable piece of social engineering, theBritish turned, throughpositive discrimination in education, job benefits, and political empowerment, a hostile MuslimcommunityintoaresourcefortheIndianempirewithinjusttwodecades.’10TheresultoftheacceptanceofMayo’sNoteandHunter’s recommendationswas thatby1921 therewasahigherdegreeof literacyamongMuslimsthanamongHindus.11

TheBritishfoundapartnerinSyedAhmadKhanwhowaskeentoconvincetheBritishthatMuslimsweregenuinely loyal and, as a corollary, convince theMuslims thatWestern educationwas thekey tocompeteinthenewdispensation.Giventheirmutualinterests,theBritishhelpedSyedAhmadobtainlandatAligarh and gave a grant-in-aid.With the support of subscriptions fromMuslimprinces and landedaristocracytheMuhammadanAnglo-OrientalCollegestartedlifeasaprimaryschoolonQueenVictoria’sbirthday,24May1875,commencingBAclassesin1881.Apartfromthenumberofdegreesitawarded,‘Aligarh’asPeterHardyputsit,‘becameaninstitutionforcomingtotermswiththeBritish-createdworldonafootingofequality,ratherthanforquestioningthatworldfromburningreligiousconviction.’12ThealumniwouldplayaleadingroleinthePakistanmovement.Two other aspects of SyedAhmad’s legacy are noteworthy: the drastic transformation in his ideas

aboutHindu–Muslimunity/relationshipandtheapprehensionsthatrepresentativegovernmentwouldleadtosubordinationofMuslims.ThiswouldbethesamepaththatJinnahwouldtreadinthenextcentury.Tilltheearly1880shewasabelieverinHindu–Muslimunity.13Yetby1888,SyedAhmadwassayingthatIndiawasinhabitedbytwodifferentnations,whichwouldinevitablystruggleforpoweriftheBritishleft:‘Isitpossiblethatunderthesecircumstancestwonations–theMohammadanandtheHindu–couldsitonthesamethroneandremainequal inpower?Mostcertainlynot.It isnecessarythatoneof themshouldconquertheotherandthrustitdown.Tohopethatbothcouldremainequalistodesiretheimpossibleandtheinconceivable.’14

SyedAhmadwasamongtheearliesttoarticulatethatrepresentativegovernmentinIndiawouldresultinthepermanentsubordinationofMuslimstoHindus.InoneofhisspeechesatLucknowhesaid:

LetussupposefirstofallthatwehaveuniversalsuffrageasinAmerica…Andfirstsupposethatall theMahomedanelectorsvote foraMahomedanmemberandallHinduelectors foraHindumember…ItiscertainthattheHindumemberwillhavefourtimesasmanybecausetheirpopulation will have four time as many … and now how can the Mahomedan guard hisinterests?Itwouldbelikeagameofdiceinwhichonemanhadfourdiceandtheotheronlyone.15

Jinnahwould echo similar sentiments in response toGandhiji in thenext century.Successivedosesofrepresentativegovernmentwouldheighten thefearsamongasectionof theMuslims that theywouldbeunable tosafeguard their interests inademocraticdispensationdue to theHindusgreatlyoutnumberingthem.However, Syed Ahmad’s most provocative statement was: ‘The Congress is in reality a civil war

withoutarms.Wealsolikeacivilwarbutnotacivilwarwithoutarms;welikeitwitharms…’16Jinnahwould also echo similar sentiments fifty-eight years later when he talked about having a pistol withreferencetotheDirectActionDay.While Syed Ahmad Khan took to Western education, there were three other responses among the

Muslimstothelossofpoliticalpower:Deoband,BarelviandJamaat-i-Islamimovements.Despitemajordifferencesamong them, inonewayor theother theywereopposed toWesterncultureandblamed thedeclineinthefortunesofthecommunitytodriftingawayfrompristineIslam.17

Meanwhile,theHinduswhohadtakentoWesterneducationinabigwaywerenowbeginningtoaskconstitutionalquestionstheBritishwouldrathernotbeasked.Tochannelizesuchdebates,theCongresswassetupin1885byA.O.Hume.Itwassupposedtobeadebatingsociety;however,almostimmediatelyafter it was founded, the British came to dislike the Congress. On 30November 1888, Viceroy LordDufferin called it ‘seditious and a microscopic minority’ adding: ‘Already it looks as if theMohammadanswere rising in revolt against the ascendancywhich they imagine a rival and lessvirileraceisdesirousofobtainingoverthem.’18

OnereasonforthisBritishconcernwastheappealoftheCongress,asyetslow,totheMuslimstojoinit.While only twoMuslims attended the first session of theCongress inBombay in 1885, thirty-threeattendedtheCalcuttasessionin1886;254attendedtheAllahabadsessionin1888;254attendedthe1889session inBombay; 300 attended the sixth session in 1890.19 The trendwas obvious as borne out byMohsin-ul-Mulk,secretaryoftheAligarhCollege,informingitsprincipalArchboldon4August1906thatamoreactivepoliticallinewasnecessary,as‘youngeducatedMohammadansseemtohavesympathyfortheCongress’. TheAligarh students union had, in fact, passed a resolution advocatingHindu–MuslimpoliticalcooperationinMay1906.20

SinceakeyprerequisiteforthepreservationofBritishrulewasIndiandisunity,theBritishembarkedonastrategythatwastoresultinthecrystallizingofaseparateMuslimpoliticalidentity.Theinstrumentsused were partition of Bengal, formation of the All India Muslim League and adoption of separateelectorates.21 The controversial partition of Bengal in July 1905, done on religious grounds, set theprecedent that religion could form the basis of a partition ignoring other attributes, under the garb ofadministrativeconvenience.ThislessonwouldberepeatedafewdecadeslatertocreatePakistan.BritishpolicywasalsorevealedinadispatchbyViceroyLordMintotoMorley, theSecretaryofState,on15August1906tosanctionaloanofRs14lakhtoNawabSalimullahofDaccaas‘apoliticalmatterofgreatimportance.22The‘politicalmatter’wouldunfoldinDecember1906withtheformationoftheAllIndiaMuslimLeague.

AgainstthebackdropoftheBritishannouncementon20July1906ofincreasingthenumberofseatsinthelegislative councils and also their powers as demanded by the Congress, a delegation of thirty-five

MuslimnotablesledbytheAghaKhan,mettheviceroyinSimlaon1October1906.Thememorandumsubmitted by them asked for separate electorates and representation in excess of numerical strength inview of ‘the value of the contribution’ Muslims were making ‘to the defence of the Empire’.23 Inresponse,Mintosaid,‘IamasfirmlyconvincedasIbelieveyoutobe,thatanyelectoralrepresentationinIndia would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement,regardlessofthebeliefsandtraditionsofthecommunitiescomposingthepopulationofthiscontinent.’24

LadyMintorecordedherviewsinherjournalthatveryevening:

Thishasbeenaveryeventfulday,anepochinIndianhistory;thismorningIhavereceivedthefollowingletterfromanofficial;‘ImustsendYourExcellencyalinetosaythataverybigthinghashappenedtoday.AworkofstatesmanshipthatwillaffectIndiaandIndianhistoryformanyalongyear.Itisnothinglessthanthepullingbackof62millionsofpeoplefromjoiningtheranksoftheseditiousopposition.’25

ThemeetingwithLordMintoisoneofthedeterminingeventsinmodernIndianhistory.AsnotedbySumitSarkar,

…thereisampleevidencethatthroughthePrincipaloftheAligarhCollegeW.A.J.Archbold,Mohsin-ul-Mulk and other Muslim leaders kept in close touch with the Viceroy’s PrivateSecretaryDunlop Smith as well as with officials like the LucknowCommissioner HarcourtButler.What is clear is that thememorandumpresented toLordMintohadbeendrafted andagreed upon in advance between Principal W.A.J. Archbold, and Dunlop Smith. It was inButler’sprivatepapersthathistoriansdiscoveredafirstdraftoftheSimlamemorial.26

Thus, clearly, the whole delegation had been stage-managed by the British. It was to prove a gamechanger.Forthefirsttime,theHindu–MuslimconflictwasescalatedtotheconstitutionalplaneandtheMuslims

were toacquire, through the1909Act,aseparateconstitutional identity.27 JaswantSinghnotes that themeeting helped to crystallize theMuslim identity in political terms and ‘contributed to a “separation”mentality.And indisputably this rejectionof personal enfranchisement and acceptanceof the device ofreservation, based on religion, finally moved the Muslim political personality of India towards aneventualseparation.’28TheinevitableconsequencewasthedivisionofIndia.AghaKhanconfirmedthistruthinhismemoirsinwhichhewrotethatineffecttheSimlaDeputation

hadaskedtheBritishgovernmentthattheMuslimsofIndiashouldnotberegardedasamereminoritybutanationwithinanationwhoserightsandobligationsshouldbeguaranteedbystate.HepointedoutthattheacceptanceofthedemandsofhisdelegationwasthefoundationofallfutureconstitutionalproposalsmadeforIndiabysuccessiveBritishgovernmentsanditsfinal,inevitableconsequencewasthePartitionofIndiaandtheemergenceofPakistan.29

Meanwhile, theAll-IndiaMuslimEducationalConferencemet atDacca on 30December 1906 andunanimouslyresolvedtosetupapoliticalassociationcalledtheAllIndiaMuslimLeague‘…topromoteamong the Musalmans of India the loyalty to the British government … to protect and advance thepoliticalrightsandinterestsofMusalmansofIndia…andtopreventtheriseamongMuslimsofIndiaof

any feeling of hostility towards other communities, without prejudice to the other aforementionedobjectivesoftheLeague.’30

TheresultsoftheSimlaDeputationwerevisibleinthe1909Minto–MorleyReformsthatintroducedthe system for separate electorates which institutionalized a communal basis for politics. Henceforth,HindusandMuslimswouldelectioneeronreligiousinsteadofonpoliticalgrounds.Thisbecametherolemodel for future constitutional advances in India. Thereafter, when additional instalments of self-governance were granted under the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, the demand forprotecting minority interests would only grow. The device of communal electorates duly served itspurpose and the principleworked sowell that ‘…once it has been fully established, it so entrenchescommunalismthatonecouldhardlythenabandontheprincipleevenifonewishedtodoso.’31

As the national movement led by the Congress and Gandhiji grew in strength, the British were tofurtherfine-tunetheirpolicyofdivideandrulebyappearingtobewillingtorelinquishcontrolassoonasthe Hindus andMuslims would come together. They knew they could utilize their influence over theMuslimLeague toensure thisneverhappened.Whatbetterway toperpetuate their rule?On1 January1925, the viceroy wrote to the secretary of state, ‘… the bridge Gandhiji had built to span the gulfbetween theHindusandMohammadanshasnotonlybrokendown,but ithascompletelydisappeared.’The Secretary of State for India, Birkenhead, replied on 22 January 1925, ‘… the more it is madeobvious that these antagonisms are profound and affect an immense and irreconcilable section of thepopulation, themoreconspicuously is thefact illustrated thatweandwealonecanplay thepartof thecomposers.’32

While the partition of Bengal and separate electorates consolidatedMuslim identity, the politicallyactiveMuslimsweredividedintoseveralfactionswho,thoughpreparedtoaccepttheleadershipoftheBritish,wereunpreparedtoaccepttheleadershipoftheirown.TheBritishalsoneededamantobeableto leadandheadthevariousfactionsamongtheMuslims.Therewere twomainfactions in theMuslimLeague–oneheadedbyMuhammadShafiandtheotherbyJinnah.InMarch1929,theviceroymetJinnahandafterthemeetingbecameconvincedthatJinnahcouldbewonover.On20March1929,theviceroywrote,‘IhadalongtalkwithJinnahafewdaysago,whichmadeitverycleartomymindthatheandalltheBombaypeople,whoarenotdisposedtoCongress,aredisposedtoswingtowardsourdirectionifwecangivethemhelplater.’33

Next,theviceroyusedhisinfluencetobringthetwomainfactionsoftheMuslimLeaguetogether.On21May1929,hepredicted‘…thetwowingsoftheMuslimLeaguearetomeetinDelhiattheendofthismonth,witharapprochementbetweenMohammadShafiandJinnah.Jinnahmaybeexpectedtogain,fromhiscommandinginfluenceintheMuslimLeague.’34ThusevenbeforetheMuslimLeaguefactionsmet,theviceroy knew that the hatchet would be buried and thatMohammad Shafi would not be a hurdle anylonger.

Muhammad Iqbal is creditedwith ‘imaginingPakistan’. In his presidential address to the rather thinlyattendedtwenty-firstsessionoftheAllIndiaMuslimLeagueatAllahabad(29and30December1930),bywhichtimeJinnahhadleftforBritain,Iqbalstated:

IwouldliketoseethePunjab,theNWFP,SindandBaluchistanamalgamatedintoasinglestate.Self-governmentwithin theBritishEmpire orwithout theBritishEmpire, the formation of aconsolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of theMuslims,atleastofNorth-WestIndia.35

Interestingly,Iqbal’sarticulationleftoutBengal,andKashmiralsoforthatmatter.Evenso,thisspeechiswidelyperceivedasbeingtheinspirationfortheformationofPakistan.Theword Pakistan (literalmeaningLand of the Pure)was first used in a four-page leaflet entitled

‘Now or Never’, published in January 1933 and signed by Rehmat Ali and three other students inCambridge.AccordingtoRehmatAli,PakistanwasanacronymcomposedofPunjab,Afghania(NWFP),Kashmir, Sindh andBalochistan. RehmatAli had actuallymet Jinnah in 1934, only days after he hadauthoredhispamphlet.AccordingtoK.K.Aziz,Jinnah,afternoticingtherestlessandimpulsivenatureoftheyoungideologue, toldhim‘Mydearboy,don’tbeinahurry; let thewatersflowandtheywillfindtheirownlevel…’36

Between1883and1940,therewerealmosttwodozensuggestionsandproposalsforseparateHinduandMuslimhomelandsinsomeformortheother.37Jinnah’ssignalcontributionisthatheprovidedunityandlogictothediversethinkingandconvertedthemintoasolidschemeforthecreationofPakistanbymaking the ‘two-nation’ theory (the idea that Muslims and Hindus constituted two ‘nations’, eachdeserving their own state) the pivot for crafting a parallel narrative to the secular narrative of theCongress.However,Jinnah’sjourneytoPakistanwasnotastraightline.Infact,forthebulkofhispoliticallife

hewasanadvocateofHindu–Muslimunity, earning the titleof thebest ambassadorofHindu–MuslimunityfromGopalKrishnaGokhaleandSarojiniNaidu.Moreover,JinnahdidnothaveacleanrunoftheMuslim space. His greatest opponent was the religious scholar Abdul AlaMaududi who founded theJamaat-i-Islamiin1941.ForMaududi,thedeclineofIndianIslamcouldonlybereversedbytherevivalof Indian Islam.As TariqAli notes, ‘If Pakistanwas to become a trueMuslim state then it needed aMaududinotaJinnah,tobeitshead.HedenouncedJinnahandtheMuslimLeagueasblasphemerswhoweremisusingIslamtopromoteasecularnationalism.’38MaududiwasagainsttheWesternparliamentarymodel thatJinnahproposedto instal inPakistan.HewasequallyopposedtoJinnah’s leadershipof theMuslimsofIndiabecauseofhisWesternattitudes,dressandlackofIslamicknowledge.TheShiaPoliticalConferencetooopposedJinnah’sscheme.TheywerebetteroffthantheSunnisand

saw little opportunities for themselves in an overwhelmingly Sunni Pakistan. On the contrary, theyanticipatedmorepressureonthemselvesinPakistanthaninthelargepolyglotandmulti-religiousIndia.39

Tillthe1930s,theMuslimLeaguewasadormantbodydespiteJinnahbeingitsleadinglightbetween1919and1930.Thus,in1927,itstotalmembershipwas1,330.During1930–33,itsannualexpendituredidnotexceedRs3,000.Inthe1930AllahabadsessionwhenIqbalmadehishistoricaddress,theLeaguemeetingdidnotevenhaveaquorumofseventy-fivemembers.Theannualsessionof1931,heldatDelhi,wasdescribedas‘alanguidandattenuatedHouseofscarcely120peopleinall’.40TheweaknessoftheMuslimLeaguewasreflectedintheelectionsof1937whenitwononly4.6percentofthetotalMuslimvotes.Itseemedtohavedevelopedanewlifeonlyafter1940.41TheLahoreResolutionofMarch1940was clearly one reason. But equally, it was the behind-the-scenes helping hand of the British that

transformedthemoribundMuslimLeagueintoadynamicorganization.GiventhestateoftheMuslimLeague,theBritishdespairedatitsineffectivenessasastrongopposition

totheCongress.Forexample,on9September1934,LordWillingdon,theviceroy,wrotetothesecretaryofstate:‘Butalas,ourbackersformaflabbycrowdwithoutanycourage,whiletheCongress,howeverstupidtheiractionsare,isnotafraidoffighting.’42

ItisinterestingthatJinnahfinallyreturnedtoIndiainOctober1935.WhilethecreditofpersuadinghimtoreturnisgiventoLiaquatAliKhanandevenIqbal,recentwritingssuggestthatthecreditmayactuallybelong toAbdurRahimDard, anAhmadiyamissionary inLondon.43However, there doesnot seem tohavebeenmuchresearchdoneonthepossibilitythatJinnahwaspersuadedtoreturnbytheBritishgiventhe state of the Muslim League and the fact that the 1935 reforms were going to push for greaterrepresentationofIndians,especiallyattheprovinciallevel.Afterall,theBritishhadrecognizedJinnah’sabilitiesveryearly.EdwinMontague,theSecretaryofStateforIndia,wroteofhimasearlyasin1917:‘Jinnahisaverycleverman,andit is,ofcourse,anoutrage thatsuchamanshouldhavenochanceofrunning theaffairsofhisowncountry.’44There isnowevidenceof thesecretcorrespondencebetweenJinnahandChurchillroutedthroughoneElizabethGiliat,aladyemployedatChurchill’shomeinKenttoavoid detection as also the encouragement given to Jinnah by Viceroys Linlithgow andWavell, bothadmirersofChurchill.45

Theresultsofthe1937electionswereahugesetbackforJinnah,theMuslimLeagueandtheBritish.TheCongresswasabletoformgovernmentsinsevenoutofelevenprovinces.ItwasclearthatIndiahadreposed itsconfidence in thesecularprogrammeandpoliciesof theCongressandrejected theMuslimLeague.However,therefusaloftheCongresstoenterintocoalitiongovernmentswiththeMuslimLeaguewastobeadecisivemomentasfarasJinnah,theLeagueandtheBritishwereconcerned.The change in attitudeof theBritish towards theMuslimLeague after Jinnah’s return is remarkable

whencomparedtoitsattitudebefore.WritinginFebruary1910toHewett,thelieutenantgovernoroftheUnitedProvinces(UP),LordMintospecificallyrefusedtoaccepttheLeagueastheonlyspokesmanforMuslims in India, although ‘we should of course always accept the League as a very representativeMahommedanbodytowhichweshouldnaturallyreferforanopiniononanyquestionofimportance’.46

Butbythelate1930s,inthefaceofthegrowingstrengthoftheCongressparty,especiallyafterthe1937elections,therewasabigchange.Forexample,inAugust1938LordZetland,theSecretaryofStateforIndia, noted that he ‘… could not resist a steadily growing conviction that the dominant factor indeterminingthefutureformoftheGovernmentofIndiawouldprovetobetheAllIndiaMuslimLeague’.47

The outbreak ofWorldWar II (WWII) changed the situation completely.Whatever their reasons, theresignation(inSeptember1939)oftheCongressfromtheprovincialgovernmentsfornotbeingconsultedatthedeclarationofwaragainstGermanyandwithoutanywaraimsbeingenunciatedwas,inhindsight,ahuge tacticalmiscalculation.TheQuit Indiamovement (August1942) furthercompoundedmatters.TheBritishviewedtheresignationsoftheCongressandlaunchofanagitationwithagreatdealofsuspicion.Forthemthepursuitofwarwasamatteroflifeanddeathandtheylookeduponanyhindrancewithalotofdistrustandhostility.Inarealsense,theCongresscageditselfpoliticallyduringthewaryears.ForJinnahandtheMuslimLeaguethewarwasagreatopportunity.AsJinnahfranklyadmittedwhenhe

consideredwhatwasgoingtohappenin1939:‘TherewasgoingtobeadealbetweenMrGandhiandLordLinlithgow. Providence helped us. Thewarwhich nobodywelcomes proved to be a blessing indisguise.’48Asaresultof theCongressresignations,Jinnahand theLeagueendeared themselves to theBritishfortheircooperationinthewareffort inrecruitingsoldiersfortheIndianArmy.Astheviceroywrote to the secretary of state on 5 September 1939: ‘I feel it wiser to be patient with Jinnah andendeavour to leadhim into thedirectionwhichwedesire.And indeed, if I cangive anyhelp to theseMuslimleaderstogettogether,thenitisthetimeIshalldoso.’49TheviceroydidbringalltheMuslimsunderthebanneroftheMuslimLeague,justashispredecessorhaddonewithregardtoMohammadShafi.On 5 October 1939, after meeting Jinnah, the viceroy wrote: ‘… he (Jinnah) thanked me with muchgraciousnessforwhatIhaddonetoassisthiminkeepinghispartytogetherandexpressedgreatgratitudeforthis.’50

On22March1940,JinnahdeliveredhispresidentialaddresstotheMuslimLeague’sopensessionatLahore.HesaidthatHinduismandIslam‘…arenotreligionsinthestrictsenseoftheword,butare,infact, different anddistinct social orders and it is a dream thatHindus andMuslims can ever evolve acommon nationality. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, socialcustomsandliterature…andindeedtheybelongtotwodifferentcivilizationswhicharebasedmainlyonconflictingideasandconceptions…,51.TheoperativeportionoftheresolutionadoptedatLahorewas:

ResolvedthatitistheconsideredviewofthissessionoftheAllIndiaMuslimLeaguethatnoconstitutionalplanwouldbeworkableinthiscountryoracceptabletotheMuslimsunlessitisdesigned on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units aredemarcatedintoregionswhichshouldbesoconstituted,withsuchterritorialreadjustmentsasmaybenecessary, that thearea inwhich theMuslimsarenumerically inamajority,as in theNorth-WesternandEasternzonesofIndia,shouldbegroupedtoconstituteIndependentstatesinwhichtheconstituentunitsshallbeautonomousandsovereign.52

Interestingly,the1940resolution,latercalledthePakistanResolution,didnotmentionPakistanatall.Likewise, its formulationwas so vague that itwas not evident if the resolution envisaged one or twostates. Though this resolution became the core of the demand for the creation of Pakistan, in itsfundamentals,theresolutionsoughtnot‘independencefromtheBritishbutapartingfromtheHindus’.53

ThereisabodyofliteraturethathasputforwardtheargumentthatitwasViceroyLinlithgowwhoinMarch1940instructedZafarullahKhan,amemberoftheViceroy’sExecutiveCouncil, toconveytotheLeagueleadershipthatthegovernmentwantedittodemandaseparatestate.Thiscouldbeasaresultofpique for theCongress resignations from theministrieson theoutbreakofWWII.According to IshtiaqAhmed,theideaofaseparatestateforMuslimswasbornintheviceroy’soffice.However, theBritishwerenotthinkingofpartitioningIndiaatthattime,norwastheMuslimLeagueconfidentthatsuchanideacouldberealizedwithoutmajorupheavalstakingplace.54

ViceroyLordLinlithgowconfirmedZafarullah’sroleinhisletterof12March1940tothesecretaryofstateforIndia:

Uponmyinstruction,Zafarullahwroteamemorandumonthesubjectoftwodominionstates,Ihavealreadysentittoyourattention.Heisanxious,however,thatnooneshouldfindoutthathe

haspreparedthisplan.Hehas,however,givenmetherighttodowithitwhatIlikeincludingsendingacopytoyou.CopieshavebeenpassedontoJinnahandIthinktoSirAkbarHydari.Whilehe,Zafarullah,cannotadmititsauthorship,hisdocumenthasbeenpreparedforadoptionby the Muslim League with a view to giving it the full publicity. (Zafarullah, being anAhmadiya,wasnotkeenthathisnameshouldappearastheauthor.)55

Ithasbeenasserted thatJinnahwas the‘lawyer’for thecaseofPakistanwhichhearguedandwon.However, he was not a visionary or a strategic thinker to chart out the course of the nation. Such avisionaryintheMuslimLeaguewasZafarullahKhanwhoauthoredtheLahoreResolution,whichforthefirst time chalked out the idea of Pakistan. Being anAhmadiya,Khan’s rolewas kept secret until therecentreleaseofdocumentsandletterswrittenbyViceroyLinlithgowrevealedhispivotalrole.56

With theMuslim League fully cooperating with them, the British did not recognize any otherMuslimorganization. For example, a large gathering of nationalistMuslimswas held inDelhi chaired by thepremier of Sindh,AllahBaksh Soomro. In his letter to the secretary of state dated 14May 1940, theviceroywrote:

Iattachnoparticular importance to theDelhiConferenceof theMuslimswhich tookplaceafewdaysago.IthasbeenwellorganizedandtheBritishpresshadwrittenitupadmirably.Webothare,ofcourse,awarethat thereisanotunimportantMuslimelementoutsidetheMuslimLeague.Indeed,IamsurethatJinnahremainsthemantodealwithontheMuslimside.57

ByignoringMuslimsoutsidetheMuslimLeague,theBritishsignalledtoeveryIndianMuslimthatitwasonlyJinnahandtheMuslimLeaguewhowererecognizedbythem,implyingthatanyonewantingBritishsupportwouldhavetojointheLeague.ThoughtheBritishproppedupJinnah,thereweretimeswhentheyneededtoshowwhothebosswas.

WiththeCongresshavingresignedfromtheministriesin1939,JinnahoverreachedhimselfandrequestedtheviceroythatadvisersbeappointedasrecommendedbytheMuslimLeagueeventhoughtheLeaguehadnotwonelectionsinsuchprovinces.ThisangeredtheviceroywhowroteinJuly1940:

IhopethatJinnahwillnotcontinuetopresshisextravagantclaim.Ifhedoes,IthinkmyselfthatwemaydefinitelyhavetoconsiderwhetherweshouldcontinuetheeffortswhichIhavemadeso far to keep the Muslims together, whether we should not let the balance of the MuslimLeagueas representedbySikandar andFazlulHaqhave their breakwith Jinnah.But I don’twanttoseesuchabreakifwecanreasonablyavoidit.58

Againon28August 1940, theviceroywrote: ‘I hope thatSikandar andFazlulHaqwill be able tobring pressure on Jinnah to make him toe the line; if he does not, I shall go without him.’59 ThishighlightedhowdispensableJinnahwasfortheBritish.ThisisfurtherevidencedbythefactthatwhenitbecameknownthatBritishrelationswithJinnahwerestrained,severalotherMuslimleadersofferedtheirservicestotheBritish.OnesuchwasthechiefministerofHyderabad,SirAkbarHydari.Inalettertothe

secretaryofstate,theviceroywroteon29August1940:‘YoumaybeamusedtohearthatHydariduringaconversationafewdaysago,coylyhintedtome,thatifthereshouldbetroublewithJinnahandMuslimLeague,therewas,atanyrate,averyprominentMuslim,whocouldsteerthecountrythroughthetroubledwatersthatmaylieahead.’60

However,Jinnahknewhislimitationsandinduecoursethedifferenceswerepaperedover.AsViceroyLinlithgow,inalettertosecretaryofstatedated10June1943,wrote:

Your comments on Jinnah’s attitude… I think he probably looks a littlemore alarming fromLondonthanhedoeshere.Idon’t,however,thinkhewantsarowwiththeGovernment.Though,ontheotherhand,heinsistsonbeingasrudetotheGovernment(andtohispoliticalopponents)ashethinkshedares.Idoubtifanyonetakesitveryseriously,andhisthreatsdonotcausemeanysleeplessnights…JinnahwouldbequiteasbadamasterasGandhiji.ButJinnahisnotinasstrongapositionasGandhiandtheCongress,andheisneverlikelytobeinthenearfuture,since he represents a minority, and a minority that can effectively hold its own with ourassistance.Nor,ofcourse,ishisorganizationasdeep-rootedasthatoftheCongress.Iwouldexpecthim tobe likely tocontinue tonotmerelynon-constructive,butpositivelydestructive,and to play his hand so as to get maximum in the way of commitments favourable to hiscommunityandthemaximuminthewayofhurdlestobetakenbytheHindusbutwithoutfacingashowdownwiththegovernment.61

ThusitisclearthatthevariousviceroysclearedthedecksfortheMuslimLeagueandJinnahattheall-India level.By the endofWWII, theBritishwanted theCongress to recognize theLeague as the solerepresentativeoftheIndianMuslims.ThiswasthenoteonwhichViceroyWavellconcludedtheabortiveSimlaConference in 1945. In fact, Jinnahhad ensured the failure of theConference bydemanding theexclusive right tonominateMuslimsonboth theMuslimquotaandalso theMuslims that theCongresswouldnominateonthenon-MuslimquotafortheViceroy’sExecutiveCouncil.62ThesignalwasalsotootherMuslims that if they wanted to be recognized, the only course was to sign up with theMuslimLeague.AsH.V.Hodson,wrote on the failedSimlaConference: ‘Aminority partywithunsupportableclaimhadbeenallowedtovetothewholeprojectforadvancingIndia’sself-government.’63Interestingly,DrKhan Sahibwhowas present there, askedWavell, ‘I am theChiefMinister of the largestMuslimprovince[NWFP],butnotamemberoftheMuslimLeague.Whatdoyouhavetosaytome?’64Thiswas,nodoubt,extremelyembarrassingtotheBritishandhence,Wavell’sanswerwasnotrecorded.The clinching evidence of the role of Britain in propping up Jinnah was given by none other than

ChurchillwhenhetoldMountbattenon22May1947,‘ByGod!He[Jinnah]isonemanwhocannotdowithoutBritishhelp.’65

Anothercrucial resolutionof theMuslimLeaguewasadoptedatameetingheld inBombayon29July1946.Here theMuslimLeagueCouncilpasseda resolutionwithdrawing its acceptanceof theCabinetMissionplanandcalledonMuslimsthroughoutIndiatoobserve16August1946asDirectActionDay.Inhisconcludingremarks,followingtheadoptionoftheresolution,Jinnahstated:

Wehavetakenamosthistoricdecision.Neverbeforeinthewholelife-historyoftheMuslimLeaguedidwedoanythingexceptbyconstitutionalmethodsandconstitutionaltalks…Todaywe have said goodbye to constitutions and constitutional methods. Throughout the painfulnegotiations,thetwopartieswithwhomwehadbargainedheldapistolatus;onewithpowerandmachinegunsbehind it,and theotherwithnon-cooperationand the threat to launchmasscivildisobedience.Thissituationmustbemet.Wealsohaveapistol.66

Theimageryofapistolwasanunambiguoussignthatviolencewasintended.ThereportofthedirectoroftheIntelligenceBureautothegovernorgeneralhighlightedthefollowing:(i)Itdefined‘DirectAction’as using violence to achieve the goals/agenda of theMuslimLeague, (ii)DirectAction could lead tobloodshed,butchery,slaughterofHindusofEast/WestBengalandSind;(iii)‘DirectAction’wouldleadtoviolencewhichwouldresult from(a) themovementforestablishmentofPakistanfosteredbyJinnahand(b)fromtheincitementtoviolencebytheMuslimpirs.67SeveralauthorshavevividlyrecordedthemayheminCalcuttathatleftover4,000deadand15,000wounded.ItrequiredGandhiji’sfasttocontrolthesituationafterdaysofrioting.

IntheaftermathofWWII,defenceandsecurityconsiderationsbecameuppermostinthemindsofBritishleadersastheyconsideredwithdrawalfromIndia.UptoMay1946,theBritishgeneralstaffwereoftheview that toprevent aSoviet threat to the area and theoilfieldsof theMiddleEast (termed ‘wells ofpower’),Britainmustretainitsmilitaryconnectiontothesubcontinent,especiallystressingthenorth-westfrom where British air power could threaten Soviet military installations. In a top secret note on‘Strategic implications of Pakistan’ dated 16 May 1946 Field Marshal Auchinleck concluded thatpartition would not serve British interests in the Indian Ocean because Pakistan would be aneconomically and militarily weak state whereas a strong and independent Indian state (post-1947)estranged fromBritain couldmove closer to theSovietUnion.He held: ‘Ifwe desire tomaintain ourpower tomove freelybyseaandair in the IndianOcean…wecandosoonlybykeeping inbeingaunitedIndiawhichwouldbeawillingmemberoftheCommonwealth,readytoshareinitsdefencetothelimitofherresources.’68

Ayearlater,however,therewasasea-changeintheattitudeoftheBritishmilitaryonpartitionandthecreationofPakistan.TheChiefsofStaffCommitteeon12May1947stronglysupportedtheassumptionthatitwouldbegoodforBritainifPakistanremainedintheCommonwealth.Shortlythereafter,inanotherreport, chiefs of staff underlinedBritish strategic interests focused on Pakistan: ‘The area of Pakistan[WestPakistanorthenorthwestofIndia]isstrategicallythemostimportantinthecontinentofIndiaandthemajorityofourstrategicrequirementscouldbemet…byanagreementwithPakistanalone.Wedonottherefore consider that failure toobtain the agreementwith Indiawouldcauseus tomodifyanyofourrequirements…’69

ThereasonforthisturnaroundwasthefeelingthatJawaharlalNehru,thefutureprimeministerofIndia,maynotbeinterestedinjoiningablockagainsttheSovietUnion.TheMuslimLeagueleadership,ontheotherhand,hadbeenprojectingPakistanasabulwarkagainstcommunism.Inaddition,theBritishmilitarycametobelievethatasmallerPakistanwouldbemoremanageableandbefarmoredependentonWesternhelpthanIndia.Assuchitcouldserveasastrategicroleinthefuture.Itwas this changed assessment of theBritishmilitary that Pakistan rather than a united India under

NehruwouldserveitsinterestsbetterthatprovedtobethelastnailinthecoffinofIndianunity.Asalaterchapterwillshow,theUnitedStates(US)tookoverfromwhereanexhaustedBritainleftthe

subcontinent.Pakistan’sparticipationandusefulnessintheBaghdadPact,CENTO,providingairbasefortheUSinPeshawarinthe1960s,beingafront-linestateagainsttheSovietsinthe1980sandinthewaronterrorintheearlyyearsofthetwenty-firstcentury,allshowedthevalidityofthestrategicappreciationoftheBritishgeneralstaff.TheconsequencesthishadforthestateofPakistanis,ofcourse,anotherstory.

To conclude, the Pakistan movement was essentially a movement of theMuslim elite in theMuslim-minorityprovincestocompensatefortheirlossofpower,theirapprehensionofhavingtoliveunderthosewhom they had governed and to secure their future in what they perceivedwould, under a system ofrepresentative government, be a country dominated by the vast Hindu majority once the British left.Picking themselves up from the despair of 1857, the Muslim elite would gradually take to WesterneducationandsoftentheirsullennesstowardstheBritishwhohadsupplantedtheMughalruleinIndia.ItrequiredaSyedAhmadKhantoplanttheseeds,anIqbaltoimagineandespeciallyaJinnahtograsptheopportunity to convert theMuslim insecurity at having lost an empire into the demand for a separatehomeland. TheBritish policy too underwent a sea change from viewing theMuslims as rebellious toseeinginthemaforcetoobstructtheCongress’smarchtowardsindependence.Intheirattempttoensuredisunity between the Hindus and Muslims, their differences were escalated to the political andconstitutionallevelssoastodevelopaseparateMuslimpoliticalconsciousnessandidentity.To implement this policy, they nurtured the Muslim League and Jinnah to make it the only

representative body of the Muslims and Jinnah its ‘sole spokesman’. They had grasped the essentialweaknessof theLeague that itwasnot rooted in thepeopleand lacked thekindoffoundations that theCongresshadand thatJinnahwasnomass leader.TheBritishwere thusable tomould theLeagueandJinnahtocountertheCongressateveryturn.Intheultimateanalysis,JinnahandtheMuslimLeaguegotPakistanonaplatter.Theydidnothaveto

struggleagainsttheBritishfortheindependenceofIndia.ThatwaslefttotheCongresstodo.TheygotPakistanbecausetheykepttheirpowderdryforthestruggleagainsttheCongress,incollaborationwiththeBritish.Jinnah’snegotiatingstrategywassimple–‘…hewouldlettheBritishortheCongressmakeanofferthathewouldturndownandaskformore.’70Thedeckswerethus,clearly,stackedagainst theCongress.Pakistanwould,however,paydearlyforlatchingontothefingerofthecolonialpowerinsteadoflearningtowalkonitsownfeet,usingthestrengthofitsownpeople.TheTimemagazinesummeditupwell,thoughharshly:

ThepeopleofKarachididnotwelcomePakistanwiththewildenthusiasmthatsweptthenewdominionofIndia.Afterall,Pakistanwasthecreationofonecleverman,Jinnah;thedifferencebetween a slick political trick and a mass movement was apparent in the contrast betweenKarachiandNewDelhi.71

2

TheLegacy

AjabandaazseyeghargirahaiMeramalbamereupargirahai

ThishousehasfallenstrangelyMyowndebrishasfallenonme

—AanisMoin

THENEWstateofPakistanthatcameintoexistenceon14August1947didnotbeginonacleanslate.ItcarriedwithitthelegacyofthePakistanmovementthathasshapeditsdevelopmentoverthepastalmostsevendecades,helped,nodoubt,bythepoliciesofitsrulers.EightelementsinparticularthatPakistaninheritedatbirthweretoshapeitsdestiny.The process of Partition itself was to leave an indelible mark on the future of Pakistan. In a

fundamental sense, Partition congealed attitudes among a large section of Pakistan’s ruling elite,especiallyPunjabi–attitudeswhichhavelastedtilltodayandexplainthevisceralhatredtowardsIndia.AsChristineFairputsit:‘Neitherthearmynorthecountry’ssecuritymanagershaveeverbeenabletoseetheeventsofPartitionasPakistan’spast;rather,Partitionpermeatesthepresentandcastsalongshadowoverthefuture.’1

Jinnah’sconceptionofPakistanhingedontheentireMuslim-majorityprovincesofPunjabandBengalbeingapartofthenewstatesincePartitionwasonthegroundsofthedivisionbetweenMuslim-majorityprovinces and Hindu-majority provinces. The rationale was that ‘Without the non-Muslim-majoritydistrictsofthesetwoprovinces[BengalandPunjab],the[Muslim]Leaguecouldnotexpecttobargainforparity between “Pakistan” and “Hindustan”.’2 In the event, however, Punjab and Bengal had to bepartitioned due to the logic of Jinnah’s own articulation of the two-nation theory –Hindus and SikhswouldhardlywanttoliveunderaMuslim-majoritystateoncePartitionwasdeterminedalongreligiouslines.3AdisappointedJinnahwouldcallPakistan‘truncatedandmoth-eaten’.Partition led to the both-way migration of between fourteen and eighteen million people and the

horrifickillingsofonetotwomillion.ConceivedasahomelandoftheMuslimsofthesubcontinent,closetofortymillion,outof thenearly100millionMuslims in1947,neverthelessremainedbehind inIndia.However,Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan had to leave almost to the lastman fromPunjab and the thenNorth-West Frontier Province (NWFP). It was only in interior Sindh and in East Pakistan that acommunityofsomesignificancestayedbehind.Notsurprisingly,suchanupheavalbequeathedabloody

andbitterlegacyoffearandhatredtobothIndiaandPakistan.4

Itisnotasifthepotentialforacommunalflare-upinPunjabwasunknown.ThegovernorsofPunjab,BertrandGlancyandlaterEvanJenkins,warnedrepeatedlyaboutitintheirFortnightlyReports(FRs)toViceroyWavell.Forexample,inhisFRNo.561dated16August1945,GovernorGlancywrote:‘…ifPakistanbecomesanimminentreality,weshallbeheadingstraightforblood-shedonawidescale;non-Muslims, especially Sikhs, are not bluffing, they will not submit peacefully to a government that islabelled “MuhammadanRaj”.’5 InFR598dated2May1946,Governor Jenkins (who tookover fromGlancyon8April1946)wrote: ‘Allcommunitiesaresaid tobepreparing forwidespreadriotingandthereismuchtalkabout“volunteers”whoconstitutethe“privatearmies”of thevariouscommunities.’6

Again,SpecialReportof31August1946:‘IfanupheavaloccursitwillIbelievebeginwithcommunalriotinginthetownsonanunprecedentedscale.TheSikhvillagesoftheCentralPunjabandtheJatsoftheEastwilljoininbeforelong,andtheMuslimvillagersoftheNorthandWestwillfollowsuit.’7

Despitetherebeingadequatenoticeoftrouble,withtheoldcolonialgovernmenthavingbeenremoved,theadministrativemachineryof thenewPakistangovernmentwasoverwhelmedby themassmigrationandthemagnitudeofviolencethathadnotbeenanticipated.8Thepopulationswerenotshiftedoutintimeand adequate security measures not adopted to mitigate the tragedy of Partition. Lord Ismay, LordMountbatten’schiefofstaff,confirmedthiswhileaddressingameetingofthechiefsofstaffinLondonon8October1947thatitwasamistaketoimaginethatthestormwhichbrokeoutinAugust,andwhichwasstillraging,wasunexpected.He,however,franklyadmittedthatneitheritscharacternoritsextentwereanticipatedbyanyoneinauthority,whetherinIndia,PakistanorEngland.9

Amajor consequence of the forcedmigration ofHindus andSikhs fromPakistanwas, according toShahid Javed Burki, to ‘Muslimize’ the country. As a result, the proportion of Muslims in Pakistanincreased from about 65 per cent to 95 per cent.He notes, ‘Had thisMuslimization not occurred, thepresenceofalargenon-MuslimpopulationmaywellhavepreventedPakistandevelopingsucharadicalIslamicidentity.’10

Apartfromcreatinghatredamongcommunities,thepartitionofPunjabwasbasedonthedistributionofthepopulationandnotwithaneyeondefence.Asaresult,theRadcliffeLinethatdemarcatedtheborderbetweenIndiaandWestPakistansawthemajorcitiesofPakistanlikeLahoreandSialkotveryclosetothe international border. Thus, right from its birth, Pakistan’s rulers saw their frontierwith India as asecuritynightmare,heightening theiranxiety.Given the imbrogliooverKashmir, the legacyofPartitionwastomakethephysicaldefenceofPakistanapriority,andthepracticeofdefencespendingtakingthebiggest chunk of the national budget began at birth. This was to give the army a salience which haspersisted.Arelated issuewas theperceived‘injustice’ofGurdaspurdistrictbeingawarded to India,enabling

landaccesstoKashmirthatIndiawouldusetoestablishitsholdontheprincelystate.11GurdaspurwassoughtforPakistanonthegroundsofitbeinga51percentMuslim-majoritydistrict.Ironically,Qadian,which is the spiritualheadquartersof theAhmadiyas, is inGurdaspurdistrict.SincePakistandoesnotconsiderAhmadiyas to beMuslims, it is indeedhypocritical to allege a ‘conspiracy’ of theBritish tohaveawardedGurdaspur to Indiaor tocontinue toclaimiton thegroundsofbeingaMuslim-majoritydistrict.YetthenarrativepersistsandisusedfrequentlytopaintIndiaasamanipulativecountry.ForJinnahandtheMuslimLeague,paritybetweenHindusandMuslimsanditsby-product,paritywith

theCongress,layatthecoreoftheirdemands.ThefundamentaldifferencebetweenthetwowasthattheMuslimLeague,‘…wantedparityorequalweightinelectoralrightsfortheminorityMuslimpopulationwiththemajorityHinduelectorate’.Withoutthisextraweight,theMuslimLeaguebelieved,theMuslimswerevulnerabletobeingdeniedtheirduepoliticalrights.12ThiswasgraphicallydemonstratedwheninresponsetoGandhiji’sstatementthatHindusandMuslimswerebrothersandequals,Jinnah,echoingSyedAhmad,statedinhis1940presidentialaddress:‘…brotherGandhihasthreevotes,Ihaveonlyone.’13

Thisquestforparity,ratherthanbeingburiedwiththecreationofPakistan,wascarriedoverintothenew state and has become an obsession with its leaders and is perhaps the most consistent andoverwhelmingtrendinPakistan’srelationswithIndia.LeaderafterleaderhassoughttoequatePakistanwith India in this elusive quest for parity and has demanded of India and the rest of theworld to berecognizedassuch.ForthePakistanArmy,thisquestisanarticleoffaith,thequestiswhatmakesanddefines themasPakistanis.Without assertionof suchparity theywouldbe seen to have acquiesced to‘Hindu’subjugation.(Foramoredetaileddiscussionofthiselementofparity,seeChapter14).

AmajordilemmathatJinnahfacedwas thathecouldnotafford tostatepreciselywhat thedemandfor‘Pakistan’ meant: whether it would be an Islamic or a secular state, what would be its geographicalshape, etc., due to several reasons. First,Muslims were spread all over the subcontinent, apart fromconcentrations in north-west and north-east India. A Pakistan scheme based on Muslim-majorityprovinceswouldleaveout theMuslimslivinginMuslim-minorityprovinces like theUnitedProvinces,Bihar,CentralProvinces,Bombay,etc.Jinnah’sdilemma,asJalalputsit,was‘howtocovertheinterestsof allMuslims in the absence of a neat equation between populations and territory’.14 Jinnah had toreconciletheneedforautonomyintheMuslim-majorityprovinceswithaffirmativeactioninfavouroftheMuslimsintheMuslim-minorityprovincesthroughastrongCentre.Second, right till mid-1946, Jinnah was not even sure about the creation of Pakistan. Thus, when

Pakistanwasformed,peopledidnotknowwhattoexpectorwhatitevenmeant.Lievensumsitupwell:‘…all theevidencesuggests thatJinnahand theLeague leadershipwerecompletelyunprepared for therealities of complete separation from India.Thiswas to have tragic consequenceswhenPakistanwascreated.’15Not surprisingly, a fewmonths before its creation,KhwajaNazimuddin,who later becamePakistan’ssecondgovernorgeneralaswellasitssecondprimeminister,candidlytoldaBritishgovernorthat‘…hedidnotknowwhatPakistanmeansandthatnobodyintheMuslimLeagueknew’.16

Jinnahwas obviously aware of these anomalies and thus it was a clever ploy to keep the idea ofPakistanasvagueaspossibleforaslongaspossible.Likewise,thefutureboundariesofPakistanwerekeptambiguous till theveryend. Instead, the focuswason theargument that inanypost-BritainunitedIndia,Muslimidentitywouldbechallengedunlesstheyhadtheirownstate.Jinnah’scontentionwasthattilltheachievementofPakistanallMuslimsneededtosubordinatetheirdifferencestothenationalgoal.Asheputit,‘Weshallhavetimetoquarrelourselvesandweshallhavethetimewhenthesedifferenceswill have to be settled, whenwrongs and injuries will have to be remedied.We shall have time fordomesticprogrammesandpolicies,butfirstgetthegovernment.Thisisanationwithoutanyterritoryoranygovernment.’17

While keeping what Pakistan meant opaque may have been a tactic, Jinnah’s own conception ofPakistanwasabithazy.Forexample,whentheAmericanjournalistBourke-WhiteaskedJinnahtodefine

whatheconsidereddemocracy,hedeclared,‘Democracyisnotjustanewthingwearelearning.Itisinourblood.Wehavealwayshadoursystemofzakat–ourobligationtothepoor.’Shelaterwroteinherbookthattheequationofdemocracywithcharitymadeherveryuncomfortable.AllJinnahtoldherwasthattheconstitutionwouldbedemocraticbecause‘thesoilisperfectlyfertilefordemocracy’.18AveryperceptiveBourke-WhitewastoidentifytwokeyattributesofPakistansoonafteritsbirth.Onewasthe‘bankruptcyofideasinthenewMuslimState–anationdrawingitsspuriouswarmthfromtheembersofanantiquefanaticism,fannedintoanewblaze’.19ThesecondattributeisdiscussedinChapter17ontheUnitedStates.Her assessment confirmedMountbatten’s caustic comment about JinnahnarratedbyH.V.Hodson:‘Nevertheless’,wroteLordMountbattenwhilerecordingtheirtalk(withJinnah,heldon9April1947),‘hegivesmetheimpressionofamanwhohasnotthoughtoutonesinglepieceofthemechanicsofhisownscheme,andhewill reallyget theshockofhis lifewhenhecomesdown toearthand tryandmakehisvagueidealisticproposalsworkonaconcretebasis.’20MountbattenwaswarningJinnahaboutthedifficultiesthatwouldarisefromthecreationofPakistan.Infact,inameetingwithLiaquatAlion19April1947,MountbattensaidthatJinnahwas‘completely

impractical’.Liaquatresponded:‘IfyourstaffwillworkoutexactlywhatpartitionmeansandthatifyoupresentthefulldifficultiestoMrJinnah,hewillofcourseunderstandthemeventhoughhehasnotworkedthemoutforhimself.’21

ThisvaguenessaboutwhatPakistanmeantwastohavetragicconsequencesoncethenewcountrycameintobeing. Itwasobvious thatPakistanhadnotbeen thought through,and its troubleswere largely theresultof thisfact. Itmeant that therewasnocommonvisionofeitherwhatPakistanwouldbeorof itsideology.ThiscontrastedwiththeCongressanditsleaderswhohadafairlygoodideaofhowtogovernIndiaandwhatpoliciestheywouldpursueonceIndependencewasachieved.TheearlydemiseofJinnahwastocomplicatematters.Eventoday,confusionandadhocracypersistaboutthenatureofPakistanandthepoliciesthatneedtobepursued.

Religion came to Jinnah’s rescue to garner support for a vague concept. Given the dominance of thelanded elite in the League, there was no way Jinnah could have launched a populist programme tomobilizetheMuslimruralmasses.SuchmassmovementsweredistastefultoJinnahinanycase.Hence,‘recourse to Islammade sense to a politician and a party with neither a populist past nor a populistpresent.Bothpoliticianandpartyneededtostealthepopulistmarchontheirrivals.’22ThefirstsignofJinnahgoingdown this routewaswhen,after the shockdefeat in the1937elections,heexchangedhisSavilleRowsuitforthedressofMuslimeliteintheUnitedProvinces–asherwaniandaKarkulcap.According to Jalal, ‘Jinnah’s appeal to religion was always ambiguous; certainly it was not

characteristicofhispoliticalstylebefore1937andevidencesuggeststhathisuseofthecommunalfactorwasapoliticaltactic,notanideologicalcommitment.’23Whilethatmaybeso, theopportunisticuseofIslamtowinthe1945–46electionsintheMuslim-majorityprovinceswastounleashforcesoverwhichneitherJinnahnortheMuslimLeague,norsuccessiverulersinPakistan,wouldhaveanycontrol.Winningthese electionswas crucial to prove to the British and the Congress that the League, in fact, was therepresentativebodyoftheMuslimsofBritishIndia.TheproblemwasthattheMuslimLeague’spresence,letalonehold,intheMuslim-majorityareaswasatbestthinontheground,ifnotnon-existent.TheLeaguehadbeenable tomakesomeinroadsherebysupportingregionalautonomyandshowinganaversionto

land reforms. But it was ultimately the use of religion that won the Muslim League 460 of the 533reservedseatsforMuslimsinthe1945–46elections.Thiswasaremarkablereversalofthe1937resultsandwasduelargelytotheuseofreligionandIslamicrhetoricduringthecampaigninwhichIslamandPakistanbecamesynonymous.Encouragementwasgivento‘avaguefeelingthattheywouldallbecomebetterMuslimsonceaMuslimstatewasestablished’.24

OneofthetacticsJinnahusedwastoassurereligiousleadersthatPakistanwouldfollowIslamiclaws.AsKhalidB.Sayeednotes:

Inaletter tothePirofMankiSharif, the[Muslim]LeagueleaderclearlystatedinNovember1945:‘ItisneedlesstoemphasizethattheConstituentAssemblywhichwouldbepredominantlyMusliminitscompositionwouldbeabletoenactlawsforMuslims,notinconsistentwiththeShariahlawsandtheMuslimswillnolongerbeobligedtoabidebytheUn-Islamiclaws.’25

IslamwithitssymbolsandslogansstartedtofigureveryprominentlyintheLeaguemeetingsthatJinnahaddressed,particularlyintheMuslim-majorityareas.Forexample,addressingthePathans,hesaid,‘DoyouwantPakistanornot?’(ShoutsofAllah-o-Akbar,Godisgreat).‘Well,ifyouwantPakistan,votefortheLeaguecandidates.IfwefailtorealizeourdutytodayyouwillbereducedtothestatusofSudras(lowcastes)andIslamwillbevanquishedfromIndia. IshallneverallowMuslimstobeslavesofHindus.’(Allah-o-Akbar.)26

Another tactic was to appoint, in 1946, a Mashaikh Committee, consisting of eminent pirs andmashaikh to influence the faithful tovote for theMuslimLeague. It included religious leaders likePirSahibofMankiSharif,PirJama’tAliShah,KhwajaNazimuddinofTaunsaSharif,MakhdumRazaShahofMultan,etc.Includedinthecommitteewerealso‘politiciansofdubiouspretentionstopiety–Mamdot,ShaukatHayat,etc.’.27ThePirofMankiSharif togetherwithulema likeMaulanaShabbirOsmaniandMaulanAbdul SattarKhanNiazi played an important role in the victory of theMuslimLeague in theNWFPreferendum.28

FortheLeague,threeslogansworkedbeautifully:‘Islamindanger’;‘IfyouareaMuslim,votefortheLeague’;and‘Pakistankamatlabkya?’(WhatisthemeaningofPakistan?);‘Lailahailallah’(thereisnogodbutGod).29AccordingtoIshtiaqAhmed,itwasAsgharSodai,apoetfromSialkot,whocoinedtheslogan‘Pakistankana’arakya(WhatisthesloganofPakistan?)Lailahailallah’whichlateronbecame‘Pakistankamatlabkya’.30

TheMuslimLeaguecampaignwasaptlydescribedinthevariousFortnightlyReportsofSirBertrandGlancy,thegovernorofPunjabtotheviceroy:

16August1945:…ImustconfessthatIamgravelyperturbedaboutthesituation,becausethereisveryseriousdangeroftheelectionsbeingfought,sofarastheMuslimsareconcerned,onanentirelyfalseissue.CrudePakistanmaybequiteillogical,undefinableandruinoustoIndiaandinparticular toMuslims,but thisdoesnotdetract fromitspotencyasapolitical slogan.TheuninformedMuslimwillbetoldthatthequestionheiscalledontoansweratthepollsis–Areyouatruebelieveroraninfidelandatraitor?31

27December1945–AmongtheMuslims,theLeaguersareincreasingtheireffortstoappealtothebigotryoftheelectors.Pirsandmaulvishavebeenenlistedinlargenumberstotourthe

provinceanddenounceallwhooppose theLeagueas infidels.Copiesof theHolyQuranarecarried around as an emblempeculiar to theML.Firoz (KhanNoonwho switched from theUnionistPartytotheML)andothersopenlypreachthateveryvotegiventotheLeagueisavotecastinfavouroftheHolyProphet.32

2February1946–TheMLorators are becoming increasingly fanatical in their speeches.Maulvisandpirsandstudentstravelallaroundtheprovinceandpreachthatthosewhofailtovote for theLeague candidateswill cease to beMuslims; theirmarriageswill no longer bevalidandtheywillentirelybeexcommunicated…Itisnoteasytoforeseewhattheresultsofthe electionswill be.But there seems little doubt theML, thanks to the ruthlessmethods bywhich theyhavepursued their campaignof ‘Islam indanger’,will considerably increase thenumberoftheirseatsandUnionistrepresentativeswillcorrespondinglydecline.33

Inreality,theuseofreligionbytheMuslimLeaguewasillegalaspertheprevalentelectorallaws.Notsurprisingly,therefore,oftheseventy-threeassemblyseatscapturedbytheMuslimLeagueinPunjab,theresultsinforty-fivewerelegallychallengedafterthepollsonthegroundsthatLeague’sIslam-basedpro-Pakistanelectoralrhetoricin1946wascorruptaspertheexistinglaws.34

The use of religion was to become a millstone around the neck of its leaders after Pakistan wascreated.ItwasonethingtosaythatHindusandMuslimswereseparate‘nations’;itwasquiteanothertousereligiontofantheflamesofhatredagainsttheHindus.Withsloganslike‘Pakistankamatlabkya?Lailahailallahbeingusedinthe1946elections,therewasnowaythatthereligiousgeniecouldbeputbackinthebottle.EvenwherethecontestwasbetweentwoMuslims,thecontestwaswidelyportrayedasonebetweenIslamanditsenemies,asonebetween‘haqobatil’ (rightandwrong)andbetweenIslamandkufr. For example, during the campaign, the slogan in these constituencies was ‘Islam aur kufr kamuqabalahai,aiktarafIslamkanamindahai,doosritarafkafroonka’(It isacontestbetweenIslamandkufr;ononesideistherepresentativeofIslamandontheotheroftheinfidels.)35ThetacticaluseofIslamsanctifiedbyJinnahwastohaveafundamentalimpactonthenewstate,andalmostimmediatelyonitscreation.Pakistanhasnotbeenabletoputthegeniebackinthebottleeversince.

Jinnah’searlydemisecreatedaleadershipvacuum,theimpactofwhichcouldhavebeencontainedhadastrongMuslimLeaguebeenable to fill thebreach.Thiswasnot tobe,primarilydue to thenatureandstructureoftheLeague.TheMuslimLeaguedidnotfightforthecreationofPakistanthroughapoliticalmassmovement.Ithadnoorganizationworththename.Tilltheend,theLeaguewasacluboftheMuslimeliteandthattoopredominantlyfromtheMuslim-minorityprovinces.Forexample,intheCounciloftheMuslimLeaguefor1942,outofatotalmembershipof503,therewere245membersfromtheMuslim-minorityprovinces and258 from theMuslim-majorityones, even thoughpopulation-wise the latter faroutnumberedtheformer.Initspowerfulworkingcommitteeduring1945–47,therewereonlytenmembersoutoftwenty-threefromthemajorityprovinces.36Itremaineddependentonlandlordsandpirstodelivervotesontheonehand,andontheBritishtosmoothentheirwayasrepresentativesoftheMuslimsontheother. As the example ofNWFP shows, it was left to the governor to cobble support for theMuslimLeaguebybribingmullahsandpirs.Asaresult,therewasnopoliticaltraining,andnoseasonedleadershipcouldemergeatvariouslevels.

It was the Congress that struggled for India’s freedom with almost every Congress leader, including

Gandhiji,Nehru,Patel,etc.,spendingyears inBritish jailsfordemandingIndia’sfreedom,andbearingthebruntofpoliceatrocities.Ontheotherhand,notasingleLeagueleader, includingJinnah,waseversenttoprisonforseekingPakistan.JinnahhimselfclaimedthisasavirtuetoLordMountbatten:

All the Muslims have been loyal to the British from the beginning. We supplied a highproportion of theArmywhich fought in bothwars.None of our leaders has ever had to goprison for disloyalty. Not one of us has done anything to deserve expulsion from thecommonwealth….Mr.ChurchillhadassuredmethattheBritishpeoplewouldneverstandforourbeingexpelled.37

An additional facet of theMuslimLeaguewas that to demonstrate itself as the representativeMuslimorganizationofIndianMuslims,itdevelopedamindsetofnarrow-mindedness,treatinganyoppositiontoit as illegitimate. Jinnah started the practice of dubbing as traitor or quisling anyMuslim who stoodagainsttheLeague.Thus,politicalopponentslikethechiefministerofPunjabandUnionistPartyleaderKhizr Hayat Khan Tiwana was denounced as ‘infidel’ and ‘traitor’ to Islam.38 Some of the MuslimLeaguerswentsofarastosaythatanyMuslimwhoopposedtheMuslimLeaguehadbetrayedthecauseofIslamitself.39

SuchprecedentsofpoliticalintolerancewouldbecomethetemplateinPakistan.AsTalbotnotes,‘Theseedswerethussownforapoliticalcultureofintolerancewhichhasbecomethehallmarkofsuccessiveelectedaswellasnon-elected regimes. Ithasbrought in itswakenotonlycurbsoncivil libertiesandselective political accountability, but violence in the absence of a consensual and accommodationistpoliticalculture.’40Theprocessbegan immediatelyafter thecreationofPakistanwhenPrimeMinisterLiaquatAliKhanandotherMuslimLeagueleadersdenouncedpoliticaloppositionasanti-stateandevenIndian-inspired.Liaquatsaid,‘TheformationofnewpoliticalpartiesinoppositiontotheMuslimLeagueis against thebest interestofPakistan. If theMuslimLeague isnotmade strongandpowerful, and themushroomgrowthofpartiesisnotcheckedimmediately,IassureyouthatPakistan,whichwasachievedaftergreatsacrifice,willnotsurvive.’41

IdentifyingoppositiontotheMuslimLeaguewithoppositiontoPakistan,whichwasahangoverfromthePakistanmovement,wasadangeroustrend,startedrightattheinceptionofPakistan.Suchintolerancewould only grow at the expense of accepting dissent as a normal part of democracy.As noted in theIntroduction,thereisalonglistofpoliticalstalwartsofPakistanwhohavebeendeclaredas‘traitors’andperiodicallyjailedfortheirtakingupnationalistcauses.AnotherbigfailingoftheMuslimLeaguewasthatunliketheCongress,itfailedtotransformitselfinto

anationalpoliticalparty,whichcouldrule thenewlycreatedstate.42TheLeaguedidnotseemtohavedone anyhomeworkonhowPakistanwas to begoverned.Therewasno evidenceof anyplanningonissues that the new countrywould face; it did not indicate the outlines of the political and economicagenda to be followed after Pakistan had been created. The only references in Jinnah’s speeches thatcould be deemed economic were those pertaining to the economic plight of the Indian Muslims andeconomy in general. Therewere some references to asking a fewMuslim business houses to start anairline,ashippingcompanyandsomebanksthatanewcountrywouldneed,buttherewasnoroadmap.Infact,hisspeechattheinaugurationoftheStateBankofPakistanwasacritiqueofthe‘westerneconomicsystem’ forcreating ‘almost insolubleproblems forhumanity’andpledging to ‘present to theworldan

economicsystembasedonthetrueIslamicconceptofequalityofmanhoodandsocialjustice’.43

Thiswasalsoborneoutby thediaryof thatgovernorofBengal,RichardCasey,whonoted that theMuslim League had had only the most cursory examination and thought given to the consequences ofIndia’sdivision.‘Ibelievedthattheyreliedtooimplicitlyontheirleader,MrJinnah–andthat,apartfromwhatever thoughthemayhavegiven to the subject, I didnot believe that anyotherMuslimhad reallyappliedhimselftothestudyofthemanyproblemsinvolved.’44

India’s first high commissioner to Pakistan, Sri Prakasa, provided one telling example of how thisworked in practice. ‘As Law Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, Zafarullah Khan used topresideoverSelectCommitteesonvariousBills.OnceaftersuchameetingwhenweCongressmembershadproposedendlessamendmentsononeparticularbill,hesaidtome,“YouCongressmendostudyveryhard.”Isaid:“Wearehereforthat.”“But”,hewenton,“membersoftheMuslimLeaguedonotdoso.Theyarealsohereforthesamepurpose.”’45

ThestructuralweaknessoftheMuslimLeaguecoupledwithlackofpoliticalexperienceanditslackofa road map or vision of how Pakistan was to be run were to be a huge impediment in the futuredevelopmentofthecountry.ItseemedthattheleaderswerecontentjusttogetPakistanbut,havinggotit,werenotsurewhattodoaboutit.ThisexplainstheinabilityoftheConstituentAssemblytodecideonaconstitution till1956,and thedominating role that thebureaucraticelite rather thanpoliticianswere toplayintheformativeyearsofPakistan.Manycommentatorshavenotedthatfromconceptiontofruition,Pakistantookonlysevenyears.The

PakistanResolutionwasmoved in 1940 andPakistanwas created in 1947.Both Jinnah andhis sisterFatimaattestedtothis.On7August1947whenJinnaharrivedinKarachiandwaswalkingupthestepsofGovernmentHouse,hetoldhisNavalADCLtS.M.Ahsan,‘Doyouknow,IhadneverexpectedtoseePakistaninmylifetime.’46FatimaJinnahtooarticulatedsimilarsentimentswhenshetoldBourke-White:‘Weneverexpectedtoget itsosoon.Weneverexpectedtoget it inour lifetime.’47 Inadvertently,bothJinnah and Fatima Jinnah put their fingers on one of the key components of the legacy that Pakistaninherited. This was the fact that the leaders got Pakistan too easily. The titanic struggle for Indianindependence was between the Congress and the British. A key beneficiary of the struggle was theMuslim League. They never had to struggle against the British. They did not have to resort to massmobilization. Their battle was always with the Congress and they got a huge helping hand from theBritish.However, because Pakistanwas achieved so easily, leaders of Pakistan felt that they too could get

everythingeasilyandthatthingswouldfallintotheirlap.Theyjusthadtobedeterminedandperseveringlike Jinnah and use force appropriately. This has bred complacency about governance and, worse,inculcated an attitudeof not being responsible for their actions, and that, ultimately, otherswouldbailthemout.Additionally, it is often forgotten that there was no universal suffrage in pre-Partition India. It is

estimatedthatperhapsonly10to12percentofthetotalMuslimpopulationofIndiavotedinthe1946elections. Thus, Jinnah’s undoubted demonstration that theMuslimLeague represented IndianMuslimswas, in fact,premisedonaverynarrowbase. Inavery real sense, therefore,Pakistanwascreatedsoquicklyandwithoutamassbasethattherewasnopreparationforgoverning.

TheBritishmidwifingitsbirthwastohavealastingimpactonPakistan.ItwasBritishspoon-feedingthatmadetheMuslimLeaguetherepresentativebodyoftheMuslimsasaneffectivecountertotheCongressandmade Jinnah its sole spokesman.Without theactiveassistanceofBritain,noneof thiswouldhavehappened.Ateverystep itwas theBritishwhocleared thehurdlesforJinnah in theirquest tohaveanoppositiontotheCongressandtobeabletoshowtotheworldthatwhiletheywerewillingtorelinquishpower,disagreementamongtheIndiansmadeitimpossibletodoso.Two consequences have flowed from this British midwifing. One, the Muslim League remained

stymied as a political party. It depended uponBritish favours rather than developing roots among thepeople or even having an organization worth the name. Not surprisingly, when IskanderMirza askedJinnah, who had become governor general of Pakistan by then, to be ‘… considerate to the MuslimLeaguersas,afterall,theygaveusPakistan’,Jinnahretortedhaughtily:‘WhotoldyoutheMuslimLeaguegaveusPakistan?IbroughtPakistan–withmystenographer.48ThistraditionwastocontinueinPakistanandcontinueseventoday.The Muslim League today remains a party of notables in each district without a grass-roots

organization.It isonlyat thetimeofelectionsthatarudimentarypartyorganizationat thedistrict levelgetscreated.Moreover,thefactthattheMuslimLeaguehassplitintosomanyfactionsremindsoneofthefactthatitwastheBritishwhointervenedonseveraloccasionstoensureunityofthepartyunderJinnah.Withoutanexternalauthoritybackingoneleadertotally,thepartywouldhavecollapsedduringtherun-uptoPartition.OncetheBritishleft,therewasnoonetokeepthepartytogether,anditbrokeuprepeatedly.ThemostscathingattackontheMuslimLeaguewasbytheeditorofPakistanTimes,MazharAliKhan.

LessthantwoyearsafterthecreationofPakistan,inaneditorialinthePakistanTimestitled‘Sabotage’,hewrote:

Once upon a time, notmany years ago, theMuslim League was justly regarded as the solerepresentativeofIndia’stencroreMuslims.ButsincetheestablishmentofPakistan,thisgreatorganizationhassunksteadilyintothemire.ActivepublicsupportforMuslimLeaguepolicieshasdeclinedconsiderablyand its front-rank leadershipstandssharplydivided into twomaincategories–thoseinoffice,andthosetryingtogetintooffice.49

Two, itwas the strategic importance of the north-west of India forBritain thatmade them agree toPartition, when faced with the possibility that India under Nehru may plough a different furrow. Theimportanceof their strategic locationwasnot lost on thePakistan leadership right from thebeginning.Evenbefore its creation, Jinnahprojected the territorial importanceofPakistan to seekUSassistance.Thisdependenceonexternalelementshascontinuedunabated.AyubKhanwentsofaras toclaimsuchassistanceasPakistan’sright.Hewroteinanarticlethat‘…theEnglish-speakingworldoughttofeelaspecialresponsibilitytoassistPakistaninattainingareasonablepostureofadvancement.Itisnotjustaclaim.Itisinfactthedictateofhistory.’50Afterabitofhesitation,theUSwouldslipintotheroleoftheBritishanditistheywhohavesustainedPakistanforthepastsevendecades.Overthelongterm,asthisbookwouldshow,itispreciselythisgeographicallocationthatPakistanhastriedtoexploit,but,equally,itisthisstrategiclocationthathaswarpeditsdevelopment.

Finally, an important componentof the legacyof thePakistanmovementwas tiedup in thepersonaof

Jinnahhimself.Jinnah’sstaturewasunparalleledinPakistan.Pakistanoweditscreationtothisoneman.Whilefatewascertainlycruel toPakistaninremovingJinnahfromthescenesosoonafter itscreation,Jinnahcanbefaultedfornotbuildingupasecond-rungleadership.Histoweringpersonalityensuredthatapart from Liaquat Ali Khan, there were no leaders who could carry the baton forward. After theassassinationofLiaquatAliin1951,therewasadearthofpoliticalleaders.Notsurprisingly,therewerefour governors general and sevenprimeministers between1947 and1958, justwhenPakistanneededpoliticalstabilitythemost.Twocurious events involving Jinnah in the run-up to thePartitionwere tohavea lasting impacton

Pakistan.It isundisputedthatJinnahhadastrongfaithinconstitutionalismjustashedidnotbelieveinstreetpoliticsanddisagreedwithGandhiji’spolicyofcivildisobediencemovementstofighttheBritishrule.Yet,when it came to thecrunch, itwashewhogaveacall forDirectAction in1946 toachievePakistanthroughunconstitutionalmeansifnecessary,whichledtomasskillingsinCalcutta.OnelessonthatsuccessivegenerationsofPakistanleadersweretoimbibefromthiswasthatitwasonlyforcethatthe‘Hindus’wouldunderstand.OrasAyubKhanwastoputitsographically,‘AsageneralruleHindumorale would not stand more than a couple of blows delivered at the right time and place. Suchopportunitiesshould, therefore,besoughtandexploited’.51ManyPakistani leadershavelivedtoregretsuchafallacy.Second,NWFPremainedaproblemfortheMuslimLeague.Neitherelectionsnorthecommunalrioting

wasabletoshaketheCongressgovernmentinNWFP,orgivetheLeagueafoothold.LikeinthecaseoftheDirectActionDay,Jinnahputhisconstitutionalcoatasideandhatchedadangerousplotwithviolentimplications.ThisinvolvedhiscommissioningIskanderMirza,thenadeputycommissionerandlaterthegovernorgeneralofPakistan,inFebruary1947,toraiseatriballashkartobeusedinNWFPtorousethePathansinfavouroftheMuslimLeague.HetoldMirzathattheprospectsofgettingPakistandidnotlookgood.Hefelt thatMuslimangerhad tobeproperlydemonstrated,asotherwise theBritishwouldhandoverthecountrytotheCongress.Hedeclaredthat ifPakistancouldnotbewonthroughnegotiations, itwouldhavetobewonbythewilloftheMuslims.He,therefore,decidedthatifnegotiationsfailedbythemiddleofMay,theMuslimsmustmakeadramaticstatement.WhileMirzastartedpreparationsforthis,ultimately the demand for Pakistan was conceded and he was not called upon to implement Jinnah’splan.52 However, since IskanderMirza became defence secretary in 1947, his experience with triballashkarsmusthavecomeinhandyinorganizingtheraidersintoKashmirinOctober1947.BoththeseincidentsdonotdoJinnah’sreputationasaconstitutionalistalotofgood.Thereisalsothe

tantalizing possibility of Jinnah having second thoughts about what he had achieved. Two strands areworthnoting.First,whileattentionhasinvariablybeenfocusedon‘…youarefreetogotoyourtemples…’portion

ofhis11August1947speechtotheConstituentAssembly,thatspeechalsoincludedthefirstsignsofself-doubt.Thus,Jinnahsaid‘…anyideaofaunitedIndiacouldneverhaveworkedandinmyjudgementitwould have led us to terrific disaster.Maybe that view is correct,maybe it is not, that remains to beseen.’53AccordingtoWolpert,

…forthefirsttimeJinnahopenlychallengedhisownjudgement,wonderingaloudifitmightnot have been correct, sensing perhaps that the worst part of the dream – the true tragic

nightmare of Partition was about to begin, the hurricane waiting behind this ‘cyclonicrevolution’.Whata remarkable reversal itwas,as thoughhehadbeen transformedovernightonceagainintotheold‘AmbassadorofHindu-Muslimunity’.54

Bourke-White, who spent several days at Government House in Karachi trying to take pictures ofJinnahforLifemagazine,wasshockedatJinnah’sphysicalcondition.Shewroteinherbook:

Later,reflectingonwhatIhadseen,Idecidedthatthisdesperationwasduetocausesfardeeperthan anxiety over Pakistan’s territorial and economic difficulties. I think that the torturedappearanceofMrJinnahwasanindicationthat,inthesefinalmonthsofhislife,hewasaddinguphisownbalancesheet.Analytical,brilliantandnobigot,heknewwhathehaddone.LikeDoctorFaustus,hehadmadeabargainfromwhichhecouldneverbefree.Duringtheheatofthestrugglehehadbeenwillingtocallonallthedevilishforcesofsuperstition,andnowthathisnewnationhadbeenachievedthebigotswere in thepositionofauthority.Theleadersoforthodoxy and a few ‘old families’ had the finalword and, to perpetuate their power,wereseeingtoitthatthepeoplewereheldinthedeadeninggripofreligioussuperstition.55

Second,Jinnahdiedanexhaustedman,unabletoevengetafunctioningambulancetotakehimfromtheairportinKarachitohisresidence.AccordingtoM.J.Akbar,Jinnah’spersonalphysicianinhislastdays,ColIlahiBaksh,hasrecordedthatonceJinnah,onhisdeathbed,losthiscoolwhilespeakingtoLiaquatAli,whohadcometoseehim.JinnahdescribedPakistanas‘thebiggestblunderofmylife’.ThestorywasprintedinPeshawar’sFrontierPostinNovember1987andquotesJinnahassaying,‘IfnowIgetanopportunityIwillgotoDelhiandtellJawaharlaltoforgetaboutthefolliesofthepastandbecomefriendsagain.’56AccordingtoSarilaifColElahiBaksh,thedoctorwhoattendedonJinnahduringthelastphaseofhisillnessinAugust–September1948atZiaratnearQuetta,istobebelieved,heheardhispatientsay:‘Ihavemadeit[Pakistan]butIamconvincedthatIhavecommittedthegreatestblunderofmylife.’And,around the same period, Liaquat Ali Khan, upon emerging one day from the sick man’s room afterreceivingatongue-lashing,washeardtomurmur:‘Theoldmanhasnowdiscoveredhismistake.’57

Toconclude,thecumulativeeffectofthevariousstrandsofthelegacyofthePakistanmovementdeeplyimpactedthedevelopmentofPakistan.Thefourmostvitalfactorsweretheuseofreligionandcommunalrhetoric that Jinnahhad sanctionedprior to the1946electionsandwhatBourke-White thoughthauntedhimintheend;thefatalfailingoftheMuslimLeaguetobedependentontheBritishtoachievePakistan,rather thanbeing amass-basedpartywith aprogrammeandvision for the future; thevaguenessof thePakistanideaandtheobsessiveneedforparitywiththeCongressthatwastranslated,post-creation,intoseekingparitywithIndia.Once Pakistanwas created, neither could the religious genie be contained nor could the communal

frenzybekeptatbay;neithercouldtheweaknessesof theMuslimLeaguebekepthiddennorcouldthevaguenessofwhatPakistanmeantbesustained.SeekingparitywithIndia,especiallymilitaryparity,hasbeen perhaps the singlemost important factor that haswarped Pakistan’s development. Jinnah’s earlydemiseensuredthatconfusioncontinuedonwhetherPakistanwastobemodelledonhis11August1947speech tokeep religionout of politics orPakistanwouldbe an Islamic state asper theLeague’sown

statementsjustbeforePartition.Given these formidable issues, Pakistani leaders harked back to the last stages of the Pakistan

movementinwhichreligionhadprovidedthegluetoforgeMuslimunity.TheychosetodefineacommonPakistaninationalidentityinreligiousterms.Thefundamentalerrorwasthatwhilereligioncouldcreatetemporary unity, especially when faced with a supposed external threat, forging long-term unity ornationalidentitybysuppressingethnolinguisticidentitieswasfarmorechallenging.Evenafterthesell-bydate of religious unity as demonstrated in 1971, Pakistan has continued to harp on it with adverseconsequences.Thus,Pakistan,whichcameintoexistenceon14August1947,hadtocarryaheavyburdenforwhichit

haspaidandcontinuestopayanenormousprice.ThesuperstructureofPakistan,builtonsuchfoundationswas bound to be skewed, shaky and suspect. Over the decades, the weight of this legacy has grownheavier,beckoningittowardstheabyss.

T

II

TheBuildingBlocks

HISSECTIONlooksattheissuesofidentityandideologythatgototheheartoftheproblemsbeingfaced byPakistan. Into the seventh decade of its creation, there continues to be a debate over the

meaningof‘Pakistaniidentity’.ThiswasandremainsacriticalissuesincePakistanwasanewcountrycarvedoutof Indiaandprecisely for that reasonhad tobedistinct from India.Created in thenameofIslam,theemphasisonanIslamicidentitywasnatural.However,therulersweretofindthatIslamwasnotnearlyaseffectiveagluetokeepthecountrytogetherasitwasincreatingone.Various strategies have been tried to blend the several nationalities residing in Pakistan into one

overridingnational identity.Apart from religion, thesehave includedcentralization,useofUrduandavirulentanti-Indiaposture.Ofthese,religionandanti-Indiasentimentshavebeenthedominantnarratives,bothblendingintowhatcametobecalled‘Nazaria-i-Pakistan’orPakistaniideology.Thisterm,however,wasconspicuousby itsabsenceduring themovement tocreatePakistan itself.Thefatherof thenation,Jinnah,neverusedit,nordidhisimmediatesuccessors.Theconundrum that faced Jinnahandallhis successorswas that thegeographical area that came to

constitutePakistansharedonlyacommonreligionandlittleelse.Therewasnocommonhistory,culture,languageorethnicity.Infact,sinceIslamhadneverbeenindangerduetotheoverwhelmingmajorityofMuslimsintheseareas,Islamwasnot thesalient identityintheseprovinceslikeitwasintheMuslim-minorityprovincesofundividedIndia.Heretheimpulsesofethnolinguisticnationalismwerefarstrongerand have become evenmore so after the creation of Pakistan due to the policies of its rulers and thedominatingroleofitslargestprovince–Punjab.

3

AQuestionofIdentityandIdeology

TheworldmayliketocallusPakistanis,buttherearefewwithinthebordersofthiscountrythat identify themselves by that moniker. No, many of our citizens are ashamed to callthemselvesPakistaniandthatiswheretheproblemsofthisnationstartandend.Pakistanisadividednation to say the least.Wearedividedon ethnic, linguistic, political, religious,educationandprovinciallines.Wegathertogetherunderdifferentpoliticalflags.Weprayinmasjidsthatare100feetfromeachotherbecauseofslightdifferencesinthewaywepracticeIslam.1

FORPAKISTAN’Sleaders,definingaPakistaniidentitywasacriticalissuefortworeasons.First, thegeographical areas that came to constitute Pakistan had never before existed as a country. As SeligHarrisonnotesaptly:

There is no precedent in the history of South Asia for a state consisting of the five ethno-linguistic regions that made up Pakistan as originally constituted in 1947, or even for thetruncated Pakistan consisting of the four regions that remained after Bangladesh seceded in1971. The ideologues of Pakistani nationalism exalt the historical memory of [Mughalemperors]AkbarandAurangzebas thesymbolsofa lost Islamicgrandeur inSouthAsia.Bycontrast,fortheBaluchis,SindhisandPashtuns,theMoghulsarerememberedprimarilyasthesymbolsofpastoppression.2

Second,theidentityhadtobedifferentanddistinctfromIndiasincePakistanhadbeencarvedoutofIndiaandasanewcountrywithanunfamiliarnamehadtobeacknowledgedbytheworldassuch.Simplyput, Indiawas a historic entity, not always politically but certainly as a concept, while therewas noPakistanbefore1947.Thisneedfordistinctiveness led to theemphasisofan identity thatwasIslamic,taking its cue from the two-nation theory that was the philosophy behind Pakistan’s creation. In afundamentalsense,asAparnaPandenotes,creatingaPakistaniidentityamountedtoerasinganytracesof‘Indian-ness’within Pakistan, ‘Denying the “Indian-ness” of Pakistan’s identitymeant emphasizing the“Hinduness”ofIndiaandreinforcingthe“Islamic”natureofPakistan.’3

To complicatematters, the new state perceived itself to be the successor of theMuslim empires inIndia, especially the Mughals who had ruled India prior to the coming of the British. Unfortunately,PakistanileadershadtofacetheuncomfortablerealitythattheseMuslimempireswerecentredinIndia

whilePakistanhadbeenpushedtotheperipheryofthoseempires,toareasthatdidnothaveevenasharedhistory. The symbols of Islamic splendour like the Taj Mahal (Agra), Red Fort (Delhi), Char Minar(Hyderabad),wereinIndia,leavingthenewstatewithverylittletoshowfortheproclaimedgrandeurofitspast.Thismadethetaskofdevelopinganationalidentityevenmoredifficult.Reflecting thepreoccupationwith adefinition forPakistani identity, as late as2000, thenewspaper

Dawnstated:‘SinceitsinceptionPakistanhasfacedthemonumentaltasktospelloutanidentitydifferentfromtheIndianidentity.BornfromthedivisionoftheoldcivilizationofIndia,Pakistanhasstruggledforconstructingitsown,aculturewhichwillnotonlybedifferentfromtheIndianculturebutthatthewholeworldwouldacknowledge.’4

Fourinstrumentshavebeenusedtotryandforgeacommonidentity–religion,centralization,UrduandplayingupasupposedthreatfromIndia.(ThelastisdiscussedindetailinthechapteronIndia).Atitscreation,Pakistaninheritedfourprovincesinthewest(Balochistan,NWFP,PunjabandSindh),

andoneintheeast.EastPakistanwasthemosthomeogeneousprovince,ethnicallyandlinguistically.Inthewest,however, therewasconsiderableethnicandlinguisticdiversity.Moreover,eachprovincedidnotcontainasingleethnolinguisticgroup.Thus,BalochistanhadtheBaloch,butalsoasignificantnumberofPakhtuns in thenorth;NWFPhadPakhtunsbutalsosignificantnumbersofHindko-speakers;Punjab,dominated by the Punjabis, had a significant Seraiki population; Sindh hadSindhis but, post-Partition,sawamassiveinfluxofMohajirsfromIndiawhosettledintheurbanareas.ThechallengeforthenewstatewastoweldthesedisparateidentitiesintoonePakistaniidentity.The

countrywas foundedon the basis of the two-nation theory that claimed that theMuslimsof the Indiansubcontinent constituted a separate ‘nation’ which bore a distinct and potentially sovereign politicalidentityandthatreligioncouldbinddiverseethnolinguisticidentities.TheshapingofaPakistaniidentitythusbecamehingedonIslam.Prof.Waheed-uz-ZamangraphicallyenumeratedPakistan’sidentitydilemmainthesewords:

‘…thewishtoseethekingdomofGodestablishedinaMuslimterritorywasthemovingideabehindthedemandforPakistan.IfweletgotheideologyofIslam,wecannotholdtogetherasanationbyanyothermeans.IftheArabs,theTurks,ortheIraniansgiveupIslam,theArabsyetremainArabs,theTurksremainTurks,theIraniansremainIranians,butwhatdoweremainifwegiveupIslam?5

Arhetoricalanswerwasgivenin1980:‘IfwearenotMuslims,whatarewe?SecondrateIndians?’6

WhileanIslamic identitywasacontinuationof the two-nation theory, ithad theaddedadvantageofpotentiallypaperingoverthemultipleidentitiesofthegeographicalareathatbecamePakistan.AsLiaquatAlisaidafterthepassageoftheObjectivesResolution(seechapter7)‘…asPakistanwascreatedfortheMuslimstolivebyIslamicteachingsandtraditions,thestatewouldthereforedomorethanmerelyleavethemfreetoprofessandpracticetheirfaith.’7Ineffect,thestatewouldsuperimposeacommonreligiousidentityoverexistingmultipleidentities.Theforgingofauniquereligion-basedPakistaniidentity,however,wasproblematicbecauseithadto

beforgedinageographicalareathathadhistoricalstateswithsignificantlinguistic,culturalandethnicdiversitiesandwherepeopleinstinctivelythoughtofthemselvesasBengalis,Sindhis,Baloch,Pakhtuns,SeraikisratherthanasPakistanis.Asnotedabove,eventhegeographicalregionsinthewesthadnever

beforebeenstrungtogetherasonecountry.Additionally,theseprovinceswerenotevenintheforefrontofthePakistanmovement andhadno sharedhistory.Given theirMuslimmajorities, therewasnever anydanger to Islam. Yet, Pakistan largely ignored the diversity of its people and tried to superimpose acommon Islam-basedPakistani identity on the dominant ethnolinguistic identity. Thiswould eventuallycostthestatehalfitsterritory.Failuretoacknowledgeethnicdiversityintheelusivequestofanationalidentitywasachallengein1947.Itremainsachallengeevenafterseventyyears.Moreover,asMaulanaAbulKalamAzadsaidinaninterview,

It[Pakistan]isbeingdemandedinthenameofIslam…Divisionofterritoriesonthebasisofreligion is a contraption devised by Muslim League. They can pursue it as their politicalagenda,butitfindsnosanctioninIslamorQuran…Strictlyspeaking,MuslimsinIndiaarenotone community; they are divided amongmanywell-entrenched sects.You can unite them byarousing their anti-Hindu sentiment but you cannot unite them in the name of Islam.To themIslammeansundilutedloyaltytotheirownsect.8

Inasense,MaulanaAzadforesawthattheovertuseofIslamwouldultimatelyleadtosectarianismandstrife.Even otherwise, the concept of ‘qaum’ (nation) in the Quran is composite. The believers and the

unbelievers, according to theQuran, do not constitute separate qaums.Theybelong to one nation, onegrouponly.9

Infact,evenbeforethecreationofPakistan,thereweresignificantwarnings.Forexample,in1944,thepresidentoftheBengalMuslimLeague,AbdulMansurAhmed,declaredinhispresidentialaddress:

Religionandculturearenotthesamething.Religiontransgressesthegeographicalboundarybuttamaddum [culture] cannot go beyond the geographical boundary. … Here only lies thedifferencebetween‘Purba’[Eastern]PakistanandPakistan.ForthisreasonthepeopleofPurbaPakistan are a different nation from the people of the other provinces of India and from the‘religiousbrothers’ofPakistan.10

ThesepropheticwordsbecamearealitywiththecreationofBangladeshin1971.That apart, continuingwith the two-nation theory afterPakistan’s creationgeneratedproblemsof its

own.ItmeantthatPakistanwouldneeda‘Hindu’Indiaconstantlyasanessentialreferencepointforitsraisond’être.ThisensuredthatPakistancouldnotsucceedinevolvingaseparateandpositivenationalidentity.Itsnationalidentitywouldcontinuetobeanegative,anti-Indianarrative.11

Centralization of power began immediately after the creation of Pakistan.With Jinnah as governorgeneral,allpre-Partitiontalkofprovincialautonomywasgivenahastyburial.Thiscentralizingpolicyofthe Pakistani state was meant to forge a common identity by suppressing any provincial aspirations.Unfortunately forPakistan’s leaders, such attempts at centralization had the reverse effect andwere togiveencouragement toprovincialdiscontent.Forexample, theone-unit schemeadopted in1955wasacrudeeffortoftheWestPakistanelitetojoinalltheprovincesinWestPakistaninordertoneutralizetheelectoral influence of the Bengali majority in East Pakistan.While the Bengali majority could not beneutralized,thesmallerprovincesofWestPakistanchafedatbeingdeniedautonomy.Oneconsequenceof

centralizationwasthattherulingelitedidnotfeeltheneedtoevolveaconsensusovercrucialpoliticalandeconomicissueslikeprovincialautonomy,distributionofresources,etc.Policieswererammeddownthethroatsofthesmallerprovinces,whichonlyhadtheeffectofbringingoutingreaterreliefthemultipleidentitiesconstitutingPakistan.EthnicidentitieshavealsobeenreinforcedbythesimplefactthatafterthecreationofPakistanthefear

ofaHindumajority suppressingaminorityMuslimpopulationwas takenoutof theequation.MuslimswerefacedwiththeprospectofcompetingwithotherMuslimsforjobsandloavesofoffice,andnotwiththeHindus.Suchcompetitionwasonthebasisofquotas–oflanguageandethnicity.Thus,oncePakistanwascreated,anoverarchingIslamicidentitythathadbeenusefulagainstthe‘Hindu’wasnolongervalidinasituationwhereaMuslimhadtocompeteagainstanotherMuslim.

Urduwasmadethenationallanguagein1947eventhoughitwasthelanguageoftherefugeeswhocamefromIndia–Mohajirs–andnotanindigenouslanguageofeitherEastorWestPakistan.Moreover,itwasspoken by only 3.7 per cent of the population. Strict measures were undertaken to implement Urdu;Bengalilegislatorswerewarnedthatiftheyusedtheirownlanguage,theywouldbetriedfortreason.12

LiaquatAliKhantold theConstituentAssemblyinFebruary1948:‘It isnecessaryforanationtohaveonelanguageandthatlanguagecanonlybeUrduandnootherlanguage.’13

Jinnah compounded matters by echoing Liaquat when he stated (in English) on 21March 1948 inDacca, before an estimated crowd of 300,000 non-Urdu-speaking Bengalis: ‘The state language ofPakistanisgoingtobeUrduandnootherlanguage.’14HeaddedforgoodmeasurethatUrduembodiedthebest in Islamic culture andMuslim tradition, thus denigratingBengali and other regional languages asbeingsomethinglessthanIslamic.15Thenegativereactionofthecrowdwasloudandclear.Jinnah’s assertionwas indeed ironical since he himself did not knowUrdu and his speeches at the

annualsessionsoftheMuslimLeaguehadtobetranslatedintoUrdubyNawabBahadurYarJungfromHyderabad(Deccan),presidentoftheAll-IndiaStatesMuslimLeague.16

Moreover,priorto1947,Jinnahhadrecognizedtheimportanceoflanguageinformingthebasisofaseparateidentity.HehadarguedduringtheproceedingsofthethirdmeetingofthesubcommitteeonSindhin 1931 that ‘the social and linguistic differences between the inhabitants of Sindh and those ofPresidencyofBombayproperprovidedanimpressivecasetoseparateSindhfromBombay’.17

TheenforcementofUrduwastohavedisastrousconsequencesinEastPakistanandwastoprovetobethefirstnailinthecoffinofPakistan’sunity.Bengalinationalismtookshapeduringthelanguageriotsof1952. As Ian Talbot puts it, ‘Urdu has proved much less effective in promoting a national PakistaniidentitythanBengali,Sindhi,Pashto,SeraikiorBalochihavebeeninarticulatingethnicidentity.’18

Themootquestion iswhy,despite thepassageof almost sevendecades,Pakistanhasnotbeenable todevelop anoverarchingnational identity.There is no easy answer but the fact is that the alienationofdifferentethnicgroups,despitebeingMuslims,hasbeenapersistentphenomenoninPakistan.For,itwasnotIslamthatkeptthemunitedbuttheir linguistic,culturalandhistoricbonds.Islamcouldnotsupplant

thesebondsinthesamemannerthatitcouldintheMuslim-minorityprovincesofBritishIndia.Intheseprovinces,especiallyinnorthIndia,duetotheirminoritystatus,theIslamicidentitywasverysalient.InPakistan the elite thatwaspredominantly from theminorityprovinces sought to transplant such a

Muslim identity, post-Partition. It was to come a cropper precisely because in the Muslim-majorityprovincesIslamoranIslamicwayoflifewasnotthreatened.Addedtothisweretheexploitativepoliciesof Punjab (see the next chapter) that led to a Punjabi–non-Punjabi divide. Apart from PunjabmonopolizingtheresourcesofPakistan,thecentralizingpoliciesofthestatewereabetrayalofthemuch-promised provincial autonomy during the Pakistan movement. All this made forging an overarchingPakistaniidentityproblematic.AsPakistandeveloped,theprocessofIslamization,whichstressedareligious(non-territorial)rather

thanasecularnationalidentity,wastofurtherimpedetheideaofacommonidentity.Islamizationputthepeople inadilemmaconcerning their identity:whether theywere firstMuslimsand thenPakistanis,orfirstPakistani and thenMuslims.19 For example, a survey of 2,000 youngPakistanis in the 18–27 agegroup found that threequarters identified themselves first asMuslimsandonly secondlyasPakistanis.Just14percentdefinedthemselvesascitizensofPakistanfirst.‘Thisresultshouldbenosurprise,’writesPervezHoodbhoy.‘Pakistanischoolchildrenlearntochantinunison:Pakistankamatlabkya?Lailahailallah!(WhatisthemeaningofPakistan?ThereisnogodbutGod!)’20

The issue of sectarianism (discussed in chapter 7) distorted the possibility of religion providing anationalidentity.Islamizationhasensuredthatthestateitselfhasstartedinsistingonseeingallitscitizensthrough the prism of religious affiliation. For example, security clearance forms in many governmentorganizations, including the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Special Plans Division(SPD),requiretheapplicanttostatehissect,nameofmurshid(religiousmentor),nameofmosqueusuallyprayed in, as well as zat (tribal affiliation). But, as Hoodbhoy notes, ‘… as primal identities arereinforced, citizenship is proportionatelyweakened.’21 Such a process is nowbeing extended to someuniversities in Sindh where federal security agencies have begun to collect records of sectarianidentificationoftheteachingfaculty,studentsandstaff.22

Thus, the issueofa religion-basedPakistani identityhas takenahit fromtwosides.For thevariousethnicgroupsalreadypresentinthegeographicalregionthatbecamePakistan,areligiousidentitydidnothavethesamesalienceasforthoseintheMuslim-minorityprovincesofBritishIndia.Second,pushingtheIslamist agendawith its underpinnings of an ummahwithout state borders furtherweakened territorialnationalism.WhiletheissueofaPakistaniidentitywasgeneric,italsoposedseveralotherquestions.AsFarzana

Shaikhpointsout,sinceitsinceptionPakistanhasbeenconflictedbytwofundamentalquestions:whoisaPakistaniandwhoisaMuslim?TheformerwasthetensionbetweenthemigrantsfromIndiawhofelttheywere the ‘real’ Pakistanis because they had given up their all for the sake of Pakistan and the localpopulationthatfelttheywerethe‘sonsofthesoil’.IssuesarosewithregardtotheBengaliswhowerenotconsidered‘Muslim-enough’becauseoftheirclosenesstotheHindus,andtheirMuslim-nesswasjudgedtofallbelowthenecessarycredentialsrequiredtoqualifyasaPakistani.23AyubKhanremarkedseveraltimesthattheBengalisshouldbefreefromthe‘evilinfluence’oftheHinduculture.HeevenbannedtheplayingofTagoresongsonRadioPakistanbecauseTagorewasHinduandtherefore,anevilinfluence.24

One look at the turmoilwithin theMuttahidaQaumiMovement (MQM), the dominant ethnic political

party of Karachi, and the serious violence targeting Muslim minorities like the Shias shows that theanswerstothesequestionscontinuetorentPakistanasunder.TheissueofwhoisaMuslimisdiscussedfurtherinChapter7onIslamization.An equally fundamental issue is that even after seven decades since its creation, the meaning of

Pakistan remainscontested.Was itahomelandof theMuslimsof thesubcontinentorwas itan Islamicstate?ThedeliberateopaquenessofthemeaningofPakistanduringthePakistanmovement,thedeliberateuseofIslamicrhetorictogarnersupportinthe1945–46elections,Jinnah’scontradictorystatementshaveallledtothisconfusionaboutthemeaningofPakistan.TheconfusionhasbeenwellsummedupbyH.A.Rizvithatsixty-sevenyearsafteritscreation,

…its intellectuals, societal leadersandpoliticalactivistscontinue todebatePakistan’s stateidentity, especially its relationshipwith Islam;whether itwas created as ahomeland for theMuslims of British India or as an ideal Islamic state which would strictly implement theclassicalIslamicstateandlegalsystemandenforcethesocietalvaluesofthatperiodinletterandspirit.Alternatively,itwouldbeamodernconstitutionaldemocraticstatethatseeksethicalinspirationsfromtheteachingsandprinciplesofIslam.25

AninterestingdevelopmentintheidentitydebatehasbeenthegradualArabizationofthelinguafranca,Urdu.Bytryingtodenyitssubcontinentalroots,PakistanhastriedtolocatetheminthedesertsofArabiaand the arrival ofMuhammad binQasim in Sindh in ad 712.As a spin-off, there is now a linguisticstruggle that reflects the identity dilemma of Pakistan. The gradual Arabization is indicated by thereplacementsofsubcontinentalwordsbytheirArabcounterparts,likeRamzanbyRamadan,KhudahafizbyAllahhafiz,namazbySalatandevenPakistanbyAl-Bakistan.The one identity that Pakistan could have laid claims to was a homeland for the Muslims of the

subcontinent.This,however,wasputpaidtobynolessthanJinnahandLiaquatAli.InAugust1947,justbefore he left forKarachi, some reporters asked Jinnah as towhatmessage hewanted to give to theMuslimswhowouldremainbehind.JinnahsaidthattheyshouldbeloyalIndiancitizensandheexpectedthe Indian government to treat them fairly. IshtiaqAhmednotes that Jinnah’s line of argument had thuschanged fundamentally – it acknowledged that a Congress government (upper-caste-Hindu dominated)could treat Muslims fairly.26 This was a repudiation of the two-nation theory and of the Pakistanmovementitself.IfMuslimminoritiescouldlivesafelyina‘Hindu’area,wasthereanyjustificationforthecreationofPakistan?Jinnahneveransweredthisquestion.27

Then,thefirstprimeministerofPakistan,LiaquatAliKhan,himselfarefugeefromIndia,stoppedtheentryofMuslimsfromIndiafrom10October1947,exceptthosefromEastPunjab.In1950,theytoowerebanned, a ban that continues till today. This has seriously impacted the 300,000 ‘Bihari’Muslims inBangladesh who had migrated from India into the then East Pakistan in 1947. They live in pitiableconditions,shunnedinBangladeshforsidingwithWestPakistaninthe1971liberationwaranddesertedbyPakistan,whichhasrefusedtotakethemintoPakistan.28Thus,Jinnah’sstatementandLiaquat’sactionputpaidtoPakistandevelopingasahomelandoftheMuslimsfromthesubcontinent.

Thevivisectionof thecountrywith thecreationofBangladesh in1971wasa traumaticexperience forPakistan since it shattered thevery raisond’être for thecreationofPakistan.Themythof Islamas theunifyingidentityofPakistanwascrushed.Thebondofreligionhadprovedtobeaninadequateone.Yetthe failurewas rationalizedasa failureof a secularized Islam thatdidnotbridge sectarianandethnicdivisionswithinandbetween regions.29Under the circumstances, the argumentpropoundedwas that itwasmisusedbytherulingclassesandneverimplementedinitstruespirit.‘Islamhasbeenmisused…tojustify and sustain status quoism, impose authoritarianism or semi-authoritarian rule and even protectvested interests. This exploitation of Islam by the various regimes and the vested interests led to agrowingdisenchantmentwiththeideologyitself.’30Oflate,thishasbeenbuttressedbytheargumentthatitwas Indianmachinationsandaggression that led to the creationofBangladesh rather thanany inherentfaultwiththepoliciesofPakistan.SuchrationalizationsprobablyledPakistantoembarkonajourneyofIslamizationontheonehandandresorttothe‘IdeologyofPakistan’orNazaria-i-Pakistan,ontheother.Intherun-uptotheBangladeshcrisis,thetermIslamicideologywasreplacedbyanewterm‘Nazaria-

i-Pakistan’.ThiswasmeanttostrengthentheunityofthecountrysinceforEastPakistanreligionhadlessofanappealthanlanguage.ThenewtermplacedmoreemphasisonthecountrythanonIslam,butreligionremainedthebasisoftheideology.31

What is the ‘IdeologyofPakistan’orNazaria-i-Pakistan?There isnoauthenticdocumentorofficialstatementthatdefinesthiselusiveterm.Reducedtoitsessentials,theideologymeanstheuseofIslam,theavowalthatPakistancameintobeingtoenforceIslamicprinciplesoflifeasenshrinedintheshariaandtheprojectionofaPakistaniuniquenessasMuslimstocreateastateidentity.Thetwo-nationtheoryandhatred of the Hindu India are an intrinsic part of the ideology. The objective clearly is to create anideology that is acceptable toallPakistanisandbinds them inacommonnationalistnarrative. It is, infact,anothermanifestationofthequestforacoherentnationalidentitythathaseludedPakistansinceitsinception.However,clues to theopaquenessof theconceptaremany.Historically, Jinnahdidnotuse the term

‘Ideology of Pakistan’ either before or after the creation of Pakistan and nor did it form part of thePakistanmovement.Inhismonograph‘FromJinnahtoZia’,JusticeMuhammadMuniridentifiedthetimewhen the phrase was coined: ‘For fifteen years after the establishment of Pakistan, the Ideology ofPakistanwasnotknowntoanybodyuntilin1962asolitarymemberoftheJamaat-e-IslamiusedthewordsforthefirsttimewhenthePoliticalPartiesBillwasbeingdiscussed.Onthis,ChaudhryFazalElahi,[wholaterbecamePakistan’spresidentduringZ.A.Bhutto’sregime]rosefromhisseatandobjected that the“IdeologyofPakistan”shallhavetobedefined.Thememberwhohadproposedtheoriginalamendmentrepliedthatthe“IdeologyofPakistanwasIslam”.’32

GeneralZia-ul-Haq included the term in an order thatwasmade part of the 1973Constitution.Ziadeclaredthat‘Pakistan’sarmedforceswereresponsiblefornotonlysafeguardingthecountry’sterritorialintegritybutalsoitsideologicalbasis.’Elaboratingheadded,the‘preservationofthatIdeologyandtheIslamic character of the country was … as important as the security of the country’s geographicalboundaries’.33However,evenhefailedtodefinetheterm,leavingittotheideologuestodoso.After1971, the term reinforced the Islamizationof the stateand the two-nation theoryespeciallyby

those political forces that needed a prop to justify their politics, like the Jamaat-e-Islami and otherreligio-politicalpartieswhohadearlieropposed thecreationofPakistan.Currently, theconceptof the

Pakistan ideology has become the preserve of the Pakistan Ideology Coordination Council under thechairmanshipoftheinternationalterroristHafizSaeed.34

TheconceptoftheIdeologyofPakistansuffersfromseveralinfirmities.First,ifPakistanwasmeanttoenforceIslamicprinciples, itwas indeed ironic thatmostof theorthodoxIslamicscholars ledbynoneotherthanSyedAbulAlaMaududiofJamaat-e-IslamiopposedthecreationofPakistan.Second,JinnahwouldhaveshudderedattheverythoughtofenforcingorthodoxIslamiclaws.Asnotedearlier,forhimthe use of Islamwas a tactic to garner support, tomask the internal divisions among IndianMuslims,thoughthegenieheunleashedwastohavesevereconsequencesforPakistan.Third,thebreak-upofthecountryin1971andthecreationofBangladeshineffectburiedtheideaof

Islam providing a glue for holding the country together. Finally, as is becoming so apparent today,IslamizationofthecountryinthenameofNazaria-i-Pakistanhasunleashedtheforcesofsectarianism.ItisnolongerthatIslamistheraisond’êtreofPakistanbutthequestioniswhoseIslam?ItisnolongerevenSunniIslambutthevarioussectsunderSunniIslam–Barelvi,Deobandi,Ahl-e-Hadis.Inanutshell,thedivisionsamongtheMuslimsaretoodeeptoremainquiescentforlong.Religionalonecouldnotbetheglueneededfornationbuilding.Despitethis,variousstrataofsociety,includingthearmy,continuetostressontheIdeologyofPakistan

asacementingforce in theabsenceofanythingelse.Amazingly,eventhough,aspointedoutbyJusticeMunir,JinnahnevermentionedtheIdeologyofPakistan,thePakistanschoolcurriculumdocumentsinsistthatthestudentsbetaughttheIdeologyofPakistanasenunciatedbytheQuaid.Asamplefromcurriculumdocumentsshowshowthishasbeensanctifiedandturnedintoanarticleoffaith.Forexample,thePakistanStudiesCurriculumforClassesXI–XII,states:‘Thechaptershouldpresent

the Ideology of Pakistan as enunciated by Quaid-i-Azam and should include relevant documentedreferences.’Needlesstosay,notextbookhaseverbeenabletociteasinglereferencetoJinnahusingthetermIdeologyofPakistan.35

Likewise,theCurriculumDocument,PrimaryEducation,ClassesK–V,1995,states:‘TheIdeologyofPakistanbepresentedasanacceptedreality,andbeneversubjectedtodiscussionordispute.’36

TheSustainableDevelopmentPolicyInstitute(SDPI)notes:‘HatredagainstIndiaandtheHindushasbeenanessentialcomponentofIdeologyofPakistanbecauseforitsproponents,theexistenceofPakistanwas defined only in relation to Hindus, and hence the Hindus had to be painted as negatively aspossible…’AninterestingpointmadebytheSDPIisthatpre-‘IdeologyofPakistan’(beforethe1970s)textbooks

inPakistandidnotcontain thishatred,despite thePartition riots.Forexample, theearlyhistorybookscontainedchaptersontheHindumythologiesofRamayanaandMahabharataaswellasgreatHinduandBuddhistkingdomsof theMauryas and theGuptas.Even in the somewhatbiasedhistoryofpoliticsofindependence, the creation of Pakistan was attributed to the intransigence of the Congress and itsleadership rather than on ‘Hindu machinations’. Some books also clearly mentioned that the mostprominentIslamicreligiousleaderswereallbitterlyopposedtothecreationofPakistan.Whiletheprintandelectronicmediaoftenindulgedinanti-Hindupropaganda,theeducationalmaterialwasbyandlargefreeofbiasagainstHindus.37

It was after the so-called Ideology of Pakistan came to be stressed in the 1970s that created anideologicalstraitjacketinwhichhistoryofPakistan,especiallythatofthePakistanmovement,cametobe

rewritten.Fourthemescametodominatethecurricula:PakistanwascreatedtoestablishatrulyIslamicstate in accordancewith the tenets of theQuran and Sunnah; the ulemawho had bitterly opposed thecreationofPakistanwereconvertedintoheroesofthePakistanmovement;Jinnahwasrepresentedasapious practisingMuslim; and hatred and denigration was created for Hindus. A few examples of theexpressionofthishateinsomecurriculumdocumentsandtextbooksaregivenbelow.38

Curriculumdocuments(PrimaryEducation,ClassesK–V1995)definedthefollowingasthespecificlearningobjectives:Tomakethechild‘understandtheHinduandMuslimdifferencesandtheresultantneed for Pakistan’ (emphasis added).39 The textbooks then respond in the following way to thecurriculum instructions: ‘Hindu has always been an enemy of Islam; … but Hindus very cunninglysucceeded in making the British believe that the Muslims were solely responsible for the [1857]rebellion.After1965war, Indiaconspiredwith theHindusofBengalandsucceeded inspreadinghateamongtheBengalisaboutWestPakistanandfinallyattackedEastPakistaninDecember’71,thuscausingthebreakupofEastandWestPakistan.’40

A more recent report titled ‘Teaching Intolerance in Pakistan: Religious Bias in Public SchoolTextbooks 2016’, commissioned by theUnited StatesCommission on InternationalReligious FreedomfoundthatthecontentofPakistanipublicschooltextbooksrelatedtonon-Islamicfaithsandnon-Muslimscontinuedtoteachbias,distrustandinferiority.Moreover,thetextbooksportrayednon-MuslimcitizensofPakistan as sympathetic towards its perceived enemies:PakistaniChristians aswesterners or equal toBritish colonial oppressors, and Pakistani Hindus as Indians, the arch enemy of Pakistan. Theseperceptions predispose students early on that the non-MuslimpopulationofPakistan are outsiders andunpatriotic.41

Foritspart,thearmytoochippedinmajorlywithexpressionslikethe‘ideologyofPakistan’andthe‘gloryofIslam’beingusedfrequentlybythemilitaryhighcommand.AyubKhankick-startedtheprocessbystatingon12April1959:‘Manasananimalismovedbybasicinstinctsforpreservationoflifeandcontinuanceofrace…Hisgreatestyearningisforanideologyforwhichheshouldbeabletolaydownhislife…SuchanideologywithusisobviouslyIslam.Itwasonthatbasis thatwefoughtforandgotPakistan…’42 Successive army chiefs have followed suit. For example, former army chief GeneralKayanistatedon14August2011:‘ThebasisofourexistenceistheideologyofPakistan’;andon1May2012,‘WewouldbesuccessfulwhenwehaveastrongbeliefintheideologyofPakistan.Anydoubtaboutthisideologywouldweakenthecountry.’43In2013hestated:‘WeasanationwouldonlysucceedifweremaincommittedtotheIslamicIdeologyofPakistan.’44

Toconclude,Pakistanhasbeenonanelusiveandunsuccessfulquest foranational identitysince itscreation.Beinganewstatecarvedout fromIndia,establishinganational identity,distinct from thatofIndia,wasanurgentpriority.Pakistan’sinabilitytodevelopanidentitywasbecauseofbeingstuckinatimeandspacewarp.ItcouldnotresolvethecontradictionbetweendenyinganyIndiannessinitsidentityandfailuretolookbeyondIndiabyclingingtothetwo-nationtheory.From the outset, the people of Pakistan have had difficulty subsuming their ethnic and linguistic

identities into a singlenationalnarrative,primarilybecause thedemand forPakistanwas lukewarm intheseareasandIslamwasnotthesalientidentity.CoupledwithsuccessivedosesofIslamizationthathasinjectedthepoisonofsectarianism,thebindingforceofIslamitselfhasdiminished,makingitunabletoprovide an overarching identity.As Jafferlot notes, ‘This development ismore challenging than ethnic

separatist movements because it takes place in the heartland of Pakistan – the Punjab and KhyberPakhtunkhwa(KPK)–andamount toakindofethnicizationofIslam…IfIslamdoesnotformavalidreference, on what basis can the ideology of Pakistan establish itself? How can Pakistan articulate anationalistidentityandhowmuchcanthisideologyborrowfromIslam?’45

Resultantly,Pakistanhasresortedtothetime-testedtacticofraisingthethreatfromIndiaasacementtobind themultiple identities of Pakistan. In fact, as has been aptly noted, Pakistan’s nation-ness is notbecauseof the lovefor itselfbutonaccountof itshatredofothers,especiallyIndia.46Thus,evenaftersevendecades,Pakistaniidentitycontinuestobedefinednegativelyasanti-Indian.Whilethiscanhardlybethebasisofasustainablenationalidentity,ithasimplicationsforIndo-Pakrelations.Infact,assoonasIndiabecamethenegativereferencepointfordefiningPakistaninationalism,therewasnowayPakistancould develop a new identity for itself, or developnormal relationswith India.That is the continuingtragedyofPakistan.

4

TheProvincialDilemma

WecansurvivewithoutPakistan.WecanremainwithoutPakistan.WecanprosperoutsidePakistan.ButthequestioniswhatPakistanwouldbewithoutus…IfPakistanwantstotreatusasasovereignpeoplewearereadytoextendthehandoffriendshipandcooperation.IfPakistandoesnotagreetodoso,flyinginthefaceofdemocraticprinciples,suchanattitudewillbetotallyunacceptabletous,andifweareforcedtoacceptthisfatetheneveryBalochsonwillsacrificehislifeindefenceofhisnationalfreedom.1

—GhausBuxBizenjo

JINNAH’SARGUMENTthatHindusandMuslimsconstitutedtwonationswasbasedat leastpartlyontheconcentrationofMuslims in thenorth-eastandnorth-westof India,parts thateventuallyconstitutedPakistan.ThedilemmawasthatPakistanwascreatedbyputtingtogethergeographicalprovinceswhichsharedacommonreligionbuthadneverbeforesharedacommonhistory,culture,languageorethnicity.All of them had a strong attachment to their traditions andwere resentful of any central control. Notsurprisingly,while theBengalismanagedtogetaway,elementsof theBaloch,PakhtunandSindhihavebeen struggling to free themselves from the grip of Punjab. After East Pakistan broke away to formBangladesh,thefearofsecessionbyotherprovinceshascometohauntPakistan’srulers.

Balochistanhasbeenrackedby intermittent insurgenciessince1948,with the lastonecontinuingsince2005. The reasons for it have as much to do with its strategic location and demography as with thehistorical context of its accession to Pakistan, and policies of successive federal governments. ThestrategiclocationofBalochistanduetoitscoastline,nearnesstotheStraitsofHormuzandabuttingIranandAfghanistancontrastswithitsskewedlandtopopulationratio.ThelargestprovinceinPakistanwith43percentofthelandarea,ithasapopulationofonly7percentofthetotal,halfofwhichisPakhtun.The scanty population has been an open invitation for ‘settlers’ raising fears of the Baloch beingconvertedintoaminorityinBalochistan.ThehistoricalcontextofBalochistan’saccessiontoPakistanisassalientasitsstrategiclocationand

demography.ThestatusoftheprincelystateofKalat(asBalochistanwasthencalled)wasdifferentfromotherprincelystatesofIndiainthattheBritish,bythetreatyof1876,hadrecognizedtheindependenceofKalat. Thus, Kalat in 1947 was not really obliged to join either India or Pakistan as were the otherprincelystatesinBritishIndia.ItisanironyofhistorythatJinnahwasthelawyeroftheKhanofKalatwhoarguedthecaseforKalat’sindependencebeforetheCabinetMissionin1946.InAugust1947,just

beforethecreationofPakistan,JinnahevenacknowledgedthisinanagreementwiththeKhanofKalatasaresultofwhichtheKhandeclaredKalattobeanindependentstate.However,byFebruary1948,JinnahwasurgingtheKhantoaccedetoPakistan.Whenheresisted,thePakistanArmymarchedintoKalatandforcedtheKhantosigntheinstrumentofaccession.2

The roots of Baloch separatism lie in the forced manner of the accession of the state of Kalat toPakistanandthetreatmentmetedouttoBalochnationaliststhereafter.Dishonouringsolemnpledgesmadeon theQuranof safepassage toBaloch leaders likeAbdulKarimandNaurozKhan (whohad risen inrebellion in 1948 and 1958 respectively) and executing their family members, have added to thegrievancesoftheBalochandtheirdistrustofthePakistanistate.TheBalochhavebeenfurtherestrangedbythepoliciesfollowedbysuccessivePakistanirulers,and

thehandlingoftheprovince.Thecauses,theissues,thedemandsandthegoalofthecurrentinsurgencythat began in 2005 continue to be the same as the insurgencies in 1948, 1958, 1962 and 1973–77 –independence.What isdifferent is the scaleof theviolence, thegeographical spreadof the insurgencyand, most important, the participation of ordinary middle class Baloch in it who are seeking anindependentanddemocraticBalochistanratherthananindependentBalochistandominatedbythesardars.The government, especially themilitary, however, continues to see the insurgency as being led and

instigatedbyafewtribalsardarsforthesakeoftheirvestedinterestsandpersonalfiefdoms.Thearmytypicallyislookingforamilitarysolutionbyusingbruteforcecoupledwithamediablackout.Apartfrom‘operations’, theyhave adopted the strategyknownas ‘kill anddump’–pickingup suspectswho then‘disappear’ and their dead bodies are found dumped. Amnesty International’s report ‘Denying theUndeniable’in2008exposedthetragicrealityofwhatwashappeninginBalochistan.3

ThedevelopmentofGwadarportprovidestheclassicexampleoftheinsensitivityandarroganceofthefederalgovernment thathas led to thealienationof theordinaryBaloch.Gwadar is the lynchpinof theChina–PakistanEconomicCorridor(CPEC),butfortheBalochitisthesymbolofhowwronglytheyhavebeentreated:theyhavenotbeenconsultedabouttheproject;theyarenotthebeneficiariesoftheproject,whichwill adverselyalterBalochistan’sdemographydue to the influxofnon-Baloch to takeupprimejobs.Inshort,theBalochfeelthreatenedbytheproject.Balochfearswereconfirmedbyadvertisementsin the national and even internationalmedia inviting investment intoGwadar city,whichwas initiallyvisualized for 2.5 million people but later raised to five million. Given that the entire population ofBalochistan isonly6–7million,Balochapprehensionsofbeingconverted intoaminority in theirownhomelandandtheiridentitybeingwipedoutareclearlyjustified.TheBalochinsurgencythathassustaineditselfforthelastelevenyearsis,eveninitscurrentlow-key

phase,likelytocontinuetobeabigthorninthesideofthePakistanArmy.

IhavebeenaPakhtunforthousandsofyears,aMuslimfor1,300yearsandaPakistaniforjustoverforty.

—WaliKhan4

TherootsofthePakistanmovementwereextremelyweakintheNWFPpartlyduetothestrongPakhtunconsciousness, institutional weakness of the Muslim League in the province and the presence of the

Khudai Khidmatgars led by the larger-than-life Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, popularly called ‘SarhadiGandhi’ (FrontierGandhi). Hewas a Pakhtun nationalist, strongly anti-colonialist and a Congressmanopposed to thecreationofPakistan.TheLeaguehadnopresence in theprovince in the1937electionswhentheCongressformedthegovernmentunderDrKhanSahib,GhaffarKhan’sbrother.Likeelsewhere,theCongressgovernment resigned in thewakeof theWWII.ViceroyLordLinlithgow,askedGovernorCunninghamtohelpJinnahinstalaMuslimLeagueministry.ThisthegovernordidbymakingaMuslimLeagueleader,AurangzebKhan,aschiefministerthoughhedidnotlastlong.5ThiswasataskthatonlytheBritishcouldhaveaccomplishedsincenotasingleLeaguerhadbeenelectedinthe1937elections.Even in the crucial 1946 electionswhen theBritish rallied themaulanas and the pirs in favour of theMuslimLeague,theCongresswonandformedthegovernmentagain.6

Unliketheotherprovincesthatvotedonthepartitionplan,theBritishdevisedaspecialprocedureofholdingareferendumforNWFP,bypassingtheelectedassembly,todeterminethewishesofthepeople.ThiswasdonetoensurethataCongressmajorityassemblydidnotvoteforaccessiontoIndia.AsearlyasMarch1946,Cripps,asamemberoftheCabinetMission,hadsaidinasecretmemorandum‘…themajorityinthelegislature(ofNWFP)isagainstPakistanbutasthepopulationispredominantlyMuslim;ifthereistobeaPakistan,itmustfallwithintheMuslimratherthantheHinduarea.’7

Ghaffar Khan and his brother Dr Khan Sahib first opposed the referendum and when it becameinevitable, asked for the third option of Pakhtunistan. When this was refused, they boycotted thereferendum. Even so, theMuslimLeague and theBritishmobilized their entire strength to ensure thatpeoplevotedforPakistan,usingtheIslamiccardliberallyanddangerously.Theresultswereaforegoneconclusion.JinnahdismissedDrKhanSahib’sministrywithinaweekofPakistan’screationandbannedtheKhudai

Khidmatgars. Even though the Khan brothers swore allegiance to Pakistan, Jinnah, as Farzana Sheikhnotes,couldnotacceptaseparatePakhtunidentitythatwouldhavevitiatedhiswholeargumentthattherewereonlytwonations–HindusandMuslimsandonlytwolegitimatesuccessorstotheBritishinIndia–CongressandMuslimLeague.8ThecallforPakhtunistanwastosowtheseedsofdoubtinthePakistanestablishmentabouttheloyaltyoftheKhanbrothersandoftheirprogenytowardsPakistan,fordecades.The issue itself was seen as the most potent internal threat to the existence of Pakistan. It was alsobecauseofsuchsuspicionsthatittookPakistanoversixdecadestochangethenameofNWFPtoKhyberPakhtunkhwa (KPK) and that too by adding the name Khyber to distinguish it from the Pakhtuns ofAfghanistan.ThelegacyofthePakhtunistanmovementlingersandthekeyissueeventodayisofidentity–whether

thePakhtunidentityisnationalistorreligious.Thethirty-fiveyearsofwarinAfghanistanwithPakistanplayingtheroleofafront-linestatehashadonepivotalimpactinKPK,aboveallelse.ThishasbeentostressthereligiouscontentofthePakhtunidentity.WhilesuchanidentitywaseggedonbytheUSforthetacticalpurposeofdefeatingtheSovietsinthe1980s,forPakistanithadasaliencethatwasmorethantactical.ForPakistan,preservationoftheDurandLine(seeChapter15onAfghanistan),underplayingthenationalistelement in thePakhtun identityand the intermittentsupport the ideaofPakhtunistangot fromseveral leaders inAfghanistanhavebeenanexistentialproblemsince1947.Hence,Pakistanwillinglyandenthusiastically jumpedon thebandwagonofpainting theconflict inAfghanistan in religious termsandstressingthereligiouscontentofPakhtunidentity.ButPakistanwasplayingwithfireindoingso.As

WaliKhanput it in the late1970s,‘Thisfireyouhavelit inAfghanistanwillonedaycross theAttockBridgeandburnPakistan.’9GiventheviolenceunleashedbytheTehrik-i-TalibanPakistan(TTP),WaliKhan’swordshaveprovedprophetic.Forawhile,thisfirewasmaskedwiththeTalibancontrolofAfghanistan,andPakistanwasassured

that the issueof theDurandLinewouldnotberaised.ThemistakethatPakistanmadewasin turningablindeyetothesteadygrowthoftheal-QaedainAfghanistantogetherwithterroristsfromothercountrieswhosoughtshelterthereaftertheSovietjihad,andtowhomtheTalibanplayedhosts.ThesecondmistakePakistanmadewasnottorecognizethatthetraditionalstructuresofthePakhtunsocietyhadbrokendown.TheTaliban filled the vacuumandwere able to get rid of the last vestiges of the old structures – themaliks–andestablishtheirownversionofasharia-basedsystem.Intheprocess,itwasthePakhtunsandtheirculturethatsufferedthemost.Today,whilethenationalistthreathasdiminished,thebirthoftheTTPhasbecomeaseriousmenace

(seeChapter9onterrorism).TherealdangertoPakistan,ofcourse,wouldbeiftheTTPweretotakeonthenationalistmantle.Forthistohappen,theywouldhavetotonedowntheIslamicagendaofimposingsharia in Pakistan and restrict themselves to Pakhtun nationalism. For the present this seems a remotepossibilitysincetheTTPischallengingthePakistanistatelargelyinreligiousterms,i.e.,tooverthrowthecurrentsystemandreplaceitwiththeirversionofsharia.However,justasPakhtunnationalisminPakistanhasovertheyearsmutatedintoareligiousform,the

ideaofIslamismcombiningwithPakhtunnationalismcouldwellbetakentoanewlevelwiththeriseandspreadoftheTTP.WhileatpresenttheTalibanhavesubsumedethnicnationalismunderreligiousfervour,there is no denying that they are a predominantly Pakhtun force with a strong sense of Pakhtun tribalnationalism. It is this, asmuch as religion, thatmotivated the armed resistance against the US/NATOforces inAfghanistan.Thus,asJ.Pariscautions, ‘explicitTalibanappeals toPashtun identity,either inPakistan,oracrosstheborderinAfghanistan’wouldbeworthwatchingoutfor.10

While it would therefore be comforting for the Pakistani state to have blunted the edge of Pakhtunnationalism,thejuryisstilloutonthefinalshapeofpoliticsinKPK–Islamist,nationalistorwhetherthePakhtunswouldforsakebothethnicnationalismandreligiousradicalisminfavourofa largerPakistaniidentity.AlotwoulddependonhowPakistanplaysitscardsintacklingtheIslamistinsurgencybothinPakistanandinAfghanistan.AvictoryoftheTalibaninAfghanistanmaynotbetheprizethatPakistanhasbeenlookingforallthesedecades.

Punjab lost its identity inorder togaina largerPakistani identity, it began toperceive itselfaloneasPakistan,whileothersstartedcallingPakistanthegreaterPunjab.11

The above statement of Hanif Ramay, a former chief minister of Punjab and Speaker of the PunjabAssembly, succinctly sumsupPunjab’sdilemma– todistinguishbetweenaPunjabiprovincial identityand a Pakistani identity, so interwoven have they become. Not surprisingly, it is Punjabi nationalism,Punjabi ideasandconcepts thathavecome todefinePakistaninationalism, ideasandconcepts.Punjabwas the essential element in Jinnah’sdemand forPakistan. It formed theheartlandof a futurePakistanstate–Jinnahcalleditthe‘cornerstone’ofPakistan.12EventhePunjabMuslimLeaguehaddeclared:‘It

hasbeensaidoftenenoughthatwearetheheart,thebrainandtheswordarmofPakistan…Withoutourdecisive and critical struggle, Pakistan would not have been realized.’13 As the most populous anddominant ethnic group in Pakistan, Punjab does not have an ethnic problem itself but all the otherprovinceshaveaproblemwithit.AsTalbotputsit:‘ThePunjabcanbeseenbothasthecornerstoneofthecountryandasamajorhindrance tonational integrationbecauseof theuseofPunjabimilitaryandparamilitaryforcesduringcivilunrestinBalochistanandSindh.’14

ThoughJinnahwasinfuriatedwhenPunjabhadtobepartitioned,callingtheresidualPakistan‘moth-eaten’, yet the history of theMuslim League in pre-Partition Punjab was dismal. NoMuslim LeaguegovernmentheldofficeinPunjabuntilPartition.ThiswasthelegacyoftheMuslimLeagueinaprovincethatwasconsideredsovitalthatPakistanwouldnotbecompletewithoutit.Post-Partition,PunjabfounditselfdominatingPakistandueitsstrongpresenceinthebureaucracyand,

especially, the army. Punjab’s domination of the army has continued apace and with the army rulingPakistan,directlyorindirectly,PunjabcontinuestodominateallaspectsofPakistan.Itwouldhavedonesoinanycasegiventhatpost-1971itconstituted56percentofthepopulation.IntheNationalAssembly,Punjabwith148seatsoutof272generalseatsandthirty-fiveoutofsixtyseatsreservedforwomenhasmoreseatsthanalltheprovincescombined.15ThusapurelyPunjab-basedpartywith171seatscanformthe government in Pakistan without needing representatives from the other provinces. In the 2013elections,NawazSharif’sPakistanMuslimLeague-Nawaz (PML-N)had163 seats fromPunjabalone,justeightshortofamajority.NowonderthatPunjabrulestheroostandneednotcareforthedevelopmentneedsoftheotherprovinces.Punjab’sdominationofthearmyandthearmy’sdominationofPakistanhasbeentheicingonthecake.Ofcourse,notallofPunjabspeaksPunjabi.SouthPunjabspeaksSeraiki,awell-developedlanguage

in itself. In the 1981 census, Seraikiwas counted as a separate language for the first time and itwasdeterminedthat9.8percentofPakistan’sand14.9percentofPunjab’shouseholdsspokeit.Asaresult,Punjabis,forthefirsttime,wereshowntobelessthanthemajorityofthethenPakistan’spopulation(48.2per cent). This boosted the demand for a Seraiki province consisting of either the erstwhile state ofBahawalpur or a larger province consisting of south Punjab. While the Seraiki issue is not one ofsecessionbutforthecreationofaseparateprovince,thereasonwhyitassumesimportanceisthefactthatthegreatestamountofradicalizationandsectarianisminPunjabisconcentratedinthisarea.AyeshaSiddiqa has argued that ‘radicalization is a greater issue inPunjab thanmilitancy primarily

becausemilitants tend to groom people for battles outside the country or the province. Thus, there isviolenceintheprovincebutthosefiguresarenotcommensuratewiththeactualamountofradicalizationthattakesplaceinPunjab.’InPunjab,itisnowdifficulttofindacityorareathathasnotbeentouchedbysomeformof radicalism,be it latentoractive.While theDeobandimadrasasarehighest innumber inPunjab,withinPunjab,thehighestnumbercanbefoundinsouthPunjab.16

In fact, Punjab, especially south Punjab, has been the site of sectarian violence since the 1980sbetweentheDeobandiAnjumanSipha-i-Sahaba(ASS)andtheShiaSipha-i-MohammadiPakistan(SMP).The Shia–Sunni conflict in Punjab is actually a Deobandi–Shia tussle. Not surprisingly, of Pakistan’s1,764mostwanted persons, 729 hail from southernPunjab.Over fifty-seven banned organizations arespreadoutinsouthernPunjab,severalamongwhomhaveevincedadesiretohoisttheISIS(IslamicStateofIraqandSyria)flaginPakistan.17Punjab, infact,hasbecometheideologicalcentreandrecruitment

groundforterroristorganizations,attimesoperatingoutofmosquesandmadrasas.Thelasttwelvemonthshaveseensomede-escalationinterroristandsectarianattacksinsouthPunjab

largely due to the targeting of the sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and violence shifting elsewhere,mainly to the northern cities, in the province. This is borne out by the fact that the ‘footprints’ of theterroristsintheprovincehavefrequentlyledbacktothesoutherndistricts.Notsurprisingly,therefore,thepolice claimed to have arrested 140 suspects from south Punjab just days after a suicide bomberassassinatedprovincialhomeministerShujaKhanzadaalongwithseveralothersathiselectionofficeinAttockinmid-August2015.18EvenoneofthetwoCaliforniashootingsuspects,TafsheenMalik,hadlinkswithsouthPunjab.ArecentexampleofthedisturbingsituationisthatinthefirstphaseoflocalbodypollsheldinPunjab

on31October2015intwelvedistricts,over500candidatesoutofthe2,000fieldedbythebannedoutfitshavemade theirway into Punjab’s local governance system.Asmany as thirty of them have grabbedchairmenslotsindifferentUnionCouncils(UCs).Resthavebeenelectedasgeneralmembers.19

Compounding the problem of south Punjab has been the discriminatory development policies beingfollowedbythePunjabgovernment.AccordingtoProf.NukhbahTajLangah,president,PakistanSeraikiParty, such discriminatory policies was resulting in unemployment and illiteracy in the region andconsequentattractionofthemadrasaandjihadiculture.Shewarnedthatitwouldbeimpossibletoconfinethe extremist tendencieswithinone specific regionas itmay spreadand impact the entirePunjaband,eventually,therestofthecountry.20

SuchdiscriminatorypolicieswereconfirmedbytheoutgoingheadoftheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)inPakistanwhotoldaseminarheldinIslamabadon10August2016:‘Investment(ofpublicfunds)inLahore,themostdevelopeddistrictofPunjab,issixtimesmorethantheallocationsoftheSeraikibeltoftheprovince.’ThisaccordingtohimwasincreasingtheinequalitybetweentherichandpoorregionsofPakistan.Heunderlinedthattheconcentrationofpublicspendingwaspoliticallydriven,implying that by depriving the Seraiki belt of funds, the state was deliberately keeping the regionunderdeveloped.AkmalHussain,arenownedeconomistandsocialactivist,revealedthatasmuchas80to85percentoftotalphysicalexpendituresoftheprovincewasincurredinLahore.21

TheproblemhasbeenaggravatedbythefactthatthePML-NgovernmentinPunjab,headedbyPrimeMinisterNawazSharif’sbrother,ShahbazSharif,isnotreadytoadmitthatthatthereisaprobleminsouthPunjabandotherdistricts.Thisisdespitenumerousreportsthat thebreedinggroundsofall theleadingsectarianorganizationsisinPunjab.ThereasonforthismyopicattitudeisbelievedtobethatthePML-Nhas used its rapport with the terrorist groups in Punjab to broaden its electoral support. Hence, it isreluctant to take the kind of hard steps taken in other parts of the country, like Karachi, to eliminateterroristsandgetridoforganizationsthatpromotesectarianandterroristviolence.Mostobservers,andeven politicians, are convinced that a Rangers operation is required in south Punjab too because thepoliceandthecounter-terrorismdepartmentdonothavethecapabilitytodealwithhard-coreterroristsinthisregion.OnseveraloccasionsthearmychiefandtheprovincialapexcommitteeshaveaskedNawazSharifand

thePunjabchiefministerShahbazShariftodeployRangersinPunjab,especiallysouthPunjab.However,neithertheprovincialnorthefederalgovernmenthaspaidheedtosuchrecommendations,raisingdoubtsabout their sincerity to move against terrorist outfits in Punjab.22 Thus far, apart from allowing such

organizations to fester, the impression has been reinforced that Punjab is different from other parts ofPakistanwheretheNationalActionPlan(NAP)toeliminateterroristsisbeingimplemented.AllofthishasraisedseriousquestionsoverPunjabgovernment’ssinceritytoactagainstterroristoutfits.However,afterthesuicideattackonEasterSundayinLahoreon27March2016,inwhichseventy-odd

peoplewerekilled,therehasbeenachange.Despitethegovernment’sambivalence,thearmyonitsownhas launcheda crackdownon terrorist elements acrossPunjabunder thebroadobjectivesof theNAP.ThisactionofthearmyhasraisedtheleveloftensionswiththecivilgovernmentwhoapprehendthattheirelectoralbaseinPunjabcouldgeteroded.Howthiswillplayoutandhowsuccessfultheoperationwillbe andwhether it will be an all-encompassing one to include elements of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)remains tobe seen. It is significant that the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a splinter groupof thePakistaniTaliban,claimedcreditfortheattackandithaspledgedallegiancetotheIslamicState.Thus,whilePunjabhasreasonstobesatisfiedaboutitsdominanceofPakistan,therecouldbesevere

trouble brewing under the surface. If the burgeoning radicalism, the growth of jihadi culture andsectarianismisnottackledonawarfooting,PunjabcouldgotheKPKwayintermsofjihadiviolenceandsetanewrecordofsectariankillings.

Historically, Sindh is regarded as the Gateway of Islam since it was here that the Arab generalMuhammadbinQasimlandedinad712anddefeatedtheSindhirulerRajaDahir.TheBritishtookcontrolin1843whenSindhbecameapartof the territoriesof theEastIndiaCompanythroughtheconquestofGeneralCharlesNapier.Napierapparentlyseizedtheprovincewithoutauthorization.Legendhasitthathesentthemessage(inLatin)toCalcutta,Peccavi(‘Ihavesinned’).23Subsequently,SindhwasbroughtundertheadministrativecontroloftheBombayPresidencywhereitwastoremaintill1936.TheMuslimLeaguewastofindSindhamorefertilegroundthanitdidinPunjaborNWFP.ASindh

MuslimLeaguesetupbasein1938butthegrowthwasslow.Nevertheless,on3March1943,inamotionmovedbyG.M.Syed,Sindhbecame thefirstprovince inundividedIndia tosupport the1940Pakistanresolution.On26June1947SindhassemblywasalsothefirsttodecidetojoinPakistan.MostanalystsagreethatbysupportingthecauseofPakistan,theSindhiswereactuallylookingforautonomytoruletheirprovince. When Syed realized what Pakistan was all about, he left the Muslim League, termed thePartition of the subcontinent on the basis of the so-called two-nation theory ‘unnatural, inhuman andunrealistic’andbecameanideologueforSindhnationalism.24

Population and the population mix are central to the problems in Sindh and, more particularly, itscapital, Karachi. In 1947, while the majority of the refugees from India settled in Punjab, about onemillion (18 per cent of total refugees) settled in Sindh. They were predominantly Urdu-speaking andethnicallyandculturallyquitedistinctfromthelocalSindhipopulation.ThoughtheycametoSindhfromdifferentregionsofBritishIndia, theyhadenoughincommonculturallyandideologicallytoenablethedevelopmentofasenseofcommonidentityandstartedcallingthemselvesMohajirs,25amonikerthathascontinuedtilltoday.Accordingtothe1951census,thedemographiccompositionofurbanSindh,showedtheMohajirsat57.55percentinKarachi,66.08percentinHyderabad,54.08percentinSukkur,68.42per cent inMirpurkhasand35.39per cent inLarkana.26According to the1998census,Urdu speakersmadeup21percentofthepopulationofSindh,comparedto59percentSindhispeakers.

ThelargeandcompactMohajirsettlement inanurbanenvironmentallowedthegrouptodevelopitsownidentity.ThedeclarationofUrduasthenationallanguageofPakistanandtheseparationofKarachi,asthenationalcapital,fromSindhin1948diminishedthepossibilitythattheUrduspeakersinKarachiwouldmerge in the Sindhimilieu. Even their children did not have to learn Sindhi. For the first twodecades,theMohajirsdidextremelywell.Theyweretheflag-bearersofthecentralizingpoliciesofthestateandpositionedthemselvesashavingcreatedPakistan.They,togetherwiththePunjabis,dominatedthe civil services and the military. They were allowed to occupy properties and businesses left byemigratingHindusandalargenumberbenefitedfromrealorboguspropertyclaims.AyubKhanmadethefinalsettlementoftheMohajirpropertyclaims,whichhefoundtobecorrectonlytotheextentof7.5percent.27YetpropertydeedswereissuedtotheMohajirsforthousandsofurbanresidencesandforroughlyhalfamillionacresofagriculturallandinSindhleftbehindbyHinduSindhiswhomigratedtoIndia.TheSindhi peasants in possession of these landswere forced off the land ormade to pay rent to the newabsenteelandlords.From the early 1970s onwards, the Sindhis started getting their due under Z.A. Bhutto. While the

MohajirsfeltsqueezedbytheSindhisfromoneside,theywereincreasinglyunderpressureonaccountofmigrationofPunjabisandPashtunsintoKarachi,ontheother.ThePunjabiswerealsoreplacingtheminthe bureaucracy once the capital shifted to Islamabad. As a result, a sense ofMohajir alienation andinsecurity began to develop.Verymuch like the insecurity among their ancestors during the decline ofMughalpower, thepresent-dayMohajirs too felt insecure after runningoutofofficial patronage in thecountrytheyfelttheyhadcreatedthroughtheirsacrifices.Theinsecuritywasonlytogrow.Theyear1971wasamajorwake-upcall.ZulfiqarAliBhutto,aSindhiprimeminister,refusedtotakebackthe250,000EastPakistaniMohajirswhohadmigratedthereatthetimeofPartitionin1947butwerenowtrappedinBangladesh.ThissetmanyMohajirsthinkingabouttheirownfateespeciallywhencoupledwiththepro-SindhimeasurestakenbyBhutto.Thisinsecuritywastocrystallizeintotheformationofapoliticalparty–theMohajirQaumiMovement

(MQM)inAugust1986ledbyAltafHussain.BygivingtheMohajirsapoliticalidentity,theMQMhaswoneveryelection since then in theurbanareasofKarachiandHyderabad.For the first time,peoplefromthelower-middleclasstastedpowerinPakistanandwereabletorubshoulderswiththefeudalsandindustrialists in thecorridorsofpower. Itwasahugesenseofempowerment for theentirecommunity.Thatiswhy,eventoday,sittinginLondon,AltafHussainhasbeenabletorunthepartylikeawell-oiledmachine. Perhaps the most controversial position of the MQM has been its insistence on calling theMohajirs a nationality. The Mohajirs distanced themselves from Pakistani nationalism; now it was‘MohajiridentificationwithinaPakistaniframework’.28

Amajor consequenceof the ethnicmix in theurbanareas, especiallyKarachi, hasbeen in termsofviolence. The security forces had to have periodical crackdowns to bring peace. Starting with an‘operation’ in 1992, the latest ongoing operation started afterNawaz Sharif became primeminister in2013. All these operations have followed the same pattern – arrests, display of illegal weaponssupposedlyrecovered,activistswithmultiplecrimesarrested,‘confessions’,ahugemediamobilization,attemptstosplittheorganization,etc.Inafewmonthstheepisodeisforgotten,tillthenexttime.Whatisalarmingaboutthecurrentoperationisthehugespikeinextra-judicialkillings.AccordingtotheHumanRightsCommissionofPakistan’s(HRCP)annualreportonviolenceinKarachi,theyear2015sawfewer

targetedkillings(387)butariseinpoliceencountersthatledtothedeathsof586people.29

OneofthekeypointsofdifferencethatJinnahhadwiththeCongresswashisoppositiontothecentralizedstatesystembasedontheGovernmentofIndiaActof1935.Hetermedita‘dangerousscheme’andthat‘itmustgoonceandforall’becauseitwouldimposeahighlycentralizedfederalgovernmentwithnoroomfor regionalautonomy.30Not surprisingly, the first point in Jinnah’s fourteenpoints of 1929was: ‘TheformofthefutureConstitutionshouldbefederalwiththeresiduarypowersvestedintheprovinces.’ForJinnahtheissueofprovincialautonomywascentraltokeeptheMuslim-majorityprovincesinterestedinthe idea of Pakistan. Thus, on 8 November 1945, Jinnah gave an interview to Associated Press ofAmerica, saying: ‘The component states or provinces ofPakistanwould have autonomy.’…Pakistan’stheory,hesaid,guaranteedthatfederatedunitsofthenationalgovernmentwould‘havealltheautonomythat youwill find in the constitutions of theUS, Canada andAustralia. But certain vital powerswillremainvestedinthecentralgovernment,suchasthemonetarysystem,nationaldefenceandotherfederalresponsibilities.’31

Inretrospect,clearlythiswasatactic.OncePakistanwascreated,Jinnahmovedtowardsacentralizedsystem, concentrating powers in himself. He was the governor general, president of the ConstituentAssembly,presidentoftheMuslimLeagueandevenaministerinthecabinetofhisownprimeminister,Liaquat Ali Khan, with the portfolio of States and Frontier Regions.32 He dismissed provincialgovernmentsofNWFP(22August1947)andSindh(26April1948)and,infact,extendedthe1935Actwhichhehadsoopposed.33Heproclaimed:

WhatwewantisnottalkaboutBengali,Punjabi,Sindhi,Baluchi,Pathanandsoon.Thereareofcourseunits.ButIaskyou:haveyouforgottenthelessonsthatwastaughtusthirteenhundredyearsago.Youhavecarvedoutaterritory,avastterritory.Itisallyours:itdoesnotbelongtoaPunjabi, or a Sindhi or a Pathan or Bengali. It is all yours. You have got your centralgovernmentwhere several units are represented.Therefore, if youwant to build yourself upintoanation,forGod’ssakegiveupprovincialism.34

Jinnah’s dismissal of the NWFP and Sindh governments as well as the banning of the KhudaiKhidmatgars,apopularmassmovementamongtheMuslimsofNWFP,ensuredthatthefoundationswerelaidofaweakdemocracy.Thiswasalsotoforeshadowhowothermovementscateringtoethnicinterestswouldbetreated–ratherthanbeingaccepted,suchmovementswouldbedealtwithbyforce.35

TheGovernment of IndiaAct of 1935was to govern Pakistan tillMarch 1956.The continuance inforceofthiscolonialviceregalsystemsharpenedtheprovincial identitiesandputtheirautonomyatthetopofthepoliticalagenda.ThefirstConstitutionofPakistan(1956)largelydeniedprovincialrights,andthe secondConstitution (1962, imposed by amilitary dictator) repudiated parliamentary democracy. Itwas only after the debacle of 1971 and the separation of East Pakistan that the Constitution of 1973concededasomewhatreasonablemeasureofprovincialautonomy.36Evenso,problemsarosewhenthisConstitutionwasnotrespectedinpractice,startingwithBhuttohimself.Thedocumentlostagreatdealofitssanctityasaresultofdrasticchangesintroducedin itbymilitaryregimesofZia-ul-HaqandPervez

Musharraf.WhenelectionswerefinallyheldinPakistanin1970,morethantwodecadesafterPartition,theresults

werenotacceptedinWestPakistan,forthatwouldhavemeantthetransferofpowerfromthePunjabi–MohajiroligarchytotheBengalimajority.Evenearlier,therewereeffortsbytheWestPakistanirulersto‘assimilate’ the Bengalis into Pakistan’s ‘mainstream’. For example, prominent individuals within thegovernmentmootedproposalsforadoptingArabicasthenationallanguageandforchangingthescriptoftheBengali language from itsSanskrit base to anArabic–Persianone.37Martial lawensured thatEastPakistanwasunabletodemocraticallyassertitsdemographicstrengthwhilethebrutalarmycrackdownled to more exploitation and repression of East Pakistan.38 In the ensuing civil war, Pakistan wasdismembered.Two examples reflect the concerns of the provinces. In 1955, theConstituentAssembly of Pakistan

heardandignoredthewarningsofanultra-conservativeBengalileader:

‘… the attitude of theMuslim League coteries here was of contempt towards East Bengal,towardsitsculture,itslanguage,itsliteratureandeverythingconcerningEastBengal.…Infact,Sir, I tell you that far from considering East Bengal as an equal partner, the leaders of theMuslimLeaguethoughtwewereasubjectraceandtheybelongedtoaraceofconquerors.’39

AllahNawazKhan,Speakerof theFrontierProvincialAssembly,articulatedthebasisforaPakhtunidentitywhenhedeclaredin1946:‘PathansandPunjabisaretwomajornationsbyanydefinitionortestofanationandtheverythoughtofgroupingtheNWFPwiththePunjabisisrevoltingtothePathanmind.…wetheFrontierPathansareabodyofpeoplewithourowndistinctiveculture,civilization,language,literature…history and traditions and aptitudes and ambitions. In short,we have our owndistinctiveoutlookonlifeandbyallcanonsofinternationallaw,aPathanisquiteseparatefromaPunjabi.’40

Jinnah’slegacyofcentralizationwastobefollowedbyhissuccessors,tothedetrimentofPakistan’sunity.BothAyubKhanandYahyaKhanbeingsoldierswere inanycase intolerantofanydissent.Theywereconcernedthatanemphasisontheprovinceswouldweakencentralauthority,underminetheconceptofanIslamicPakistanandwouldleadtothebreak-upofthecountry.ThestatemachineryencouragedtheimpositionofculturaluniformitybasedonIslam.Bhuttowasauthoritarianbynature.Hisdismissaloftheelected Baloch government was to lead to an uprising that lasted four years. Zia, like his uniformedpredecessors,wasaghastatthepossibilityofautonomy.AccordingtoSeligHarrison,‘…onthecriticalautonomyissue,Ziamadeitclearthathehadlittlesympathyfortheconceptofa“multinational”Pakistanin which Baluch, Pushtun, Sindhis and Punjabis are entitled to self-rule.’ Zia said, ‘I simply cannotunderstandthistypeofthinking.Wewanttobuildastrongcountry,aunifiedcountry.Whyshouldwetalkinthesesmall-mindedterms?WeshouldtalkintermsofPakistan,oneunitedPakistan.’41ThedemocraticgovernmentsofBenazirBhuttoandNawazSharifinthe1990sweretoobusyfightingwitheachotherandensuringtheirownsurvivaltohaverectifiedthesituation.After he overthrew Nawaz Sharif in October 1999, Musharraf started by big announcements on

provincialautonomy.Hepromisedto‘strengthenthefederation,removeinter-provincialdisharmonyandrestorenationalcohesion’asoneoftheseven-pointagendahelaidoutbeforethecountry.42However,likemostofhisother ideas this too fellby thewayside.Thus,provincialautonomywas to remainamajorissueinPakistan.

AbigsteptoresolvetheissueofprovincialautonomyandtorestorethebalanceintheConstitutionwastakenbytheeighteenthamendmenttotheConstitutionthatwasadoptedunderthePPPgovernmentinApril2010.TheamendmentsoughttoremovethedistortionsintheConstitutionintroducedbymilitarydictatorslikeZiaandMusharrafthathadconvertedPakistan’sparliamentarysystemintoasemi-presidentialone.Thus,theamendmentdidawaywiththesweepingpowersofthepresidencyandgavealargemeasureofprovincialautonomy,restoringthebalancebetweentheCentreandtheprovinces.Hastheamendmentactuallyworkedinpractice?IftherecentcomplaintsofthechiefministersofSindh

andKPK are to be believed, clearly the eighteenth amendment has notmademuch of a difference inpractice. Even though the issue of provincial rights has, at times, got intertwined with the politicalwranglingbetweenOppositiongovernmentsinthesmallerprovincesandthePML-NgovernmentsattheCentreandPunjab,thefactremainsthatprovincialautonomyisnotworkingassmoothlyasitshould.Thereasonforthescepticismisthattheimplementationofthedevolutionofpowertotheprovinceshasnottakenfulleffect.AccordingtoPeterJacob,‘Operatinginanenvironmentoflackoftrustandlackofcivilsociety input, the constitutional review process has beenmarred by bottlenecks and the failure of thegovernmenttoappointabodytosupervisethedevolutionofministriesfromthefederaltotheprovinciallevel.’43

Forexample,despitetheabolitionofseventeenministriesafterdevolutionofpowerstotheprovinces,the federal budgeted current expenditure (excluding defence) has actually risen fromRs 1.8 billion in2011–12toRs2billionin2012–13.44Sixyearsaftertheamendment,somefeara‘rollback’tothepre-2010 order. At a discussion organized by the HRCP in Islamabad in September 2015, speakershighlightedthat‘forces’couldbetryingtoundotheprogressmade.Areferencewasmadetotwospecificcases: the presence of theNational CurriculumCouncil as an example of ‘federal encroachment’ andfailureoftheCouncilofCommonIntereststomeetregularly.AccordingtoDawn, therehavealsobeenissueswithdivisionofresourcesandfundsbetweenIslamabadandtheprovinces.Ithasbeenpointedoutthatdepartmentswithliabilitieshavebeenhandedovertotheprovinces,whiletheCentreisreluctanttoletgoofprofitableinstitutions.45

Oneissuethathasreallyagitatedall thethreesmallerprovincesis thatofownershipofoilandgas.SindhandBalochistanjointlycontributemorethan93percentofthenationalgasproductionandaretheenergybasketofPakistan.ThegrouseoftheseprovincesisthatwhileSindhconsumesabout46percentofitsproductionandBalochistanconsumesjust25percent,Punjabutilizesanastounding930percentagainstitsproductioninthenationaloutputofgas.Thefederalgovernmentgives12.5percentroyaltytoprovinces based on the well-head price. The injustice is the discriminatory well-head prices.Balochistan’s average gas field well-head price is Rs 66.34 per MMBTU (Million Metric BritishThermalUnit), forSindh, it isRs142.57andforPunjab it isRs162.93.Thusallarrangements favourPunjab.46

Sixyearsafterthepassageoftheeighteenthamendment,thethreesmallerprovincesarestillwaitingforadecisionbytheCouncilofCommonInterests(CCI)onthecontroversyaroundtheinterpretationofthe Constitution’s Article 172(3). This Article inserted in the Constitution through the eighteenthamendment,vestedownershipofoilandgasresourcesjointlyandequallyinthefederalgovernmentandthe relevantprovinces.TheBalochistan,KPKandSindhgovernmentshavebeen repeatedly requesting

that a meeting of the CCI be held to decide on this issue. According to the KPK government’sinterpretation,underArticle172(3)theprovincesown50percentofoilandgasresources.However,thefederal petroleumministry has not accepted this. Its stand is that the amendment only recognizes jointownershipofthefederalandprovincialgovernmentsandnot50percentownershipoftheprovinces.47

AsperArticle 154(3) of theConstitution, ameetingof theCCIhas to beheld everyquarter.Thus,sincethePML-Ngovernmentcametopowerin2013,thereshouldhavebeentenmeetingsoftheCCItillDecember 2015 but only four were held. This does reflect poorly on the federal government’scommitment to resolve power-sharing disputes between the Centre and the provinces in any seriousmanner.48Resultantly, thechairmanof theSenatewasconstrained to ruleon12February2016 that thefederalgovernmentwasviolatingtheConstitutionbynotconveningtheCCImeetingswithinthestipulatedtime, adding, ‘the consequences, arising from this delay, were grave and could have a chaotic effect,bringingtheentirestatemachinerydealingwithrelevantitemsintheFederalLegislativeListtoagrindinghalt’.49

Infact,apossiblereasonfornotconveningameetingoftheCCIforsolongmayhavebeentoavoidthevexedissueofownershipofoilandgasresources.ItisthusincreasinglybecomingevidentthattheCentreisjustnotreadytorelinquishitspowersandthegovernancestructureremainsmoreorlessthesame.Finally,whenameetingoftheCCIwasheldon29February2016,theonlymajordecisionitseemsto

have takenwas to once again defer the census50 due to security concerns as the required numbers oftroopswerenotavailableatthemoment.ThelastmeetingoftheCCIinMarch2015haddecidedtoholdthemuch-postponedcensusinMarch2016.The general feeling among the smaller provinces is that despite the eighteenth amendment, the

dominationofPunjabcontinuesandthePunjabelite,representedinthefederalgovernment,isnotreallyinterestedindevolutionofpowers.Worse,lefttoitselfitwouldratherrollbackwhathasbeendone.Thisiscertainlynotahappytemplateforprovincialharmony.One of the major hindrances to provincial harmony is the obvious economic disparities and gross

differencesinthestatusofdevelopmentandqualityoflifebetweenPunjabandtheotherprovinces.Forexample,accordingtotheEconomicSurveyofPakistan2015–16asagainstthenationalliteracyrateof60percent,literacyinPunjabwas63percentfollowedbySindhwith60percent,KhyberPakhtunkhwawith53percentandBalochistanwith44percent.Accordingtoareporttitled‘ClusteredDeprivation’,publishedbytheSustainableDevelopmentPolicyInstitutein2014,thehighestincidenceofpovertywasin Balochistanwheremore than half (52 per cent) of the householdswere living under conditions ofpovertyand35percentofthemunderseverepoverty.PovertyinbothKPKandSindh,being32and33percentrespectively,ofwhich20and21percentrespectivelyfellbelowtheseverepovertyline,wasequal to thenationalaveragewhilePunjab,had leastpovertywithonly19percenthouseholds fallingbelowthepovertylineofwhom11percentfellinthecategoryofseverepoverty.51

Astudytitled‘ProvincialAccountsofPakistan:MethodologyandEstimates1973–2000’conductedbyKaiserBengaliandMahparaSadaqatfortheSocialPolicyandDevelopmentCentre(SPDC)concluded,somewhat despairingly, that ‘… on thewhole,Balochistan appears—at best—to remain trapped in alow-level equilibrium and—at worst—regressing further into under-development.’ Such a conclusionwas based on a study that disaggregated Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) into its provincialcomponentsfortheyears1972–73to1999–2000–aperiodoftwenty-eightyears–andfoundthatPunjab

alonehadseenitsshareofnationalGDPrise.TheNWFPhadmanagedmerelytomaintainitssharewhileSindh and Balochistan provinces saw theirs reduced by about one percentage point each – inBalochistan’scasefallingfrom4.5to3.7percent.Thefigureslookedevenmoredismal,whenseenintermsofpercapitaGDP.InPunjab,percapitaGDProseannuallyintheperiodsurveyedbyabout2.4percent, in the NWFP by 2.2 per cent, in Sindh (even with the country’s industrial colossus of Karachiincluded)byonly1.7percent,andinBalochistanbyamiserable0.2percent.52

HowthisworksonthegroundisshownbythefactthatwhiletheHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)forLahore is 0.806, for places like Awaran, Qila Abdullah and JhalMagsi districts in Balochistan it is0.467, 0.499 and 0.435 respectively, making them the worst places on earth to live. Ten districts ofBalochistanareworseoff thantheimpoverishedregionsofsub-SaharanAfricaintermsof theirhumandevelopmentranking.53

Another example of Punjab getting a vastly disproportionate share is the distribution of the annualdevelopmentbudgetthatisusedatthediscretionofparliamentarians.TheamountallocatedtoKPKandBalochistan is less than that allocated to Islamabad, a citywith a populationof less than twomillion.MorethanhalfofthetotalRs19billionhasgonetoPunjab.Balochistan,byfarthemostunderdevelopedamong theprovinces,got2.3per centorRs445million– littlemore thanchicken feed in theoverallpictureofdevelopment funding;KPKgotRs480millionor2.5percentandSindh4.2percentof thefunding.54

Thus,onallparameters,BalochistanisthemostdeprivedprovinceinPakistanandthedisparityisonlygrowing.Sixty-threepercentpeopleofBalochistanaresufferingfromfoodinsecurity,accordingtotheNationalNutritionSurveyof2011.Thisdeplorablesituationisadirectresultofthelackofemploymentopportunities for the people of the province. People are unable to earn for their families, resulting inmalnutrition and other health-related problems across Balochistan.55 According to the social sectormember of the Planning Commission, Dr Naeem-ul-Zafar, with the exception of Quetta, the bestperforming districts of Balochistanwereworse than theworst performing districts of Punjab.56 Evenwhendevelopmentschemeshavebeeninitiated,theBalochgrousehasbeenthatoutsidershavebenefited.Forinstance,PunjabiswereallottedmostofthelandthatbecamearablefollowingtheconstructionofthePatFeeder canal.For these reasons,manyaBalochhavecome to see insurgencyas the last option todefend their homeland against the predatory colonization by the Punjabi-dominated civil and militarygovernmentsinIslamabad.Thus the issueofprovinces isa seriousone inPakistan. In itsorigins, itharksback to thePakistan

movement when religion was believed to be a bond strong enough to weld together the disparatenationalitiesthatcametoconstitutePakistan.Twootherissuesaggravatedtheproblem:thefailureoftheearly leadership to follow through on promises of provincial autonomy made during the Pakistanmovement and the centralizing response of successive leaders to such demands. The history of theamalgamationof these provinces should have alerted the leaders to handle issues farmore sensitivelythan they did. The result was the breakaway of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh and bruisinginsurgencies inBalochistan, the fifth ofwhich is continuing today.The situation inKPK,Sindh and inPunjab itself is festering and could explode for differing reasons. Devolution of powers under theeighteenth amendment was a welcome development. Unfortunately, it has not worked successfully inpractice. On the crucial issue of mineral resources of the provinces, the Centre seems unwilling to

concedethespacetotheprovincesthattheeighteenthamendmenthadgiven.Whether or not Pakistan’s separatist movements and provincial discontent repeat the Bangladesh

example is a matter of conjecture. However, what is undeniable is that they do pose a significantchallengetothestateofPakistan.IfnationalistmovementsmorphwithgrowingIslamistsentimentsastheypotentiallycan inKPK,or if thegrowing radicalizationandsectarianism inPunjabexplodes,or if theethniccauldroninSindh,especiallyKarachi,getsoutofhandandiftheinsurgencyinBalochistangathersmomentum,thechallengetothePakistanistateapparatuswouldbeseverelyenhanced.ItisanironythatIslamandthesloganofprovincialautonomy,whichwereseenasthebindingforcesduringthePakistanmovement,todayposeseriousthreatstotheexistenceofthePakistanistateandhavebecomeamongthekeydriversforPakistancourtingtheabyss.

T

III

TheFramework

HISSECTIONlooksattheinternalfunctioningofPakistan,keepingthefocusonthePakistanArmyandcivil–militaryrelations.ThefactthatthearmydominatesPakistanisnotdisputed,thoughwhyit

doessoisafrequentlyaskedquestion,andonethatishotlydebated.Whatthedominationhasensuredisthatithasbeenthearmywhichhasdeterminedthesecuritythreatsforthecountry,andasforanyarmy,thesecurity threats are seen primarily as physical.Hence, the policies it has framed are largelymeant toprovidephysicalsecuritytoPakistan,ignoringahostofothersecurityparameters.Suchdominationhasalsoensuredthatcivilianshavebeenshutoutofcrucialareas likedefenceand

foreignpolicies,aswellas thenuclearprogramme.Thepoliticalclassasawhole isweakinPakistananddoesnothavethecapacity toquestionthesecurity threats,whichthearmyhasdefinedfordecadesand the strategies it has adopted tomeet these self-defined security challenges. In fact, civil–militaryrelationsareactuallyamisnomersincethe‘civil’intherelationshipexistsonlytotheextentthemilitaryallowsitto.Toalargeextent,thepoliticiansarethemselvestoblameforthisstateofaffairs.Acruciallegacyof

thePakistanmovementwastheweaknessoftheMuslimLeagueasanorganizationandthishaspersistedevenafterthecreationofPakistan.Similaristhecasewithotherpartiestoo.Jinnahfailedtodevelopasecondandthirdrungofpartyleadershipthatcouldruntheaffairsofthepartyafterhim.Evenwhenthepoliticianshavehadtheopportunitytocutthearmytosize,theyhavefaltered.Moreover,thepoliticianshaveinvariablybrokenranksandmanyhaveprovidedlegitimacytothearmyinsearchofcivilianizingitsrule.Thepresentphaseincivil–militaryrelationscanbestbedescribedasa‘softcoup’orevena‘creeping

coup’wherethearmychiefGen.RaheelSharifisfarmorepopularandacceptablethanNawazSharif,theelectedprimeminister,andseemstoprovidetheleadershipthatthecivilianSharifisunabletodo.

5

TheArmyHasaNation

Noarmywhichconcerns itselfwithpolitics iseverofanyvalue. Itsdiscipline ispoor, itsmoraleisrottenanditsreliabilityandefficiencyis[sic]boundtobeofthelowestorder.Youonly have to look at certain foreign armies which are constantly mixed up in politics torealizethetruthofwhatIhavetosay.1

—SirRoyBucher

VOLTAIRE’SFAMOUSquip,‘Wheresomestateshaveanarmy,thePrussianarmyhasastate’,hasbeenusedfrequently,andrealisticallyso,withregardtoPakistananditsarmy.Soall-powerfulhasthearmybecome that instead of being an organ of the executive, the army has become identifiedwith the stateitself. It is not just the sheer size of the army (the eighth largest in the world) nor its huge businessinterests,but thearmy’sclaimtobe thedefenderofPakistan’s territorial frontiersand the‘ideologyofPakistan’thathasgivenitalarger-than-liferoleinPakistan.Somuchsothatthethreatperceptionsofthearmyhavebecomethethreatperceptionsofthestate.AsStephenCohenputsit,‘timeandtimeagainthearmy’swayhasbeenPakistan’sway’.2

ThearmyhascraftedPakistan’sstrategicconcernsandpoliciessincethe1950s.Evenwhentherehasbeenaciviliangovernmentinpower,itisthearmythathascalledtheshotsasfaraskeyforeignpolicy,defenceandsecurityissuesareconcerned.Asaconsequence,sincethearmythinksofsecuritylargelyinmilitaryterms,themilitaryaspectsofsecurityhavepredominatedPakistan’sstrategicthinkingatthecostofnon-militaryones.ThisisamajorpartofthetragedythatPakistanfacestoday.Thekey to the army’sdominancewas the advicegivenbyMaj.Gen.SherAliKhan toGen.Yahya

Khanin1969thatthearmy’sabilitytorulelayinitsbeingperceivedbythepeopleas‘amythicalentity,amagicalforce, thatwouldsuccourthemintimesofneedwhenallelsefailed…thearmywasthefinalguarantor of Pakistan and its well-being.’3 Every military ruler has made this the cornerstone of hispolicy.Itiswhenthearmy’scharismastartstofadethatthegeneralsknowtheirtimeisup.The army that Pakistan inherited at birth was Punjabi-dominated, and Punjab was the dominant

provinceinPakistan,especiallyafter1971.AccordingtoCohen,

AfterPartitionitwasdeterminedthatover77percentofthewar-timerecruitmentfromwhatbecamePakistanhadbeenfromthePunjab,19.5percentbeingfromtheNWFP,2.2percentfrom Sindh and just over 0.06 per cent from Balochistan. Today the percentages have notchangeddramatically:75percentofallex-servicemencamefromonlyfivedistricts–threein

Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Attock) and two adjoining districts in NWFP (Kohat andMardan).4

ShujaNawaznotesadeclineinthepercentageofrepresentationofsoldiersfromPunjab,between1990and2005,from63.86percentto43.33percent,butthatoftheofficersrisingfrom66.46to66.93percent.WithinPunjabtherewasashifttothemorepopulousandemergingurbancentresofcentralandevensouthern Punjab. These bigger cities and towns were also the traditional strongholds of the growingIslamistpartiesandconservatism,associatedwiththepetitbourgeoisie.5

However,accordingtoa2007informationbriefbythemilitary’smouthpiece,theInter-ServicesPublicRelations(ISPR),in2001Punjabiscomprisedover71percentofthearmy.Contrarytothis,accordingtoa government report laid before parliament inAugust 2014, Punjab still sent themaximum number ofofficers (1,018, or 59 per cent) to Kakul (Pakistan Military Academy) and Risalpur (Air ForceAcademy).KhyberPakhtunkhwaremainedsecondinthelistforPakistanArmyandPakistanAirForce.Thestoryof48,639soldiers,sailorsandairmenrecruitedduring2011–12wasareplicaofthepatternofofficers’ induction. The share of Balochistan still remained the lowest, at 4 per cent. Out of 1,379recruitedofficersonly55werefromBalochistan.6

Clearly, therearesomediscrepanciesintheexactcompositionofthePakistanArmybutthefact thatstandsoutisthatPunjabdominatestheotherprovinces,thoughperhapsnottothesameextentasbeforeand that the areas of recruitment have shifted from being predominantly in Potohar in north Punjab tocentralandsouthPunjabandtotheurbancentres.Thetotalstrengthofthearmyisbelievedtobearound800,000-plus,includingover550,000regular

troopsandtherestasreserves.7Ofthese,interestinglyenough,troops,almostaslargeastwodivisions,areemployedasservantsinofficer’smessesandhomes.8

Like the Pakistani state, Partition also shaped the army’s world view and development, especially ininjectinganelementofinsecuritybasedonitsgeographicalborders.Onthewest,Afghanistanrefusedtorecognize the new state and claimed the Pakhtun territories that had been taken over byBritain in thenineteenthcentury(seeChapter15onAfghanistan).Ontheeast,whileIndiadidnotclaimanyterritory,therewas a feeling that the Partition had been unfair since bulk of themilitary industries and trainingestablishmentswere located in India; that theRadcliffeAward had givenGurdaspur to India giving itaccesstoKashmir.AddingtothreatsonitswesternandeasternborderswasPakistan’sgeographicalconstructitself.As

notedearlier,whenJinnahsoughtPakistanasahomelandfortheIndianMuslims,hewastalkingabouttheMuslim-majorityprovinces.Hedidnotviewthenascentstateinmilitarilydefensibleterms.ThePakistanthat came into being hadmost of its population centres close to the Indo-Pak borders and, except forBalochistan, in easy range of India. In the 1970s, after the loss of East Pakistan, this geographicaldisadvantagewouldleadtothearticulationoftheconceptof‘strategicdepth’inAfghanistan,whenfacedwithnumericallysuperiorIndianforces.Thisconceptinitiallywasterritorialbuthasincreasinglybecomepolitical,i.e.,aweakanddependentgovernmentinKabul,whichwoulddenyanyspacetoIndia.Inthefuture, theconceptwill encompasswater securityasAfghanistanstarts to implementplans to store the

watersoftheRiverKabulforitsownuse.AnotherlegacyofPartitionwasKashmir.In1947,thePakistanileadershiphadpresumedthatKashmir,

beingaMuslim-majorityprincely state,wouldaccede toPakistanonaccountof the two-nation theory.The feeling that Partition had been unfair was aggravated when it was realized that theMaharaja ofKashmirwasprevaricatingoveracceding toPakistan,andwould rather remain independent.Though ithadsigneda‘StandstillAgreement’withthemaharaja,Pakistanbrokeiton22Octoberwhenitsent intribal‘raiders’toseizeKashmirforcibly.ThetribalinvasionnotonlyfailedtoachievetheobjectivebutresultedinthemaharajaaccedingtoIndiaandtheIndianforcesrepulsingtheso-calledtribal‘raiders’.WithKashmirbecomingapartofIndiaandPakistanfailingtotakeitbyforce,hatredforIndiaintensified,heightenedbyahostofissueslikethePartitionriots,notgettingitsshareofmilitarystores,etc.Thevisceral hatred for India has had severe consequences forPakistan.According toLieven, ‘The

Pakistanimilitary…suffersfromonetragicfeaturewhichhasbeenwithitfromthebeginning…,whichcould in some circumstances destroy Pakistan and its armed forces altogether. This is the military’sobsession with India in general, and Kashmir in particular.’ He quotes Lt Gen. (Retd) Tanvir NaqvitellinghimthattheaveragePakistaniofficeroftoday,‘hasnodoubtinhismindthattheadversaryisIndia,andthatthewholeraisond’êtreofthearmyistodefendagainstIndia.HisimageofIndiansisofananti-Pakistan, anti-Muslim, treacherous people. So he feels that he must be always ready to fight againstIndia.’9

Maj.Gen.MahmudAliDurranitoodescribesthisbelligerentattitudetowardsIndia:‘IgrewupwiththefirmconvictionthattheonlygoodIndianwasadeadIndian.ToaddtotheranksofthegoodIndiansIjoinedthePakistanArmy.’10

AccordingtoChristineFair thisvisceralhatredforIndiagoesbeyondtheantagonismoverKashmir.She notes: ‘… Pakistan’s defense literature clearlymaintains that Pakistan’s army also aims to resistIndia’spositionofregionaldominanceanditsslowbutsteadyglobalascent,andmoreoftenthannotthisthreatfromIndiaisdescribedinideologicalandcivilizationtermsratherthanthoseofsecurity.’11

GiventhatbothIndiaandPakistanarenuclear-armedstates,theobviousquestionthatarisesiswhetherPakistan will continue with its policy of trying to change the status quo with regard to Kashmir andimpedeIndianeffortsatglobalascent.Fairanswersthisbrilliantly:

ForPakistan’smenonhorseback,notwinning,evenrepeatedly,isnotthesamethingaslosing.But simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India’s supremacy, is, by definition,defeat…Byseeingvictoryastheabilitytocontinuefighting,Pakistan’sarmyisabletoseizevictoryevenfromthejawsofwhatotherobserverswoulddeemdefeat.12

Even if, and this is a big if, the army is constrained to seek accommodation with India given theeconomicconditionsofPakistan,itsvisceralhatredforIndiaisunlikelytochange.Neitherwillitdiscardits strategy of bleeding India via non-state actors. Unless the army examines its and Pakistan’s firstprinciples,themindsetwillnotalterthoughtacticallyitmaybeforcedtomakeadjustments.TwoofthecorebeliefsofthearmystemfromthecircumstancesofPartition.ThefirstisthatPartition

itselfwasunfairandisincomplete.AlinkedbeliefistheperceptionthatIndiahasnotacceptedPartitionand,givenanopportunity,wouldundoit.Post-1971,afterthecreationofBangladesh,thisbeliefhasbeenfurther strengthened and has given rise to the third core belief that Bangladeshmust be avenged. The

fourth is that the army is not only the guardian of the territorial frontiers of Pakistan but also of the‘ideologicalfrontiers’andthecustodianofthe‘Nazaria-i-Pakistanorthe‘IdeologyofPakistan’.Afifthelementisthatpoliticianscannotbetrusted,asgivenanopportunitytheywouldcompromisePakistan’sinterests.A final element, arising out of its geographical insecurities vis-à-vis India, is the concept of‘strategicdepth’inAfghanistan.Afterthe1965Indo-Pakwar,andespeciallyafterthe1971war,theonebigdentinthearmy’sbelief

systemisthatitnolongerbragsthatoneMuslimsoldierisworthfiveorten‘Hindu’soldiers.AsGoharAyubput it, ‘Inthepast ifanyofficerwasaskedwhathisdreamwas,hewouldsayitwastohoist thePakistani flagon theRedFort inDelhi.Everyonewasready to takeonIndia.Butafter1971, themostanyonewouldbewillingtosayisthatwecouldfightadefensivewarforashortperiodagainstIndia.’13

Yet,aswillbeseen in theChapter14on India, thebelief systemcontinues tohold that the ‘Hindu’ isweakandPakistancancontinuetobleeditwithimpunity.Basedonthesecorebeliefs,thearmyhaddevelopedadoctrinewhosekeyelementsare:‘Borrowed

power’ in conventional capability from theUS and conventional and nuclear capability fromChina toneutralize Indianconventionalsuperiorityand itsnuclearweapons;useofnon-stateactors, initially theconceptwastomilitarilyseizeKashmirthatlatertransformedintobleedingIndiaby‘athousandcuts’tobringittothenegotiatingtableinaweakenedpositionandultimatelychangethestatusquoinJammuandKashmir; continuing to use non-state actors against India under the nuclear overhang; not to allowpoliticians any independence of action on foreign, defence and nuclear policies lest they compromisePakistan’s interests; to ensure a weak, dependent and friendly (towards Pakistan) government inAfghanistantochoketheIndianfootprintanddenyitanyspacethere;anddespiteinternalthreatstakingonagreatersalienceandhenceafocusoncounter-terrorism,thethreatfromIndiaremainstheprioritygivenIndiancapabilities.

ThearmywasalsoinfluencedandshapedbytheideologicalunderpinningsofthePakistanmovement,aprocessthatbeganin1947itselfwiththearmyadoptingthenumber786astheidentificationnumberforthe GHQ (General Headquarters) of the new Pakistan Army.14 The number 786 is the numerologicalequivalentoftheopeningsentenceoftheQuran,Bismillahir-Rehmanir-Rahim(InthenameofAllah,theMerciful andBeneficent), thewords that allMuslims saybeforebeginning anything.The secondovertIslamicsymbolwasadoptedin1976,whenZia-ul-Haq,asarmychief,changedthemottoofthearmyfromJinnah’sUnity,Faith,andDisciplinetoIman,TaqwaandJihadfisabeelillah(Faith,ObediencetoGodandStruggleinthepathofAllah).15TothiswasaddeddefenceoftheideologicalfrontiersofPakistan.ThearmytoowassubjectedtoZia’sIslamizationzealwithIslamicteachingsbeingintroducedintothe

curriculumoftheArmyCommandandStaffCollegeandtheofficersbeingrequiredtoreadthe‘QuranicConcept ofWar’; signboardswere put up around the cantonments quoting theQuran and the Prophet;evaluation formswere redesigned to includecommentsonanofficer’s religious sincerity; theTablighiJamaatwasencouragedtovisitcantonments.Oneresultofthesemeasureswasanincreaseinthenumberofofficerswithbeards.The result ofZia’s policieswas the growth of religious orthodoxy in the armed forces. ItwasZia,

accordingtoCohen,‘whooversawthetransitionfromalargelyseculararmywithanoccasionalnodinthedirectionofIslamtoastill-seculararmythatpaidmoreattentiontoIslam,butwhosemajorinnovation

wastheuseofIslamasastrategicassetathomeandabroad’.16

AnexampleofhowthisworkedwasprovidedbyformerarmychiefAslamBeg.InapressconferenceinSeptember1989,ontheeveofthelarge-scalemilitaryexercisecode-namedZarb-e-Momin(BlowoftheTruebeliever)heexplainedthatoneoftheobjectivesoftheexercisewasto‘…fulfilideologicalandprofessional obligations …’ Elaborating on the ideological functions, the general declared, ‘AllahordainsonallMuslimstoalwaysremaininastateofpreparednessandthePakistanArmy,byholdingthisexercise,hascompliedwithaDivineOrderandfulfilleditsreligiousduty.’17

Aconcernfrequentlyraisediswhetherthearmyasawhole,orpartsofitlikethejuniorofficersandmen,mightsupportanIslamistrevolution,oratleastsubscribetoanideologythatisakintothatofsomeofthejihadiorganizations.Thequestionisprovokedbytwodevelopments:one,thechangeinthesocialclassof the officer corps from the earlierWestern-educated upper class to amore lower-middle class and,second,despitebeinginacocoonofmilitarycantonments,theofficersandmencanhardlybeimmunetothe greater radicalization and Islamization of society around them. As Shuja Nawaz stated in aCongressionalhearing, ‘Myownresearch into therecruitmentof thePakistanArmyover1970to2005indicatesthatthearmyisnowrecruitingheavilyinthesameareafromwheretheLashkar-e-Toiba(LeT)springs.Unlesswechangetheunderlyingsocialandeconomicconditions,theIslamistmilitancywillstartseepingintothemilitary.’18

Ominously,aswillbenotedlater,over80percentofallthemadrasasinPunjabarelocatedinsouthandcentralPunjab.Thisisthesameareafromwherethearmyandthejihadisrecruitextensively.Itwouldbe fascinating to know the percentage of soldiers recruited from these areas who have studied in amadrasa.ThatwouldgivetherealindicationofthedepthofIslamizationinthePakistanArmy.There have been several instances where the army has refused to open fire under the influence of

Islamists.Forexample,inthe1977PakistanNationalAlliance(PNA)agitation,whichwasdominatedbythereligiouspartiesandledtoBhutto’souster, therewerereportsaboutthearmydecliningtoshootonprotestors inLahore.19On26September1995,Maj.Gen.Zahirul IslamAbbasi, alongwith thirty-fiveofficers,wasarrestedforplottingtoassassinatethecorpscommanders,duringaconference,aswellasthecabinet.20Between2004and2007,therewerenumerousinstancesofmassdesertionsandrefusaltofight in the Frontier Corp units deployed to target militants in Federally Administered Tribal Areas(FATA).21 There were two attempts to assassinate Gen. Pervez Musharraf in which armed forcespersonnelwereinvolved.InMay 2011 the army arrestedBrig.AliKhan and four other officers for linkswith theUK-based

Hizb-ut-Tahrir(HT)whichbelievesinestablishingan‘IslamicCaliphate’.Also,theattackontheMehranNavalbase(22May2011)andtheearlier10October2009attackontheGHQrevealedthattheattackershadinsideknowledgeandknewwheretheblindspotswere.TariqAliwritesaboutanincidentinDecember1999,whenIndiahadinformedPakistanthatoneofthe

peaks inKargil–Draswas still occupied byPakistani soldiers, contrary to the ceasefire agreement.AseniorofficerwenttoinvestigateandorderedthecaptaininchargeofthepeaktoreturntothePakistanisideoftheLoC(LineofControl).ThecaptainaccusedtheseniorofficerandthemilitaryhighcommandofbetrayingtheIslamistcauseandshottheofficerdead.TheIslamistofficerwasfinallydisarmed,triedbyasecretcourtmartialandexecuted.22

In October 2011, Tassaduq Bashir, a retired colonel of the Special Services Group (SSG), wasarrestedforbeingthemastermindofamissileattackplanonParliamentHouse.Policerecoveredfifteenmissiles,suicidejacketsandninehandgrenadesduringasearchoperation.23

InMay2016,anavaltribunalsentencedfiveofficerstodeathintheKarachiNavalDockyardattackcase of 6 September 2014. The five were charged with having links with the Islamic State, mutiny,hatchingaconspiracyandcarryingweaponsinthedockyard.24

Suchincidentscanbetermedas isolatedandstray,but itwouldbeamistaketodismiss themoutofhand.TheyarereflectiveoftheweakeningofdisciplineonaccountofIslamizationofthearmythatcangrowgiventhetrajectoryofradicalizationinthecountry.

Manyhavewonderedwhy the armyhas ruledPakistandirectly for somanyyears, dominated it in theperiods it was not ruling directly and why it continues to do so. There are several reasons for this.Historically,theinitialpost-Partitiondevelopmentsandtheinsecuritiestheybred,madethenascentstateplacegreat importanceonthephysicaldefenceof thecountry.Massiveresourceswereallocatedtothearmy.ThepriorityofbuildingupthearmedforceswasspelledoutbyPrimeMinisterLiaquatAliKhaninabroadcasttothenationon8October1948:‘ThedefenceoftheStateisourforemostconsiderationandhasdominated all other governmental activities.Wewill not grudge any amount on thedefenceof ourcountry.’25 Five years later, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra declared in his defence policystatementthathewouldratherstarvethecountrythanallowanyweakeningofitsdefence.26Successiveprimeministershavereiteratedsuchsentiments.However,merely allocating bulk of the funds did not in itself create a dominating position for the

armedforcesinPakistan.Intheinitialyears,itwerethepoliticianswhocalledtheshotsbuttheirfailuretoinstitutionalizedemocracyandtheinfirmitiesoftheMuslimLeaguenotedearlier,allowedthearmytostepin.WiththefearofaphysicalthreatfromIndiaplayedupsincePartition,itwaseasyforthearmytoglideintopower.Onceinpower,theymadesurethatnationalsecuritywasprojectedandinternalizedasthe number one priority for the country. To quoteT.V. Paul, ‘Elevating national security to the highestsalienceisintheinterestsofthemilitary,inordertomaximizeresourcesfromthenationaleconomy.’27

Havingdoneso, it iseasy tounderstandwhy thearmyhasbeenable todominatePakistanforso long,evenwhenitisnotdirectlyinpower.Afactorignoredbymostanalystsisthatin1947thecivilleadershipofPakistanhadcomelargelyfrom

India–Jinnah,Liaquatandbulkofthecabinet.TheyhadnorootsintheterritorythatbecamePakistan.Given thecompositionof thearmyin1947, thearmyleadership,on theotherhand,waspredominantlyrooted in the soil ofPakistan–PunjabandNWFP.Officers likeAyubKhan,MuhammadMusa,YahyaKhan,etc.,werefromtheterritoriesthatbecamePakistan.BeingunfamiliarwithPakistanandnotrootedin it, the politicians needed assistance to find their way. This is where the infirmities of theMuslimLeague,includingitslackofasecond-rungleadershipandpartyorganizationcametoplay.Thismadeitfareasierforoneortwogenerationsofthearmyleadershiptodominatethepoliticalleadershipandsetthetrendfortheirsuccessors.Themannerinwhichthefirstmartiallawwasimplementedwastobeanimportantprecedentinpublic

memory.ItwasimposedinLahoreon6March1953whenthePunjabgovernmentwasunabletodealwith

theanti-Ahmadiyariots.ThelocalmilitarycommanderMaj.Gen.AzamKhan,broughtthesituationundercontrolinafewhoursandLahorereturnedtonormalinafewdays.Despitethis,thearmyremainedincontrol for over twomonths duringwhichAzamKhan introduced the ‘Cleaner Lahore Campaign’, inwhich the citywasgiven abig facelift – streetswerewidened, drainswere cleaned, publicbuildingspaintedandparkssprucedup.28

Asaresult,whenthearmywaswithdrawn,Dawnon16May1953commented:‘…MemoriesofthearmyruleinLahorewilllingerforalongtimetocomeandthenewlookthatLahorehasacquiredandthesense of discipline among its people inculcated by the armywill bear eloquent testimony to the goodwork done byMaj. Gen. AzamKhan and his men.’ 29 Thememory of this precedent has had lastingconsequences for Pakistan. It created a public impression of the capability of the army in not onlyrestoringpeacewhentheciviladministrationhadfailedbutinprovidinganeffectivegovernmenttoo.ThearmytoonotedtheeasewithwhichtheproblemofPunjabhadbeensolved.IfPunjabcouldbesortedoutinafewdays–whynotthewholecountryifsorequired?If the army does not like democracy, as will be noted in the next chapter, the politicians have not

exactlyexhibitedwildenthusiasmforiteither.Asnoted,byholdingthethreemostimportantpositionsofgovernor general, president of the Constituent Assembly and president of the Muslim League (laterrelinquished)at the same time, Jinnahset a traditionbywhichapowerful individualcame tobemoreimportant than the institutionalizeddistributionof statepower.AsAdeelKhannotes, ‘bybecoming theall-powerfulfirstGovernorGeneral,Jinnahfoundedaunitarypoliticalsystemthatretardedthegrowthoftheparliamentarysystem’.30Morerecently,thosewhoareoutofpowerseemtobefarmorevociferousintheircommitmenttodemocracythanthoseinpower.Butonceinpower,allpoliticiansseemtodevelopselective memories. Unless the political leadership learns to appreciate and internalize democraticnorms,democraticconsolidationwillremainadistantgoal.Theattitudeofthepoliticiansseemstobethatsince they have been elected, Pakistan is a democracy. Being responsible to the people and thereforeresponsivetotheirneedsisroutinelyignored.Further,thearmygetsanopportunitytointervenewhenthepoliticianscreateamessofgovernance.As

the InternationalCrisisGroup(ICG)puts it, ‘Failing todelivergoodgovernance,civiliangovernmentshaveundermined theirdomestic legitimacy, rendering themselvesvulnerable tomilitary intervention.’31

Thefavouriteexcuseofpoliticiansisthatdemocracyhasnotbeengivenachance.Forthis,theyhavetosharetheblamesincetheyhaverepeatedlyrefusedtoacceptdemocraticprinciples.Inaddition,noneofthepoliticalpartieshaveprovidedsolidintellectualinputsonpolicies,governanceornationalsecurity.AccordingtoGoharAyubwhowasSpeakeroftheNationalAssembly,‘TheNationalAssemblylibrarywasusedbyonly3.5percentofallMNAs–andthattoo,mostlyfornewspapersandmagazines.’32Allpoliticians have exhibited the same symptoms of exploiting the system for personal benefit rather thanconcentratingongovernance.Additionally,thereareanumberofpoliticianswhoareeagartobeco-optedbythearmy,knowingthat

itistheonlywaytheycancomeintopower.Itisthesepoliticianswhofacilitatethecontinuationofarmyrule.AccordingtoMusharraf,asacorpscommander,hesawhow‘…oppositionpoliticians–regularlyvisited thearmychief toencouragehim tooppose thesittinggovernment.…Wheneveranygovernmentwasperformingpoorly(unfortunately,thatwasthenorminthe“democratic”decadeofthe1990s)orwasinpoliticaltrouble,allroadsledtothearmyGHQ.’33

Moreover, the democratic system itself has lacked credibility because the fairness of elections hasbeenrepeatedlyquestioned.ImranKhan,thePakistanTehrik-i-Insaf(PTI)leader,hadnotonlyquestionedthefairnessofthelastelectionsin2013butlaunchedanagitationallegingmassiverigginginfavourofthePML-N ofNawaz Sharif.Allegations of rigged elections have battered public confidence in electoralinstitutions, hampered Pakistan’s democratic development and eroded political stability. Concerns thatparliamentsdidnotrepresentthewillofthepeoplehaveunderminedthecredibilityofpoliticiansandofdemocracyitself.34

Except on the rare occasionwhen their own future is at stake, no politician has used the power ofparliament to strengthen democracy. Most prime ministers, including Nawaz Sharif, have treatedparliamentwithdisdain,rarelycondescendingtoattenditssessions.Thus,thosewhosegreateststrengthitcouldhavebeenhavethemselvesunderminedparliament’srole.Takingtheircuefromtheprimeminister,ruling party parliamentarians too have not taken their role seriously.As a result, parliament has beenreducedtobeinglittlemorethanadebatingclubinsteadofbeinganinstitutionconcernedwithlegislationandsupervisionthatcouldhaveputchecksonthearmy.Theployfrequentlyusedbypoliticians,bothingovernmentandintheOppositionis tocallall-partiesconferences(APCs)todiscussimportant issues.Sincetheseareheldoutsideparliament,theroleofthisinstitutiongetsfurtherdevalued.CompoundingtheproblemisthefactthatpoliticalpartiesinPakistanareweak.Theinfirmitiesofthe

MuslimLeagueaswellastheintoleranceoftheearlyleaderstowardsotherpoliticalpartieshavebeennotedearlier.Thiswasnotagoodauguryfordemocracy.InastingingeditorialthePakistanTimesnoted:‘Today,morethaneverbefore,itistruetosaythattheMuslimLeague,bereftofwhatlittlewasleftofitsintegrity and idealismafterpost-Partition scramble forpower andpelf, is inofficenotbecause it is ahealthy, living organization, deriving its strength from genuine public backing; but… only because itretainsamonopolyofpower.AcompletelackofdemocracycharacterizestheMuslimLeague’sinternalfunctioning.’35 The criticism levelled against theMuslimLeague in 1953 is as valid today and for allpoliticalparties.Anotherdebilitatingfactoristhatpresent-daypoliticalpartieshavebecomedynasticfiefdoms.Barring

theMuttahidaQaumiMovement(MQM)andtheJamaat-i-Islami(JI),alltheothersignificantmainstreampolitical parties are family enterprises without any inner-party democracy. Thus, the Bhuttos/Zardaridominate thePPP; theSharifshavean irongripon thePML-N;WaliKhan’sheirs rule the roost in theAwami National Party (ANP); and despite his claims to clean up the system, Imran Khan is PTI.Additionally,noneofthepartieshaveapartyorganization,bottomupwards.WhilethePPPdoeshaveacadre, it is hampered by the lack of an effective party organization from the village or tehsil levelupwards. The PML-N is in any case a district-wise, notables-based party that comes together duringelections.ThefactthatpoliticalleadersareallergictointernaldemocracywasshockinglydemonstratedinApril

2010whentheconstitutionalobligationtoholdpartyelectionswasdeletedbytheeighteenthamendmentoftheConstitution.Thisspeaksvolumesforthecommitmentofthepoliticianstodemocracy.36Asaresult,barring a few exceptions like the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) against Zia,politicalpartiesarenotabletomobilizemassesagainstthearmyforanyprolongedperiodoftime.Finally,thearmyhasdevelopedtremendousexpertiseinmanipulatingthemedia.TheISPR,themedia

wingofthearmy,knowswhichjournalistswilldotheirbidding.Infact,itisthemedia‘talkshows’that

firstcreateanenvironmentofuncertaintyandrumour-mongering,whichisthencapitalizedbydisgruntledpoliticianswithanodfromthearmy.Intermsofusingsocialmedia,thearmyismilesaheadoftheciviliangovernment.Theimpressionthat

hasbeencreatedbytheslickuseofthemedia,especiallythesocialmedia,isofaselflessarmymakingsacrificesforthesakeofthesafetyofcivilians.Thisiscontrastedwiththeselfishandcorruptpoliticianswhoarebusyliningtheirpocketsthaninimprovingthelivesofthepeople.Therecentarmycampaignhascatapulted army chiefGen.Raheel Sharif as themost popularman in Pakistan, leaving his namesake,PrimeMinisterSharif,thecivilian,farbehind.Notsurprisingly,theheadoftheISPRhasbeenelevatedtoathree-stargeneral,andtheincumbent,AsimSaleemBajwa’sTwitteraccounthasmorethan1.5millionfollowers,andtheISPR’sFacebookaccountmorethan2.8millionlikes.Ironically,while the army’smanipulation of themedia has paid rich dividends, the record of army

chiefswritingbooks issomewhatdubious.AyubKhanhad to relinquish thepresidencybarelyeighteenmonths after the publication of his autobiography Friends not Masters. Similarly, Musharraf barelysurvived two years as president after publishing his In the Line of Fire in 2006, having to resign aspresidentinAugust2008.

Aninterestingquestionishowhas thePakistanArmymanagedtoretain itscredibilitydespite itsmanyfailures.Thelowpointsforthearmywereafterthe1965andespeciallythe1971war,post-Kargil,attheendofMusharraf’srule,theUSraidonAbbottabad,attheendofGeneralKayani’sextendedtenureandsoon.Everytime,however,thearmyhasbouncedback.Theshortanswerhastobetheweaknessesofthepoliticianswhowereunabletocapitalizeontheopportunitiesthatwereprovidedtocutthearmydowntosize(seeChapter6).Giventhemisgovernancebypoliticiansitdidnottakethearmyverylongtoprojectitselfas theonlyfunctionalorganization in thecountry,anorganization that thepeoplecould look to intimes of dire need – in other words, to regain its mystique as ‘a mythical entity, a magical force’.Additionally,despiteitsreverses,atnopointintimehasthearmy’saccesstobudgetaryresourcesoritscontroloverdefence,foreignandsecuritypolicieseverbeenquestionedbypoliticians.Whilethearmyhascertainlybouncedbackaftereverydisastertoreclaimitsmystique,amootquestion

is the credibility of the army leadership within the army. At times, army officers themselves havechallengedthequalityofmilitaryleadership.Forexample,militaryleadershiphasbeendescribed,inapaperbyaseniorofficerat theNationalDefenceComplex(NDC),as ‘ineptandweak…Wehavenovisionandperspectiveofthefutureandthusliveonadaytodaybasis.’Theauthorgoesontocitelackofcreativitybecauseofbondagetostandardoperatingprocedures,sycophancy,conformityandcareerism.37

ThishasalsobeenconfirmedbyBrianCloughleywhoobserves,that

[I]fthestudentsofStaffCollegedevotedmoretimetogenuinestudyandoriginalthoughtratherthan (manyof them,butnotall, itmustbesaid)attempting toacquirepastyears’papersandidentify “correct solutions” then they and the armywould benefit greatly. There is toomuchactivity that takesplace for the sakeofappearingenergetic, andnotenoughquiet, thoughtful,hardwork.

OnereasonCloughleyidentifiesforthiswasthatZiaencouragedrotelearningofreligiousdetailat theexpenseofintellectualprobingsandteachingofEnglish.38ThishasalsobeenconfirmedbyIqbalAkhund

whonoted that underZia, the ‘Islamic’ elementwas givengreater prominence in the courses taught atmilitary academies and other training institutions, whereas there were no courses on subjects ofcontemporaryimportancesuchasdevelopmenteconomicsorinternationaleconomicrelations.39

Asaresult, ‘Standardsinmanyof themostprestigiousschoolshavebeenpermittedtofall to levelsthatwouldhavebeenunthinkableonlytwentyyearsago.Somebelow-standardyoungmenjointhearmyasofficercadets.’40Unlessthetrendisreversed,withacombinationofanineptcivilianleadershipandanineptmilitaryleadership,Pakistan’smarchtowardstheabyssisassured.

Overthepastdecade,thePakistanArmyhasbeenconfrontedwithseriousinternalsecurityissues.TheseincludetheongoingfifthinsurgencyinBalochistanthatintensifiedafterthekillingofNawabAkbarKhanBugtiin2006,aswellasthebirthoftheTTPtoseekvengeanceagainstthearmyafterthebloodyarmyactionintheLalMasjidofIslamabadin2007.SartajAziz,theprimeminister’sadviseronforeignaffairs,in a statement thatwould embarrass himnowhad revealed earlier, ‘For every ten [militants]who aretrained here to fight in Kashmir, one goes and the rest stay in Pakistan to cause trouble.’41 Notsurprisingly, successive army chiefs, starting with Ayub Khan down to Musharraf and Kayani haveunderlinedthedangerfrominternalthreats(seeChapter14onIndia).FollowingKayani’sassertion,therewasa reviewofPakistan’smilitarydoctrine to fight thenon-stateactorsposinga threat toPakistan.Anew chapter, ‘Sub-conventional warfare’ was included in the army’s Green Book for the first timeunderliningthatthePakistanArmysaw‘internalthreats’asthegreatestsecurityriskratherthanIndia.42

Thecurrentarmychief,Gen.RaheelSharif,speakingattheEighthInternationalDefenceExhibitionandSeminar, IDEAS-2014 inKarachi (4December2014), stressed that in today’sworld, securityconceptdoesnotapplyonlytoborders,‘…butsecuringourculturesandwayoflifearealsoseenasprimarysecurityconcerns’.Accordingtohim,theenemy‘…liveswithinusandlookslikeus’.43However,thishasnotresultedinchangingthearmy’straditionalhostilitytowardsIndiaorinducedittogiveupuseofjihaditerrorismasastrategicweaponagainstIndia.44

ItisworthnotingthatthePakistanArmy’sforaysintodomesticsecuritysituationshavenothadahappyending.Thearmy’soperationsinEastPakistanin1971ledtothevivisectionofthecountry;againsttheBaloch in the1970s created conditions forZia’s coup and thepost-1977militarydictatorship; theLalMasjid operation led to the formation of the TTP; the operation in Swat led to the rise of MullahFazlullah.The jury is, therefore, out on the army’s operation inNorthWaziristan, launched since June2014,calledZarb-e-Azb,andtheoperationinKarachilaunchedsinceMarch2013.Historicalprecedentsapart, one reason for scepticism about the army’s domestic success is due to its selective use ofIslamist/jihadigroupsasinstrumentsofforeignpolicy.Theoperationsarenotacrosstheboard,targetingeverysinglegroupofterrorists.Severalgroupsthatareconsidered‘strategicassets’areleftout.

Despitetheeconomybeingfrequentlyincrisis,theexpenditureondefencehasneverbeenaffected.Forexample, on an average, Pakistan spent 59.51 per cent of the total government expenditure on defenceduringtheperiod1948–59goinguptoashighas71.32percentin1948–49and73.32in1949–50.45

Thepercentageofexpenditureondefenceandservicesinthenationalbudgetoverthepastfewyearshasbeen:46

2008–09 14.72percent2009–10 13.92percent2010–11 15.99percent2011–12 7.89percent2012–13 17.02percent2013–14 15.73percent2014–15 16.27percent2015–16 17.54percent2016–17 17.6percent(estimate)

The defence expenditure figures, however, do not include the nuclear programme, Rs 177.6 billionallocatedformilitarypensions that isbookedunder thecivilianbudgetandaseparateallocationofRs100billionfor‘security-related’expenses.Theincreaseindefencespendingcontrastswitha3.6percentincreaseinthegovernment’scurrentexpenditureanda7.3percentgrowthinthetotalexpenditures.Thecomparisonwiththenationalbudgetshowshowmuchmoneyisgoingtothearmedforcesinrealterms.47

Since fiscal 2000–01, defence expenditure is being calculated net of defence pensions.As a result,defenceexpenditurein2000–01showedasuddendeclineof12.8percenttobesubsequentlyincreasedby 13.6 per cent in 2001–02 and further by 6 per cent in 2002–03. In a written reply in the Senate,DefenceMinisterKhwajaAsifstatedthatexpenditureonaccountofpensionwasnotbeingreflectedinthedefencebudgetsinceJuly2000.Givingtheyear-wisedata,theministerinformedthesenatorsthatRs105.98billionwaspaidtotheretireddefenceservicepersonnelintheyear2011–12,Rs131.74billionin2012–13andRs142.89billionin2013–14,makingatotalofRs513billionpaidaspensiontoretiredpersonnelofthearmedforcessince2011fromthe‘civiliankitty’.48

NodiscussionofthePakistanArmyiscompletewithoutreferringtoitscommercialinterests.Forthepastseveral decades, the military has managed to establish an extensive network of business enterprisesinvolved in economic activities ranging frommanufacturing to construction, from logistics to financialservicesand,aboveall,realestate.According to a July 2014 report by Pakistan Institute of LegilativeDevelopment and Transparency

(PILDAT)titled‘Military’sCommercialInterests’,thecommercialactivitiesofdefenceforcesdatebackto 1942 when the government of British India established aMilitary Reconstruction Fund. Today, itssuccessor, theFaujiFoundation,hasbecomethe largest industrialconglomerateofPakistanwithassetsworthRs321billion.ThePakistanAirForceandNavyhavetheirownShaheenandBhariaFoundationsengaged in a large number of commercial activities.As important as the commercial activites are themassivelandholdings,especiallyinurbanareas,thathavenowcometodistinguishthethreeservices.Thearmy’s most important asset and reward for loyalty is the land parcelled out to officers during theircareersandagainwhentheyretire.Thearmyownsanestimatedtwelvemillionacres,equivalentto12percentoftotalstate-ownedland.49

Inapioneeringstudy,AyeshaSiddiqacoined the termMilbus to refer to ‘…miltarycapital that isusedforthepersonalbenefitofthemilitaryfraternity,especiallytheofficercadre,whichisnotrecorded

aspartofthedefencebudgetordoesnotfollowthenormalaccountabilityproceduresofthestate,makingitanindependentgenreofcapital’.50Sheunderlinesthefollowing:(i)thereisanelementofillegalityinsuch military capital since it involves transfer of funds from the public to the private sector withoutproper transparency;51 (ii) it creates vested interests which do not encourage democratic norms andinstitutions and discourage the army from giving up political control;52 (iii) Milbus has significantfinancial and socio-political costs, ‘because the profit-making role is dependent on the armed forces’preferential access to decision-making, and this is detrimental for creating a free-market economicenvironment’.53According toher, ‘…economicandpolitical interests are linked inacyclicprocess:political power guarantees economic benefits which, in turn, motivate the officer cadre to remainpowerfulandtoplayaninfluentialroleingovernance.’54

Howthisworksinpracticeisinstructive.AKarachi-basedNGO,Shehri,hadsubmittedanRTIrequesttothedefenceministryinMarch2012askingaboutthedetailsofplotsallottedtotheArmyWelfareTrust(AWT). TheAWT is a privateNGO registered under the Societies RegistrationAct, 1860, and not adefenceorganizationor connectedwith thedefenceofPakistan.TheRTI requestwaspromptedby thelease of 25,000 square yards to theAWT in the commercial hub ofKarachi for amere amount ofRs6,000.TheAWTsubleasedtheplot toacommercialorganizationforanannualamount inexcessofRs17.5 million thus making a huge profit in the process and causing a substantial loss to the publicexchequer.Aftergettingnoresponse,theNGOsoughttheinterventionoftheFederalOmbudsmanwhichresponded:‘Yourcomplainthasbeenexamined.Itshowsthatthematterrelatestoadefenceorganizationor is connected with the defence of Pakistan. In such circumstances, the Ombudsman cannot takecognizanceofthismatter,asperthelaw.’ArepresentationfiledbeforethepresidentofPakistanin2012hasbeenpendingsince.EvenarequesttotheCantonmentExecutiveOfficerofKarachiinquiringaboutthe laws and notification regarding the fee charged for car parking was also not answered by theconcerneddepartment.AsubsequentappealtotheOmbudsmanagainsttherefusalofinformationwasalsodismissedonthegroundsthatthematterisrelated‘tothedefenceofPakistan’.55Clearly, theleasingofstate-ownedlandtoaprivateorganizationatthrowawaypricesorchargingcarparkingfeeswithoutlegalsanction isnothingmore than institutionalizedcorruptionand reinforces the fact that thearmy is a lawuntoitself.Business interests of the armed forces, especially land acquisitions, seem to have kept pace with

increaseddefenceallocationsovertheyears.RealestatehavegrownsofastthatatonepointajudgeoftheLahoreHighCourt,whenexamining themapofLahore showing theexpansionofDefenceHousingAuthority(DHA),remarkedthat‘itseemshalfofLahoreisgoingtobeDHA’.56

Thedamagethatsuchactivitieshavedonetothearmy’simageisreflectedinthecomparisonthatShujaNawazmakesbetweentheslogansof1965and2007.Inthemiddleofthe1965warwithIndia,oneofthepopular patriotic songs was ‘Ae watan ke sajeele jawanon; meray naghme tumhare liye hain’ (‘Osplendidsoldiersofthehomeland,mysongsareforyou’).By2007,thecountrysawthejarringbannercarriedbylawyerswhowereprotestingtheremovalofachiefjusticebythemilitaryrulersofPakistan:‘Ae watan ke sajeele Gernailo; saaray ruqbey tumhare liye hain’ (‘O handsome generals of thehomeland,alltheplotsarejustforyou’).57

Giventhehugecommercial interests that thethreeserviceshavedeveloped, itwouldnotbetoofar-fetchedtoimaginethattheircorporateinterestshavestarteddictatingthetrajectoryoftheirpoliciesand

attitudes, at least domestically.Moreover, the military leadership regards even a fair criticism on itscorporateinterestsasadeliberatecampaigntomalignthemilitaryandhencetreasonous.58

Theperiodicboutsofmartiallawandthearmydominatingevenduringperiodsofcivilianrulehavehadsevere consequences for the development of Pakistan and for the army itself. Lt Gen. Gul Hassanprobablysummeditupbestwhenhewrote:

Our environment went askew because martial law became a part and parcel of our veryexistence, thereby burdening the army with the dual tasks of administering the country anddefending it in any emergency. I shall frankly state that we failed miserably in both theseundertakings.Ourcommitmenttomartiallawwastotalin1971,wheninspiteofthefactthattheArmywasall-in-all,therewasnocommunicationwhatsoeverbetweentheGovernmentandtheGHQ.Thevoidwasabsolute,andithadtobeexperiencedtobebelieved.59

Musharraftoocommentedontheeffectsofmartiallaw:‘Ourpastexperiencehasamplydemonstratedthat martial law damages not only military but also civilian institutions, because as the army getssuperimposed on civil institutions the bureaucracy becomes dependent on army officers to make thecrucialdecisionsthattheythemselvesshouldbemaking.’60

Whileboutsofmartiallawhavebeenbadenough,worsehasbeenthearmy’spropensitytoseesecurityprimarilyinmilitaryterms.Asaresultofthis,ahugeproportionoffundshashadtobeallocatedtothemilitary.Theargumentofthearmy,whichhasbeenboughtbypoliticianstryingtosecuretheirownfuture,has been that such spending is necessary for the defence of the territorial and ideological frontiers ofPakistanagainstIndia,andthatitisnotIndianintentionsbuttheircapabilitiesthathavetobefactoredin.Resultantly, allocation of such massive resources to the military has left very little for economicdevelopmentandinvestmentinissuesoflong-termsecuritylikeeducation,water,infrastructure,health.Given the poor shape of its economy, Pakistan can only sustain such massive expenditure on the

militarybyignoringothervitalsectors.Suchaskewedmodelhasbecomearecipefordisaster.Asthediscussioninthechaptersonwater,economy,educationandpopulationwillshow,Pakistanisfacinganemergencyineachofthese,primarilybecauseoflackofinvestmentoverthedecades.Nationalsecuritydoesnotresidesolelyinmilitarypowerbutalsoinseveralnon-militaryareas.Both

hardandsoftpowerhavetobeblendedtoprovideaholisticsecuritytoanycountry.Infact, intoday’sworlditisnotsomuchmilitaryprowessaseconomicstrengththatcouldprovetobedecisive.AsPaulKennedy,surveyingtheriseandfallofgreatpowersoverthepastfivecenturies,concludes:‘…thefactremainsthatallthemajorshiftsintheworld’smilitarypowerbalanceshavefollowedalterationsintheproductivebalances…[In]theGreatPowerwars…victoryhasalwaysgonetothesidewiththegreatestmaterialresources.’61

Acommonthreadthatrunsthroughthearmy’sthinkingandactionssince1947hasbeenitstacticalnature.Whether itwassending‘tribalraiders’ intoKashmir in1947,or‘infiltrators’ in1965,or‘mujahideen’intoKargilin1999,themoveswerealltactical,withoutconsideringthelong-termconsequences,oreven

seeing their logical conclusion. Such a conclusion was confirmed by Gen. Aslam Beg at a pressconferenceinSeptember1989inwhichhedescribedthe1965and1971warswithIndiaas‘apatheticstoryofhownottofightawar’.Bothwars,hesaid,werefoughtwithonlytacticalaimsandwithoutclearstrategicobjectives.Asaresult,thearmyhadsometacticalvictoriesbutPakistanlostthewars.62

In each of these tactical forays, Pakistan has lost much more than what it could have gained. Theattitudeseemstohavebeen‘throwthefirstpunchandtheconsequenceswilltakecareofthemselves’,ormorelikely,the‘USorChinawillbailusout’.Likewise,inAfghanistan,thechimeraofseeking‘strategicdepth’mayhavegainedPakistanaseatatthehightabletemporarily,butthecostthecountryhaspaidoverthe last twenty-fiveyears is incalculable,and thestory isbynomeansover.Forone thing, thegoalofPakistanevolvingintoamoderate,democraticanddevelopmentalstatehasebbedominously.There is no doubt that under the present trajectory, the armywill continue to dominate politics and

especially its core areas of interest – defence, foreign and nuclear policies. The Pakistan ArmywillcontinuetouseIslamandprojectitselfasanIslamicarmywithoutbecominganIslamizedarmy.Likewise,thechainofcommand is likely tohold,and there isunlikely tobeacivilwarwithorwithout Islamicovertonesunlesssomethingdrastic–ablack-swanevent–happens.WhatthearmyneedstoaskitselfiswhetherbysuchdominationPakistanisamore,oraless,secure

state today than it was, say, thirty years ago. It also needs to introspect whether Pakistan’s fragileeconomy can sustain such a security model without further worsening Pakistan’s structural problems,whichallthenuclearweaponsintheworldwillnotresolve.Finally,itneedstoaskitselfwhetherIndiaistheproblemor is theproblem itsownneed todominatePakistan forwhich the Indianbogeyhasbeensustained.

6

Civil–MilitaryRelations

Whateverbetheconstitutionalposition,onethingisclearthatinthefinalanalysis,politicalsovereignty in Pakistan resides neither in the electorate, nor the Parliament, nor theexecutive, nor the Judiciary, nor even theConstitutionwhich has superiority over all theinstitutions it creates. It resides, if it resides anywhere at all, where the coercive powerresides. In practice it is the ‘pouvoir occulte’ [the hidden power], which is the ultimateauthority in the decision-making process in Pakistan. They decide when to abrogate theConstitution; when it should be held in abeyance; when elected governments should besacked;andwhendemocracyshouldbegivenachance.Behindthescenes,theyalsodecidewhetheranelectedprimeministershallliveordie.1

—RoedadKhan

INMOSTdemocracies,civil–military relationsaresubject to laid-downguidelinesandprotocol,withthearmedforcesbeingresponsibletotheexecutive.InPakistan,however,civil–militaryrelationshavebeenthecentralissueingovernance.IfonetakesanoverviewofgovernmentsinPakistanfromthe1950still2016,aclearpatternofalternatingcivilianandovertmilitaryruleemerges.Whilethearmyhasinterveneddirectlyinthegovernanceofthecountryfourtimessince1947(fora

combinedperiodofthirty-fouryears),ithascalledtheshotsinareasthatpertaintonationalsecurityevenwhencivilianswereincharge.IqbalAkhundexplainsthissuccinctly:

OnAfghanistan,Kashmir and India thegovernmentwas facedwithvery complex and thornyissues, but the decision-making in all of these had been taken over by the army and theintelligenceagenciesinZia’stimeandthere,intheultimateanalysis,itremained.TheroleoftheForeignMinistrywasscarcelythatofprimusinterpares.2

Moreover,when thecivilianshave tried to stepoutof line, theyhavebeen removed.Thusbetween1988and1999,withanodfromthearmy,fourciviliangovernmentswereremoved–twiceofBenazirBhutto and twice of Nawaz Sharif – by the president using the infamous Article 58(2) (b) of theConstitution. Amore recent example is of theMarch 2009 period of political turmoil, whenGeneralKayani told theAmerican ambassador in Islamabad that he ‘might, however reluctantly’, pressureMrZardari(thethenpresident)toresignandmentionedAsfandyarWaliKhan,leaderoftheAwamiNationalParty, as a possible replacement. ‘Kayani made it clear regardless howmuch he disliked Zardari he

distrusted Nawaz even more’, the ambassador wrote in a cable leaked later byWikiLeaks.3 Thus, itwould perhaps be more accurate to say that Pakistan has been under military control for most of itsexistence.Suchastateofaffairscouldneverhavebeenimaginedin1947.AtthereceptiongivenbyJinnahon14

August1947whenAsgharKhanandLtCol(laterMaj.Gen.)AkbarKhanmetJinnah,KhantoldJinnahthat theyweredisappointed that thehigherposts in thearmedforceshadbeengiven toBritishofficerswhostillcontrolledtheirdestiny.AccordingtoAsgharKhan,‘theQuaidwhohadbeenlisteningpatientlyraisedhisfingerandsaid,“Neverforgetthatyouaretheservantsofthestate.Youdonotmakepolicy.Itiswe,thepeople’srepresentatives,whodecidehowthecountryistoberun.Yourjobisonlytoobeythedecisionofyourcivilianmasters.”’4

Could any politician have the temerity to say this to the army chief today?The answer has to be aresounding no. Hence, democratic governance in Pakistan instead of being a tripod of the executive,legislatureandjudiciarylooksmorelikeagardenumbrellainwhichthearmyisthecentralpolearoundwhichtheotherorgansofthestaterevolve.Consequently,civiliangovernmentsinPakistanhaveneitherdefinednationalsecurityobjectivesnordevelopedstrategiestoimplementthem.Twoexamplesillustratethisgraphically:one,thecontinuingambiguityaboutwhetherthethenprimeministerNawazSharifwasaware of, or had been briefed about, the 1999 Kargil intrusions; second, the civilian leadership inPakistanhasnorealcontroloverthecountry’snuclearassetsandpolicy.Boththeseexamplesunderlinethegravityoftheissueofcivil–militaryrelations.Initsessentials,thetusslebetweenthecivilandmilitaryauthoritiesinPakistanisnotjustaboutpower

andsupremacy.Itisaboutthecontemptthatthemilitaryholdsthepoliticiansinandabouttheirbeliefthatleft to themselves, the political classwill destroy Pakistan oneway or the other, or, at theminimum,compromiseitsvitalsecurityinterests.Atellingcommentistheinstructionsgivenbythethencommander-in-chiefAyubKhan toPakistan’s firstmilitaryattaché inWashingtonDC,BrigadierGhulamGillani, in1952,barelyfiveyearsafterPakistanwascreated.Hewastoldthathismaintaskwastoprocuremilitaryequipment from the Pentagon, and he need not take either the ambassador or Foreign Office intoconfidencebecauseinhisview,‘thesecivilianscannotbetrustedwithsuchsensitivemattersofnationalsecurity’.5

Later,AyubKhanwroteinanarticleinForeignAffairs:

Theformerpoliticiansarenoproblemtousnoworinthenearfuture.Wehavetakengoodcareto spare them the usual tragic fate of those overtaken by revolutionary upheavals. On thecontrary,wearecontenttotreatthemasabigjoke,justastheyturnedaperfectlysoundcountryintothelaughing-stockofthewholeworld.Whentheyareconfrontedwithskeletonscollectedfromtheircupboards,mostof themwiselyprefer to retireand,possibly, frompublic life forfivetosixyearsratherthanfacetheriskofopentrial.Thissavesalotofdirtylinenfrombeingwashedpublicly,anddecentfolkpreferthisquietexitoferrantpoliticians.6

AnotherexampleisintheForewordofGen.K.M.Arif’sbookonZia-ul-Haq:

Likemanyothersoldiers,hehadcontemptforpoliticians;however,hisdislikeofpoliticians…wasrootedinaknowledgeoftheseamieraspectsoftheirpersonalandpublicbehaviour…Zia

wasconvincedthatmostpoliticianshadaprice;andexperienceconfirmedhisopinionthatonlyafewwerepreparedtoriseabovetheirpettypersonalambitions.7

The curriculum at the National Defence College and the writings of officers in the army’s internalpublication,theGreenBook,haveoneunderlyingtheme:distrustofpoliticians.8Forexample,theentire322-pageGreenBook2000,publishedafterMusharraf’scoup,wasdedicatedtocelebratingtheroleofthemilitaryinsavingPakistanaftercivilianshadfailed.9

LtGen.HamidGulprobablyexpressedthearmy’ssentimentswellwhenhetoldIqbalAkhund,

[A]democraticgovernmentbyitsverynaturetendedtocompromise,andpoliticalcompromisemightsometimeruncountertothenationalinterest.So…theremustbesomemeansofdefiningand promoting the national interest, some means of rising above political partisanship andcompromiseonissuesofhighpolicy–suchasAfghanistan,Kashmir,orrelationswithIndia.10

Onereasonforsuchcontemptisthefailureofthepoliticianstounderstandthemilitaryanditsbeliefsystems.ShujaNawaznotespertinently:

Thegapbetweenthecantonmentandthecity,wherethecivilianslived,washugeandalmostinsurmountable. This divide continued well into the first couple of decades of independentPakistan,leadingnotonlytoseparateeconomicandsocialsystemsfortheseentities,butalsotoa different world view and indeed to a different view on national issues. Even today, thecantonment functions as an autonomous economy within the cities and towns of modernPakistan.11

Aconsequenceofsuchanattitudetowardstheciviliansisthearmy’sobsessiveneedtocontroleveryaspectofPakistan’snationalsecurity.Ontheotherhand,anydemocraticallyelectedgovernmentworthitssaltwouldliketohavefullcontroloverallpolicies,andpursuedevelopmentalstrategiestoensureare-election.Aclashis inherent insuchadichotomyandsofar ithasbeenthecivilgovernments thathaveblinked first. For example, oneway that the politicians can restrain the army’s clout is to reduce thedefenceexpenditure.Havingbetterrelationswithitsneighbours–IndiaandAfghanistan–isonewaytodo it. This, however, is unacceptable to the army which sees such efforts as an attack on Pakistan’sideology, or Nazaria-i-Pakistan, that implies unending hostility towards India and compromising theobjectiveof‘strategicdepth’inAfghanistan.Intheensuingtussle,itisthearmythatwinssimplybecausethepoliticalclassinPakistanisbothtimidandnotunited–politicianswillalwaysbreakrankstodothearmy’sbidding,whileinthearmytherearenoservingdissenters.Contemptforpoliticiansapart, thearmy,since the inceptionofPakistan,hasnot reallybelieved that

democracyissuitedtoPakistan.Thekeyelementinthe‘RawalpindiConspiracy’hatchedin1949–51byMaj.Gen.AkbarKhanwashisopenscornforpoliticians‘whomheblastedforincompetence,indecisionandcorruption’.12Sevenyearsafter theRawalpindiConspiracy,Gen.AyubKhanstated: ‘It isnowthefashiontoblamethepoliticiansoutrightforthismess.Yes,theywereguiltyofmanymisdeedsofomissionandcommission;but there isone fundamentalpoint inwhich, Ihavea feeling, theywere rather sinnedagainst thansinning.That is, theyweregivenasystemofgovernmenttotallyunsuitedtothetemperand

climateof thecountry.’13Onanotheroccasion,AyubKhanstated, ‘Wemustunderstand thatdemocracycannotworkinahotclimate.TohavedemocracywemusthaveacoldclimatelikeBritain.’14

Echoing Ayub but using Islam instead of climate, Zia at a press conference stated: ‘Our presentpoliticaledificeisbasedontheseculardemocraticsystemoftheWest,whichhasnoplaceinIslam…InPakistanneitheranarchynorWesternismwillwork.ThiscountrywascreatedinthenameofIslamandinIslamthereisnoprovisionforWestern-typeelections.’15

Musharrafgavehisown twist by stating, ‘Ourdemocracy is notmature in the country. I thinkmanypoliticiansdonotbehaveinamaturemanner…Ihaveabeliefthatdemocracyhastobemodifiedtoanenvironment;thatisthereasonofmyretainingthepowerofdismissinganassembly.’16

The trend of the army’s role in politics began almost at the very creation of Pakistan. For example,Pakistan’spolitical leaders failed to foreseeorpoliticallyanalyse the repercussionsofendorsingMaj.Gen.AkbarKhan’splanofsending‘raiders’intotheKashmirValley,whichledtothefirstIndia–Pakistanwar in1948.Gen.FrankMesservy, the first commander-in-chiefof thePakistanArmy (1947–48)wasquicktorecognizethesignsandwarnedabouttheerosionofthearmy’sapoliticaltradition.HesaidhewasfedupwithwhatwasgoingoninKashmir;themannerinwhichitwasgoingon;allbehindhisback.He predicted that politically minded young officers would make a mess of things under the garb ofpatriotism.Headded, ‘Politiciansusing soldiers and soldiers allowing themselves tobeused,withoutproperapprovalofsuperiors,weresettingabadexampleforthefuture.’17

Havingdonned themantleofsavioursofPakistanwith thepower todeterminewhat is inPakistan’sbest interest, the army also claims the right to take charge directly when, as determined by them, thecivilians are unable to govern. Thus, the army has intervened periodically to pause democracy in anattemptto‘sortoutthebloodycivilians’.However,everymilitarydictatorhashadto‘civilianize’himselfbecauseeverymilitarydictatorrealizedthathecouldnotgovernacountryascomplexasPakistanwithoutthe‘bloodycivilians’.AyubKhanandYahyaco-optedZ.A.Bhutto,Ziaco-optedMuhammadKhanJunejoandMusharraf had to get TajMuhammad Jamali and ShaukatAziz. In June 2001,Musharraf declaredhimselfpresidentinthe‘supremenationalinterest’.TheDawnsummedthisupbrilliantly:

MilitaryrulersinPakistantraverseafamiliarandwell-troddenroute,soonerorlaterassumingthetitleandofficeofpresident.IttookGeneralAyubKhanthreeweekstoarriveatthisstage,GeneralYahyaKhan a few days.General Zia-ul-Haq about a year and it has takenGeneralPervezMusharrafalittleovereighteenmonthstocoverthesamejourney.18

Thearmyhas rationalized its ‘reluctant’ takeover in twoways.First is the ‘threat tonational security’argument–thatPakistanwasunderthreatduetotheactivitiesofthepoliticians,thearmycouldnotallowthistocontinue,andonlythearmycouldsecurePakistan;secondisthedisinteresteddemocratargument–the army did not hanker after power, democracywould not be derailed, the armywould ‘reform’ thesystemand electionswouldbeheld soon.Such rationalization is evident in the statementsmadewhenmartiallawhasbeenimposed.InOctober1958,Gen.AyubKhansaidthatthearmedforceswereforcedtoimposemilitaryrule,‘with

greatreluctance–butwiththefullestconvictionthattherewasnoalternativeexceptthedisintegrationandcompleteruinationofthecountry.Historywouldneverhaveforgivenusifthepresentchaoticconditionswereallowedtogoonanyfurther.’Themilitary’sonlyobjective,hestressed,wastogivethecountry‘asound democratic system and lay the foundations for a stable future… our ultimate aim is to restoredemocracy…butofthetypethatpeoplecanunderstandandwork.’19

In1969,thechiefmartiallawadministrator,Gen.YahyaKhan,asserted:

Thesituationhasdeterioratedtosuchanextentthatnormallawenforcingmethodshavebecometotally ineffective and have almost completely broken down.…The nation has to be pulledback to safety and normal conditions have to be restoredwithout delay. TheArmed Forcescouldnot remain idlespectatorsof thisstateofnearanarchy.Theyhave todo theirdutyandsavethecountryfromutterdisaster.MysoleaiminimposingMartialLawis toprotect life, libertyandpropertyof thepeople

andtoputtheadministrationbackontherails.…Ihavenoambitionotherthanthecreationofconditionsconducivetotheestablishmentofaconstitutionalgovernment.20

In1977,thechiefofthearmystaff,Gen.Zia-ul-Haqsaid:

When thepolitical leaders failed tosteer thecountryoutofacrisis, it is inexcusable for theArmedForcestositassilentspectators.ItisprimarilyforthisreasonthattheArmyperforcehadtointervene,tosavethecountry.…IwanttomakeitabsolutelyclearthatneitherIhaveanypoliticalambitionsnordoesthearmywanttobedetractedfromitsprofessionofsoldiering.Iwasobligedtostepintofill thevacuumcreatedbythepoliticalleaders.IhaveacceptedthechallengeasatruesoldierofIslam.Mysoleaimis toorganizefreeandfairelectionswhichwouldbeheldinOctoberthisyear.21

InOctober1999,GeneralPervezMusharrafsaidthathehadtakenoverpower‘inextremelyunusualcircumstances–notofmymaking’–andaccusedPrimeMinisterNawazSharifof‘intriguingtodestroythelastinstitutionofstabilityleftinPakistanbycreatingdissensionwithintheranksofthearmedforcesof Pakistan’.22 ‘This is not martial law, only another path to democracy. The armed forces have nointentionofstayinginchargeanylongerthanisabsolutelynecessarytopavethewayfortruedemocracytoflourishinPakistan.’23

Thereare,ofcourse, limits tohowoften thearmycandirectly interveneoreven indirectlypush thecivilians. For one thing, there is the fear that the USwould cut off aid onwhich the army is greatlydependent.Second, aspreviousexperiencesofdirect interventionhave shown,Pakistan isnot aneasycountrytogovern.AsAyubKhanlamented:‘Weareaverydifficultcountrystructurally.PerhapsIpushedittoohardintothemodernage.Wearenotreadyforreforms.Quitefrankly,Ihavefailed.Imustadmitthatclearly.Ourlawswereforasophisticatedsociety.’24Moreover, thesystemicfaults in thePakistaneconomyarebeyondthecompetenceofthearmytofix,eventhoughithasmanagedtoacquireandrunavast business empire.Not surprisingly, the armyhas found that its own credibility has taken a beatingeverytimeithasintervened.

AyubKhanprovidedadamningindictmentofhisownelevenyearsofmilitaryruleinhislastaddresstothenationon25March1969.Hesaid:

IthurtsmedeeplytosaythatthesituationisnolongerunderthecontroloftheGovernment.Allgovernment institutions have become victims of coercion, fear and intimidation … Everyprinciple,restraintandwayofcivilizedexistencehasbeenabandoned.Everyproblemof thecountry isbeingdecidedin thestreets.Exceptfor theArmedforces there isnoconstitutionalandeffectivewaytomeetthesituation.25

Thisbeingso,theobviousquestioniswhytheydidnotletthe‘bloodycivilians’continueinthefirstplace.Whilethatquestionremainsunanswered,thefactisthatithastakenthecountryyearstorecoverpoliticallyfromeveryinterventionofthearmy.Thealternatingcivilandmilitaryrulesuggeststhatneithertheciviliansnorthemilitaryhavebeenina

position to provide suitable governance to the country. This is borne out by the fact that each time aciviliangovernmentisbootedout,thepublichaswelcomedthemilitarywithgarlands,andeachtimethemilitarybowsoutanddemocracyisrestored,thesamepublichasequallywelcomedthepoliticianswithgarlands. In short, neither has the armybeen able tomanage the affairs of the state anybetter than theciviliangovernmentitgotridof,norhavetheciviliangovernmentsdemonstratedtheabilitytodosoanybetterthanthearmy.Ultimately,itisthepublicthatisleftdangling,inanelusivesearchofaleaderwhocouldamelioratetheirproblems.IsthenPakistanungovernable,orareitsleadersincapableofgoverningPakistan?Giventhesituation

Pakistanisin,thejuryisstilloutonthisall-importantquestion.

Therehavebeenatleastthreeoccasionswhenelectedprimeministerscouldhavetakenfirmcontrolofthearmyandclippeditswings.Onallthreeoccasions,theciviliansfailed.ZulfikarAliBhuttohadthebestopportunityoftakingthearmyhead-onandcuttingitdowntosizein

thewakeofthearmy’shumiliatingdefeattoIndiain1971,whenitsmachoimagewasdestroyedanditsreputationwas at an all-time low.AsZiringputs it: ‘At the endofYahya’s tenure,Pakistanwas evenmore“moth-eaten”thanatthetimeofpartition.ThePakistanArmy,therecipientofthegreaterportionofresources,layinashambles,evenmoredemoralizedthanthegeneralpopulation.’26

Bhutto was also inclined to do so. In 1966, in London, Tariq Ali had asked Bhutto why he hadembroiled the country in anunwinnablewar (1965).The reply, saysTariqAli,was ‘breathtaking’: ‘Itwastheonlywaytoweakenthebloodydictatorship.Theregimewillcrackwideopensoon.’27Likewise,in 1968 during the student uprising, Bhutto promised the students that after the people’s victory, theywould‘dressthegeneralsinskirtsandparadethemthroughthestreetslikeperformingmonkeys’.28

However,accordingtoZiring,‘BhuttowastooclosetothedisasterthatengulfedtheformerPakistantounderstand the significance of the dismemberment. … It must be remembered that Bhutto declaredPakistanhadbeen‘saved’onhisreturntoKarachifromDaccathedayafterthePakistanArmyattackedtheprecinctsofDaccaUniversity.’29Moreover,Bhutto’sattitudetowardsIndiawassimilartothatofthearmy.HewasblindedbyhishatredforIndiaandwasdeterminedtocontinuetheconfrontation.Afterall,

hehadfamouslyremarked:‘IfIndiabuildsthebomb,wewilleatgrassandleavesforathousandyears,evengohungry,butwewillgetoneofourown.’Itwasthisimperativeofpursuingananti-Indiapolicythatmadehimneedthearmyratherthantrimitdowntosize.WhatBhuttodidwas to insert a legaldeterrence in the shapeofArticle6of the1973Constitution,

whichprescribedcapitalpunishmentforanyattempttooverthroworsubverttheConstitutioninanyway.However,thisdidnotpreventhisoverthrowbyZia.AsAkhundnotes,‘Thearmedforcesaretrainedandprogrammedtounquestioningobedience,sowhenanordercomesdowntheproperchainofcommand,themanwhoistocarryitoutisunlikelytocheckitfirstwithhiscopyoftheConstitution.’30

NawazSharifhadthesecondopportunitywhenMusharrafwasdiscreditedasarmychiefforthefailureof theKargil intrusions in1999.Insteadof takingactionagainstMusharraf immediately,NawazwaitedforsixmonthsbywhichtimeMusharrafhadbouncedbackthroughamassivemediacampaignthatitwasNawazwhohadletthearmyandthecountrydown.Finally, Zardari as president andGilani as primeminister had another opportunity on 2May 2011

when theUSkilledOsamabinLaden inAbbottabad, followedvery soonby the attackon theMehrannavalbaseon22May2011.Theeventswereadisasterforthearmy.ThenthereweremanyinPakistanwhofelt thateither thearmyknewandhadhidOsama,or that itwasan incompetentanddysfunctionalarmy.Thisledtoquestionslikewhethersuchanarmyshouldbeentitledtomassivechunksofthebudget.Ineithercase,aboldciviliangovernmentshouldhavetakenthearmytotask,andthearmychiefandDG,Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) shouldhavebeen sacked to set anexampleof civilian supremacy.Butthiswasnottobe.Likeafterthe1971debaclewhenthearmygotitsmedialackeystoturnthetablesonBhutto,heretoothe‘talkshow’hostsstartedquestioningtheUSviolationofPaksovereignty.Thus,PMGilanihadthemortificationofhavingtothreatentheUSafewdaysaftertheraid.Thearmywasabletoquicklyregaintheupperhandandthewholedebateturnedonitsheadwiththe

focus on the violation of Pak sovereignty rather than the role of the army and the ISI in either hidingOsamabinLadenorintheirfailuretopreventtheUSraid.Thisopportunitytoowaslost.EventheleakedAbbottabad Commission report in 2013 put the blame on ‘collective failure’ of state military andintelligenceauthoritiesand‘routine’incompetenceateverylevelofcivilgovernancestructure,ratherthanidentifyanypersonorinstitutionforspecificblame.31

Asnoted in thepreviouschapter, thearmy is likely todominatePakistanand its core interests.GulHassanputshisfingeronthereason:

AsfarasIcanforesee,thespecterofMartialLawwillbeever-presentinPakistan,unlesssheproducespoliticalleaderswhocanlookbeyondprovincialhorizons,beabove-board,possesshonestyofpurpose,commandthesolidsupportofthemasses,andbegenuinelyconcernedwiththeirwelfare, and lastbutbynomeans least,bepatriots.Thiswouldbea tallorder forourpoliticalcommunitytofulfill,anditwillbeequallywishfultoconsoleourselvesthatonefinedaytheleadershipoftheArmymaydecidetodevotethemselveswhollytotheirprofession.32

Tothissummation,Cohenadds:‘BecauseitbelievesitisPakistan’sguardian,andbecauseithasthemeanstoenforcethisbelief,thearmywillremainthemostimportantinstitutioninPakistanformanyyears…Sincethearmythinksithastheonlytrueprofessionalabilitytohandlenationalsecurityorthenationalinterest, Pakistan is likely to be in for a long spell of direct and indirectmilitary rule. Therefore the

beliefsoftheofficercorpswillshapebothPakistan’sdomesticandforeignpolicies.’33

RecentdevelopmentsconfirmtheprognosisofGulHassanandCohen.Theestablishmentofmilitarycourtstotryterrorsuspects,bypassingtheregularjudicialsystem,inthewakeoftheterroristattackontheArmyPublicSchool inPeshawar inDecember2014and thestemmingofanyprogressonrelationswithIndiahasreiteratedthearmy’sascendancyinforeignandsecurityaffairs.Militarycourtsapart,thearmy is seen to have taken charge, and the civilian government, having failed to cope with internalsecurity issues, especially religious extremism and terrorism, has chosen to sit on the sidelines andabdicateditsresponsibility.AsaresultarmychiefGen.RaheelSharif’sprofilehasincreasedbyleapsandboundsincomparisontothatofPrimeMinisterNawazSharifandmembersofhiscabinetwhoareperceivedas indecisive, lacking in leadershipandvision.GeneralSharif isperceived tobe takingallmajor policy decisions on issues pertaining to internal and external security. Little wonder then thatcolumnists have started describing the ascendancy of the army and the current state of civil–militaryrelationsasa‘softcoup’ora‘creepingcoup’.The key mechanism of the ‘soft coup’ is the system of apex committees set up to monitor the

implementation of the National Action Plan.34 Committees consisting of the civilian and militaryleadershiphaveformallygiventhearmyaroleinthecivilianadministrativedomainandrelegatedfederalandprovincialcabinetsintothebackground.Theyhavebecomethepivotalbodyfortakingdecisionsonissuesthatfallprimarilyintheciviliandomain.Tomaskthefundamentalchangethathastakenplaceinthecabinetsystemofgovernance,thewordbeingusedisthatthecivilianandmilitaryleadershipareon‘one page’, or ‘same page’, a euphemism for the former having abdicated its responsibility and beingallowedtostayoninpower.35

Howdidthisincrementalshiftofpowercomeaboutandwherewillitend?ItisindeedaremarkableU-turnfromMay2013wheneveryonehailedthedemocratictransitionfromoneciviliangovernmenttoanotherasasignofPakistan’smaturingdemocracy.Twosignpoststhatheraldedtheshiftarenoteworthy.The firstwasNawazSharif’s flip-flopsover involving thearmychief to resolve theprotestsof ImranKhanandTahir-ul-QadriinAugust2014.Afteraskingthearmychieftofacilitateapeacefulresolution,NawazShariflatertriedtobacktrackbyputtingtheonusontheOpposition.ItwaslefttotheISPRtorebutthePMpublicly.ThesecondwashislackofleadershipafterthetragedyinPeshawarinDecember2014.LetalonevisittheschoolimmediatelyNawazSharifdidnotevencomeonTVtoconsolethenation.Thiswas in contrast to the army chief who was seen as leading from the front. It was this abdication ofpoliticalandconstitutionalresponsibilityandleadershipthatcontrastedwiththevigorousmovesbythearmychiefinthehouroftragedy.Resultantly,moreandmorespacehasbeenconcededtothemilitaryoninternalsecuritymattersandanincrementalshiftingofpowertowardsthemilitaryhastakenplace.36

Thecurrentimbalanceincivil–militaryrelationswasgraphicallydemonstratedwhen,afterameetingofthecorpscommandersinNovember2015,theISPRthroughapressrelease,expressedconcernaboutthepoor implementationof theNationalActionPlan (NAP)by the civiliangovernment.The statementquotedthearmychiefashavingunderlinedtheneedformatching/complementarygovernanceinitiativesforlong-termgainsofoperationsandenduringpeaceacrossthecountry.Itfurtherstatedthat‘progressofNational Action Plan’s implementation, finalization of FATA reforms, and concluding all ongoing[investigations by Joint Investigation Teams] JITs at priority were highlighted as issues which couldunderminetheeffectofoperations’.37

Whilethewordingofthestatementwasasevereindictmentoftheciviliangovernment,thefactthatthearmychose togopublicbarely twenty-fourhoursafterahigh-levelmeetingbetween thePM, thearmychiefandtheirtopaidesmadeitmuchworse.Allthatthegovernmentcoulddointhefaceofsuchblatantcriticism was to issue a rejoinder saying that the NAP was a joint responsibility. Even though manybelieve that the army is stepping outside its domain, suchmoves are popular because the civilians –provincialgovernments inSindhandPunjaband thePML-Nfederalgovernment–hardlyevercrackeddownonterrorismandcorruption.Where thiswillendwoulddependentirelyon theabilityof thecivilian leadership toretakecontrol

andprovideleadership,andontheappetiteofthearmychief–howmuchwouldhewanttoassertcontrol.AsAyubKhantoldhissonGoharAyubatatimewhenhewasnotwellandthearmychief,Gen.YahyaKhan,wassniffingatpower,‘YouhaveservedinGHQandshouldknowthatiftheCommander-in-ChiefofthePakistanArmygetsitintohisheadtotakeover,thenitisonlyGodabovewhocanstophim.’38

IndicativeofthechangedequationsisthefactthattheGHQhasnowbecomeanimportantdestinationforvisitingforeigndignitaries,includingtheAfghanpresident,theIranianforeignministerandothers.Thethreechiefsevenmet theChinesepresident inhishotelwithout thedefenceministerbeingpresent.Allthissignalstheenhancedroleofthemilitary.39EventheChineseambassadorinIslamabadhastakentomeetingthearmychieftoresolveissuesrelatingtotheChina–PakistanEconomicCorridor(CPEC)ratherthanrelyonthecivilianstodoso.Thedanger,ofcourse, is thatsuchpublicadulationcouldgetoutofhand.AsAbbasNasir,aformer

editorofDawn,toldtheGuardian:‘Myworryisthiscompletelyone-sidedpraise,ifitgetstotheheadofsomemilitaryleaders,mayleadusbacktomisadventurism,whetherthat’samarchonIslamabadorsomesortofanattackonIndia.Ifyouareconstantlytoldyouaregreat,soonerorlateryouwillbelieveit.’40

Gen.RaheelSharifmayormaynotnursedictatorialambitions,havingalreadyannouncedthathedoesnotwantanextension,butwhatabouthissuccessor?Whataboutgreaterinvolvementofthearmyininternalaffairs,normallyapreserveofthecivilians?Whatabouttheheightenedexpectationsofthepublicfromthearmyratherthanfromthecivilians?Theseareissuesthatshouldbeofseriousconcernforthefutureofcivil–militaryrelations.Moreover,theappointmentoftherecentlyretiredLtGen.Janjuaasthenationalsecurityadviser(arole

beingperformedsofarbySartajAziz)institutionalizesthearmy’sroleinsecuritypolicy,especiallyonissues like Indo-Pak relations andPak-Afghan relations. The caveat, of course, is that he continues toenjoytheconfidenceandtrustofthearmychief.AmootquestioniswhetherPakistanwouldgraduallybecomelessofasecuritystatewerethecivilians

togainanupperhand,unlikely though itmayseem today.Would, forexample,aciviliangovernment’sIndiaandAfghanpoliciesbeanydifferent,woulditbeabletojettisonthejihadistructurenurturedoverthe decades for foreign policy purposes?There is no easy answers precisely because the odds of thecivilians getting the upper hand are so long. And it is unlikely that the army would ever permit thecivilianstoemergeontop.Theonlywaythecivilianscanreversethetrendiswhentheystrengtheninner-partydemocracyaswell

asparliament,whichwould, in turn,strengthendemocracyinthecountry.Theywouldhavetoraisethebar of governance to ameliorate the condition of the people and come to be seen as effectiveadministrators.Ifthepoliticianscan’tdothattheywillbelefttoblamethemselvesandlamenttheirfate.

TheWest has not helped civil–military relations in Pakistan either.AsCohen puts it, for theUS inparticular,a ‘pro-WesternPakistan,astablePakistan,aprosperousPakistanandademocraticPakistanwerealldesirablebutinthatorder’.41Notsurprisingly,thearmychiefisgivenfarmoreimportancebytheUS than cabinetministers of the Pakistan government, undermining the civilian establishment. Theclassicexamplewas the firstPak-USstrategicdialogue in theUSwhere the starwasarmychiefGen.Kayani rather thanShahMehmoodQureshi, the foreignministerwhowas the leaderof thedelegation.Gen.Kayanidemonstratedhis importanceagainin the thirdUS–PakistanStrategicDialogueinOctober2010bymeetingbothmilitaryandcivilianleaders,includingPresidentObama.42IthasbeennodifferentforGen.Kayani’s successor,Gen.Raheel Sharif.His visit to theUS inNovember 2015 got farmoreattentionandwasbilledasbeingmore important than theOctober2015visitofPrimeMinisterSharifduringwhichthePMhadmetPresidentObama.According to David Sanger, when formal meetings with the Pakistanis were held for the cameras,

AmericanleaderswouldsitdownwiththePakistanipresidentorprimeministerandlaudthearrivalofademocratically elected civilian government. That was almost entirely for show. When they wantedsomethingdone,theyignoredtheciviliansandcalledKayani.43

Toconclude,at theheartof thedistortedcivil–militaryrelationshasbeen thefailureof thedemocraticprocesstodeepenandtakefirmroots.Despitethepassageofsixty-nineyearssinceitscreation,Pakistanhas been unable to create vibrant, mature and credible democratic political institutions which canwithstand the manipulations of the army. If the 2013 elections that heralded the first-ever democratictransitioninmorethansixdecadesaretohavethepotentialoferodingtheoverwhelminginfluenceofthearmy,attheveryminimumNawazSharifhastoensurethatthe2018electionsresult inanotherciviliangovernment. It will only be a succession of democratic governments that can give the civilians theconfidencetostanduptothearmy.Thefactthatmilitaryrulershavehadtoco-optcivilianstolegitimizetheirruleisindicativeofthefact

thatthearmyrealizesitslimitations.Ifthepoliticiansdidnothaveblacksheepintheirmidstandiftheywereabletocloseranksandbidetheirtimeforpower,itisunlikelythatthearmycouldeithertakeoverpower or prevent any democratic government in exercising full powers, including those relating toPakistan’s security. This, however,may be a tall order, given the disruptive, personality-oriented andpolarizednatureofpolitics inPakistan. In thenear tomediumterm,Pakistan’scivilian institutionsandpoliticiansareunlikelytohavetherequiredcapabilitiestogenuinelyexercisecontroloverthemilitary.Thatiswhythearmywouldbehappywiththecurrent‘softcoup’.Theconundrumfacedbythearmyisthatif itallowstheciviliangovernmentspacetogovernlikein

any other democratic country, the government will want to interfere and control matters the armyconsidersitspreservelikedefenceandforeignpolicy.Thiswouldbeanathematothearmysinceitdoesnot trust the civilians to do the right thing. However, without strengthening civil government, withoutgivingitspacetogovern,thecountrywillcontinueitsdangerousslide.Thearmyhasyettoresolvethisconundrum;andtillitdoes,Pakistanwillcontinuecourtingtheabyss.

T

IV

TheSuperstructure

HISSECTIONlooksattheinterrelatedissuesofIslamization,sectarianism,themadrasasand,finally,terrorism.Thecommonthreadbetweenthemhasbeenthecynicaluseofreligionbysuccessiverulers

fortacticalobjectives,ignoringthefactthattheywereplayingwithfire.ThoughGen.Zia-ul-HaqismostassociatedwithIslamization,hewasfollowingatraditionestablishedduringthePakistanmovement,theonlydifferencebeing thathewas a truebeliever, unlike theother rulerswhoprecededand succeededhim.However,periodicdosesofIslamizationhaveradicalizedsocietyontheonehandandinjectedthepoison of sectarianism, on the other.Over sixty years ago, the JusticeMunir EnquiryReport of 1954highlighted how each of the forty-odd ulema belonging to different sects, who appeared before theEnquiryCommissiondeclaredeveryothersectaskafirandassertedthathissectalonewastrulyIslamic.Thingshaveonlybecomeworsesincethen.ThemushroomgrowthofmadrasashasbeenanadjuncttotheIslamizationandgrowthofsectarianism,

witheachsectsettingupitsownmadrasas.Theanti-Soviet jihadinAfghanistanandtheneedforfreshrecruitsforthejihadprovidedanaddedfilliptothegrowthofmadrasas.Theyhavebecomesuchaforceastoresistperiodicattemptsbydifferentgovernmentstoregulatethemandtheircurriculum.ThegrowthofterroristorganizationsinPakistanisthedirectresultofthesupportgiventothembythe

statewhichusesterrorismasaninstrumentofdomesticandforeignpolicy.Theircontinuedexistenceisprimarilybecauseoftheselectiveapproachadoptedbythearmyindealingwithterrorists,targetingsomeandencouragingothers.Resultantly,Pakistantodayisperhapsthemostradicalizedandviolentstateintheworld.Today, the enforcement of the sharia is being demanded not only by the Taliban and other terrorist

groupsbutalsobyallmainstreamreligiouspoliticalpartiesasthepanaceaofalltheillsofPakistan.Butifimplemented,whoseshariawillitbe?

7

IslamizationandGrowthofSectarianism

Surely,itistimetoreflectonwhatmakessomanyPakistanisdisposedtowardscelebratingmurder, lawlessnessand intolerance.Tounderstand thekindofpsychologicalconditioningthathasturnedusintonastybrutes,cruelbothtoourselvesandtoothers,Isuggestthatthereaders sample some of the Friday Khutbas [sermons] delivered across the country’sestimated 250,000mosques…Often using abusive language, the mullahs excoriate theirenemies: America, India, Israel, Christians, Jews, Hindus, Shias, and Qadianis. Beforeappreciativecrowds,theybreathefireagainsttheenemiesofIslamandmodernity.1

—PervezHoodbhoy

PAKISTANCAMEintobeinginthenameofIslamanddefineditselfasmamlekatkhudadad–adivinelygrantednation.JinnahdemandedaseparatehomelandfortheMuslimssothattheycouldpractiseIslam,freefrombeingswampedbytheHindumajority.Hissuccessors,civilandmilitary,haveall,invaryingdegrees,strengthenedtheIslamiccharacterofPakistan,eitheroutofconvictionoropportunisticallyforpoliticalsurvival.AplethoraofIslamicpoliticalparties(includingsomethathadopposedthecreationofPakistan), groups and organizations ensure that the Islamic nature of Pakistan is reiterated on a dailybasis.WherehasallthisleftPakistan?Onefactconcededbymostobserversisthatthereisfarmoreviolence

associatedwithreligioninPakistanin2016thantherewasin1947(leavingasidethePartitionriots,ofcourse).AsMusharrafasks,‘Wewereonceaperfectlynormal,religiouslyharmonioussociety,withonlyoccasionaltensionbetweentheSunniandShiasectsofourreligion.Howdidwereachthepresent-dayepidemicofterrorismandextremism?’2

Howdidthiscomeabout?Theseeds,asnotedearlier,weresownduringthePakistanmovementitself.SuccessiverulersincrementallyaddedtothetrajectoryofIslamizationtilltodaywhenthereisasituationwhereonesectofIslamisalmostatwarwithanother.SeveralwritersandhistorianshavepointedtothesecularnatureofJinnah,especiallyinhispersonal

life.ButthatistomissthepointthatitwasnotJinnah’ssecularlifestylebuthispublicpersonathatwasrelevanttothePakistanmovementandthelegacythatheleftbehind.Moreover,afterthe1937electionstherewasadefinitechange inJinnah’ssartorial style toappear Islamic.Moresubstantively,hestartedusinganappealtoIslamandsanctionedIslamicrhetoric.AndtheMuslimLeaguestartedusingulemasandpirs to garner support for the party in the name of Islam during the 1945–46 elections. Thus, despiteJinnah’ssecularpersona,thelogicofthetwo-nationtheoryandtheuseofIslamduringthelaststagesof

thePakistanmovementtiltedthepoliticaldiscourseinPakistantowardsIslamization.InsomeofhisinterviewstotheWesternmedia,JinnahhadsaidthatPakistanwouldnotbeatheocratic

stateandthatthestatehadnothingtodowithone’sreligion,apointthathereiteratedduringhisfamousaddresstotheConstituentAssemblyofPakistanon11August1947:

Youarefree;youarefreetogotoyourtemples,youarefreetogotoyourmosquesortoanyother place ofworship in this state of Pakistan.Youmay belong to any religion or caste orcreed; that has nothing to do with the business of the state. … We are starting with thisfundamentalprinciplethatweareallcitizens,andequalcitizens,ofonestate.…youwillfindthat in thecourseof timeHinduswouldcease tobeHindusandMuslimswouldcease tobeMuslims,notinthereligioussense,becausethatisthepersonalfaithofeachindividual,butinthepoliticalsenseascitizensofthestate.

However,twostatementsofJinnahweretothrowdoubtsontheaboveassertion.One,duringtheMuslimLeagueCouncilmeetingatKarachion14and15December1947hesaid,‘LetitbeclearthatPakistanisgoingtobeaMuslimstatebasedonIslamicideals.Itwasnotgoingtobeanecclesiasticalstate.InIslamthere is no discrimination as far as citizenship is concerned. The whole world, even UNO, hascharacterizedPakistanasaMuslimstate.’3Second,on25 January1948, justmonthsbeforehepassedaway and in failing health, he publicly retracted his earlier commitment to democratic citizenship bydeclaringthatPakistan’sConstitutionwouldbebasedonIslamiclaw(sharia)‘tomakePakistanatrulygreatIslamicState’.4

There is also evidence of Jinnah’s assurance to the ulema about the role of Islam in Pakistan. Forexample,MaulanaZafarAhmedThanviandAllamaShabbirAhmadUsmanimetJinnahinBombayon11June1947,whenheassuredthemthatPakistanwouldhaveanIslamicConstitution; that itwouldbeanIslamicstateandthepatternofsecularTurkeywouldnotbeadopted.5Inanearlierchapter,Jinnah’slettertothepirofMankiSharif6inNovember1945thattheConstituentAssemblywouldbeabletoenactlawsforMuslimsnotinconsistentwiththesharialawshasbeennoted.While Jinnah had given contradictory statements, therewas similar confusion among the ulemas on

Pakistan.TheJamaat founder,SyedAbulAlaMaududiwasopposed to thecreationofPakistanon thegrounds that ‘the demand for Pakistan was insufficiently Islamic to warrant support from Muslimbelievers’.Once created, however,Maududi led an aggressive campaign tomake Pakistan an Islamicstate.7 The stand of the central leadership of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind (JUH) led byMaulanaHusaynAhmedMadaniwaspro-Congress:‘Inthemodernage,nationsarefoundedonhomelands;nationsarenotfoundedonthebasisofraceorreligion.ThedwellersofEnglandarerecognizedasonenation,whereastheyhaveJewsandChristiansastheircitizens,andsuchisthecasewithAmerica,JapanandFrance.’8

SomeprominentdissidentsfromDeoband,however,likeMaulanaThanviandAllamaUsmanisupportedthe Muslim League. Maulana Thanvi even issued a fatwa calling onMuslims to support the MuslimLeagueandtojoinitastheonlycourseinaccordancewithsharia.9

Aquestion frequently asked is that being a secularist did Jinnah reallyunderstand the impact of theIslamic forces he was unleashing would have on the future of Pakistan. As noted earlier, if the LifecorrespondentBourke-Whiteistobebelieved,Jinnahdidrealizewhathehaddoneandwastorturedbyit.Moreover,ifhisspeechof11August1947wasanindicator,washetryingtomakeamends?Washe

trying toclawback thespace thathadbeenconceded in theambition togetPakistan?Whateverbe thecase,Jinnahhadclearlyunderestimatedwhathehaddone.Aftersloganslike‘Pakistankamatlabkya,lailaha ilallah’ to say ‘you are free to go to your temples’, etc.,was quite a somersault.Given such alegacyofopportunisticandcontradictorypolitics,itishardlysurprisinglythatsincePakistan’screationJinnah’s 11August speech has become hotly contested between those wanting to establish an Islamicorderandthoseafull-fledgeddemocracy.TheincrementalgrowthofIslamizationbeganevenbeforeJinnah’sdeath,infact,duringthedebatesin

theConstituentAssembly.On11August1947, samedayas Jinnah’s celebratedaddress, theAssemblyapprovedthedesignofthenewPakistanflag.ItwastheoldMuslimLeagueflagwithawhitecrescentandawhite five-pointed starwith theadditionof averticalbandofwhitenear themast,one fourthof thebreadth of the flag, intended to represent Pakistan’sminorities. Thiswas not comforting to theHinduelements in the Assembly, who argued for a less historically controversial emblem. The governmentspokesman,however,deniedblandlythatthecrescentandthestarhadanyreligiousconnotation.10

Lessthantwoyearslater,inMarch1949,LiaquatAliKhanwhowasfondofjazzsessionsmovedtheObjectivesResolutionintheConstituentAssemblywhichsaidthatsovereigntybelongedtoGodandthattheauthorityHehaddelegatedtothestateofPakistan,‘throughitspeople’,wouldbeexercised‘withinthelimitsprescribedbyHim’; that thestatewouldfullyobserve theprinciplesofdemocracy,freedom,equality,toleranceandsocialjusticeasenunciatedbyIslam;andthatitwouldenableMuslimstoordertheirindividualandcollectivelivesaccordingtotheteachingsandrequirementsofIslamassetforthintheQuranandSunnah.11Asnotedearlier,speakingontheResolution,LiaquatAliunderlinedthatthestatewouldinterfereinthelivesofthepeopleonthepretextofimplementingIslamicteachings.After its passage, Liaquat Ali Khan described the Objectives Resolution as ‘the most important

occasioninthelifeofthiscountry,nextinimportanceonlytotheachievementofindependence’.12ItdidprovetobesobecauseitwasthefirstmilestoneonthewaytomakingPakistanideologicallyanIslamicstate.Thoughhe stated thatPakistanwouldnot becomea theocracy, thedoorhadbeenopened for theIslamists.TheObjectivesResolutionbecame thepreambleof threeConstitutionsPakistansubsequentlyhad.The Objectives Resolution raised immediate concerns among the minorities, whose members held

almost20percentof theseats in theConstituentAssembly.Pakistan’sfirst justiceandlabourminister,Jogendra Nath Mandal, a Hindu, resigned stating: ‘Muslim League leaders are repeatedly makingdeclarationsthatPakistanisandshallbeanIslamicState.Islamisbeingofferedasthesovereignremedyforall earthlyevils.…In thatgrandsettingof theSharia,Muslimsaloneare rulerswhileHindusandother minorities are jimmies [members of other faiths, living in a Muslim state] who are entitled toprotectionataprice.’13

Begum Shaista Ikramullah (one of the two female representatives in the Constituent Assembly)providedadoseofrealityafterthepassageoftheObjectivesResolution:

What exactly have we achieved? I do not think that for a State where the majority of thepopulationisMuslim,itissuchatremendousachievementtohavedeclaredthatthesovereigntyof thisuniversebelongs toGodalone…Idonot thinkmeredeclarationof it issuchagreatachievementjustifiesanorgyofpraisewehavebeengivingtoourselves.14

The impact of the Objectives Resolution can be gauged from the ‘Report of the Court of InquiryConstitutedUnderPunjabActIIof1954toInquire into thePunjabDisturbancesof1953’.Theinquiry,headedbyJusticeM.MuniraspresidentandJusticeM.R.Kayaniasmember,wasconstitutedtoenquireinto the anti-Ahmadiya riots in Lahore in 1953 that were instigated to declare the Ahmadiyas non-Muslims.KnownastheJusticeMunirReport,itisoneoftheveryfewenquiryreportsthathaveseenthelight of day in Pakistan. The report is an amazing document and fundamental to our understanding ofwheretheoriginsoftheproblemsplaguingPakistanlie,andhowtheycontinuetoplaguethecountryevenmorevirulentlytoday.Itquestionedalargenumberofulemarepresentingdifferentpointsofview.Almostall the ulema stated that the demand to declare theAhmadiyas as non-Muslimswas a corollary to theObjectivesResolution.Thejudgesnotedthatitwasvehementlyurgedthat:

Pakistanwasclaimedandwasbrought intoexistenceso that thefuturepoliticalset-upof thenew State may be based on the Qur’an and the sunna and that the actual realization of thedemandandtheexpressrecognitionbytheObjectivesResolution,hadcreatedinthemindoftheulemaand the citizensofPakistan thebelief that anydemandwhich couldbe establishedonreligiousgroundswouldnotonlybeconcededbutwarmlywelcomedbythepeopleatthehelmofaffairsoftheStatewhohadduringthelastseveralyearsbeencryingthemselveshoarseovertheir intention to establish in Pakistan an IslamicStatewith a set-up of political, social andethicalinstitutionsoftheIslamicpattern.

The judges went on to state that the Quaid-i-Azam’s conception of a modern national state asarticulated in his 11 August 1947 speech, ‘… it is alleged, became obsolete with the passing of theObjectives Resolution on 12th March 1949’. The Report also noted ‘that the form of government inPakistan,ifthatformistocomplywiththeprinciplesofIslam,willnotbedemocraticisconcededbytheUlama.’ The Report’s conclusion was that a democracy, based on the will of the people, wasincompatiblewithanIslamicState.15

AyubKhantriedtosteeramiddlecourse.HebannedtheJamaatandimprisonedMaududibecauseofhisdislikeofIslamists.Ashewroteinhisautobiography,

SincenoonehaddefinedthefundamentalelementsofanIslamicConstitution,noConstitutioncould be called Islamic unless it received the blessings of all the Ulema. The only way ofhavingan IslamicConstitutionwas tohandover the country to theUlemaandbeseech them,‘leadkindlylight’.ThisispreciselywhattheUlemawanted.16

However, he used Islam for the purposes of strengthening the state. He saw Islam essentially as anideology that could strengthenPakistan. In amessage to the nation on 24December 1962,AyubKhanstated: ‘Pakistancame intobeingon thebasisof an ideologywhichdoesnotbelieve indifferencesofcolour,raceorlanguage.ItisimmaterialwhetheryouareaBengalioraSindhi,aBalochioraPathanoraPunjabi–weareallknittogetherbythebondofIslam.’17Ayub’slastingcontributiontoIslamizationofPakistan was the introduction of a course titled ‘Islamiat’ in the school curriculum. Curricula andtextbookswerestandardized,presentingaversionofhistoryshowingthatPakistanwastheculminationof

thejourneythatwasstartedinad712whenMohammedbinQasimlandedinSindh.ToAyub’sefforts,YahyaKhan,hissuccessor,addedthatthearmedforceswouldhenceforthalsobethe

guardians of Pakistan’s ‘ideological frontiers,18 a concept that was further developed by Zia-ul-Haq.Thesefrontiers,however,didnotlastlong.Bangladeshbrokeawayin1971becausereligionprovedtobe an inadequate gluewhen confrontedwith linguistic identity coupledwith lack of acceptance of themajorityprinciple.Unfortunately,Pakistanileadersweretolearnthewronglessonsfromthisdebacle–theyhaveresortedtomoreIslam,ratherthanotherelementstostrengthennationalismandidentity.ZulfikarAliBhutto,another leaderwithasecular lifestyle,continuedPakistan’sopportunisticuseof

Islam.BhuttogavePakistan its thirdConstitution inApril 1973 inwhich theObjectivesResolutionof1949 was included in the preamble; Islam was declared the state religion, and a Council of IslamicIdeology created to ensure that lawswere in harmonywith Islam. The Constitution required both thepresidentandtheprimeministertobeMuslimsandto‘strivetopreservetheIslamicideologywhichisthebasis for thecreationofPakistan’.19For thefirst time itwasmade‘incumbent forholdersofbothoffices to publicly confess their faith as “believers” by acknowledging the finality of Muhammad’sProphethood,therebyimplicitlyofferingadefinitionof“theMuslim”’.20Moresignificantly,Ahmadiyaswere declared non-Muslims by a constitutional amendment in 1974. Faced with an agitation by thecombinedOppositionagainst riggingof the1977elections,Bhutto triedopportunisticappeasement.Hechanged his motto of ‘Islamic Socialism’ into ‘Musawat-e-Muhammadi’ (Muhammad’s egalitariansystem);imposedabanonliquor,madeFriday(Islamicholyday)theweeklyholiday.NoneofthisworkedandBhuttowasoverthrowninacoupbyhishand-pickedarmychief,Gen.Zia-ul-

Haq.Zia remains inseparably associatedwith the IslamizationofPakistan, but in avery real sensehecontinuedwhathadbeenstartedduringthefinalstagesofthePakistanmovementandthepassageoftheObjectives Resolution. Unlike his predecessors and successors, he actually believed in PakistanbecominganIslamicstateandthatthroughIslamPakistanwouldachievetheunitythathadbeenelusivesofar.Hisacross-the-boardIslamizationtouchedeveryaspectofsociety,frompoliticsandthemilitarytolaw,educationandpersonallife.21Hismeasureswouldhaveadeleteriousimpactonthestatusofwomenand on the minorities. Equally, it would impact generations of children through Islamization of thecurriculaandinjectthepoisonofsectarianismintosociety.Suchhasbeentheforceofthesechangesthatno succeeding government, military or civilian, has been able to touch any of the Islamic measuresintroducedbyZia.ItwasPakistan’sparticipationintheAfghanjihadinthe1980sthatwastoturnthegroundpreparedby

ZiaintomilitantIslam.Zia’spoliciesandencouragementtomadrasasdidthegroundworkofcreatingamuch more religiously aware society than it had been before. The Afghan jihad added a substantivechange by patronizing the concept that Islam sanctioned the use of terror to achieve state objectives.WhileBhuttohadalreadybegunalow-intensitywarwithAfghanistan(seeChapter15onAfghanistan),itlackedanyIslamicbacking.ZiawastochangethatandgiveanIslamiccolouringtotheextremistgroupsinthecontextoffirsttheAfghanconflictandlatertheseparatistmovementinKashmir.Pakistanandthemujahideen were to view the Soviet disintegration as an Islamic victory. For Pakistan, asymmetricwarfarethathaditsoriginsin1947,reinforcedin1965,wasnowheretostay.TheAfghanjihadwastoleadtoamassiveexpansionoftheinfluenceof‘radical’Islamicideologyin

Pakistan. ‘Pakistan practised an open-door religious policy to foreign fighters and countries and soon

becameabattlefieldforaproxywarbetweenIranandSaudiArabia.’22TheJamaat-i-Islami(JI)andtheDeobandi Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) were promoted by the Zia regime to function as vehicles forchannellingaidcominginfrominternationalIslamicorganizations,whichmostlybelongedtotheSalafi-Wahabi/ Deobandi genre like the Saudi Arabia–based Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (TheMuslimWorldLeague),theWorldAssemblyofMuslimYouth(WAMY),etc.,withintimatelinkswithSaudiofficialandnon-officialIslamicbodies.OtherPakistaniIslamicsectsliketheShias,Barelvis,Ismailis,etc.,hadlittleornoroleintheAfghanjihadandhencenoaccesstothemillionsofdollarspouringintothecountry.During the alternating regimeofBenazirBhutto andNawazSharif in the1990s, Islamizationper se

sawnofurtheradvances,exceptthepassageoftheShariaBillintheNationalAssembly.Beforethebillcould be passed in the Senate, Nawaz Sharif had been dismissed. However, the momentum of Zia’sIslamizationpoliciescontinuedapacewithlittleeffortmadebyeitherofthetwoleaderstoslowitdown.Byconviction,Musharrafwasnotabeliever likeZia,butneverthelessfollowedhispredecessorsin

tryingtoco-optreligiouspartiestosupporthisgovernment.Intheprocesshehadtograntconcessionstothe religious parties allied in the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) as a quid pro quo for theirparliamentarysupportinthewakeoftheseventeenthamendment.23Forexample,inJune2003,ChaudhryShujaatHussain,amemberofthegovernment,admittedthattenMMAdemandsforIslamizationhadbeenaccepted.TheseincludedlegislationinaccordancewiththerecommendationsoftheCouncilofIslamicIdeology;restructuringtheeconomy,educationandmediaalongIslamiclines;ensuringrightsforwomeninaccordancewithIslamicinjunctions;andgivingIslamicsubjectsequalimportancewithotherfieldsofstudyinalleducationalinstitutions.24

ThenetresultoftheMusharrafperiodwasfurtherIslamizationofsocietyduetothecriticalroleplayedby the religious parties in supporting the government. The madrasas continued to churn out religiousextremistsandthejihadipartiescontinuedtospewvenomagainstIndia.Inthepost-Musharrafera, likeduringthedecadeofthe1990s,noneofthepoliticalpartieshavebeenabletoresist,letalonerollback,thegrowingstrengthoftheIslamicforces.Aslaterexampleswillshow,thegovernmenthasbeenonthebackfootwhenconfrontedwiththeforceofreligion.

Thefirstsectariantestforthenascentstate,asnotedabove,wastheanti-AhmadiyaprotestsinPunjabin1953. The comments of the Munir Committee, set up to inquire into the riots, on the ObjectivesResolution,havebeennotedearlier.Evenmoresignificantwerethecommittee’sfindingsonthedefinitionofaMuslim.Thecommitteeaskedleadingulema‘togivetheirdefinitionofaMuslim,thepointbeingthatiftheulemaofthevarioussectsbelievedtheAhmadistobekafirs(non-Muslims),theymusthavebeenquite clear in theirminds not only about the grounds of such belief but also about the definition of aMuslim.’Afterhearingalltheulema,justicesMunirandKayaninoted,‘Butwecannotrefrainfromsayingherethatitwasamatterofinfiniteregrettousthattheulemawhosefirstdutyshouldbetohavesettledviewsonthissubject,werehopelesslydisagreedamongthemselves.’25

Keepinginviewtheseveraldefinitionsgivenbytheulema,needwemakeanycommentexceptthat no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental (definition of aMuslim). If weattemptourowndefinitionaseachlearneddivinehasdoneandthatdefinitiondiffersfromthat

givenbyallothers,weunanimouslygooutofthefoldofIslam.Andifweadoptthedefinitiongivenbyanyoneoftheulema,weremainMuslimsaccordingtotheviewofthatalimbutkafirsaccordingtothedefinitionofeveryoneelse.ThenetresultofallthisisthatneitherShiasnorSunnis norDeobandis norAhl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis areMuslims and any change from oneview to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if theGovernmentoftheStateisinthehandsofthepartywhichconsiderstheotherpartytobekafirs.AnditdoesnotrequiremuchimaginationtojudgetheconsequencesofthisdoctrinewhenitisrememberedthatnotwoulemahaveagreedbeforeusastothedefinitionofaMuslim.26

The status of Shias was also debated, since leading Deobandi ulema had issued similar edicts ofapostasyagainstthem.‘Whatishappeningnow’,saidthejudges,‘seemsalmostawritingonthewall,andGodhelpusifwedonotstopthese…peoplefromcuttingeachother’sthroat.’27

ThereportclearlyrecognizedthedangersthattheuseofIslaminthePakistanmovementhadcreatedand tried to warn succeeding generations about the explosive issue of sectarianism, which is tearingPakistanaparttoday.Unfortunately,thefundamentalsofthereportwereignoredthenandcontinuetobeignoredeventoday.Priortothelate1970sandearly1980s,sectarianconflictsinPakistanweresporadic,primarilyduring

Muharram.Thestatedidnothaveasectarianprogramme.ThischangedunderZia;itwasnotlongbeforeIslamization moved inexorably towards ‘Sunnification’.28 Zia’s Islamization measures sharpenedsectariantensionsbecause‘oftheiremphasisonShariahandFiqhi(juristic)hair-splitting,ratherthanonmaqasid-i-shariah(objectiveofShariah).Thislegalisticapproachto“Islamization”naturallyraisedthequestion as to which interpretation of the Islamic law was more authentic and should, therefore, beincorporatedinpublicpolicy.IslamicrevivalthuscreateddissensionsamongvariousIslamicsectsmorethanitunifieddifferentsocialstrataofPakistanisociety.’29Hence,thegovernment’seffortstoimplementshariabroughtouttheoldjuristicanddoctrinaldifferencesnotonlybetweentheShiasandtheSunnisbutalsoamongthefourSunnischoolsthemselves.30

ThemostseriousconflictoverIslamizationmeasuresintroducedbyZiawasbetweentheSunnisandtheShias.ZiatriedtoimplementtheSunniHanafifiqhthatledtomassiveShiaopposition,especiallyonthe issue of collection of Zakat. An aggressive stance towards the Shias was taken by the Deobandiorganizationsandpublicationsassociatedwith the JUIofMuftiMahmud.Theanti-Shia rhetoricon thepart of the JUI religious leadership can be gauged from the following editorial that appeared in aprominentDeobandimonthly:

The Shias are controlling the entire Sunni auqaf (religious endowment). There are five Shiacabinet ministers in the (central) government and they happen to control themost importantportfolios.TheShiasarealsocontrollingthekeypositionsinthe(civilandmilitary)servicesandareinthemajority(intheseservices).Thisisdespitethefactthattheyarehardlytwopercentof the totalpopulationofPakistan.…Wemustalso remember that theShiasconsider ittheirreligiousdutytoharmandeliminatetheAhl-e-sunna…TheShiashavealwaysconspiredtoconvertPakistan intoaShia state since thevery inceptionof thiscountry.TheyhavebeentryingveryhardtowardsthatendandhavebeenconspiringwithourforeignenemiesandwiththeJews.ItwasthroughsuchconspiraciesthattheShiasmastermindedtheseparationofEast

PakistanandthussatiatedtheirthirstforthebloodoftheSunnis.31

Interestingly,MumtazAhmednotes thatwhen in1988,PirKaramShah, amoderateBarelvi scholarfrom Sargodha, convened a meeting of religious scholars belonging to different schools of thought inordertofoster‘unity,toleranceandharmony’amongthedifferentsects,hewasreprimandedbyaBarelvipublicationRaza-i-Mustafa,initsNovember1988editorial:

ThereisatraditionoftheProphet(PBUH)whichsaysthatmyummahwillbecomedividedinto73sects.PirKaramShah’seffortstounitedifferentIslamicsectsarethusadirectviolationofwhatourProphethas said.There canbeno formula forunitywhichcan succeedagainst theprophet’sprediction.32

Undoubtedly,Zia’sIslamizationspurredsectarianism,buttherewereotherreasonstoo.TheseincludetheimpactoftheIranianrevolutionontheShiasofPakistanandthereactionofSaudiArabiatoit,whichadded fuel to the fire.With both countries funding rival sectarian organizations, Pakistan became thebattleground for their contest for leadership of the Islamic world. A cable from the US consulate inLahore,leakedbyWikiLeaks,statedthat‘financialsupportestimatedatnearly$100millionannuallywasmakingitswaytoDeobandiandAhl-i-HadithclericsinsouthPunjabfromorganizationsinSaudiArabiaand the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments’. These fundsfuelledthefirethatwasconsumingPakistan.33

Otherreasonsincludethepost-9/11convergenceofal-Qaedaandtheanti-ShiaLashkar-e-Jhangvi;thefusion of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan as the latter emerged and spread,particularly in theKurramAgencyandKarachi;thepermissionof thePunjabprovincialgovernment forthe ostensibly banned anti-Shia Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat organization to operate with impunity; andLashkar-e-Jhangvi’s cooperation with military-backed and/or anti-state militias or militant groups inBalochistan.34Thus,what iscommonlycalledSunni–Shiaviolence ismorepreciselyaDeobandi–ShiaconflictinwhichtheDeobandishaveappropriatedthetermSunniforthemselves35andthemaindrivingforcebeingtheSunniDeobandimilitantgroupsespeciallytheLashkar-e-JhangviandtheTehrik-i-TalibanPakistanwhowanttoofficiallydeclarePakistan’sShiasasnon-Muslims.SectarianviolencehastakenahugetollonPakistan.Between2001and2015(upto1November)there

were1,431incidentsinwhich4,174werekilledand7,240injured.Themaximumnumberofincidentssofarwerein2007(341)followedby2012(173);themaximumnumberkilledwasin2013(525)followedby2010(509)and2012(507);maximuminjuredwerein2010(1,170)followedby2013(914).36

Thenatureofthesectarianconflicthasalsoundergoneachange.Tillthemid-1990s,sectariankillingstargeted leaders and activists of both sects.Gradually, thekillings shifted to those associatedwith thegovernment:policeofficers,judgesandthelikes.Bythelate1990s,therewasanescalationandordinarycitizens became target because they happened to be Sunni or Shia.37 The latest trend is to targetprofessionals among both communities – doctors, lawyers, etc. From early in the first decade of thetwenty-first century,with thecoming intoprominenceof suchSunni terroristoutfits like theLashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)andfromlaterinthedecade,withtheappearanceoftheTehrik-i-TalibanPakistan(TTP),sectarian conflict has, in fact, transformed itself intowhat is being calledShia genocideusing suicidebombers.

The geographical spread of sectarian violence has also increased. In the 1980s and 1990s it waslimitedtoJhanginPunjab,partsofKarachi,andtheKhurramAgencyinFATA.Todaysectarianviolencecoverstheentirecountry.TheextentofviolenceagainsttheShiaHazaracommunityinBalochistanisthenewphenomenon.Therealfear,however,isthesectarianwarexplodinginPakistan’sheartland,Punjab.Ominously,a2012PewGlobalSurveyshowedthat41percentoftherespondentsinPakistanbelieved

thatShiaswerenon-Muslim.Assectarianismtakesdeeperroots, thequestionofwhat is trueIslamhastakenongreatersalience.SinceShiasareseenasdivergingfrommainstream(Sunni)Islam,theirkillingseemstoattractlesssympathy,addingtotheimpunityofthekillers.38

ItisindeedtragicthatastatefoundedontheprincipleofMuslimsbeinganationwasconvertedintoonewhere being aMuslimwas no longer the sole religious identity; orthodoxSunni circles require adenominationalprefix.EvenformerprimeministerShaukatAzizhadtoidentifyhisreligioussectathisinauguralpressconferenceinIslamabad.‘IamaSunniMuslim’,hesaid,confrontingrumoursthathewasaQadiani(amemberoftheAhmadiyasect)andthusconstitutionallyineligibleforthepost.39AzizhadtofurtheridentifyhisSunnisub-sectbycitinghisfamily’sreligiousrituals.40

This being the case of theMuslim population, the plight of the religiousminorities and decreed non-Muslims like theAhmadiyas canwell be imagined.Themost notoriousweapon to beat theminoritieswithhasbeentheblasphemylaw.ItwasGen.Ziawho‘Islamized’theblasphemylawwiththefocusonprotecting Islamby inserting a specific provision in thePakistanPenalCode for blasphemy related toIslamic holy figures. The punishment prescribed was death, with no room for pardon. A study titled‘BlasphemyintheDigitalAge’hasrevealedthatblasphemyaccusationsincreasedbyalmosttwohundredtimesafterGen.Zia’samendmentin1987.Priortothis,therehadbeenonlysevenblasphemyaccusationsbetween1927and1986.Since1987,however,thenumberofblasphemycaseshasjumpedto1,335.41

Theimpactof the lawonminoritieshasbeendisproportionate to theirpopulation.Accordingtooneestimate702caseshavebeenregisteredagainstminorities,(494Ahmadiyas,187Christiansandtwenty-oneHindus)undervariousclausesoftheblasphemylawsince1987,whichequalsto52percentoftotalcasesasagainst4percentoftheirpopulationofPakistan.Thelawsareroutinelyusedtotargetreligiousminoritiestosettlepersonalscores:takeoverpropertiesandbusinesses;forforcedconversionstoIslamandforcedmarriagesofminoritywomentoMuslimmen.42

ThelawcameintorenewedprominencewiththekillingofthePunjabgovernorSalmanTaseerbyhisownguardMumtazQadri,who shot him twenty-seven times in front of other guards.For this, hewastreatedasaheroandshoweredwithflowersbyIslamistlawyersandsomemembersofthepublic.Inalandmarkjudgment,theSupremeCourtupheldthedeathpenaltyofQadriandruledthatraisingobjectionsaboutthemisuseandflawsoftheexistingblasphemylaw,asGovernorTaseerhaddone,wasnotanactofblasphemyitself.Inacourageousmove,thegovernmenthangedQadrion29February2016.Given the treatment of minorities, the annual US congressional report titled ‘US Commission on

International Religious Freedom’ mentions that Pakistan represents one of the ‘worst situations’ forreligious freedom anywhere in the world. The commission has been recommending, since 2002, thatPakistan be given the status of countries ‘of particular concern’ that would warrant sanctions.43 Inadditiontomobviolence,theReportraisestheissueof‘[f]orcedconversionofChristianandHindugirlsandyoungwomenintoIslam’and‘forcedmarriagestoMuslimmen’asa‘systemicproblem.’

Where have all the incremental doses of Islamization left Pakistan? Have they strengthened a uniquePakistaniidentityorunity?HasIslamizationledtogreatersecurityforthecitizensofPakistan?Orhasitledtogreaterintoleranceandinsecurity?HasthedebatewhetherPakistanisahomelandfortheMuslimsoranIslamicstatebeensetatrest?AndthefundamentalquestionwhoseIslamistobefollowed:Shia,Deobandi,Barelvi,Ahl-e-Hadis?Areporttitled‘WakeupPakistan’releasedinIslamabadinMay2015providespartoftheanswer.It

states:‘Publicopinionhaschangedandthespacetochallengewidely-heldorthodoxiesaboutreligioninPakistanhasalmostcompletelyevaporated.Thisprocesshasbeendirectedbythereligiousrightwing,with active and sustained support from mainstream political groups and the endorsement of statepolicy.’44

IslamizationhasclearlyneithercreatednorstrengthenedauniquePakistaniidentityorunity.Sectariankillings indicate that ordinary citizens of Pakistan are neither safe nor secure. If anything, successivedosesofIslamizationhaveledtogreaterintoleranceandinsecurity.Asearlyas1954,theJusticeMunirCommission report had pointed out that given the Shia, Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-e-Hadis divisions ofsociety,attemptstoenforceanyoneideologywouldrentthecountryasunder.ThisisborneoutbythefactthateverysecthasapostatizedallothersinPakistan.ThustheBarelvisandDeobandishavedenouncedeachother;bothBarelvisandDeobandishavedenouncedtheShias;theBarelvishavecalledtheAhl-e-Hadis infidels and pure devils; the Ahl-e-Hadis have denounced all Hanafi sects to be against theteachingsofQuranandaccusedthemofcommittingshirk;whilealltheSunnisectsfawnonSaudiArabia,theclericsofthelattercountrypourscornonallsubcontinentalsectscallingtheirattributesasbeingofkufr(disbelief)andbid’ah(innovation).45

Twoexampleswouldsuffice to judge the impactof Islamization inPakistan. InJanuary2016, in thedistrictofOkara,afifteen-year-oldboyapparentlymisheardaquestionrelatedtotheHolyProphetandmistakenlyraisedhishandinresponse.Thelocalprayerleaderandasectionofthecongregationpouncedonhim,accusingtheboyofhavingcommittedblasphemy.To‘atone’hismistake,theboylaterreportedlychoppedoffhisownhandusingafodder-cuttingmachineandpresentedhisappendagetothepreacheronaplate.Theboy’sfamilycelebratedtheaction.AstheDawnputit:‘Themindsetthatapparentlyledtheclerictodenouncetheboyfor“blasphemy”isfartoocommon.Invillages,smalltowns,andevencitiesinPakistan,semi-literateclericsoftenshape thenarrativeand insomecases,especiallywheremattersoffaithareinvolved,endupplayingjudge,juryandexecutioner.’46TheNationnotedaptly:‘Ifpeoplearereadytohurtthemselvesinthenameofreligion,imaginewhattheywouldbewillingtodotoothers?’47

TheDailyTimesaskedominously:

Thesheersavageryofthisactcompelsonetoask:havewereallybeendriventotheedgeofinsanityinoursubserviencetothemaulvisandmullahsthatwenowchopoffourlimbsinordertoacquirethestatusofabelieverwhohasbeenindoctrinatedbytheirparochialanddogmaticinterpretations?Unfortunately,theblackandwhitemindsethascolouredreligiousinterpretationin such away that people have turned religion… into a convoluted version that constantlydemandsviolentretributionfromothersandfromone’sownself.48

Second, Islamization has strengthened religious parties at the expense of security of the ordinarycitizen.Take,forexample,theProtectionofWomenAgainstViolenceBillpassedbythePunjabAssemblyinMarch 2016.Though passed by an elected assembly, the religious parties opposed it threatening towhip upmass hysteria and launch a big agitation against it. In otherwords, the religious parties havearrogated to themselves the power to reject a lawpassedby an elected assembly– anunelectedvetopoweroverthewillofanelectedassembly.Thegovernmentseemstohavebuckledunderpressureandassuredtoformacommitteetolookintogrievances.Infact,anemboldenedJamiatUlema-i-Islam-Fazl(JUI-F)chiefthreatened,‘Thoughwecan’tformgovernment,butwecancertainlytoppleone.’That the future isominouscanbe judged from just twodevelopments.First, seven Jamaat-ud-Dawa

(JuD)/LeT ‘Sharia courts’ have been functioning for many years, one each in Lahore, Gujranwala,Bahawalpur,Multan, Karachi, Quetta and Islamabad dispensing ‘justice’ among people in the light ofsharia laws.Hafiz Saeed, the LeT supremo, is the head of all these ‘courts’ and he is empowered toappointjudgesasheadqazi(chiefjudge).Similarly,heisalsoanappellateauthority,ashereservestherighttohearingappealsandcandismissdecisionsmadebythe‘subordinatejudges’.CalledDarulQazaSharia and Saalsi Sharai Adalat-i-Aalia (Arbitration Court of Sharia), they have been summoning the‘defendants’inpersonorthroughalegalcounselwithwarningsofstrictactionunderthesharialawsincase of no response.49 A personwho had received such summons took thematter to the LahoreHighCourt. Hewas kidnapped and threatened by two unidentifiedmen of dire consequences if he did notwithdrawthecaseandreconcilethematter.50

ThoughtheConstitutiondoesnotallowanyprivateorganizationtousetheword‘court’,anofficialintheofficeof inspectorgeneralofpolice,Punjab,wasquotedbyTheNews saying that legality did notmatter in the case of the JuDbecause theywere free to do anything as theyweremore powerful thanothers.‘Theyhaveestablishedastatewithinthestate.’51

Second,theministryofeducationandprofessional traininghadfinalizeditsproposedcurriculumforpubliceducationalinstitutions,makingastrongpitchforallfederatingunitstointroduceteachingoftheQuranasacompulsorysubjectfromgradeonetotwelve.TheCouncilofIslamicIdeology(CII),thoughonlyarecommendatorybody,foundthatintheproposedsyllabusversesaboutjihadhadbeendeleted.Ithasdemandedthatthe480-oddversesaboutjihadintheQuranbeincludedinthesyllabi.52

Both these representativedevelopments show that the Islamic forcesaregainingmoreconfidence inPakistan.Infact,theseareclearindicationsthattheabdicationofthestatefromperformingitsdutiesisnowgatheringgreatersteam.ThisdoesnotaugurwellforthefutureofPakistan.

Duringthelastsevendecades,thespaceandopportunityforPakistantobeamoderateandinclusivestatehasshrunkenormously.Theperceivedsafetyvalvesoflackofelectoralsupportforthereligiousparties(something that is touted frequently by scholars) and the reservoir of Barelvi–Sufi influences are fastdepleting.Religiousintolerance,confinedtopocketsatonestage,isnowwidespread.Thewarningsignsforthenextgenerationareeverywhere.Thehugepoolofmadrasa-educatedunemployableyouthasalsothemillionscomingoutofgovernmentschoolsimbuedwithhatredofothersinastagnanteconomywouldbefodderforjihadioutfitsthatthriveonacultureofintolerance.In reality, Pakistan is reaping the fruits of the dangerous seeds the early leaders had sown in the

Pakistanmovement.ThesteadyprogressionofIslamizationisthenaturaloutcomeoftheMuslimLeague’s

rhetorictoimplementIslamiclawsinPakistanandofreligiousnationalismthatwasaroused.Asaresult,the Islamistshavegone fromstrength to strengthanddemanded thatPakistanbemadean Islamicstate.WhereJinnahandLiaquaterredwastothinkthatreligioncouldbeexploitedforasecularobjectiveandonce the objective was met, religion could be sidelined. Their successors, whether civil or military,continued touse Islam to legitimize their rule and to forgeanational identity in the faceof ethnic andregional diversity in society. Instead of opposing the efforts to establish an Islamic state, everyConstitution – 1956, 1962 and 1973 – proclaims Pakistan to be an Islamic state with the ObjectivesResolutionasthePreambletotheConstitution.Pakistanileadersofallhues,includingreligious,woulddowelltorecallwhatthe1954JusticeMunir

Commissionreporthadtosay:‘ThesublimefaithcalledIslamshallliveevenifourleadersarenottheretoenforceit.Itlivesintheindividual,inhissoulandoutlook,inallhisrelationswithGodandmen,fromthecradle to thegrave,andourpoliticians shouldunderstand that ifDivinecommandscannotmakeorkeepamanaMusalman,theirstatuteswillnot.’53

8

Madrasas

These universities of ignorance, to whom we give donations and hides, are giving anideologyofhatredandconservativenesstothesociety.1

—PervaizRashid

MADRASASHAVEintermittentlycomeintothespotlightinPakistanasbeingtherootsofextremistIslamandconnectedtoterrorism.Duringtheanti-Sovietjihadinthe1980s,theywereseenasthenurseriesforproducingjihadistobesenttofightinAfghanistan;after9/11,theywereheldresponsibleforcreatingtheTalibanmindset;the9/11Commissionreportreleasedin2004saidsomeofPakistan’sreligiousschoolsormadrasasservedas‘incubatorsforviolentextremism’2.MadrasaswereblamedaftertheJuly2007LalMasjid/JamiaHafsa incident (when thePakistanArmystormed thecomplex inwhichover150peoplewerekilled)and,morerecently,inthewakeofthe16December2014attackontheArmyPublicSchoolinPeshawarthatledtothemassacreof135schoolchildren.MadrasasalsocameintofocusafterTashfeenMalikandherhusbandkilledfourteenpeopleinSanBernardino,California,inDecember2015.TashfeenhadstudiedattheAl-HudaInstituteinPakistan.FourfemalestudentsatitsaffiliateinOntariotriedtojointheIslamicStateaccordingtotheCanadianBroadcastingCorp.3

Thenotorietyof themadrasas canbe judged from the fact that bulkof the leadershipof theAfghanTaliban (including Mullah Omar, Akhtar Mansoor and Jalaluddin Haqqani), and the Tehrik-i-TalibanPakistan(TTP)(HakimullahMehsudandMullahFazlullah)areproductsofmadrasas.Other‘luminaries’whohaveattendedmadrasas includeHafizGulBahadur,WaliurRehmanMehsud,KhalidHaqqani, themastermindofsuicidebombers,QariHussainandmanymore.ItwasafterthePeshawaroutragethatthegovernment formulated another action plan (the twenty-point National Action Plan), one of the keyprovisionsofwhichwastheregistrationandregulationofmadrasas.ThePeshawartragedyforgedaconsensusthatthenationalnarrativeneededtochange.Whilemilitary

operations and expanding the jurisdiction of military courts to try terrorism cases were to be theimmediateactionabletriggers,forthelong-termachangeintheextremistmindsetwasidentifiedasbeingnecessary.Theuncheckedproliferationofmadrasaswasidentifiedasoneofthemaincausesforgrowingextremism.AccordingtotheDailyTimes,

Althoughnotallmadrasashavefundamentalistcurriculumsorextremistagendasandsome, ifnot most, are actually doing good work, in the current security climate, they cannot gounchecked.Childreninmadrasasareoftenatriskofpsychological,physicalandsexualabuse.

More troublingly, according to reports, a significant number of madrasas have becomerecruitmentcentresforterroristorganizations,breedingfuturemilitantsthroughteachingsbasedupon on [sic] distorted, fundamentalist Islamic views, and are funded by questionablesources.’4

Foralmostamillennia,madrasasproducedsuccessivegenerationsofIslamicscholarsandclerics.Buttoday,madrasasinPakistanareafarcryfromtheeleventh-centurymadrasaofIbnSinainIsfahanwherestudents would flock to study mathematics, medicine and astronomy. Today, madrasa curriculum hasshrunktodoctrinalreligionwithallothersubjectsexcised.5

Undoubtedly, madrasa reform has to be one of the key elements of a long-term strategy to purgePakistanof threeof its ills– thecultureof radicalization, thegrowthof sectarianismand theextremistmindset–throughacurriculumthatismodern,inclusiveandwhichshunsviolenceinsteadofglorifyingit.This,aswillbenotedinChapter11oneducation,isequallyapplicabletothegovernmentschoolsystemasitistothemadrasas.Pakistan’sNationalInternalSecurityPolicy(NISP)2014–18whilereferringtomadrasasnotedthatreligiousrhetoricwasusedtomotivatetheyoungpeopletocommitsuicidalmissions.‘Thenarrativeofextremismrevolvesaroundthereligiousdiscourseandispresented, tocomparativelyless educated people, with great zeal and primitive logic. Many scholars are afraid to challenge thearchaicviewsofextremistsandsomeofthemhavebeenmartyredforspeakingthetruthandexposingthefallacyofterrorists’narrative,’thepolicystated.6

However,militancyisonlyapartofthemadrasaproblem.Eventhoughmostmadrasasdonotimpartmilitarytrainingoreducation,theydosowtheseedsofextremisminthemindsofthestudents.Further,students are educated and trained to counter arguments of opposing sects on matters of theology,jurisprudenceanddoctrines.Thisleadstoanarrowworldviewthatencompassesrejectionofothersects.In short, a madrasa education indoctrinates and greatly contributes to intolerance of other religiousbeliefs.Madrasasposeseveralchallenges.First,accordingtoInteriorMinisterChaudhryNisarAliKhan,‘90

percentofmadrasashadnoconnectiontoterrorism,basedonintelligencereportsreceived’.7Onanotheroccasionhewasatpainstopointoutthathisgovernmentwasnotpaintingallseminarieswiththesamebrush;hesaidthat‘around10percentofmadariswereinvolvedinterroractivities’.8Thiswouldimplythat10percentofthemadrasas,whereanywherebetween150,000and300,000studentsstudy(estimatesvaryhugelyaboutthetotalnumberofstudentsstudyinginmadrasas)couldbepotentialterrorists.Evenif1percentofthemweretobecomesuicidebombers,therecouldwellbearound3,000potentialsuicidebomberswaitingtoblowthemselvesup.Eveniftheydonotblowthemselvesup,thelimitededucationthey have received would make them dysfunctional members of society, prone to being incited toviolence.Whataboutthebalance90percent?AccordingtoTheNation,whiletheymaynotdirectlycontribute

toterrorism,theycertainlycreateanenvironmentconducivetoit.

The students that graduate from these institutes, about 200,000 a year, have only ever beeneducated in religion.Theyhavenomarketable talents, littleexperienceof theoutsideworld,andtheonlysocialsettingtheyfeelcomfortableinistheonlyonetheyhaveknown;composedofsegregated,zealousacolytes.Theyinevitablyfailintheoutsideworldandreturntothisone

trackworld,whereadvancementislimitedandinteractionwithterroristshighlyprobable.9

Eventhoughtheinteriorministerplayeddownthenumberofmadrasasthathadlinkswithterrorism–10 per cent – thiswas belied by the extraordinarymeasures taken ahead of the PakistanDaymilitaryparadeinMarch2015whenallthethirty-ninemadrasasina2-kmvicinityofthevenueinIslamabadwereclosedandvacatedforaweekinadvanceoftheparadethatwasbeingheldaftereightyears.10

Second,themadrasasarenolongerjustbastionsofmedievaltheology.Theyhaveevolvedintotrainingcentres for radical anti-Western and anti-India propaganda, and cultivate the sentiment of Muslimvictimhood.They inculcate inyoungmindshatred fornon-Muslims ingeneral and JewsandHindus inparticular.AsDaniaAhmednotes:

They tend to indoctrinate children to discriminate against non-Muslims, raising children toclassifynon-MuslimsandMuslimsoutsidetheirsectsaskafirs(infidels),mushrakeen(pagans),dhimmis (non-Muslims),murtids (apostates), and enemies of the state. As a result, many ofthesemadrasasproducegraduateswholackcriticalandanalyticalthinkingandareintolerantofothersects;graduateswhogoontobecomemaulviswhoissueirrationalfatwasandspewhatespeechagainstminoritygroups.11

Third, there is a hugegap– economic, intellectual and social and lifestyle–between studentswhograduatefromprivateandgovernmentschoolsandthosefromthemadrasasjustasthereisasimilargapbetweenthosegraduatingfromprivateschoolsandgovernmentschools.Thisyawningdividecanhardlybeconducivetothestabilityofthecountry.AsSyedMoazzamHainotes,

Thecontemptuous ragewithwhich stick-wieldingmadrassa studentsactduring roadprotestsgives us a glimpse of the ostensible grudge many of them seem to carry against the worldoutsidetheirmadrasas.Limitedinteractionbetweenthemadrassastudentsandthe“outsiders”furtherwidens thegap.Theabsenceofaneconomicdream in the livesofmadrassa studentsfurtheraddstothesenseofindignationagainsttheworldoutside.12

Fourth, links betweenmadrasas and terrorist groups have been identified. According to the Punjabpolice,ananalysisoftheprofilesofsuicidebomberswhohavestruckinPunjabshowedthatmorethantwo-thirdshadattendedmadrasas.Therewerealsoseveralinstanceswhereaccidentaldetonationsinsidemadrasashadkilledwould-besuicidebombers.TheSpecialBranchofthePunjabPolicehasidentifieddozensofmadrasasthatarelinkedtoterroristgroups.13

Fifth,bulkofthemadrasashavepoliticalaffiliationsapartfromtheirreligiousones.Asurveyof251madrasasacrossthecountrybelongingtothefivemadrasaeducationboardsfoundthat172(62percent)hadpoliticalaffiliations–59percentwereaffiliatedwithreligio-politicalparties,3percentwithothermainstreampartiesand18percentwithsectarianorjihadiparties.Eighteenpercentdidnotexpressanysuchassociation.ThesurveyshowedthatDeobandiandJImadrasasweremoreinclinedtowardspoliticsas82percentofDeobandiand100percentofJImadrasashadpoliticalaffiliations.Theaffiliationsofthemadrasaswithpolitical,sectarianandmilitantorganizationsarecertainlyacauseofconcern.14

Whilethemadrasaproblemiscomplexenough,theextentofproblemisunknown.Nooneseemstohaveaclear idea of how many madrasas there are in the country, registered as well as unregistered. It isestimatedthatin1947Pakistanhad136madrasasandtill1980therewereonly700,growingattherateof3percent.Bytheendof1986,however,theyhadincreasedby136percent.Intheearlyyearsofthemillenniumtheyhadfurtherincreasedtoover12,000.15In2014,accordingtotheinteriorministry,therewereat least22,052registeredmadrasasinPakistan,buttherewasnorecordoftheunregisteredones.AccordingtoaJuly2015reporttitled‘TheMadrassaConundrum—ThestateofreligiouseducationinPakistan’,thenumberofmadrasasinPakistanhadcrossed35,000.16

Itisnotjustthenumbersbutthequantumincreaseinthenumbersthatisworrying.Thus,accordingtoaMarch2016reportintheDawn,thenumberofmadrasashadincreasedthreefoldinSindhduringthepastone year alone. More than 4,000 madrasas had been recorded until April 2015, while their numberjumped to 9,590 inOctober and around 12,000 byMarch 2016. Of these, only 6,711madrasaswereregisteredwiththegovernment.17

Punjabhas themostmadrasasat13,000.WithinPunjab, southPunjabdominateswitharound7,000,central Punjab has around4,000 andnorthPunjab 2,000madrasas.Apart from themaximumnumbers,southPunjabalsohostsaround70percentofallmadrasastudentsinPunjab.Ofthecities,Multantoppedthe listwith1,108madrasas, followedcloselybyLahorewith1,102madrasas.SouthPunjabcitiesofMuzaffargarhandRahimYarKhanfollowedwith900and811madrasasrespectively.18

Theestimateof thenumbersofstudents inmadrasasvarieswidelyfromonemilliontothreemillioneven according to government statistics. According to a report launched by the Ministry of FederalEducationandProfessionalTrainingon21April2015,around1.8millionchildren,nearlyatenthofallenrolledstudentsinPakistan,studyinreligiousseminaries.However,talkingtothemediaon7September2015, the interior minister said that there were more than three million students studying in 18,000madrasas.19

The Ittehad-i-Tanzeemat-i-Madaris-i-Deenia (ITMD), the umbrella organization representing fivemajor wafaqs or boards in Pakistan (The five wafaqs are Wafaqul Madaris al Arabia [Deobandi],TanzeemulMadarisAhleSunnatPakistan[Barelvi],WafaqulMadarisalShia,WafaqulMadarisalSalfia[AhleHadis]andRabtatulMadarisulIslamia[seminariesaffiliatedwithJamaat-i-Islami])claimsthatthenumber of registered madrasas in the country is 26,000 and that of unregistered 4,000. The ITMD’sgeneralsecretaryandspokesman,MaulanaMohammadHanifJalandhri, says that threemillionstudentsareenrolledinmadrasasaffiliatedwiththeorganization.20

Numbers apart, the funding of thesemadrasas is another vital but grey area. Themadrasas receivefundingfromdifferentsources–overseasentities,regularcontributionsfromtheirgraduatesworkinginbig cities, local influential figures and now even provincial governments. In April 2014, the interiorministry, in reply to a question before the Senate had said that Saudi Arabia and four other Islamiccountries–Qatar,UAE,BahrainandKuwait–hadprovidedRs258milliontofifteenseminariesinoneyear.However,suchfundingwasthroughbankingchannelsandcouldbemonitored.Theissuewasaboutthefundsthatcameinthroughnon-banking,informalchannelslikehawalaandhundi,whichwereillegalandmuchlargerinvolume.21AstheinteriorministeradmittedinawrittenreplytoparliamentinJanuary2015, ‘… it is often difficult to trace the transaction of such money’, though he did admit that somemadrasaswerereceivingfinancialsupportfromMuslimcountries.22

TheconfusionaboutfundingisevidentfromthefactthattheSenatewasinformedinJanuary2015thatonlytwenty-threemadrasas,twoinSindh,twelveinKhyberPakhtunkhwaandnineinBalochistan,werereceiving foreign funding. Punjab maintained that, ‘No madrassa involved in receiving financial andtrainingassistancefromIslamiccountrieshascometoournoticeduringsurveillancecarriedoutbyfieldformations.’23 Subsequently, Punjab informed that 147 madrasas in the province receive funds fromabroad.24Theflip-flopbyPunjabwasathinlydisguisedattempttohidetheextentoftheproblemintheprovince.However, it is not just the Punjab government that has a soft spot for the madrasas. The KPK

government, ledbyImranKhan’sPTI,hasrecentlyallocatedRs300millionforjustonemadrasa–theDarul-Uloom-Haqqania–whichhasthedubiousdistinctionofbeingthealmamaterofsomeofthemostdangerousterroristsoninternationalwantedlists.Thismoneyexceedsthetotalbudgetoftheprovincialreligiousaffairsministry.Thejustificationgivenwasthatitwasanattemptto‘mainstream’themadrasa.However, theheadof themadrasa,MaulanaSami-ul-Haqandaknownfather figureof theTalibanhascategoricallysaidthegrantwasaimedatbuildingnewblocksoftheschoolandnothingelse.Themadrasa and Sami-ul-Haq have a dubious record. In 1997, the madrasa was closed for many

monthstoenablestudentstojointheTaliban’swartocapturetheAfghanprovinceofMazar-i-Sharif.Justmonthsbefore the9/11 terrorist attacks, the school hosted a conferenceof Islamicparties andmilitantgroups to express solidarity with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban regime. In 2015, addressing aceremony at the madrasa, Sami-ul-Haq pledged complete support to Mullah Mansour who, like hispredecessor Mullah Omar and other terrorists like Jalaluddin Haqqani, were alumni of the madrasa.Sami-ul-Haq also heads theDifa-e-Pakistan council, an umbrella coalition ofmore than forty groups,includingHafeezSaeed–ledJamaat-ud-Dawa(JuD)andthebannedSipah-e-Sahaba.25

Onesaspectof funding, thoughnotdirectly related, is the fact thata largenumberofmadrasashavebeen built illegally on government land. For example, nearly 10 per cent of the 649madrasas in theHyderabad police range are built on state land, according to a report compiled byHyderabadDIG’soffice.26InIslamabad,atleast446unregisteredmadrasasarebuiltillegallyongovernmentland,outofatotalof633madrasas.Anothercrucialareaiswhatisbeingtaughtinthemadrasas.Thecorecurriculumtaughtinmadrasasis

known as Dars-e-Nizami, but each of the five madrasa wafaqs follows their own exclusive texts,projectingtheirspecificandsectarianinterpretationsofIslamicteachings.27Inrecentyears,whilesomemadrasashavestarted teaching ‘modern’subjects (suchasscienceandmathematics) theoverwhelmingattention is mostly on religious education emphasizing, apart from the Quran, hadith (sayings of theProphet)andfiqh(Islamicjurisprudence).Itisthisfocusonreligiousinstructionalongsectarianlinesthatgivesthestudentsanarrowandlimitedworldview,whichboostsreligiousintolerance.Inaconservativesociety,alargenumberofpeopleattendtheFridayprayerswheresuchnarrowlyeducatedpersonssubjectthem to sermons.Even if they themselveshavenot attendedamadrasas, theFriday sermonsgive themenoughfoodforradicalization.Thus,withoutamajorrestructuringofthemadrasacurriculum,notmuchprogresswillbemadeinreclaimingsocietyfromradicalization.Notsurprisingly,thejobmarketforastudentwithamadrasaeducationisratherlimitedtoperforminga

religiousfunctionofaparticularsect.Withthenumberofstudentsfaroutnumberingthemosques,thereisa glut of religiously trained students who are unsuitable for any other kind of employment. Not

surprisingly,manystudentseasilyfallpreytoterroristorganizations.ArelatedproblemisthatdifferentsectsofIslamhavestartedrunningtheirownbrandofmadrasas.As

aresult,thesectariandivideinsocietyhasgotdeepenedandperpetuated.OtherIslamicsects,letalonetheminorities,arelookedatwithsuspicionandevenhatred.AninterestingsurveywascarriedoutbytheInstituteofPolicyStudies(IPS), theJamaat-i-Islami’sresearchinstitute,28 in2002, thatshowed that20per cent of themadrasa students interviewedwere intolerant of other sects; only some 60 per cent ofstudentsintheDeobandiand49percentinBarlevimadrasasexpressedreadinesstoaccepttheexistenceof other sects. Significantly, areas with the highest concentration of madrasas have become the focalpointsofsectarianism.Forexample,Karachi’scentraldistricthasmorethan813madrasasandmorethan74percentofallsectariankillingsinKarachiarecarriedoutinthisdistrict.29

The impression that there isadirectconnectionbetweenmadrasasand jihadwas the resultofZia’spolicies that fostered a mushrooming of madrasas to produce recruits for the anti-Soviet jihad inAfghanistan.However,newerstudieshaveprovidedacorrection.ChristineFair,forexample,notedthatwhile madrasas proved to be a hotbed for disseminating ideology, they were not a major source ofmilitantrecruitment.Ofthe141casesstudiedbyher,lessthanaquarter,thirty-threeof141everattendedtheologicalschools.Ofthosethirty-threemadrasaproducts,twenty-sevenattendedamadrasaforfourorfewer years, and most also attended public schools. In contrast, the remaining eighty-two were welleducated by Pakistani standards, at least a matriculate.30 Another survey of ten major jihadi groupsrevealedthatoftheover15,000peoplefromPunjabwhodiedinAfghanistanandKashmironly40percent had actually studied inmadrasas. The survey also reported that out of 800Harkat-ul-Mujahideenmemberswhowerekilled,only188wenttomadrasas–therestwenttostateschoolsorweredropouts.Thisobviouslymeant thatamajorityof thejihadisfromPunjab,andmorespecificallytheSeraikibelt,werecomingfromthestateschoolsystem.31

However,asAyeshaSiddiqanotes,madrasasarethevitalcogsthatproducetheideologythatfeedsthejihadi,evenifheisaproductofpublicschools.Whatthemadrasadoesistocontributetoandsustainanarrow ideologyand thenarrative that rejectsopposing ideaswhich feeds radicalismandmilitancy inPakistan.32

AstudybyTariqRehmanhasshownthatmadrasastudentsaremore likely thanstudents in theothertwoschoolsystemstosupportviolentextremism,thoughstudentsfromthepublicschoolsystemwerenottoofarbehind.Hefoundthatwhereas60percentofinterviewedmadrasastudentssupportedtheuseofopenwartotakeKashmir,40percentofstudentsfromPakistan’sUrdu-mediumpublicschools,and26percentofstudents inprivateschools,held thesameview.AsimilarpatternheldwhenstudentswereaskedwhethertheysupportedtakingKashmirthroughtheuseofjihadistproxies:53percentofmadrasastudentssharedthisview,comparedto33percentofthoseinpublicschoolsand22percentinprivateschools. While the madrasa students show consistently higher support for political violence, publicschool students,whocomprise some70percentof theeducationalmarket,displayworrying levelsofsupportforthesamepolicies.33

Thecaseofsuicidebombers,however,seemstobedifferent.TherehasbeenconcernthatmadrasasinPakistan’s tribal areasprovided suicide attackers inAfghanistan.A2007 reportby theUnitedNationsAssistance Mission in Afghanistan found that suicide attackers in Afghanistan ‘draw heavily frommadrasas across the border in Pakistan’. The report noted the recruits were also drawn fromAfghan

refugeessettledinPakistan.34

One factor that needs to be noted is that the overwhelming majority of the madrasas are from theDeobandischoolofIslam.ItwasthisschoolthatwasintheforefrontoftheAfghanjihadandthelargestpercentageofmilitantorganizationsinPakistanalsobelongtotheDeobandischoolofIslam,includingtheAfghanTaliban, thePakistaniTaliban,Jaish-e-Mohammed(JeM),andHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami(HuJI).TheyalsoincludegroupsthathavefocusedonkillingShias,suchasLashkar-e-Jhangvi.

Inasocietywherethereislimitedaccesstopubliceducation,madrasaswillcontinuetohavearoleineducatingtheyouth.However,themootpointis,whyshouldareligion-basededucationpersebecometheconduit for radicalization? The major reason, of course, is the repeated doses of Islamization thatsuccessive rulers have injected into Pakistan. Another reason is the intervention of the state in theplacementofmadrasastudents.Fordecadesnow,thePakistanistatehasfacilitatedtheuseofthesealumniasrecruitsforthevariousterroristorganizationsthatitusesasinstrumentsofstatepolicy,especiallyinIndia and Afghanistan. Likewise, the religious parties have used these students to bolster their streetpower.Unlessthisnexusisbrokenbythestate,radicalizedmadrasaswillalwaysremaininbusinessandnoamountofmadrasareformwillhelptode-radicalizethePakistansociety.Thedubiousroleofthestatewasenhancedinthe1980swhentheproductsofthemadrasasweresent

toAfghanistantotakeuparmsagainsttheSovietUnion.Inthe1990s,theyweresentforjihadinKashmir.Intheearlyyearsofthetwenty-firstcentury,itwasagainAfghanistan.WhiletheJIandtheJUIwereintheforefrontinthe1980s,bytheturnofthecenturyterroristorganizationslikeLashkar-e-TaibaandJaish-e-Mohammed,backedbythePakistanArmy,wereleadingthefightinKashmir.BothhaveastrongpresenceinsouthPunjabanddocumentsrevealthathundredsoftheirrecruitsfromsouthPunjabhavebeenkilledinKashmir.AspartoftheimplementationofNationalActionPlan(NAP),35thegovernmentinformedtheNational

Assemblyon24February2016thatithadclosed254madrasasacrossthecountryduetotheirsuspiciousactivities(167inSindh,thirteeninKPK,twoinPunjabandanotherseventy-twounregisteredmadrasasinSindh).36Thoughwelcome, the closingof only twomadrasas inPunjab,which is the hubof extremistorganizations and madrasas, is indeed strange and has raised many an eyebrow, reinforcing theimpressionthatthePunjabgovernmentissoftonextremists.

Reformingthemadrasasisanoldproject.UndertheMusharrafregime,severalinitiativestoreformthemadrasaswereinstitutedin2001,fundedinpartbyinternationaldonors.SucheffortsthroughthePakistanMadrasaEducation (Establishment andAffiliationofModernDeeniMadaris)BoardOrdinance,2001,included introduction of subjects like English, mathematics, computer science, economics, politicalscience,lawandPakistanstudiesinthecurriculum.TheVoluntaryRegistrationandRegulationOrdinance,2002,waspromulgatedtocontrolandregulatetheadmissionofforeignersintothemadrasasofPakistan,and tokeepaclose tabon theiractivities.37All these initiatives fellby thewaysidedue tooppositionfromthereligiouspartiesandtheMadrasaBoardonthegroundsthatstate interferencein theaffairsofreligiouseducationwasunacceptable.Due to coalition compulsions, no decisive action could be taken, especially changing the jihadi

curriculum of the madrasas by adopting government-prescribed syllabi, or monitoring their funding,despite several assurances. A large number of madrasas remained unregistered and gradually thegovernment reassured the religious parties, onwhom itwas dependent for political support, that therewouldbenointerferenceintheinternalaffairsofthemadrasas.A five-year reform project was launched in 2004–05 by theMinistry of Education targeting 8,000

madrasas,with the government offering to provide funds to hire four teachers each to teach ‘modern’subjects. The idea was to create a balance between formal and religious education and expand thecurricula to include the teachingof social andphysical sciences, religious tolerance andhuman rights.However, only 6.3 per cent of the targeted madrasas were accessed. In 2008, the education ministryreported ithadonlyspent$4millionof theallotted$100millionformadrasareformover thepastsixyears.38Infact,theinitialfundingof$50millionprovidedbytheUStotheMinistryofReligiousAffairswasusedtomodernizeitsofficesandbuynewSportUtilityVehicles(SUVs)forthebabus.39

Againin2010,thegovernmenthadreachedanagreementwithmadrasaleadersaboutregistration.TheOctober 2010 accord was a comprehensive one as it focused on mainstreaming of madrasas throughintroducingcontemporaryeducation,amongotherpoints.Acommitteewasconstitutedwithrepresentationfromreligiousleadersandthegovernmenttodraftalawonreformbutnotasinglemeetingwasheld.40

UndertheNationalActionPlan,effortshaveagainbeenmadetotacklethemadrasas.However,atameetingofthecollectiveboard–theITMD–inMarch2015,itwasdecidedtostronglyresistgovernmentmeasuresagainstthemadrasasandtorejectallunconstitutionalstepsoftherulerspursuingtheagendaofthe imperialpowers.41 InMay2015, the fivewafaqsagain rejected theplan to registerandreformthemadrasassayingitisbeingdone‘atthebehestoftheWesternpowers’,andpledgedtoresistgovernmenteffortstoputanyrestrictionsontheirindependence.The deputy chairman of the Senate,MaulanaAbdul Ghafoor Haideri, said action againstmadrasas

would harm education and that those who were talking about taking action against madrasas did notunderstandthefalloutofsuchanactionontheeducationalstructureofthecountry.42InSeptember2015,madrasaleadersmettheprimeministeranditwasagreedtosetupacommitteetoworkoutmodalitiesofaudit,registration,etc.Atthetimeofwriting,thegovernmentandtheITMDsappeartohavereachedanagreement over registration and curriculum that will include modern science subjects, English andPakistanstudies.ThecatchisthattherecognitiontothemadrasaeducationwillbegiventhroughanActofParliamentandalleducationalboardsanduniversitieswillholdexaminationsofcompulsorysubjectstoissuethemcertificatesanddegrees.43Howthispansoutinactualpracticewillhavetobeseen.Asecondsourceofoppositiontomadrasareformhasbeenthereligiousparties.Themadrasasaretheir

constituency, the students the main source of their street power. Given their dismal performance inelectionafterelection,anydilutionintheirholdovermadrasaswouldreducetheirrelevanceandstreetpower. Thus, they have to oppose any reform of the system for their own self-preservation. Notsurprisingly,thirtyreligiouspartiesandorganizationsaffiliatedwithTahaffuz-e-Namoos-e-RisalatMahaz(TNRM), a platform ofBarelvi school of thought, decided to launch a countrywide agitation from 27February2015againsttheallegedcrackdownonmadrasas,victimizationofulemaandprayerleadersinthewakeoftheArmyPublicSchoolkillinginPeshawar,especiallytheirarrestsandtheremovalofloudspeakersfrommosques.44

Letalonemadrasareform,anycriticismofmadrasashasinvitedswiftretribution.Themostrecentcase

has been that of Information Minister Pervez Rashid who said at a book launch in Karachi: ‘Theseuniversities of ignorance, towhomwegivedonations andhides, are giving an ideologyof hatred andconservativeness to the society.’ Theminister’s speech resulted in a tirade of condemnation from thereligiousright.WafaqulMadaris,castigatedRasheedandannouncedcountrywideprotests.NotedclericMuftiNaeemof JamiaBinoriadeclaredhimanapostate,arguing thathehad ‘ridiculed thebastionsofQuran andHadith’.Asked if criticizingmadrasas could be equatedwith criticizing Islam, he said theseminariesrepresentIslam.45Ultimately,withnosupportfromhisownparty,Rashidhadtoeathumblepie,apologizeintheSenatethathisremarksweredirectedtowardsonly3to4percentofmadrasasthatwereinvolvedinspreadingmilitancywhiletherestwerenotcentresofignorance

Pakistanisfacedwithatwinproblemvis-à-visthemadrasas.Ontheonehandisaneconomythatisnotgrowingfastenoughtoabsorbthealmostthreemillionyoungpersonsenteringthejobmarketeveryyear.Ontheother,thereisalargepoolofmadrasa-educatedyouthwhowouldbecompetingwithamuchlargernumberofgovernment/private-school-educatedyouth.Even though theeducationandskill levelsof thelatter category arenotveryhigh, theywill still edgeout themadrasa-educated inmost jobs.Thus, theoptions for the madrasa-educated are limited and joining a jihadi outfit or a religious political partyseemsanattractiveoffer.While religious motivation will help, it will be the economic circumstances that will impel them

towards violent organizations. In such a scenario, arguments like Pakistan has a strong Barelvi–Sufitradition will not matter. Moreover, the growing socio-economic, intellectual and ideological gapbetweenmadrasastudentsandotherstudentswillalsoaddtothefrustrationofthemadrasaalumni.ThePakistanistatewouldalsohavetopayattentiontothemadrasachildren.AspointedoutbyJalees

HazirinTheNation,

Thesechildrenarethecollectiveresponsibilityofoursocietyandwemustnotleavethemtothemercy of professional peddlers of faith who fill their innocent minds with ignorance andprejudice.Wemustnotleavethemtobeusedbythemasfodderfortheirconvolutedpoliticalagendasandtobeabusedbytheminmyriadways.Whenwetalkaboutreformingthemadrasas,weshouldnot thinkonlyaboutcounteringmilitancybutalsocomingtotherescueofchildrentrappedinthem.46

So far, the government and the army have looked atmadrasa students as cannon fodder for elusiveforeignpolicygoals.AsandwhenPakistandecidestopullbackfromthebrink,aprioritywouldbetostartlookingatthesemadrasastudentsasaresource.Theyaremuchtoolargeanumbertobeignored,andtheywillcontinuetobeignoredunlessthegovernmentworksoutaneconomicstrategytogivethemskillsto enable them to earn a livelihood. This should be as much a priority as madrasa registration andchangingthecurriculum.Military courts and hanging terrorists will not de-radicalize society. Registering madrasas, even

changingthecurriculumwillonlymakeadent.Thereal impactwillcomewhenthenexusbetweenthestateagencies supporting terroristgroupsand the terroristgroupsneedingmadrasa recruits to fulfil the

Pakistanistate’sagendaisbrokenandthestatecomesupwitharealisticplantomainstreammadrasasandtheirstudents.Untilthathappens,reformingmadrasasorbringingthemintothemainstreamwillremainamirage.Ashasbeenbrilliantlyput,‘Historyofnegotiationsonseminaryreformsindicatesthatenthusiasmisconsumedatmeetingsandendsatthepressconferences.’47

9

Terrorism

You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them to only bite your neighbor.Eventually,thosesnakesaregoingtoturnonwhoeverhastheminthebackyard.’1

—HillaryClinton

WHILEISLAMIZATIONhadacertainsalienceinacountrycreatedonthebasisofreligion,thegrowthofjihadi terrorism and violence prevalent in Pakistan today is the result of deliberate state policy. Evenbeforeitscreation,andmoresoafterwards,Pakistanhasusedjihadisofvarioushuesasinstrumentsofstatepolicywithoutexaminingtheir long-termeffectsonPakistanisociety.Notsurprisingly,Pakistanisseentheworldoverastheepicentreofterrorism.FareedZakariasummeditupbestwhenhewrote,‘Forawannabeterroristshoppingforhelp,Pakistanisasupermarket.’2

ThereareaconfusingplethoraofjihadiorganizationsinPakistanwithostensiblenicheagendas.Thesecan be subdivided into (i) Sunni sectarian, notably theSipah-e-SahabaPakistan (SSP) now called theAhleSunnatWalJamaat(ASWJ)andtheLashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ);(ii)Kashmir-centricDeobandigroupslikeJaish-e-Muhammed(JeM)andHarkat-ul-Mujahideen(HuM);theAhl-e-HadisgrouplikeLashkar-e-Taiba(LeT)andtheJamaat-e-Islami-supportedHizbulMujahideen(HM);(iii)anti-PakistangroupsliketheTehrik-i-TalibanPakistan(TTP).TheLeT,ofcourse,hasanagendabeyondKashmirandevenbeyondIndiaaswillbeseenbelow.While the above distinctions are useful to understand the complexity of the jihadi scenario, and the

primary agendas of various groups, on the ground, these distinctions are not watertight and at times,sharingof resources andvolunteers is commonbetween them.For example, as the InternationalCrisisGroup(ICG)putsit,

But such distinctions are tenuous at best. Sharing idiosyncratic religious interpretations andseekingtopropagatethemthroughforce,alltheselocal,regionalandinternationaljihadigroupshave combined resources and recruits to fight Islam’s perceived enemieswithin and beyondPakistan’sborders.3

AccordingtotheGlobalTerrorismDatabase,therewereabout1,000terror-induceddeathsinPakistaninthe1980s,largelyperpetratedbythesectarianoutfitsandtheAl-ZulfikarOrganizationthatwasformedbyZ.A.Bhutto’ssonstoavengehismurder.Thenextdecadesawa300percent increasein terrorism,largely perpetrated by the SSP. The decade after 9/11 witnessed a further 100 per cent increase in

terrorism,largelyperpetratedbytheTTPandtheLeJ.AccordingtopartialdatacompiledbytheSouthAsiaTerrorismPortal(SATP),since2003andupto1

July2016,60,772combatantsandnon-combatantshavebeenkilled.Themilitaryhaslost6,516soldiersandofficers.Thefiguresforterrorism-linkedfatalitiesareasfollows.In2014,thenumbersoffatalitieswere5,496,

including1,781civilians,533securityforce(SF)personneland3,182terrorists.In2015,therespectivefigureswere3,682fatalities,including940civilians,339SFpersonneland2,403terrorists.Thenumberofmajor incidents also declined from402 to 322over this period.Till 1 July 2016, 1,078 terrorism-linkedfatalitieshadoccurredinPakistan,including307civilians,146SFpersonneland625terrorists.Duringthecorrespondingperiodof2015,Pakistanhadseen2,210terrorism-relatedfatalities,including539civilians,170SFpersonneland1,501terrorists.OperationZarb-e-Azb4launchedon15June2014,in the tribal areas of Pakistan has been significant in bringing about this relative improvement, thoughdoubtscontinuetobeexpressedaboutwhomexactlyithasbeentargeting.5

Despitethedeclineinthenumberofterroristincidentstherehavebeenseveralhigh-profileincidentsin2015and2016asshowninthetablebelow:

High-profileterroristincidents(2015–16)

Year Date Details2015 30January Sixty-twokilledinaShiamosqueinShikarpurdistrict. 13February Twenty-twokilledinaShiamosqueinPeshawar. 15March Seventeenkilledintwinsuicide-bombattacksthattargeted

churchesinLahore. 13May Forty-threeIsmailiskilledinKarachi. 18September Twenty-nine,mostlyservicemen,killedinanairforcebase

nearPeshawar. 23October Twenty-fourShiaskilledinJacobabad;andtwenty-three,

mainlyShias,killedinFATA. 29December Twenty-sixkilledinMardan.2016 20January Twenty-onekilledinauniversityinCharsadda. 27March Sixty-fivekilledinLahore.6

8August Seventy,mostlylawyers,killedinQuetta.

ThecontinuingviolencecouldindicatethatdespiteOperationZarb-e-AzbandtheNationalActionPlan,7

the terrorists have been regrouping and perhaps even regenerating. Finding security targets harder toaccess,thestrategynowistogoaftersofttargets.Casualtiesapart,thefinancialcostofterrorismhasbeenenormous.Inawrittenreply,FinanceMinister

IshaqDarinformedtheSenateinMay2016thatduetoterrorism,thenationaleconomysustaineddirectandindirectlossestothetuneofRs5,193.95billion(US$56.88billion)duringthelastfiveyears.Headded that most losses, i.e., Rs 2,037.33 billion were recorded during 2010–11 and least Rs 457.93

billionin2014–15.8

ThePakistanArmy’suseoftheIslamistsasinstrumentsofstatepolicyhascometobetermedthe‘mullah–militaryalliance’.AsHaqqaninotes,‘ThealliancebetweenthemosqueandthemilitaryinPakistanwasforgedovertime,anditscharacterhaschangedwiththetwistsandturnsofPakistanihistory.’9Ithastwokeycomponents:allowingthestatetoplayaduplicitousgamebyusingnon-stateactorstorealizeforeignpolicyobjectiveswhilemaintainingdeniabilityforthemselvesandselectivelyempoweringandtargetingthenon-stateactorswhofollow/donotfollowrespectively,thelaid-downagendaofthestate.Thehistoryofusingnon-stateactorspredates thecreationofPakistanasnotedinanearlierchapter.

While IskanderMirza, thena joint secretary, laterdefence secretaryandpresidentofPakistan,didnothavetousethetriballashkarstofomenttroubleinthethenNWFPontheinstructionsofJinnahinFebruary1947,10Mirza’spreparatoryeffortsweretobearfruitinOctober1947,justtwomonthsafterPakistan’screation,totryandforcetheissueandcaptureKashmirmilitarily.Initscurrentform,however,thegrowthofthejihadiphenomenondatesbacktoPakistan’sparticipation

in theAfghan jihad that led to thematuring of themullah–military alliance. AhmedRashid estimates:‘Between1982and1992,some35,000Muslimradicals from43Islamiccountries in theMiddleEast,NorthandEastAfrica,centralAsiaandtheFarEastwouldpasstheirbaptismunderfirewiththeAfghanmujahideen.’11LtGen.(Retd)HamidGul,formerchiefoftheISI,boastedabouthowhisorganizationhadchannelledIslamistsfromalargenumberofMuslimcountries:‘WearefightingajihadandthisisthefirstIslamicbrigadeinthemodernera.’12

Pakistanhasn’tlookedbacksince.Whatpushedthejihadiculturefurtherwasthataftertheanti-Sovietjihad,theISIdivertedthereturningjihadisfromPunjab,especiallyfromsouthPunjab,towardsKashmir.Thisallowedthejihadistoconsolidatethemselves,ideologicallyandphysically,especiallyinthe1990s,anddevelopagendasoftheirown,notalwaysinlinewiththatofthemilitary.UnliketheAfghanTalibanwhoseagendawas territorially limited toAfghanistan, the jihadis inPakistandevelopedamuchwideragenda,territoriallyandideologically.Inimplementingthis,theywereabletofeedofftensionsinsociety;using theirmuscle power to help the business community, the landmafia and the local politicians formutualbenefit.13

OncePakistanbecameanuclear-weaponstatein1998,thearmyunderPervezMusharrafresortedtoahigh-riskstrategyofusingnon-stateactorsunderanuclearoverhang.TheassumptionthistimewasthatIndiawouldnotdare to retaliatedue to the fearofescalation to thenuclear level.ChristineFairnoteshow the acceptability of low-intensity conflict (LIC) under a nuclear overhang was reflected in thewritingsofarmyofficers.14

OneofthefundamentalproblemsinPakistanhasbeenthateveryleaderhaspromisedtocrackdownonterrorismtoendthejihadiculturewhenhecomestopowerbutforgetsthosepromisesinduecourse.Forexample, Musharraf in his celebrated 12 January 2002 address outlined an action plan of targetingterrorismthatincludedanassurancethatPakistaniterritorywouldnotbeusedforterrorisminIndia;thatterroristswouldnotbeallowedafreerun;thatmadrasaswouldbereformedandsoon.15WhileitistruethatseveralPakistanigroupswerebanned,nofollow-upactionwastakenforprosecution;bannedgroupscontinuedasbeforebyadoptingnewnamesbutwiththesameleadership.Forexample,HafizMuhammadSaeed (LeT) and Maulana Azhar Masood (JeM) were detained only for a few months under the

Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance but not under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The LeT’s name waschangedtoJamaat-ud-Dawa(JD)andJeMtoKhudam-ul-Islam.Bothleadersandorganizationswereabletocarryontheiractivitiesasbefore.HafizSaeed,aninternationalterrorist,hasbeenopenlyandrepeatedlycallingforjihadinKashmir.At

itsannualcongregationinPatokiinOctober2003,barelyayearafterMusharraf’sassertion,theLeT/JuDopenlyannounced jihad inKashmir.16Adecade later, inDecember 2014,HafizSaeedheld amassivetwo-dayrallyatLahore’sMinar-e-Pakistanthatwasattendedbymorethanalakhofparticipants,whosemovement and logisticshadbeen facilitatedby theauthorities.Duringhis speech,Saeed reiteratedhisfavouritetopicof‘Ghazwa-e-Hind’orwaragainstIndia.Subsequently,onPakTVtalkshowsheblamedIndia for thePeshawar schoolmassacre,dramaticallydemonstrating thatnothinghadchanged.17On30May2016,JuDhostedameetingofprojihadiorganizationsinIslamabadundertheauspicesofDefenceofPakistanCouncil.Leadersofdifferentoutfitsexpressedtheirdeterminationtocontinuetheirsupportformilitants fighting in the neighboring countries. On 5 June 2016, the same conglomerate of extremistorganizationscameoutforapublicshowofstrengthinIslamabad.Finally,apublicrallywasorganizedbyHafizSaeedandotherextremistoutfitson31July2016inRawalpindiandIslamabad,ostensiblyinsupportofJ&K.Theorganizersoftherallypubliclycollectedfinancialdonations.ThisshowsPakistan’slackofcommitmenttofightterrorismanditsduplicitouspolicies.Astonishingly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, the chief minister of

Punjab,protecttheJamaat-ud-Dawa.UnderShahbazSharif,thePunjabprovincialgovernmenttookoverJuD’soperations,essentiallyrenderingitsworkersemployeesoftheprovincialgovernment.18Accordingto files released from the Abbottabad compound where Osama bin Laden was hiding, there was areferencetoShahbazSharif,initiatingnegotiationsforadealwiththeTTPaslongasthelatteragreedtohaltalloperationsinthePunjab.Thisnotonlyshowsthelackofseriousnessonthepartofthegovernmentineliminatingterrorismacrosstheboardbutalsoitcomplicity.19

ItwaslefttothePunjablawminister,RanaSanaullah,andMusharraftoconfirmtheroleofthestate.SanaullahtoldBBCUrduthatlegalactionagainstproscribedorganizationslikeJamaat-ud-Dawa(JuD)andJaish-e-Mohammad(JeM)wasnotpossiblesince‘stateitselfhasremainedapartofthis’.20Forhispart,MusharrafadmittedinaninterviewthatPakistansupportedandtrainedgroupslikeLashkar-e-Taiba(LeT)in1990stocarryoutmilitancyinKashmir.‘In1990sthefreedomstrugglebeganinKashmir…AtthattimeLashkar-e-Taibaand11or12otherorganizationswereformed.WesupportedthemandtrainedthemastheywerefightinginKashmiratthecostoftheirlives.’HesaidHafizSaeedandZakiurRehmanLakhvitypepeopleenjoyedthestatusofheroesatthattime.21

DespitelaunchingofoperationZarb-e-Azbagainst theTTP,it isoftenforgottenthatnotsolongago,FazalHayat,betterknownasMullahFazlullah,theheadoftheTTPwasactuallyaheroofthearmyandthe administration.On3April 2009,Fazlullah led theprayer at his homevillage,Mamdirai.A reportabout the event states that hewaswarmly receivedbyhis followers, aswell asmilitaryofficials andofficialsofthedistrictadministration.Thosewhoprayedbehindhimwerekeymilitaryandcivilofficers– including Brigadier Tahir Mubeen, Syed Javed Hussain, the commissioner of Malakand region,Khushhal Khan, the District Coordination Officer of Swat, Danishwar Khan, Swat’s District PoliceOfficerandthemaninchargeofOperationRah-e-Haq.AftertheprayersFazlullahgaveanemotionalbutthreateningspeech,whichwasheardwith respectbyall, including themilitaryandcivilofficials, like

obedient subjects. The army does owe the people an explanation as to how key state functionaries,includingfromthePakistanArmy,prayedalongwitha terroristwhohadkilledsoldiers,NWFPpoliceofficersandciviliansofthevalley.ThiswasatatimewhentheSwatpolicehadregisteredatleastsixtycasesrelatedtosuicidebombings,kidnappings,attacksoncivilians,policeandarmedforcesanddamagetopublicandprivatepropertyagainstFazlullah.22

Moreover,insteadofensuringthatterroristleadersgetnopublicity,suchleadersarefrequentlygivenprime-timeexposure in the electronicmedia.HafizSaeed is a frequentgueston ‘talk shows’ as is thepatron-in-chiefofthevirulentlyanti-Shiaoutfit,theAhleSunnatWalJamat(ASWJ).MuhammadAhmedLudhianvi,Saeedand theHizbulMujahideenchiefSyedSalahuddinhaveusedsuchoccasions tospewvenomagainst India.This is despite the fact that a circular issuedon2November2015by themediaregulator, PakistanElectronicMediaRegulatoryAuthority (PEMRA), had announced a blanket ban oncoverage of seveny-two proscribed organizations, including the ‘banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD),Lashkar-e-Taiba(LeT)andFalah-i-InsaniatFoundation(FIF)underUNResolution1267’.23

The ambiguity of the state was further underlined by the adviser to the primeminister on nationalsecurityandforeignaffairs,SartajAziz,statinginaninterviewtoBBCUrduon17November2014thatPakistan should not target militants who do not threaten the country’s security, adding, ‘Why shouldAmerica’senemiesunnecessarilybecomeourenemies?’Whenspeakingabout theHaqqaninetwork,hesaid, ‘Someof themweredangerousforusandsomearenot.Whymustwemakeenemiesoutof themall?’24 Sartaj Aziz also acknowledged in March 2016 that Pakistan had, in fact, been sustaining theTalibaninsanctuariesinPakistanalltheseyears.(Thisisdiscussedindetailinasubsequentchapter.)Thefailureofeverygovernmenttocrackdownonterroristsissimplybecauseoftheirunwillingnessto

doso.Musharraf, like thosebeforehimand thosewhohavesucceededhimasarmychiefs–GeneralsKayaniandRaheelSharif–deliberatelyfailedtoneutralizethejihadifactoriesbecauseoftheroletheseorganizationsplayed in theirperceptionofPakistan’snationalsecurity.Hence, themeasuresannouncedand implementedhavebeen cosmeticwith an eyeon the international community, to ease internationalpressure.25 Given the interlinkages between the groups, Pakistan will find it increasingly difficult toisolate and degrade the capabilities of those opposing the statewithout targeting thosewho seeminglycarryoutitsagenda.

TheTehrik-i-TalibanPakistan(TTP)thathasbecomethemostdangerousterroristgroupforPakistanisaloosenetworkofDeobandisstraddlingFATAandpartsofKhyberPakhtunkhwa(KPK)withlinkagesinPunjab.Theprimary focusof theirviolence is thePakistan state and theobjective is toestablish theirbrandof sharia inPakistan.The attack on theLalMasjid in 2007 is believed to be the catalystwhenvarious jihadi groups in FATA came together to form the TTP throughout the Pashtun belt, under theleadershipofBaitullahMehsud.Hewaskilled in adroneattack inAugust2009andwas replacedbyHakimullahMehsudwhowas killed in another drone attack inNovember 2013 andwas replaced byFazlullah,whocomesfromadifferentsocialcontextfromBaitullahandHakimullah.‘HavinglivedandworkedinSwatasalow-levelmullahinasocietyknownforitshierarchy,FazlullahbringsahatredoftheSwatelitethatisnottemperedbyanykindofcode.’26

Apartfromitsstrictideology,theTTPhasbeenabletoattractfollowersduetopoorgovernanceand

especiallyanexpensiveandcorruptjudicialsystem.InplaceslikeSwat,theTTPhasalsowonsupportforredistributinglandtolandlesspeasants.Itisareasofpovertyduetolackofjobs,economicstagnationandunderdevelopmentthathavebecomefertilegroundstoseedextremistideology,thoughtheyarenottheonlyareas.TheTTPbeliefsystemisfairlysimple:First,theTTPmovementrejectsthelegitimacyofthePakistani

stateandtheConstitutionsincetheybelievethatneitherisIslamic.TheyonlyrecognizetheshariaastheConstitution.Second,accordingtoJoshuaWhite,‘theyaresomewhatmoretakfiriintheirideologythanthemainstreamIslamists.’(TakfiristhepracticeofaccusingotherMuslimsofapostasy.)Inotherwords,‘they are willing to sanction jihad against other Muslims who reject their sectarian or ideologicalposition.’Infact,theyclaimthattheseothergroupsarenottrulyMuslim.’27

Ideology apart, one notable feature of the TTP is its linkage with criminal networks, especiallytransportnetworksengagedinsmuggling,andthetimbermafia.28 Inmanyplaces,armedcriminalgangshave adopted the label of the Taliban to give themselves a protective facade. According to statisticscompiled by the interior ministry, the TTP runs a syndicate worth $50–120 million per month fromprotection racket, drugs and extortion alone. Karachi has become their financial hub with largeinvestmentsinvariousbusinesses,apartfromconnectionwithorganizedcrime.29

The links between the TTP and the al-Qaeda are worrying for the Pakistan government and theinternational community. Describing the TTP as an ‘extension of al-Qaeda’, Rehman Malik, the thenadviser of the interior ministry, admitted that the suicide bombers, their handlers and financers werePakistan-based, dispelling the notion that terrorismwas foreign-funded and an offshoot of the Afghanconflict.30AneditorialintheDailyTimescommentedthatthiswas‘arealisticdiagnosisoftheproblemofterrorism’inPakistan.31AkeyfactorintheTTP’sgrowthandstrengthisitsmobility.TalibanmilitantscanmoveacrosstheborderfromPakistantoAfghanistanandfromAfghanistantoPakistanwithease.Anothertermbeingincreasinglyusedisthe‘PunjabiTaliban’.AccordingtoHassanAbbas,thename

PunjabiTalibanwasfirstusedforethnicPunjabisassociatedwiththeHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami(HUJI)who,under the leadershipofQariSaifullahAkhtar,went tosupportand join the regimeof theTalibanleaderMullahOmar inAfghanistan in themid-1990s.The second time thenamewasusedwasduring2001–03whenMusharrafbannedsomemilitantandsectariangroups(LeJ,SMP,SSP,TeJ,JeM,LeT)thathada supportbase inPunjab.Asa result, someof theseelementsbeganmoving toFATA to seek safehavensandestablishnewcamps.32

ThecurrentPunjabiTalibannetworkhasanumberofkeyfeatures.First, it lacksanyorganizationorcommandstructureandoperatesasaloosenetworkofelementsfromdistinctmilitantgroups.MembersfromLeJ,SSP,JeMandtheirvarioussplintergroupsareallconsideredtobepartofthisloosenetwork.Second, many of these militants were professionally trained in guerilla tactics and sabotage by thePakistanistate.Third,mostofthegroupsareSunniandSalafistinorientation.Fourth,DeobandiLeJandJeMarePunjab-basedandarecomponentsoftheTTP.TheyhaveconductedaseriesofattacksinPunjabinthenameoftheTTP.AworryingquestionforPakistaniswhetheritsheartland–Punjab–isbecomingthenewTalibanfocus.Thearmy formally launchedanoperationagainst theTTP inNorthWaziristanon15 June2014and

gaveitthenameZarb-e-Azb(thenameoftheswordthattheProphetusedinthebattlesofBadrandUhud;literallysharpandcuttingstrike).ArmychiefRaheelSharifhasgoneonrecord tosay that themilitary

operation in progresswas ‘against all hues and colours, and it iswithout any exception,whether it isHaqqaniNetworkorTehrik-i-TalibanPakistanoranything’.However,hismorerecentpronouncementshavegonebeyondterrorisminFATAperse.Forexample:‘Wearedeterminedandwillgotoanylengthtofinishallpocketsofterroristsfromeverynookandcornerofthecountry,’33declaring2016as‘theyearofnationalsolidarity’,onewherecompleteeliminationofthenexusofterrorism,crimeandcorruptionwillbeachieved.34

Three factors need to be noted here. First, it is generally accepted that prior to the launch of theoperation, the cadres of the Haqqani network had fled to Afghanistan.35 Second, even Pakistanicommentators agree that there are clear indications that the LeT and the JuD are not in the targetedcategory.36Third,todefeatterrorisminallitsmanifestationsrequiresadefeatoftheterroristmindsetandtheclosureof recruitment factories thatbreedsuch terrorists.There is little to suggest thatanyseriousattentionandactionhasbeenfocusedonsuchissues.Overtwoyearslater,themootquestionishoweffectivetheoperationhasbeen.Thearmy,ofcourse,

hasbeenclaimingthattheoperationwasahugesuccessandhasperiodicallybeentoutingstatisticsofthenumberofterroristskilledandareasthathavebeencleared.Forexample,theISPRclaimedthatsincethelaunch ofOperationZarb-e-Azb in June 2014,more than 21,000 suspects had been arrested in nearly14,000intelligence-basedoperationsand200killedwhileresistingarrests.However,therehasbeennoindependentverificationof thearmy’sclaims.Such figuresdobeg thequestion: ifdespite the scaleofsuch arrests, terrorist attacks are continuing, clearly the number of terrorists must be massive ormultiplyingat a fast rate.AsTheNation asked: ‘If thousandsofpeoplewere arrested in thousandsofoperations,andstillwearefacingterribleattacks,isthearmysayingthattheterroristhordeissomassivethatitjustcan’tbecontaineddespitethousandsofoperations?14,000intelligenceoperationsshouldhavescaredthesemenwitless,yettheyfindtheirwaytobombs,AfghaniSIMsandinnocentchildren.’37

Neither do periodic announcements that the operation is now in its final stages inspire confidenceparticularlysincetheoperationhasbeenextendedtill2019.Thisspeaksvolumesaboutitsresults.Whilethearmyoperationseems tohavehadsuccessagainst theTTP in termsof reducing theiractivities, theHaqqaninetwork,astheDailyTimesnoted,wasstillaspowerfulandbrutalasiteverwas,ifnotmoreso,suggestingthatithadnotbeendegraded.38

Internationalopinionisalsoquitecynicalaboutthesuccessoftheoperation.Forexample,theUSstatedepartmentreportonglobalterrorism,2014,acknowledgedthattheongoingmilitaryoffensiveinNorthWaziristanandKhyberAgencyhasseverelydentedal-Qaeda’spresenceinSouthAsia.Evenso,itheldthatsomegroupscontinued to findspace toorchestrateand launchattacks intoAfghanistanandagainstminoritiesinPakistan.ItsaidthatwhileoperationscarriedoutbyPakistan’smilitaryandsecurityforcesdisruptedtheactionsofmanymilitantoutfitsinthecountry,groupsliketheAfghanTaliban,theHaqqaninetwork andLashkar-e-Taibawere sparedby theoffensive, and they continued tooperate, train, rally,propagandizeandraisefundsinPakistan.39

That theHaqqani network operatives have been allowed tomelt away raises serious doubts aboutwhether the Pakistani security establishment would actually take on the Haqqanis, who have been itsoldest jihadiasset.Onecan reformand regulate themadrasasbut so longas there isademand for thejihadis,theywillkeepchurningoutmore.Pakistanwould dowell to refer to the 2008 study of theRandCorporation of 648 terrorist groups

existingbetween1968and2006.Thestudyfoundthatmilitaryoperationsresultedintheeliminationofterroristgroupsonlyinsevencaseswhereas40percentofthegroupswerecrushedthroughpoliceandintelligencework and 43 per cent renouncedmilitancy by joining political parties.Military force hasrarelybeentheprimaryreasonfortheendofterroristgroups.Whileitacknowledgedtheimportanceofhard force, especially against large and well-organized groups, it also stressed a range of policyinstrumentsincludingpolicingandintelligencenetworks.40ThiselementislargelyabsentinPakistan.Thegovernmentformulatedatwenty-pointNationalActionPlan(NAP)inDecember2014,againstthe

backdropofthePeshawarschoolattack,tocrackdownonterrorism.BothPrimeMinisterNawazSharifandarmychiefGen.RaheelSharifstatedcategoricallythatnodistinctionwouldbemadebetweengoodandbadterrorists.Theplanincludedalonglistofmeasuresincludingcounter-terrorism,chokingoffthefinanciallifelineofterrorism,acrackdownonhatespeech,onmadrasasandonsectarianorganizations,etc.Akeyelementwasthesettingupofmilitarycourt to trycasesof terrorismthroughaconstitutionalamendment.Morethantwoyearslater,itisclearthattheleadership,bothcivilianandmilitary,lackthepolitical

will to fully implement the NAP. The army has no intention to act against anti-India groups like theLeT/JuD and Jaish-e-Mohammad and anti-Afghan groups like the Haqqani network and the AfghanTaliban.ThefreedomenjoyedbyterroristslikeMasoodAzhar,ZakiurRehmanLakhviandHafizSaeedproves this. Despite its own failings, the army has strongly criticized the failure of the civiliangovernment to implement the NAP. For its part, the civil leadership has not acted on issues likeoperationalizingtheNationalCounter-TerrorismAuthority(NACTA)orundertakingthemadrasareformsor formulatinga counter-narrative, thus showing its lackof seriousness.Asa result, tackling terrorismholisticallyremainsadistantgoal.

TheLeT/JuDhasemergedasthemostimportantterroristgroupinPakistanwithinternationaldimensions.WhatgaveitadditionalnotorietywastheMumbaiattackinNovember2008.SeveralfacetsdistinguishtheLeT fromother terroristgroups.First,unlikeotherPak terroristgroups, theLeThasnotyet stagedattacksinPakistanortargetedtheinterestsofthePakistanArmy/ISI.MassivesupportgivenbytheISIinits formative stage is partly responsible for such loyalty. Second, the LeT is predominantly a PunjabiterroristgroupthathasnaturalethnicaffinitytothepredominantlyPunjabiarmy.Third,theLeT/JuDhadcondemnedinJanuary2010thekillingofMuslimsbysuicidebombingasun-Islamicandsaidthatsuchattacks ‘played into thehandsof theUS, Israel and India’ and argued that focus shouldbeon jihad inKashmir andAfghanistan – against non-Muslims. Fourth, it has also condemned sectarian violence inPakistan.41

Fifth, the LeT also plays a crucial role domestically. Lieven, for example, notes that due to itscharitable work and fight against India, the LeT has managed to establish itself in Punjab. This issignificantbecauseitsAhl-e-HadiththeologyisforeigntomostPunjabis.’42ChristineFairarguesthattheLeT’sdomesticroleishingedonitsoppositiontootherterroristgroupsattackingthestate.Asaresult,Pakistan would not abandon the LeT even if it were not required in the Indo-Pak context. She seesPakistan’srelianceuponLeTdeepeningastheinternalsecurityproblemsofthestateworsen.43

For these reasons, the PakistanArmy is unlikely to take action against the LeT just as the latter is

unlikelytoturnagainstthePakistanistate.OneofthefearsthathauntsthePakistanArmyisthattargetingtheLeTcouldpushitintocollaboratingwiththeTTP.Equally,thereisthefearthatdealingwiththeLeTmilitarily,aswithotherPunjabiterroristgroups,couldtesttheloyaltyofthepredominantlyPunjabiarmy.This isall themoresonowthatpartof therecruitinggroundof thearmyand the jihadis is thesame–southPunjab.44

ThoughaPunjab-basedgroup,theLeThasbeenspreadingitstentaclestootherpartsofthecountrytoo.IthassetupcampsandestablisheditsfootprintinareaslikeTharparkarinSindh,whichhasseenasurgeininfantdeathsduetomalnutritionoverthepasttwoyears.TheLeTalsohasanagendathatgoesbeyondKashmir. Bruce Riedel summed this up well: ‘LeT’s ideology as laid out by Saeed goes far beyondrecoveringtheMuslimpartsofKashmirforPakistan.HeseeksthecreationofaMuslimcaliphateovertheentiresubcontinent.ThevisionofSaeedandhisfellowleadersofLeTrequirestheliteraldestructionofIndiaasastate.Saeedannouncedthisgoalinaspeechin1999aftertheshortKargilwarwithIndia,saying, ‘… today I announce the break-upof India, Inshallah [Godwilling].Wewill not rest until thewholeofIndiaisdissolvedintoPakistan.’45

For a long time theWest, especially theUS, saw theLeT as predominantly an India-specific threatwhile their focus was on the al-Qaeda. But when LeT-trained terrorists started getting implicated interrorist plots inEurope andNorthAmerica, theWest began tounderstand the truenatureofLeT.Forexample, in a testimony before a subcommittee of theHouse ofRepresentatives, LisaCurtis, a seniorresearchfellowatTheHeritageFoundation,stated,

…theUSmustdeveloppoliciesthatapproachtheLeTwiththesameurgencyasthatwhichtheUSdealswith the threat from al-Qaeda.Given the potential forLeT-linked terrorist cells toconductaMumbai-styleattackhereintheUS,Washingtonmustpursuepoliciesthatcontainandshutdowntheoperationsofthisdeadlyorganization…giventhattheLeThascooperatedwithal-Qaeda and shares a similar virulent anti-west Islamist ideology, it makes little sense tobelieveonecandismantleal-QaedawithoutalsoshuttingdowntheoperationsoftheLeT.46

LeT’s efforts to access nuclearweapons should also be noted. In his book,Call for TransnationalJihad,ArifJamalrevealsthatsincehisdaysasateacherintheUniversityofEngineeringandTechnology(UET),HafizSaeedandco-founderoftheJuDZafarIqbalhadbeenencouragingtheirstudentstojointhecountry’snuclear scienceand technology institutions likePakistanAtomicEnergyCommission (PAEC)andKhanResearchLabs(KRL)aftergraduatingfromUET.JamalbelievesthatdozensofJuDmembersfrom UET and other universities have joined Pakistan’s nuclear and technology institutions. It is thispenetrationof state institutions, includingnuclearones, that seems tohaveconvinced the JuD that it islikely to acquire access to nuclear technology. This may come sooner than imagined given the JuD’sabilitytorealizeitsplanssystematicallyandcool-headedly,hewarns.47

InthiscontextitisworthnotingthatDrA.Q.KhanwasreportedtohaveattendedtheralliesofHafizSaeedtogetherwithothernuclearscientistslikeSultanBashiruddinMehmood,formerdirectorofPAECandAbdulMajid.The latter’scharityUmmaTameer-e-Nau(UTN)was found tobe incorrespondencewith the LeT and papers on construction and maintenance of nuclear weapons were found on theirpremises.ThesetwoscientistshadseparatelymetOsamabinLaden.48SpeakingataKashmirSolidarityDayrallyinLahoreon6February2004,HafizSaeedsaid:‘He[A.Q.Khan]sharedthetechnologyforthe

supremacyofIslamandheactedonAllah’scommand.’49

Beforeconcluding,it isworthlookingatthereportsaboutthepresenceoftheIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS),orjusttheIslamicState,inPakistan.ThesereportsinitiallycentredonthepresenceofsomePakistanis (Abdul Rahman al Amjad al Pakistani) in Iraq, expression of support to the ISIS by somesplinter TTP groups; ISIS logo and name appearing in some graffiti, posters and pamphlets acrossPakistan,etc.50Moreimportantly,theBalochistangovernmentina‘secret’memoreportedtothefederalgovernmentinIslamabadon30October2014that‘ISIShascreateda10-man“strategicplanningwing”with amasterplanonhow towagewar against thePakistanimilitary’.The report alsomentioned thegroup’slinkswithLashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)andotherassociatedsectariangroups,andclaimedthatitwasactivelyandsuccessfullyrecruitinginFATA.51

InOctober2014,anumberofseniorcommandersdefectedfromtheTTPandpledgedtheirallegianceto the ISIS and al-Baghdadi. These included Hafiz Saeed Khan (TTP chief for Orakzai Agency),ShahidullahShahid(formerTTPspokesman),DaulatKhan(TTPchiefforKurramAgency),GulZamanal-Fateh (TTP chief for Khyber Agency), Shiekh Mufti Hasan (TTP chief for Peshawar) and KhalidMansoor(TTPchiefforHangu).ApreviouslyunknownoutletcallingitselfKhurasanMediareleasedaprofessionallymadevideoinJanuary2015,inwhichAbuMuhammadal-Adnani,anISISspokesperson,endorsed the formation of his organization’s chapter in Pakistan and Afghanistan and declared HafizSaeedKhanasitssupremeleader.However,despitemountingevidencetothecontrary,thegovernmentappearedtohaveanostrich-like

attituderegardingtheISIS.Forexample,thearmychief,Gen.RaheelSharif,whileaddressingtheRoyalUnited Services Institute (London, 9 October 2015) asserted that Pakistan would not allow ‘even ashadow’ofIslamicState(IS)initsterritory.52TheinteriorministerhasonseveraloccasionsstatedthattheISIShad,‘noorganizedpresenceinPakistan’andthat‘terroristorganizationsareusingDa’ishasafaçadetomountattacksinthecountry’.TheForeignOfficespokesman,echoingthearmychief,reiteratedon 1 January 2016 that the Islamic State had no footprint in Pakistan. ‘Wewill not tolerate even theshadowoftheIslamicStateinPakistan.WehavealertedoursecurityagenciestothethreatposedbytheIslamicState.Theywilltakeappropriateaction,ifrequired,’hesaid.53

Severalinstances,however,revealthatthegovernment’sassessmentaboutthepresenceoftheISISinPakistanhasbeenwrong.ThegroundinPakistanisundoubtedlyfertilefortheISIStotakerootnotmerelybecauseofthejihadiambiencebutbecauseofthelargepoolofvirulentanti-ShiasentimentinPakistanthatfindscommongroundwiththeideologyoftheISIS.Notsurprisingly,itwasthegruesomekillingofforty-five Ismailis inKarachi inMay2015bywhich the ISIS first announced itspresence inPakistan,thoughclumsyattemptsweremadetopinthisactonanallegedIndianspy.Another disturbing factor is that reports fromeasternAfghanistan indicate that bulk of the terrorists

affiliated with the ISIS were actually Pakistanis.Most of them in Achin, Nazian and Kot districts ofNangraharprovincehailfromOrakzai,KhyberandBajourAgencies.TheywerepartoftheTTPandhadfledafterthePakistanArmylauncheditsmilitaryoperation.Therehasbeenanactivesupplylinetothesefighters inAfghanistan fromTirahValley inKhyberAgencywhich is geographically adjacent to theseAfghandistricts.Lashkar-e-Islami(LI) ledbyMangalBaghfromtheKhyberAgencyhasbeenthemainsupplier.54TheAfghanambassadorinIslamabadJananMosazaialsoconfirmedthesedevelopmentswhen

he stated at a seminar in Islamabad that the majority of the terrorists escapingmilitary operations inPakistan’sOrakzaiandMohmandAgencieshadjoinedtheIS.55

Inthefaceofmountingevidence,thegovernment’spointofviewseemstobegraduallychanging.Thus,almost immediatelyafter theForeignOfficestatementmentionedabove, thePunjab lawminister statedthat over 100 people from Punjab, including JuD workers and women from Al-Huda madrasa andthousandsfromotherprovinceshadlefttofightforISIS.56ThedirectorgeneraloftheIntelligenceBureau(IB),AftabSultan,informedtheSenateStandingCommitteeonInterioron10February2016thattheISISwas emerging as a threat because severalmilitant groups had soft corner for it.He namedLashkar-e-JhangviandSipah-e-SahabaPakistanasexamples.HedisclosedthattheIBhadbustedabigISnetworkafter several members reached Punjab following Karachi’s Safoora Goth carnage in May 2015.57 InMarch, the Karachi police admitted that they had killed Kamran Aslam, alias Kamran Gujjar, theoperationalcommanderoftheISISinPakistan.58InApril2016,thecounter-terrorismdepartmentoftheKarachipoliceannouncedinapressconferencethatmorethantwodozenIslamicState–inspiredmilitantswerefoundoperatingandplanningsomemajorterrorattacksinthemetropolis.Previously,theybelongedto the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and al-Qaeda but now had jumped on the ISbandwagon.However,itisunlikelythattheISIShasanidentifiablephysicalorganizationalstructureandleadership

inPakistan.NeitherisitnecessaryfortheISIStophysicallyshift toPakistan.Yet,whenscoresofmenandevenafewwomenhavegonetofightinSyriaandwhenreportsindicatethatmembersofthebannedLashkar-e-JhangviandJamaat-ud-Dawahavejoinedthegroupinsignificantnumberscanits‘presence’bedenied?Allthatitneedsarelocalsympathizersandsupporterswhoarerecruitedformissions.AsTheNationaptlynoted,‘ISisnotgoingtomarchfromIraqandSyriatoPakistantomakeaclaim;itwillbelocals who will pledge allegiance, create links and then be recruited for a mission. This is alreadyhappening.59AloomingdangeriswhentheseindoctrinatedpeoplereturntocontinuethejihadinPakistan.AtthesametimethejihadigroupsconnectedwiththePakistanimilitaryareunlikelytoseeanybenefit

goingtheISISway,eveniftheyhadtheoption.TheTTP,barringafewdisgruntledsplintergroupsandindividuals,isstronglyconnectedwitheithertheAfghanTalibanortheal-Qaeda.WhetherornottheISISfindsaphysicalandorganizedhomeinPakistanwoulddependagreatdealonthearmyandtheISI.IncasetheISIfindstheISISausefultoolorlabeltoachievetacticalresults,likekeepingtheattentionoftheUSfocusedinthearea,theISIScouldfindaberthinPakistan.ButthiswouldmeaneitherbreakingwiththeAfghanTalibanordevelopingamodusvivendibetweentheISISandtheTaliban.60Tillthen,theISISpresencecouldgrowasanideaappealingtoasectionofthepopulation.

Toconclude,Pakistan’ssecuritycrisisisrootedinitsownskewedforeignandinternalpolicies–whichhave traditionallyand selectivelydistinguishedbetweengoodnon-stateactors suchasAfghanTaliban,Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Haqqani network and the bad ones like the LeJ, TTP, etc. The continuoussupporttothesejihadigroupssincethetimeofZia-ul-HaqandthepoliciesofIslamizationintroducedbyhimandfollowedbysuccessivegovernmentshasensured that themoderatecivilsociety inPakistan isfacedwithshrinkingspaceandismuchtooweaktotakeonthejihadichallenge.Decadesofmilitaryrulehasalsostuntedthegrowthofpoliticalpartiesandofdemocracyitself,makingpoliticalleaderstoethe

army’slineinsecuritymatters.Andsolongasthearmylooksatsecurity,internalandexternal,throughtheprism of India, there is little likelihood of any change in its policy of treating jihadis as anything but‘strategicassets’.For long, thearmy’spresumptionhasbeen that the jihadigroupsandespecially theKashmir-centric

groupsdonothurtPakistan.Thisassumptionhasbeenunravellingforquitesometime,onatleastthreelevels.First,astheexampleoftheTTPshows,jihadigroupshaveturnedagainsttheirmaster.Theworstexampleofthiswasthebrutalmassacreof135schoolchildrenintheArmyPublicSchoolinPeshawar.Second, jihadi groups in Pakistan can be hijacked for international terrorism – for example, becomeaffiliatedwithorshowloyaltytogroupsliketheAQIS(al-QaedaintheIndianSubcontinent)andISIS,ordevelopagendasof theirown.Thirdandmostcritical, jihadi terrorismmaylead toapotentialnuclearconflict with India in case of another 2008 Mumbai-type attack. For the army, keeping the Indo-PaknormalizationprocessderailedthroughtheuseofjihadismaybeparforthecoursebutitcanposeseriousdangerstoPakistan’swell-being.Encouragingly, there is growing realization in Pakistan about the impact that the policy of breeding

jihadishashadonPakistan.For example, in aneditorial, theDailyTimes commented: ‘We can by nomeanscontinuetheoldpatternoffollowingaduplicitousforeignpolicythatcontradictsitselfinspeechand action. Neither Afghanistan nor the US believes that Operation Zarb-e-Azb is targeting terroristgroupsoperatingfromPakistanisoilwithoutdiscrimination.…theHaqqaninetworkisstillaspowerfulandbrutalasiteverwas,ifnotmoreso,suggestingthatithasnotbeenstymied.…Pakistan’sdescentintoastateofperpetualchaosandviolentterrorattackswasinpartthestate’sownfaultforfosteringIslamistgroups to use as proxies in the region.At this point, the statemust realize that there is absolutely nobenedictioninfosteringterrorgroups.’61

ThemootpointiswhetherthePakistanileadership,especiallythemilitary,willrethinkitsstrategyofusingnon-stateactorsanddistinguishingbetweengoodandbadjihadis.AsHillaryClinton,theformerUSsecretaryofstateputitsobrilliantly:‘Youcan’tkeepsnakesinyourbackyardandexpectthemtoonlybiteyourneighbor.Eventuallythosesnakesaregoingtoturnonwhoeverhastheminthebackyard.’62

However,stoppingtheuseofsuchelementsasinstrumentsofstatepolicywillonlybethestart.Itwillhave to be followed up by dismantling the infrastructure of jihad – themadrasa network, the trainingcamps – and provision of jobs, after a period of re-educating themadrasa graduates and changing themindsetingovernmentschools.Thiswouldmeanmassiveinvestmentinindustryandagriculturetocreatejobsandineducationtoprovidemoderneducation.Pakistanwouldhavetobuildacounter-narrativetojointhebattleagainsttheIslamichardlinersandpresentaviablealternative.Unfortunately,Pakistanhasyettoacknowledge,letalonedealwith,theideologyofhatredandmilitancythathasbeencultivatedasstate policy for over four decades. Given that for decades the Pakistan has viewed jihadis as aninstrument of state policy against India, it will be extremely difficult to change that policy in theimmediatefuture,orevenmediumterm.Withterrorismcontinuingtofesterinternally,Pakistan’sslideontheslipperyroadtowardstheabysswillhastenintheyearstocome.

T

V

TheWEEPAnalysis

HEFIFTHsectionundertakesaWEEPanalysis, lookingat thecritical issuesofWater,Education,EconomyandPopulation.Individually,eachofthesefactorshavenotonlyafar-reachingimpacton

every strata of society but are decisive elements in the security of any state. Collectively, they are afundamentalfactorindeterminingthequalityoflife,healthandlongevityofthecountry.Thedegradationineachoftheseparameterstakesalongtimetomanifestitselfjustasrectificationandreversingthetrendstakeaconsiderablylongertime.Pakistantodayhasbecomeawater-scarcecountryfromawater-abundantonein1947.Itisindanger

ofbecominganabsolutewater-scarcecountryby2035,thoughsomeanalystsevenpredictthiswillcometo pass by 2020. What this means for an agricultural-dependent country with a rapidly expandingpopulationcanwellbeimagined.Pakistanalsofacesaneducationemergency.Withtwenty-fivemillionchildrenoutofprimaryschools

andthosewhoattendschoolgettinganindifferenteducation,thescaleoftheproblemiscolossal.Compounding theproblem is the fact that requisite investmentshavenotbeenmade in these crucial

sectorsfordecadesonaccountofthePakistaneconomysufferingfrommajorstructuralimbalances.Asaresultofsuch imbalances, it is inconstantneedofexternalaidwithoutwhich itwouldcollapse. Ithassquanderedthevastamountsofforeignassistanceithasreceivedonphysicalsecurityratherthanontherealsinewsofpower.An increasing burden on all the resources of Pakistan is the rapidly expanding population. Though

Pakistan is undergoing ademographic transition, it faces theprospect ofmissingout on theonce-in-a-lifetime ‘demographic dividend’. Instead, it may well be left with a large youthful population that isunemployedandunemployableandwillbecomeeasypreyfortheterroristorganizations.Pakistanfacedanemergencysituationinallthesefourareasaboutadecadeago.Today,itshouldbein

thedisastermanagementmode,buttherearenosignsthatitis.Collectively,theseissuesstronglysuggestaloomingmulti-organfailureinPakistan.Thefailurehasbeenmadeworsebythesecriticalissuesbeingignoredbyasuccessionofleaders,civilianandmilitary,sinceitscreation.Increasingly,theseissueswillhauntthecountryandwillbetheprimaryfactorsimpellingittowardstheabyss.

10

Water:RunningDry

Whenthewellisdry,weknowtheworthofwater.—BenjaminFranklin(1746)

THEPERcapitaavailabilityofwaterinPakistanhasdecreasedfrom5,650cubicmeters(m3)peryearin1951whenitwasawater-abundantcountrytoroughly1,040m3/yearin2010,to964m3/year in20131

and 940 m3/year in 2015,2 a decline of more than 400 per cent. It is estimated that by 2020, wateravailabilitywouldhavefallento855m3/year.3Thecountryisexpectedtobecomeabsolutewater-scarce–lessthan500m3/yearpercapita–by2035,orearlierassomeanalystspredict.4Anewreportof thePakistanCouncilofResearchinWaterResources(PCRWR)saysthatthecountrywillapproachabsolutewaterscarcityby2025.5

Theseverityoftheloomingwatercrisishasbeenred-flaggedbyseveralindicators.Thechairmanofthe IndusRiverSystemAuthority (IRSA)6wrote to the federal secretary,water, on25February2015,askingforafreezeofthecountry’sentiredevelopmentprogrammeforfiveyears,andtodivertthefundstowards the construction of major water reservoirs on a war footing, as a national priority, sinceagriculturewasthebackboneofthecountry.Theseriousnessof therecommendationwasunderlinedbythefactthattheletterwasissuedafterameetingoftheAuthority,attendedbyallthefivemembers.Whilenotspecifyingthemajorwaterreservoirs,hementionedthatataveryminimumastoragecapacityof22million acre feet (MAF) should be developed at the earliest. He pointed out that the ‘total wateravailabilityof thecountry is145MAF(average)while theexistinglivestoragecapacity isonly14.10MAF, i.e., 9.7per cent.Bycomparison theworld average is40per cent,which requires achievementexpeditiously’.7

The2013–14and2014–15EconomicSurveysofPakistanhavealsoflaggedtheurgencyofthewaterproblem.Accordingtothesereports, thedeclineinwateravailabilityfrom5,650m3/yearpercapita in1951 to thecurrent lowof964m3/yearpercapitawascompoundedby the1.9percentgrowthrateofPakistan’s current population of 191.7 million that made future water prospects grim. Moreover,Pakistan’sstoragecapacitywasonly132m3percapitawhereas in theUSandAustralia thepercapitastoragewas6,150m3and5,000m3, respectively.Additionally,Pakistancanbarelystore thirtydaysofrequirementofwaterintheIndusbasin.Theinternationalstandardis120days.8

Furthermore,Pakistan’sproductivityperunitofwaterandlandisoneofthelowestintheworld.Indiaand China have reduced substantial amount of water usage in the agricultural sector and enhancedproductivitymanifold.Pakistan’sproductivityperunitofwateris0.13kg/m3only,one-thirdofIndia’sand

one-sixthofChina’s.Similarly,Pakistan’s productivityper unit of land is one-thirdofEgypt’s, half ofSaudiArabia’sandhalfofIndia’s.9

AccordingtotheIMF,Pakistan’swaterintensityrate–theamountofwater,incubicmetres,usedperunitofGDP–istheworld’shighest,whichmeansthatPakistan’seconomyismorewater-intensiveandwater-dependent than that in anyother country in theworld. It is also indicative of the inefficiencyofwaterusage.Itspercapitawaterwithdrawalisthethirdhighestintheworld.10

Suchlevelsofwaterconsumptioncanonlyincreasegiventherateofpopulationgrowth,andwillhaveperilousrepercussions. In2009,whenPakistan’swateravailabilitywasabout1,500m3percapitaperyear,astudytitled‘RunningonEmpty’hadestimatedthatPakistanwouldnotbecomewater-scarce(i.e.,fall below the benchmark of 1000 m3/year per capita) until 2035. However, thanks to the risingconsumptionrates,Pakistanisnearlywater-scarcetoday.11

ThesestatementsandreportsunderlinetheextentoftheloomingwatercrisisthatPakistanfaces.Foryears,localandinternationalwaterexperts,includingtheWorldBank,havebeenwarningPakistanthattheunusuallyfastdepletionoftheHimalayanglaciers,lowstoragecapacity,unwiseuseandotherrelateduncertaintieswouldleadtoacutewatershortageandcrisis–floodanddrought–inthenext10–40years.However,nothingtangiblehasbeendonetosalvagethesituation.It is estimated that about 90 per cent of Pakistan’s land area is arid or semi-arid, and is totally

dependentonirrigationforitsfoodproduction.ThismakesPakistanacountrywiththehighestirrigatedandrain-fedlandratiointheworld.Irrigation,inturn,isdependentononemajorriversystem–theIndus–asthecountry’sotherriversareseasonalinnature.TheIndusriversystemconsistsoftheIndusriveranditstributaries,threemajorreservoirs,nineteenbarragesorheadworks,forty-threemaincanals,withaconveyancelengthof57,000kmofcanalsand89,000watercourseswitharunninglengthofmorethan1.65millionkilometres.Itfeedsmorethan40millionacresofirrigatedlandinPakistan.12Itisthelargestcontiguousirrigationsystemintheworld.TheIndusitselfcontributesthelargestflowwithameanannualof91.26MAF.Itswesterntributaries,

theJhelumandChenabrivers,contribute23.28MAFand27.1MAFrespectively.Theriversreceive75percentoftheflowsduringfoursummermonthsand25percentduringrestoftheyear.Theproblemisthat thewaterdemand is60per cent in summer and40per cent inwinter.Thisnecessitates sufficientwater storage during the short surplus period for use during the longerwater stress period.13Withoutstorage,much of the water in the Indusmust inevitably run to the sea. However, the Indus’smassiveirrigationsystemhasastoragecapacityofonlyamonth’ssupply.14

Pakistanreceivesthemajorityofitswaterfromthreeriverbasins–theIndus,KaranandMakran.Ofthese, Pakistan is most dependent on the Indus river basin as it covers 71 per cent of its territory –comprisingthewholeofPunjab,Sindh,KhyberPakhtunkhwa,andtheeasternpartsofBalochistan–andprovideswaterfor77percentofthepopulation.Theothertworiverbasins–KaranandtheMakran–originatealongtheplainsofBalochistanandtheycoveronly15percentand14percentofPakistan’sterritoryrespectively.15Theaverageannual flowof theentire Indus river system isestimated (averageduring1976–2002)tobe142MAF.ThisincludesflowsfromtheKabulriver(approx.16.5MAF).TheKaran and Makran combined contribute less than 4 MAF to Pakistan’s total water resources.Groundwater accounts for around 55 MAF. The remaining 2.4–3.2 MAF are a combination ofmiscellaneoussources suchas small riversand lakesmakingagrand totalofapproximately200MAF

(availabilityvariesbetween194and209MAF).However, the availability of water is changing due to climate change, change in rainfall pattern,

melting of glaciers, etc., as borne out by the trends of water availability. A statistical comparison ofsurfacewater availability between the last thirty and ten years points towards decliningwater flows.Whileaverageflowsfortheyears1978to2008equal140MAF,thesamefor1998–2008is128.52MAF.In yearswithout super floods (four out of five years), average flows have declined from 135.6MAFduring1978–2008to123MAFduring1998–2008.Thehighestriverinflowinthelastthreedecadeswas172.10MAFin1977–78;thehighestinflowsince1998hasbeen152.69MAFin2006–07.16

ThisisalsoborneoutbytheEconomicSurveysofPakistanaccordingtowhichduring2013–14,theavailabilityofwaterfortheKharifseason(sowinginApril–JuneandharvestinginOctober–December)2013was2.4percentlessthanthenormalsuppliesof67.1MAF.ThewateravailabilityduringtheRabiseason (sowing in October–December and harvesting in April–May) 2013–14 was estimated at 32.5MAF,whichwas10.7percentlessthanthenormalavailabilityof36.4MAF.AccordingtotheEconomicSurvey2014–15,theavailabilityofwaterduringtheRabiseason2014–15wasestimatedat33.1MAF,whichwas9.1percentlessthanthenormalavailabilityof36.4MAF.AccordingtomediareportsfortheRabiseason2015–16,theavailabilityofwaterwasestimatedat31.70MAF,orasmuchas20percentlessthannormal.17

PakistanandAfghanistansharenineriverswithannualflowsofabout18.3MAFofwhichtheKabulriveraccountsforanaverageflowof16.5MAF.Theflow,however,fluctuatesfromaslowas11.2MAFtoashighas34.8MAF.AdeclineintheflowsoftheKabulriverhasbeennotedatAttockinPakistan–moresevere during theKharif season than in theRabi possibly due to climate change over the last seventyyears.AtpresentthereisnoinstitutionalizedframeworkofcooperationforsharingofwaterfromtheKabul

riverbetweenPakistanandAfghanistan.Attempts todraftawater treatyfailed in2003and2006.ThishasassumedimportancebecauseAfghanistanplanstobuildtwelvedamsonthisriverwiththehelpoftheWorldBankandtheinternationalcommunityincludingIndiatogenerate1,177MWofelectricity.Whenconstructed,therewillbeatotalwaterstoragecapacityof4.7MAF.SincetheentireflowoftheKabulriverhasbeenfactoredinbyPakistanaspartofitsownwaterresources,itsfearisthatthesedamscouldlead toa16–17percentdrop inwatersupplyfromAfghanistan,whichwouldseriouslyaffect itsownwateravailability.18PakistanwillbeespeciallyvulnerablebecausethisdropwilloccurduringthewinterwhentheflowoftheIndusisalreadylow.Infact,increasinglyinthefuture,theterritorialandpoliticalstrategicdepthconceptwillshiftfocusto

ensuringwatersecurityforPakistan.

Oftheestimatedlong-termbasin-widewateravailabilityofapproximately194to209MAF,142MAFisextractedinPakistan.Ofthis,approximately71percentisfromsurfacewater(accountingforabout74percentofthetotalsurfacewateravailable),and29percentfromsubsurfacegroundwater(accountingfor83percentoftotalrenewablegroundwateravailable).19

Of the 55MAF of groundwater, about 45MAF is being exploited to supplement the surfacewater

throughpublicsectorandprivatetubewellsnumberingabout1.1millionby2014.Thisisunsustainablebecausethegapbetweenwithdrawalandrechargeisgrowing.Groundwatersuppliesaredepletingat16–55 centimetres a year, according to a study carried out by the InternationalWaterlogging and SalinityResearch Institute (IWASRI), part of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA).20 Theirrigation department of Punjab has stated that while in the 1990s, water could be extracted in theprovinceatadepthof20–40feetbelowground,inthe2010s,drillinghastotakeplaceatcloseto800feet below ground. Additionally, this indiscriminate pumping and heavy use of pesticides arecontaminating theaquifer,where tube-well salinity is increasing. It is estimated that14percentof thegroundwaterreservesarehighlysaline,unfitfordrinkingpurposesaswellasirrigation,andthereisnowsalinewaterintrusionintominedaquifers.21

Groundwater is akin to the family gold – to be used as a last resortwhen there are problemswithsurface supplies. In Pakistan, however, groundwater has been used indiscriminately leading to fallingwater tables.NewNASA satellite data indicates that the Indus basin aquifer is now the secondmoststressed in the world. This rapid depletion of the aquifer means that Pakistan does not have muchgroundwaterinreservethatcanbeusedastheriversystembecomesmorestressed.22

Consumption of water is heavily skewed towards agriculture – the agricultural sector presentlyconsumes90–95percentoftotalwaterwithdrawal.Someexperts,however,feelthatalmost97percentofwaterwithdrawalisforagriculture.Waterwithdrawalformunicipaluseisestimatedat5.2percentand industrialuse0.76percent.This isunlikely tochange in thenext fewyearsasagricultureplaysapivotal role in Pakistan. First, about 60 per cent of Pakistan’s population lives in rural areas and isdependentonagriculturedirectlyor indirectly.Second, theagriculturesectoraccountsforabout20percentoftheGDP.Third,itabsorbs43.7percentofthelabourforce.Fourth,over70percentofPakistan’sexportsdependonagriculture-basedproducts.Crucially,outofthetotalcroppedareainPakistan,Punjabaccountsfor76.38percent(16.10millionhectares).Nearly63percentofruralworkforceinPunjabisemployedinagriculturewhileSindhisrelativelylessagricultural,relyingmoreonindustrialandservicesectors.23 Given the dominance of Punjab in Pakistan, the importance of agriculture can well beunderstood.TheUNestimates thatwaterdemand inPakistan isgrowingatanannual rateof10percent.24 This

demandisprojectedtorisefromthecurrentlevelsto274MAFby2025whiletotalwateravailabilityby2025 is not likely to change from the current approximately 200MAF. This gap of about 74MAF isalmost two-thirdsof theentire Indus river’s current annual average flow.25The InternationalMonetaryFundreport,‘IstheGlassHalfEmptyorHalfFull?’,takesthefiguresofwateravailabilityat191MAFandsoprojectsawatershortageat83MAFby2025.26

All this calls for carefulmanagement ofwater.However, there aremany issues that bedevilwatermanagementinPakistan.Thesearediscussedinthefollowingparagraphs.(i) The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) measures the pressure on national water

resourcesbycalculatingwaterwithdrawalasapercentageoftotalrenewablewaterresources(TRWR).StressesareconsideredhighiftheTRWRvalueisabove25percent.Pakistan’swaterpressureamountstoastaggering74percent.Thispressureisexorbitantevencomparedwithneighbouringhigh-pressuredcountries,includingIndiaat34percentandAfghanistanat31percent.27

Cropping intensity is another factor thathas led tounsustainableuseofwater.Whendeveloped, the

irrigationsystemwasdesignedfor64percentcroppingintensity.TheCanalandDrainageActof1873legallymandatesenoughwaterdeliverytosustain64percentcroppingintensities(Afarmersowing100percentofhisorherlandtwiceayearwouldbeequivalentto200percentcroppingintensity.)Todayreal cropping intensities are between 150 and 200 per cent, thanks partially to green revolutiontechnologiestokeeppacewithpopulationgrowth.28Tomeetsuchcroppingpatterns,excessivewaterisbeingextracted.(ii) According to a ‘Special Report on theWater Crisis in Pakistan’ by Pakissan.com (Pakistan’s

largestagriculturalwebportal),25percentofthewaterdivertedtothecountry’scanalsystemiswastedin‘linelosses’inthecanalsorpipeleakages.‘Waterlossesbetweencanalheadsandwatercourses,andlosses within watercourses, are generally accepted to equal one-third of the total amount of waterdelivered.Another25percentislostwithinthefarms’29resultinginafinalwaterefficiencythatdoesnotexceed36percent.FormerforeignministerS.M.QureshielaboratedthisinaninterviewwithaPakistaninewschannelin

April2010.Hesaid,‘ThetotalaveragecanalsuppliesofPakistanare104MAFandthewateravailableatthefarmgateisabout70MAF.Wheredoesthe34[MAF]go?It’snotbeingstoleninIndia.It’sbeingwastedinPakistan.’30ThiswasalsoconfirmedinaMarch2013seminarheldbythePakistanAgricultureResearchCouncilwhereinthethensecretaryoftheMinistryofNationalFoodSecurityandResearchsaid,‘…abouttwo-thirdsofourwaterresourcesarelostintransmissionandseepage’.31

(iii) Cotton exports from Pakistan generate more foreign trade income than any other export item.However,cottonisawater-intensivecropanditisgrownforeightoutoftwelvemonthsinPakistan.Onekilogramofcotton,whichisenoughtoproduceoneT-shirtandapairofjeans,consumes13,000litresoffreshwater. Sugar cane is anotherwater-intensive crop that is grown all the year round.The averagewaterrequirementofsugarcaneismorethanthecombinedaveragewaterrequirementofwheat,maizeandcotton.32Intimestocome,withstaticwatersupplybutgrowingdemand,Pakistanwillhavetofindalternativecropsforexportthatarenotwater-intensive.(iv)AsnotedbytheEconomicSurvey,Pakistan’scropproductivityperunitofwater isvery lowat

0.13kilogramspercubicmetre.Whatthismeans,accordingtoSimiKamal,isthat‘Pakistanisusing97percentofitsallocatedwaterresourcestosupportoneofthelowestproductivitiesintheworldperunitofwater.’33 For example, the fact thatPakistaniPunjab’swheatyields are approximatelyhalf thoseofIndianPunjab(inbothabsolutetermsandperunitofwaterused)atteststotheinefficiencyofthePakistaniPunjab’sagriculture–andyetthePunjabrepresentsthebreadbasketofPakistan.34ThiswasconfirmedbytheministerofplanningwhotoldaconferencethatPakistan’sproductivityperunitofwaterandperunitoflandwasoneofthelowestintheworld.Likewise,thereturntoGDPononecubicmetreofwaterisalso the lowest in theworld.Against theworld average of $8.6, Pakistan’s one cubicmetre ofwatercontributesonly34centstoitsGDP.35

(v)Salinityremainsamajorproblem,withsomeaspectspartiallycontrolledbutothers–includingthefateoftheapproximately15–20milliontonnesofsalt,whichareaccumulatingintheIndusbasineveryyear36 and the ingress of saline water into overpumped freshwater aquifers – remain only a dimlyunderstoodthreat.About80percentofcultivatedlandinPakistanisirrigated,ofwhichabout33percentisaffectedbywaterloggingandsoilsalinity,leadingtosignificantdeclines(anestimated25percent)incrop yields, especially downstream. These issues will remain problematic until more sustainable

irrigationpracticesareputinplace.(vi)Sedimentationisalsoaddingtotheexistingproblem.AccordingtoaDawn reportonPakistan’s

irrigationproblems,Tarbeladamhaslostnearly30percentofitsstoragecapacitysincethelate1970s,and now retains so littlewater that irrigation supplies are threatened.37 The threewater reservoirs inPakistan,i.e.,theTarbela,ManglaandChashma,whenconstructed,hadatotallivestorageof15.73MAF.However, due to silting, their capacity had reduced to 11.47MAF in 2010 and is estimated to furtherreduceto10.70MAFin2020.TheWaterandPowerDevelopmentAuthority(WAPDA)predictsthatby2025,thestoragecapacityofTarbeladamwilldeclineby42percent,ofMangladamby21percentandthat of Chashma dam by 52 per cent. In all, storage capacity of around 8.37 MAF will be lost toincreasingsiltlevels,resultingina37percentstoragelossby2025.38

WhatthiscouldleadtohasbeendescribedbytheDawnreportcitedearlier.Accordingtoit,

TheTarbelaDam,which used to serve the agricultural needs up tomid-June,when the nextfillingcyclestarts,nowregularlyhitsdeadlevelbyearlyormid-March.Silteatsupitsstorageby100,000acrefeet–10days’irrigationsupplies.Bythatcalculation,itwouldstarthittingthedeadlevelbytheendofJanuaryinnextfiveyears,leavingthecountrywithoutsecondandthirdirrigationsuppliesforwheatandsowingneedsofcotton– threateningbothfoodsecurityandnearly60percentexportsinonego.39

(vii) There is record water theft in Pakistan, especially across Punjab. Findings of a recentinvestigationreportcompiledbythePunjabirrigationdepartmentindicatedthatfarmersatthetail-endofirrigationsystemwerebeingdeprivedof60to65percentoftheirdueshareofwaterowingtowatertheftbybiglandlords.Thiswasbeingdoneinconnivancewiththecorruptofficialsofthewaterdepartmentand representatives from farmers’ organizations.While 28,390 out of total 58,000water outletswerereportedtampered,thetotalnumberofwatertheftcasesinPunjabstoodat77,970;ofthese25,877casesinvolvedinstallationofillegalpipesatthecanals.40

Anotherkindofwatertheftiswhenmembersoftherulingelite,topmilitaryandcivilofficialsaswellas law enforcement agencies, donot pay theirwater bills. Itwas reported that theKarachiWater andSewerage Board (KWSB) was owed as much as Rs 40 million for the water tanker service such‘influentials’ had availed of in 2012–13. Among these, the Pakistan Rangers topped the list with anoutstandingofRs15millioninunpaidbills.41

Thearmy,ofcourse,hasindulgedinsuchmassivewatertheftthateventhePunjabgovernmenthadtoadmit in the provincial assembly that a major part of land allotted to the army for exercises in theCholistanareawasbeingusedforagriculturalpurposesbystealingwaterfromtheAbbasiacanal.ThearmyhadsubletthelandtoarmyofficersandcontractorsattherateofRs40,000toRs50,000peracre.‘They are stealing water from Abbasia Canal by making cuts into it, and the Punjab government ishelpless before these outlaws,’ a parliamentary secretary for irrigation department, KhalidMehmoodJajja, told thePunjab assembly.As a result of such theft ofwater, tail-enderswere facing shortageofwater.Armyofficershadusedexcavatorstodigsmallcanals,calledminors,fromthemainAbbasiacanalwithoutpermissionfromtheirrigationdepartment.DespitethematterbeingbroughttothenoticeofhigherranksofthePakistanArmythesituationhadremainedunchangedforyears,headded.42

(viii) The fact that the governmentwas aware of thewater crisiswas borne out by thewarning of

FederalMinister forWaterandPowerKhwajaAsif inMarch2015thatPakistanwill faceacutewatershortagesinthecomingyears.43Despitethis,twoexamplesshowhowunconcernedthegovernmentreallyisaboutthiscriticalissue.First,thegovernmenthasstoppedresearchfundingofthePakistanCouncilforResearchinWaterResources(PCRWR)forwaterdevelopmentprojectsfor2015–16,whichcouldfindsomesolutionstothisproblem.Second,thefederalgovernment, insteadofincreasingtheallocationforwaterprojectshasactuallyreduceditbyawhopping27percentinthePublicSectorDevelopmentPlan2015–16.Italsoseemsunconcernedaboutthetimelycompletionofmajorwaterprojects.44Pakistanhasspent0.25percentofGDPonwaterdevelopment. Incomparison, itspendsforty-seven timesmoreondefence.45Thisthenistheactualrealityofthegovernment’sseriousnesstotacklesuchacriticalissue.OrtakethecaseofPunjab,thebreadbasketofPakistan.Thefinancialallocationforthewatersectorin

2014–15wasaround5percentoftotalannualdevelopmentplanoftheprovincialgovernment.OftheRs250millionsoallocated,onlyRs61millionwasactuallyreleasedwiththerestofthefundslapsing/beingdiverted to other areas. Worse, 33 per cent of the total number of water-related schemes weredysfunctionalintheprovince.46

(ix)Thereisalotofscientificuncertaintyaboutthenatureandeffectofclimatechangeespeciallyonissueslikeglacialmelt,rainfallandresultantwateravailabilityinPakistan.AndthereisaragingdebateonhowfasttheHimalayanglaciersareretreatingandtowhatextentitwillaffectPakistan.Accordingtoa2010Dutchstudy,60percentoftheInduswatersaremadeupofHimalayanmelts(glacialandsnow)andthereislikelytobean8.4percentdecreaseonupstreamwaterflowsintheIndusduetoclimatechangeby2050.47Theimpact,however,isalreadyvisibleintermsoffrequentfloodingandspellsofveryhightemperature.SincetheriverflowsareheavilydependentonHimalayanglacialmelt,anyimpactofglobalwarming on these mountains will have a double whammy impact – first flooding due to acceleratedmelting and thereafter decrease in river flows. According to theWorld Bank, it could aggravate the‘already serious problems’ of flooding and poor drainage in the Indus basin over the next fifty years,followedbyuptoa‘terrifying’30–40percentdropinriverflowsin100years’time.48

TheGlobalClimateRisk Index (CRI)2016 releasedby aGerman think tankGermanWatch rankedPakistaneighthonitslistofmostaffectedcountriesduring1995–2014.ItalsolistedPakistanfifthamongthecountriesmostaffectedbyclimatechangein2014.49

TheconflictbetweenPakistan’sprovincesregardingwater,especiallybetweenSindhandPunjab,datesback to the 1870s, when Punjab started constructing irrigation infrastructure on Indus river.50 SeveralcommissionswereappointedduringBritishruleandsubsequently,andseveralreportshavebeenissuedonthiscomplexissue.ThelatesthasbeentheWaterApportionmentAccord(WAA)signedbythechiefministers of all four provinces of Pakistan on 16 March 1991.51 This accord replaced previousagreements to distribute the Indus waters among the provinces and command areas. The Indus RiverSystemAuthority (IRSA)wascreatedas the regulatoryauthority formonitoringanddistributionof thewaterresourcesoftheIndusinaccordancewiththeWAA.ThetotalamountofwateravailablefordistributionintheIndusriversystemaspertheWAAof1991

was104MAF.Anextra10MAFwasaddedasanticipatedflowsafterbuildingadditionalstorages.Theaccordthusdividesatotalof114MAFbutcurrently114MAFisnotavailable,andthishasledtothe

disputebetweentheprovinces.Punjabhasarguedthatallocationsshouldbemadeaccordingtoaveragepercentagesofhistoricaluse.Ontheotherhand,Sindharguesthatdivisionsmustbemadeaccordingtothe same percentages as the accord allocations,with all provinces sharing an equal percentage of theshortfall.But that is not all. Punjab has periodically being constructingwaterbodies despite objections from

Sindh. For example, the Thal canal provides an additional 1.86MAF ofwater from the Tarbela dam(PunjabhassolerightstotheMangladamwater,whereasSindhisexpectedtosharethewaterstoredinthe Tarbela with Punjab as well as the other provinces) to the Bhakker, Layyah, Jang, Khushab andMuzzafargarhdistrictsofPunjabwhereseniormilitaryofficialsofthePakistanArmyhavebeenallottedlandatthrowawaypriceswhentheselandswerenotirrigated.Despitethewateraccord,disputesbetweenSindhandPunjabhavecontinued.Forexample,in2014,

followingsevereshortageofwaterthatbadlyaffectedtheKharifcropinSindhandanacutescarcityofwaterfordrinkingpurposeinfar-flungareasoftheprovince,PakistanPeoplesParty(PPP)membersoftheNationalAssemblyblamedtheFederalandPunjabgovernmentsfornotimplementingthe1991wateraccord and accused Punjab of not merely stealing water but committing a robbery of Sindh’s watershare.52

However, it is not only Sindh that has a problem. Recently, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)governmentclaimedfromtheCentreRs120billionascompensationforuseofitsshareofwaterfortwodecades(1992–93to2012–13)byPunjabandSindhbecauseoflackofinfrastructure.Nottobeleftout,Balochistanhasalsocomplainedthatithasbeenusingonly3.05MAFoutofitswatershareof3.87MAFsince1992duetoinfrastructureconstraintsand,therefore,itshouldbeimmediatelypaidacompensationofRs2billiontocompleterehabilitationandimprovementofitsexistingcanalsanddrainagesystem.53

In fact, Balochistan’s case is especially ominous. A recent report submitted to the Senate by theMinistry of Water and Power has confirmed that Balochistan is facing a groundwater shortage ofpotentiallycatastrophicproportions.Itidentifiesexcessivegroundwaterutilizationintenoutofnineteensub-basinswhilegroundwaterusageexceedsrechargeby22percent.54

Theinter-provincialdiscordoverwaterisbestrepresentedbythecontroversyovertheconstructionoftheKalabaghdam.WhilePunjabwantsthedam,theotherthreeprovinceshaveseriousreservationsaboutits impact on them. In fact, the three provincial assemblies have passed resolutions opposing itsconstruction. Several leaders from these provinces have evenwarned thatmoves to construct the damwillleadtothebreak-upofPakistan.LittlewonderthatMusharrafhadtogiveuptheideaeventhoughhetried, unsuccessfully, very hard to convince the smaller provinces about the necessity of the dam.Ultimately,itboilsdowntothelackoftrustthatthesmallerprovinceshaveinPunjabandbasedonpastexperience,fearthatPunjabwouldtrampleontheirrights.

OneofthemostdevastatingconsequencesoftheinefficiencyofwaterusagehasbeenthedestructionoftheIndusDelta.‘Withthereductionofthehistoricalflowofwaterintothedeltaregiontobarely0.50–0.70MAFperyear,thesixthbiggestmangroveforestintheworldhasbeenreducedfrom0.6millionto0.25million acres.’55 In addition, the drying up of the IndusDelta has led to sea intrusion up to 225kilometres. The two tehsils of district Thatta, i.e., Kharo Chan and Keti Bander, have almost been

eliminatedfromPakistaninthepastthreedecadesandnowonlyafewthousandfishermenresidealongthecoastalbeltofKetiBanderandKharoChan.56Likewise,hundredsofvillagesinBadindistricthavebeendesertedandaround3.5lakhpeoplehavebeenforcedtomigratetosomeotherareasinsearchoflivelihood.Asof2012,apartfromtraditionallyat-riskdistrictsofThattaandBadin,evendistrictslikeSanghar,Umerkot,Mirpurkhas,NawabshahandNaushehroFeroz,partsofHyderabadinSindhhavealsobeen classified as being at risk of increasing soil infertility as a result of salinity due to sea waterintrusion.Thisistheaccumulated‘environmentaldebt’(atermusedbytheWorldBank)thatPakistan’sfuturegenerationswillhavetopay.RapidurbanizationinPakistanislikelytocreateadditionalproblemswhenitcomestotheavailability

ofwaterastheexampleofKarachishows.ThepresentsupplyofwatertoKarachifromIndusandHubsources isapproximately650milliongallonsperday (MGD)while thedemand for the twentymillionpopulationisestimatedtobe1,080MGD(54gallonspercapitaperday)makingashortfallof430MGD.By 2020, the population ofKarachi is expected to be around twenty-threemillion and the demand ofwaterwouldbe1,242MGDtakingtheshortfallto600MGD.57Withabout40percentofwaterbeinglostthroughleakagesandtheftandatcurrentpopulationgrowthrates,Karachiwillneedmassiveschemeseveryyearbuttherearenoadditionalsourcesofwateravailable.While,massiveshortagesareoneissue, theotheris thatofcontamination.AstudybytheInstituteof

EnvironmentalStudiesofKarachiUniversityshowedhighlevelsoffecalcontaminationandrarepresenceofchlorineinthepipedwaterbeingsuppliedtoOrangitown,inKarchi.Onlyninesamplesoutofforty-sixwerefoundfitforhumanconsumption.58Theotherissueisuntreatedwaterbeingreleasedintothesea.‘Riversflowingthroughthecitycontainlead,chromiumandcyanide,andmoremetalshavebeenfoundinKarachi’s harbour than in any other major world harbour. Karachi’s own mayor has judged that 400million gallons of sewage pour into the sea, untreated, every day.’59 The impact of this manifests instatistics like at least 30,000 Karachi-ites (of whom 20,000 are children) perishing each year fromdrinking unsafewater. In fact, it has been estimated thatmore people inKarachi die eachmonth fromcontaminatedwaterthanhavebeenkilledbyIndia’sarmysince1947.AccordingtoareportofPakistanCouncil of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR), the mortality rate of children under five due tocontaminatedwateris101per1,000children.60

OnseveraloccasionsPakistanhasblamedIndiaforitswaterwoes,accusingitof‘waterterrorism’andpointingoutthat‘underinternationallaw,Indiahasapositiveobligationnottoinflictunreasonableharmonthelowerriparianstateandthisobligationdoesrestricttheirsovereigntyoveritswater’.Whilesuchstatementscouldbedismissedaspurelyrhetoricalandfordomesticconsumption,itisnotablethatformerPakistanpresidentAsifAliZardarivoicedsimilarconcernsinaWashingtonPostop-edinJanuary2009.‘ThewatercrisisinPakistanisdirectlylinkedtorelationswithIndia,’hedeclared.Failuretoresolvethewaterimbroglio‘couldfuelthefiresofdiscontentthatleadtoextremismandterrorism’.61

While it iseasy toblameIndiaas theupper riparianstateand the IndusWatersTreaty for itswaterwoes,whatisoftenforgottenisthatunderthetreaty,ofthetotalaverageannualvolumeofwaterintheIndus system of 170MAF India got only 30MAF from the eastern rivers of Ravi, Beas and Sutlej.Pakistangot140MAForover80percentof thewater.62 In addition, Indiapaid$162million for theconstructionofdamsinPakistan.Todayalmost85percentofhydroelectricityand95percentofwater

storage in Pakistan is because of the storage built as a consequence of the Treaty andWorld Bank’scommitment.63Ifanything,itisIndiathatshouldhaveagrouseoverthetreaty.Despitethis,frequentcallsaremade inPakistan to either scrap or ‘revisit’ the treaty. For example, thePakistanSenate passed aresolution on 7 March 2016 asking the government to ‘revisit’ the Indus Waters Treaty with India,somethingthatDawncalled‘bizzare’.64

Fortunately,thematterhasbeensetatrestbynoneotherthanthechairmanoftheIndusRiverSystemAuthority (IRSA),who,while briefing the Senate StandingCommittee onWater and Power on 9 July2015,saidthatIndiawasusinglessthanitsallocatedshareundertheIndusWatersTreaty(IWT)signedbetween the two countries. As reported in The Express Tribune, ‘Turning away from what usuallybecomesaback-and-forthblamegame,Pakistan’swaterregulatorhascomeoutdefendingIndia,sayingtheneighboursarenotresponsibleforwatershortageonthissideoftheborder.’HedismissedallmediareportsaboutIndiabuildingdamsonPakistaniriversas‘propaganda’clarifying:‘ReportsinmediaaboutIndiagettingmorewaterisapropaganda.Indiaisusingwateronlytoproduceelectricity.’Healsosaidthattheneighboursaregettinglesscomparedtotheirallocatedshareofwater.65

Toconclude,per capitawater availability inPakistanhasdrastically reduceddue to a combinationofimprudentagriculturalpractices,apoorlymaintainedinfrastructure,cultivationofwater-intensivecrops,widespreadcorruptioninthewatersector,over-abstraction,lackofadequatestoragecapacities,etc.ThenetresultisthatPakistanisliterallyrunningitselfdry.TheIMFhaswarnedthatsincewaterisakeyinputin agriculture, water shortages and variability can lead to food insecurity, raise production costs andconstrainproductivitygrowth.66

Onthesupplyside,twocrucialfactsdonotseemtohavesunkintopolicymakers.One,Pakistandoesnot have any other additional water source that can supplement the water that it now uses. Second,Pakistanistotallydependentonasingleriversystemanddoesnothavetheflexibilitythatothercountrieshaveofnumerousriverbasins.On the demand side, what is often forgotten is that the water that Pakistan has today for its 194.5

millionpeopleisroughlythesameithadin1951forits32.5millionpeople,lessthewaterbeingusedbyIndiaaftertheIndusWatersTreatyof1960.Thus,whiletheabsolutequantityofwaterhasremainedthesame, thepercapitawateravailabilityhasdecreaseddue toa rapidly increasinglypopulationcoupledwith intensive, yet inefficient agriculture. Pakistan’s population of 32.5 million in 1951 increased to152.4millionin2004–05,to191.7millionin2015and194.5millionin2016.Itcouldincreaseto220millionby2025.Tofeedthispopulationatthecurrentlevelofproduction,‘…Pakistancouldhaveafoodgrains shortfall of 16 million tonnes by 2020, increasing to 28 million tonnes by 2025. This wouldnecessitatea31percentincreaseinwateravailabilitytomeetrequirementsofthepopulationin2025,’67

anavailabilitythatisjustnotpossible.Despitethenear-criticalconditionofwatersupply,verylittleseemstohavebeendoneaboutit.Why?

The basic reason is that Pakistan’s policymakers have yet to start viewing thewater crisis in securityterms.Pakistan’sdecisionmakers,especiallythearmy,arenotdirectlyaffectedbywaterinsecuritiesandhavelittleincentivetochangethesystemormakewatermanagementreformapriority.Duetoavailabilityofbottledwaterandhomefiltrationsystems,thedecisionmakershavecleanwaterandanabundanceofit.Thosewhodonotarenotinapositiontoinfluencethepolicymakers.

WhilePakistan’swatercrisismaynotthreatentheviabilityofPakistanasastateatpresent,essentialcomponentslikeagriculture,thehealthofthepopulationand,aboveall,politicalandeconomicstability,dolieverymuchinthebalance.DeterioratingwatersecuritywouldbecatastrophicforPakistanwhereirrigatedagricultureplayssuchadominantpartintheeconomy,onwhich60percentofthepopulationisdependentandanydecreaseincropyieldswillaffectbothlivelihoodsandfoodsecurity.In fact, declining water availability has to be seen as one of the foremost security challenges that

confront Pakistan, on par with terrorism and religious extremism. In reality, water scarcity has thepotential to demolish all aspects of national security. According to a recent independent reportcommissioned by members of the G7, the mounting pressures on available water for Pakistan couldtranslateintopoliticalinstabilityandsecurityrisk.Pakistan’sleaderswouldneedtoheedsuchwarningsbecausewith terrorism, sectarianism and economic vulnerabilities already plaguing the country,waterstresshasthepotentialofbeingthetippingpointandacceleratingPakistan’strajectorytowardstheabyss.

11

Education:AnEmergency

Pakistan ranks 113th out of 120 countries in UNESCO’s Education for All EducationDevelopment Index. Pakistan’s literacy rate (57 per cent) lags well behind the country’sneighbours.’Thisproportionalsoincludesthosewhocouldonlywritetheirnames.LiteracyrateinruralareasofPakistanisevenlowerat50percent.Pakistanhaslownetenrolmentratios at all three levels – primary, secondary and tertiary – with a much lower femaleenrolmentrateascomparedtomales.Whenwemovefromprimarytosecondaryandtertiarylevels, enrolment ratios decrease sharply. Pakistan has theworld’s second highest out-of-schoolpopulationofchildren.Publicsectorexpenditureoneducationisbarely2percentofGDP.Thisiscompoundedbyinsufficienttrainedteachersandtheirabsenteeism,andweakgovernanceresultinginthepoorqualityofpublicschooling.1

—PakistanVision2025

ThegreatestthreattoPakistanmaybeitsabysmaleducationsystem.Pakistanischools–andnot just madrasas – are churning out fiery zealots, fuelled with a passion for jihad andmartyrdom.2

—PervezHoodbhoy

IN2011,sixty-fouryearsafterthecreationofPakistan,thePakistanEducationTaskForce2011describedthesituationasan‘EducationEmergency’3primarilybecausethecountry’seducationsystemwastheleasteffective in theworld.Thereportestimated thatone in tenof theworld’snot-in-schoolchildren in theprimaryagegrouplivedinPakistan(globallyplacingitsecondworstinout-of-schoolchildrenrankings).Italsoindicatedthatnearly30percentofthecountry’spopulationlivedinextremeeducationalpoverty,i.e., less than twoyears of education in their lifetime.Furthermore, those admitted to schools sufferedfrommassivedropoutratesbeforetheyreachedclassfive(63percentboys,77percentgirlsin2011).InApril2010,Article25AoftheConstitutionofPakistanwasamendedbytheeighteenthamendmentto

state,‘TheStateshallprovidefreeandcompulsoryeducationtoallchildrenoftheageoffivetosixteenyears in such manner as may be determined by law.’4 Despite the passage of six years since theamendment,twenty-fivemillionchildrenwithinthisagebracket,oralmosthalf,areoutofschool.WhileKhyberPakhtunkhwa (KPK)has simply failed to introduce thenecessary legislation,5 other provincialgovernmentshavenotyetinitiateditsimplementation.Pakistan’s education sector is a combination of three parallel streams – public or government-run

schools,privateschoolsandmadrasas.(Theschoolsrunbythemilitaryareinaclassoftheirown.)Eachofthesethreestreamshasitsowncurriculumandexaminationprocesses.TheNationalInternalSecurityPolicy2014–18hassummeduptheimpactofsuchstratificationofeducationas:‘Seriouscleavageshaveappeared in the society as a result of these systems, and continued existence in parallel spherescompoundsthepossibilitiesofviolenceamongdividedyouth.’6

AbrieflookatfactsandfiguresregardingtheeducationsectorinPakistanrevealsthedismalsituation.The school-age population (5–19 years old) in Pakistanwas estimated to be around 52.91million in2015.7 It is expected to rise to 90million in 2035.There are 146,185 formal primary, 42,147middlelevel(lowersecondary),29,874secondaryschools,2,318collegesand141universities;75percentarepublic sector schools; 10 per cent private sector schools and the remaining almost equally dividedbetween non-formal basic education schools and ‘DeeniMadrasas’.8 Of the total number of studentsgoing toprimaryschools(classesone tofive),73percentgo topublicorgovernmentschools,26percent to private schools, and less than 1 per cent to madrasas, according to the Karachi-based policyresearchinstituteSocialPolicyandDevelopmentCentre.Pakistan ranks 113 out of 120 countries in the Education Development Index and has the world’s

secondpositioninout-of-schoolchildren.Thegrossprimaryschoolenrolmentrate in2010–11was92percent,whilethenetprimaryschoolenrolmentrateinthesameyearwasonly56percent,indicatingahighdropoutrate.In2012–13,itwas91percentand57percentandin2013-14itwas90percentand57percentrespectively.9

Thesituationforsecondaryschooleducation,whichiscrucialforvocationalandhighereducation,isofequalconcern.Thenetsecondaryschoolenrolmentis20percentoverall.Theachievementofa100percentenrolmentrateinsecondaryeducationisthusadistantdream,letalonethequalityofeducation.The‘EducationStatistics2014-15’report,whichwaslaunchedbythefederalMinistryofEducationandProfessionalTraining inFebruary2016 revealed adeclineof 18per cent in the total enrolment at thepostgraduatelevelinuniversitiescomparedto2013-14.10

High dropout figures present onemajor challenge. The other is the ratio of out-of-school children.AccordingtotheNGOAlifAilaan,outof52.91millionschool-goingchildren,only27.89millionattendaneducationalinstitute(governmentorprivate),leaving25.02millionchildrenornearly50percent,outofschool.Ofthese,5.1million(otherestimates,includingofMinistryofEducation’s‘EducationforAll’isabout6.7million)areattheprimarylevel(44percentboys,56percentgirls).11However,aseriesofresearch studies titled ‘Population of Pakistan: An Analysis of National Socio-Economic Registry(NSER) 2010-11’ carried out by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) incollaborationwithUNICEFhasrevealedthatthenumberofout-of-schoolchildrenofprimaryschoolagehas reached 12.3million or 58.88 per cent of all primary-school-age children.Only 41.1 per cent ofprimary-school-agechildrenareattendingschoolinPakistan.12

The proportion of out-of-school children increaseswith the rise in the level of education.Thus thecorrespondingfiguresformiddleschool(agegroupof10–12years)is6.6millionor52.1percent;highschool(agegroupof13–14years)5.6millionor66.7percentandhighersecondary(agegroup15–16years)7.5millionor84.8percent.13Whatisunfortunateisthataccordingtoofficialrecordsthisfigure

hasremainedmostlyunchangedsince2005.14

The Education Statistics Report, which is based on the data of the federal government’s NationalInstituteofPolicyStudies(NIPS),saysthatithasbeenestimatedthatPunjabneedsatleast15,000moreschoolstoaccommodateitsout-of-schoolchildrenwhileSindhneedsaround20,000moreschools.Thecountryneedsatleast100,000newprimaryteachersfor50,000newschools.15

Inabsoluteterms,halfofthecountry’sout-of-schoolchildren–about52percent–liveinPunjab,25percentinSindh,10percentinKPK,7percentinBalochistan,andsixpercentinotherparts.Intermsof proportion,Balochistan andSindh are home to the highest proportion of out-of-school children.Asmanyas66percentofchildreninBalochistanand51percentinSindhareoutofschool,followedbyPunjab andKPKwith 47 per cent and 34 per cent out-of-school children respectively.16 Speaking inQuettarecently, theadviser to theBalochistanchiefministerSardarRazaBarrechsaid that1.6millionchildrenwereoutofschoolintheprovince,two-thirdsofwhomweregirls.17

Karachi has less than 9 per cent children enrolled in government primary educational institutions,accordingtothefindingsofasurveybytheHumanRightsCommissionofPakistan(HRCP).Fromapeakof30percentin1998,enrolmentingovernmentschoolsattheprimaryleveldeclinedto26percentin2002–03,to24percentin2005–06andto9percentin2016.Nobodyappearstohavetheslightestideahoworwhy.Itisalsodoubtfuliftheremaining91percentareintheprivatesectorprimaryschools.Mostlikely,theyare‘outofschool’.18

There is also awide disparitywithin provinces. In Punjab, for example, two districts, Lahore andFaisalabad,get9percentofthetotaleducationbudgetwhileeightofthepoorestperformingdistrictsget8percentofthetotalbudget.Inallprovinces,districtbudgetsaregenerallylowestwheretheproportionofout-of-schoolchildrenisthehighestandthuswhereneedsaregreatest.19

Apartfromseriousprovincialdisparities,therearealsodistortionsinregionalhistoriesthataretaught.Forexample, theInternationalCrisisGroup(ICG)quotesfroman interviewitconducted inKarachi inApril 2004 of one Mahtab Rashti saying ‘there is no mention of the role of Sindh in the Pakistanmovement, no examination of the role of revered Sindhi figures like G.M. Syed. Or, when they arementioned, they are demonized. So the impact on the Sindhi student is: “What place do I have in thiscountry?”’20 Echoing these sentiments an educator inKPK said: ‘Our local heroes likeBadshahKhan[Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan] are either ignored or denigrated. Malakand’s place in the IndependenceMovementisnevertaught.’21InBalochistan,aseniorofficialoftheprovincialeducationdepartmentsaid:‘BalochistanhastheoldestandrichesthistoryofanyprovinceinPakistan.Unfortunatelyourstudentsarenevertoldaboutit.’22

AccordingtotheEconomicSurvey2015-16,thenationalliteracyratewas58percent–74percentinurbanareas(81percentmaleand66percentfemale)and49percentinruralareas.However,therewassignificantdisparitybetweentheprovinces.WhileliteracyrateforPunjabwas61percent,itwas56percentforSindh,53percentforKPKand43percentforBalochistan.TheoverallliteracyrateinPakistanhasactuallydeclinedfrom60percentin2012–13to58percentin2013–14.23

Comparativelyspeaking,in1950thetotalliteracyrateofIndiawas20percentandPakistan’swas14percent.However, in2012, theliteracyrateofIndiahadreached75percentwhile inPakistanitwasonly58percent.In1950,IranhadalowerliteracyratethanPakistanbutnow90percentofitsadultsare

literate.24

According toUNESCO’sEFAGlobalMonitoringReport2002,5percentof theworld’s totaladultilliteratepopulationof862millionin2000wasinPakistan.Itsprojectedshareofthetotaladultilliteratepopulationof799million in2015was7percent.25Currently, thereareanestimated fifty-twomillionadult (over sixteen years) illiterates, of which 62 per cent are females. This is the key challenge forsustainable development in the country as an illiterate and unskilled workforce can hardly contributetowardseffectivesocialandeconomicprogress.26

Genderdisparityisanothermajor issue.Nationally, in2015,15.9millionboys,betweentheagesoffiveandsixteen,wereenrolled,comparedto just11.9milliongirls.Asaresult,13.7milliongirlsand11.4million boyswere out of school.Of the total number of girls aged 5–16, 53 per cent are out ofschool, compared to 42 per cent of boys in the same age group.Of the total number of out-of-schoolchildren,themajorityaregirls,comprising55percentofthetotal.27PakistanstillseemstobefollowingwhatSyedAhmadKhanhadsaidin1873:‘NosatisfactoryeducationcanbeprovidedforMohammedanfemalesuntilalargenumberofMohammedanmalesreceiveasoundeducation.’28Whatmighthavebeenrelevantinthenineteenthcentury,isclearlynotrelevantforthetwenty-first.Compoundinggenderdisparities,the‘EducationStatistics2014-15’reportofthePakistanMinistryof

EducationandProfessionalTraining,launchedinFebruary2016,alsoshowedasignificantdeclineinthenumberoffemalestudents.The2013–14reporthadstatedthattheratioofmaletofemalestudentsintheuniversitieswas50:50.However,the2014–15reportputthenumberofmalestudentsat54percentandthatoffemalestudentsat46percent.29

Pakistanhasalong-standingtargetofspending4percentoftheGDPoneducation.Thistargetwassetin1992andeverygovernmenthasrepeatedthepledgesince,includingthecurrentgovernment,withtheaimof achieving it by2018 as statedbyPrimeMinisterSharif at theOsloEducationSummit.30 However,increasing educational spending to 4 per cent of GDP would be next to impossible for the PML-NgovernmenttoachievesinceitwouldmeanaddingamassiveRs485billiontothecurrentallocationofRs790billionrepresenting2.83percentofGDP.31

Moreover, during the past decade, Pakistan’s expenditure on education as a percentage ofGDPhasvariedbetween1.5percentand2.1percent.32Of thismeagreallotment,only7.5percent isspentonprimary education.33 According to a 2001 study, the government spent 3.3 per cent of GDPmore ondefencethanothercountriesofitsincomelevelandthattheoverspendingondefencewasroughlyequaltothesumof theunderspendingonhealthandeducationasapercentageof theGDP.34 In2016,given theincreased amount spent on defence, the difference between the expenditure onmilitary and educationwouldbeevengreater.Tragically,20–25percentofeventhisremainsunused.Forexample,between2010–11and2013–14,

9–13percentofPunjab’seducationbudgetremainedunspent.Thismoneycouldsupport1.1–1.5millionprimary-schoolchildren.InSindhnearlyaquarteroftheeducationbudgetremainedunspentin2013–14,equivalentto$310million.Thisamountcouldsupport2.7millionchildreninprimaryschools.Spendinginthesmallerprovinces–KhyberPakhtunkhwaandBalochistan–appearstobebetter,withtheformerspendingmorethanitsbudgetaryallocationsinsomeyears.35

Moreover, on an average, at the national level, 89 per cent of education expenditures comprises

administrativeexpenseslikesalariesofteachers.Only11percentcomprisesdevelopmentexpenditures,whichisnotsufficienttoraisethequalityofeducation.Acrossprovincestooanoverwhelmingproportionofactualeducationexpendituresarespentonadministrativeheads,mainly teachers’salaries, leavingavery smallproportion fordevelopmentexpenditures.For2012–13,except inKPKwheredevelopmentexpenditureswere22percentoftheactualexpenditures,theserangedbetween5percent(inPunjab),6percent(inSindh);and9percent(inBalochistan).36

Giventhecurrentspendingpatterns,Pakistanfacesenormousfinancingchallenges.Tomeetpost-2015educationgoalsby2030,thecountrywillhavetoincreaseitscurrentperstudentexpendituretentimesatthepre-primarylevel,bysixtimesattheprimarylevel,andbyfourtimesatthelowersecondarylevel.Pakistan isamongaminorityof lower-middle-incomecountrieswhichwillneed to roughlydouble thespendingonbasiceducationtoachievegoalsby2030,andwillhavetoincreasetheproportionofGDPallocationstobasiceducationbyalmostthreetimes.37

TheNationalPlanofAction(2013)requiresadditionalresourcestothetuneofRs189billioninthenext three years for effective implementation of its components. For this to happen the provinceswillhave to increase budgetary allocations for education and assistance from international developmentpartnerswouldhavetobeforthcoming.38

Asof31December2015,Pakistanmissedeachoneofitseducation-relatedMillenniumDevelopmentGoals (MDGs) to achieveuniversal primary school access, improve retention in schools and increaseadultliteracy.Currently,theliteracyrateinPakistanis58percent,whilethetargetwastoincreaseitto88percent;theretentionrateofenrolledchildrenfromclassesonetofivewastobe100percentbuttherateiscurrentlyonly67percent.Similarly,thenetprimaryenrolmentis58percentinPakistanandthetargetof100percentremainsadistantdream.39

Themostcontroversialandcrucialaspectofeducationis,ofcourse, thecurriculumorwhatisactuallytaughtinschoolssincethisprovidestheroadmapforfuturegenerations.InPakistan’scasethisisallthemoresosincefromthetimeofAyubKhanonlyofficiallypublishedtextbooksareallowedtobeusedfromclass one to college level, in order to enable the governments to set the curriculum as per their ownpredilections.Under theeighteenthamendment,educationhasbeendevolved to theprovinces,butveryfewchanges,ifany,havebeenmadeinthecurriculumasyet.Areporttitled‘TheSubtleSubversion:TheStateofCurriculaandTextbooksinPakistan’,editedby

A.H.Nayyar andAhmadSalim (2004) and published by the SustainableDevelopment Policy Institute(SDPI),an Islamabad-based think tank,has identifiedseveral issues in thecurriculaand textbooks thatincludedfactualinaccuraciesandomissionswhichdistortedthenatureandsignificanceofactualevents;incitementtomilitancyandviolencethatincludedencouragementofjihadandshahadat,aglorificationofwarandtheuseofforce;encouragementofprejudice,bigotryanddiscriminationtowardsfellowcitizens,especiallywomenandreligiousminorities,andothernations.Its findings were: ‘Madrassas are not the only institutions breeding hate, intolerance, a distorted

worldview,etc.Theeducationalmaterialinthegovernment-runschoolsdoesmuchmorethanmadrassas.Thetextbookstell lies,createhatred, inculcatemilitancy,andmuchmore…thecurriculumencouragesideasthatareincompatiblewiththeidealsofPakistanasaforward-looking,modernstatecommittedto

equalrightsandequitabletreatmentforitscitizens.’Morespecifically, it identifiedfour themesthatconstitutedthebulkof thecurriculaandtextbooksof

thethreecompulsorysubjectsofsocialstudies/Pakistanstudies,UrduandEnglish:thatPakistanwasforMuslimsalone;thatIslamicteachingsweretobeincludedinallthesubjects,hencetobeforciblytaughttoallthestudents,whatevertheirfaith;thatIdeologyofPakistanwastobeinternalizedasfaithandthathate be created againstHindus and India; and studentswere to be urged to take the path of jihad andshahadat.40

Thesituationhasn’tchangedmuchinthelastfifteenyears.TheNationalCommissionforJusticeandPeace(NCJP),andthePakistanInstituteofLabourandResearch,conductedaseminarinKarachion30March2016atwhichareportonthecurriculainallfourprovinceswasdiscussed.Afteranalysingsomeseventytextbooks, includingUrdu,Islamiyatandoptionalsubjects, theNCJPfoundthat therewerestilltoomanyexamplesofcontentthatcouldbeconsidereddivisiveandofportionsamountingtohatespeech.For example,Hinduswere portrayed as ‘enemies’,whileChristianswere portrayed as ‘agents’ of theWest.Themosttellingfact,however,wasthatthereportcarriedonly25percentoftheNCJP’sfindings,for,astheprojectcoordinatorpointedout,‘sharingtheremainingportionmayjustangersomepeoplesomuchthattheymaywanttoeliminateus’.41Givensuchastateofaffairs,thereisverylittlehopethatthecurriculumwilleverundergoachange.Clearly,unlessthereisabasicchangeincurriculaandtextbooks,educationwouldcontinuetoresultin

bigotry,violenceandhatredandthereshouldbenosurprisethatwithsuchacurriculumthesocietyhassuchextremisttendencies.TherealfightagainstterrorismandtoreclaimmoderatespaceinPakistanwillhavetobeginhere.A major reason for the curriculum being distorted in Pakistani schools is the repeated efforts to

Islamize education. Though AyubKhan had introduced ‘Islamiyat’ in the curriculum and prescribed acentralizedmechanismforthecurricula,itwasunderZia-ul-HaqthatIslamsystematicallypermeatedtheeducationalsystem.Hestated:‘Thehighestprioritywouldbegiventotherevisionofthecurriculawithaview to reorganizing the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an ideologicalorientationsothatIslamicideologypermeatesthethinkingoftheyoungergenerationandhelpsthemwiththenecessaryconvictionandabilitytorefashionsocietyaccordingtoIslamictenets.’42

Asaresult,politicalIslambecamepartandparcelofthecurriculumuptouniversitylevel.Therewasan increasingemphasisonanti-Hinduandanti-Indiadistortionsaswell as thegloryof jihadunder theinfluenceoftheJamaat.Anewsubject,‘PakistanStudies’,wasmadecompulsoryforallstudents.In1981the University Grants Commission (UGC) issued a directive to prospective textbook authors ‘… todemonstrate that thebasisofPakistan isnot tobefoundedinracial, linguistic,orgeographicalfactors,but, rather, in the sharedexperienceof a common religion;Toget students toknowandappreciate theIdeologyofPakistan and to popularize itwith slogans;Toguide students towards the ultimate goal ofPakistan—the creation of a completely Islamicized State’.43 India and Hindus were converted intocaricatureswithtwooutstandingfeatures–cowardiceanddeviousness.Asaresult,duringZia’stime,‘Islamwasusedtosupportthestate’sownmilitaristicpoliciesinaway

thatitappearedtothereadersofthesetextbooksthatPakistan, thePakistanMovement,Pakistan’swarswithIndiaandtheKashmirissuewereallconnectednotonlywithPakistaninationalismbutwithIslamitself.’44

While the curriculum is distorted enough, a study found that upwards of 80 per cent of the publicschoolteachersviewednon-Muslimsas‘enemiesofIslam’insomeformorother.45Andsuchvalueshavebeentransmittedrepeatedlytosuccessivegenerationsofstudentsoverthelastthreedecades.

WhilePakistandoesfaceaneducationemergency,especiallyofout-of-schoolchildrenandcurriculum,anequally huge challenge is the quality of education. A low-quality education negates any gains that theoveralleducationsystemmayshow.TheEconomicSurveyofPakistan,2014–15,highlightsthefactthattherehasbeen amarkeddeterioration since thepreviousyear in all three competencies, i.e., languageUrdu/Sindhi/Pashto, English and arithmetic. For example, quoting the Annual Survey of Education(ASER) 2014, it notes that while 50 per cent of class five students could read a class twoUrdu/Sindhi/Pashtostoryin2013,only46percentcoulddosoin2014.ForEnglishin2014,42percentofclassfivestudentscouldreadclasstwolevelEnglishsentencesascomparedto43percentin2013.Similarly,40percentofclassfivestudentswereabletodotwo-digitdivisionsumsin2014comparedto43percentin2013.46

ProvincialcomparisonsshowedthatBalochistanandSindhweretheleastsatisfactoryregionsamongstall when compared for the assessment results for class five children. Only 24 per cent of class fivechildreninBalochistanwereabletoaccomplishclassthreeleveltasks(two-digitdivision)inarithmeticand33percentofclasstwoleveltasksforlanguage(Urdu,readingstory).WhileinSindh,only24percentofclassfivechildrenwereabletoreadsentencesinEnglish.47

Whathasbeentheimpactofsuchapatternofeducation?Cohensumsitupwell:

A significant product of Pakistan’s educational system is generation after generation of ill-trained and barely literate youngmenwho head to the towns and cities where they find anexpandingandtemptingpopularculturebutnojobs;justassignificantarethemillionsofyounggirlswhodonotreceiveanyseriouseducation,andwhoconsequentlytendtohavemanymorechildrenandareexcludedfromtheformalworkforce.48

In real terms, the impact was graphically elaborated by nuclear scientist Dr Samar Mubarakmandwhile delivering the keynote address at the ninth convocation of the Government College University(GCU)inDecember2010,whenhestatedthattherewasaneedofthousandsofmathematicians,chemicalanalysts, engineers and other experts.However, he regretted that Pakistan had a very small number ofeducationalinstitutionsofhighereducationthatwereproducingqualitymanpower.’49

HislamentwasborneoutbytheTimesHigherEducationworlduniversityrankingsfor2016thatdidnothaveanyPakistaniuniversityinalistof500educationalinstitutionsacrosstheworld.Theonlytwouniversities toevenfeatureontheTimesHigherEducationwebsitewereQuaid-i-AzamUniversityatarankingof501–600andtheNationalUniversityofSciencesandTechnology(NUST)rankedanabysmal601-800.50Infact,noPakistaniuniversityevenfiguredinthetop100Asianuniversities.IndiaandChinawereplacedatamuchbetterposition,withnineIndianandtwentyChineseuniversitiesmakingthecut.51

Likewise,aBritishuniversityrankingagency,QuacquarelliSymonds(QS),hasplacedPakistanatthe

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verybottomof a fifty-country list comparing theirhigher education systems.While theUSand theUKtook the two top positions, China and India made it to the eighth and twenty-fourth positions,respectively.52

The Education for All Global Monitoring Report (October 2012) assessed the long-term effect ofneglectingchildren’seducationasfollows:

ThereisahugeskillsdeficitamongyoungPakistanisnowfacingtheworldofwork;OveroneinthreeyoungpeopleinPakistanhavenotcompletedprimaryschooland,asaresult,donothavethebasicskillstheyneedforwork;Equivalenttoatotaloftwelvemillion15–24-year-oldslackbasicskills,whichisthesecondhighestnumberindevelopingcountries;Whileover70percentoftherichestyoungmenandwomenhavecompletedlowersecondaryschool,only16percentofthepoorestyoungmenandfewerthan5percentofthepoorestyoungwomenhavedoneso;Youngpeoplefromdisadvantagedbackgroundsareleastlikelytohaveskillsfordecentjobs.53

AccordingtotheUnitedNationsGlobalEducationMonitoringReport2016,thecumulativeimpactofalackofsustainedfocusoneducationhasresultedinPakistanbeingmorethanfiftytosixtyyearsbehindinitsprimaryandsecondaryeducationtargets.54

Giventhestateofeducation inPakistan,especiallyscientificeducation, it ishardlysurprisingly thatPakistanisamongtheleastinnovativecountriesintheworld.AccordingtotheGlobalInnovationIndex(GII) 2016, co-published by Cornell University, INSEAD and the World Intellectual PropertyOrganisation,Pakistanranked119of128countriessurveyed.Thecurrentallocationonresearchwasonly0.29percentofGDP,farbelowtheworldaverageasmostdevelopedcountriesspendbetween2and4percentoftheirGDPonresearch.55

Thenetimpact,therefore,isthatwithsuchhugenumbersbeingilliterateandsemi-literate,thetypeofjobs they can do are at best low-end. Thiswould adversely impact the economic development of thecountry in the twenty-first century.However, retardingeconomicdevelopment isonlyoneaspect.Withsuchlowskillsset,theoneattractiveavenueopenistojointhejihadiranks.Cumulatively,thiswillactasadeadweightonPakistanemergingasamoderateanddemocraticstate.PervezHoodbhoysumsuptheendresultofsuchaneducationsystemaptly:‘Mostuniversitystudents

have little curiosity about their subject, no feeling of excitement, and no desire to explore.Most havenever read a serious book in their entire life, other than a textbook or a religious book. Campusdiscussionsofphilosophical,social,orintellectualissuesarerare.’56

Thecurrent‘educationalemergency’inPakistanistheresultofdecadesofneglectoftheeducationsectoranditwilltakedecadestobeovercome,providedadeterminedstartismadeimmediately.ForPakistan’sleaderstocontinuetoignorethechallengesineducationissuicidalsincemorethanhalfthepopulationisbelownineteenyearsofage.In fact, as early as 2001, an analysis had noted that, ‘twenty-four percentage points of Pakistan’s

population [was] illiterate than isnormal for a countryof its income level’.57 Inotherwords, the lowlevel of literacy inPakistanwas indicativeof the indifferenceof the rulers to implement policies thatwould educate the people. It also indicated the low-level skills required for the country to stay afloatwhere high and broad-based achievement was not a priority. By implication, products of such aneducation system also could not challenge the existing feudal set-up inPakistan.The priorities can begaugedfromthefactthat‘evenintheculturalcapital[Lahore],wherealargepercentageofthepopulationiseducated,wehavefivepologrounds,andfivegolfcourses,butclosetonopubliclibraries.’58

Buttheproblemisfardeeper.Inallsocieties,theprimarypurposeofeducationistoeducatetheyoungmind,todevelopaspiritofinquiryandunderstandingoftheworldaroundandtopreparethemfortakingup responsibilities in society. InPakistan, however, education seems tohavebeenhijacked to achieveideologicalandpoliticalgoalsinlinewiththethinkingoftheelites,especiallythemilitary.SuchthinkinghasnarroweddownthepurposeofeducationintotryingtocreateaPakistaniidentitythathasatitscorereligion,militarismandahatredofIndia.Thesefacetshavepermeated theentireeducationsystemandcurriculum,andtheresultantproductsarenot imbuedwithaspiritof inquirybutwithhatred.Sincethe1970s, several generations have been through the system cumulatively creatingmillions of individualswithnarrowthinking.Theeducationcrisis,likethewatercrisis,hastakenonproportionsthatwouldprogressivelymakeit

extremelydifficultforanygovernmenttotackle.Withthepopulationcontinuingtogrowatanalarming1.9percentandahugeyouthbulge,millionsofchildrenareenteringtheeducationmarketyearafteryear.ThecolossalchallengeforPakistanisclearlyeducatingallthesemillionstoreapthedemographicdividendbefore thewindowofopportunity closes.However, finding schools for themwillbe aHerculean taskgiven the lack of adequate investment in education,while even the existing schoolswill not equip themajoritytotakeupresponsiblejobsinthesociety.ChangesinPakistan’seducationsystemwillcomeaboutonlywhenthearmychangesitsmindsetand

looks upon the education emergency in Pakistan as a security problem. Since the Pakistan Armyunderstandsonlythreatscenarios,boththeissuesofwaterandeducationwouldhavetobecouchedinasecuritylanguageforthearmytotakenoteanddosomethingaboutit.Thosewhotalkabout‘Jinnah’sPakistan’adnauseamwoulddowelltoheedhispropheticwords:‘The

importanceofeducationandtherighttypeofeducationcannotbeover-emphasized.…ThereisnodoubtthatthefutureofourstatewilldependuponthetypeofeducationandthewayinwhichwebringupourchildrenasthefutureservantsofPakistan.’59

PooreducationinPakistantodayhassimilaritieswiththeMuslimsfailingtotaketoWesterneducationinpost-1857era.ItrequiredLordMayoandtheHunterReportontheonehandandtheeffortsofSirSyedAhmad on the other to pull the Muslims out of their gloom. What Pakistan needs today is anotherMayo/Hunter and another SyedAhmad. Themisfortune of Pakistan is that no one seems to be on thehorizonwhocanpullPakistanbackfromitsbriskmarchtowardstheabyss.

12

Economy:StructuralWeaknesses

ThequestionwemaynowaskiswhetherornotPakistan,asitcompletesthefirstfiftyyearsof its existence, has the political resources, social maturity, institutional capability, andavailabilityof economic expertise to institutemajor economic changes?Will it beable tofashionasetofpoliciesthatwouldhelpitdealwiththepresenteconomiccrisisandtocharta course for the future that would free the economy from the sort of turbulence it hasexperienced in its fiftiethyear?It isclear thatwithoutstabilizing theeconomy,Pakistan’sdreamofmovingintotheranksofmiddle-incomecountrieswillremainjustthat–adream.1

—ShahidJavedBurki

BYALMOSTallparameterslistedbyBurki,theanswerwouldhavetobeinthenegative.Asimilarsetofquestionscouldwellbeposedin2017,onPakistan’sseventiethanniversary,andinalllikelihood,theanswerwillbethesame.Pakistan’seconomicgrowthsincethe1950shasbeenmarkedbyapersistenceofperiodiccrisesandbailouts,andbyhighvolatilityingrowthratesduetoa‘stop–go’growthmodel.Notsurprisingly,economiccrisesseemtohavebecomethenormforPakistan.PakistanVision2025,adocumentpreparedbythePlanningCommissionoftheGovernmentofPakistan

inMay2014explainsthesituationsuccinctly:

Pakistaniscurrentlyfacingseriouschallengesonvariousfronts.Theseincludethecombinationoflowgrowthandhighinflation,whichisoneofthemajorfactorsleadingtotheperpetuationofpovertyandunemployment.Energyshortageshaveposedgreatproblems to thecitizensaswellasbusinessesandagriculture.Socialindicatorsreflectseriousdeficienciesineducation,health and population, gender equity and social services. The law and order situation in thecountry poses a critical threat to security aswell as the economy. The decade-long struggleagainst terrorism and extremism continues to impose immense social, economic, and humancosts.2

Giventhis,itisnotsurprisingthatthegrowthoftheeconomyfromUS$50billiontoUS$275billionin the last fifteen years, and increase in the per capita income from $490 to $1,370, has not beentranslatedintothewell-beingofthepopulation.Insteadithaswideneddisparitiesbetweentherichandthepoor.3

The basic reason for the inconsistent performance of the economy is the structuralweaknesses that

havenotbeenrectifiedoverthedecadesandwillnotberectifiedbyadhoc,Band-Aidtypeofsolutions.The key among these are poor governance; the high dependence upon external factors like foreignassistance, exports andworkers’ remittances insteadof internaldriversofgrowth;highburdenofdebtrepayment; inadequate measures to raise the rate of savings and investment; low investment as apercentage of GDP in the social sectors such as health and education; a very high defence burden; askewedlandpolicy;revenueshortagesandsoon.Theresultofthesestructuralflawshavebeenlowratesof growth, poor infrastructure, unscientific agricultural practices, lack of industrialization, a wideningtradegap,highincidenceofpoverty,lowsocialdevelopmentindicators,alowstandardofliving,alowliteracyrateandanunskilledworkforce.

Onemajorreasonforthepersistingstructuralweaknesses,apartfromthepropensityofgovernmentsnotto tackle economic problems head-on, is the change in the nature of Pakistan. During its first threedecades, Pakistan was a ‘development state’, wherein the state agenda pursued by all governments –civilianandmilitary–waseconomicdevelopment.Thisperiodwasmarkedbylarge-scaleassetcreation(dams, irrigation systems, highways, power plants, industrial complexes, factories, etc.). The ‘securitystate’replacedthe‘developmentstate’in1977asaresultofwhicheconomicdevelopmentceasedtobethe primary agenda of the state. The period was marked by a failure to invest in additional capitalformationaswellaslackofreplacementinvestmentineconomicassetscreatedearlier.Briefattemptstorevivethe‘developmentstate’itin1990sprovedfutile.4

This isprovedstatisticallyby the fact thatduring the1970s, the real rateofgrowthofdevelopmentexpenditurewas21per centper annumand the rateofgrowthofdefenceexpenditurewas2per cent.Duringthe1980s,therateofgrowthofdevelopmentexpenditurecrashedsevenfoldto3percentandtherateofgrowthofdefenceexpenditureescalatedalmostfivefoldto9percent.AsapercentageofGDP,developmentexpenditurehasbeenfallingfrom9percentinthe1970sto7.3percentinthe1980sto4.7percentinthe1990sandto3.5percentinthefirstdecadeofthemillennium.5Currentlyitis3.2percent.The aberrationsof the ‘security state’ syndromecanbe evidenced from just one exampleof theFY

2007–08.AgainstthetotaltaxrevenuesofRs1,000billion,current(non-development)expendituresonjustthreeheads–debtservicing,defenceandciviladministration–wasRs1,160billion,i.e,anoutlayofRs160billionmorethanwhatthegovernmenthadcollectedindirectandindirecttaxes.Clearly,notaxrupeeswere available for development of infrastructure or social services.KaiserBengali sums it upbrilliantly: ‘Cutting development expenditure rather than current (non-development) expenditure to cutbudgetdeficitsisakintoanindustrialistdealingwithhiscashflowproblemsbylayingoffthe(wealth-producing) factory labour and retaining the (wealth-consuming) array of domestic servants in thehousehold(khansamas,ayahs,malis,chowkidars,drivers,etc.).’6

Comingtothepresent,thePML-NgovernmenthashadtoconsistentlycutthedevelopmentbudgetforthreeconsecutiveyearsinordertomeetthebudgetdeficittargetassignedbytheIMFat4.3percentofGDP.Thus, in2015–16,of theRs700billionallocated to thePublicSectorDevelopmentProgramme(PSDP),anamountofRs628.8billionwasdisbursedrecordingacutofRs71.2billion,or10.2percentless than the allocation. Allocations of two crucial road projects of the China–Pakistan EconomicCorridor(CPEC)–theThakot–HavelianandMultan–Sukkar–hadtheirfundsslashedmassively.7

AverageannualGDPgrowthrateswere6.8percentinthe1960s,4.8percentinthe1970s,6.5percentinthe1980s,4.6percentinthe1990sand4.9percentinthefirstdecadethecurrentcentury–althoughtheaveragegrowthrateduringthelastfiveyearsslowedtojust3.2percent.8AccordingtotheEconomicSurveyofPakistan2014–15and2015–16,theeconomyhadagrowthrateof4.2percentin2014–15and4.7percentin2015-16,missingtheambitioustargetof5.1percentand5.5percentrespectivelyithadsetforitself.Despitethis,thePML-Ngovernmenthassetanambitioustargetof7percentGDPgrowthbytheendofitstenurein2018.Interestingly,thegovernment’sfigureof4.7percentGDPgrowthhasbeencontested,forexample,bynotedeconomistDrHafizPashawhoheldthattherealGDPgrowthwasnearerto3.1percent.9

With thepresent rateofgrowth, thePakistan economygenerates employment for less than amillionpersonsperyear.ThechallengeforPakistan is toaccelerategrowthto7–8percent if it is togenerateemployment for themore than threemillion people who are entering the labourmarket annually. Thecrucial question to ask is: What will it take to realize a 7–8 per cent GDP growth rate to absorbPakistan’sgrowingpopulation?Thiswoulddependtoalargeextentonimprovementsintheinvestmentenvironmentthatisanessentialdriverofgrowthandsustainedmacroeconomicstability.Togenerateagrowth rateof7–8percentona sustainedbasis, thecountrywouldhave to raise the

levelofinvestmentfromthecurrentrateof15.21percent(againsttargetof17.7percent)ofGDP(publicand private sector)10 to about 25 per cent of GDP with special attention on human and socialdevelopment.This level of investment is impossible to achievewithout a simultaneous increase in therateofnationalsavings.AccordingtotheEconomicSurvey2015–16nationalsavingswere14.6percentof GDP in 2015–16 compared to 14.5 per cent in 2014–15 and 13.7 per cent in 2013–14. Domesticsavingswereat8.3percentin2015–16ascomparedwith8.4percentofGDPin2014–15and8percentofGDPin2013–14.Thedomesticrateofsavingwouldhavetobeincreasedtoabout20percentofGDPon a sustained basis. Thiswill be possible onlywith policies that encourage savings and discourageconsumption.

Historically,Pakistanhasbeenlargelydependentonforeignbailoutstokeeptheeconomyafloat.Infact,thereisadirectcorrelationbetweenhigherGDPgrowthandlargeforeigncapitalinflowsandconversely,slowingdownofgrowthwhentherewasareductioninforeignassistance.Thus,themartiallawperiodsofGeneralsAyubKhan,Zia-ul-HaqandMusharrafin1958–69,1978–88and2001–08respectively,whenPakistanwasinalliancewiththeUS,sawgrowthratesacceleratingduetolargeamountsofforeignaid.Itreached 6 per cent under Ayub Khan, 6.6 per cent under Zia and 6.3 per cent under Musharraf.Conversely, when foreign inflows slowed, like under Z.A. Bhutto (1972–77), the democratic period(1988–98)andpostMusharraf(2007onwards)GDPgrowthfellto4.9percent,4percentand2.6percentrespectively.11

Foreignassistanceapart,remittancesandexportskeepthePakistaneconomyafloat.Whileremittancesarediscussed in thechapteronpopulation, suffice it to sayhere thatheavydependenceon remittancesmakesPakistanvulnerabletotheeconomicandgeopoliticaldevelopmentsincountriesfromwheretheseinflows occur. Exports show a declining trend from a peak of $25.3 billion in 2011 to $22 billion in2015.This ispartlyonaccountofdecrease inglobal trade in2015but inPakistan’scase, the loomingexternal debt position of Pakistan makes the impact of the decline ever more daunting. Exports from

Pakistanarenotonlyheavilyconcentratedinprimaryproductsandlowvalue-addedgoodsbutarealsolimited to products that contribute negligibly to the global trade. Thus, the top ten export productscumulativelyaccountforapproximatelyone-thirdoftheexportsfromPakistanbutonly0.5percentoftheglobaltradeflow.12

Thus, it is obvious that its alliance with the US, and leveraging its geographical position, helpedPakistanimproveitsgrowthrates.AsStephenCohenputsit,

Pakistan now barely survives on its own income and most social services are paid for byforeigncountries.Wereaidtocease,asithasinthepast,thegovernmentwouldagainbefacedwithfinancialfailure.Thathappenedin2001,anditwasonlyUSinterventionafter9/11thatcame to the rescue of the fiscally bankrupt state.BothPakistan’s leaders and foreign donorsknow that given its current tax structure and weak export capability, Pakistan will remaindependentonforeignassistanceindefinitely.13

Pakistan’stax-to-GDPratioforthelastfiveyearshasaveragedaround9.8percent,oneofthelowestintheregion.Year-to-yearfluctuationshavevariedfrom9to11percentinthelasttenyears;itwas10.5percent in2013–14andslumped to8.4percent (againsta targetof12.5percent) in2015–16.Thus,three years into the PML-N government’s tenure, tax-to-GDP ratio has actually declined instead ofimproving.Thereare several reasons for this.Forone, less than1percentof thepopulationof194.5millionpaysincometax.Consequently,about65percentofthetotaltaxrevenueisderivedfromindirecttaxesthatareregressiveintheirimpactandhaveadirectbearingontherateofinflation.Second,65percent of themembers of parliament andmore than half of the federal cabinet do not pay income tax.14

Third,noneofPakistan’stop100frequentinternationalflyerspayanytaxandonlyfiveamongthemfileataxreturn,withnoneofthemclaimingtofallwithinthebracketoftaxableincome.15

Fourth,thereislackofaccountabilityinthecorporatesectorwithonly23,000outof65,000registeredcompanies filing tax returns.Out of these, 11,000 declared zero profit.16 Fifth, actual tax collection isbelieved tobealmosthalfofwhat isdue. Ifmediaaccountsare tobebelieved, theFederalBureauofRevenue(FBR)spendsmoremoneyoncollectionoftaxesthanitactuallycollectsinovertwo-thirdsofitstotalfieldformations.17Finally,lackofdocumentationhasensuredthatalargechunkoftheeconomyremainsbeyondthepaleofthegovernment,retardingtheeffortstoprovideservices.An interestingWorldValuesSurveyheld that tax-to-GDPratio in thosecountrieswashealthywhere

people trusted the government, bureaucracy and judiciary. Anything below 50 per cent showed poorlevelsofconfidence.InPakistan’scaseonly35.8percentexpressedconfidenceinthegovernment,37.3per cent in the bureaucracy and 45.8 per cent in the judiciary, indicating poor levels of confidence.According to theSurvey,people couldbe convinced topay taxesprovidedbettergovernance restoredconfidencelevelininstitutions.18

Over the decades, the sectoral breakup of the GDP has been changing from the initial mainstay ofagriculture(declinedfrom46percentinthe1950sto19.8percentofGDPin2015–16ascomparedto21.4percentin2014–15)tothecurrentservicessector(increasedfrom38percentin1960to59.16of

GDP in2015–16ascompared to58.8percent in2014–15).The shareofmanufacturinghas remainedrelatively constant. Despite employing nearly 43 per cent of the country’s labour force with strongbackward and forward linkages, in 2015–16 agriculture recorded a negative growth of 0.19 per centcomparedwithgrowthof2.53percentin2014–15andatargetedgrowthof3.9percent.Thiswasmainlydue to the drastic decline of cotton production by 27.8 per cent. Over the long term, the share ofagricultureintheGDPhasbeendroppinglargelyduetoinefficientpractices, lowproductivity,skewedlandowning patterns and declining water availability.With a growing population and declining wateravailability,foodsecuritycanbecomeamajorissueinPakistaninthedaystocome.Declining agriculture has a direct and immediate impact on the population. According to a report,

sixty-onemillionPakistanis are already food-insecure.19 TheNationalEconomicCouncil in its annualreport for the financial year 2013–14, recently presented before the national assembly by FinanceMinisterIshaqDarhasadmittedthat‘oneineverythreePakistanisstilldoesnothaveregularandassuredaccesstosufficientnutritiousfood’.20

Theindustrialsectorcontributed21.02percenttoGDPin2015–16ascomparedwith20.30percentin2014–15,ofwhich64.71percentsharewasofmanufacturingcomparedwith65.4percentin2014–15.Manufacturingoutputhasbeenaffectedduetoacuteenergyshortages,lackofskilledworkersandanarrowproductionbasefocusedontextiles.Itistheservicessectorthathasreallyprovidedtheimpetusto growth, especially in transport, storage and communication, wholesale and retail trade and socialservices.Notsurprisingly,ithasreplacedagricultureasthedominantsectoroftheeconomy.

Energyisanareaofcriticalshortageswithswathesofthecountrysufferinguptotwelvehoursofpowercuts.Theenergydeficithasreducedproduction–includinginthevitaltextilesector–curtailedeconomicgrowth and discouraged foreign investment.According to an estimate, due to power shortages a largenumberoffactories(includingmorethan500intheindustrialcityofFaisalabadalone)havebeenforcedtoclose.SomeWesterncompanies,citingelectricitydeficits,havesuspendedoperationsinPakistan.InJanuary2015,theMoody’swarnedthatenergyshortageswilldamagePakistan’screditworthiness.Ithasbeenestimatedthatpowershortageshavecostthecountryupto4percentofgrossdomesticproductinrecentyears.21

In1947,Pakistan’stotalpowergenerationcapacitywas60MW.In2015installedelectricitycapacitywas about 23,000MW – though actual productionwas just half of this at 12,000MW. Peak demandestimatedat20,800MWcurrentlyisexpectedtorisetonearly32,000MWby2019.Ineffect,accordingtoKugelman, in just a few years, the demand could outstrip installed capacity by nearly 10,000MW,though, the gap is even larger if the actual production is factored in.Thus,Pakistanmaywell have toinstalasmuchelectricalcapacityinthecurrentdecadeasitdidoverthelastsixtyyears.’22

However,powergenerationisonlyhalftheproblem.AccordingtotheStateBankofPakistan’sAnnualReport2014,themorebindingbottleneckintheenergysectorwasnotgeneration(mostgenerationunitswereworkingwellbelowcapacity),butdistribution.Apartfromtheftandleakagesestimatedatabout20percent, ‘theprevailing transmissionanddistribution (T&D)systemcan reliablyhandle loadsofonly11,500–12,500MWduringagivenperiod.Anyloadbeyondthisincreasesthelikelihoodofabreakdownin thedistributionnetwork,which is becomingmore common.’ In effect, even if generatingunitsweregeared up to increase capacity utilization or additional generation capacity was created, the country

simplydidnothavethecapacitytodistributethispowertowhereitwasneeded(i.e.,fromthemaingridtoactualusers).‘Thus,theexistingT&Dnetworkwasamorebindingconstraintthangenerationcapacity.Without upgrading the existing distribution network, any addition to generation capacity (and even thesettlement of the circular debt) could not ease loadmanagement on a sustainable basis.Unfortunately,despitethishardconstraint,policyhasmostlyfocusedongeneration.’23

DespitethemassiveenergycrisisinPakistan,therealityisthatpowerprojectloansworth$16billionthathadbeenapprovedby internationaldonors forenergyprojects in thecountryhavebeenunutilized.The$16billionamountrepresents85percentofthe$18.8billionloansapprovedforPakistan’senergysector by multilateral donors, and includes projects for power generation as well as improving thetransmissionanddistributiongrids.Islamabad’sfailuretoutilizetheseloanshascostthetaxpayers$21millionayearincommitmentfeesfortheloans,including$15millioninfeestoChinaalone.Alltold,atleastthirty-fourprojectshaveyettogetoffthegrounddespitehavingforeignfundingavailable.24

Anotherexampleofpoorgovernance is theGadaniEnergyPark inBalochistan. InAugust2013, theGadaniEnergyPark–tencoal-basedpowerplantswithatotalcapacityof6,600MW–wasannouncedwith much fanfare. The Chinese were supposed to provide financial as well as technical assistance.However, on 4 February 2015 the Ministry of Water and Power, in a testimony before the nationalassembly’sStandingCommitteeonPlanningandDevelopment,disclosedthattheGadaniEnergyParkhadbeen ‘puton thebackburner’.ByMarch, ithadbecomeclear that theentireprojecthadbeenshelvedbecausethegovernmentfailedtoprovideguaranteesforaprofittoChineseinvestorsandalsobecausetheChinese investors wanted to take up the project on their own termswithout following the prescribedpublicprocurementrules.Thewaytheprojecthasbeenhandledhasseriousimplicationsfor themuch-touted China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As Farrukh Saleem cautions, ‘In the absence ofwholesalepowersectorreforms,theproposedChineseinvestmentof$34billion(intheenergysectoraspartoftheCPECannouncedwithmuchfanfareinApril2015)shallremainapoliticalstatement.’25

An interesting sidelight of the energy situation is the fact that till around 1990, industrial powerconsumptionexceededdomesticpowerconsumption;thenceforth,thesituationhasreversed.Forthelasttwo-and-a-half decades, domestic power consumption has been rising faster than industrial powerconsumption.Thisreflectsthebasicfeatureoftheeconomy–consumptionratherthanproduction.26

ThedeficitasapercentageofGDPdoubledfromanaverageof3.6percentduring1992–2002to7.6percentduring2003–10.Thishasoccurredonaccountofthegrowingimportintensityoftheeconomyascanbeseenfromthefact that importswere,onaverage,27percenthigher thanexportsduring1992–2002and 65 per cent higher during 2003–10.27 Trade apart, there is also an ever-widening gap betweenresourcesandspendingatthefederallevel.AccordingtovariousreportsoftheMinistryofFinanceandtheFederalBoardofRevenue(FBR),taxcollectionforfiscalyear2005–06wasRs704billion,whereasthetotalcurrentexpenditurestoodatRs826billion.ThedifferencebetweenthetwowasRs122billion(roughly 17 per cent). In fiscal year 2014–15 tax collection was Rs 2.3 trillion against total currentexpenditureofRs4.5trillion,almostdouble.Thus,thegapbetweenfederalspendingandrevenuesrosebetweenfiscal2005andfiscal2014fromRs122billiontoRs2.2trillion.28

Onereasonforsuchfinancialchaosisthelackofgovernancedemonstratedbyfrequent‘loanwaivers’.

For example, an estimatedRs 20 billion in loanswerewaived off bymore than thirty banks between2012 and 2014 to facilitate about 2,000 privileged customers among the previous and incumbentgovernments, causing amassive loss to the public exchequer.This cameon topofRs403billion thatwerewrittenoffbyvariousgovernmentsbetween1997and2009.29ThePML-NgovernmentofNawazShairfhas,however,brokenallrecordsinloanwaivers.FinanceMinisterIshaqDarinawrittenreplytotheSenaterevealedthatthepresentPML-NgovernmenthadwrittenoffoverRs280billioninbankloansoverathree-yearperiod.Ofthis,Rs270billionwaswaivedoffin2015,Rs4.4billionin2014andRs6billionin2013.30Withsuchirresponsibility,itislittlewonderthattheeconomyisinsuchdirestraits.Tohidethediresituation,everygovernmenthasresortedto‘datamanipulation’.However,according

toaformerfinanceminister,‘fiscaldatamanipulationhasbeentakentoanew“art”formbythecurrentPML-Ngovernmentwhichhasengagedin“accountingengineering”muchmoreaggressivelyinpreparingandpresentingthebudgetarystatisticstomakethemlookbetteronpaper’.Forexample,thebudgetdeficitforFY13–thelastyearofthePPP-ledgovernment–wasinflatedto8.2percentofGDPbyincludingthepayments of circular debt.However, in FY14, the same circular debtwas kept out of the budget, andtogetherwithsomeothermanipulations,thebudgetdeficitwasprojectedtohavedeclinedto5.5percentof GDP. In FY15 the deficit is much worse but has been again been manipulated to meet IMFbenchmarks.31

ThishasbeenconfirmedbytheStateBankofPakistan,whichrevealedinitsannualreportissuedinDecember2014that thegovernmenthadartificiallymanagedtobringdownthefiscaldeficit to5.5percentas itdidnotpay theamountdue inFY14.32Thebanknoted that thegovernmentdidnot settle thecirculardebtofaboutRs235billioninFY14.Ittreatedaone-offgrantofRs157billionasastatisticaldiscrepancy which reduced the overall deficit by the same amount. ‘In effect, just these two factorsaccountfora1.5percentagepointreductioninthefiscaldeficit.IfweaddtothistherecoveryofRs56billionfrompublicsectorenterprises(asmark-uponloansextendedearlier)followingthesettlementofcirculardebtinJuly2013,andtheone-offutilizationofRs67.7billionfromtheUniversalServiceFund(USF),thefiscalgapincreasesto7.5pc[sic]ofGDP.’33

Giventhegrowingfiscaldeficit, it ishardlysurprisingthatPakistanissinkingdeeperintodebt.Thegalloping burden of debt servicing has created fiscal imbalances.Much of the repayments have beenbaseduponincreasedborrowing,suggestingthatasubstantialproportionofnewloansarenotdeployedfornationaldevelopmentbutusedinsteadtoretireolddebt.AtRs13trillion($124billion),77percentofthebudgethasbeenallocatedforloanrepaymentsin2015–16.34

The Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation (FRDL) Act of 2005 binds the government to keeppublic debt below 60 per cent of the total size of national economy and that the revenues should besufficient to financeat least currentexpenditures.Both theseconditionshavebeen repeatedlyviolated.Thepublic-debt-to-GDPratiobyJune2015wasrecordedat63.5percent,3.5percenthigherthantheFRDLlimit.Neithercouldrevenuesbeincreasednorwerereceiptssufficienttofinanceeventhecurrentexpenditures.TherevenuedeficitstoodatRs471billionor1.7percentofGDPin2014–15.ThetotalpublicdebtwasrecordedatRs18.2trillionattheendofSeptember2015,registeringanincreaseofRs1.8 trillionor11percentoverSeptember2014.35Accordingto theStateBankofPakistan, thefederalgovernmentborrowedanunprecedentedRs2.1trillioninthelastfiscalyearthatcomestoaboutRs5.7billion per day on average.This is the highest-ever amount added to the debt pile of the country in a

singleyearbyanygovernment.Resultantly,thecountry’sdebtincreasedfromRs16.96trillionin2014–15 toRs 19.1 trillion by the end of the 2015–16 fiscal year showing a growth of 12.2 per cent. Theamountisexclusiveofliabilitiesanddebtsobtainedbypublicsectorenterprisesontheirbooks.36

In its latest report, the IMF has projected that by the end of fiscal year 2015–16, Pakistan’s totalexternaldebtwillsurgeto$70.2billion–forthefirsttimeinhistory.Earlier,ithadprojectedexternaldebtatabout$68billion.Ithasalsostatedthatthedebt-to-GDPratiowillremainat63.2percentagainstitsearlierprojectionofalmost1percentdeclineintheratio.37

A recent report by Research and Advocacy for the Advancement of Allied Reforms (Raftaar), onPakistan’staxationandpublicexpenditurehasposedthequestion:‘IsPakistanonthebrinkofafinancialcrisislikeGreece?’Ithascalledthepublicdebtsituationan‘existentialcrisis’forthePakistanistate.Ithighlightsthefactthatthegovernmenthasbeenusingcommercialloans,donorloansandaidtocoverthebudgetdeficitinsteadofcreatingthecorrecttaxcollectionmechanisms.It further notes that Pakistan’s public debt that stood at Rs 6.3 trillion in 2008 had reached Rs 17

trillionin2015–athreefoldincreaseinthelasteightyears.One-thirdofthisdebtisforeignwhiletherest israiseddomestically.Fiveyearsago,thisratiowasalmostequal.Apartfromsqueezingdomesticbanklendingtoprivateenterprises,foreigndebtisatleastfivetimescheaperthandomesticdebtbutishardforPakistantoaccess.Eachyear,PakistanpaysRs1.3trilliontocreditors,with92percentof itgoingtodomesticcreditorsand8percentgoingtointernationallenders.Thismeansthatincaseofadebtrepayment crisis, the Pakistani state is likely to take down the domestic banking industrywith it. Thesituationissodirethatinterestpaymentstakeuparound44percentofthetaxrevenue.38

The size of investment by banks in government securities is more than double the size of SBP’sreserve/liquidityrequirements.Bankshaveinvested57percent ingovernmentsecuritiesagainst the24per cent requirement (Cash Reserve Requirement [CRR] 5 per cent and Statuary Liquid Requirement[SLR] 19 per cent). This is an extremely dangerous proposition given the precarious nature of theeconomy’sfundamentals.39

Ominously, both the PPP and PML-N governments have taken the softer and short-term option ofborrowinginsteadofthehardandlong-termoptionofstructuralreforms.Thenetresulthasbeenthatthesegovernmentshaveborrowed–inaperiodoffiveyearsendinginFY14–morethanthetotalborrowingbyallgovernmentssincePakistan’screation.40

ThenetimpactofPakistan’seconomicdevelopmentoverthedecadeshasbeentheriseintheincidenceofpoverty from18per cent in1988–89 to33per cent at present.41 TheWorldBank’s poverty estimatesyieldapovertyreductionof0.8percentovertheperiod1998-99to2004–05.42

One can conclude, therefore, that there has been no significant poverty reduction during the period1998–99 to 2004–05. For theMusharraf period as a whole (1998–99 to 2007–08), the incidence ofpovertyincreasedfrom30percentto33.8percent,withanadditionalsixteenmillionpeopleenteringthecategoryofpoorovertheperiod.Dataonincidenceofpovertyfrom1998–99to2011–12arepresentedinthetablebelow:

Incidenceofpoverty1998–99to2011–121998–99 40.35million2004–05 45.48million2006–07 48.12million2011–12 79.08million

TheeconomicstrategyoftheMusharrafregimedidachievehighratesofGDPgrowth.However,thepro-richnatureoftheGDPtogetherwithhighfoodinflationratesresultedinincreasedpoverty,inequalityandunemployment.43Duringhisregime,45percentofthepopulationfellintothemiddle-classcategory.Butby2014,ithaddeclinedto35percent.Aboutthreemillionpeoplewerefallingintothepovertytrapeveryyear.44

Onthecurrentsituation, therehavebeenseveralstudiesaboutpoverty levels.Threeareas follows.According toa studyby theSustainableDevelopmentPolicy Institute (SDPI), asmanyas58.7millionpeopleinPakistan(almostone-thirdofthepopulationcalculatedat180million)weremultidimensionallypoor45with46percentofruralpopulationand18percentofurbanhouseholdsfallingbelowthepovertyline. Of these multidimensionally poor, 21 per cent of the households fell in the category of extremepoverty.Theproportionofextremepoorhouseholdswasmuchhigherinruralthanurbanareas;one-thirdof the rural households fell in the category of extreme poor as compared to only 8 per cent of urbanhouseholds.46

Applying a multidimensional poverty index (combination of the levels of education, health andstandardof living), theOxfordDepartmentof InternationalDevelopmentshowed that in2012–13,44.2per cent of the Pakistanis were poor, 23.7 per cent were in severe poverty and 15.1 per cent werevulnerable to poverty.Among the provinces, 70.6 per cent of the population inBalochistanwas poorcomparedto53.2percentinSindh,50.1percentinKPKand36.6percentinPunjab.Intermsofincomecriterion,50.7percentofthepopulationwasbelowthe$2adaybenchmarkand12.7percentbelowthe$1.25adaybenchmark.47

AccordingtotheEconomicSurveyofPakistan2015–16,anewpovertylinehasbeenestimatedusingCostofBasicNeeds(CBN)approach(insteadoftheFoodEnergyIntake[FEI]model,inusesince2001)by takingpatternsofconsumptionof referencegroup.Thiscomes toRs3,030peradultequivalentpermonthusingthelatestavailableHouseholdIntegratedEconomicSurvey(HIES)2013–14data.AccordingtoCBNmethodology,29.5percentof thepopulation(about60million) isestimated to livebelowthepovertylineduringFY2014.However,thereareseveredisparitieswithpovertyinurbanareasbeing9.3percentascomparedto54.6percent inruralareas.Disparitiesalsoexistacrosstheprovinces.UsingPakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) data, the headcount of multidimensionalpovertyinFY2015was38.8percent,withanintensityofdeprivationof51.0percent.48

Toconclude,areviewofPakistan’seconomicdevelopmentindicatesfundamentalstructuralproblemsonthe one hand and poor governance on the other. Pakistan’s economic growth has not translated intoappropriate improvements in human and social indicators that, in turn, has acted as a drag on futureeconomicgrowth.Whileeconomicindicatorssituatethecountryamonglower-middle-incomeeconomies,

thesocialindicatorsarecomparabletothoseofleastdevelopedcountries.Pakistanhasbeenavoidinganeconomiccollapsenarrowlynotbecauseofanystructuralchangesor

policy initiatives of its own but because the international situation has allowed it to monetize itsgeographicalposition.Thriceinthelastseventyyears,PakistanhasbeenbailedoutbytheUSjustasitwasgoingoverthebrink,allthreetimeswhenthearmywasruling.Andallthreetimes,therulershavenot used the opportunity provided by foreign bailouts tomake the necessary structural changes to putPakistanonthepathofsustainablegrowth.Theremayormaynotbeafourthbailoutbutthecrucialquestioniswhethertheleaders,civilianand

military, have begun to recognize how deep-rooted the problem is and how the already yawning gapbetween Pakistan and the rest of the world, including its neighbours is widening? Leveraging itsgeographicalpositionandloansfrommultilaterallendingagenciesagainmayhelpPakistantoweatheritscurrentpressingeconomicdifficulties,butonlyamajorstructuralchangeandimprovementinthesavingsandinvestmentclimatecanbringaboutlong-termgrowth.ThreefactorswillhinderPakistan’seconomicgrowth,irrespectiveofpoliciesadoptedinthenearto

medium term: demographic trends, water scarcity and tackling the education emergency. Theconsequences of their neglect over the decades cannot be rectified in the immediate ormedium term.However,thepresenceorabsenceofanothersetoffactorswilldeterminehowdeepPakistanwillsink,orwhetheritwillbeabletokeepitsheadabovewater:continuedforeignbailoutssolongasPakistan’sstrategic importance remains intact, reduction or increase in the defence budgets, and immediate andurgentinvestmentintheeducationsectorandthemanagementofwaterresources.Ultimately,thequestionboilsdowntowhetherornotthePakistanleadership,especiallythemilitary,

continuestoseePakistan’ssecuritypurelyinmilitaryterms.Ifitdoes,Pakistanwillsinkdeeperintotheabyss.Evenifitchangesitsmindsetandseessecurityinbroaderterms,itwilltakeaHerculeanefforttopullPakistanfromthebrinkoftheabyss,butatleastPakistanwillhaveachance.Answersto thequestionsposedbyBurkiat thebeginningof thischapterarequiteobvious.Pakistan

has been as unable to demonstrate the political resources, social maturity, institutional capability oreconomicexpertiseinthefirstfiftyyearsofitsexistenceasithasbeenunabletodosothereafter.Therearenovisiblesigns that ithas thecapacityorcapabilityoreventhe inclinationtodosoin thenearormediumtermeither.Theshapeoftheeconomytogetherwithissueslikewater,educationandpopulationwillensurethatPakistancontinuestohurtletowardstheabyss.

13

Population:ReapingtheDividend

Demographicchangeshapespoliticalpowerlikewatershapesrock.Upclosetheforcelookstrivial,butviewedfromadistanceofdecadesorcenturiesitmovesmountains.1

DEMOGRAPHICTRENDS, especially age structures, areoneof thekey componentsof any country’sfuture.Suchtrendshavealonggestationperiodjustastheirimpactisalsolong-term.Ifsuchtrendsareanticipatedandplannedfor, richeconomicdividendscanbereapedasdemonstratedbytheEastAsianeconomies.Ifthenecessarymeasuresarenottakenearly,theconsequenceswillmanifestthemselvesafterdecadesbywhichtimeitmaybetoolatetorectifythesituation.ExpertsbelievethatPakistanisgoingthroughademographictransitionandisexperiencinga‘once-in-

a-lifetime’windowofopportunityofa‘demographicdividend’astheworking-agepopulationbulgesandthedependencyratiodeclines.Thecruxofademographictransitionisthenatureoftheagestructureofacountry’spopulationbasedontherealitythatwhiletheyoungandtheoldtendtoconsumemorethantheyproduce,theworking-agepopulationtendstoproducemorethanitconsumes.Thus,countriesthathavealargerproportionofworking-agepopulation relative to theyoungandelderlydependents is said tobeundergoingademographictransitionthatcreatestheconditionforademographicdividend.However,ademographicdividendisatime-specificwindowofopportunity,anddoesnotlastindefinitely.Overtime,theagestructurechangesagain,asthelargeadultpopulationstartsageingandbecomeslessproductive.2

Thus, the demographic dividend only creates the conditions for an economic spurt that has to beharnessed.Ifharnessed,itcouldleadtopotentiallygreatereconomicactivity.Ifitisnotcapitalizedupon,itcouldleadtomassiveunemploymentanditsattendantconsequences.Howdoesademographictransitioncomeabout?Itcomesaboutbythedeclineinmortalityfollowed

bythedecline infertility,andit is thedifferencebetweenthe twothatdefines thenatural increase inapopulation.Pakistan’scrudedeath ratedeclinedprogressively from twenty-fourdeathsper thousand in1950toeightdeathsperthousandin2006,6.80deathsperthousandin2015(EconomicSurvey2014–15)and 6.70 deaths in 2015–16 (Economic Survey 2015–16). Crude birth rate improved from 26.1 perthousand in 2014–15 to 25.6 per thousand in 2015–16. This, coupledwith falling fertility rates,3 hasmeantthatPakistanispresentlyundergoinga‘demographictransition’.

ThepopulationofPakistanwas32.5millionin1951,atwhichtimeitwasthefourteenthmostpopulouscountryin theworld.Itspopulationhassinceincreasedapproximately5.5 times,reachinganestimated191.71millionin2013-14accordingtotheEconomicSurvey2014–15andanestimated195.4millionin

2015–16asper theEconomicSurvey2015–16.Pakistan isnowthesixthmostpopulouscountry in theworld.Thepopulationfiguresforthecensusescarriedoutduring1951,1961,1972,1981and1998showthatthepopulationgrewatanaveragerateof2.42percentperyearfrom1951to1961,3.69percentperyearfrom1961to1972,at2.86percentperyearduring1972–81andat2.69percentperyearfrom1981to1998.Thegrowthrateofthepopulationwasestimatedtobe1.92in2015and1.89in2016aspertheEconomicSurvey2015–16.TheproblemofarticulatingthedemographicchallengesinPakistanbeginswiththefactthatnocensus

hasbeenheldsince1998(whichitselfshouldhavebeenheldin1991).Thishasbeenlargelyduetolackof trust between provinces and within provinces about its fairness.4 In March 2015, the Council ofCommonInterests(CCI)decidedtoholdthelong-delayedcensusinMarch2016.However,withinafewmonths,thegovernmentseemedtobehavingsecondthoughts.Foronething,nofundswerereleasedtothePakistanBureauofStatistics(PBS),theofficialbodytaskedwithcarryingouttheexercise.AmeetingoftheCCIinMarch2016(heldafterayear)againpostponedthecensusforanindefiniteperiodongroundsofsecurity.5

Sincethecensus isalreadyeightyears lateandwith the lastcensushavingbeenheldeighteenyearsago, the inability to hold the crucial exercise calls into question the competence of this and previousgovernmentstocarryoutroutinefunctionsofgovernance.Theimportanceofthecensusinpolicymakingcan hardly be overstated. Simply put, without knowing howmany people there are and what is theirdistribution,nogovernmentcanplanandframepoliciesthatwouldcatertotheirneeds.Fromconstituencydelineation that would factor in urban migration lessening the hold of the rural constituencies to theNational Finance Commission Award, from ethnicity-based quotas to development schemes, all aredependentoncensusdata.Asa result, figuresofpopulationare,atbest,estimatesandprojectionsandtherearehugevariationsbetweendifferentestimates.These projections, however, vary greatly due to assumptions about fertility levels and have been

termedas‘High’,‘Median’and‘Low’variants.Theextentofthevariationcanbeseenfromonesetoffiguresaccordingtowhich,basedonthe1998numbers,thepopulationin2050mayreachashighas395million ifcurrent fertility levels remainconstant,andas lowas266million if fertilitydecline ismorerapidduetostrengtheningofPakistan’sfamilyplanningprogramme.Ontheotherhand,iffamilyplanningefforts areweak, fertility could be half a birth higher and the population of Pakistan could reach 342millionin2050.Thus,thedifferencebetweenaweakandastrongfamilyplanningprogrammescenarioisapproximately76millionpeopleby2050,and129millionbetweenastrongprogrammeandtheabsencethereof.6AccordingtotheUnitedNations’‘medianvariant’,Pakistan’spopulationwillreach335millionbytheyear2050.7

Suchhugevariationsmakeanykindofplanninganddevelopmentunrealistic.Theconsensus,however,isthatthepopulation,eventhoughdownfromthe3percentgrowthofthe1980s,isgrowingveryfastatalmost 2 per cent, which will give Pakistan the dubious distinction of being the fastest-growingpopulationinSouthAsiaforsometimetocome.Theagestructureofthepopulationhasbeencalculatedasshowninthefollowingtable:8

9

*Theseareprojectedfigures.

An important impact of a growing population is urbanization. According to the Economic Survey2014–15,

Pakistan is one of the fastest urbanizing countries in South Asia and the share of urbanpopulation is increasing significantly.Thepopulation in rural areasdecreased from61.4percentin2014to60.8percentin2015andto60.1percentin2016whereasthepopulationinurbanareasincreasedfrom38.5percentin2014to39.2percentin2015and40percentin2016.

Others10haveestimated thatby the2020salmost50percentof thePakistanipopulation–113millionpeople–willresideincities.PakistanVision2025concurswith thisviewstating that ifcurrent trendsofrural tourbanmigration

continue,theshareofurbanizationwillexceed50percentin2025.ThePakistanVision2025,however,warnsthatinthecaseofPakistan,thistrend(ofurbanization)hasadditionalcomplexity.‘Theinabilityofthe cities to absorb, comfortably accommodate, and meaningfully employ rural-to-urban migrantsexacerbates social/ethnic tensions between “native” and “migrant” populations.’11 The challenge forPakistanwillbetoaddresstheexistingproblemsofthelargeurbancenterswhileplanningaheadforthecontinuedmigrationtowardscities.

HowdoesthedemographicdividendworkinPakistan?Pakistan’smedianagein2006wastwentyyears.By 2050, it is projected to be thirty-three years. Pakistan’s working-age population of 15–64 yearsreached 52 per cent in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 59 per cent in 2006 and is estimated by theEconomicSurvey2015–16tobe60.4percentofthepopulation,creatingthepossibilityofademographicdividend.Thiscurrentshareof60percentoftheworking-agepopulationisexpectedtopeakat68percentaround2045bywhenitwillstartdecliningagainasthepopulationbeginstoageandmovesoutoftheworking–agegroup.By2050,thecurrent4percentshareoftheold-agepopulationwouldincreasetoalmost 10 per cent. Thus, the once–in–a–lifetimewindow for Pakistan for a demographic dividend isroughlybetween1990and2045.Ofthesefifty-fiveyears,twenty-fiveyearshavealreadypassed.12

Inordertoactualizethedemographicdividend,thebasicquestiontobeaskediswhetherthoseenteringthe labourmarketcanbeabsorbedproductivelyagainst thebackdropofan increasinglyglobalizedandtechnologicallyadvancedworld.Pakistanhasthetenthlargestlabourforceintheworld.AccordingtotheLabourForceSurvey2013–

14,thetotallabourforceinthecountrywas60.09million,increasingto61.04millionin2014–15.(Thislowfigurecompared to the totalpopulation isdue to lowfemaleemployment rates).According tooneestimate,by2030, thereare likely tobe175millionpotentialworkersofwhichninetymillionwillbemalesandeighty-fivemillion females.This is likely to increase to221million individuals inworkingagesby2050.Giventhelowfemaleemploymentrates,conservativeestimatesareatotalofroughly105millioninthelabourforceby2030,increasingto140millionby2050.13Accordingtoanotherprojection,theworking-agepopulationwillrisefromeighty-fivemillionin2010to178millionin2050.14

Thenumberofemployedincreasedfrom56.01millionin2012–13to56.52millionin2013–14andto57.42millionin2014–15.Thechangestemmedmorefromurban(0.57million)thanruralareas(–0.06million).IncreaseswereregisteredinthecaseofPunjab(1.02million)andBalochistan(0.26million),whileadecreasewasobservedinKPK(0.23million),andSindh(0.56million).Outofthetotallabourforceof60.09million,3.58millionpeoplewereunemployed.15Unemploymentratedecreasedfrom6.0percentin2013–14to5.9percentin2014–15.However,undertheoverallemploymentfigurestherearesignificantvariations.InthecaseofPunjab,

theLabourForceSurvey2014–15revealedthattheunemploymentratewas6.3percent,i.e.,abovethenational average of 5.9 per cent. Despite various schemes like concessional and interest-free loans,laptopschemesandyouthmelas,thehighestratesofunemploymentwereamongtheyouth.Theagegroupof15–19years suffereddouble-digit unemployment rate of 12.4per cent, followed closelyby the agegroupof20–24yearswithanunemploymentrateof11.02percent.ThecorrespondingfiguresforSindhwere5.48percentand8.66percent,respectively.16

Punjab’s‘EconomicGrowthStrategy2014–18’targetscreatingonemillionqualityjobsannuallyandtrainingtwomillionskilledgraduates.However,thehighunemploymentratessuggestahugegapbetweenwhat isbeingprofessedandwhat isactuallyhappening.AccordingtoAyeshaGhaus-Pasha, thefinanceministerofPunjab,toabsorbtheoveronemillionworkersenteringthelabourmarketyearlyinPunjab,ithastogrowat7–8percent.However,accordingtoher,eventhoughtheprovincewasgrowingatahigherpacethanPakistanasawhole,therequiredgrowthratehasnotbeenachievedyet.Sheadded,‘Creatingonemillionjobsisessentialtoeliminateextremismandterrorism’.17

TheInstituteforPolicyReform(IPR),quotingthegovernment’sLabourForceSurvey2014–15,saysthatunemploymentrateinPakistanunderthepresentgovernmentisthehighestinthelastthirteenyears.Ominously,itaddedthatoveronemillionmalesagedbetweenfifteenandtwenty-nineyearswereneitherundergoing education nor searching for a job and thus were perhaps more vulnerable to crime andmilitancy.Itadded,‘Anextremelyworryingfeatureofthecurrentunemploymentsituationisthattherateamong literate workers is more than twice that among illiterate workers. In fact, the highest rate ofunemployment,threetimesabovethenationalaverage,isobservedinthecaseofhighlyeducatedworkerswitheitherdegreeorpostgraduatequalifications.’18

The Planning Commission has mentioned growing unemployment as the topmost challenge for thegovernment.Itschiefeconomist,NadeemJavaid,whilebriefingthecabinet,saidthatattheexistingrateofgrowth,thecountrycouldnotabsorbbulkoftheyouthandthatunemploymentmightincreaseto7.93per cent by June 2018 when the current government’s term would end. There would be 5.4 millionunemployedyouthbythen.19

Forgeneratingmassiveemployment,therehastobesustainedhigheconomicgrowth.Accordingtothe

PlanningCommission’s (2011)Framework forEconomicGrowth inPakistanbetween1972 and2010,Pakistan’seconomygrewatanaverageannualrateof4.9percent,butthatthisgrowthwassporadicandshowedadecliningtrend.20AGDPgrowthof5percenthasbeengeneratingemploymentforlessthanonemillionpersonsperyear.Basedonpopulationprojections,3.1millionpersonsareexpectedtoenterthelabourforceeveryyearoverthenextfourdecades.ThuswhatPakistanneedsisasustainedGDPgrowthofover7percenttogenerateemploymenttoabsorbthesenumbers.Itwouldhavetogrowevenfasterifthecurrentunemploymentrateof6percentistobereduced.21Inlate2010,Nadeem-ul-Haque,thedeputychairman of Pakistan’s PlanningCommission, had stated thatGDP growth stood at 2.5 per centwhilePakistanwouldhavetogrowat9percenttoemployPakistan’s80–90millionpeopleundertheageoftwenty.22However, theGDPgrowthduring2012–13and2013–14hasbeen4.03percentand4.24percent respectively as per the Economic Survey 2014–15 and 4.7 per cent as per the Economic Survey2015–16.As noted in Chapter 12, given its structural problems there are few signs of optimism in the key

economicindicators.Infact,pooreconomicperformancehasledtoadeclineinemploymentandalsointheratioofemploymenttotheworking-agepopulationfrom56percentin1973to48percentin2002.Theshareofindustryinemploymenthasremainedflat(ataround20percent)post-1980,implyingthatthehigher-productivitysectoroftheeconomyhasnotgeneratedsufficientnumberofnewjobstoraiseoverallemployment.Theshareofmanufacturinghasalsostagnatedataround12percent.23

ThisisborneoutbytheEconomicSurvey2014–15accordingtowhich,barringthetransportandtradesectors,theshareofemploymentinallotherimportantsectorsshowedadecliningtrend.Forexample,theshareofemploymentintheagriculturesectordecreasedto43.5percentin2013–14ascomparedto43.7percentin2012–13;theshareofemploymentinminingandmanufacturingdeclinedto14.16percentascomparedto14.20percentin2012–13;theshareofemploymentinconstructiondeclinedin2013–14to7.33percentascompared to7.44percent in2012–13; theshareofemployment inelectricityandgasdistribution declined to 0.48 per cent in 2013–14 as compared to 0.53 per cent in 2012–13.Only thetransportandtradesectorssawincreasesto5.4percentand14.58percentrespectivelyin2013–14ascomparedto4.98percentand14.39percentin2012–13.Withthefemalehalfofthepopulationnotabletofullyparticipateinthelabourmarketduetoavariety

of reasons, it isdebatablewhether theage structure itself canbecalledawindowofopportunity.Notsurprisingly,Pakistan ranks123rd in theworldon theGenderDevelopment Index, even lower than itsHuman Development Index ranking, indicating that access to opportunities, resources and benefitsbetweenmenandwomenareskewed.AccordingtotheEconomicSurvey2015–16,femalelabourforceparticipationrateincreasedfrom15.6percentin2012–13to15.8percentin2014–15andremainedat15.8in2015–16.Significantly,theSurveynotedthatfemaleparticipationintheruralareaswas19.3percentin2012–13,20percentin2013–14and20.2percentin2014–15,showingonlymarginalincreases.However, intheurbanareasthefiguresfor thesameyearswere8.2,7.7and7.5percentrespectively.The declining trendof female participation in the urban areas should be aworrying factor. It is fairlyclearthatadvantagesofademographicdividendcannotbesecuredwithoutwholesomeparticipationofhalfofthepopulation.The second issue is of education and an educated workforce. A major factor inhibiting Pakistan’s

economicprospectsisthelowlevelofeducationandtechnicalskillsoftheworkforce.Asnotedearlier,

Pakistan’seducationsystemisbothquantitativelyandqualitativelypoor.AccordingtocalculationsmadebyRashidAmjad,thefollowingisthedistributionoflabourforcebylevelofeducation.24

With one-third of the youth labour force being illiterate and the rest possessing very low levels oftechnical education in2010–11, not surprisingly,Pakistan, it hasbeen argued, is stuck in a ‘low-levelskills equilibrium trap’which severely restricts itsmove into higher value-added sectors essential forraising productivity and increasing economic growth.25 This is the snowballing effect of insufficientinvestmentintheeducationsectoroverthedecades,whichhasmanifesteditselfatatimewhentheneedfor an educated work force is the most in order to reap the demographic dividend. Moreover, theseconsequences will last for years if not decades to come, even if Pakistan were to launch a crashinvestmentprogrammetoday.Inaddition,women’seducationiswoefullyneglected.Thishashadadoublewhammy–notonlyare

morewomen uneducated even if theywere allowed to participate in theworkforce but, as shown theworldover,women’sfertilityislowerwithhigherlevelsofeducationalattainment.ThemassiveincreaseinPakistan’spopulationisinalargemeasureduetonotfocusingonwomen’seducation.Thedecliningtrendinwomen’seducationnotedearlier,isalsoaworryingfactor.Theonepositive featureof theotherwisegloomydemographic scenario is theoutwardmigrationof

Pakistani labour. Presently, Pakistan has a huge and diverse diaspora sprinkled all over the world.Pakistan is one of the largest labour-exporting countries in the region and huge remittances from theoverseasworkforceisonemajorsourceofincomenotonlyfortheirfamiliesbutalsoforthedevelopmentofPakistan.During the period, 1971–2015, around 8.77 million Pakistanis proceeded abroad for employment

throughtheBureauofEmigration.ThemainconcentrationofoverseasPakistaniswasintheMiddleEast(49percent),Europe(28.2percent)andtheUnitedStatesofAmerica(16percent).Manpowerexportcontinuestoshowanupwardtrendfrom0.622millionin2013to0.752millionin2014and0.946millionin2015.However,aroundhalfofthemigrantworkersareilliterateandunskilledworkersandonly1.76per cent workers are doing white-collar jobs. Among the skilled workers, drivers are in the highestnumber,followedbymasons,carpentersandtailors.26

Remittances sent by workers are the second largest source of foreign exchange, after exports, andfinance 45 per cent of the country’s import bill. These amounted to $18.4 billion in 2014–15, whichtranslatedintoayear-on-yearincreaseof16.5percent.BetweenJuly2015andJanuary2016remittancesamountedto$11.2billionwhichtranslatesintoayear-on-yearincreaseof5.98percent,accordingtotheStateBankofPakistan(SBP).27

Themanpowerexport fromPunjab ishigherascompared tootherprovinces.During2015,478,646workers from Punjab went abroad for employment, followed by 220,993 from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa(KPK),116,935fromSindhand7,686fromBalochistan.

However, a growing concern is that the fall in global oil prices could slow down infrastructurespending in theGulf countries. If that happens, it could lead to a chain reaction of triggeringmassivelayoffsofPakistaniworkersthere.This,inturn,wouldimpactremittanceswithadverseconsequencesforPakistan’sfragileeconomy.28

Whathappens if thedemographicdividend isnot realized?Theflipsideofanunrealizeddemographicdividend is that themassive ‘youth bulge’ could pose a serious threat to law and order including, inPakistan’scase,thethreatofterrorism.Asnotedinanearlierchapter,thefailureofthegovernmentschoolsystem to absorbnewentrants has led to greater popularity of themadrasas.According to the interiorministerofPakistan,about10percentofthemadrasasareinvolvedinterrorism-relatedactivities,whiletheothersgive anarrow, sectarianvision to its students (seeChapter8 onmadrasas). The danger forPakistan, then, is that without sustained economic growth and without investment in education thedemographicdividendwoulddegenerateintoa‘demographichorde’withallitsattendantconsequencesoffrustration,alienationandviolence.Theotherproblemwithanunrealizeddemographicdividendisthatanunproductivepopulationwould

pose huge pressures on resources like food,water and energy.A country thatwas near to being self-sufficientinfoodintheearly1980shasafoodsecurityissuetodaylargelyduetoincreasedpopulation.Asnotedearlier,agricultureaccountsforabout20percentofPakistan’sGDPandemploys60percentofits labourwhile 70 per cent of export revenue stems from agriculture.Adecline inwater availabilitywould impacton foodproductionata timewhen thepopulation is increasing,creatingmultiplecrises.Andtheavailabilityofwaterisdecliningandisbelowthe1,000m3/yearpercapitabenchmark.One sign of an unrealized demographic dividend is already visible. According to the ‘National

Nutrition Survey, approximately 60 per cent of the country’s population is facing food insecurity andnearly50percentofthewomenandchildrenaremalnourished.Itwarned:‘ThegrowingpopulationinPakistan poses a significant threat to food security, Pakistan’s development and social indicators andstability.’29 The Planning Commission of Pakistan and the World Food Programme in a report titled‘MinimumcostofdietinPakistan’,putthefigureoflackofaccesstoproper,recommendednutritionat67.6percentofthehouseholdsacrossthecountry.ThiswasparticularlyprevalentintheruralareasofBalochistan,whereasmanyas83.4percenthouseholdswereunabletopayforanadequatenourishment,closelyfollowedbythatinSindh(70.8percent),KhyberPakhtunkhwa(67.4percent)andPunjab(65.6percent).30

Apart from these statistics, the trend showed amarkeddeterioration.Thus, according to the survey,43.7 per cent children under age five had stunted growth in 2011 compared to 41.6 per cent in 2001.Similarly,15.1percentchildrenwereinthewastingcategory(lowweightforheight)in2011comparedto14.3percent in2001.Furthermore,anestimated35percentofchilddeaths (underage five) in thecountrywerelinkedtomalnutrition,whiletheWorldHealthOrganizationlabelsanationalaverageof15percentoraboveasan‘emergency’.31

Amorewidespreadriskofnotoperationalizingthedemographicdividendistheradicalizationofyouth–thethreatofmillionsofyoung,impoverishedandunemployedPakistanissuccumbingtoextremism.AsthePakistanVision2025putsit,‘AlargesetofPakistaniyouthisdissatisfied,frustratedandinastateof

disarray due to low education levels and large-scale unemployment. This has led to serious socialproblems including drug abuse, crime, mental disorder, terrorism and religious fanaticism.’32 MoeedYusuf identifies ‘supply-side’ and ‘pull’ factors that could impel young Pakistanis towards extremism.Thesupply-sidefactorsarethethreeindependentstreamsofeducationnotedinthechapteroneducationwherealumnifromthethreestreamsare isolatedfromeachotherbutare taughtanIslam-and-Pakistan-under-siege mentality. The second is the growing socio-economic inequalities that figures in militantrhetoric.33Burki, for example, estimates that the richest18,000 inPakistanhaveanaverage incomeofUS$72,700percapitacomparedtotheoverallpercapitaincomeofUS$1,050.34

Thepullfactoris thegreatdemandforextremistsbasedonthe‘state’sself-definedstrategicneedtouse extremism as a tool of foreign policy’, whether in Afghanistan or in Kashmir. Such penetration,irreversibleintheshortrunaccordingtoYusuf,hasallowedPakistaniterroristgroupstorecruitontheirown,evenastheychallengedthePakistanistateforfollowingtheUSagendainAfghanistan.Yusuf,however,insiststhatthepointofnoreturnhasnotbeencrossedsincetheyoungmilitantsonly

accountforasmallpercentageofthetotalpopulationbutconcedesthateveryterroristattackinPakistanafter9/11havebeenbythoseundertheageofthirty.Quiteclearly,massivechangesinthemindsetofthePakistanileadership,especiallythearmy,areessentialtoreversethetrendtowardsyouthradicalization.Finally, it is worth noting that after the period of demographic dividend, there would be rapid

population ageing.Given the anticipated rapid fertility decline in the future, the size of the populationagedoversixty-fivewillrisefrom7.5millionin2010tothirtymillionin2050,representing10percentofthecountry’spopulationatthelatteryear.WhileintheSouthAsiancontext,olderparentsarelookedafterby thegrown-upchildren,yeta rapidlyageingpopulationwillposesocietalchallenges includingthoseofhealthandcare for theelderly.Pakistan thencouldbecaughtbetweena largeuneducatedandunskilledyoungpopulationandasignificantolderpopulation,whichwouldplaceanextraordinaryburdenonPakistan’seconomy.Durr-e-Nayab warns: ‘Aging of population is the inevitable end of demographic transition, and

Pakistan,albeitslowly,ismovingtowardsit.Intheabsenceofanystateplannedoldagesecuritysystemandtheexisting lowsavingrates in thecountry, thedemographicdividendcan turn intoademographicnightmareformajorityoftheelderly.’35

Toconclude,Pakistanstandsatapivotalmomentinitshistory.Twenty-fiveyearsoftheonce-in-a-lifetimedemographic-dividendwindowofopportunityhavealreadypassedPakistanbywithoutanyvisiblesignsofaneconomicupsurge.Asofnow,theredoesnotappeartobeanyurgencyonthepartofthePakistanileadership,civilianormilitary, tomake thenecessary investmentsforavastly improvedhumancapitaland to boost economic growth and development to productively employ its youthful population. Nothinking seems to have gone into understanding the needs of a changing age structure. The lack ofinvestmentintheeducationsectorfordecadesisshowingresultstodayintermsofthequantityandqualityofeducation,literacyratesand,especially,thepoorstatisticsforfemaleeducation.ThelatterisperhapsoneofthemostimportantfactorsthathashamperedPakistan’sdevelopment.ThepoliciesthatPakistanadoptsordoesnotadopttoday,theinvestmentthatitmakesordoesnotmake

todaywilldeterminethekindofcountrythatPakistanwillbeinthenextthreedecades.Withsuchahugefocus and investment on defence and other priorities, tackling the demographic challenge is indeed

difficult, especially because results are barely visible during the relatively short attention span of apoliticianorageneral.Notsurprisingly,expertshavelamentedthatthereisnosustainedattentiononthedemographicsofPakistan.36

Time clearly is not onPakistan’s side.The demographic transitionPakistan is undergoing can haveexplosivesocialandpoliticalconsequencesduetopastfailuretomaketimelyinvestmentsineducation,healthandadevelopmentaleconomy.Inabilitytogeneratetherequirednumberofjobsthroughsustained,highGDP growth, will result in the streets being crowdedwith youngmen andwomen seeking jobs,justice, education, and medical care for themselves and their families, leaving them vulnerable. Thiscouldposeaseriousthreattothecountry’sstability.37

Inthiscontext,Pakistanwoulddowelltoheedthewarning:‘If,in10or20years,Pakistanstillhasalargenumberofunemployedorunderemployedpeople, including tensofmillionsofyoungpeople, thecountrymayfacecrises thatdwarf those ithasexperiencedtodate.’38TheCentre for InternationalandStrategicStudieshasanevenmoredirewarning:‘ManynationsinNorthAfrica,theMiddleEast,Southand East Asia, and the former Soviet bloc – including China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan – are nowexperiencingarapidorextremedemographictransitionthatcouldpushthemtowardcivilcollapse,or(inreaction)toward“neo-authoritarianism”.’39

Therearenoshortcutshere.Pakistanwillhavetomakeheavyinvestmentsnotmerelytorealizethedemographic dividend but to ensure that the demographic dividend does not become a demographicnightmare; that Pakistan’s population structure, instead of becoming a ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ opportunity,doesturnintoa‘tickingtimebomb’,40hasteningthecountry’sslidetowardstheabyss.

T

VI

WindowstotheWorld

HESIXTHsectionlooksatPakistan’srelationswiththefourcountriesthathaveplayedavitalroleinshapingitsdestiny–India,Afghanistan,ChinaandtheUS.*Ofthese,ithasbeenIndiathathasplayed

thecentralrolearoundwhichPakistanhasfashioneditsresponsestotheworld.Jinnah’squestforparitybetweenHindus andMuslims in the run-up toPartitionwas transformed into the quest for paritywithIndia. All of Pakistan’s actions, especially seeking ‘borrowed power’ to counterbalance the superiorstrengthofIndia,canbeseenwithreferencetothissingle-mindedpursuitofparity.PakistanhascometotreatAfghanistanasitsbackyard,seeking‘strategicdepth’anddeterminednotto

allowanygovernmenttoestablishitselfinKabulthatisnotbeholdentoit.Thisservesthetwinobjectiveof limiting Indian influence in Afghanistan and ensuring that no government in Kabul would be in apositiontochallengethevalidityoftheDurandLine.PakistanandChinashareamutualityofinterestsvis-à-visIndia.ForChina,bolsteringupPakistanisa

low-costoptiontokeepIndiaboggeddowninSouthAsiaandforPakistan,Chinaprovidesthemilitaryhardware,includingnuclearweaponsthatallowsittoseekmilitaryparitywithIndia.Thenewcomponentintherelationshipisthemuch-toutedChina–PakistanEconomicCorridor.Willitwork?The US has taken over the role played by Britain in Pakistan’s creation by sustaining it over the

decades.PakistanhasleverageditsgeographicalpositiontobecomeanallyoftheUSthriceinthelastsevendecades.Intheprocessithasbecomedependentonexternalsupportforitsverysurvival.WillPakistanevergiveupitsquestforparitywithIndia?Will itallowAfghanistantodevelopasa

sovereign country?Will such external support from theUS be forthcoming in the future?Or is it thatPakistan’s shelf life may well be coming to an end, if not already over for the US? Can and, moreimportantly,willChinastepintothevoid?

*TheIslamicworld,especiallySaudiArabia,IranandtheUAEhavealsoplayedanimportantrole.Butforthesakeofbrevity,theyhavebeenleftoutofthediscussion.

14

India:TheQuestforParity

Theessenceof theparadoxofPakistanlies in thisverybasic fact:bornoutofapartitionchosen by itself, it appears to have found in independence neither the peace, nor thesecurity,northefreedomofspiritthatwouldenableiteithertoliveinharmonywithIndia,ortoignoreit.ItseemsimpossibleforPakistantoforgetIndiaandtogetalongwithit.1

—Jean-LucRacine

PAKISTAN’SATTITUDEand policy towards India hinge on one factor above all else: the desire forparity–military,politicalandregionalparity.ItisthisobsessiveandfixatedyetelusivesearchforparitywithIndiathataccountsforthetrajectoryofitsdefence,securityandforeignpolicies.Italsoexplainsthevarious stratagems thatPakistanhas adoptedover thedecades andcontinues to adoptunmindfulof theconsequences for its own survival. The compulsive need for parity harks back to the history of thesubcontinentand to thePakistanmovement itself.Believing itself tobe the inheritorsofamillenniaofIslamic rule over the Indian subcontinent, especially of theMughals, Pakistan feels that its inheritancedemandsthatitbetreatedasatleastequal,ifnotsuperior,toIndia.It was this quest that led to the demand for a separateMuslim homeland in the first place and to

Jinnah’s articulation that Muslims must have parity in representation in legislatures despite being anumericalminority.AshetoldtheMuslimLeaguesessionatLucknowinOctober1937:

Honourablesettlementcanonlybeachievedbetweenequalsandunlessthetwopartieslearntorespect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for settlement. Offers of peace by theweakerpartyalwaysmeansconfessionofweaknessandinvitationtoaggression.Politicsmeanspowerandnotrelyingonlyoncriesofjusticeorfair-playorgoodwill.2

Twoexamplesofhowthiswastranslatedintoactionareveryrevealing.First,intherun-uptotheMay1950 visit of PrimeMinister Liaquat Ali Khan to the US, FinanceMinister GhulamMohammad metGeorgeMcGhee,assistantsecretaryofstateforNearEastern,SouthAsianandAfricanaffairs.DuringthemeetingGhulamMohammadtoldMcGheethattheUShadtoappeartotreatPakistanonparwithIndia:itwas‘ofutmostimportance’.McGheerelatedlaterthatLiaquatwasaccordedareceptionequaltowhatJawaharlalNehrureceived.3Second,in1954thethenprimeministerofPakistan,MohammadAliBogra,reflectedthePakistaniviewwhenhesaidthat thereasonPakistanwasnotabletoresolvetheKashmirconflictfavourablywas‘becauseIndiahasgreatermilitarystrengthandNehruisnotinterestedinafair

settlement.When there ismoreequalityofmilitary strength, then Iamsure that therewillbeagreaterchanceofsettlement.’4

Sixdecadeslater,thetuneofparityhasnotchanged.FollowingUSpresidentObama’svisittoIndiainJanuary2015,thePakistanForeignOfficelamentedthatanIndia–USpartnershipwouldalterSouthAsia’s‘balanceofpower’andcreatea‘regionalimbalance’.ThisargumentwastakenforwardduringtheUS–Pakistantalksonsecurity,strategicstabilityandnon-proliferationinWashingtoninJune2015.Priortothetalks, Pakistan foreign secretary stated that the US nuclear deal with India had affected the strategicstabilitythatexistedinSouthAsiabeforethedeal.5

AsnotedbyHusainHaqqani,

Inreality,thePakistanireaction(toPresidentObama’svisittoIndiainJanuary2015)reflectsthe Pakistani security establishment clinging to the notion of parity with India. For years,PakistanhasignoredchangesintheglobalenvironmentandacceptedtheheavypriceofinternalweaknesstoprojectitselfasIndia’sequal…Foracountrytobaseitsforeignpolicyforover60 years on the same assumptions is unusual. As the world around us changes, so must anation’sforeignpolicy.ButPakistanhasyettoembracepragmatismasthebasisofitsforeignandnationalsecuritypolicies.6

ThelegacyofthePakistanmovementapart,thedesireforparitywasalsobasedontheassumptionthatIndia had not accepted the Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and was out to undo Pakistan. Thisnecessitatedphysicaldefenceofthecountryforprotectionandsurvival.AsPrimeMinisterLiaquatAliKhanwrote to JawaharlalNehruon30December1947: ‘Indiahasneverwholeheartedlyaccepted thepartitionscheme…IndiaisouttodestroythestateofPakistanwhichherleaderspersistentlycontinuetoregardaspartofIndiaitself.’7AyubKhanwastoreiteratesuchsentimentsinhisautobiography:‘India…wantedtobrowbeatusintosubservience.Allwewantedwastoliveasequalandhonourableneighbours,but to that Indiawouldneveragree.’8Suchaviewwas reinforcedby thevivisectionof thecountry in1971.In the initial years, Pakistan may have had cause for concern about Indian intentions given the

statementsmade by some Indian leaders, but despite Indian acceptance of the permanence of Partitionsubsequently,theattitudesofthePakistanileadershipseemtohavefrozenin1947.This,ofcourse,hadtheadvantageofjustifyingcontinuedprivilegesofthosewhohavebenefitedfromsuchaposture.NehruinaspeechatAligarhMuslimUniversityinJanuary1948probablysummedupthesituationbest:‘ItistoIndia’sadvantagethatPakistanshouldbeasecureandprosperousstatewithwhichwecandevelopcloseandfriendlyrelations.Iftoday,byanychance,IwereofferedthereunionofIndiaandPakistan,Iwoulddecline it for obvious reasons. I do notwant to carry the burden of Pakistan’s great problems. I haveenoughofmyown.’9

SubsequentlytooIndianleadershavetriedtoreassurePakistan.InFebruary1999,PrimeMinisterAtalBihariVajpayeeinhisbanquetspeechatLahoredescribedhisvisitasacategoricalaffirmationofIndia’scommitment to the sovereignty, unity and stability of Pakistan. According to India’s former foreignsecretaryandlaternationalsecurityadviserJ.N.Dixit,noIndianleaderhadvisitedtheMinar-e-Pakistan.Vajyapee implied that his visit should remove all doubts as to India not having accepted Partition orwantingtoreabsorbPakistan.10On9June2009,PrimeMinisterManmohanSinghstatedintheLokSabha,

‘IsincerelybelieveitisinourvitalinterestthereforetotryagaintomakepeacewithPakistan…IftheleadersofPakistanhavethecourage,thedeterminationandthestatesmanshiptotakethisroadtopeace,Iwishtoassurethemthatwewillmeetthemmorethanhalfway.’11

In1983aFrenchhistoriannotedthat‘anoverwhelmingmajorityofIndianshaveacceptedPartitionandhavenodesiretoconquerorreabsorbPakistan.ButfewPakistanisarewillingtobelievethis.Theyseemtobelievethatanattitudeofconstantbelligerenceistheonlywaytheycanaffirmtheirseparateexistenceandspecificidentity.’12Theproblem,however, isnotmerelyofPakistannotwanting tobelieveIndianassurancesbutfarmoredeep-rootedthanthat.Asnotedearlier,beinganti-IndiahascometodefinethePakistaniidentity.Thus,‘HinduIndia’hastobeconstantlyportrayedasathreat.Theprojectionof Indiawanting toundoPartition is amplifiedby theprojectionof the larger Indian

militaryestablishment,itscapabilitiesandactions.AsAyubKhanputit:‘Inmattersofdefence,countriesdonotformulatetheirpoliciesonthebasisoftheintentionsofothers;itistheircapabilitywhichmustbetakenintoaccount.IfabigcountrylikeIndiahasthecapabilitytoattackPakistan,theintentioncanalwayschange…’13Manydecadeslateranotherarmychief,Gen.ParvezKayani,echoingAyubstatedinOctober2011: ‘We cannot base our strategies on any good intentions, no matter how noble they may be, asintentionscanchangeovernight.OurstrategyhastobebasedonIndia’scapability.’14ThisargumentthatthearmyhastomatchIndia’scapabilitiesorPakistanwouldbeoverwhelmeddoesnot,deliberatelyorotherwise, factor in India’s defence needs againstChina. India using the same argument of its defenceposturecitingChinesecapabilitiesis,ofcourse,rejectedoutofhand.

ComplicatingmattersforPakistanwasnotmerelytheself-imposedquestforparitywithIndiabutthefactthat since1947 itwasa revanchist state.ForPakistan,Kashmirwasand is the ‘unfinishedagenda’ofPartition. Itwas the ‘K’ in theacronymPakistan.AsBhuttowrote: ‘If aMuslimmajority [region]canremain a part of India, then the raison d’être of Pakistan collapses…Pakistan is incompletewithoutJammuandKashmirbothterritoriallyandideologically.’15

Kashmir acquired greater salience after Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan. Issues of revengeagainst India apart, the creation ofBangladesh effectively buried the two-nation theory and the use ofIslam to weld a national identity. Even though rationalizations were made about Islam not beingeffectivelyusedbyasecularizedelite,thefactwasthatPakistanneededanothercrutchandthatbecamethe Ideology of Pakistan of which Kashmir was an integral part. Kashmir thus became a ‘rallyingground’… and ‘No Pakistani leader, present or future, was allowed to ignore the significance of theHimalayanterritory,andespeciallyitsconnectiontoPakistan.…AllofPakistanwasmadehostagetotheKashmirconundrum.’16

Pakistan has spent the last almost seven decades in revanchist schemes like the ‘raiders’ in 1947,‘infiltrators’in1965,and‘freedomfighterin1999’.DespiteseriousreversesineachventureandfailuretoachievetheobjectiveofincorporatingKashmir,PakistanhasstillnotacceptedtherealitythatseekingtowrestKashmirfromIndia,amuchlargerpower,requiresnotmerelyparitybutadditionalstrengthtoforceachangeinthestatusquo.Theprocessofseekingparity-plusiswhathasledPakistantoitspresentpositionofhoveringnear theabyss.Notwithstanding this,Pakistan’sobjectivehasnot changed, thoughstrategyhas. Insteadof trying to forceachangemilitarily, itnowseeks togenerateenoughviolence inIndia,especiallyKashmir,toforceIndiatocometothenegotiatingtableinaweakenedposition.

Atellingexampleof the importanceofKashmirwasseenin the justificationgivenbyMusharrafforacceptingUSdemandsafter9/11.Inhisaddresstothenationon19September2001,MusharrafclaimedtohavesavedPakistan’sKashmirpolicyfromUSinterference.HereiteratedthisinaninterviewtoPTV(PakistanTelevision):‘Wewereontheborderlineofbeingornotbeingdeclaredaterroriststate–inthatsituation,whatwouldhavehappenedtotheKashmircause?’17 Inotherwords,support to theUSin thewaronterrorwasbasedonthecalculationofdenyingIndiaanyadvantageratherthanonthemeritsofthecause.TheUShadrealizedthefutilityofsuchapolicybeingpursuedbyPakistanasearlyas13October1965

when it informed its ambassadors in NewDelhi, Karachi, London and in the UN of the fact that thePakistangovernmenthadrefusedtoadmit,evenafterthestalemateofthe1965round:

Pakistan’spolicyofattemptingtoforceaKashmirsettlementhasfailed.Itsonlyhopeofgettingone lies in reversing its present course and seeking a reconciliationwith India, whichwillsimultaneously assure Pakistan’s long run security vis-à-vis India. It is a simple fact that noKashmir settlement is possible when both sides are becoming more antagonistic and morefrozenintheirpositionsthanthereverse.18

Thisassessmentremainsasvalidtodayasitdidin1965.AyubKhanacknowledgedasmuchwhenhetoldaCanadiandiplomatduringthe1965war:‘Wewant

Kashmirbutweknowwecan’twinitbymilitaryaction.Ifonlysomeofyoupeoplewouldshowsomegutswewouldhaveit.’19Morerecently,TariqFatemi(currentlyspecialassistanttotheprimeministerofPakistan on foreign affairs) wrote that Pakistan has to recognize that the long conflict with India hasachievednothingbeyondcreatingamilitarizedsecuritystatethatusesforceasitsfirstresort.‘AttemptstoresolvetheKashmirdisputemilitarilyhavebledthecountryandleftitdependentonforeignaid.First,thenationmustbegintoredefinethearmy’srolesothatitislimitedtodefendingthecountry’sfrontiers.’20

Pakistan’squestforparitysufferedabigblowwiththecreationofBangladeshin1971.Notonlydiditlosehalfitsterritorybutthepsychologicalimpactwasevenmorefundamental.WritingabouttheIndianvictoryinBangladesh,AyubKhanwroteinhisdiary:

ThursdayDecember 16, 1971. The separation ofBengal, though painful,was inevitable andunavoidable…IwishourrulershadthesensetorealizethisintimeandlettheBengalisgoinapeacefulmanner insteadof Indiabringing thisaboutbyasurgicaloperation…Isuppose theHindu morale is now very high. It is the first victory they have had over the Muslims forcenturies.Itwouldtakeusalongtimetolivethisdown.21

Similar sentimentswere expressed by a Lahore-basedUrdu paper: ‘… today the entire nationweepstearsofblood.TodaytheIndianArmyhasenteredDacca.Todayforthefirsttimein1000yearsHindushave won a victory over Muslims…Today we are prostrate with dejection’22 The defeat, instead ofprovokingintrospectionreinforcedtheconclusionthatinordertoshow‘HinduIndia’itsplace,theonlywayoutwasmilitaryparity.

Thehuntforparityhas ledPakistan toadoptastrategythathasseveralstrands: theuseof terroristsornon-stateactors to inflict ‘a thousandcuts’, inorder to ‘soften’ India for talks;developmentofnuclearweapons;useofborrowedpower,relativelylargeexpenditureondefence,bothconventionalandnuclear(seeChapter5).Inanearlier chapter, it hasbeenmentionedhowJinnah suggested to IskanderMirza to start a jihad

againsttheBritishinthetribalareastoacceleratetheachievementofPakistan.Thoughtheplanwasnotexecuted then, it came inhandy inOctober1947.According toHumayunMirza, IskanderMirza’s son,AbdulQayyumKhan, the chiefministerofNWFPwhowasofKashmiriorigin, encouraged thePathantribesmenwithouttheknowledgeofGovernorSirGeorgeCunningham.Whenthelatterlearnedofthe22October1947invasion,hewantedtoresign,butwaspersuadedbyIskanderMirza tostayon.IskanderMirzametCunninghamon25OctoberandbriefedhimindetailaboutwhatwashappeninginKashmir.HeconveyedLiaquatAli’sapologiesfornotlettingCunninghamknowaboutthedevelopmentsearlierduetoillhealth.Apparently,Jinnahwasawareofwhatwasgoingontwoweeksearlier,butsaid,‘Don’ttellmeanythingaboutit.Myconsciencemustbeclear.’AccordingtoIskanderMirza,HariSingh(theMaharajahofKashmir)meanttojoinIndiawithinthreemonths.‘ItwasdecidedapparentlyaboutamonthagothatthePoonchis should revolt and should be helped. British officers were kept out simply not to embarrassthem.’23Cunninghamblamedthegovernmentforthetribalinvasion.HeresignedinMarch1948.Likewise, thewar of 1965was deliberately orchestratedwith ‘infiltrators’ being sent intoKashmir

(OperationGibraltar and the accompanyingOperationGrandSlam) on the presumption that the IndianKashmiriswouldriseinsupportoftheinfiltrators, thatinretaliation,Indianforceswouldnotcrosstheinternationalborder, and that the internationalcommunity, especially theUS,wouldpressurize India toresolve theKashmir issue.Noneof thesepresumptions fructified.AsZiringnotes, ‘India’s inability toeffectivelycountertheChinesethrustintoitsterritoryin1962wasexaminedinconsiderabledetailbythePakistanHighCommand.PakintelligencedescribedtheIndianPMShastriasweak,colorless,ineffectualandwithlittlestomachforwar.’24AyubKhan,infact,referredtoIndiansas‘adiseasedpeople’andtotheIndianprimeministeras ‘that littlemanShastri’.25TheRannofKutchencountermade thePakistanArmysenseaweaknessintheIndianarmedforcesthatitcouldexploitinKashmir,whichwouldfinallygivePakistanthevictoryithadsought.26

Whileusingnon-stateactorsasamatterofpolicyagainst Indiagoesback to1947, itgotaboostafterPakistan’s defeat in the 1971war. Realizing that they could notmatch India in conventional warfare,Pakistan resorted to asymmetrical warfare in a much more focused manner. In this, they were highlyencouraged by the events inAfghanistanwhere a ragtag band ofmujahideen hadmanaged to defeat asuperpower. (Ofcourse, themassiveassistanceprovidedby theUSandSaudiArabia isconvenientlyforgotten in such narratives.) Coupled with the kind of perception of the ‘Hindu’ and hence Indian,PakistanileadersfeltthatIndiacouldbecuttosizethroughirregularwarfareontheAfghanpattern.Startingfromthelate1970s,PakistanfirstfannedtheKhalistanmovementinIndianPunjabandfrom

1989onwards,takingadvantageoftheoutburstofprotestsinKashmir,transformedapoliticalmovementinto amilitary one.Kargil in 1999was a similar attack on India by Pakistan, this time using regularsoldiersofthePakistanArmydisguisedasKashmiris.Post-Kargil,thePakistanArmyhasrealizedthatamilitaryconquestofKashmirisbeyondtheircapabilitygivenIndiandeterminationtodefendit,whatever

the odds. However, instead of seeking political accommodation, Pakistan has resorted to a policy of‘bleedingIndia’byusingnon-stateactorsunderanuclearoverhangtoforceittothenegotiatingtableinaweakenedposition.Over the years, the concept of asymmetrical war has been modified to include not only offensive

operations but also to develop a defensive component to tackle any Indian retaliation. Thus, in 2001,MusharrafhadthreatenedanunconventionalwaronIndiaifitcrossedtheLOCsayingtherewere150,000retired military personnel in Pakistani Kashmir who would have surrounded the Indian troops. Thisstrategyencompassed settlingex-servicemenand jihadistgroups inPakistanOccupiedKashmir (POK)and marrying local girls. In the event of a war with India they would carry out dozens of fidayeenoperationssimultaneously.27

Theuseofnon-state actorshasnotbeenwithout its consequences. InMay1992, theUS threated todesignatePakistanastatesponsorofterrorismonthegroundsthattheorgansofthePakistanigovernmentcontrolledbythepresident,theprimeministerandthechiefofthearmystaffweresponsoringterrorism.Asastatesponsorofterrorism,thescopeofthesanctionswouldincludetheshutdownoffundingfromtheInternationalMonetaryFund,theWorldBank,andotherinternationalfinancialinstitutionsaswellasbarbilateral tradeandthestoppageofExport–ImportBankfinancingforprojects inPakistan.ThePakistanresponsetosuchathreatisreallyinstructive.Inahigh-levelmeeting,LtGen.JavedNasir,thedirectorgeneralof theISI,claimedthat thejihadinKashmirwasatacriticalstageandcouldnotbedisrupted,adding, ‘We have been covering our tracks so far andwill cover them even better in the future’.Hisconclusionwas: ‘Theseareempty threats.TheUnitedStateswillnotdeclarePakistana terroriststate.Allweneedtodoistobuymoretimeandimproveourdiplomaticeffort.ThefocusshouldbeonIndianatrocities inKashmir,notonoursupportfor theKashmiriresistance.’Inresponse toForeignSecretaryShahryarKhanwhostressedondiplomaticefforts,NasirechoingAyubdecadesago,said:‘…theHindusdonotunderstandanylanguageotherthanforce’.NawazSharif,thethenprimeminister,concurredwithGen.Nasir’sassessment,whichbecametheconsensusofthemeeting.Nawazadded,‘WehaveaproblemonlywiththeAmericanmediaandtheCongress…Thisproblemcanberesolvedbyastrongerlobbyingeffort.’ThatiswhatPakistandidthenandinresponse,theUSdidnotcarryoutitsthreattolistPakistanasastatesponsorofterrorism.28

TheUShastriedtomodifyPakistan’suseofnon-stateactorsbyprovidingithugefinancialincentives.Butthesehavenotworked.AsformerUSambassadortoPakistan,AnnePatterson,wroteina2009cablethat was subsequentlyWikiLeaked: ‘There is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistancelevelsinanyfieldassufficientcompensationforabandoningsupportforthesegroups,whichitseesasanimportantpartofitsnationalsecurityapparatusagainstIndia.’29

Withsuchahistoryofsupportofthejihadis,itishardlysurprisingthatthearmycontinuestoshieldtheLashkar-e-Taiba(LeT)anditsleadership.Itwillcontinuetodoso.Thisisdespitetheassertionsbythecurrent political and military leadership that even-handed action is being taken against all terroristgroups.

Nuclear weapons were seen as the magic wand that would make Pakistan India’s equal, guaranteeterritorialintegrityevenwithoutthesupportofalliesandalsogivePakistanrespectabilityintheMuslimworldasthefirstMuslimcountrywithnuclearweapons.TheprimarygoalofPakistan’snuclearweapons

programmebeingmilitary paritywith India, nuclearweaponswere seen as amethod of balancing theasymmetricconventionalrelationshipbetweenIndiaandPakistan.Oneexamplewould illustrate the lengths thatPakistanhasgone tokeepup its quest forparitywith

India irrespective of the consequences to itself. This example goes to the heart of the Indo-Pakrelationship on the one hand and the Pak-US relationship on the other. Soon after the US imposedsanctions against Pakistan in keeping with the Pressler Amendment in 1990, the ISI prepared anassessment of theUS resolve that concluded that theUSwanted to pressurePakistan over the nuclearissuebutthatthiswasatemporarythreattoUS–Pakistanrelationsresultingfrom‘thepoliticalmaneuversof Indian and Zionist lobbies’ in the United States. The recommendation was for Pakistan to remainengagedwiththeUnitedStateswithoutgivingintoitsdemandsandsoontheUnitedStateswouldcometotermswithPakistan’snuclearprogrammeasafaitaccompli.Hence,Pakistancontinuedwithitsnuclearquestsuccessfully,unmindfuloftheUSthreat.Thoughthebilateralsanctionslastedforabit,theUSdidnotuse its influence tochokeoffmultilateral financial assistance from the IMFand theWorldBank toPakistan.30

The consequences for Pakistan of being declared a state sponsor of terrorism, and a nuclearproliferator,wouldhavebeensevere.But,givenitsobsessionwithparitywithIndia,Pakistanchosetogambleand ignore thedangers inherent inpursuingsuchapath.Clearly,givensucha track recordandwithsuchamindset,Pakistanwouldgotoanylengthstocontinueitselusivequestforparity.

The third strand inPakistan’s strategy to tackle Indiahasbeen ‘borrowedpower’: seek the supportofallies, leveraging its geographical position, to compensate for its weakness against India – a conceptinitiated by Jinnah even before Partition. Jinnah sought substantial funding from the US for defencepurposeswithintwomonthsofPakistan’screation(seeChapter17).Thiswasevenbeforethe‘raiders’hadenteredKashmirandbordertensionswithIndiawereyetinthefuture.WhatPakistanwantedaboveallwassecurityguaranteesfromtheUSagainstIndia,somethingthatthe

USwasunpreparedtogivesince‘itdidnotsharePakistan’sperceptionofIndiaasanenemy,’despiteitsperiodicdifferenceswithIndia.31WhileclaimingtouseUSfundsforfightingterrorism,PakistanhasusedthemforequippingitselfagainstIndia.Accordingtoa2009Harvardstudy,‘ThePakistanimilitarydidnotusemostof thefundsfor theagreedobjectiveoffighting terror.Pakistanboughtmuchconventionalmilitary equipment. Examples include F-16s, aircraft-mounted armaments, anti-ship and anti-missiledefensesystems,andanairdefenseradarsystemcosting$200million,despitethefactthattheterroristsin theFATAhavenoairattackcapability.Overhalfof the total funds–54.9percent–werespentonfighteraircraftandweapons,overaquarter–26.62percent–onsupportandotheraircraft,and10percentonadvancedweaponssystems.’32Clearly,thepatternofpurchaserevealsthattheywerenotintendedtofightterroristsbutforbeefingupitsconventionalmilitarystrengthagainstIndia.Onitsown,PakistanwouldhavebeenunabletopursueitselusivequestforparitywithIndia.Itwas

fortuitouscircumstancesthatenabledPakistantoleverageitsgeographytogethugebailouts,militaryandeconomic,fromtheUSand,toalesserdegree,fromChina.ThisiswhathasbolstereditscapabilityandconfidenceandallowedittocontinueitspursuitofparitywithIndia.Withoutsuchsupport,therewasnowayPakistancouldhaveindulgedinthekindofdangerousbrinkmanshipthatithas.ByaidingPakistanovertheyears–some$40billionsince1950,accordingtotheCongressionalResearchService–theUS

hasfedPakistan’sdelusionofbeingIndia’sregionalmilitaryequal.AsHaqqaninotes,‘Seekingsecurityagainst amuch larger neighbor is a rational objectivebut seekingparitywith it on a constant basis isnot.’33

Inthechangedinternationalcontext,theUShasstartedseeingIndiaasalonger-termallyandpartner.This is sending shivers down Pakistan’s spine though it is doubtful if Pakistan would moderate itsbehaviourfactoringinthisdevelopment.Onthecontrary,PakistanhaspusheditsrelationshipwithChinaasacountertotheperceiveddistancingbytheUS.However,aswillbenotedlater,ChinaisunlikelytostepintotheUSshoesandtakeontheresponsibilityofholdingPakistanaloftallonitsown.Withitsownproblemsathome,economicandsecurity,likeinthecaseoftheUighurs,Chinawilltreadcautiouslyvis-à-visPakistan.WhilethisdoesnotaugurwellforPakistan’scontinuingquestforparitywithIndia,itisunlikelythatPakistanwillstoptrying,especiallyunderthenuclearumbrella.

Atvarioustimes,PakistanhasviewedIndiaasacowardly‘pushover’adversarybecausethe‘Hinduhasnostomachforafight’.34ForcefulandsuccessfulIndianreactionhasinvariablyrefutedsuchassumptionsandsurprisedthePakistanis.Forexample,ledtobelievethatonePakistaniMuslimsoldierwasequaltotenHindu Indian soldiers, the inability to take all of Kashmir in 1965was a rude awakening for thePakistanipublic.NotesBritishBrigadierBidwell:‘…therepulseofthePakistanisbytheIndiansin1965was the first reversal of [the unbroken trend ofMuslim victories in the subcontinent going back eightcenturies]andatrulyhistoricoccasion.’35

SinceitisthearmythatcallstheshotsinPakistan,itis,therefore,crucialtounderstandhowthearmyperceives India. Two sets of documents help in understanding the thinking of the officer corps of thePakistanArmy.The first set comprises thevariousGreenBookscontainingarticleswrittenbyvariousarmyofficersonsubjectsofinterest.ThesehavebeenreferredtoinChapter5,onthearmy.ThesecondisastudytitledIndia:AStudyinProfile(1990)writtenbyLtColJavedHassanforthearmy’sFacultyofResearch and Doctrinal Studies (FORAD) of the Command and Staff College, Quetta. According toHaqqani,itisdistributedbythemilitarybookclub,whileFairnotesthatitcontinuestoberecommendedreadingatPakistan’sdefenceeducationalinstitutions,iswidelycitedbyPakistanimilitarypersonnelandis one of the only four books on India included by theNational DefenceUniversity on its ‘ImportantBookstoRead’list.36

Afterananalysisof2,000yearsofIndianhistory, theconclusions inJavedHassan’sstudywere:(i)Indiahasapoortrackrecordatprojectionofpowerbeyonditsfrontiers;(ii)Ithasahopelessrecordinprotectingitsownfreedomandsovereigntydespitehavinglargerarmies;(iii)Dismalperformanceofthemilitary ismatchedby thenear-totalabsenceofanypopular resistanceagainst foreigndomination; (iv)ThekeytraitsoftheHinduarepresumptuousness,persistenceanddeviousness;(v)Indiahasbeenunabletoexistasasingleunifiedstate;and(vi)India’snorthernandwesternstatesrepresenteditsHinducore;Indian Punjab, Jammu andKashmir, the southern state of TamilNadu, and the six north-eastern tribalstateswerealienatedfromtheIndianmainstreamandwithsomeencouragementcouldbecomecentresofinsurgenciesthatcouldweakenIndia, ifnotdismemberit.Theotherstateshadregionalist impulsesbutinadequatemomentumforsecessionism.37

GivenhisviewsonHindusandthusonIndia, it ishardlysurprisingthatJavedHassan(bythenaLt

General)was one of the ‘infamous four’who, togetherwithMusharraf, chief of general staff LtGen.MohammadAziz,andXCorpscommanderLtGen.MahmudAhmad,plannedaschemelikeKargil.Thewholeschemewasbasedon theassumption,underlinedbyHassan,onhowthe‘Hindu’wouldcave inbefore a superior power. Such amassivemiscalculation, based onhalf-bakedknowledge and a prioriassumptions,canhavedisastrousconsequencesinthefuture,giventhatbothcountriesarenuclear-weaponpowers.SuchattitudesreflectthePakistanArmy’scivilizationalhostilitytowardsIndia.Thisisunlikelytochangeinthenearormediumterm.ApointfrequentlymadebyPakistanhasbeenthatIndiadidnotacceptitscreationandhasthreatenedto

undoPartitionrightfrom1947.Suchathreatperceptioncontinuestilldate.Thisbeingso,itisnaturaltoaskifamilitarilyweakerstate,fearingdismemberment,wouldadoptanaggressivepostureandlaunchnotonebutseveralwarsonastrongerpowerandactuallyinvitethescenarioitfeared?Theanswerhastobeanemphaticno.Look at the evidence in Pakistan’s case. InOctober 1947, Jinnah knew about what was happening

fifteendaysbeforetheeventsbutwantedto‘keephisconscienceclear’.PrimeMinisterLiaquatAliwasvery much involved in planning the whole scheme. It is also clear that about a month before the 22October invasion, it had been decided that the Poonchis should revolt and should be helped. In otherwords,theinvasionwasnotaspontaneousonebythetribalsincensedbythecommunalkillingsinJammubutadeliberate,pre-plannedattackbythenewlycreatedstateofPakistantomilitarilytakeoverKashmir.Themootpointisthatwouldastatefeelingthreatenedbyitslargerneighbour,complainingaboutthe

Partition process being unfair and being denied its due share of military stores, launch a militaryoperationagainstthissameneighbour?Itreallystrainsthecredulitytothinkso.Hence,thewholetheoryofbeingthreatenedbyIndia,orIndiatryingtoundoPartition,needstobetakenwithalargepinchofsaltand requires a hard re-examination. As Venkataramani puts it: ‘Assuming that the threat of “Hinduimperialism”asadumbratedbyJinnahwerereal,Pakistanleadersshouldhavetakentheutmostcaretoavoid anyprovocationof India for an extendedperiod required forPakistan tomake itself reasonablysecureagainstaggression.’38

Infact,itwasnotexternaldangersbutinternalonesthatwereamatterofconcern.Inearly1958,afewcorrespondents referred to political instability in Pakistan and askedAyubKhan how he proposed todefend Pakistan under such conditions if some hostile neighbour attacked.He replied: ‘Do notworryabout the defence of the country. That is my business. Attend to your leaders who are wrecking thecountry. Do not talk of external dangers. The real danger is within the country. Cannot you see it?’39

Musharrafwastorepeatsomethingsimilar:

We are capable ofmeeting external danger.We have to safeguard ourselves against internaldangers.Ihavealwaysbeensayingthatinternalstrifeiseatingusliketermite.Don’tforgetthatPakistanisthecitadelofIslamandifwewanttoserveIslamwellwewillfirsthavetomakePakistanstrongandpowerful.40

GeneralKayani’sstressoninternalthreatshasalreadybeennotedinChapter6.Clearly, thethreatfromIndiahasbeenhighlyexaggeratedsince1947toservethepoliticalendsofthePakistanileadership,bothcivilianandespeciallythemilitary.

The Indo-Pak dialogue since 1947 has been characterized by a roller coaster of expectations anddisappointments.WhetheritwastheNehru–Liaquattalkspost-Partition,ortheSwaranSingh–Bhuttotalksof1962–63,orthecompositedialogueprocessofthe1990sandthenextdecade,theresultshavebeenthesame:somepositivemovementonissueslikeconnectivity(roadandrail),trade,visasandsoon.Amajorachievementwas the IndusWatersTreatyof 1960 that haswithstood the test of time andwar, and theceasefireontheLOCinthefirstdecadeofthenewcentury.ButonissueslikeKashmirandterrorattacksagainstIndia,therehasbeennoforwardmovement.Oflate,anoticeablefeatureofthedialoguehasbeenthatwhenevertheyaretobegin,orhaveproceededforawhile,aterroristincidenttakesplaceinIndiaoronIndianinterestsinAfghanistanthatvitiatestheatmosphereforthecontinuationofthetalks.Invariably,thefootprintsoftheperpetratorscanbetracedbacktoPakistan.Thelatest,atthetimeofwriting,wastheattackbytheJeMontheIndianAirForcebaseatPathankot

(2January2016),followingtheunprecedentedvisitofPrimeMinisterModitoLahoreon25December2015 and just before the two foreign secretarieswere tomeet. Resultantly, the talkswere postponed.Whatwasdifferent,however,wasthatthetalkswerenotcalledoff,asinthepastbutpostponedandthelines of communication between theNSAs (national security advisors) of the two countrieswere keptopen. Registering of an FIR (first information report) in Pakistan and the visit of a Pakistani JointInvestigationTeamtoPathankotwerealsounprecedented.Thoughminorinthelargerschemeofthings,these could have been encouraging signs if Pakistan had allowed an Indian investigative team to visitPakistan.Inreality,however,thegroovesofanytalksbetweenIndiaandPakistanonKashmirandterrorismare

deepandaredifficulttochange.ForPakistan,Kashmirhastobeontopoftheagenda.Theblueprintforfuture engagement agreed to at Ufa41 failed precisely because Kashmir was not given the priorityPakistanisexpected.NogovernmentofPakistancansurvivefor longwithoutprojectingKashmirasthe‘core’issue.Inanycase,whatdoIndiaandPakistantalkonKashmir?AllPakistanwantsistoget,attheminimum,

the Kashmir Valley. It knows that Jammu and Ladakh are pipe dreams. Its entire foreign and defencepoliciesaregearedtowardsthatobjective.ThatiswhyitkeepsharpingontheUNresolutionsontheonehand and uses non-state actors on the other to promote violence. However, it must be noted that forPakistan,anunresolvedKashmirissuealsoservestheusefulpurposetowhipupanti-Indiapublicopiniontodivert attention fromanydivisivedomestic issue.AndkeepingKashmir on theboil also serves thePakistanArmywell,assuringitthepre-eminentplaceinPakistanwiththefirstclaimonitsresources.ForIndia,whosenationalismisterritorialandnotreligious,thisisjustnotgoingtohappen.Infact,for

IndiatheonlythingtotalkaboutisthepartofJammuandKashmirillegallyoccupiedbyPakistan–theso-called ‘Azad’ Kashmir and Gilgit–Baltistan (GB) both of which jointly constitute Pakistan OccupiedJammuandKashmir(POJK).Pakistan’sholdonboththeseregionsistenuous–GB’sstatusisopaqueand‘AzadKashmir’ishardly‘Azad’orindependent.NeithercantheLOCbecomeaninternationalboundarygiventhesentimentsoftheIndianpeopleandtheresolutionofparliament.OnthePakistaniside,itwouldbeequallyimpossibletosellanysuchideatothePunjabis,whohavebeenfedonadailydietofKashmirbeingPakistan’s‘jugularvein’fordecades.ForIndia,terrorismfomentedbyPakistansincethe1980sisthenumberoneitemontheagendaoftalks

withPakistan.Bydragging its feet on the investigation and trial of theLeT terroristswhoplanned the

2008 Mumbai attacks and, more recently, the Pathankot attack, Pakistan has clearly signalled itsunwillingnesstomoveaheadontheseissues.Claimingtobethevictimofterrorism,PakistanisextremelyreluctanttodiscussterrorismthatitdirectsagainstIndia.Forthepastfewyears,Pakistanhasbeentryingdesperately to find some evidence of Indian interference in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan andKarachi.BythisitcouldclaimequivalencewithIndianassertionsofPakistanfomentingterrorisminitsterritory.Itcanthencometothenegotiatingtableonterrorismasanequal,andnotonthebackfoot.Aspartofthisstrategy,Pakistanhasclaimedtohavepresented‘proof’ofIndianinvolvementinBalochistan,whichithaspresentedtotheUSduringthevisitofPrimeMinisterNawazSharifinOctober2015.Whiledetailsarenotknown,atthetimeofwriting,PakistanclaimstohavearrestedanIndiannavalofficerinratherdubiouscircumstancesandattributedahostofcrimestohimwithoutanyevidence.Aclumsilyputtogether‘confession’oftheofficerhasbeencirculated.GivenPakistan’strackrecord,itishighlyunlikelythateitherIndiaortheinternationalcommunitywouldbegintobelievePakistan’scharges.Asnotedearlier,anti-IndiannessishowPakistanhaschosentodefineitsidentity.Itisthisrelentless,

almost immutable, ‘anti-Indianism’ in the veryDNAof Pakistan thatwill prevent a sustained positiverelationshipwithIndia.Thatbeingthecase,Kashmirisonlyasymptomoftheconflict.India‘addressing’theissueofKashmir,whateverthatmaymean,isunlikelytosatisfyPakistansinceitalsowantsIndiatotreat Pakistan as an equal. Thus, while a dialogue is necessary with a neighbour, it will be highlyoptimistic that a dialoguewith Pakistan can either be uninterrupted or uninterruptible. If anything, thepossibilityofanyrealprogress inIndo–PakdialogueisbleakunlessanduntilPakistanre-examines itsroots,stopsseekingitsidentityin‘anti-Indianness’andstopsitsfutilepursuitofparitywithIndia.

Thequest forparitywith India, seen largely inmilitary terms,hasbeen thecentral reasonforPakistanbeing a security state and its inability to transform itself into a democratic nation with a strongdevelopmentagenda.HadthequestforparitywithIndiabeenacrosstheboard,Pakistanmaywellhavebeen a different country. Parity in terms of democratic functioning, economic development, education,social sector advancements, etc., would have seen a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s priorities. AsHaqqani notes, 94 per cent of India’s children between five and fifteen complete primary schoolcomparedwith54percent inPakistan.Everyyear,8,900 IndiansgetaPhD in the sciencescomparedwith the 8,142doctorates awardedbyPakistan’s universities since Independence.The total number ofbooks published in any language on any subject in Pakistan in 2013, including religious titles andchildren’sbooks,stoodat2,581,against90,000inIndia.42

InPakistan, thequest formilitaryparityandan imagined threatperceptionfromIndiahascomeatahugecost.AsFaruquinotes,‘Pakistan’scontinuingpreoccupationwithseekingamilitarysolutiontoitsconflict with India is strategically myopic on three counts. First of all, it has not been militarilysuccessful.Second,ithasfailedtoachievePakistan’sstatedpoliticalaims.Third,ithasbeencostly,intermsofthebenefitforgonebynotspendingenoughonraisingthepeople’sstandardofliving.’43

In simplemathematical terms, with the IndianGDP growing at over 7 per cent, as comparedwithPakistan’sGDPgrowthofaround4percentandgiventhatIndia’seconomyisnearlyeighttimesthesizeofPakistan’s,Pakistanhastoexpendconsiderablymoreresourcesandenergytomaintainmilitaryparitywith India, even if it is supplemented with use of non-state actors, nuclear weapons and ‘borrowed

power’.WiththePakistanieconomyconsistentlyunderperformingduetostructuralflaws,theexpenditureon the army is unsustainable without outside support. By being fixated on an India-centric securitytemplateandtheresultantuseofresources,Pakistanisunabletotakecareofitsinternalneeds.Therewillneverbeadequateresourcestofocusontheeconomyandvitalsectorslikewaterandeducation,andthisatatimewhentheIndianeconomyisgrowing,makingthegapbetweenthetwocountriesevenwider.However, it isunlikelythatthePakistanisecurityestablishmentwillrelinquishthenotionofmilitary

paritywithIndia.Ifitstrackrecordisanythingtogoby,Pakistanwillcontinuetopayaheavypriceintermsof lackof internaldevelopment in itselusivequest forparitywithIndiaandhasten its trajectorytowardstheabyss.

15

Afghanistan:TheQuestforDomination

NomanwhohasreadapageofIndianhistorywilleverprophesyabouttheFrontier.—LordCurzon’swarningin19041

TheproblemisnotaboutpeacewiththeTaliban;theproblemispeacebetweenPakistanandAfghanistan.

—AfghanPresidentAshrafGhaniinMarch20152

PAKISTANIStheinheritorofthe‘GreatGame’,atermmadepopularbyRudyardKipling’sfamousbookKim.ThetermdescribesthemovesmadebyBritaininthenineteenthcenturytoprotectitsempireinIndiaagainst the backdrop of Russia’s rapid southwards advance. The key British gambit was to push itsfrontiers westwards that made Afghanistan, described famously as ‘the graveyard of empires’, thecherished prize for both empires. Ultimately, both countries accepted Afghanistan as a buffer and soavoidedadirectmilitaryconfrontation.Inthetwentiethcentury,regionalpowerscontinuedtobeattractedtothislandlockedcountryduetoits

geographicallocationbetweenCentralandSouthAsia.Ashasbeenwellput:‘Afghanistanisoneofthefew countries of the world whose every frontier divides peoples speaking the same language andbelongingtothesameethnicgrouportribe.’3ItisthisinterplayofregionalinfluenceanditsowninternaldynamicsthatmakesAfghanistansoimportant.WhenMaharajaRanjitSinghcrossedtheIndusandcapturedPeshawar,theDurraniwintercapital,and

itssurroundingsin1823fromtheAfghans,littledidherealizethathewastochangethecourseofhistoryof the region forever.Verymuch likeCaesarcrossing theRubicon, therewasno turningbackonce theSikhsestablishedthemselvesonthewestbankoftheIndus.TheBritishinheritedRanjitSingh’sempirethatincludedPeshawarandpusheditfurtherwestwards,demarcatingtheirboundarywithAfghanistanviathe1893DurandLine.Pakistan,inturn,inheritedtheBritishpossessionsin1947andthestagewassetfortheeventsthathad,andcontinuetohave,afundamentalimpactonPakistanandtheregion.Ayub Khan possibly best summed up Pakistan’s disparaging attitude towards Afghanistan. Keen to

projectPakistanasthebestMuslimbastionagainstthespreadofSovietcommunism,inDecember1959hetoldvisitingUSpresidentEisenhower,‘TheAfghanswerenotMuslimsnearlyasmuchastheywereopportunists.’4Commentingonthis,HaqqaninotesthatthisprovidedaninsightintotheemergingmindsetinPakistan. ‘AfghanshadbeenMuslim for longer than several ethnicgroups inPakistan.Pakistanhadcomeintobeingonlytwelveyearsearlier,whereasPakistan’smilitarydictatorfelthecoulddismisshis

country’snorthwesternneighborasanopportunistandasinsufficientlyMuslim.’5

AbroadsweepofthehistoryofPak-Afghanrelationssince1947revealsthatatitscore,Pakistan’spolicyis dictated by its insecurity vis-à-vis the Durand Line. Right from 1947, Pakistan was faced with awesternborder thatwasdisputedby itsneighbour just as, in itsperceptions, India in theeast toowasseeking toundoPartition.Afghanistanwas theonlycountry thatopposedPakistan’smembership to theUnitedNationson30September1947onthegroundsthattreatieswithBritainlapsedwhenanewstate,Pakistan,was created.As such, forAfghanistan, theDurandLine that demarcated the border betweenAfghanistan and British India after the Second AfghanWar ceased to exist. In any case, the Afghansconsidered the 1878 Treaty of Gandamak and the Durand Agreement of 1893 as unjust agreementsimposed on them by Britain, which they were forced to accept after a military defeat. Every Afghangovernmenthashopedtore-annextheterritorieseastoftheborder,extendinguptotheRiverIndus.6

TheoneopeningthatAfghanistangotwasin1947itselfwhenthePakhtunleaderKhanAbdulGhaffarKhanwantedathirdoptionofPakhtunistaninthereferendumtodecidebetweeneitherIndiaorPakistanasperthePartitionplan.ThisdemandwassupportedbytheAfghangovernmentbutrejectedoutrightbytheBritishforwhomthenorth-westofIndiabeingpartofPakistanwascrucialfortheirstrategicplans.Intheevent,thenationalistPakhtunsboycottedthereferendumandtherestishistory.However,successiveAfghangovernmentshavenotgivenupthepossibilityoftheindependenceoftheseareasiftheycouldnotbe reincorporated intoAfghanistan. In 1949,Afghanistan formally repudiated any formal status for theDurandLineinaLoyaJirga(grandnationalassembly).Thus,AfghanistanhasnotreconciledtothelossofwhatistodayKhyberPakhtunkhwa(earlierNWFP)andthenorthernpartofBalochistanoralmost20–25percentofpresent-dayPakistan.However,Afghanistanhasneverreceivedanyinternationalbackingforitsposition.BeingmilitarilyweakanddependentonPakistanfortransittrade,therewasverylittlethatAfghanistancoulddoaboutitthenorcandoaboutitatpresent.For itspart,Pakistan treats theDurandLineasasettled fact,especiallyafterKingAmanullahKhan

confirmed it in 1919 followinghis defeat by theBritish.However,Pakistanhas alwaysbeen insecureabout the lack of its acceptance by Afghanistan. The insecurity is real given the common PakhtunpopulationstraddlingbothsidesoftheDurandLineandabout20–25percentofPakistan’sterritorybeingvulnerable to any Afghan revanchist designs. Pakistan’s policies towards Afghanistan are, therefore,gearedtogetanAfghangovernmentacceptthesanctityoftheDurandLineastheinternationalbordersothatnoambiguityisleftasfarasitswesternbordersareconcerned.AccordingtotheformerTalibanambassadortoPakistanMullahAbdulSalamZaif,Pakistantriedthree

timestoformalizetheborderduringtheTalibanruleinAfghanistanbutitrepeatedlyreceivedanegativeresponse.ThefirsttimewaswhenMullahAbdulRaziqwasappointedastheinteriorminister;thesecondtime during the visit of Pakistan’s interiorministerMoinuddinHaider toKabul andKandahar and thethirdtimeduringthepresidencyofGeneralPervezMusharaf.7

Thepolicyofsecuringtheborderhastwoobjectives.One,astronggovernmentinAfghanistanwouldbedangerousasitcouldtryandrecoverPakhtunterritorieslosttotheSikhsandinheritedbyPakistanviatheBritish.Therefore,Pakistan’spolicyhadtoensureaweakgovernmentinKabulthatwasdependentonPakistan.Thiswouldbethebestguaranteeagainstanyrevanchistposture.ThesecondobjectiveisbasedonPakistan’sperceptionaboutIndia.Pakistanviewsitsrelationswith

AfghanistannotmerelyinabilateralcontextbutinaSouthAsiancontexttoocoupledwiththeperceivedrelationshipthattheUShaswithIndiaandPakistan.AnightmarescenarioforPakistanwouldbeforIndiatoencouragetherevanchistclaimsofastrongandfriendly(towardsIndia)Afghanistan.ThisIndo-AfghanalliancewouldcatchPakistaninavice-likegripwithahostileIndiaontheeastandahostileAfghanistanon the west. For this reason, Pakistan has determined that India must not be allowed any space inAfghanistan.Onlyaproxygovernment inKabul,oraweakanddependentAfghangovernment that toesPakistan’slinecanensurethis.The basic flaw in Pakistan’s policy has been to underestimate theAfghans, a throwback toAyub’s

description,mentionedabove.AsnotedbyRoedadKhan,‘ThefatalerrorZiaandallhisadvisersmade…wastobrandallAfghanleadersasSovietstooges.WesawthemfirstascommunistsandonlysecondasAfghan nationalists.We did not realize that theAfghans areAfghans first andAfghans last.’8 Zia’ssuccessorshavecontinuedwiththisflawedperception,withtheSovietsbeingreplacedwithIndians.Thishasledtothepersistenceofseriouspolicymiscalculations.For these complex and interrelated reasons, Pakistan has followed a forward policy inAfghanistan

fromZ.A.Bhutto’stime.Theforwardpolicyhasbeenoperationalizedbytacticallyleveragingitsfront-linestatusduringsuperpowerinterventioninAfghanistantoobtaineconomicand,especially,militaryaidwhilepursuingitsownagendaagainstIndiaandAfghanistan.

A term frequentlyused inPakistan is ‘strategicdepth’ todescribe themotivationof itspolicy towardsAfghanistan. The concept, as noted in an earlier chapter, was based on the reality that several ofPakistan’spopulationcentreswereclosetotheborderwithIndia.Coupledwithaflatterrainitprovidedascaryscenarioinmilitaryterms.Hence,geographicalspaceordepthwassoughtinAfghanistan.EvenbeforethecreationofPakistan, theCabinetMissionPlanof16May1946hadstatedclearly:‘ThetwosectionsofthesuggestedPakistancontainthetwomostvulnerablefrontiersinIndiaandforasuccessfuldefenceindepththeareaofPakistanwouldbeinsufficient.’9

AyubKhanwas perhaps the first to articulate the lack of depth of Pakistan, though not necessarilyseeking it in Afghanistan.While recalling a conversation thatMao Zedong hadwith his adviser FidaHussain and recommending Pakistan to adopt guerilla tactics,Ayubwrote in his diary on 10October1968:

TheChinesekeep talking tous in termsof guerillawarfarebecause that is their experience,besides theyhave thespace for this.Unfortunately,we lackdepth inourcountryandbesidessome of our centres of population, communication links, headworks and canals lie near thebordersowehavetobereadytodefeat theenemyassoonasheentersour territory.This iswhatwedidlasttimeandwehaveeveryhopeofsuccessshouldheaggressagain.10

Theoperationalizationoftheconceptofstrategicdepthdependedonafriendly,preferablydependent,anti-IndiagovernmentinKabul.ThishasbeenanarticleoffaithwiththePakistansecurityestablishment.Additionally,afriendlyAfghanistanwouldenablePakistantosetupbasesfortrainingKashmirimilitantsas they did in the 1990s and claim to the world that they were ‘providing only moral, political anddiplomatic support’ to the Kashmiris. This assumed significance when the US threatened to declarePakistanastatesponsorofterrorism.

TheonlytimethatPakistanhasfeltrelativelysecureaboutitswesternborderasalsoaboutitsPakhtunpopulationwaswhentheTalibanwereinpowerinKabulbetween1996and2001.However,noAfghangovernment,noteventhePak-sponsoredandbackedTalibangovernment,hasacceptedthelegalityoftheDurandLinethough,ofcourse,theydidnotraiseanyirredentistclaimseither.MohammedDaoudKhan,whooverthrew theAfghankingZahirShah in a coup in July1973was a

staunchsupporteroftheideaofanindependentPakhtunistan.Hispronouncementsandpoliciesdidtrytorekindle the idea, much to Pakistan’s discomfort. This set the stage of for the first of many PakistaninterventionsinAfghanistan.ZulfikarAliBhuttostartedtheprocess,whichcontinuestilltoday,ofarmingandsupportingAfghandissidentswhowereopposedtotheregimeinAfghanistan.Thus,Pakistan’ssupportoftheIslamistinsurgencyinAfghanistanbeganin1973–74,yearsbeforethe

Soviets intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979. Following Daoud’s coup, an Afghan cell wascreatedintheForeignOfficeinJuly/August1973togiveoutpolicyguidelines.TheFrontierCorpshadthe overall responsibility of the operation and worked in tandemwith the ISI to conduct intelligenceoperations inside Afghanistan.11 Afghan dissident leaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Prof.BurhanuddinRabbaniwhohadescapedtoPakistanin1974afterDaoud’scoup,cameintocontactwithPakistaniauthoritiesduringthisperiod.PakistanestablishedtrainingcampsfortheminNorthandSouthWaziristan agencies. They were to become the bases for the much larger effort in the 1980s withassistancefromtheUSandSaudiArabia.The Afghan cell was revived after the April 1978 coup d’état led by NurMohammed Taraki that

overthrew Daoud. The cell was tasked ‘… to analyze the available information and suggest policyoptions.ThedefenseplanswereupdatedasadestabilizedAfghanistanhadadverselyaffectedthesecurityofPakistan.12However,accordingtoHaqqani,‘…theAfghancell’sprimaryfunctionsweretocoordinatetheresistancetocommunistruleinAfghanistanaswellassecureinternationalbackingforPakistanandtheresistance.’13

TheSovietUnioninvadedAfghanistanon24December1979.ThiswasagodsendforZia-ul-Haq.HehadbecomeaninternationalpariahafterhangingBhutto,turningdowninternationalappealsforclemencyandrefusingtoholdthepromisedelections.HesawinAfghanistananopportunitytoturnthetablesonhisopponentsbyappearing,likehispredecessors,tobehaltingthemarchofcommunismandsobecomingachampioninWesterneyes.ZiaknewtheUSwouldhavenooptionbuttoprovidemassiveassistancetoPakistan to bleed their coldwar rival. The deal was straightforward: in return for US economic andmilitaryaidPakistanwouldexpanditsexistingcovertoperationsusingtheAfghanresistance,againsttheSoviets in Afghanistan. Pakistan, thus, willingly became the base camp for the US/Saudi-backedoperationsagainsttheSovietUnioninAfghanistan.ForZia,defeatoftheSovietUnionwasthetactical,immediateobjective.Hisstrategicobjectivewas

toinstalaregimeinKabulthatwouldfinallyputanendtoAfghanrevanchistclaimsforever.Infact,ZiatoldSeligHarrison,

Wehaveearned the right tohave [inKabul]apowerwhich isvery friendly towardsus.Wehavetakenrisksasafrontlinestate,andwewillnotpermitareturn to thepre-warsituation,markedbyalargeIndianandSovietinfluenceandAfghanclaimsonourownterritory.Thenewpower will be really Islamic, a part of the Islamic renaissance which, you will see, will

somedayextenditselftotheSovietMuslims.14

TheturningpointinthejihadcamewiththeUSsupplyingStingermissilestothemujahideenin1986thatneutralizedtheadvantageofSovietairpower.By1988,theSovietswerereadytoquitAfghanistan.TheUShadachieved itsobjectives, short-termas itproved inhindsight.Pakistanhadadeepsenseofbetrayal when after the Soviet withdrawal, the US not only turned its back on Afghanistan, leavingPakistanholdingthebaby,butimposedsanctionsforitsnuclearweaponsprogramme.Itwasaratherlargebaby that Pakistanwas left holding and included 3.5millionAfghan refugees and in theirwake, drugtrafficking, smuggling, and a region flush with weapons and thousands of mujahideen of variousnationalitieswhohadbeenspeciallyrecruitedforthejihad.

Pakistancould stillhavemanaged if themujahideen– thePeshawar seven–hadcome toanamicablepower-sharingagreement.Theycouldnotand the resultwascivilwar,withGulbuddinHekmatyar, thefavouriteofPakistan,unabletowinmilitarily.Pakistan’sAfghanpolicywasinruins;theyhadtoacceptapower-sharing arrangement between the various groups even thoughHekmatyar was not able to enterKabul. The civil war had devastating consequences for the Afghans. In such a scenario, a group ofreligious students – the Taliban (plural for talib, an Islamic student) – arose fromKandahar in 1994duringBenazirBhutto’ssecondtermasprimeminister.Itwascertainlyalocalphenomenonborneoutofthe frustration of the civil war. It is debatable if any Pakistani element was actually involved in theformationof theTaliban but the fact remains that Pakistan’s subsequent support transformedwhatwasessentiallyaKandahar-basedgroupintoafightingforcethatcapturedKabulin1996.BenazirBhuttoandher interior minister Naseerullah Babar initially provided this support but later the operation wasappropriatedbytheISI.DuringtheTalibanregime(1996–2001)PakistancametoviewAfghanistanasitsbackyardandfelta

senseof securityabout itsPakhtunpopulation.ForPakistan, support to theTalibanbecamean integralpart of its national interest. InMay 2000, Musharraf publicly attested to this support: ‘Afghanistan’smajorityethnicPakhtunshavetobeonourside.Thisisournationalinterest.…TheTalibancannotbealienated byPakistan.Wehave a national security interest there.’15 Pakistan alsomade it clear that itwouldnot allow theTaliban regime tobedestabilized.Forexample,AhmedRashidquotesMaj.Gen.GhulamAhmedKhan, principal staff officer toMusharraf, saying, ‘We are trying to stop theUS fromunderminingtheTalibanregime.TheycannotdoitwithoutPakistan’shelp,becausetheyhavenoassetsthere,butwewillnotallowittohappen,’16

However,knowinglyorunknowingly,Pakistan’ssupporttotheTalibanendedupbolsteringal-QaedainAfghanistan.Itwasnotonlylogisticsupport that thePakistanijihadigroupswereprovidingbutalsomanpowerthatwasusedbyboththeTalibanandal-Qaeda.17

WhilePakistan’sproxies,theTaliban,werewellensconcedinAfghanistan,9/11changedthecourseofhistory.Pakistanhadtofaceastarkchoice:asPresidentBushputit,‘Eitheryouarewithusoryouareagainstus.’Thatdidn’t leaveMusharrafmuchofachoiceandhehadtobite thebulletandturnagainstPakistan’sprotégés.WiththeTalibanrefusingtohandoverOsamabinLaden,theUSlaunchedairattacksonTalibanstrongholdsandbytheendof2001,theTalibangovernmenthadcollapsed.Theal-QaedaandTalibanleadershipfoundrefugeinPakistan’stribalareas(FATA)whiletheirrankandfilewentbacktotheirhomesinAfghanistan.Asaresult,FATAbecameabasecampfortheal-QaedaandtheTalibanfrom

wheretheyrecruited,trainedandlaunchedterroristattacksonUSforcesinAfghanistan.ThecollapseoftheTalibanwasbadenoughforPakistan,worsewastofollow.Itfeltitsinterestswere

ignored in the Bonn Agreement18 and that ‘it was essentially an elite pact between members of theNorthernAllianceandinternationalactors,whichleftoutpartsofthePakhtunsouthandtheconcernsofPakistan’.19TherefrainofthePakhtunsbeingignoredwastobeaconstantthemeofPakistan,projectingitself as champions of the Pakhtuns. It also found resonance, as for example, in the report of anAfghanistan–Pakistan Task Force, which concurred that it was imperative to address ‘long-standingissuessurroundingthestatusofPakhtunsinbothAfghanistan,wheretheyarethelargestethnicgroup,andPakistan,wheretwiceasmanyliveasaminority’.20

TheBonnAgreementmadeHamidKarzaithepresident,whowentontowinthenexttwopresidentialelections too.His relationshipwith Pakistanwas rocky.His linkswith India and his determination topursuehisownindependentforeignpolicyratherthantoePakistan’slinewaslargelyresponsibleforthis.What made matters worse for Pakistan was that with Karzai as president, India re-established itsdiplomatic presence and launched sizeable reconstruction projects totalling around $2 billion. ThegrowingIndianfootprintoutragedPakistanbecauseitperceiveditsworstnightmarescomingtrue.FacedwithrecedingprospectsofAfghanistanbecomingdependentonit,Pakistanhaspursuedapolicy

oftryingtogettheTalibanbackinpowerinKabul,eithermilitarily,aftertheUSleft,orpolitically,viathebackdoor.Fromasearlyas2002-03,al-QaedaandTalibanfightersstartedattackingUSbasesinsideAfghanistan and thenwithdrawing to FATA.21 By 2004, active involvement of the PakistanArmywasnotedwhenitstrucksdroppedandretrievedTalibanfightersattheAfghanborder.By2005NATOtroopsinAfghanistanwerefacedwithseriousattacksfromtheTalibanwhohadthefullbackingofPakistan.22

BruceRiedelcitesasecretNATOstudy,leakedin2012,basedontheinterrogationsof4,000capturedTaliban, al-Qaedaandother fighters inAfghanistan inover27,000 interrogations,whichheld that ‘ISIsupportwascriticaltothesurvivalandrevivaloftheTalibanafter2001.Itprovidessanctuary,trainingcamps,expertise,andhelpwithfundraising.’Thereportconcludedthat‘…theISIisthoroughlyawareofTalibanactivitiesandthewhereaboutsofallseniorTalibanpersonnel.’23

DuringtheTalibanregime,PakistanwasabletosecureitsobjectivesasfarasIndiawasconcerned.Indiawasforcedtoshutitsembassyandthefourconsulates.Inaddition,demonstratinghow‘strategicdepth’workedinpractice,Pakistanrelocatedtrainingcampsoftheanti-IndianjihadistoAfghanistan.Aftertheregimechange,sustaininglinkswiththeTalibanwasconsideredvitalforPakistantomaintain

itsinfluenceinAfghanistanaftertheAmericanwithdrawal.Pakistandidnotwantthevacuumtobefilledupby anyother country in the region (especially India).24 This fearwas articulated clearly by formerarmychiefGen.Kayaniwhostated,‘Strategically,wecannothaveanAfghanarmyonourwesternborderwhichhasanIndianmindsetandcapabilitiestotakeonPakistan.’25

The substantial economic reconstruction programme undertaken by India in Afghanistan has beenanathemaforPakistan.UnableorunwillingtomatchIndianefforts,Pakistanhasresortedtoviolencetoapplybrakeson it.For thispurpose ithasmobilized theTaliban, theHaqqaninetworkand theLeT totargetIndianinterests.AttacksontheIndianconsulateinJalalabadin2003and2007,ontheembassyinKabulin2008and2009,onahotelusedbyIndiansin2010andontheconsulateinHeratinMay2014just as the new Indian governmentwas going to be sworn in, are part of this strategy. These attacks,

however,havenotdeterredIndiainhelpingAfghanistanrebuilditseconomy.Another component of the Pakistani narrative about the alleged adverse consequences of the Indian

presenceinAfghanistanisthatIndia’sconsulatesarebeingusedforsubversivepurposes.Theallegationshave ranged from India printing false Pakistani currency to employing Afghans to carry out acts ofsabotage and terrorism on Pakistani territory. It has accused India of setting up networks of ‘terroristtraining camps’ inside Afghanistan, ‘including at the Afghan military base of Qushila Jadid, north ofKabul;nearGereshk, insouthernHelmandprovince; in thePanjshirValley,north-eastofKabul;andatKahak and Hassan Killies in western Nimruz province.’ None of the charges could, however, beproved.26

The then Balochistan chiefminister, JamMuhammadYusuf, alleged on 13August 2004 that Indiansecret services were maintaining forty terrorist camps all over Baloch territory.27 Likewise, at thebeginningofJuly2006SenatorMushahidHussain,chairmanoftheSenateStandingCommitteeonForeignAffairs, stated that ‘RAW [Research and Analysis Wing] [is] training 600 Baluchis in Afghanistan’insistingthat‘India[is]proppinguptheBalochwar’28.Severalpoliticians,journalistsandarmyleadershave repeated thisallegation since then.However, toquoteDarlymple, ‘US intelligenceagencieshavefollowedupalltheleadsprovidedbythePakistanisonthismatterandhavenotfoundanyevidencethatIndiaisactivelyaidingBaluchiseparatistsinthewayPakistanalleges.’29

Pakistan’sdeepinvolvementinAfghanistanhasintermittentlygivenitaseatonthehightableforawhile,and as a front-line state brought it financial assistance.Has it brought itmore security? In reality, theblowbackfromAfghanistanhashadmajoradverseconsequencesforPakistan.First,Pakistanhad to cater to almost3–3.5millionAfghan refugeeswho sought shelter inPakistan,

manyofwhomhavestillnotreturned.WhiletheUNHighCommissionforRefugees(UNHCR)paidforthem,severalissuesweretohavelong-termconsequencesforthestabilityofPakistan.PakistansoughttorecruittheyoungmalerefugeesforundertakingjihadinAfghanistan.Forthispurpose,ahostofmadrasaswere set upwith the help of Saudi andGulfmoney, not only for theAfghan refugees but also for thePakistanipopulation.Inhisenthusiasmforthecause,Zia-ul-HaqencouragedIslamicvolunteersfromallovertheworldto

trainalongsidetheAfghanmujahideen.TheseglobaljihadiswerefundedbySaudicharitieslikeRabitatal-Alamal-Islami.One suchwho responded to thecallwasOsamabinLaden.Manyof these ‘foreignfighters’weretostaybackafterthejihadwasoverandsettledowninFATA,marryinglocalsandsettingthestageforthenextepisodeofjihadinAfghanistan.Second, according to theUNHCR, as ofDecember 2014, therewere 1.5million registeredAfghan

refugees in Pakistan (and another 1.5 million internally displaced persons [IDPs] displaced due toPakistanArmyoperationsinFATA)makingatotalofoverthreemillionpeopleofconcern.Accordingtoit,‘TheoperatingenvironmentforhumanitarianactorsinPakistanremainsvolatile,withfragilesecurity,aswellasaccess,socialandeconomicchallengeslikelytoaffecthumanitarianoperations.’30

Third,notonlydotheAfghanrefugeesprovidecheaplabourinPakistanicities,buttheyarealsothemainsourceforprovidingrecruitstothePakistan-supportedTalibaninAfghanistan.Solongasthisvastreservoirhasbeenavailable,TalibanhaverecoupedtheirsubstantiallossesinAfghanistanfromamong

theAfghan refugees.The quandary for Pakistan is that so long as theTaliban continue to recoup theirlosses and continue to fight, therewill not be any sustainable refugee repatriation. The government ofKPKhastakenseriousobjectiontothecontinuedpresenceofAfghanrefugeesandhasascribedincidentsofterrorismandcrimetothem,callingfortheirtime-boundrepatriation.31Thishasalsoledtotheriseofanti-PakistansentimentamongtheAfghanPakhtunsduetothebrutaltreatmentmetedouttorefugeesandtheirforcedevictionbyvariousprovincialactors.Interestingly,evenPakistaniPakhtunswere facingproblemsbybeingconsideredasAfghans.As the

Pakhtun leader in Balochistan Mehmood Khan Achakzai told the National Assembly nearly 100,000Pakhtuns had their identity cards blocked because theywere thought to beAfghans.He added, ‘FromSialkottoIslamabadandfromQuettatoPeshawar,anyonewhohasabeardoranyonewhowearsaturbanis [considered] a terrorist.’32 Such discrimination and ethnic profiling does not bode well for inter-provincialharmony.Fourth, drug smuggling, a by-product of the jihad, not only fed organized crime and corruption in

Pakistan, it also had a debilitating effect on consumers. The number of users steadily increased from50,000in1980to8.1million in2011.Everyyearat least50,000morepeoplegetaddicted tovariouskindsofdrugs.ThequantityofopiumconsumedinPakistanhadgoneupto80milliontonnes.33

Accordingtothe2015WorldDrugReportpreparedbytheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC) about 43 per cent of narcotics, heroin and opium produced in Afghanistan transits throughPakistan,withKarachibeing themainoutlet.The reporthaswarned thatunlessPakistan takessteps tocurbtransitofdrugsthroughitsterritory,itrisksturningintoanarcotics-consumingcountry.34

Fifth,since2001,accordingtoPakistanofficialfiguresconveyedtotheSupremeCourtinMarch2013,over 49,000 Pakistanis have died in terrorist attacks, while the armed forces have suffered 15,681casualtiesinthetribalareassince2008.35

Sixth,theEconomicSurvey2015–16estimatesthatduringthelastfourteenyearssince9/11,thedirectandindirectcostincurredbyPakistanduetotheimpactofthewarinAfghanistanamountedto$118.31billion(Rs9.86trillion).ItnotesthattheincreaseinviolentextremismandterrorisminPakistanwasafallout of instability in Afghanistan, causing serious damage to the economy and responsible forwidespreadhumansuffering.36AccordingtoareportpreparedbytheLahoreChamberofCommerceandIndustry, quoting aWorld Bank document, smuggling in Afghan transit trade alone caused $35 billionrevenue loss in the period between 2001 and 2009.37While the figures of the economic cost can bedisputed, the social cost in terms of drugs, weaponization of society, deterioration in law and order,radicalizationofsociety,growthofajihadiculture,etc.,isincalculable.Seventh,beingabasecampforthejihadmeantthatPakistanbecameflushwithmassivequantitiesof

weaponsofall types.PakistanbecameamarketforAfghanarms.Thefreeweapontradeenabledlocalmiscreantstoequipthemselveswithsophisticatedhardware.Thisgavebirthtothe‘Kalashnikovculture’inthecountry.SteveCollestimatesthatby1992AfghanistanhadmorepersonalweaponsperheadthanIndiaandPakistancombined;theSovietUnionpumpedinmilitaryequipmentworthbetween$36billionand$48billion,whiletheUS,SaudisandChinesesuppliedbetween$6billionand$12billionworthofaid.38AlargeportionoftheseweaponsfoundtheirwayintoPakistanandespeciallyintoKarachiwherethelawandordersituationdeterioratedsharplyinthe1990s.It is estimated that there are twentymillion or so arms held by the Pakistani public, ofwhich only

sevenmillionarelicensed.Inotherwords,elevenoutofevery100personsinPakistanisinpossessionof a gun of some kind,whether acquired legally or illegally.39 Not surprisingly, violence has becomeendemic.Eighth,theentireeffortwashandledbytheISIthatmassivelyexpandeditsoperationsandmanpower

to cope with the demands being made on it. The CIA helped increase its technological capabilities,making it an extremelypowerful institution inPakistan.Resultantly, the role and importanceof the ISIgrewexponentially inPakistan.Thiswouldhaveadverseconsequences for the fledglingdemocracy inPakistan.40

Finally,manyperceptiveanalystshavewarnedaboutthefuture.Forexample,EqbalAhmadwrotethatthe Taliban victory was likely to augment Pakistan’s political and strategic predicament instead ofimproving it because it was an illusion that a Taliban-dominated government in Kabul would bepermanentlyfriendly towardsPakistan.Hepredicted that if theTalibanremained inpower, theywouldturn on Pakistan, linking their brand of ‘Islamism’ with a revived movement for Pakhtunistan. Hecautioned,‘Ihavemetsomeofthemandfoundethnicnationalismlurkingjustbelowtheir“Islamic”skin.… The convergence of ethnic nationalism and religion can mobilize people decisively. Howeverinadvertently, Islamabad is setting the stage for the emergence in the next decade of a powerfulPakhtunistan movement.’41 In fact, the backlash from Afghanistan is leading to the Talibanization ofPakistanwith‘strategicdepth’workinginthereversedirection.Suchablowbackhasbeenthehighcosttopayfortryingtopursuethechimeraof‘strategicdepth’and

for tactical advantage.Many in Pakistan agree but so long as the army determines the security policy,thingsareunlikelytochange.

Since the establishment of a new government led by President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul in 2014, theprospectshadbrightenedforbetterPak-AfghanrelationsthantheyhadbeenwhenHamidKarzaiwasatthe helm in Afghanistan. During his joint press conference with Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad on 15November 2014, PresidentGhani declared that the ‘enormous steps’ taken in the ‘last three days hadovercometheobstacles’ in tiesof the‘past thirteenyears’.Ghani’svisitmarkeda renewalofmilitary,intelligenceandeconomiccooperationasalsosetoutaplanforfuturepartnership.Thiswasfollowedupbyaninformation-sharingdealinMay2015betweenPakistan’sInter-ServicesIntelligence(ISI)andtheAfghanNationalDirectorateofSecurity(NDS).Thatwashailedasagamechanger.42

However, the honeymoon did not last very long. By August 2015, Ghani was forced to vent hisfrustrationbysaying, ‘Wehopedforpeacebutweare receivingmessagesofwar fromPakistan’.43Headded:

SinceItookoffice,AfghanshavebeenwaitingforPakistantoshowtheirtangiblecommitment[topeace].ButattacksinthepasttwomonthsandnowinKabulhaveshownusthatitisstillthesameasthepast.…ThesanctuariesofthesuicideattackersarestillinPakistan.…Thesafetyof our people and the interests ofAfghanistan are the only criterionof our relationshipwithPakistan.Ifourpeoplearedyingandgettingkilled,thentherelationshipmakesnosense.44

Ghani’s overtures to Pakistan were rooted in the belief that a resolution of Afghanistan’s securityproblems lay with that country and he staked a lot of domestic capital on this overture.What GhaniwantedwasforPakistantodeliveronitspromisesofbringingtheTalibantothenegotiatingtable.Insteadofdoingthat,GhanifoundthattheTalibanlaunchedmassiveattacksatthecommencementoftheirspringoffensivein2015and2016includinginareasinnorthernAfghanistanlikeKunduz,BadakhshanandSariPol apart fromKabul. This led to formerNorthernAlliance commanders likeVice-PresidentRasheedDostamandGovernorUstadAtatogalvanizetheirforces.To avoid a complete break, Pakistan succeeded in bringing some sections of the Taliban to the

negotiatingtablewherethefirstroundoftalksbetweentheTalibanandtheAfghangovernmentwereheldon7July2015withtheUSandChinaasobservers.SeveralcommentatorssawtheparticipationoftheTaliban in the talks and their agreement to continue the process as amajor change in their attitude.Asecondroundwasscheduledfor31July2015,butwaspostponedduetotheannouncementofthedeathofMullahOmar.Intheensuingleadershiptussle,thenewleaderMullahAkhtarMansoorcarriedoutaseriesofdevastatingattacksinAfghanistaninAugusttoprovehiscredentials.TheattacksledtothecancellationofthepeacenegotiationsasPresidentAshrafGhaniannouncedhewouldnotaskforPakistan’sroleinthefutureforthedialoguewiththeTaliban.ThetensionsbetweenPakistanandAfghanistanescalatedtosuchanextentthatcross-borderskirmishes

took place between the forces of the two sides in mid-June 2016 at Torkham. Resultantly, severalpersonnelwerekilledonbothsides,includingaPakistanimajor.AfghanistanhasalsonotboughtPakistan’sclaimaboutthesuccessofZarb-e-Azb.Inresponsetothe

Pakistanprimeminister’sadvisoronforeignaffairsSartajAziz’sassertionthattheHaqqaninetworkwasnolongeroperationalinPakistanandthattheyhadshiftedtoAfghanistan,theAfghanpresidentialpalaceinastatementinearlySeptember2015insistedthatdocumentsandevidenceshowedthatthenetwork’sleadership, command and control, supportive infrastructure and sanctuaries were still operational inPakistan.SolongasPakistandidnotfrontallytakeontheHaqqaninetwork,itseffortsagainsttheTTPandnudging theAfghanTaliban to talk peacewithKabulwill not getmuch tractionwith the internationalcommunity.After a six-month hiatus some forward movement on talks has become visible largely due to the

participationoftheUSandChina,togetherwithAfghanistanandPakistaninaQuadrilateralCoordinationGroup(QCG)format.Followingseveralmeetings,theQCGsucceededinadoptingaroadmapfordirectAfghangovernment–Talibantalks,stipulatingthestagesandstepsintheprocess.ThefirstroundofpeacetalksbetweenKabulandtheTalibanwassupposedtohavebeenheldinthefirstweekofMarch2016butcould not take place afterTaliban refused to attend and reiterated their demand for the exit of foreigntroops,liftingofcurbsontheirleadersandreleaseofdetainedmilitants.ThekillingoftheTalibanAmirAkhtarMansoorinaUSdronestrikeon21May2016putpaidtoanyhopeofanimmediaterevivalofthepeacetalks.Pakistan’s role in theQCGwas clearly to use its influence over theTaliban and bring them to the

negotiatingtable.SartajAzizconfirmedsucharoleon1March2016atWashington’sCouncilonForeignRelations,whenheadmitted to thepresenceof the top leadershipofAfghanTaliban in safehavens inPakistan for the last many decades. He also confirmed that Islamabad had pressured Afghan Talibanleaderstoparticipateinthefirst-everdirecttalkswiththeAfghangovernmenton7July2015.Afteryears

ofdenial(whichnoonebelievedanyway),PakistanhadfinallyadmitteditscomplicityinsustainingtheTaliban in pursuit of its policy of strategic depth. Sartaj Aziz further compounded matter by tellingReuters,‘Therearerisksinvolvedofhowfarwecangoandinwhatsequenceweshouldgoandinwhatscaleweshouldgo.’45ThisputpaidtotheassertionsofbothPrimeMinisterNawazSharifandarmychiefGen.RaheelSharifatthecommencementofOperationZarb-e-AzbinJune2014thattheAfghanTalibanwouldalsonotbesparedduringthisoperation.Aziz’sassertionmakesitevidentthatPakistancontinuestoregardtheAfghanTalibanasitsstrategicassetandconfirmssuspicionsthattheyweremerelyrelocatedduringtheoperation.ThereasonsforAziz’sconfessionsaredebatablebutitprovidestheAfghangovernmentwithenough

reasonstodoubtPakistan’sintentionsforpeaceandreinforcesPakistan’sdubiousrecord.ItalsomakesPakistanresponsiblefortheactionsoftheTaliban,aresponsibilityitwouldfindhardtofulfilgiventheTalibanoffensivealloverAfghanistan.Given thecurrentstateofplaywithin theTaliban,withseveralgroups vying for leadership and using violence to establish their credentials, it would be extremelydifficulttobringthemorevenamajorityofthemtothenegotiatingtable.Moreover,evenifthetalkstakeplace,groupsnotparty to thenegotiationsare likely topursue theirownagendasregardlessofwhat isagreedinIslamabad.

It is indeedironicalthatPakistan,whichitself isarevanchiststatevis-à-visIndiaasfarasKashmirisconcerned,isfacedbyabiggerrevanchistchallengefromAfghanistan.ThedifferenceisthatinthecaseofKashmir,Pakistanseeksadditionalterritoryasthe‘unfinishedagendaofPartition’whileinthecaseofAfghanistanitwouldloseasubstantialchunkofitsterritoryiftheDurandLineischallenged.Asaresult,Pakistanhashadtojugglebetweenthisconundrum–arguingforachangeinthestatusquointheeastandbeingadefenderofthestatusquointhewest.BothaftertheSovietinterventioninAfghanistaninDecember1979andtheUSinterventioninOctober

2001, Pakistan perceived an opportunity for itself to settle the issue of the Durand Line and bring aclosure to the uncertain status of its western borders. Unfortunately, such an opportunity was seen intactical rather thanstrategic terms.Onbothoccasions,Pakistandidnotsee throughtheopportunityandcalculatethelong-termeffects.Consequently,itendedupdoingfarmoredamagetoitselfthanintryingtoachieveanystrategicgoals.The grievous miscalculation that Pakistan is making is to envision that a Taliban-controlled

Afghanistanwill toeitsline.IftherehasbeenonelessonfromAfghanhistory,it isthatnooutsiderhasbeenabletodominateitforlong.ThisiswhattheBritishlearntinthenineteenthcentury,theSovietsinthetwentiethandtheUSinthetwenty-first.PakistanisnodifferentbutitwillnotstoptryingduetoitsobsessivedesiretocontrolandinstalaweakanddependentgovernmentinKabul.Intheprocess,giventhecostthatithasborneforitsAfghanpolicy,Pakistanisfastbecomingthenextvictimofthis‘graveyardofempires’.Tactically,aweakanddependentAfghanistanmayhelptemporarilytocalmtheinsecuritiesof Pakistan’s military. However, over the long-term, it has brought in its wake refugees, drugs,‘Kalashnikov culture’, and heightened the religious identity of the Pakhtuns even as the concept of‘strategic depth’ itself has become redundant given the fact that both India and Pakistan are nuclearweaponstates.Pakistanalsoneeds togiveup itspatronizingattitude towardsAfghanistanandsee its relations ina

bilateralcontextratherthaninalargerSouthAsiancontext.Asampleofsuchanattitudeisvisibleevenin

thewritingsofnotedcommentatorNajamSethiwhowroteeditoriallyinTheFridayTimes:

Given the burden of geography and history, there can be no peace, security and stability inAfghanistanwithouttheactivesupportofneighbourPakistan…PresidentAshrafGhaniknowsthatforeignrelationsareallaboutquidproquos.IfhewantstoresettieswithPakistantohisadvantage,hehastostartbymakingsurethatAfghanistan’stieswithIndiawillnolongerbetoPakistan’sdisadvantage.46

Ifthiscontinuestobetheattitude,itishardlysurprisingthatthemovestowardsrapprochementhavestalled.Clearly,fromthePakistanside,itwasnotagenuinechangeofheartandpolicy,andtheyhadlittleintentiontomatchwordswithactionsontheground.It isonlywhenthearmyacceptsAfghanistanasasovereigncountryentitledtohaveitsownpoliciesthatbestservesitsowninterests,andrealizesthattheAfghansarefirstandforemostAfghans, thatadentwillbemadeinPak-Afghanrelations.Till then, theblowbackfromAfghanistanwillcontinuetopushPakistantowardstheabyss.

16

China:TheQuestforSuccour

[A]sneighbours,itisdifficultnottohavesomedifferencesordisputesfromtimetotime.…We should look at the differences or disputes from a long perspective, seeking a just andreasonable settlement through consultations and negotiations while bearing in mind thelargerpicture.Ifcertainissuescannotberesolvedforthetimebeing,theymaybeshelvedtemporarilysothattheywillnotaffectthenormalstate-to-staterelations.

—ChinesePresidentJiangZemintothePakistanparliamentinDecember1996

THE ‘ALL weather’ friendship between Pakistan and China has been variously described by theleadershipof the twocountries as ‘higher than themountains’, ‘deeper than theoceans’, ‘sweeter thanhoney’and‘strongerthansteel’.Thenewepithetis‘Ironbrothers’.InMarch1969,ChinesepresidentLiuShao-chiusedthetermmujahidanadosti(friendshipbetweenfellowfightersinajihad)whenhevisitedPakistan,1thoughthatmonikerhasnotbeenusednowforquitesometimeforobviousreasons.ItisindeedauniquerelationshipbetweenacommunistgiantandanIslamiccountry,betweenagodlessoneandGod-fearingone.Continuedcommonalityofinterestshasbridgeddifferencesinlanguage,culture,historyandideology.

ForChina,PakistancontinuestobethehubofitsSouthAsiapolicy;forPakistan,ChinaisthePoleStarinitsnationalsecuritystrategy.IrrespectiveofthenatureofthegovernmentinPakistan–civilianormilitary–andirrespectiveoftheparty–PPPorPML-N–thereisabasicunderstandingthattherelationshipwithChinaissacrosanct.Till recently, China’s interest in Pakistan was not bilateral per se but a combination of three

interrelatedstakesthathadmoretodowithitsregionalinterests.ThefirstwasthemutualityofinterestswithPakistanvis-à-visIndia.ThesecondwasthespilloverofterrorismandIslamicradicalizationfromPakistan and Afghanistan into Xinjiang, adversely impacting the eight million ethnic Uighurs. Third,China’s growing economic stakes in Afghanistan, including the $3.5 billion copper-mining contract atMesAynaknearKabul.Pakistan’smotivationhasbeentouse‘borrowedpower’fromChinatobalanceitsinferioritywithIndia.Tothisend,ithasseeninChinaafriendthatwouldbailitoutpoliticallyandmilitarily. The new bilateral economic element in the relationship is the China–Pakistan EconomicCorridor(CPEC)thathasbeenbilledasagamechanger.

The Pakistan-China relationship dates back to the 1950swhen Pakistanwas one of the first states torecognizethePeople’sRepublicofChinaandthefirstMuslimonetodoso.However,itwasonlyinthe

1960s,especiallyafterthe1962Indo-Chinawar,thattherelationshipstartedtakingoff.Thefirstsignofthiswas the twocountries resolving theirboundary issue inKashmir.Ahighpointof thebuddingPak-China relationship (as alsoof thePak-US relationship)wasPakistan facilitating the secretvisit ofUSSecretaryofStateHenryKissingertoChinainJuly1971.AneditorialintheDawnrationalizedIslamicPakistan’salliancewithcommunistChinaasfollows:

ForthepreservationofourIslamicstateandtominimizetheriskofHinduBharat’saggressionagainstit,wemustnowturntoChina,andthiswecandowithnorisktoourIslamicideology.InHinduBharat,IslamishatedbecauseitisIslamandMuslimsareperiodicallybutcheredinlargenumbersbecausetheyareMuslims.InRedChinareligionassuchmaybedecried,butofallreligionsonlyone,namelyIslam,isnotsingledoutfordenigration,andofallcommunitiesonlyone,namelytheMuslimsarenotsingledoutforviolentpersecution.2

IntheChina–PakistanTreatyofFriendshipandCooperationandGoodNeighbourlyRelationssignedinApril2005,bothcountriesagreedthat‘neitherpartywilljoinanyallianceorblocwhichinfringesuponthesovereignty,securityandterritorialintegrity’ofeithercountry,whilesimultaneouslypositingthatbothparties‘wouldnotconclude treatiesof thisnaturewithany thirdparty’.Further,neithershallallowitsterritorytobeusedbyathirdcountrytojeopardizethestatesovereignty,securityandterritorialintegrityof the other and each country will prohibit, on its own soil, the establishment of organizations orinstitutions which infringe upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other.3 In July2013, with the signing of ‘Common Vision for Deepening China–Pakistan Strategic CooperativePartnershipintheNewEra’,therelationshipwasfurtherstrengthened.4

ThereareahostofexampleswhereChinahasservedasakeyallyforPakistan.SomeoftheseincludeprovidingdiplomaticsupporttoPakistan’spositiononKashmirintheUnitedNations;vetoingproposalsin theUN thatwere harmful to Pakistan, and lobbying against bringing a proposal to theUNSecurityCouncil (UNSC) that would hurt Pakistan’s interests. For years China vetoed or held up UNSCresolutionsbanning jihadigroups like theJamaat-ud-Dawa(JuD),dropping its resistanceonlyafter theterrorattacksinMumbaiinNovember2008.Morerecently,inresponsetotheUSraidthatkilledOsamabinLaden,ChineseprimeministerWenJiabao issuedastatement insupportofPakistan;ChinavetoedIndia’scomplaintintheUNaboutZakiur-RehmanLakhvi,themastermindbehindtheMumbaiattacks,andthe banningofMasoodAzhar, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) chief, inMarch 2016.Earlier,China hadevenvetoedBangladesh’sentryintotheUNsinceitregardedittobearebelliousprovinceofPakistan.On itspart,Pakistanhas refrained from takingup the issueof thepersecutionofMuslimUighurs in

China, thoughithasbeenveryvociferousaboutthestatusofMuslimsinotherareasliketheRohingyasandtheKashmiris.Equally,ithasensuredthattheissuewasnottakenupduringtheOIC(OrganizationsofIslamicCountries)meetings,whichwasacknowledgedbyChinatoo.5

China’simportancetoPakistancanalsobegaugedfromthefactthatthefirstvisitprimeminister–electNawazSharifmadeafterwinningthe2013electionswastoChina,andnottoSaudiArabiathathadgivenhimsanctuarywhileMusharrafhadexiledhim fromPakistan.Pakistanhasalsogoneoutof itsway tosecureChineseinterestsinPakistan.TheattackontheLalMasjidin2007wasinpartmeanttoassuageChineseconcernssincesomeChinesenationalshadbeenheldhostagethere.Itisbelievedthatthebrutalcrackdown in Balochistan and the ‘kill and dump’ policy adopted there is meant to protect Chinese

interestsinBalochistan.6

However, the all-weather friendship has not been without its hiccups. The address of ChinesepresidentJiangZemintothePakistanparliamentinDecember1996hasbeennotedatthebegningofthechapter.7Theimplicationofthespeechwasthatforeignrelationsshouldnotbeheldhostagetodisputeswithneighboursandunresolvedissuesshouldbesetasidefor thesakeof longer-termstability.Almosttwodecadeslater,anotherChinesepresident,XiJinping,wastoreiteratesimilarsentiments.Duringhisaddresstoparliamenton21April2015,Xiunderscoredinternalsecurityastheprerequisiteforstabilityand development by highlighting philosophy of China’s peaceful development and achieving nationalrenewal.More interestingly,heskippedissuessuchasKashmir, therebyindirectlyadvisingPakistan toreviewtheirKashmirpolicyinordertoremoveamajorstickingpointinrelationswithIndia.8

Evenmorethanthepolitical,thekeyelementofthePak-Chinarelationshiphasbeen,andis,defencecooperation – conventional weapon supplies and nuclear cooperation (civil andmilitary). For China,militarilyequippingPakistanhasbeenalow-costoptiontokeepIndiaboggeddownandthreatenedwithapotentialtwo-frontwar.By2013,PakistanhademergedasthelargestrecipientofChinesearmsexport,indicatingadrawing

downof reliance of thePakistanmilitary solely onWestern sources, despite quality issueswith someChinesesystems.AmongthedefenceequipmentsuppliedrecentlyhavebeentheChineseJF-17Thunderfighteraircraft;J-10medium-rolecombataircraft,F-22Pfrigateswithhelicopters,K-8jettrainers,T-85tanks,F-7aircraft,smallarmsandammunition.ChinahasalsohelpedPakistanbuilditsheavymechanicalcomplex,aeronauticalcomplex,andseveraldefenseproductionunits.9Moreover,unlike theUS,Chinahasnevercutoffsuppliesofweapons,orimposedsanctionsonPakistan.AnexampleoftheclosedefencecooperationisthegeneralimpressionthattheChineseengineerswereallowedtoexaminethewreckageoftheUSstealthhelicopterthathadcrashedinAbbottabadduringtheraidtokillOsamabinLaden.10

However,thekeyelementintherelationshiphasbeennuclearcooperation.AsAndrewSmallputsit;‘…ifthemilitaryrelationshipliesattheheartofChina–Pakistanties,nuclearweaponslieattheheartofthemilitaryrelationship.’11ThereisfairlywelldocumentedevidencethattransferofChinesetechnologyandexpertise toPakistan in the1980sand1990shelpedoperationalizePakistan’snuclearweaponandmissile programme.This included supplies of low-enriched uranium, nuclearwarhead design from its1966 nuclear test and 5,000 ringmagnets for use in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium.12 On missiles,ChinaisreportedtohavesuppliedPakistanwith thirty-fourshort-rangeballisticM-11missiles,builtaturnkeyballisticmissilemanufacturing facilitynearRawalpindi, andhelpedPakistandevelop the750-km-rangesolid-fuelledShaheen-1ballisticmissile.13

Onthecivilside,ChinahelpedPakistanbuildtwonuclearreactorsatChasmain1990s,beforejoiningtheNuclearSuppliersGroup(NSG).Itsignedadealin2009tobuildtwomoreunderthe‘grandfather’clause–namely,thatthesetwonewreactorswerepartoftheearlierdeal(forChashma1and2)whichChinahadalreadydeclaredaspartofitscommitmentswhenitjoinedtheNSG.14

Pakistan and China have set up several ‘Framework Agreements’ and mechanisms to foster bilateraltrade.Despite these, the trade targetof$15billionby2010(extended to2015)couldnotbeachieved.Bilateral trade that stoodat$7billion in2006, rose to$12.35billionby2014,withPakistaniexports

increasingby48percent(2011–12).Incontrast,China’stradewithIndiahasincreasedfromaround$5billionin2002tomorethan$60billionin2010,andthetwohavepledgedtoboostitoverthenextfiveyearsto$100billionannually.Currently,PakistanhasanenormoustradedeficitwithChina.Outofthetotaltradeofaround$12.35

billion between the two countries in 2014, only around $2.76 billion were exports from Pakistan.AccordingtoUrumqiCustoms,thetotaltradebetweenXinjiangandPakistanintheyear2014wasworthonly $319 million, which is about 2.6 per cent of the total trade between the two countries. Thus,upgrading the road linkages between Xinjiang and Pakistan may not by itself result in improving thebalanceoftradebetweenthetwocountriesashasbeenclaimed.TheprimaryreasonfortradebetweenPakistanandChinabeingatalowebbisthatPakistan’sexports

toChina are basically low-value rawmaterial and commodities since it is not in a position to exporthigh-techgoods.This,togetherwithminimalpeople-to-peoplecontacts,detractsfromthehigh-soundingepithetsofthepoliticalandmilitaryrelationship.ChinaisalsouncomfortablewithPakistanseekinglargebailoutsfromitandhasinvariablypushedit towardsmultilateralinstitutionsliketheIMFasitdid,forexample, in2008whenPresidentZardaricameseekingabailout.Theattemptwasunsuccessful.15 ForBeijing, the risk of Pakistan’s defaultwas simply too high.China did notwant to be the only countryshoringupPakistanfinancially.Will the recent developments regarding the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) take the

economic and strategic relationship between the two countries to a new level? PresidentXi Jinping’stwo-day visit to Pakistan in April 2015 marked the formal launch of the CPEC that is part of thepresident’spetprojectoftheSilkRoadEconomicBeltandtheTwenty-first-CenturyMaritimeSilkRoad(alsoreferredtoasOneBeltOneRoad–OBOR).China’sinterestinaneconomiccorridorfromGwadartoKashgarinXinjiangisunderstandable.With

about80percentofChineseoil importsarrivingvia sea routes from theMiddleEastandAfrica,anyalternativeroutetothe‘choke-point’oftheStraitsofMalaccawouldbeappealing.ReroutingpartofthesuppliestoXinjiangfromthePersianGulfviaGwadarshortensthedistancebyover7,500km.Intermsoftime,Chinawouldgainovertendaysintransporttimeforgoodsandenergy.Currently,ittakestwelvedaystoshipgoodsandfuelfromtheMiddleEast,whereasthecorridorwouldcutthisdowntothirty-sixhours.16ThecorridorwouldalsoopenupXinjiangsincethedistancebetweentheprovinceandGwadaris2,500kmcomparedto4,500fromChina’seasternseaboard.However, there is considerable scepticism about the economic viability of the corridor given the

uneconomiccostsforChinaofusingGwadarasatransitpointforevenpartofitscrudeoilsupplies.IthasbeenestimatedthatwhiletransportingabarrelofoilthroughtheMalaccaStraitsisUS$10percubicmetre,transshippingitviaGwadarandthencetoKashgarwouldcostUS$70.Thisbeingso,quiteclearlyfortheChinesethesignificanceoftheCPEChastobemorestrategicthaneconomic.17

Be that as it may, for Pakistan, what the CPEC signifies is a huge Chinese commitment and anexpansionandupgradationoftherelationshipfromthepoliticalandmilitarytotheeconomicsphere.Thecrucialquestion,however,iswhetherPakistancankeepupitsendofthebargain.TheeconomiccorridorwilllinkKashgarinXinjiangtoGwadarinBalochistan.Chinawillprovidean

investment-cum-loan package of $45.65 billion over the next 10–15 years for Pakistan’s energy andinfrastructure.Thiswouldinvolveabout$34billioninprivatesectorinvestmentbyChinesecompanies,

insurersandbanks.Theremaining$11billionwillbeintheshapeof‘veryconcessionalloans’andsomegrants,accordingtoPlanningandDevelopmentMinisterAhsanIqbal.18

Thebiggestchunkof the investmentofabout$35billionwillbe forenergyprojects includingcoal-firedpowerplants,adam,asolarpowerpark,andagaspipeline to Iran.Together, theseprojectsareexpectedtocreateabout17,000megawatts(MW)ofpower.TheNawazSharifgovernmenthasproposedtwenty-nine industrial parks and twenty-one mineral-processing zones in all four provinces.19

Theoretically,ifalltheenvisagedprojectsmaterialize,Pakistanwouldgetanetworkofroads,railwaysand energy pipelines linking Gwadar to Kashgar. All this potentially would be a shot in the arm forPakistan’sfalteringeconomyandconsolidateadecades-oldstrategicpartnership.TheeuphoriaandanticipationinPakistanwasbestexpressedbyPlanningandDevelopmentMinister

AhsanIqbal:‘Thisisgoingtobeagamechanger.Ifweareunabletotakefulladvantageofthis,itwillbea historic national failure andwe are unlikely to get another chance like this in decades and perhapscenturies.’20Morerealistically,commentatorAyazAmirwroteinhisinimitablestyle:‘ThewayPakistanistalkingabouttheCPECgivestheimpressionasifourdestinyisallsettochange.Thekeystoparadisewillfallinourhands.’21Inreality,theCPECisahugeopportunityforPakistanbutlikeinthecaseofthedemographicdividend, it is anopportunity thathas tobe seizedand realized.By itself itwillnotpullPakistanoutofthemorassitisinnow.ItisPakistanwhowillhavetopullupitssockstotakeadvantageofthepotentialthattheCPECcanprovide.AtthecentreoftheprojectistheportofGwadarlocatednearthemouthoftheStraitofHormuzasthe

corridor’sgatewaythatopensupaccessforChinatotheMiddleEastandAfrica.ChinahadfinancedtheconstructionoftheGwadarportintheearlyyearsofthetwenty-firstcentury.Itwasinauguratedin2008and for several years operated by a Singaporean company PSA International. In February 2013, theoperation of the port was taken over by the state-run Chinese Overseas Port Holdings Company(COPHC). The port can also function as a ‘listening post’ tomonitor US naval activity in the IndianOcean and Persian Gulf. Many analysts describe Gwadar as one of China’s ‘string of pearls’, i.e.,ChinesenavalbasesorfacilitiesringingIndia.To provide security to the 3,000-kilometre-long CPEC, the Pakistan Army is creating a Special

SecurityDivision(SSD)consistingofninecompositeinfantrybattalions(9,000personnel)andsixwingsofcivilianarmedforces(6,000personnel)tobeheadedbyaservingmajorgeneralofthearmy.OnavisittotheSSDon19February2016,Gen.RaheelSharifstated,‘Themilitaryisreadytopayanypricetoturnthisambitiousprojectintoreality.’22

The original route linkedGwadarwithKashgar viaBalochistan andKPK. The plan has now beenchangedandmedia reports suggest that therewill be three routes, one theoriginal, the second throughcentral Pakistan and the third through Sindh and Punjab. Balochistan andKhyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)governmentshaveaccusedthefederalgovernmentandPunjabofchangingtheroutetosuittheinterestsofPunjabeventhoughthisroutewillbe300kilometreslongerthantheoriginalone.23

The Balochistan government has prepared a report titled ‘China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: TheRoute Controversy’, which has examined the viability of the three routes. Its conclusion is ‘… bypreferringaroutethatpassesthroughPunjabandSindhratherthanKhyberPakhtunkhwaandBalochistan,thefederalgovernment isartificially inflatingthecostof theChina–PakistanEconomicCorridor, to thepointwhere itmaybecomeeconomicallyunviable.’ Itwarned that, ‘Byselecting theeastern route, the

governmentwastradingofftoday’ssecurityriskswithprovincialdiscordandpoliticalinstabilityinthefuture.’24

OneoftheobjectivesthatChinaistryingtoachievethroughtheCPECistoprovidedevelopmentforthebackwardregionofwesternChina.ForPakistantoo,thereallong-termbenefitfromCPECwouldbetodevelopnewareasandcitiesbringingprogress to them.However, insteadof following theChinesemodel, thePML-Ngovernmentseemskeen to focuson theroute thatpasses throughalreadydevelopedcentralPunjabareas.Thiswillonlyincreaseprovincialdisparitiesandfuelalienationthatisatdangerouslevels.Even though Nawaz Sharif has himself assured that the original western route will be developed

expeditiously, the fact of the matter is that the executing agency of the CPEC, the National HighwayAuthority(NHA), informedtheSenateCommitteeonCommunication that theallocationfor thewesternroutewasRs20billioncompared toRs110billion for theeasternalignment. ‘Thisallocationpatternconfirms that the priority will be given to the eastern route that passes through Punjab and that theassurancesoftheprimeministerwerejustaneyewash,’writesDrPervezTahir.25ThechiefministerofKPK, Pervez Khattak, has been the most vocal critic of the route change and has threatened massagitationsandahalttolandacquisitionsunderwayfortheprojectintheprovinceincasethedemandsoftheprovincearenotmet.In fact, thewestern route is a bit of themystery.According to theKPK chiefminister, theChinese

ambassador inameetinghaddenied thepresenceof thewestern route.26According to theBalochistangovernment, they have not received any directives from the federal government regarding the landacquisitionforthewesternroute.27Moreover,theJointCoordinationCommittee(JCC)thathasthefinalauthorityonCPECmattershadapprovedtheroutesanddetailslongbeforetheChinesepresidentvisitedPakistan.NoreservationbyanypoliticalpartyofPakistanorprovincewaspresentedordiscussedbytheJCC.Inotherwords,theAllPartiesConference(APC)calledbyPrimeMinisterNawazSharifandtheopeningceremonyforthewesternroutewerenothingbutabadjoke.28

One shameful result of the wrangling and discord over the CPEC route is the unprecedentedinterventionandadmonitionbytheChineseembassyinIslamabadon9January2016:

We hope that relevant parties could strengthen communication and coordination, solvedifferencesproperly,soastocreatefavourableconditionsfortheCPEC.WearereadytoworkwithPakistanisidetoactivelypromoteconstructionoftheCPECprojects,andbringtangiblebenefitstothepeoplesofthetwocountries.29

The unsavoury route controversy demonstrates the lack of a long-term vision and planning amongPakistan’srulingelite.Italsohighlightsthatinsteadofanationalgood,politiciansarelookinguponthisprojectinprovincialandconstituencyterms.AttheheartoftheroutecontroversyiswhatAyazAmircalls‘theRaiwindapproachtotheCPECthathasfannedtheflamesofinter-provincialdiscord.’30ThisharksbacktothehistoricalexploitationofthesmallerprovincesbyPunjab.Asaresult,thesmallerprovincesseetheCPECasanotherexampleoftheSharifbrothersleveragingtheprojectforthebenefitofPunjabonly.Apart from the route controversy, there are several issues with the CPEC project. For one,

transparencyandaccountabilityhavebeensacrificedbecausedetailsoftheprojectshavenotbeenshared,

there is nopublic biddingor even announcement.Clearly, the intention is that themajor proportionoftheseloanswillbechannelledbacktoChinatobenefitonlyChinesecompanies.Worse,sincethereisnotransparency, issues suchas cost efficiency, economic feasibility andviability, environmental concernsarelikelytobeignoredthatcouldleadtoseriouseconomicandenvironmentalissueslateron.Recently,the federal minister for planning and development, Ahsan Iqbal, has laid to rest the debate abouttransparencybytellingtheSenatethattheCPECagreementissensitiveandcannotbedisclosed.31

Asaresultoflackoftransparency,reportsaboutlarge-scalecorruptionhavestartedemergingalmostimmediately after theproject got off theground.For example, twoof the four highwayprojects of the‘Westernrouteof theCPEC’ inBalochistan, inauguratedby theprimeminister inDecember2015withmuchfanfare,wereawardedtothesecondlowestbiddersinsteadofthelowestones,causingalossofoverRs650million.Thereasoningforrejectingthelowestbidderhasbeenunsatisfactory.32TherearealsoreportsaboutCPECprojectsbeingbilledatmuchhighercoststhanoriginallyplannedduetoChinesecompaniesnotfollowingcompetitivebiddingprocesses.Much worse, it has later emerged that the whole inauguration drama was another example of the

deception being carried out by the federal government. In reality, the two projects inaugurated wereactuallyfundedbytheAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB)asperanagreementsignedinMay2015andnotthroughtheCPECfunds.ThusBalochistanwasagainshort-changedbyusingADBfunds insupposedlyCPECprojectsthusdeprivingtheprovinceofitsdueshareinCPECfundsforinfrastructuredevelopment.Such sleights of the hand can only fuel provincial discord and reinforce suspicions of the federalgovernment’sintentions.Second,asimportantastheprovincialconcernsaretheissuesoffinances,especiallybecausethereis

noclarityaboutthem.SomuchsothateventhegovernoroftheStateBankofPakistan,AshrafMahmoodWathra,themainfinancialregulatorofthecountry,wasconstrainedtosayinaninterviewtoReutersthathedidnotknowhowmuchwasgoingtobefinancedbydebtandhowmuchbyequity.Heopenlycalledfor theCPEC to bemore transparent.33 The governormust be aworriedman because the $46 billionCPEC is three times the reserves held by theStateBank and repaymentswould become a huge issue.GivenPakistan’s loan repayment situationasdiscussed inChapter12 on the economy, the last thing itneedsisfurtheraccumulationofunspecifieddebt.EventheWorldBank,initslatestreporttitledGlobalEconomicProspects2016,releasedinJanuary2016,hascautionedthat‘Sovereignguaranteesassociatedwith CPEC could pose substantial fiscal risks over themedium term.’ Former financeminister HafizPashahasprojectedthatloanscontractedunderCPECwillpushthecountry’stotalexternaldebtto$90billion34fromthecurrentabout$70billion.Third,Pakistan isonlynowwakingup to thekindof strings thatwill comeattached to themassive

Chinese investment. For example, some of the Chinese demands include granting tax exemptions tointerest income earned by Chinese banks that lend to projects in Pakistan; special protection fromexposuretothecirculardebtinthepowersectorthrougharevolvingfacilityfundedbythegovernment;exemption of insurance income from tax; settlement of payments in dollars; exemption from taxes onmachinery imports for infrastructure and other projects; purchase of equipment only from Chinesesuppliers and their installation by Chinese labour. Negotiations on these and other issues have beeninconclusive so far.Decisions on such issueswill determinewhere the real costs and benefits of theinvestments lie. If they are not negotiated properly,Dawnwarns, the country can be left saddledwith

paymentobligationsthatwillbecomeknownonlywhenitistoolate.35

Fourth, as noted earlier, the main issue in the energy sector is not generation but productivity,distribution, line lossesandpoorgovernance.Further investment ingenerationwillnotsolve the long-termissuesplaguingtheenergysectorthoughtheymaygivetheimpressionofdoingsointheimmediateterm.Tooperationalizetheinvestment,Pakistanwillhavetomakecrucialreformsintheenergysector.Fifth, for Pakistan to truly benefit from such amassive investment, itwill have to upgrade its own

absorption capacity by bringing the education sector up to scratch so that skilled and semi-skilledworkforce can be employed in these projects. However, as noted in Chapter 11 on education, suchinvestmentsaresorelylacking.Sixth, the emphasis in the energy sector is on thermal power projects based on bothThar coal and

imported coal, and LNG. It is universally accepted that thermal power is far more expensive thanhydropower.Theemphasis,therefore,shouldhavebeenonthelatter.Consideringthattwentytextilemillshave already closed down recently due to exchange appreciation, with 100 more believed to bevulnerabletopowerviabilityissues,willtheindustrysurviveapotentialhikeinpowerprice?‘No’,saysAllPakistanTextileManufacturersAssociation(APTMA)chairmanS.M.Tanveer.36

Seventh,theeconomiccorridorwillbeviableifitisused.TheLahore–Islamabadmotorwayisacasein point. Though it has been in existence for the last twenty years there is very little industrialdevelopmentalongitsrouteandneitherhastherebeenanyvalueadditiontoagriculture.Ifanything,ithasonlybenefitedtheelite,enablingthemtotravelbetweenLahoreandIslamabadquickly.WillthehighwaysunderCPECmeetthesamefate?Eighth,notallpreviousannouncementsofChineselargessehavematerializedinPakistanandthiswill

notbe thefirstoccasion thatmegabuckdealshavebeenannouncedbyChina.During thevisitofPrimeMinisterWenJiabaoofChinatoPakistanin2010,thenewswasthathehadbroughtalonga200-strongbusinessdelegationtosignMOUsworthUS$35billionwiththepublicandprivatesectorofPakistan.However,mostoftheMOUswerenotworththepapertheywerewrittenon.Ultimately,neitherdidChinamakeanysignificantforeigninvestmentsinPakistan,nordidithandoutfreemoney.Infact,overthepastfifty years, China’s foreign direct investment in Pakistan has averaged around $100million a year. Ifhistoryisanyguide,Pakistanwilltakearound450yearstoabsorbthenewMOUsbeingvaluedat$45billion.37

Ninth,previousexperiencewithChinesefundingofprojectsinPakistanhasnotbeenveryencouraging.Between2001and2011,accordingtoMoeedYusuf,only6percentofaidpledgedbyChinawasactuallydeliveredintermsofprojectsontheground.Inthemajorityofcases,itwaslackofseriousness,capacityor resources on the Pakistani side that dissuaded Chinese counterparts from following through.38 AspecificcaseisoftheshelvingoftheGadaniEnergyParkasnotedinChapter12ontheeconomy.FortheSharifsthereisanurgencytocompletethe‘earlyharvest’projectsbeforethenextelectionsdue

in2018.Notsurprisingly,bulkof theseprojectsareplanned inPunjabandSindh.Outof$28.6billionearly-harvestprojects,Punjabhasthelion’sshareof$13billion,Sindh$4.6billion,KPK$1.8billion,Islamabad$1.5billion,andBalochistan$920million.However,lessthantwoyearsaftertheApril2015launch of CPEC, several of these early-harvest projects are facing delays or are in danger of beingclosed. These include the $1.8 billion, 870-MWSuki–Kinari hydroelectric power project;39 the $590million,330MWcoal-basedpowerprojectinPunjab;40acoalminingproject inThar;andfourpower

plants listedtogenerate4,620MWofpower;41andalso the$2.1billion,878-km-longMatiari–Lahoretransmission line listed to supply 4,000 MW of electricity produced from coal in Sindh to cities inPunjab.42

Thedelaysandpossibleclosureoftheaboveprojectsindicatethatnotmuchthoughtandplanninghavegoneintotheprojects.ItisalmostasifthefederalandPunjabgovernmentswanttoramhometheprojectssothattheycanshowsomeachievementbeforethenextelections.Intheprocess,thereisagravedangerthatthemistrustthatthesmallerprovinceshavewithPunjabandtheirinsecuritiesvis-à-visthefederationwill get aggravated as a result of theCPEC.Unless the smallerprovinces, especiallyBalochistan andKPK,aregivenasenseofownership, theCPECmayactuallydamagePakistanratherthanbethegamechangeritisbilledtobe.Anominouswarninghasbeensounded:‘Itwoulddouswelltorememberthatinvestment inEastPakistanwas also consideredunsafe for security reasons.What are the planners oftodaydrivingthesmallerprovincesto?’43

ThedelayshavenotgoneunnoticedbytheChinese.TheadmonitionbytheChineseembassyinJanuary2016hasalreadybeennoted.Inaddition,readingbetweenthelinesofmediareports,itwouldappearthattheChinesearegettingincreasinglyfrustratedwiththefailureofthepoliticalleadershiptoprovideinter-ministerial and inter-provincial coordination. It has been suggested in themedia that theChinese haveeven suggested that the government formally rope in the PakistanArmy to ensure themanagement andsmoothexecutionofCPEC.44

ReflectiveofChinesefrustrationisthemeetingthattheChineseambassadortoPakistanhadwithGen.RaheelSharifon7June2016wheretheCPECwasdiscussed.PakistanpresidentMamnoonHussainhelda meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai CooperationOrganization(SCO)meetinginTashkent,Uzbekistan,on23June2016where‘thetimelyrealizationofallprojects under CPEC’ was discussed. Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan also met visitingChineseminister for state security, GengHuichang, on 14 July 2016wherein the two agreed that toppriority would be given to timely implementation of CPEC.45 The repeated focus on ‘timelyimplementation’isaclearindicationoftheChineseunhappinessattheprogressoftheprojects.Thus,whileCPECcouldenormouslybenefitthePakeconomy,expectationsneedtobetemperedwith

realism,especiallywherefinancialissuesareconcerned.AnecdotalevidencesuggeststhatatleastsomePakistanisarebeginningtorealizethis.Forexample,ataseminarheldinDecember2015,anadvisertotheBalochistangovernmentaskedifPakistaniswillbasicallybefixingpuncturesonChinesetrucks.ThereplyreportedlygivenbythecommanderofSouthernCommandofthePakistanArmywasthatChinesecompaniesoughttobeaskedtoexplainhowPakistanwillbenefitfromthelargervisionoftheCPEC.46

Fortheimplementationoftheproject,thenatureandqualityofthePakistanileadershipwillbecrucial.Gen.RaheelSharifhasstatedonseveraloccasionsthatthearmyiscommittedtothesuccessoftheCPEC.WilltheimplementationofCPEC,perhapsunderChineseprompting,becomeanothercontentiousissuesincivil–militaryrelations?WillthearmyseektomoveinandcontrolallaspectsofCPECinsteadofjustsecurity?Thisissomethingthatwillhavetobewatchedoutfor.

The friendshipbetweenPakistanandChinahas stood the testof timesince the1960s toa largeextentbecauseof themutualhostility towards India.ChinesesupportofPakistan,especiallymilitarysupport,

hasbeena low-costoptionofdivertingIndianattentionfromChinaandmakingsure it remainsboggeddowninsquabbleswithPakistan.China’sovertsupporttoPakistanpeakedduringthe1965Indo-Pakwarwhen Chinese premier Zhou Enlai reportedly assured the Pakistanis that China was prepared to putpressureonIndiaintheHimalayas‘foraslongasnecessary’.47ChinacontinueditssupportforPakistanduringthe1971warbutdidnotintervene.DuringZ.A.Bhutto’svisittoBeijinginNovember1971‘therewasneveranyquestionofactivemilitaryinvolvementandsuchaneventualitywasnotevendiscussed’.48

However,BhuttoandYahyaKhancreatedanimpressioninPakistanthatChinawouldintervene.In1972,during Bhutto’s trip to China, a joint communiqué strongly condemned India’s ‘naked aggression’ and‘occupationofPakistan’sterritory’49

AccordingtoSmall,itwasnotmilitarydisarrayorfearofwarwiththeRussiansthatpreventedChinafrominterveningin1971.‘Rather,itwaspoliticaljudgementthatwouldforeshadowmanyothercrucialepisodesintherelationshipbetweenthetwocountriesoverthedecadestocome:ChinawouldnotpullPakistanoutoftheholesitinsistedondiggingforitself.’50

Sincethen,ChinahasmodulateditsstanceonIndo–PakfrictiontothediscomfortofPakistan.TheshiftinChina’spolicytowardsIndiahithomeinthe1996speechofPresidentJiangZeminquotedearlier.ThechangeinChineseattitudebecameevenmorepronouncedinthe1999Kargilconflict,whenthethenprimeministerNawazSharifwenttoBeijingandunsuccessfullysoughtChina’ssupportagainstIndia.‘Beijingprivately supported US calls for Pakistan to withdraw its forces to defuse the crisis, and apparentlycommunicatedthisstancetoPakistanileaders.’51AnalystscontendthatBeijingnolongerconsidersitinChina’sbestinteresttogetentangledinaconflictwithtwonuclear-armedneighbours.WhileChinesehostilitytowardsIndiastillholdsgood,therehavebeenchanges,primarilybecauseof

Chineseapprehensions,andgrowingSino-Indian relations.Given thegiantstrides thatChinahasmadeeconomicallyandmilitarily,China’spriorityissecurityinitsneighbourhoodinordertoconsolidateitseconomic gains. China’s ambitions of becoming a superpower would in a large measure depend onregionalpeaceandstabilityandinpromotingeconomicrelationswiththeUS.BeijinghassignalledthatitfavouredbilateralIndo-Paknegotiationstoresolvetheirdifferences.This,however,doesnotmeanthatChinawouldeasilysettleitsboundarydisputeswithIndiaorwill

notpressurizeIndiaon theLineofActualControl (LoAC).ForChina,whileeconomicdevelopment iscrucial,itsterritorialclaimsareevenmorevital.ItisalsounlikelythattheburgeoningIndo-Chinatradewould impact on the all-weather Pakistan-China relationship, especially itsmilitary component. Smallsumsitupwellwhenhestates:‘…forBeijing,whatevertheebbsandflowsinitsbilateraltieswithNewDelhi,Pakistan’sutilityasabalancer,potentialspoiler,andstandingcounterpointtoIndia’sambitionshasnevergoneaway.’ThiswasrecentlydemonstratedbytheChineseoppositiontoIndia’smembershipoftheNuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and opposition toMasood Azhar, the JeM chief, being declared aninternationalterrorist.52

InthelastdecadeandahalfthePak-Chinarelationshiphascomeundersomestrains,thehighsoundingadjectives notwithstanding. The main issues have been terrorism in Xinjiang linked to jihadi trainingcampsinPakistanandAfghanistanandtheissueofsafetyofChineseworkersinPakistan.Xinjiang,borderingPakistan,AfghanistanandtheCentralAsianRepublics,constitutes17percentof

China’s landmass and produces roughly 40 per cent of its oil, coal and gas.TheUighur (Muslims ofTurkicorigininXinjiang)separatistmovementintheprovinceisanethnicconflictagainsttheattemptsoftheChineseauthoritiestodilutetheiridentitybyencouragingthemigrationofHanChineseintotheregion.In1949,whenthePeople’sRepublicofChinawasfounded,HanChineseaccountedforabout6percentof Xinjiang’s population; today that figure is more than 40 per cent.ManyUighurs say they feel likeoutsidersintheirownhome.ThesituationhasbecomeaggravatedduetothefactthatUighurseparatismisnotonlyanethnicmovementbutalsohasanIslamicdimensiontoit.Strongmeasures takenby the authorities to suppress ethnic sentimentshad resulted inmanyUighurs

becomingradicalized,andajihadistmovementhasmadeinroadsinsidetheMuslimcommunities.TheseMuslimUighurs have been receiving sanctuary and terrorist training inPakistan afterwhich they havereturned toXinjiangandcaused terrorist incidents.Thus there is anoverlapbetween theUighur terrorcampaigninChinaandtheethnicUighurstruggleforliberationorseparation.To an extent China too is facing a blowback from the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. China had

suppliedSoviet-madearmstoPakistanthatwereusedbythemujahideenfighters.SignificantnumbersofUighursendedupintrainingcampsandmadrasasinPakistanandmanyUighursalsoparticipatedinthejihad. It is believed that thosewho returned toChina after the Soviet retreat took to arms against thepolicies of the government. This has been partly responsible for the heightened levels of violence inXinjiang.IncidentsofethnicviolenceinthecapitalUrumqiandotherpartsoftheprovincehavebeenoccurring

withincreasingfrequencysincearound2005includingafewspectacularonesliketheoneinXinjianginlate July 2011 that killed twenty people.While Pakistan has cracked down onUighurs located on itsterritory, even handing over some periodically to China, its failure to completely stop Uighurs fromgettingtrainedandreturningtoXinjiangisasourceofgrowinguneaseintherelationshipwithIslamabad.SuchincidentshaveevenprovokedrareChinesecriticismofPakistan.ItwasacknowledgedinPakistanthatothersuchattackscouldhaveadverseimplicationsforPak-Chinaties.53

Chinese concern about the role of Islamicmilitancy in Pakistan and its spread to China’sXinjiangprovince is clear from the fact thatChinawithdrew its objections over the banning of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa(JuD)–afrontorganizationoftheLashkar-e-Taiba–in2008.Likewise,accordingtooneChineseacademic,ChinahasdevelopedamoreneutralpositionontheIndo-PakistanidisputeoverKashmiroverthe past decade in part because China believes that the dispute could have implications for ethnic–religiousunrestinChina,especiallyinTibetorXinjiang.54

Thesecondissueisaboutthesafetyandprotectionofabout10,000ChineseworkersininfrastructureandenergyprojectsalloverPakistanandtheincreasingnumberthatwouldstartworkingontheCPEC.TherehavebeenseveralattacksontheminthepastbyBalochseparatistsaswellasjihadisinGwadar,PeshawarandIslamabad.TheJamaat-ul-Ahrar,asplintergroupoftheTTP,haswarnedBeijingagainstpersecutingMuslimpopulationinXinjiang;otherwise‘thecentresofChineseeconomicinterests’wouldbe targeted inwaysbeyond the imaginationof theChinesegovernment.55According toAndrewSmall,senior Chinese leaders such as former president Hu Jintao had asked Pakistani leaders to increaseprotectionofChineseworkers.Chinahadeventhreatenedtocutfundingfromprojectsandwithdrawitsworkers from thecountry.56ThatPakistan is awareof this is obvious from its commitment to create a‘specialsecuritydivision’of12,000specially trainedpersonnelmentionedearlier.57While thisshould

address someChineseconcerns, the fact remains that the securityof theCPEC’snetworkofpipelines,highways and railway lines will require almost constant attention. Given Pakistan’s track record ofprotectingitsownSuigaspipelines,thejuryisoutwhethersuchprotectionwillbefoolproof.Athirdissue,asyetnotverysignificantbutwiththepotentialtogrowinimportance,isthedivergence

between the two on Afghanistan. The initial Chinese interest in Afghanistan was economic. In 2008,ChineseMetallurgical Group and Jiangxi Copper Co. obtained a thirty-year lease on the site ofMesAynak inLogar for$3billion,which theyestimated tobe the largestcopperdeposit in theworld.Butafter Taliban attacks, the mine remained dormant, and Beijing started to viewAfghanistanmore as asecurity problem than an economic opportunity. This has led to changes in the Chinese approach toAfghanistan.Inthiscontext,avictoryoftheTalibaninAfghanistanwouldnotbeinChina’sinterestsinceincrease

ofanyjihadiinfluenceandactivitiesinAfghanistanand/orPakistancouldencouragesimilaractivitiesinXinjiang.Forthepresent,ChinesestrategyseemstobefocusedongettingPakistan,AfghanistanandtheTalibantodesistfromtrainingtheUighursandtodiscourageattacksonChineseinterests.Before9/11,forexample, the Chinese reached agreements with the Taliban to prevent Uighur separatists from usingAfghanistanasatraininggroundformilitantactivities.58ChinaevenjoinedhandswiththeUS,PakistanandAfghanistaninaQuadrilateralCoordinationGroupmechanismtoencouragetheAfghangovernmentandtheTalibantonegotiatepeace.Pakistan’s objective in Afghanistan, on the other hand, is to instal a dependent, Pak-friendly

government thatwould reduce Indian influenceandnot rakeup the issueof theDurandLine.Theonly‘Pak-friendly’governmentinKabulinthepasthasbeentheTalibangovernmentthathashadlinkswiththeUighurs.Hence,theobjectivesofthetwocountriesvaryfortheendgameinAfghanistan.

PakistanhasfrequentlyprojectedChinaasanalternativepartnertotheUS.AttimestheUStooappearstobeapprehensivethatifitpressurizesPakistantoohardonvariousissuesChinamaycometoPakistan’said. This is potentially true but only in so far as the political and defence relationship is concerned.Economically, China is unlikely to replace the US any time soon. As noted earlier, the economicrelationshipisweakandChinahasshiedawayfrombailingoutPakistaneconomicallyevenintimesofneed.AnotherfactortobeconsideredisthatChina,liketheUS,isgettingincreasinglyconcernedaboutPakistan’s stability and the growth of jihadi terror. For these reasons, China is unlikely to accept theresponsibility of propping up Pakistan all by itself. Pakistan too would be wary of actually trying toreplace theUSwithChina. Itknowswhichside itsbread isbuttered.For,alongwith theUScomethemultilateralfinancialinstitutionsliketheIMFandtheWorldBankandalsotheEuropeanUnion,withoutwhoseassistancePakistanwouldbeabasketcase.59

Thus far, the primary Chinese interest in Pakistan has been regional rather than purely bilateral, andsecurity-driven rather than economic. China has used Pakistan as a cat’s paw against India. For thispurpose,ChinahasgivenPakistannotmerelyconventionalmilitarysuppliesbutready-madenuclearandmissile capabilities to keep India focused on the threat fromPakistan rather than on the emergence ofChina. These defence and political bonds are likely to remain the cornerstone of the relationship.

However, the burgeoning trade between India and China on the one hand and scepticism regardingPakistan’suseofjihadisunderanuclearumbrellahasledChinatocounselPakistantoimproverelationswith India and lessenbilateral tensionswithout compromising its stanceon the territorialdisputewithIndia.Sincetheinitialyears,theeconomiccontentoftherelationshiphasnotbeenprominent.TheCPEChas

the potential to be a game changer through greater connectivity and greater Chinese investment ininfrastructureprojects.Whetheritwillbesoornot,however,remainstobeseen.ButithasachanceofsuccessnotsomuchbecauseofPakistan’seffortsbutowingtoChinesepush,especiallyunderPresidentXiJinping.Threeblipsontheradarmaygaininimportanceastheyearsgoby.Thesearetheconnectionsthatthe

UighurshavedevelopedwithjihadigroupsinPakistanandAfghanistan,thesecurityandsafetyofChineseworkers inPakistan anddivergence about the endgame inAfghanistan.AsChina’s footprint grows inPakistan,itspersonnelwouldbeexposedtogreaterrisksespeciallyifinstabilityalsogrowsinPakistan.ForPakistan toreallybenefit fromtheopportunity thathascomeitsway, itwillhave torealize that

Chinawouldbe as concernedabout jihadi terrorismemanating fromPakistan as is theUS. IfPakistanremainsintheoldgrooveofusingnon-stateactorsasinstrumentsofstatepolicy,anddoesnotfocusonitsowneconomicdevelopment,itfacestheriskofalienatingtheChineseasseriouslyasithasalienatedtheUS. Inallprobability,Pakistanwould find theChinese farharder taskmasters than theUS, especiallysincetheyshareacommonborder.Thus,PakistanwouldneedtodosomeseriousintrospectionaboutthecostsofexportingterrorasalsotheeconomiccostsoftheCPEC.

17

TheUnitedStates:TheQuestforDependence

Pakistan…isoneofthemostanti-Americancountriesintheworld,andacovertsponsorofterrorism. Politically and economically, it verges on being a failed state. … And if themeasure of our aid is Pakistan’s internal security, the program has fallen short in thatrespectaswell.…IfthemeasureofouraidisthegratitudeofthePakistanipeopleandtheloyalty of their government, then it has clearly been a failure. Last year, aPewResearchCentersurveyfoundthathalfofPakistanisbelievethattheUSgiveslittleornoassistanceatall.1

—LawrenceWright

THESEWORDSsumupthetragicstoryofPakistan–USrelations.AccordingtoWright,theUSinvestedbillionsofdollarsintoPakistanwiththeobjectiveofcreating‘areliableallywithstronginstitutionsanda modern, vigorous democracy’. However, he laments that American military aid has been wasted,misused,andturnedagainsttheUS.Histouchingconclusion:‘IndiahasbecomethestatethatwetriedtocreateinPakistan.Itisarisingeconomicstar,militarilypowerfulanddemocratic,anditsharesAmericaninterests.’2

RelationswiththeUShavebeenandarethekeyelementinPakistan’sforeignpolicysinceitscreationin 1947. However, the fatal flaw in the Pakistan–US relationship has been its transactional naturecompoundedbydifferingperceptionsonbothsides: theUSseeingPakistan ina larger, regional ratherthaninabilateralcontext;Pakistanseekingtousethe‘borrowedstrength’oftheUSagainstIndiainitsquestforparity.As mentioned earlier, one of the key consideration for the British when they partitioned the

subcontinentwasstrategic–therolethatPakistanratherthanaunitedIndiaunderNehrucouldplayinthefurtherance of its imperial objectives.With the British power on thewane in the aftermath ofWWII,Pakistansought toally itselfwith theUSevenprior to itscreation.DuringameetingwithLordIsmay,JinnahhadexaminedthepossibilityofPakistanaftertheBritishleftanddetermined,accordingtoIsmay,that‘Pakistancouldnotstandalone’.3AyubKhanwas to reiteratesimilarsentimentswhenhesaid thatoneoftheimperativesofPakistan’sdefenceandsecurityproblems‘…wastohaveastrongandeffectivefriend,whoseinterestsshouldbetoseethatPakistanremainedafreecountryandwasnotsubjugatedbyanothercountry’.4

JinnahmadethefirstpitchforUSsupportusingthesameargumentthathadkeptBritainmotivatedtoplaythe‘GreatGame’–thefearofaRussianadvance.Post-WWII,an‘ironcurtain’haddroppedover

Europeandboth theUSandBritainwereworriedaboutSoviet advances towards theoil fieldsof theMiddleEast.Duringhis1May1947meetingwith twoUSdiplomatsathisBombay residence, Jinnahstressed that ‘the emergence of an independent, sovereign Pakistan would be in consonance withAmericaninterestssincePakistanwouldbeaMuslimcountryandMuslimcountrieswouldstandtogetheragainstRussian aggression’. In that endeavour theywould look to theUnited States for assistance, headded.JinnahcoupledthedangerofRussianaggressionwithanothermenacethatMuslimnationsmightconfront. That was Hindu imperialism. The establishment of Pakistan was essential to prevent HinduimperialismintotheMiddleEast,heemphasized.5

Afewmonthslater,JinnahexpandedonhisthemeofleveragingPakistan’slocationinanalliancewiththeUS in an interviewwithAmerican journalistMargaret Bourke-White. In response to her questionwhetherAmericantechnicalorfinancialassistancewouldbeenlisted,Jinnahanswered,‘AmericaneedsPakistanmorethanPakistanneedsAmerica.Pakistanispivotoftheworldasweareplaced…[on]thefrontieronwhichthefuturepositionoftheworldrevolves.’Healsoadded:‘IfRussiawalksinherethewholeworldismenaced…’,Bourke-WhitewrotelaterinherbookHalfwaytoFreedom thatwhensheaskedPakistaniofficials‘iftherewereanysignsofRussianinfiltration,theywouldreplyalmostsadly,asthough sorry not to be able tomakemore of the argument, “No, Russia has shown no signs of beinginterestedinPakistan.”’6Pakistanwouldhavetowaitthreedecadesforthattohappen.WehaveearliernotedaveryperceptiveBourke-WhiteidentifyingakeyattributeofPakistanasbeing

the‘bankruptcyofideasinthenewMuslimstate–anationdrawingitsspuriouswarmthfromtheembersofanantiquefanaticism,fannedintoanewblaze’.Hersecondperceptiveobservationwas:

Jinnah’s most frequently used technique in the struggle for his new nation has been playingopponent against opponent. Evidently, this technique was now to be extended into foreignpolicy.NotonlythetensionbetweenthegreatpowersbutthePalestinesituationaswellheldopportunitiesforprofitingfromthedisputesofothers.7

Within two months of its creation, in October 1947, Laik Ali, on Jinnah’s behest, presented amemorandum to theUSStateDepartment asking for financial assistanceof$2billionover a five-yearperiodtoacquireawiderangeofweaponsincluding$170millionforthearmy,$75millionfortheairforce and $60 million for the navy. The memo stated: ‘Primarily defence and secondly, economicdevelopmentsarethetwovitallyessentialfeaturesofPakistan’slifeandforbothoftheseshehastolookfirstlytotheUSAandthentoGreatBritainforassistance…whatisneededisfinanceandmorethanthat,aregularsourceoffinance.’8Byaskingforsubstantial fundingfromtheUS,Jinnahhadmadeclearhispriorities in the relationshipwith theUS.PositioningPakistanasaMuslimbulwarkagainst theSovietUnion,Jinnah’sprioritiesweredefence-related.However,atthattimePakistanwasnotperceivedtobeafactorof significance forUS interests.According toChristineFair, ‘theCIAnevermentioned IndiaorPakistan by name or even referenced the region generally in the 1947 and 1948 editions of its annual“ReviewoftheWorldSituationasitRelatestotheSecurityoftheUnitedStates”’.9

Despite this, Jinnah’s successorswere to continue to assiduously cultivate theUS. In the colourfullanguageofTariqAli,Pakistan‘…decidedtoaccepttheofferofapermanentnurse.ItwasassumedthattheonlyroutetosurvivalwastobecomeaColdWarpatientunderthepermanentsupervisionofWesternimperialism’.10 After initial hesitation, the US was to turn to Pakistan even as India turned to non-

alignment.In 1954, Pakistan joined the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and subsequently the

BaghdadPactandtheCentralTreatyOrganization(CENTO).In1959,PakistanmadeavailablealisteningpostnearPeshawar.Intheearly1960s,aftertheU-2incidentandtheIndo-Chinawarof1962,theUS–PakistanalliancewentthroughitsfirstturbulencewithPakistanobjectingtotheUSsupplyofweaponstoIndiaunlessitwaslinkedtothesettlementoftheKashmirissuewhiletheUSlookedaskanceatPakistandeveloping a relationship with China and even entering into a border demarcation treaty with it onKashmir.In1965, theUS imposed sanctionsonboth India andPakistan for the1965war.The sanctionshurt

PakistanmorebecauseitwasmoredependentonUSsuppliesthanIndia.Forabriefwhilein1971therelations were back on track after Pakistan facilitated the secret US opening to China. The USreciprocated by looking the other way during the Pakistan Army’s genocide in Bangladesh11 withPresidentNixonrecordingonthememofromKissingeron28April1971suggestingpolicyoptions:‘ToAllHands,Don’tsqueezeYahyaat this time.’12TheUSevenencouragedChina to threaten Indiaapartfrom sending its Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean during the Indo-Pak war in December 1971.13

Militaryandcivilianassistancewas revived in1975,butonly tobediscontinuedunder theSymingtonAmendmentin1979,whichexpressedconcernoverPakistan’sclandestinenuclearweaponsprogramme.RelationsweretoplummetafterZia’s1977coup,thehangingofZ.A.Bhuttoin1979andburningoftheUSEmbassyinIslamabadinthesameyear.With the Soviets choosing just this time (December 1979) tomarch intoAfghanistan, Pakistanwas

convertedfromapariahtoafront-linestate.TheUSwasobligedtotakea180-degreeturn,shelvingitsconcernsregardingPakistan’snuclearprogrammeanddemocracy.ThegrowthofIslamicradicalismwasthenjustablipandinanycase,theyweretheonesfightingtheSoviets.AftertheSovietwithdrawalfromAfghanistan, nuclear concerns kicked in again as did the provisions of the Pressler Amendment. The1990sweremostlyspentinbickeringovertheF-16s.USassistancetoPakistanceasedbetween1991and2001 and the sanctions became harsher after the 1998 nuclear explosion by Pakistan andMusharraf’scoupagainsttheNawazgovernmentin1999.Onceagain, justas theSoviet intervention inAfghanistanhadchanged thedynamicsofPakistan–US

relationsinthe1980s,9/11tootransformedbilateralrelationsearlyinthenewcentury.ItledtoathirdPakistan–USallianceandthetriple-layeredsanctionsweresetaside.Pakistanonceagainbecameafront-line state and a strategic partner. In a déjà vu,Bushwas to do a JimmyCarter/Nixon– lift sanctions,providemassiveassistance–andMusharrafwoulddoaZia–allowPakistantobecomeabaseforthewar in Afghanistan and in the hunt for Osama bin Laden.WithMusharraf on board, the US not onlyrestoredeconomicandmilitaryaidforPakistanbutalsoannouncedafive-yearbilateralaidpackageof$3.2billioninJune2003andwaivedoffUS$1billionofPakdebt.AccordingtotheCongressionalResearchService,theUSaiddisbursedtoPakistansince9/11totalled

over$33billion.14OnlyIsraelhasgotmoreaidthanPakistaninthelastdecade.UndertheKerry–LugarAct2007, theUSannounced$1.5billioneachformilitaryandeconomicassistanceperannumforfiveyears.Thisbriefreviewrevealsthat,atitscore,Pakistan–USrelationshavebeensporadic,transactionaland

basedonleveragingPakistan’sgeographicalposition.ThelastbearsouttheBritishforesightednessabout

the role Pakistan could play, as it turns out not for their imperial strategy but for the strategy of theirerstwhilecolony,theUS.Inasense,asinheritorsoftheBritishEmpire,theUStoosawPakistanasfittinginto theirglobalstrategiccalculations,firstduringthecoldwarandlaterduringthewaragainst terror.ForPakistan,USinterestinthemwasexactlywhattheywerelookingfor–borrowedpowerthatJinnahandAyubhadidentifiedasbeingnecessaryforPakistaninitscontestwithIndia.

Behindtheerraticnatureoftherelationshipwere,ofcourse,thedifferingobjectivesandtakeawaysthatthetwobroughtintotherelationship.PakistanpursuedanalliancewiththeUSinthe1950sandthe’60sto obtainmilitary supplies against India in return for helping theUS contain communism.Pakistandidprovideintelligencegatheringfacilitiesbutnotthe‘centrallypositionedlandingsite’theUSwanted.Foritspart,theUSdidnotsharePakistan’sapprehensionsaboutIndianhegemonyinSouthAsiaorthatIndiawasathreattoPakistan.Inthenextphaseoftherelationship,accordingtoHusainHaqqani,

Zia-ul-Haq’scooperationinbleedingtheSoviets inAfghanistancamewithPakistan’splantoinstal a client regime in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. The US never controlledPakistan’s ISI, or for that matter the mujahideen, even though it paid for the operation.Pakistan’s role in the jihad against the Soviet Union also inspired the ISI to push PakistanijihadistoexpandjihadintoKashmir.15

Equally,despitepromisestothecontrary,Pakistanwentaheadwithitsnuclearprogrammerightunderthenoseof theUS.Perhapsevenmoresignificantlyfor the long term,SecretaryofStateAlexanderM.HaigJrtoldPakistaniofficialsthatUSreservationsoverPakistan’snuclearprogramme‘neednotbecomethe centerpiece of the US–Pakistan relationship’.16 The new US administration appeared to havecommunicated tacitly that it ‘could livewithPakistan’s nuclear program as long as Islamabad did notexplodeabomb’.17AshrewdjudgeofhowfarhecouldpushtheAmericans,Ziabelievedthataslongasthe war in Afghanistan continued – neither he nor the Americans expected an early end – the USgovernment would find some way to avoid imposing sanctions, provided Pakistan did not explode adevice.18

Inthecurrentandthirdphaseoftherelationship,therecontinuestobedeeplydivergentobjectives:FortheUSwhiletheal-Qaedawastherealenemy,theTalibanwereaccomplices.Bothneededtobetargetedbecausetheyrepresentedviolentextremistthreats.ForPakistan,theTalibanwere‘strategicassets’sincetheydidPakistan’sbiddinginAfghanistan;hence,thePakistanimilitarysoughttoprotectthembygivingthemsanctuaryandassistancewithwhichtocontinuefightingagainsttheUSandNATOtroops.Inreality,fromtheoutset,PakistanwasneverfullycommittedtotheUS’swaronterror.Apartfromdifferingobjectives,endlessillusionsbedevilledbothsides,notesAshleyTellis.Whilethe

US thought it could get Pakistan to jettison its jihadi proxies using financial and military assistancecoupledwith the promise of a strategic partnership, they could not assuage Pakistan’s paranoia aboutIndia.Pakistan,foritspart,‘imaginedthatthestrategyofhuntingwiththeAmericanhoundswhilerunningwiththejihadihareswassustainableindefinitely–evenafter9/11irrevocablychangedtherulesofthegame’. Such illusions undermined prospects for sturdy bilateral ties. ‘They also confirm that the realsurpriseisnotthemeltdownintheUS–Pakistanrelations,butthefactthatittooksolongtomaterialize.’19

EvidenceofPakduplicityinhelpingtheTalibanwhileclaimingtobepartoftheUS-ledwaronterrorhas been overwhelming. A few examples will suffice. As early as February 2003, the two seniormembers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – Senator Lugar and Senator Biden – expressed‘deepconcern’that‘elementsofPakistan’spowerfulInter-ServicesIntelligenceagencymightbehelpingmembersoftheTalibanandal-QaedaoperatealongtheborderandinfiltrateintoAfghanistan’.20

MikeMcConnell,directorofNational Intelligence in theBushadministration, inhis firstbriefingofpresident-elect Barack Obama said: ‘Pakistan is a dishonest partner of USA in Afghan war … Inexchangefor$2billionayearfromUS,Pakistan’spowerfulmilitaryanditsspyagency(ISI)helpedtheUS,while giving clandestine aid, weapons andmoney to theAfghan Taliban. They had an “office ofhedgingyourbets”.’21

LtGen.KarlEikenberry,whocommandedtheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF)–NATOandUSforcesinAfghanistan,warnedtheUSCongresson13February2007thatNATOcouldnotwininAfghanistanwithoutaddressingthesanctuariestheTalibanenjoyedinPakistan.The most damming was the 2011 testimony, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, of Admiral

Mullenwhohadmadetwenty-sixtripstoPakistanandconsideredarmychiefGen.Kayaniafriend.Themainpoints hemadewere: theHaqqani network acted as a veritable armofPakistan’s Inter-ServicesIntelligence agency; therewas ample evidence that theHaqqaniswerebehind several blasts inKabul;supportforextremistgroups,includingtheHaqqaninetworkandanti-IndianterrororganizationLashkar-e-Taibawaspartof thePakistangovernment’spolicyand served Islamabad’s interests; and supportofterrorismispartofPakistan’snationalstrategy.22

Musharraf’s successors,ParvezKayaniandRaheelSharif, continuedhisduplicitouspolicy.Kayani,forexample,wasoverheard–presumablyontelephoneintercepts–referringtoJalaluddinHaqqaniasa‘strategicasset’.23NSAalsopickedup interceptsasPakunits thatweregetting ready tohitamadrasacalled up the tribal areas in advance, to warn them what was coming.24 While Raheel Sharif hasundertakenoperationsagainst theTTPinNorthWaziristan, theHaqqanishavebeenleftoutashavetheother‘India-centric’terroristoutfitsliketheLeTandtheJeMinotherpartsofPakistan.

WhyhastheUSfailed,despitespendingbillionsofdollars,tomakePakistanbehavelikeanormalstate,atpeacewithitselfanditsneighbours?Infact,thetruescaleofthefailureisthatdespitetheUS,Pakistanleaders fromAyubKhan to thepresent oneshaveprettymuchdonewhat theyperceived their nationalinteresttobe.AyubprovokedawarwithIndiain1965withUSweaponsdespitespecificassurancestothe contrary; Bhutto initiated Pakistan’s nuclear programme despite US pressure; Zia weaponizedPakistan’s nuclear programme despite warnings; both Benazir and Nawaz continued with the nuclearprogramme and support to Kashmir terrorists despite the threat of being declared a terrorist state;MusharraffollowedaduplicitouspolicyofseeminglysupportingtheUSwaronterrorwhileprovidingsanctuary and support to ‘strategic assets’ like the Taliban and the Haqqani network. His successorsKayaniandRaheelSharifhavefollowedsuit.Amongthekeyreasonsfor thefailure is thatUShasnotseenanddealtwithPakistanbilaterallybut

throughtheprismofasupposedly‘larger’andimmediateobjective.Tofulfil that‘largerobjective’theUSneeded to leveragePakistan’sstrategic locationandsoneglectedandcompromised itsowncruciallong-termgoals.This‘largerobjective’inthe1950sand1960swastomakePakistanapartoftheanti-

communist‘northerntier’againsttheSovietUnion;intheearly1970sitwastheopeningtoChina;inthe1980s,itwastobleedtheSovietUnioninAfghanistanandinthefirstdecadeofthenewmillenniumtousePakistan in the conduct of thewaron terror and tohuntbinLaden; and currently it is tobring theAfghanTalibanintothepeacetalkswiththeAfghangovernment.In the pursuit of ‘larger objectives’, theUS has invariably lost sight of its own long-term goals of

tacklingthedangeremanatingfromPakistanthatovertheyearshascumulativelygrown.Preciselyforthisreason, theUS has been unable to develop a policy focusing exclusively on Pakistan’swaywardness,insteadofpaying‘rentals’orhirechargesforusingPakistan’slocation.Suchaquidproquoapproachindealing with Pakistan may have tackled the immediate issue (though the jury is out on this) but hasinvariablyaddedtothegrowingproblemofandinPakistan,especiallyitsgrowingnucleararsenalandsupporttodiversejihadigroups.In an interview published by the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur of 15–21 January 1998,

Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security adviser, when asked if he regretted havingsupportedIslamicfundamentalism,havinggivenarmsandadvicetofutureterroristssaid,‘Whatismostimportant to the history of the world? The Taliban or collapse of the Soviet Empire? A few crazedMuslimsortheliberationofCentralEuropeandtheendoftheColdwar?’25NoonecouldhaveputtheUSperspectiveoffocusingonanimmediateobjectivebutignoringitsconsequences,inabetterfashion.US goals in and for Pakistan are extremely serious in themselves: to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear

weaponsandmaterialsfromfallingintothehandsofIslamicextremists;toensurethatAfghanistandoesnotagainbecomeasanctuaryforterroriststolaunchattacksagainsttheUSanditsalliesandfriends;toavoid a war between India and Pakistan that could escalate to the nuclear level; and to prevent theTalibananditsradicalcollaboratorsfromgainingcontrolofPakistan.Therefore,seeingPakistanfromtheprismofsomeotherobjectiveshasbeendangerousandhascompoundedproblems.Forexample,theUShasbeenwellawareofPakistan’sperfidyinrehabilitatingtheTalibanbuthasn’tdonemuchaboutit.IthascontinuedtosupplyweaponrytoPakistanthatiseitherfordualuseorcannotbejustifiedforcounter-terrorism, likeaPerry-classmissile frigateanddozensofnuclearcapableF-16s thatcanonlybeusedagainstIndiaandnotagainst terrorists insidePakistan.SuchapolicyhasonlyemboldenedPakistan,assupplyofweaponryhademboldenedAyubKhanin thepast.AndtheUShasnotbeenable topersuadePakistantogiveuponwhatitconsideredtobe‘good’terrorists,liketheLeTandtheHaqqaninetwork,whosepresenceandactivitiesaddtothegrowingnumberofterroriststhatinfestthecountry.A second major reason for the US failure to achieve its objectives in Pakistan is the policy of

appeasementadoptedbysuccessiveadministrations.ExamplesaboundoftheUSbendingoverbackwardstoaccommodatePakistan.TakethecaseofOsamabinLaden.Afteraneleven-yearmanhunt,binLaden,the world’s most wanted terrorist, was found in a house next to the Pakistan Military Academy inAbbottabadandyettheUSdidnot,atleastpublicly,holdPakistanaccountable.HowaboutA.Q.Khan?IthastobeaverygulliblepersontobelievethatKhancouldrequisitionmilitaryaircraft toferrynuclearequipmentonhisownwithouttheknowledgeandpermissionofthegovernment.AsDavidSangerputsit,inbothcasestheUSavoidedpushingtoohardhopingtowinPakistan’scooperation.‘ItprovedabadbetinthecaseofKhanandthereislittleevidencethat,intheaftermathofthebinLadencase,itwillturnoutanybetter.’26HowaboutthemultiplewaiversthattheUShasgivenPakistanandthemanytimesitbentitsown laws to accommodate Pakistan? An exception is understandable but waiver after waiver has

convincedPakistanthattheycouldgetawaywithprettymuchanythingsolongastheUShasa‘larger’objective.HavinggotthehangoftheUSmindset,Pakistanwillmakesurethattherealwaysisa‘larger’objectivetokeeptheUSengagedintheregion.TakethecaseofGen.Kayani.EarlyintheObamaadministration,Kayanimadeclearaconditionfor

improvedrelations.AstheheadoftheISIfrom2004to2007,hedidnotwanta‘reckoningwiththepast’,saidaUSEmbassycablein2009,laterWikileaked,introducinghimtothenewadministration.‘KayaniwillwanttohearthattheUnitedStateshasturnedthepageonpastISIoperations,’itsaid.27Inshort,allof Pakistan’s past shenanigans were wiped clean and a new page was opened. This confirmed thePakistani belief that they could get away with anything if they just hung in long enough for a newadministrationtotakeoffice.The third reason for the US failure is its inability to grasp the essential underpinnings of Islam in

PakistansincethetimeofthePakistanmovementandtheopportunisticuseofitbysuccessivePakistanirulers. TheUS experience in defeating the Soviet Union in the 1980s inAfghanistan by using jihadisfurthermaskedthedangerthattheycouldpose.EventhoughthedangertotheUSwasmademanifestafter9/11,theUSpolicywashingedonthePakistanArmy,firstonMusharrafandthenonhissuccessorKayaniandnowRaheelSharif,tomakeadifferenceasfarasthejihadiswereconcerned.Quiteapartfromthefactthatneitherwaswillingorevencapableofdoingso,USsupporthasprovedtobeadoublewhammy.On the one hand, by strengthening the army, the secular and moderate civil society in Pakistan hasremainedweakandunabletomakeapushagainsttheincreasingradicalizationofPakistan.Ontheother,fixatedasitwaswithusingjihadisforforeignpolicyobjectives,thearmyusedAmericangenerositytofurtherstrengthenjihadinetworkwhilefoolingtheUSthatitwasactuallyfightingthejihadisandwastheonlybulwarkagainstthem.Finally, at its core, the failure of the US to mould Pakistan’s policies has been due to divergent

perceptionsaboutwhat is inPakistan’sbest interests,especiallywhereIndia isconcerned.As the thensecretaryofstateDeanRuskwroteafterhisMay1963SouthAsiatrip,‘fear,distrust,andhatredofIndia’mean‘wecannotrelyonPakistantoactrationallyandinwhatwethinkwouldbeinitsowninterests’.28

Thisassessmentisastruetodayasitwasin1963.PakistanwouldratherloseAmericanassistancethancompromiseonwhatitperceivedtobeitsinterestsvis-à-visIndia.

Given Pakistan’s perfidy, why does the US deliberately dupe itself by continuing the same policy ofunderwritingPakistan,ofrewardingacountrythattheUSknewrightfrom2003washandinglovewiththe very enemy that was killingAmerican soldiers? AsDavid Sanger puts it, ‘Everyone knew it; thePakistaniswerenotfooling;Washingtonwasfoolingitself.’29

Thereareseveralreasonsforthis.Thefirstisthe‘ThereIsNoAlternative(TINA)’factor.AsAshleyTellisputsit, thereasonwas‘becausefewalternativesofferedabetterchanceofsuccess’.TheUnitedStateswasdependentonPakistanforlogisticsupportforitsforcesinsideAfghanistanandforoperationsagainstal-Qaeda.Thus,theUSpersistedwithbribingPakistaninthehopethatthearmy’spolicieswouldchange.30Resultantly,theonlysuperpowerintheworldwastakenforarideandwhosehelplessnessatsuchperfidyresultedinthedeathofthousandsofUS/NATOsoldiers.ThesecondreasonisthebeliefthatPakistanis‘toodangeroustofail’.TheWesthasinternalizedthe

Pakistani narrative that goes something like this: it would collapse without bilateral and multilateralbailouts;ifitdoescollapse,Islamistterrorists(whoincidentallyhavebeencreatedbythePakistanistateinthefirstplace)wouldcomeintopossessionofnuclearmaterials,ifnotweapons,andusethemagainstthe West; it is only the Pakistan Army that stands between the terrorists and nuclear weapons and,therefore,itmustbesupportedfinanciallyandwithweaponry.WhattheWest,especiallytheUS,hasnotrealizedisthatsuchscenariosaredeliberatelycreatedbyPakistantoscaretheWestandtogarnerevenmoreaidtokeepPakistanafloat.Forexample,evenpriorto9/11Musharrafhadraisedthestakesbypointingoutthedangersofrising

Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan and how hewas the only bulwark against it.Musharraf knew thatPakistancouldnotbeignoredsolongasitwasperceivedtobedangerous.Post-9/11,Musharraf’sfearwasthattheUSwouldabandonitassoonasitsobjectivesinAfghanistanweremetwhichwouldhavecalamitous impact onPakistan.Therefore, he devised a strategy thatwould keep theUS engagedwithPakistan by escalating the levels of danger that Pakistan posed. Cohen puts it well, ‘Pakistan nownegotiateswithitsalliesandfriendsbypointingaguntoitsownhead.’31

ThethirdreasonisthepossibilityofPakistan’stacticalnuclearweapons,ornuclearmaterials,fallingintothehandsofthejihadis.ThisisoneoftheworstnightmaresoftheUS.‘Forallthepublictalkaboutdemocracyanddevelopment,abouttheneedtofostermoderationinPakistanisociety,intheenditisthesecurityofthat(nuclear)arsenalthatcaptivatesWashington’sattention.’32GiventheproliferationbytheKhannetworkandthepresenceoftheTTPterroristsinSwatin2009,closetoIslamabadandKahuta,afearhasgrowninthemindsofUSpolicymakersthatnuclearmaterialmaygetdivertedtothejihadisbyanestrangedPakistan.AWikiLeakedcablefromtheUSambassadorinPakistan,AnnePatterson,inFebruary2009 heightened such concerns. The cable stated that theworrywas not the theft of an entire nuclearweaponbut of diversionof somehighly enricheduraniumorweapon-gradeplutonium fromPakistan’sstockpiles.33

Such concerns have prompted appeasement of Pakistan. Appeasement as a policy has never paiddividends.Infact,ithasonlyemboldenedPakistan.Toanextent,ofcourse,theUShasitselftoblameforPakistan’s nuclear programme by winking at it to serve a ‘larger’ objective in the 1980s. ZbigniewBrzezinski told President Carter, ‘Our security policy cannot be dictated by our non-proliferationpolicy.’34InitsdefenceitcanbesaidthatUSaidtoPakistanwaspremisedonthesolemnassurancesthatPakistanwouldnotadvanceitsnuclearweaponsprogramme.ThustheUSthathadmoregroundstofeelbetrayed since Zia and his successors did not stop the nuclear programme. However, to continue tobelieve Pakistan’s solemn assurances is to exhibit a degree of naivety, given Pakistan’s perfidy sinceAyubKhan’stime.

Forthefuture,withthewarinAfghanistanwindingdown,thoughrealpeaceisfaraway,Pakistanknowsthat its usefulness to the US is also winding down. Anticipating a repeat of what happened after theSovietsleftAfghanistanattheendofthe1980s,PakistanismakingpreparationstokeeptheUSengaged.Thereareseveraloptions:toprojectthearrivaloftheIslamicStateinAfghanistanandPakistanoroftheAQIS as a real threat to peace; midwifing the Afghan peace talks; accelerating the tactical nuclearweaponsprogramme;andifallelsefails, theoldstrategyofcreatinganotherIndo-Pakcrisisisalwaysavailable.

AsPakistan’smainexternalsupporter,istheUSinapositiontoreversePakistan’strajectorytowardstheabyssbybecomingaresponsibleandstablestate?OrwillPakistan,despitetheUSsupport,continuetohurtletowardsdisaster?WilltheUScontinuetoshoreupPakistandespiteitsduplicity,orwilltheUSlessentheengagement?TherearenoeasyanswerstothesequestionsbecausemorethantheUS,itisuptoPakistantohelpitselfespeciallyasfarasseriousdomesticissuesareconcerned.Beyondapoint,however,PakistancannotaffordtoalienatetheWestandtheUSbecausethecardsare

clearlystackedagainstPakistan.Foronething,withoutfundingfromtheUSandmultilateralagenciesliketheIMFandtheWorldBank,Pakistan’seconomywouldbeseriouslyaffected.AsnotedinChapter12,foreignassistanceisanintegralpartofPakistan’sbudget.AsTheNationputiteloquently:‘Withoutaidinjections, we risk continued deficits, low reserves, devaluation of the rupee, inflation, etc. Chineseinvestment,thoughagrand$40billion,isforthenext10to15years.Itisnotalumpsuminjectionthatcankeepusafloat.’35Second,almost40percentofPakistan’sexportsaredirected to theWest justasmostoftheforeignassistanceandinvestmentcomesfromthesecountries.Third,eventhoughChinahasbecomethemainsupplierofweapons,thePakistanmilitarycontinuestobeheavilydependentontheUSforweaponsandspares.ChinahasalsodemonstratedthatitwillnotbailoutPakistaneconomicallywithlargefinancialassistance.Asaconsequence,thearmywouldfacearesourcecrunchthatmaywellforceittocutbacksignificantly.ButPakistanalsoknowsthatbeyondapoint,theUSwillnotpushiteither.Pakistaniswellawareof

theUSdilemmathatcuttingoffallUSaidtoPakistancouldimperilUSinterestsintheregion.However,it is equally aware that for the US to continue with the current policy of underwriting a countryincreasingly defiant towards it alsomakes little sense.36 It is a catch-22 situation and hinges on whoblinksfirst.InthepastitistheUSthathasdoneso.Since there will be a new US president in January 2017, the views of the leading contenders on

Pakistanwouldbeanimportantindicatorofwhatispossiblyinstore.TheviewsofDemocraticnomineeforthepresidency,HillaryClinton,onPakistanwerewellencapsulatedinhercommentsaboutkeeping‘snakes inyourbackyard’.TheDemocraticParty’splatform(electionmanifesto)doesnot listPakistanamong friends or allies. Pakistan gets mentioned only in the context of the party’s reaffirmation tostrengthencounter-terrorismmeasures:‘DemocratswillcontinuetopushforanAfghan-ledpeaceprocessandpressPakistantodenyallterroristssanctuaryonitssoil.’37

Theviewsof theRepublicannominee,DonaldTrump,areevenstrongeronPakistan.He toldCNN,‘Pakistan isavery,veryvitalproblemand reallyvitalcountry forusbecause theyhavea thingcallednuclearweapons.Theyhavetogetaholdoftheirsituation.’Lastyear,TrumphadcalledPakistanthemostdangerous country in the world. In an interview, he had indicated that Pakistan needed to bedenuclearized.38 The Republican Party’s platform states with reference to Pakistan, ‘Our workingrelationship is necessary, though sometimes difficult, benefit to both, and we look towards thestrengtheningofhistorictiesthathavefrayedundertheweightofinternationalconflict.…Thisprocesscannot progress as long as any citizen of Pakistan can be punished for helping the war on terror.Pakistanis, Afghans and Americans have a common interest in ridding the region of the Taliban andsecuringPakistan’snucleararsenal.’39

WillPakistan’sduplicityfinallycatchupwithit?Afewrecentdevelopmentscouldbeindicativeofwhat

isinstore.First,underalawpassedin2014,WashingtonmustwithholdsomeoftheCoalitionSupportFunds(CSF)ifPakistandidnottakeadequatestepstodisrupttheHaqqaninetwork.WiththeUSdefencesecretary not certifying that Pakistan had taken action against the Haqqani network, the Pentagon haswithheld$300millioninCSFforthefiscalyearending30September2016.40This is,perhaps,for thefirsttimethatPakistanisbeingpenalizedfinanciallyforitsdoublegame.Moreover,CSFitself,underwhichPakistanreceived$3.1billionsince2013,and$13billionsince

200141expiresinOctober2016,asitwasassociatedwiththespecificUSmissioninAfghanistan,whichhasformallyended.ItislikelytobereplacedbyanotherfundthatfocusesspecificallyonPakistan’sownsecurityneedsinsteadoftyingittoAfghanistan.Second, theKerry–LugarAct (KLA) lapsed inOctober2014,butonlyabouthalfof the$7.5billion

outlayhasbeendisbursedsofar.TheUSstatedepartmenthasclarifiedthatnofundshavebeenissuedtoPakistanundertheKLAsince2013.42

Third, US commerce secretary Penny Pritzker stated in Islamabad in March 2015 that the Obamaadministrationwasnot inapositiontoget legislativeapprovalforanytradeagreementswithPakistan,andhencewasfocusingongettingmoreUSbusinessestoinvestinPakistan.PritzkerurgedPakistantofixitsbureaucracyandaddresswhatshedescribedasan‘inconsistentandunfair’taxregime,cautioningthatifthegovernmentdidnotremovesuchimpedimentstoAmericanbusinesses,UScompaniesmaymovetootherplaces.43Theseremarkscertainlycarryimplicationsforbilateraleconomicrelations.Fourth,theissueofterroristsanctuariesinsidePakistanhasbeenraisedbytheUSinnumerabletimes

withoutgettingmuchsatisfactionfromPakistan.ThelatestinthisregardhasbeenGen.JohnNicholson,thenewlyappointedUScommanderinAfghanistan,whotoldtheSenateArmedServicesCommitteethatit was difficult to defeat the enemy when he enjoys a sanctuary in Pakistan. ‘I view it as a seriousproblem.Andthishasbeenoneoftheprincipalchallenges.It’sasanctuarythatourenemies,inparticulartheHaqqaniNetwork, have enjoyed insidePakistan.’He added, ‘We’venot been satisfied that there’sadequatepressureputontheHaqqanis.’44SuchremarkswererepeatedbySecretaryofStateJohnKerryduring the sixthUS–Pakistan strategic dialoguewhen he askedPakistan to stand up to groups like theHaqqaninetwork,Lashkar-e-TaibaandJaish-e-Mohammad,whichwereliterallystealingsovereigntyofthenation.Fifth,theUSthinktankshavestartedtodemandretributionforthecostsinmenandmaterialthattheUS

hashadtoincurduetoPakistan’sdouble-dealing.Forexample, inahard-hittingarticle,ChristineFair,callingPakistanahostilestatededicatedtoundercuttingUSinterestsintheregionandbeyond,wrote:‘ItshouldoutrageAmericansthattheTalibanenjoyongoingsupportfromPakistan,acountrythatclaimstobe fighting this warwith the United States and its allies rather than against it.’ Accusing Pakistan ofcontinuouslyunderminingthewareffortsoftheUSinAfghanistan,sheadded:‘TheUnitedStatesanditsinternationalandAfghanpartnershavepaidaheavypriceinbloodandtreasurebattlingtheTalibanandtheirallies,suchastheHaqqaniNetworkandevenLashkar-e-Taiba.’45

Sixth, even though the US government had notified the Congress about the sale of eight F-16s toPakistanandtheSenatehadapprovedthesale,thefinaldealdidnotgothrough.TheCongressrejectedthefinancialproposalunderwhichtheUSwouldfinance$430millionoutofthe$700milliondealfromForeignMilitaryFinancing (FMF) funds.As a result Pakistanwould have to pay the entire amount of$700million.Pakistandeclined todosoandbynotproviding theLetterofAcceptanceby the24May

2016deadline,thedealexpired.Seventh,twostatementsofPresidentObamasuccinctlysumupwheretheUSthinkstherelationshipis

going.InhislastStateoftheUnionaddress,PresidentObamastated:

For evenwithout ISIL, evenwithout al-Qaeda, instabilitywill continue for decades inmanypartsof theworld– in theMiddleEast, inAfghanistan,partsofPakistan, inpartsofCentralAmerica,inAfricaandAsia.Someoftheseplacesmaybecomesafehavensfornewterroristnetworks.Otherswill just fall victim to ethnic conflict, or famine, feeding the nextwave ofrefugees.46

Further,theApril2016issueofthemagazineTheAtlanticcarriedalongarticlebyJeffreyGoldbergbased on interviewswith PresidentObama. The fleeting reference to Pakistanwas extremely critical.Goldbergwrites:‘HequestionedwhytheUSshouldavoidsendingitsforcestoPakistantokillal-Qaedaleaders, and he privately questions why Pakistan, which he believes is a disastrously dysfunctionalcountry,shouldbeconsideredanallyatall.’47

Finally, at aUSCongressionalhearingon12July2016, titled ‘Pakistan:FriendorFoe in theFightagainstTerrorism’,Pakistancameinforseverecriticism,thelikeofwhichhasseldombeenwitnessed,according to observers. More than once Pakistan was called manipulative and accused of ‘makingchumps’outoftheUS.SomelawmakersevensuggesteddeclaringPakistanastatesponsorofterrorismandimposingeconomicsanctionsifitcontinuedtoallowAfghanTalibantouseitsterritory.48

Pakistanwouldhavetofactorinthesefewexamples,asyetstrawsinthewind,whileitconsidersitsfuture relationship with the US.What these developments show, above all, is that Pakistan’s double-dealingisfinallycatchingupwithitand,frombeinganally,itisnowgoingtofindincreasinglyshrinkingspace in theUS corridors of power.While aid – bothmilitary and economic –would continue for awhile, the trajectory of that aidwill also be shrinking.Were this to be accompanied by tightening ofconditionalities (underUS prompting) by international institutions like the IMF andWorld Bank, etc.,Pakistan’seconomyandmilitarywouldcomeunderalotofstrain.

ThePakistan–USrelationshiphasbeenacomplexone,indeedatragicone.TragicfortheUSinthesensethat despitemassive funding, theUnited States and the international community have failed tomodifyPakistanibehaviour. Itsmassiveassistancehas failed tochangePakistan’s jihadipoliciesof fomentingterrorismamongitsneighbours,anditsnuclearweaponsprogramme.MeaningfulcoercionbyWashingtonhasneverbeen triedbecauseofseeingPakistan through theprismofa largerobjective than thepurelybilateralrelationship.Ithas,asaresult,onlyreinforcedthePakistanibeliefthatitcanignoreAmericanthreatswithimpunity.The relationshiphasbeenevenmore tragic forPakistanbecause ithasusedAmericangenerosity to

beefupitsmilitaryprowessinitselusivequestformilitaryparitywithIndia,insteadofinvestingintherealsinewsofpower–inthepeopleofPakistan.Thearmy’sdominationofPakistanhasmeantthat itsperniciousworldview,centredonlyonmilitarysecurity,hasfritteredawaymassiveforeignassistance.Unfortunately, the domination is unlikely to changewithout a dramaticmakeover of the Pakistani state

itself–somethingthatisnotinsightrightnow.EvenbriberybytheUnitedStatesintheformofgenerousmilitaryandcivilianassistancehasmadenodifference,becausethePakistanimilitaryhascalculatedthatitcanpursueitscurrentsubversivepolicieswithoutfearofretaliationbecausePakistanistooimportanttobepunishedortobeallowedtofail.HaqqanisumsuptheAmericandilemmabrilliantly:

ThreeAmericanPresidents–DwightD.Eisenhower,JohnF.KennedyandLyndonB.Johnson–haveaskedthequestion:WhatdowegetfromaidingPakistan?Five–JimmyCarter,GeorgeH.W.Bush,BillClinton,GeorgeW.BushandBarackObama–havewonderedaloudwhetherPakistan’s leaders can be trusted to keep their word. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, successivegovernmentshavespentalotoftimetryingtofigureouthowtomaintainPakistan’sfreedomofactionwhiledependingonUSaid.49

Thatis,indeed,Pakistan’stragedy.

VII

LookingInwards

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LookingInwards

HISFINALchapterisaselectionoflamentsofPakistaniswhosewritingsreflectthepainandanguishatthestateofaffairsinPakistanandthetrajectoryofitsfuture.Whileitisencouragingthatmanyin

Pakistanareextremelyworriedaboutwherethecountryisheadedandhaveidentifieditsproblems,thetragedyisthatdespiteknowingtheproblems,nothingisbeingdonetorectifythem.ArticleswrittenbymanyPakistanisreflecttheirperceptionoftheabysstowardswhichthecountryis

hurtling.FromAyazAmir’s,‘Ifwehadtocometothis,whydidwegothroughthetroubleofPartition’toMira Sethi’s, ‘What will I tell my children about the kind of Pakistan I grew up in’; from KhalidMuhammad’s ‘The worldmay like to call us Pakistanis, but there are fewwithin the borders of thiscountrythatidentifythemselvesbythatmoniker’toRoedadKhan’s,‘TheFederationisunitedonlybya“ropeofsand”…TodayfailureisthemostoftenheardexpressioninPakistan.Somesayweareatthelastquarterofanhour…’;fromShahzadChaudhry’s‘Pakistanisocietystandsatitsweakestpointinhistory.Below this, itmust simply implode…’ toSaif Samejo’s, ‘Is it compulsory to hate India,America andIsrael,inordertolovePakistan?’;fromMamaQadir’s,‘Iaskforourchildrenback.Iaskforasolutiontothe dumped bodies’ to BanariMengal’s, ‘What havewe received from the people of Pakistan exceptneglectandtorment?’;fromBabarSattar’s,‘Whilepygmiesrunningthiscountrytraffichalf-bakedinaneideasofsaviour-hood,onecanfeelsandslippingthroughthefingers’,toPervezHoodbhoy’s‘Surely,itistimetoreflectonwhatmakessomanyPakistanisdisposedtowardscelebratingmurder,lawlessnessandintolerance’,thechaptertriestogleanhowordinaryPakistanisseethemselvesandtheirfuture.

WhitherPakistan?

‘It would thus appear that in some respects, the dawn of our freedom has been only a shade lessdismalthanthelongnightofslavery.Dark,overhangingclouds–whetherthey…haverisenlikeevilvaporsfromthebogsandmarshes,whichwehavesofarfailedtodrain–stillcastanuglyshadowacrossourfairland.Whatthenisourfuture?1

‘IfwehadtocometothiswhydidwegothroughthetroubleofPartition?Ihavewantedtoaskthisquestion for years but never could bring up the courage to frame it thus. After all, how can onequestionthebasisofone’sexistence?‘Butaswecontinuetoinventevermoreelaborateformsofextremismandviolence–killinginthe

name of our higher faith and exulting no end when the wages of barbarism are impressive – thisquestion returns to hauntme.…[I]f after 65 years of independent existence themess thatwe have

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createdisthebestthatwecando,anyfoolwillbetemptedtoaskwhetherwehaveprovenourselvesfitfornationhood.’2

‘…lately,Ihavebeenaskingmyselfaquestion:whatwillItellmychildrenaboutthekindofPakistanIgrewupin?Mychildhoodwasabuoyant,sunnytime.NowIliveinacountrymaddenedbyterror.’3

‘TheveryexistenceofPakistanisthreatenedbecauseourpastfolliesarecatchingupwithus.’4

‘Bornatmidnightasasovereign,independent,democraticcountry,todayitisneithersovereign,norindependent,norevendemocratic.Todayitisnotjusta“rentierstate”,notjustaclientstate.Itisaslave state, ill-led, ill-governed by a power-hungry junta and a puppet government set up byWashington.‘If youwant to know how a people can survive despite their government, well, visit Pakistan.

TodayPakistanisdangerouslyatwarwithitselfonceagain.TheFederationisunitedonlybya“ropeofsand”.…This isaneerieperiod, theheartof thenationappears tostopbeating,while itsbodyremainssuspendedinavoid.…TodayfailureisthemostoftenheardexpressioninPakistan.Somesayweareatthelastquarterofanhour.’5

‘Pakistanisocietystandsatitsweakestpointinhistory.Belowthis,itmustsimplyimplode.’6

‘IlovePakistan,butwhythatisn’tenough?IsitcompulsorytohateIndia,AmericaandIsrael,inordertolovePakistan?’7

Army

‘There is perhaps no other political–military elite in theworldwhose aspirations for great-powerregional status,whosedesire tooverextendandoutmatch itselfwithmeager resources, sooutstripsrealityasthatofPakistan.‘Thisisacountrythatsadlyappearsoneveryfailing-statelistandstillwantstoincreaseitsarsenal

fromaroundsixtyatomicweaponstowellover100bybuyingtwonewnuclearreactorsfromChina.’8

‘Pakistan acquired a unique distinction. Whereas elsewhere on the planet the word “defence”conjuredupavisionofcannon,tanksandearthworksthrownupagainstthreateningarmies,initscasedefencecametosymbolizerealestate.ThatunknownwagdeservesaprizewhofirstsaidthatF-16wasacornerplot.‘Noothermilitary,anywhere,hasgoneaboutthereal-estatebusinessinsuchanorganizedmanner.

…Thehigherconductofwarbyourgeneralstaffmayleavesomethingtobedesired–asthehistoryofourwarstestifies–butnomilitarycomesclosetooursinthematterofdefencehousingcolonies.’9

Balochistan

‘Iaskforourchildrenback.Iaskforasolutiontothedumpedbodies.’10

‘TheBalochpeoplehavebeenatthereceivingendsinceMarch27,1948andhavebeenbeatenwithdifferent traitor, separatist, foreign agent, anti-progress sticks.…Even if thousands are killed, theproblemisnotgoingtogoaway.’11

‘Whatconcernsmemostisaword.Itisasimplewordthatisnotheardonthelipsofpeopleinmostpartsoftheworld…WheneverIdohearthisword,orsayitmyself,itstirsemotionsthatIcannot

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explain.‘ThatwordisBalochistan.‘WhathavewereceivedfromthepeopleofPakistanexceptneglectandtorment?’12

Education

‘… itwasnotpossible tocontrolhis emotionswhenKewalram learnt that thebooks inhispubliclibraryinPakistanChowkhadbeenthrownoutbecausethepremiseswereneededtohouseapolicestation.Thiswas an early indication that the custodians of power inPakistanputmore value on apoliceman’sbatonasameansofbuildingagreatnationthanonequippingtheyouthwithknowledge.‘ThereisnorecordofthewayscoresoflibrariesinthecitiesandtownsofPakistan,suchasthe

oneatKarachi’sKhaliqdinaHall,wereravaged.…Bookskeptlosingouttoavarietyofsubstitutes.Forinstance,ahouseofbooksinLahorebecameahouseofkebabs.‘Thenwesaw themostmind-bogglingattacksonknowledgeduring theZia-ul-Haqregimewhen

studentsweretoldtoavoidreadingseveralclassicsandJ.S.Mills’OnLibertywasprominentamongthebookssetalightatLahore’sPunjabUniversity.TheFaisalabadUniversityofAgriculturewentastep further and prohibited any reference to Newton, Darwin, Marx, Freud and Einstein on thecampus.’13

‘Infact,fewsubjectshavesufferedgreaterdistortioninPakistanasIslamandMuslimhistory.Here,Islamanditshistoryhavebeeninvokedformorethanfourdecades.Yet,throughouttheseyearsneitherreligionnorhistoryhavebeenaccordedseriousattentionbythestateorsociety.IknowofnotasinglenoteworthyworkonthesesubjectstohavebeenpublishedinPakistan.ThecurriculumofIslamiyat,acompulsorysubjectinourschoolsandcolleges,isalmostentirelydevoidofasenseofpiety(taqwa),spiritualism(roohaniyat),ormysticism(tassawuf).Atbestitiscastintermsofritualisticformalism.Atworst,itreducesIslamtoapenalcode,anditshistorytoaseriesofviolentepisodes.’14

‘WemightcastigatethePakistanStudiescurriculaallwewant,butifanti-Hindumaterialistakenoutofthesebooks,thecurriculumdesignersandthenarratorsofPakistan’sversionofIndo–PakhistorywouldfinditreallyhardtojustifythecreationofPakistan.’15

FoundationsofPakistan

‘[I]natextbookexampleofthelawofunintendedconsequences, thePakistanistateandnationhavenowbecomeasIslamicasispossibleforanon-Arabcommonlawcountryinthe21stcentury.Indeed,the21stamendmenttotheConstitutionpassedearlierthisyeartocurbterrorism“usingthenameofreligion or a sect” represents a point of saturation and token acknowledgment of the flaws in theLahoreResolution….However,whetherwenowhavetheconstructivevisionthatwaslackingin1940isstillnotclear.’16

‘Sixty-fouryearsafter thepartitionofBritish India,keyquestionsstandunresolved.ArePakistanisArabsorSouthAsians?IsthereaPakistaniculture?ShouldthecountryberunaccordingtoIslamiclaw?CanHindus,Christiansand“Qadianis”beproperPakistanis?Whatwillbethenextgeneration’sanswers?’17

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‘We,thepigeonswitheyeswideshut,areridingavehiclethatisheadingtowardstheedgeofacliff.Ratherthanopeningoureyes,seeingtheobviousandaskingtherightquestions,wearetoofearfultoeven look at the monster we face. Maybe, just maybe, now is the time to consider that there issomethingfundamentallywrongwithourfoundation.Maybeit is timetoconsiderthatanationstatethat claims religion to be its reason for creation is bound to turn exclusionist. Consider this: westartedwithHinduversusMuslim.ThenitbecameAhmediversusMuslim.Beyondthat,nowcomesthequestionofShiaversusSunni.Nextup,andthecontoursofitareveryvisiblealready,willbethequestionofBarelviversusDeobandiversusSalafi.Astatemarriedtoreligionwillalwaysplayintothehandsofpeoplewhohaveamonopolyoverinterpretingitandwillalwaysleadtoadivisiveandpolarizedsocietyfuelledbydifferentreligiousinterpreters.’18

Government

‘Inpublicandinprivacy, insidehomesandoutinthemarketplace, thespeechofthepeopleissickwithdisgustandfrustration,streakedwithimpotentanger.Therearemanyreasonsforthis,butthereisonebasiccausewhichentersintothemallandthisbasiccauseisthecompleteexclusionofthepeoplefrom thepowerwhich shouldhavedevolvedon themwith thecomingof independence, thepowerwhichhasbeenrightfullytheirseversincethisdaytenyearsago,buthasbeenwithheldfromthembyasuccessionofself-appointedcoteries.’19

‘Whilepygmiesrunningthiscountrytraffichalf-bakedinaneideasofsaviour-hood,onecanfeelsandslippingthroughthefingers.‘AfalsenarrativehasbeensoldtoPunjab-dominatedPakistanthatastrongmanwithabighammer

andthewilltouseitindiscriminatelycantransformthisblightedlandintoheaven.Theapproachtostatecraft that cultivated violent (political and religious) non-state entities as assets and stateinstitutionsasameansofcoercionasopposedtoservicedeliveryisstillinplay.‘Ifthecitizenisn’tsurewhetherthestateistheprotectorortheperpetrator,whoistoblame,the

citizenorthestate?’20

HumanRights

‘Inacountryofunfetteredextremism,everyattempt tostemtheslide intoobscurantismismetwithresistance, every voice raised in defence of moderation, plurality and intellectual curiosity issilenced,oftenatthepointofagun.ParweenRahman,RashidRehman,SabeenMahmud—thesearebutafewamongthemanyvoicesofreasonthatwecouldnotaffordtolose.InsteadofprotectingthosethatarePakistan’sbesthopeofclawingbackthespacecededtoright-wingforces,thestateremainsshamelesslyinretreat.’21

‘In our endeavor to protect the “sanctity” and “integrity” of our religion and the State, we havesystematicallystampedoutallvoicesofdissent thatchallengedtheprevalentnarrative,andhadthepotentialofinfusingtoleranceintoourdemocraticdispensation.’22

India

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‘Let’s stop worrying about India. In its wildest dreams India could not do to us what we havemanagedtoinflictonourselves.RAW,withinputfromtheRashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh,couldhavetriedforahundredyearsandnotbeenabletoinventthelashkarsandjaishesandtehriksthatwehaveproducedinsuchabundance.What’smore,toscarenoonesomuchasourselves.OurjihadisusedtodreamofplantingthegreenflagontheDelhiRedFortorcreatingfancifulemiratesinCentralAsia.Those proving arduous undertakings, they have embarked upon a new jihad – conquering Pakistanfromwithin.’23

‘I grew up at a time when India and Pakistan were hyphenated in social and political discourse(remember“Indo–Pak”?)IarguedwithmyIndianfriendsoverthesuperiorityofourcricketteam,ournational icons,evenourGDP.Thesedaysanalysts find“Af–Pak,”and itsgeo-strategic resonances,moreuseful…TherivalryofmyIndianfriendsfirstgavewaytopity,andnowarticulatesitselfassympathy.Isupposethat’scomforting.’24

‘…wehave lost trackof theoriginalpurposeof thecreationof thecountry.MoreMuslims live infearinPakistanthaninIndiaandthousandsmoreMuslimshavebeenkilledinPakistanonreligiousandsectariangroundsthaninIndiasinceindependence.’25

Karachi

‘A friend recently visited Karachi and on finding it more peaceful than before, commended it.However, I toldhim that this apparentpeacewas transitory and that therewouldbe an evenmoredangerousandviciousKarachi.Forthatmatter,everyplacewouldbecomeevenmoredangerousandvicious because the harsh and cruel measures being employed neither address nor change theconditionsresponsibleforthedeeprotthatcontinuestoeatawayattheveryinnardsofsociety,whichhasnowforsakenitselfandcontinuestoslidedeeperanddeeperintothemorassofchaos,violence,intolerance,crime,corruption,hateandapathy.’26

‘Thefindingofbullet-riddenbodiesofsuspectedterrorists,allegedlyinstaged“encounters”,isnowalmost a daily occurrence asKarachi limps towards normality. There has beenmarked decline intargetedkillingsandnomoredostrikesbringthecitytoahalt.‘Yet thesuspicion that thesegainsarebeingachieved througha rise inextra-judicialexecutions,

allegedlybylawenforcementagencies,isdisturbingforthatwouldmeanonekindofviolencebeingreplacedbyanotherformofterror.Thiscanhardlybringlong-termpeaceandstability.Thelessonsofthepastmustnotbeforgottenintheglareoftemporarysuccess.Theuseofstateviolenceasapartofthecounterterrorismpolicyhasitsownlong-termconsequences.Havewenotbeentherebefore?’27

Minorities

‘…thesignificanceofhatingHindusforPakistanisisalotmorethanjustbiasedhistoricalnarrativesorpumpingupbigotryunderthegarbofpatriotism…whatneedstobeunderstoodandunderscoredhere is that an IndianHindumanifesting communal bigotry contradicts the ‘idea’ of India,while aPakistani Muslim by doing so conforms to the ‘idea’ of Pakistan. Opposition to Hindus, andantagonismbetweenHindus andMuslims, form the foundingprincipleofPakistan…howcanyou

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expect Hindu–Muslim harmony in a state that was created through fanning the embers of Hindu–Muslimdisharmony?…RefusingtoacknowledgethecommonalitiesbetweenHindusandMuslimsoftheIndiansubcontinentisapartofthelegacyofourfoundingfathers,andthereasonwhyPakistanwascreated in the first place… For Pakistan to achieve religious harmony and existential stability itwouldinevitablyhavetoquestionitsfoundingideology.That’stheparadoxstaringthecountryinthefacerightnow.’28

ReligiousExtremism

‘Surely,itistimetoreflectonwhatmakessomanyPakistanisdisposedtowardscelebratingmurder,lawlessnessandintolerance.Tounderstandthekindofpsychologicalconditioningthathasturnedusintonastybrutes,cruelbothtoourselvesandtoothers,IsuggestthatthereaderssamplesomeoftheFridayKhutbas[sermons]deliveredacrossthecountry’sestimated250,000mosques…oftenusingabusivelanguage,bythemullah.’29

‘Thedilemmaofthevocalcitizenopposedtoviolenceofallsortsisthatheorshedoesn’tknowwhoto fear more: the state or non-state actors. It is open hunting [sic] season in Pakistan for thisendangeredspecies.Ifyou’reagainstreligiouslyinspiredsavagery,theTehreek-i-TalibanPakistanoroneofitscousinscankillyou.Ifyou’reagainstsectarianviolence,theLashkar-i-Jhangvioroneofitscousinscankillyou.‘Ifyoucontestthestate’sversionof“patriotism”,chancesareyouarealsoopposedtotheTTPs,

LJs,obscurantismandstateoppression.Insuchcaseanyonecankillyou.’30

‘Violence,itseems,isthePakistaniway.…OnTV,oneheardtwobeardedgentlemendebatingwhichparticular transgressions would render a person liable to be murdered. My goodness! Such apreoccupationwithkilling…revenge…violence.OnewouldthinkthatmenwhoclaimscholarshipintheWordofGodwouldspeaktousaboutHisMercy,HisBenedictionsandHisInfiniteLove.‘Wheredoesonebegin togrieve?Thedaily toll of thedead and themissing inBalochistan? In

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa?TheunendingbloodlettingofmyfellowKarachiites?More than80,000men,womenandchildrenmurderedalloverPakistanbyterrorism?Wherewillthegrievingend?Thisisanationborninviolenceanditcontinuestoremaininastateofviolence.‘Wherethenisthefatalflawthathascreatedsuchasulphurouscauldronofviolence?Theflawisa

failureofleadership.’31

Sectarianism

‘Itwasclearthatourcollectivehumanityisdying,suffocatingslowlyundertherubbleofconspiracytheories, fear, apathy, and sheer number of dead bodies. … It is a tragedy for a country whosefoundingfatherhadShiafamilyhistory,thefirstlawministerwasaHindu,andthefirstforeignmisterwasanAhmadi.Acountrywhichatbirthwashometosomanysects,thatbytheirsheervolumewewerecompelledtobeatolerantsociety.…overtimethatpluralisticqualityhaserodedsocompletelythatthegenerationbornintothenewmillenniumdoesn’tevenrecallatolerantPakistan.’32

‘Awisemanoncesaid,“IamnotsureifPakistanwascreatedinthenameofreligionbutitsureis

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beingdestroyedinthenameofreligion.”WhetherthevictimsaretheHazarasofQuetta,ChristiansofYouhanabad in Lahore, Bohras offering Friday prayers in Karachi, or the children targeted in theArmyPublicSchoolattackinPeshawar,therootcauseisthesame.Itisthebeliefthatonehasarightto judgeothersbasedontheirfaithandif theyaredeterminedreligiouslydeviant(as in thecaseofothersectsorreligions)orreligiouslywanting(asinthecaseofthemajoritysect),thentheyarefairgame.’33

‘Brandingeachother“Kaafir” isanewcoolapparentlyamong the religiouschauvinists.Facebookpagesarechock-fullofdisgustingcontentpertainingtodifferentschoolsofthoughts.’34

Terrorism

‘OxfordandCambridge,misguidedspirits,mayboastoftheircolleges.Thankstoahistoryofjihadiwarfare,andthankstoothercountries,fortressesofpiety,meddlinginouraffairs,wecantakeprideinthelargestcollectionofreligiousschoolsorseminariesanywhereintheworld.Cantheoutstandingscientistsproducedelsewherematchthestreamofoutstandingbigotspouringoutfromourfountsoflearning?’35

‘Therealizationisdawningslowlyandinexorably: thehorror thatwasDecember16,2014wasnoturningpoint.Thecurtainhasnotbeenbroughtdownonextremistelements;notonlydotheyremainfreetopropagatehatredandintolerance,thoseintheircrosshairsstillhavenorecoursebuttofendfor themselves. … this is the same country where banned organizations have been taking outprocessionsevenafterDecember16andthreateninglaw-abidingcitizens.Cosmeticmeasures,evenatthispointwherenothing less thana single-mindedcleaningof theAugean stables is required,willtakeusevenfurtherintotheabyss.’36

‘An indicationofPakistan’schallengesandGen.Gul’spowerful legacycameathis funeral. Itwasattended among other militant leaders (presumably all “good” Taliban) by Hafiz Saeed, MaulanaFazlurRehmanKhalilandSyedSalahuddin.AlsoinattendancewastheCOASGen.RaheelSharif.’37

I

Conclusion

NSCHOOL, I read a short story inHindi bynoted authorYashpal titled ‘Purdah’1 (veil or curtain)aboutChaudharyPirBuksh,theuneducatedgrandsonofaminorgovernmentfunctionary.Aftermarriage

heisforcedtorentasmallhouseinaworking-classneighbourhoodwhereheliveswithhiswife,fivechildrenandmother.Hebarelymakesenoughtofeedhisfamily.However,havinginheritedmiddle-classpretentions,hispride is thepurdahon the frontentranceof thehouse.Over theyears, thedoorsof thehousewitherawaybutthepurdahkeepshisprideintactbyhidingthetruesituationofhisfamily.Heisforcedtotakeasmallloanfrom‘PunjabiKhan’tomeethisexpenses.Whenheisunabletorepaytheloan,PunjabiKhancomes tohishousedemandingrepayment incashorkind.WhenPirBukshexpresseshisinability for either, Punjabi Khan in a fit of rage yanks off the purdah. Khan and the neighbours areshockedtoseethestateofpovertyinPirBuksh’shouse,withthewomenbarelyabletocovertheirbodieswithrags.Inpityanddisgust,PunjabiKhanandtheneighbourswalkawayandPirBuskshnolongerhasthehearttoputupthepurdahagainbecauseallhasbeenrevealedandhisfalseprideshatteredforever.Juxtapose this story toPakistanand it isamazinghowclosely it fits the situation thatPakistan finds

itselfintoday.PirBuksh’slackofeducationcompareswiththeeducationemergencyinPakistan;hislargefamilywith the growth of population and the potentially unrealized demographic dividend; his lack ofearningcapacitywiththestateoftheeconomy;hisdebtwiththedebtPakistanismiredin,thepurdahwiththespitandpolishofthearmy;PunjabiKhanwithPakistan’screditors,especiallytheIMF.Unfortunately,thereisnointernationalbenefactorliketheUS,SaudiArabiaorChinatobailoutPirBuksh.BehindthepurdahorthefacadeoftheeighthlargestarmyintheworldliestherealityofPakistan–a

massofilliterateandpoorlyeducatedpeoplewhoseneedswillincreasinglynotbemet;agrowingdebtnecessitatingmoreloanstorepayolderdebt.Yet,thepurdahofthearmyanditsnuclearweaponsgivesthe illusion of things being in order. So long as the purdah holds, the reality of Pakistanwill remainconcealed.Butcan thepurdahholdout indefinitely?Like thewithereddoorsofPirBuksh’shouse, thestateiswitheringfrominside.Soontherewillbenothinglefttohangthepurdahon,justasthearmywillfindthatsoonenoughPakistanwillbarelybeacountrywhereitcanstrutabout.ThetragedyofPakistanisthatsuchasorrystateofaffairsneednothavebeenitsfate.Havingforgeda

country–‘moth-eaten’asitwas–theleadersimaginedthattheachievementofPakistanpersewasthejourney’send;thathavingachievedPakistan,restwouldfollow;thattheforceofreligionwouldbindallthe disparate communities; and that the force of Jinnah’s leadership would resolve all issues. Jinnahunfortunatelydiedinjustoverayearofitscreation,andeversincePakistanhasbeenstrugglingtofind‘Jinnah’sPakistan’evenasreligionthathaspervadedthestateandsocietyhasbecomeadivisiveforceratherthanaunifyingone.

Pakistan’sgeographicallocationhas,overthedecades,attractedgreatpowersliketheUSandChinaand have given it access to massive economic and military resources. However, given the military’smindset,suchresourceshavebeensquanderedonnarrowlydefinedsecurityratherthanonstrengtheningPakistan’s economic and social sectors – the real sinews of power. This is proving disastrous in anincreasinglytechnologicalandglobalizedworld.Decades of underinvestment in education, and institutionalizing a limited ideological bias in the

curriculumhasmanifested itself in abysmallypoor-qualityeducation resulting inanarrowandbigotedworldviewandlowlearningskills.Thisisquiteapartfromdismalstatisticsregardingenrolmentatalllevelsofschoolingandliteracy(nottomentiontheevenmoredismalstatisticsforfemaleeducation).Forthis reason, Pakistan is on track to miss the opportunity provided by the demographic transition andinstead of reaping a demographic dividend, it may well land up having to deal with a demographicnightmare.AneglectofthewaterinfrastructurehastransformedPakistanfromawater-abundantcountryin1947

toawater-scarcecountry in less thansevendecades.Thiswillhavedisastrousconsequences for foodsecurityaswellasruralemployment,furtheraddingtothegrowingnumberoftheunemployedatatimewhenthepopulationisfastincreasing.WhileitisdebatablewhetherPakistanis,infact,moresecuretodaythanearlierevenwithitsnuclear

weapons, the fact is that the state has not given any kind of priority to human development.Simultaneously, themilitary-dominated securitymindset has eroded the space required for democraticinstitutionstoflourish.Thus,eveninperiodsofsupposedlycivilianrule,thereis,infact,ahybridsystemwhere the civiliangovernment is constantly lookingover its shoulder and is effectivelydebarred fromsomeofthemostvitalareasofstatecraft,i.e.,foreignpolicy,defenceandsecurityissues,tosaynothingofthenuclearassets.Thenewterminology,ofcourse,isthatofa‘softcoup’.For thePakistanArmy,gettinga seaton the internationalhigh table intermittentlyhas resulted in an

exaggeratedsenseofitsownimportance.Thishasledtoruinousconsequencesasfarasdomesticpolicyisconcerned.Baskingintheattentionasafront-linestatebyleveragingitsgeographicalpositioninthe1980sandmostofthiscenturytillnow,PakistanhasnothadtofacetheuncomfortablequestionsofwherePakistan’s key indicators were going. Kept artificially afloat, Pakistan has not had to take the toughdecisionsonhowtolivewithinitsmeans,onhowtoamelioratethelivingconditionsofitscitizensandhowtobuildthestrengthofitspeople.Worse, Pakistan has come to internalize its own propaganda about jihad – that it can continue to

promoteterrorisminneighbouringcountrieswith impunityandthat theUSwillultimatelycomearoundandbailitout.Unfortunately,itisnowreapingthewhirlwindofjihadinsideitsownterritorybyitsownproxies,whohave learnt the lessons taught to themonly toowell.This isonecrisiswhere theoutsideworldcannotbailthemout.FortheUSandChina,theaddeddangernowisthatthetrajectorythatPakistanhasadopted–makinga

distinctionbetween‘good’and‘bad’terroristswillonlyleadtogreater,notlesser,terrorism.Thereistheever-present possibility that a jihadi group will carry out anotherMumbai-style attack on India or asuccessfulattackontheUSliketheoneattemptedbyFaisalShehzadinTimesSquare,NewYork.WilleitherofthetwogovernmentsbeabletoresistpublicpressuretopunishPakistan?Togetoutofthejihadigrip,Pakistaniswillhavetojettisonthecollectiveescapistfallacytheyhave

been living under.According to this, terrorist acts targeting civilians, especiallywomen, children andreligiousplaces,aresoheinousthatMuslimscouldnothavecarriedthemout.Thisistheconstantrefrainin the media, especially the TV talk shows. Pakistanis will have to accept that foreigners are notcommittingheinousactsinPakistanbutPakistanisare;thatHindus,JewsorChristiansarenotdoingsobutMuslimsare.SuchdevelopmentsclearlyshowthetrajectoryinwhichPakistanishurtling.WhetherornotPakistan

willcontinuetotraveltowardstheabysswilldependonitscomprehensionofthemultiplecrisesfacingthecountryand itswillingness to take resoluteaction to tackleeachof theproblems.Given thehydra-headedproblemsfacedbyPakistan,ameretinkeringwithissueswillonlymakemattersworse.Pakistanileadershipwillhavetorevisittheentiregamutofitsdevelopmentsince1947.Whilethepastcannotbechanged,fundamentalquestionswillhavetobeaskedaboutbasicissueslike

thevalidityofcontinuingtousereligiontoforgeacommonidentity, thestate’sroleinIslamizationandaggravatingsectariandivisionsinsociety.Questionswillhavetobeaskedabouttheroleofthearmyandtheintelligenceservicesinmanipulatinganddominatingthepolityandaboutreorganizingsucharoletoadapttociviliansupremacy,strengtheningdemocracyandthefederalprinciples.Answerswillalsohaveto be found about the kind of negative identity it has sought to impose, the kind of insecurities it hasfostered about its neighbours and the policies it has adopted to tackle such insecurities. Consensualanswerswillhavetobefoundforsuchfundamentalissues.Rethinkingsuchfundamentalswillonlybethefirststep.Amorefundamentalandimportantstepwould

befortheleadership,civilandmilitary,andthepeopleofPakistantodevelopavisionofthemselvesandan identity that isnotnegative,whichdoesnothingeonhatredofothers, isnotbasedonconspiracies.WithoutsuchamajortransformationitisunlikelythatPakistanwilleverbeatpeacewithitselfandwithothers.Whatwould theparametersof sucha transformationbe?Someof thekeyareas that the statewould

havetofocusonwillhavetobe:(i)theeconomy–whetherornotexpenditureprioritiesaremodifiedtomatch the lofty goals enunciated in its own Vision 2025 document, like increasing expenditure oneducation to4percentofGDP;(ii)genuinereduction in thedefencebudgetandnotmerely tricks likeparkingdefenceexpenditureundercivilheadsasdonefromMusharraf’stime;(iii)learningtolivewithinits ownmeans bywidening the tax base and tax-to-GDP ratio, increasing domestic savings, and othersimilar measure instead of depending on domestic and foreign borrowings; (iv) reordering therelationshipwithIndiafromoneofinveteratehostilityandseekingparitytoarealisticrelationshipbasedongeographicalrealitiesofbeingneighbours;(v)stoppinginterferenceinAfghanistanandrespectingitsindependenceand sovereignty; (vi) establishing thewritof the stateandmonopolyover instrumentsofviolencebydistancingitselffromall jihadigroupswithoutmakingadistinctionbetween those thatareanti-Indiawho are allowed to continue and those that are anti-Pakistanwho are targeted; (vii) takingserious measures to rein in madrasas spreading sectarian hatred, glorifying violence and making thecurriculummeaningfulfortoday’sworld;(viii)reformingthecurriculumofgovernmentschoolstodeleteall chapters promoting hatred and distorting history of Pakistan; (ix) the army realizing that it existsbecause there is a Pakistan and not the other way around; and (x) Pakistanis of all Islamic huesunderstandingthattheyarenottheonlyIslamiccountryintheworldanddonothaveanexcusivecontractonIslam.

WhatwouldmakePakistanundergosuchatransformation?ItisnotfinancialinducementssincetheUShaspumpedinenoughoverthedecadestolittleavail.NeitherisitthepotentiallyhugeinvestmentsthatChinahadpromisedin2010andnowagainin2015.ItisnotthreatsofsanctionsthatPakistanhasdealtwithinthepast.Neitheris it thethreatofbeingdeclaredaterroriststateunlessit is implemented(andPakistan has had good reason to believe that such a threatwould not be implemented).Neither is thethreatofbeingdeclaredaroguenuclearstateeffective,becauseonceagainthosemakingsuchthreatsareunlikelytoimplementit,astheydidnotinthecaseofA.Q.Khan.Domestically, the leadership seems to have immunity from bad governance because irrespective of

draggingthecountrydowntothebottomofalmosteveryinternationallist,itisasimilarsetofpoliticiansthathavereturnedtopower,electionafterelection.Thus,thefearofnotbeingelectedorbeingpunishedfortheirmisdemeanorsisnotanincentiveforgoodgovernanceorresponsibilityandaccountabilityasitisinotherdemocracies.Onepossibilityofavoluntary transformation is ifPakistan’s ‘wish list’ is satisfied.Over theyears,

Pakistan’s‘wishlist’,asarticulatedbyvariousleaders,civilandmilitary,includesthefollowing:

(i) Indiaiscompelledtohandover,ataminimum,theKashmirValley;(ii) IndiawithdrawsfromSiachen;(iii) IndiaagreestoPakformulationonSirCreek;(iv) Indiaagreesnottobuildevenrun-of-theriverprojectsonthewesterntributariesoftheIndusas

permittedbytheIndusWatersTreaty;(v) IndiastopsallprojectsinAfghanistan;(vi) IndiaclosesallitsconsulatesinAfghanistan;(vii) AfghanistanishandedovertotheTaliban,oratleastafacadeofpowersharingisenteredinto

withthem;(viii) OtherethnicgroupsinAfghanistanacceptthesupremacyoftheTalibanvarietyofPakhtuns;(ix) AfghanistanrecognizesthefinalityoftheDurandLineanddoesnottryandreducetheflowofthe

Kabulriverevenforitsownuse;(x) TheUSentersintoacivilnucleardealwithPakistanlikeithaswithIndiaandfacilitatesits

entryintotheNuclearSuppliersGroup(NSG);(xi) IndiaisbarredfrombecomingamemberoftheUNSecurityCouncilunlessPakistanisalso

simultaneouslymadeamember;(xii) TheUSandinternationalfinancialinstitutionscontinuetoprovideliberalfinancialbailout

packagestoPakistanindefinitely;(xiii) IndiaandtheinternationalcommunityrecognizePakistan’sparitywithIndia;(xiv) Pakistanbeallowedtocontinueinitsfinanciallyirresponsiblewaysandisnotheldaccountable

formismanagingitseconomy;and(xv) Pakistanisnotaskedto‘domore’againstterroristsithascreatedandnurturedovertheyears.

The absurdity of each item in such a wish list is obvious. Allowing the fulfilment of any of these‘wishes’ would only be appeasement of the worst kind – rewarding irresponsible behaviour because

‘Pakistanistooimportanttofail’andtocontinuetoleverageitsgeographicalposition.Thereare,however,twootheroptionstomakePakistanmodifyitsbehaviourwithoutacquiescingtoits

irrationalwishes.Thefirst isforcingPakistantobehave,not throughappeasementandinducementsbutthroughforcefulnon-militaryaction,suchasreducing,ifnotstopping,multilateralandbilateralfinancialassistance.ThiswouldadverselyimpactthePakistaneconomyandforceittoreducethesizeofitsarmyandlivewithinitsmeans.This,however, isunlikelytobetriedoutforfearofadverselyimpactingthepopulationandbecauseasanuclear-armedcountry,Pakistan’sproblemsareaglobalconcernandstatefailureisnotanoption.ThesecondoptionistowaitforPakistantocollapseunderitsownweight.AneconomylikePakistan’s

cannot bear the massive cost of debt repayment and the defence budget coupled with sustaining theTaliban,supportingIndia-centricterroristsandfightingthehome-grownterrorists,whetherinFATAorinPakistan’shinterland,tosaynothingofanykindofdevelopmentalactivity.Thesecoststogetherwiththedemographicpressures,waterscarcityandmillionsofunemployedyouthwillcripplePakistanwithoutashot being fired.However, this option too is not advisable for the simple reason that the internationalcommunity would find the cost of rehabilitating thousands if not millions of radicalized, unemployedyouthunacceptable.Therefore, to make Pakistan behave like a normal state living within its parameters, accepting

responsibilityfor itsownactions, therehas tobeacombinationof these twooptions.Thedisbursalofforeignassistance–bilateralandmultilateral–has tobecoordinatedandmadedependentonspecificaction taken by the leadership on the menu of transformative actions provided above. Without suchspecificaction,aidmustbewithheldirrespectiveofwhat‘larger’objectivesPakistanmaybeservingatthat point in time. No ‘waivers’ should be permitted for slippages. It is only when the cost of itsmisdemeanours become unbearable to the leadership, especially the military, will Pakistan give upillusionsofgrandeurandbehaveresponsibly.Howmuch timedoesPakistanhave toget itsact together?Notmore thanadecadeat themost, if it

doesnotchangethetrajectoryofitsslidebytakingatleastsome,ifnotall,ofthetransformativeactionsmentionedabove.Acombinationofdemographicpressures,anuneducatedhordeofyoungpeople,lackofjobs, increasingly diminishingwater supplies, an economyon the drip and an increasingly radicalizedpopulation will lead to unacceptable social chaos and anarchy that the army too will not be able tocontrolorbeimmunefrom.Forpreciselythisreason,it is incumbentontheinternationalcommunitynottoappeasePakistanany

further.Pakistanhasbeendiggingitselfintoaholefrequently,chasingillusionsofgrandeur,secureintheknowledgethatitwillbebailedoutbyitsbenefactors.Thosebenefactors,forPakistan’sownsake,willhavetostopdoingsoandinstead‘encourage’ittoshowthevision,determinationandleadershiptocomeoutoftheholebyitself,albeitwithahelpinghand.ButtheefforthastobePakistan’s.RebuildingPakistanwill requireperseverance, dedication and a long-termcommitment fromall the

stakeholdersworkinginademocraticframeworktodevelopaconsensusonthewayforward.Ifthearmywere toobstruct civiliancontrolor thepoliticianswere to fail thecountryonceagain,Pakistan’s trystwiththeabyssisassured.WheredoesPakistangofromhere?Thatwoulddepend,ofcourse,agreatdealonwhereitwantstogo

(asthecaterpillartoldAliceinAliceinWonderland).Asofnow,theonlyroadthatPakistanseemsseton

inistowardstheabyss.ItappearsthatverylittleseriousintrospectionisgoingonanywhereinPakistanaboutthetrajectorythatitison.Thereis,ofcourse,afairamountofthinkingoutsideofPakistanonthisissue. But that is invariably dismissed as being motivated, especially when it comes from India.Ultimately,itiswhenPakistanis,especiallythemilitary,understandtheissuesinvolved,understandthatwhatisatstakeisnothinglessthantheverysurvivalofPakistanasastatethatperhapsthefirsttentativestepwouldbetakeninreversingitstragictrajectory.ItisthenthattheleaderswillstartaskingtherightquestionsaboutwhatrealsecurityentailsandwhatitmeanstobeaPakistani,andrealizethebenefitsthatwouldaccruefrombeingatpeacewithitselfanditsneighbours.Pakistan’sleaderswoulddowelltorecallIqbal’sfamouscoupletwith‘Pakistan’beingsubstitutedfor

‘Hindustan’intheoriginal.

NasamjhogetomitjaogeaiPakistanvaaloTumharidaastantakbhinahogedastaanonmein.

Ifyoudonotfathom,youwillbedestroyed,OpeopleofPakistanEvenyourstorywillnotendureinthestoriesoftheworld.

—MuhammedIqbal,‘Tasvir-e-Dard’

1.2.3.

4.5.6.7.8.9.

10.11.12.13.14.15.

1

1.2.

3.

4.

5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.15.

Notes

Introduction

HectorBolitho,Jinnah:CreatorofPakistan,London:JohnMurrayPublishers,1954.Reprinted1956,p193.Ibid.Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith, High Commissioner in Karachi, to Arthur Henderson, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations;IOR:L/E/8/5831,DespatchNo.1 (54/47),19August1947,cited inLionelCarter (ed.),PartitionObserved:BritishOfficialReportsfromSouthAsia,14August-15October1947,Vol.I,NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers,2011,p.71.StanleyWolpert,JinnahofPakistan,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress(henceforthOUP),1984,p370.LtColIlahiBaksh,MD,WiththeQuaid-i-AzamDuringHisLastDays,Karachi:OUP,1949;2011edition,p.54.SriPrakasa,Pakistan:BirthandEarlyDays,Meerut:MeenakshiPrakashan,1965,p.113.Ibid.LtColIlahiBaksh,MD,op.cit.,pp.57–58.KunwarKhulduneShahid, ‘Shiaphobia’,TheFridayTimes, 4April2014.According toAkbarS.Ahmed,however, JinnahhadmovedtowardstheSunnisectearlyinlife.AkbarS.Ahmed,Jinnah,PakistanandIslamicIdentity:TheSearchForSaladin,Oxford:OUP,1997,p.4.HumanRightsCommissionofPakistan,StateofHumanRightsin2014,p.2.AliMughal,‘Pakistanslipsto113ontheHumanCapitalIndex’,TheExpressTribune,2May2015.SairaYaminandSalmaMalik,‘MappingConflictTrendsInPakistan’,UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,2014.Ibid.HumanRightsCommissionofPakistan,StateofHumanRightsin2014,p.178.‘Pakistanipassportsecondworstforinternationaltravel’,TheExpressTribune,27February2016.

ThePakistanMovement

SeeSumitSarkar,ModernIndia1885-1947,Delhi:MacmillanIndia,1983,Reprint2013,pp.428–32.AngusMaddison,ClassStructureandEconomicGrowth:IndiaandPakistansince theMoghuls,London:1971,cited inTariqAli,CanPakistanSurvive:TheDeathofaState,London:PenguinBooks,1983,p.63.ChristopherThorne,AlliesofaKind:TheUS,BritainandtheWaragainstJapan,1941-1945,London:HamishHamilton,1978,p.62,citedinAlexVonTunzelmann,IndianSummer:TheSecretHistoryoftheEndofanEmpire,London:Simon&Schuster,2007,p.109.LordCanning’sletterof21November1857.LetterNo.93of‘Letters tothePresidentof theBoardofControl,JanuarytoDecember1857’,citedinPeterHardy,TheMuslimsofBritishIndia,London:CambridgeUniversityPress,1972,p.72.CitedinTariqAli,op.cit.,p.22.KhalidB.Sayeed,Pakistan:TheFormativePhase1857-1948,London:OUP,1968,secondedition,pp.14–15.PeterHardy,op.cit.,p.93.Ibid.,p.85.Ibid.,p.90.M.J.Akbar,Tinderbox:ThePastandFutureofPakistan,NewDelhi:HarperCollinsPublishersIndia,2011,p.74.PeterHardy,op.cit.,p.103,quotedinTariqAli,CanPakistanSurvive,TheDeathofaState,London:PenguinBooks,1983,p.29.PeterHardy,op.cit.,p.103.SeeM.J.Akbar,op.cit.,p.90.Ibid.,p.94.‘OnthePresentStateofIndianPolitics’,Allahabad,1888,p.12,citedinPeterHardy,op.cit.,p.130.

16.17.18.

19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.

30.

31.32.33.34.35.

36.37.38.39.40.41.42.43.44.45.46.

47.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.60.61.62.63.64.65.66.

Ibid.,pp.27–28.CitedinPeterHardy,op.cit.,p.129.SeeIanTalbot,Pakistan:AModernHistory,NewDelhi:OUP,1998,pp.28–29.Minute by LordDufferin on Provincial Councils enclosedwith letterNo. 118 of Letters fromLordDufferin toCross, cited in PeterHardy,op.cit.,p.134.PeterHardy,op.cit.,p.131.SumitSarkar,op.cit.,p.141.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.,p.140.PeterHardy,op.cit.,p.155.CitedinV.V.Nagarkar,GenesisofPakistan,Bombay:AlliedPublishers,1975,p.78.SumitSarkar,op.cit.,p.141.PeterHardy,op.cit.,p.147.JaswantSingh,Jinnah–India,Partition,Independence,NewDelhi:Rupa&Co.,2009,p.48.AghaKhan,TheMemoirsofAghaKhan:WorldEnoughandTime,London:Chasseil, 1954, pp. 93–94, cited inMahboobHussain,‘MuslimNationalisminSouthAsia:EvolutionthroughConstitutionalReforms’,JournalofPoliticalStudies,Vol.1,No.2,1994,pp.65–77.SyedSharifuddinPirzada,FoundationsofPakistan,AIMLDocuments,Vol.I,1906–24,NewDelhi:MetropolitanBookCo.Pvt.Ltd,1982,p.l.V.V.Nagarkar,op.cit.,p.153.CitedinWaliKhan,FactsareFacts,Peshawar:BaachaKhanTrust,2006Reprint,p.25.Ibid.,p.26.Ibid.SyedSharifuddinPirzada,FoundationsofPakistan,AIMLDocuments,Vol.II,1924–47,NewDelhi:MetropolitanBookCo.Pvt.Ltd,IndianEdition1982,p.159.CitedinNadeemF.Paracha,‘Themapman’,Dawn,SundayMagazine,21June2015.SeeSyedSharifuddinPirzada,op.cit.,pp.xiv–xx.TariqAli,TheClashofFundamentalisms–Crusades,JihadsandModernity,NewYork:Verso,2002,p.174.NarendraSinghSarila,TheUntoldStoryofIndia’sPartition,NewDelhi:HarperCollinsIndia,2005,p.69.HindustanTimes,Delhi,30December1931,citedinKhalidB.Sayeed,op.cit.,p.177.Ibid.,pp.176–77.CitedinWaliKhan,op.cit.,p.30.http://pakteahouse.net/2011/10/05/the-return-of-jinnah-1934/accessedon20June2016.EdwinS.Montague,AnIndianDiary,London:WilliamHeinemann,1930,p58,citedinKhalidB.Sayeed,op.cit.,p.86.NarendraSinghSarila,op.cit.,p.88.MintotoHewett,15February1910,citedinS.R.Wasti,LordMintoandtheIndianNationalistMovement,1905–10,Oxford:OUP1964,pp.86–87,citedinPeterHardy,op.cit.,p.166.MarquessofZetland,Essayez,London:JohnMurray,1956,p.247,citedinPeterHardy,op.cit.,p.229.Jamil-ud-dinAhmed(ed.),SpeechesandWritingsofMrJinnah,citedinKhalidB.Sayeed,op.cit.,pp.181–82.CitedinWaliKhan,op.cit.,p.38.Ibid.,p.41.SyedSharifuddinPirzada,op.cit.,p.337–38.SeealsoAdeelKhan,PoliticsofIdentity,NewDelhi:SagePublications,2005,p.71.SyedSharifuddinPirzada,op.cit.,p.341.‘BecomingPakistan’,editorialinTheNation,23March2015.IshtiaqAhmed,‘SplittingIndia,PartI’,TheFridayTimes,20–26September2013.Ibid.HussainNadin,‘DowereallyneedJinnah’sPakistan?’,TheDailyTimes,22December2012.CitedinWaliKhan,op.cit,p.52.Ibid.,pp.53–54.Ibid.,p.54.Ibid.Ibid.,pp.76–77.Y.Krishan,Partition&Pakistan–Jinnah:TheFounder,British:TheArchitects,NewDelhi:MosaicBooks,2013,p.55.H.V.Hodson,‘TheGreatDivide’:Britain-India-Pakistan,London:Hutchinson,1969,Karachi:OUP,1985,p.125.CitedinWaliKhan,op.cit.,p.106.Reporton‘TheLastViceroyalty’,PartC,para56(OIC),BritishLibrary,London,citedinNarendraSinghSarila,op.cit.,p.296.SyedSharifuddinPirzada,op.cit.,pp.557–58.

67.68.

69.70.71.

2

1.2.

3.4.5.

6.7.8.9.

10.

11.

12.13.

14.

15.16.

17.18.

19.20.21.22.23.

24.25.26.27.28.29.

30.31.

TransferofPower(ToP)Vol.III,Doc.No.300,pp.576–81,citedinY.Krishan,op.cit.,p.58.ClaudeAuchinleck,TopSecretNoteontheStrategicImplicationsofPakistan,GHQDelhi,16May1946,citedinNarendraSinghSarila,op.cit.,pp.218–20.TopSecretCOSmemorandum7July,1947TP(47)90Final(OIC,BritishLibrary,London),citedinIbid.,p.28.HafeezMalik(ed.),Pakistan:Founders’Aspirations&Today’sRealities,Karachi:OUP,2001,p.9.Time, 25August 1947, pp. 31–32, cited inDennis Kux,TheUS and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies, Washington DC:WoodrowWilsonCenterPress,2000,p.4.

TheLegacy

C.ChristineFair,FightingtotheEnd,ThePakistanArmy’sWayofWar,Delhi:OUP,2014,p.65.Ayesha Jalal,State ofMartialRule: TheOrigins ofPakistan’sPoliticalEconomyofDefence, NewDelhi: CambridgeUniversityPress,1990,FirstIndianedition,1992,p.18.TariqAli,TheDuel:PakistanontheFlightPathofAmericanPower,NewYork:Scribner,2008,p.30.IshtiaqAhmed,‘SplittingIndia,PartI’,TheFridayTimes,20–26September2013.LionelCarter,PunjabPolitics,1January1944–3March1947:LastYearsof theMinistries (Governor’s FortnightlyReports andotherkeydocuments),NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers,2006,p.142.Ibid.,p.186.Ibid.,p.279.IanTalbot,Pakistan:AModernHistory,NewDelhi:OUP,1998,p.102.StatementofLordIsmaytoBritishchiefsofstaff,14October,1947,citedinLionelCarter(ed.),PartitionObserved:BritishOfficialReportsfromSouthAsia,14August–15October1947,Vol.I,NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers,2011,p471.Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Historical Trends in Pakistan’s Demographics and Population Policy’, in Michael Kugelman and Robert M.Hathaway (eds), Reaping the Dividend: Overcoming Pakistan’s Demographic Challenges, Washington DC: Woodrow WilsonInternationalCenterforScholars,2011,pp.56–75.SeeRajmohanGandhi,Punjab–AHistory:FromAurangzebtoMountbatten,NewDelhi:AlephBookCompany,2013,pp.351–52;C.ChristineFair,op.cit.,pp.51–53;IshtiaqAhmed,ThePunjabBloodied,PartitionedandCleansed,NewDelhi:Rupa&Co.,2011,p.348;NarendraSinghSarila,TheUntoldStoryofIndia’sPartition,NewDelhi:HarperCollinsIndia,2005,p.411.T.V.Paul,TheWarriorState,PakistanintheContemporaryWorld,NewYork:OUP,2014,pp.38–39.CitedinSyedSharifuddinPirzada,FoundationsofPakistan,Vol.II,NewDelhi:MetropolitanBookCo.Pvt.Ltd,Indianedition,1982,p.332.AyeshaJalal,TheStruggleforPakistan:AMuslimHomelandandGlobalPolitics,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,2014,p.33.AnatolLieven,Pakistan:AHardCountry,London:PenguinBooks,2012p.56.FortnightlyReporttotheViceroybySirEvanJenkins,governorofPunjab,February1947,BritishIndiaLibraryRecordsofthePoliticalandSecretDepartment,L/P&J/5/250,3/79,citedinHusainHaqqani,MagnificentDelusions:Pakistan, theUnitedStates,andanEpicHistoryofMisunderstanding,NewYork:PublicAffairs,2013,p.17.CitedinKhalidB.Sayeed,Pakistan:TheFormativePhase1857–1948,London:OUP,19682ndedition,pp.180–81.MargaretBourke-White,Halfway toFreedom:AReporton theNew India in theWordsandPhotographsofMargaretBourke-White,Istedition,NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1949,p.92.Ibid.,p.93.H.V.Hodson,TheGreatDivide,Britain,India,Pakistan,London:Hutchinson,1969;Karachi:OUP,1985,p.228.LatifAhmedSherwani,ThePartitionofIndiaAndMountbatten,Karachi:D&YPrinters,1986,p.21;H.V.Hodson,op.cit.,p.231.AyeshaJalal,op.cit.,2014,p.29.Ayesha Jalal,The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, TheMuslim LeagueAnd TheDemandFor Pakistan, London: CambridgeUniversityPress,1985,p.5.KhalidB.Sayeed,op.cit.,p.198.Ibid.Ibid.,p.199.Ibid.,p.203.Ibid.,p.205.AyeshaJalal,‘SelfandSovereignty:IndividualandCommunityinSouthAsianIslamsince1850’,citedinRajmohanGandhi,Punjab:AHistoryFromAurangzebToMountbatten,NewDelhi:AlephBookCompany,2013,p.329.IshtiaqAhmed,op.cit.,2011,p.104.LionelCarter,PunjabPolitics,1January1944–3March1947:LastYearsof theMinistries (Governor’s FortnightlyReports andotherkeydocuments),NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers,2006,pp.141–42.

32.33.34.

35.36.37.38.39.40.41.

42.43.44.

45.46.47.48.49.

50.51.

52.53.

54.55.56.57.

3

1.2.

3.4.

5.6.

7.

8.

9.

10.11.12.13.

Ibid.,p.160.Ibid.,p.171.DavidGilmartin, ‘DivineDispleasure&MuslimElections’, inD.A.Low(ed.),Political InheritanceofPakistan,London:MacMillanAcademicandProfessional,1991,pp.106–107.Ibid.,pp.123–24.KhalidB.Sayeed,op.cit.,p.206.TransferofPower,Vol.X,1981,p.541,citedinIshtiaqAhmed,op.cit.,2013.IanTalbot,op.cit.,p.12.Fazl-ul-HaqinaspeechtotheSindhMuslimLeagueConferenceinKarachi,1938,citedinKhalidB.Sayeed,op.cit.,p.180.IanTalbot,op.cit.,p.12.TheStatesman,28October1958,citedbyHassanAskariRizviinTheMilitary&PoliticsInPakistan1947-86,Lahore:ProgressivePublishers,1974,4thedition,1987,pp.48–49.HassanAskariRizvi,op.cit.,pp.47–48.MohammadTaqi,‘Pakistan,IslamandEconomics:BurkitoBourke-White’,DailyTimes,15January2015.EntriesinMrCasey’sDiary,11September1945,Documents84and103intheTransferofPower1942-47,Vol.VII,pp.246–247,citedinHusainHaqqani,op.cit.,p.17.SriPrakasa,Pakistan:BirthandEarlyDays,Meerut:MeenakshiPrakashan,1965,p.98.HectorBolitho,Jinnah:CreatorofPakistan.London:JohnMurrayPublishers,1954,Reprinted1956,p195.MargaretBourke-White,op.cit.,p.91.HumayunMirza,FromPlasseytoPakistan,Maryland,USA:Timespinner,1999,thirdedition,Lahore:Ferozsons,2013,pp.148–49.MazharAliKhan,‘Sabotage’,PakistanTimes,6April1949,citedinPakistan:TheFirstTwelveYears,ThePakistanTimesEditorialsofMazharAliKhan,Karachi:OUP,1996,p.379.MohammedAyubKhan,‘PakistanPerspective’,ForeignAffairs,Vol.38,No.4,July1960,pp.547–56,CouncilonForeignRelations.DirectivefromPresidentMuhammadAyubKhantoGenMuhammadMusa,C-in-C,PakistanArmy,citedinBrianCloughley,AHistoryofthePakistanArmy,WarsandInsurrections,Karachi:OUP,1999,p.71.HumayunMirza,op.cit.,pp.147–49.‘SpeechesofQuaid-i-AzamMohammadAliJinnahasGovernorGeneralofPakistan’,Karachi:SindhObserverPress,11August1947,citedinStanleyWolpert,JinnahofPakistan,NewYork:OUP,1984,p.338.Ibid.MargaretBourke-White,op.cit.,p.101.CitedinM.J.Akbar,Nehru:TheMakingofIndia,London:Viking/Penguin,1988,p.433.NarendraSinghSarila,op.cit.,p.94.

AQuestionofIdentityandIdeology

KhalidMuhammad,‘WhitherPakistan?’,TheNation,18January2015.Selig Harrison, ‘Ethnic Conflict and the Future of Pakistan’, in Wilson John (ed.) Pakistan: The Struggle Within, Delhi: PearsonEducation,2009,p.18.AparnaPande,ExplainingPakistan’sForeignPolicy:EscapingIndia,London:Routledge,2011,IndianReprint2014,p.44.MubarakAli,‘InSearchofIdentity’,Dawn,7May2000,citedinChristopheJaffrelot(ed.),NationalismWithoutANation:PakistanSearchingForItsIdentity,NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers,2002,p.7.CitedinM.J.Akbar,Tinderbox:ThePastandFutureofPakistan,NewDelhi:HarperCollinsPublishers,2011,pp.251–52.MichaelT.Kaufman,‘Pakistan’sIslamicRevivalAffectsAllAspectsofLife’,TheNewYorkTimes,13October1980,citedinHusainHaqqani,Pakistan:BetweenMosqueandMilitary,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2005,p.136.Anwar Syed,Pakistan, Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984, cited in Adeel Khan, Politics ofIdentity,NewDelhi:SagePublications,2005,p.72.MaulanaAbulKalamAzad’sinterviewtoShorishKashmiriforaLahore-basedUrdumagazine,Chattan, inApril1946.Reproducedinhttp://www.newageislam.com/books-and-documents/maulana-abul-kalam-azad--the-man-who-knew-the-future-of-pakistan-before-its-creation/d/2139(accessedon20June2016).AsgharAli Engineer, ‘Islam&Polity:Contradictions in the StateBuilding of Pakistan’, in PandavNayak (ed.),Pakistan Society&Politics,Jaipur:SouthAsiaStudiesCentre,UniversityofJaipur,1984,p.3.CitedinIanTalbot,Pakistan:AModernHistory,London:Hurst,1999,p.90.SyedJaffarAhmed,ForewordinMubarakAli,PakistanInSearchofIdentity,Delhi:AakarBooks,2011,p.8.FerozeAhmed,EthnicityandPoliticsinPakistan,Karachi:OUP,1998,p.27.H.Zaheer,TheSeparationofEastPakistan:TheRiseandRealisationofBengaliMuslimNationalism,Karachi,1994,p.21,citedinIanTalbot,op.cit.,p.26.

14.15.16.17.

18.19.20.

21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.

31.32.33.

34.35.

36.37.38.39.40.41.

42.43.

44.45.46.

4

1.

2.

3.4.

5.6.7.

CitedinHafeezMalik(ed.),Pakistan:Founders’Aspirations&Today’sRealities,Karachi:OUP,2001,p.15.AdeelKhan,op.cit.,p.70.KhalidB.Sayeed,Pakistan:TheFormativePhase1857-1948,London:OUP,1968,secondedition,pp.11,199.Reportdated16January1931inHamidaKhuhro(ed.),DocumentsonSeparationofSindhfromBombayPresidency,Vol.1,citedinSavitaPande,PoliticsofEthnicandReligiousMinoritiesinPakistan,Delhi:ShipraPublications,2005,p.32.IanTalbot,op.cit.,p.26.MubarakAli,op.cit.,p.40.PervezHoodbhoy,‘ZiaMian,Pakistan,theArmyandtheConflictWithin’,12July2011,MiddleEastResearchandInformationProject,http://www.merip.org/mero071211(accessedon20June2016).PervezHoodbhoy,‘Healingoursectariandivide’,Dawn,21February2015.Z.Ali,‘Bigbrother:Ispywithmylittleeye,somethingamiss’,TheExpressTribune,5October2015.FarzanaSheikh,MakingSenseofPakistan,London:C.Hurst&Co,2009,p.46.FerozeAhmed,EthnicityandPoliticsinPakistan,Karachi:OUP1998,p.27.H.A.Rizvi,‘TheMakingofPakistaninViewofItsIdentity’,Dawn,14August2014.IshtiaqAhmed,‘SplittingIndia,Part-II’,TheFridayTimes,27September–3October2013.YuvrajKrishan,‘PassionsofPakistan’,TheFridayTimes,28February–6March2014.Ibid.L.Ziring,PakistanattheCrosscurrentofHistory,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2004,p.131.Sharif-al-Mujahid,IdeologyofPakistan,Lahore:Sang-e-Meel,1976,p.23,citedinMubarakAli,PakistaninSearchofIdentity,Delhi:AakarBooks,2011,p.28.MubarakAli,op.cit.,2011,p.26.CitedinShamsHamid,‘Pakistanhistory,DistortedbytheLiteralists’,TheExpressTribuneBlogs,29June2010.TheMuslim, 14 March 1984, cited in Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947–86, Lahore: ProgressivePublishers,1987,p.242.‘Movementfor“protectionofPakistanideology”Planned’,TheDawn,10August2015.A.H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim (eds), The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan, Lahore:SustainableDevelopmentPolicyInstitute(SDPI),2004.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, ‘Teaching Intolerance in Pakistan: Religious Bias in Public SchoolTextbooks’,2016.MohammadAyubKhan,Friends,NotMasters,London:OUP,1967,p.196.‘Kayaniwants continuity of democratic system’,TheDailyTimes, 1May2012, cited inC.Christine Fair,Fighting to the End: ThePakistanArmy’sWayofWar,Delhi:OUP,2014,p.79.Citedinibid.,p.80.ChristopheJaffrelot(ed.),op.cit.,p.35.AdeelKhan,op.cit.,p.18.

TheProvincialDilemma

MirGhousBuxBizenjo,addressingtheDar-ul-AwanoftheKalatstateon12December1947atDhadhar,citedinMartinAxmaan,BacktotheFuture:TheKhanateofKalat&theGenesisofBalochNationalism1915-1955,Karachi:OUP,2008,p.230.For thehistorical context see, InayatullahBaloch,TheProblemofGreaterBalochistan:A Study ofBaluchNationalism, Stuttgart:Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden Gmbh, 1987; Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations,Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981; Martin Axmann, op. cit., Naseer Dashti, The Baloch andBalochistan,Bloomington,Indiana,USA:TraffordPublishing,2012.AmnestyInternational,‘DenyingtheUndeniable:EnforcedDisappearancesinPakistan,2008’.AkbarS.Ahmed,‘Tribes,RegionalPressuresandNationhood’,inVictoriaSchofield(ed.),OldRoadsandNewHighways:FiftyYearsofPakistan,Karachi:OUP,1997,p.14.WaliKhanhasalsobeenquotedassayingthathehadbeenaPakhtunfor6,000years,aMuslimfor1,300years,andaPakistanifortwenty-five.SeeIsabelHilton,‘ThePashtunCode’,TheNewYorker,3December2001,p.59.YuvrajKrishan,Partition&Pakistan,Jinnah:TheFounder,British:TheArchitects,NewDelhi:MosaicBooks,2013,p.66.WaliKhan,FactareFacts,Peshawar:BaachaKhanTrust,2006reprint,pp.102–03.‘MemorandumbyCripps’(undated),TransferofPower,Vol.VII,DocumentNo.71,p.176;PeterClarke,TheCrippsVersion:The

8.9.10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.

27.28.

29.30.31.

32.33.34.35.

36.

37.38.39.40.

41.42.43.44.45.46.47.48.

LifeandTimesofSirStaffordCripps(1889-1952),London:PenguinBooks,2002,p.417,citedinYuvrajKrishan,op.cit.,p.67.FarzanaSheikh,MakingSenseofPakistan,London:C.Hurst&Co.,2009,p.202.CitedinSayyedFawadShah,‘CounteringPakhtunNationalism’,TheDailyTimes,23November2014.Jonathan Paris, ‘Prospects for Pakistan’, Legatum Institute, 2010, p. 38, http://li.com/docs/default-source/publication/2010-publications-prospects-for-paksitan.pdf?sfvrsn=2(accessedon20June2016).MohammedHanifRamay,PunjabkaMuqadima(TheCaseofPunjab),(inUrdu),Lahore:JangPublications,1985,pp.28,31and35,citedinFerozeAhmed,Ethnicity&PoliticsinPakistan,Karachi:OUP,1998,p.xxi.IanTalbot,‘TheUnionistPartyandPunjabiPolitics,1937-1947’,inD.A.Low(ed.)ProvincialHistoriesandtheHistoryofPakistan,London:McMillanAcademia&ProfessionalLtd,1991,p.86.‘The ElectionManifesto of the PunjabMuslim League (December 1950)’, cited in Kalim Bahadur, ‘Problems in the Evolution of aConstitutional Framework for Pakistan’ in Pandav Nayak (ed.), Pakistan Society & Politics, Jaipur: South Asia Studies Centre,UniversityofJaipur,1984,p.39.Ian Talbot, ‘The Punjabization of Pakistan:Myth or Reality’, in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.)NationalismWithout a Nation: PakistanSearchingForItsIdentity,NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers,2002,p.51.Sindhhas sixty-onegeneral and fourteenwomen seats;KPK thirty-five and eight;Balochistan fourteen and three;FATA twelve; andIslamabadtwoseats.(Tenseatsarefornon-Muslims.)Ayesha Siddiqa,The New Frontiers: Militancy & Radicalism in Punjab, Haslum, Norway: Centre for International and StrategicAnalysis,SISA,2013,pp.4,20.FahdHumayun,‘NAPinsouthernPunjab’,TheNews,6February2016.NAPstandsforNationalActionPlan.NasirJamal,‘Trackingthefootprints:AllroadsleadtoSouthPunjab’,Dawn,3January2016.JawadR.Awan,‘BannedoutfitsbigwinnersofPunjabpolls’,TheNation,10November2015.AminaHassan,‘Tacklingradicalism’,DailyTimes,6August2016.ShahbazRana,‘AllocationandspendingispoliticallydriveninPakistan,saysUNDP’,TheExpressTribune,10August2016.HassanNaqvi‘Whyhaven’tweseenanyRangersoperationinPunjab?’TheNation,2March2016.CitedinStephenCohen,TheIdeaofPakistan,Delhi:OUP,2004,p.211.AdeelKhan,PoliticsofIdentity:EthnicNationalismandtheStateinPakistan,NewDelhi:SagePublications,2005,p.15.PakistanInstituteofLegislativeDevelopmentandTransparency(PILDAT),EthnicConflictinSindh,October2011,Islamabad,p.13.TariqRehman, ‘Language andPolitics in a PakistanProvince:TheSindhiLanguageMovement’,Asian Survey, Vol.XXXV,No. 11,November1995,p.1008.AyubKhan,FriendsnotMasters,NewYork:OUP,1967,p.94.YunusSamad,‘InandoutofPowerbutnotdownandout:Mohajiridentitypolitics’inChristopheJafferlot(ed.),Pakistan:NationalismwithoutaNation,p.68.‘Smokinggun:Aftertargetkillings,encounterscometohauntKarachi’,TheExpressTribune,16January2016.AdeelKhan,op.cit.,p.62.TheTimesofIndia,Bombay,9November1945,citedinSyedSharifuddinPirzada,FoundationsofPakistan,AIMLDocuments,Vol.II,1924–47,NewDelhi:MetropolitianBookCo.,Indianedition1982,pp.xxxi–xxxii.KhalidB.Sayeed,Pakistan:TheFormativePhase1857-1948,London:OUP,1968secondedition,p.239.AdeelKhan,op.cit.,pp.62–63.AkbarS.Ahmed,Jinnah,PakistanandIslamicIdentity:TheSearchforSaladin,London:Routledge,1977,p.236.Erland Jansson, ‘The Frontier Province: KhudaiKhidmatgars and theMuslim League’, inD.A. Low (ed.),Political Inheritance ofPakistan,London:MacMillanAcademic&Professional,1991,p.214.‘Minorities in South Asia’, Paper prepared by I. A. Rehman, Director, Human Rights Commission Pakistan, Sub-Commission onPromotionandProtectionofHumanRightsWorkingGrouponMinorities,NinthSession,12–16May2003.CitedinHussainHaqqani,Pakistan:BetweenMosqueandMilitary,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2005,p.17.FerozeAhmed,op.cit.,p.25.TariqAli,TheClashofFundamentalisms:Crusades,JihadsandModernity,NewYork:Verso,2002,p.182.S.A. Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province,1901-1947,Durham,NC:CarolindAcademicPress,1988,p.337,citedinIanTalbot,Pakistan-AModernHistory,NewDelhi:OUP,1998,p.14.SeligHarrison,op.cit.,p.151.PervezMusharraf,IntheLineofFire:AMemoir,NewYork:FreePress,2006,p.149.PeterJacob,‘Aserialtransformation’,TheFridayTimes,28February2014.AmirHussain,‘Devolvingdisparities’:TheNews,30July2016.‘Devolution“rollback”’,editorialinDawn,17December2014.MirMohammadAliTalpur,‘Confrontinginjustices’,DailyTimes,20September2015.QaiserButt,‘FederalgovernmentduckspleasforCCImeetings’,TheExpressTribune,15February2015.‘ALackofEnergy’,editorial,TheNation,15September2015.

49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.

5

1.

2.3.

4.5.6.7.8.

9.10.

11.12.13.14.15.16.17.18.

19.20.21.22.23.24.25.

26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34.35.36.

37.

‘SenatechairmansaysgovtviolatingtheConstitution’,TheExpressTribune,13February2016.Thelastcensuswasheldin1998,postponedfrom1991.ArifNaveedandNazimAli,‘ClusteredDeprivation’,SustainableDevelopmentPolicyInstitute,Islamabad,2012.‘Sindh,Balochistan’sshareinGDPdrops’,Dawn,21February2006.AmirHussain,‘Devolvingdisparities’,TheNews,30July2016.‘Acruelshare-out’,editorial,TheExpressTribune,17March2016.AdnanAami,‘UnemploymentinBalochistan’,TheNews,27April2015.ShahbazRana,‘AllocationandspendingispoliticallydriveninPakistan,saysUNDP’,TheExpressTribune,10August2016.

TheArmyHasaNation

SirRoyBucher, the lastC-in-Cof theBritishIndianArmyandthefirstC-in-Cof theIndianArmy,addressingthecadetsof theIndiaMilitaryAcademy,DehraDunin1948,citedinHumayunMirza,FromPlasseytoPakistan,Maryland,USA:Timespinner,1999,Lahore:Ferozsons,thirdedition,2013,p.162.S.Cohen,TheIdeaofPakistan,NewDelhi:OUP,2012,p.97.RoedadKhan,‘TheRoleoftheMilitary-BureaucraticOligarchy’,Dawn,25August2001,citedinHusainHaqqani,PakistanBetweenMosqueandMilitary,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2005,p.54.StephenCohen,ThePakistanArmy,Karachi:OUP,1998,p.44.ShujaNawaz,CrossedSwords:Pakistan,ItsArmy,andtheWarsWithin,Karachi:OUP,2008,pp.570–71.ZafarullahKhan,‘Federalizingthearmedforces’,TheFridayTimes,19September2014.ShujaNawaz,op.cit.,p.xxxvii.BrianCloughley,AHistoryofthePakistanArmy:WarsandInsurrections,Karachi:OUP,1999,p.356,quotinga1993calculationdoneattheNationalDefenceCollege.AnatolLieven,Pakistan,AHardCountry,London:PenguinBooks,2012,pp.185–86.CitedinAhmedFaruqui,RethinkingtheNationalSecurityofPakistan:ThePriceofStrategicMyopia,London:AshgatePublishingLtd,2003,pp.43–44.C.ChristineFair,FightingtotheEnd:ThePakistanArmy’sWayofWar,OUP,Indianedition,2014,p.17.Ibid.,p.7.GoharAyubKhan,GlimpsesintotheCorridorsofPower,Karachi:OUP,2007,p.161.ShujaNawaz,op.cit.,pp.xxx–xxxi.Ibid.,p.384.StephenCohen,op.cit.,p.112.IqbalAkhund,TrialandError:TheAdventandEclipseofBenazirBhutto,Karachi:OUP,2000,p.123.Shuja Nawaz, Hearing of theMiddle East and South Asia Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 11March 2010,WashingtonDC.HusainHaqqani,op.cit.,p.122.BrianCloughley,op.cit.,p.355.AnatolLieven,op.cit.,p.175–76.TariqAli,TheClashofFundamentalisms–Crusades,JihadsandModernity,NewYork:Verso,2002,p.250.‘MastermindofParliamentattackplanturnsouttoberetiredSSGColonel’,DunyaNews,1February2016.MalikAsad,‘Five“IS-linked”navyofficersgetdeathsentenceindockyardattackcase’,Dawn,24May,2016.NewsChronicle, 9October 1948, cited inHassanAskariRizvi,TheMilitary&Politics inPakistan 1947-86, Lahore: ProgressivePublishers,1974,fourthedition,1987,p.42.Dawn,17August,1953,citedinibid.T.V.Paul,TheWarriorState:PakistanintheContemporaryWorld,NewYork:OUP,2014,p.80.BrianCloughley,op.cit.,pp.42–43.HasanAskariRizvi,op.cit.,p.61.AdeelKhan,PoliticsofIdentity:EthnicNationalismandtheStateinPakistan,NewDelhi:SagePublications,2005,p.62.InternationalCrisisGroup,‘Pakistan,‘TransitiontoDemocracy?’3October2002.GoharAyubKhan,op.cit.,p.235.PervezMusharraf,IntheLineofFire:AMemoir,NewYork:FreePress,2006,p.77.InternationalCrisisGroup‘ReformingPakistan’sElectoralSystem’,AsiaReportNo.203,30March2011.MazharAliKhan,‘TheMuslimLeague’,PakistanTimes,10November1953.MaleehaLodhi,‘BeyondtheCrisisState’, inMaleehaLodhi(ed.),Pakistan:BeyondtheCrisisState,NewDelhi:RupaPublications,2014,p.54.ShujaNawaz,op.cit.,2008,p.569.

38.39.40.41.42.43.44.45.46.47.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.60.61.62.

6

1.2.3.

4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.

13.14.15.

16.

17.18.19.

20.21.22.23.

BrianCloughley,op.cit.,pp.355–57.IqbalAkhund,op.cit.,p.125.BrianCloughley,op.cit.,p.356.CitedinAnatolLieven,‘ThePressuresonPakistan’,ForeignAffairs,January–February2002,Vol.81,No.1.‘PakistanArmysees“internalthreats”asgreatestsecurityrisk’,Dawn,2January2013.‘DefiningSecurity’,editorial,TheNews,6December2014,and‘TheInternalDanger’,editorial,Dawn,6December2014.B.Raman,‘Pakistan’snewmilitarydoctrineshouldn’tbemisread’,rediff.com,6January2013.HassanAskariRizvi,op.cit.,pp.43–44.Variousfederalbudgets,FinanceDivision,GovernmentofPakistan.BaqirSajjadSyed,‘Defencebudgethikedbyusual11pc’,Dawn,4June2016.AmirWasim,‘Rs513billionpensionwaspaidtoretiredsoldiersfromcivilianbudgetsince2011’,Dawn,6August2015.AhmedRashid,DescentintoChaos,London:AllenLane,PenguinBooks,2008,p.391.AyeshaSiddiqa,MilitaryInc:InsidePakistan’sMilitaryEconomy,London:PlutoPress,2007,p.5.Ibid.,p.7.Ibid.,p.17.Ibidp.219.Ibid.,p.248.UmarCheema,‘Anislandoftransparencyinaseaofsecrecy’,TheNews,23February2016.KhurramHusain,‘Budget2016-17:BudgetingForSecurity’,Dawn,31May2016.ShujaNawaz,op.cit.,2008,p.567.RizwanAsghar,‘TheWayForward’,TheFridayTimes,9–15May2014.LtGen.GulHassanKhan,MemoirsofLtGen.GulHassanKhan,Karachi:OUP,1993,p.xi.PervezMusharraf,op.cit.,p.143.PaulKennedy,TheRiseandFalloftheGreatEmpires,NewYork:RandomHouse,1987,citedinAhmedFaruqui,op.cit.,p.113.CitedinIqbalAkhund,op.cit.,p.121.

Civil–MilitaryRelations

RoedadKhan,Pakistan:ADreamGoneSour,Karachi:OUP,1997,p.179.IqbalAkhund,TrialAndError:TheAdventandEclipseofBenazirBhutto,Karachi:OUP,2000,p.xiii.Jane Perlez, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, ‘Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance with Pakistan’, New York Times, 30November2010.M.AsgharKhan,We’veLearntNothingfromHistory,Pakistan:Politics&MilitaryPower,Karachi:OUP,2005,p.3.MushahidHussainandAkmalHussain,Pakistan:ProblemsofGovernance,NewDelhi:KonarkPublishers,1993,p.30.MohammedAyubKhan,‘PakistanPerspective’,ForeignAffairs,Vol.38,No.4,July1960,pp.547–56.GenK.M.Arif,WorkingWithZia,Karachi:OUP,1995,p.x.T.V.Paul,TheWarriorState–PakistanintheContemporaryWorld,NewYork:OUP,2014,p.76.C.ChristineFair,FightingtotheEnd:ThePakistanArmy’sWayofWar,Delhi:OUP,2014,p.89.IqbalAkhund,op.cit.,pp.137–38.ShujaNawaz,op.cit.,2008,p16.AyeshaJalal,TheStruggleforPakistan,AMuslimHomeland&GlobalPolitics,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,2014,p.79.MohammedAyubKhan,op.cit.,pp.547–56.TariqAli,TheClashofFundamentalisms–Crusades,JihadsAndModernity,NewYork:Verso,2002,p.183.DailyTelegraph,18October1979,citedinTariqAli,CanPakistanSurvive:TheDeathofaState,London:PenguinBooks,1983p.138.‘MusharrafFavoursTailoredDemocracy’,TheNation,16June2003,citedinInternationalCrisisGroup‘UnfulfilledPromises:Pakistan’sFailuretoTackleExtremism’16January2004.Maj.Gen.SherAliPataudi,TheStoryofSoldiering&PoliticsinIndiaandPakistan,Lahore:AlKitab,2ndedition,1983,pp.116–17.Editorial,Dawn,21June2001,citedinAhmedRashid,DescentintoChaos,London:AllenLane,PenguinBooks,London,2008,p.52.Text ofGen.AyubKhan’s first broadcast to the nation, 8October 1958, cited inHasanAskari Rizvi,TheMilitary and Politics inPakistan1947–1986,Lahore:ProgressivePublishers,1974,fourthedition,1987.AppendixC,pp.275–77.TextofGen.YahyaKhan’sfirstbroadcasttothenation,26March1969,citedinibid.,AppendixF,p.285.TextofGen.Zia-ul-Haq’sfirstaddresstothenationon5July1977.CitedinIbid.,AppendixH,p.291.PervezMusharraf,IntheLineofFire:AMemoir,NewYork:FreePress,2006,p.149.BBCNews,17October1999.

24.

25.26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34.

35.36.37.

38.39.40.41.42.43.

7

1.2.3.

4.

5.6.7.

8.9.10.

11.12.

13.14.15.

16.17.

18.19.

20.21.

AltafGauhar,AyubKhan:Pakistan’sFirstMilitaryRuler,Lahore:Sang-e-MeelPublication,1994,pp.488–89,citedinRoedadKhan,op.cit.,p.43.FieldMarshalAyubKhan’slastaddresstothenation,25March1969,inHassanAskariRizvi,op.cit.,pp.282–83.L.Ziring,PakistanattheCrosscurrentofHistory,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2004,p.132.TariqAli,op.cit.,2002,p.242.Ibid.,p.243.L.Ziring,op.cit.,pp.133–34.IqbalAkhund,op.cit.,pp.130–31.Reportavailableat:http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/binladenfiles(accessedon21June2016).StephenCohen,TheIdeaofPakistan,NewDelhi:OUP,2004,p.56.KarenDeYoung,‘AdministrationtoaskformorePakistanaid’,WashingtonPost,23October2010.David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, New York: CrownPublishers,2012,p.6.LtGen.GulHassanKhan,MemoirsofLt.Gen.GulHassanKhan,Karachi:OUP,1993,p.xi.StephenCohen,op.cit.,pp.128–29.TheNationalActionPlanisatwenty-pointplanformulatedbythegovernmentinJanuary2015inthewakeontheterroristattackonaschoolinPeshawartocrackdownonterrorism.HasanAskariRizvi,‘Thecivil–militaryhybrid’,TheExpressTribune,23February2015.DrFarrukhSaleem,‘EndofCharterofDemocracy’,TheNews,27March2015.‘COASeyeslongtermgainsforoperationsvia“matchinggovernance”’,TheNews,10November2015.GoharAyubKhan,GlimpsesintoTheCorridorsofPower,Karachi:OUP,p.114.AyazAmir,‘Howmanythingswillthearmydo’,TheNews,24April2015.JonBoone,‘Pakistanpressfreedomunderpressurefromarmy’,TheGuardian,14September2015.

IslamizationandGrowthofSectarianism

PervezHoodbhoy,‘Along,sadyearafterSalmanTaseer’skilling’,TheHindu,4January2015.PervezMusharraf,IntheLineofFire:AMemoir,NewYork:FreePress,2006,p.274.SyedSharifuddinPirzada,FoundationsofPakistan,AIMLDocuments,Vol.II.,1924–47,NewDelhi:MetropolitanBookCo.Pvt.Ltd,IndianEdition1982,p.571.Jinnah’sspeechtotheSindhBarAssociationinKarachi,Dawn,24January1948,citedinFarzanaSheikh,MakingSenseofPakistan,London:C.Hurst&Co.,2009,p.60.SayyidA.S.Pirzada,ThePoliticsofJamiatUlema-i-IslamPakistan,Karachi:OUP,2000,p.13.KhalidB.Sayeed,Pakistan:TheFormativePhase1857-1948,London:OUP,1968,secondedition,p.198.AyeshaJalal,TheStruggleforPakistan,AMuslimHomelandandGlobalPolitics,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,2014,p.53.SayyidA.S.Pirzada,op.cit.,p.4.Ibid.,p.5.LionelCarter(ed.),PartitionObserved:BritishOfficialReportsfromSouthAsia,14August–15October1947,Vol.I,NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers,2011,p.72.DennisKux,TheUSandPakistan,1947-2000:DisenchantedAllies,WashingtonDC:WoodrowWilsonCenterPress,2000,p.26.Safdar Mahmood, Constitutional Foundations of Pakistan, Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1990, cited in Husain Haqqani, Pakistan:BetweenMosqueandMilitary,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2005,p.17.CitedinPeterTopychkanov,‘IslamandthepathsofPakistan’sPoliticalDevelopment’,Carnegie,MoscowCenter,2009.ShahzadRaza,‘Historicblunder’,TheFridayTimes,14March2014.‘ReportoftheCourtofInquiryConstitutedUnderPunjabActIIof1954toEnquireintothePunjabDisturbancesof1953.Availableat,www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/…/Munir_Report_1954.pdf(accessedon21June2016).AyubKhan,FriendsnotMasters,London:OUP,1967,p.203.Cited in Rubina Saigol, ‘Myths vs Facts about Fundamentalism’, http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/threads/pakistan-political-discussions.24/page-2(accessed21June2016).M.J.Akbar,Tinderbox:ThePastandFutureofPakistan,NewDelhi:HarperCollinsPublishers,p.248.AnwarSyed,Pakistan,Islam,PoliticsandNationalSolidarity,Lahore:VanguardBooks,1984,p.146,citedinAdeelKhan,PoliticsofIdentity,NewDelhi:SagePublications,2005,p.74.FarzanaSheikh,op.cit.,p.62.ForZia’sIslamizationmeasures,seeLawrenceZiring,PakistanattheCrosscurrentofHistory,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2004;HusainHaqqani,Pakistan:BetweenMosqueandMilitary,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2005.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.27.28.29.

30.31.32.33.

34.

35.36.37.38.39.40.41.42.

43.44.

45.46.47.48.49.50.51.52.53.

8

1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.

MariamAbouZahab,‘TheRegionalDimensionofSectarianConflictsinPakistan’,inChristopheJaffrelot(ed.)NationalismWithoutaNation:PakistanSearchingforItsIdentity,NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers,2002,p.117.The amendment, passed inDecember 2003, allowedGen. PervezMusharraf to serve out his term as president, ending in 2007, andformalized the special powers he had given himself including the right to sack the primeminister and disband parliament. In return,Musharrafagreedtostepdownasarmychiefby31December2004.‘PML-Q,MMAComeClosertoAgreement’,Dawn,2June2003,citedinInternationalCrisisGroup,‘UnfulfilledPromises:Pakistan’sFailuretoTackleExtremism’,16January2004.‘ReportoftheCourtofInquiryConstitutedUnderPunjabActIIof1954toenquireintothePunjabDisturbancesof1953’,availableat,www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/…/Munir_Report_1954.pdf(accessedon21June2016).Ibid.Ibid.FarzanaSheikh,op.cit.,p.64.Mumtaz Ahmed, ‘Revivalism, Islamization, Sectarianism and Violence in Pakistan’, in Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy (eds),Pakistan:1997,NewDelhi:HarperCollinsPublishers,1998,p.118.Ibid.,p.108.Al-Haq,Vol.14,No3,December1978,pp.26–27,citedinibid.MumtazAhmed,op.cit.,p.113.PervezHoodbhoyandZiaMian, ‘Pakistan, theArmyand theConflictWithin’,MiddleEastResearchandInformationProject,12July2011.ArifRafiq,‘SunniDeobandi-Shi’iSectarianViolenceinPakistan:ExplainingtheResurgencesince2007’,WashingtonDC:MiddleEastInstitute,December2014.InternationalCrisisGroup,‘TheStateofSectarianisminPakistan’,ICG-Asia,ReportNo.95,18April2005.SouthAsiaIntelligenceReview,Vol.14,No18,2November2015.MariamAbouZahab,op.cit.,p.115PervezHoodbhoy,‘Healingoursectariandivide’,Dawn,21February2015.‘IamaSunniMuslim,saysShaukat’,Dawn,1July2004.InternationalCrisisGroup,‘TheStateofSectarianisminPakistan’,AsiaReportNo95,18April2005.‘Blasphemyaccusationsincreasedaftercurrentlawintroduced’,Dawn,19December2015.Ammar Anwer, ‘Pakistan’s blasphemy law under the light of Sunni jurisprudence’, The Nation blogs, 23 January 2016,http://nation.com.pk/blogs/23-Jan-2016/pakistan-s-blasphemy-law-under-the-light-of-sunni-jurisprudence(accessedon21June2016).‘Adamningreport’,editorial,DailyTimes,3May2015.The Century Foundation, International Working Group on Pakistan, ‘Wake up Pakistan’,http://www.tcf.org/assets/downloads/WakeUpPakistan.pdf(accessedon21June2016).SeeUmerAli,‘Theironyof“Islamic’Pakistan”’,PakistanToday,13February2016.‘Distressingincident’,editorial,Dawn,19January2016.‘FromErrortoTerror’,TheNation,18January2016.‘Accidentalblasphemy’,editorial,DailyTimes,18January2016.WajihAhmadSheikh,‘Shariacourtdispenses‘justice’inLahore’,Dawn,7April2016.WajihAhmadSheikh,‘ManwhomovedLHCagainstJuD“Shariahcourt”kidnapped,harassed’,Dawn,1June2016.SherAliKhalti,‘JUD’s“Shariacourts”workinginsevencities’,TheNews,9April2016.ObaidAbbasi,‘CIIwantsjihadversestobetaughtinschools’,TheExpressTribune,3August2016.‘ReportoftheCourtofInquiryConstitutedUnderPunjabActIIof1954toEnquireIntothePunjabDisturbancesof1953’,availableat,www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/…/Munir_Report_1954.pdf(accessedon21June2016).

Madrasas

InformationMinisterPervaizRashid,addressingthePakistanAcademyofLettersinKarachion3May2015,Dawn,10May2015.9/11Commissionreport,p.367.TimCraig,‘Pakistanisstilltryingtogetagriponitsmadrassaproblem’,TheWashingtonPost,16December2015.‘Madrassareform’,DailyTimes4August2015.SaadRasool,‘Madrassareforms’,TheNation,23November2014.‘NationalInternalSecurityPolicy’,MinistryofInterior,GovernmentofPakistan.NisarAli,‘Sympathisers,SupportersofTerroristsLiveAmongUs’,Dawn,21December2014.‘Madressahproject:Fromreformtoaregistrationdrive’,Dawn,29December2015.‘ReformtheMadrassa’,editorial,TheNation,26December2014.‘Securingtheparade’,editorial,Dawn,18February2015.

11.12.13.14.

15.

16.17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34.

35.

36.37.38.

39.40.41.42.43.44.45.46.47.

9

1.2.3.4.

5.6.7.

8.9.

DaniaAhmed,‘CanfundamentalisminPakistanbetracedbacktomadrassas?’,TheExpressTribune,8July2015.SyedMoazzamHai,‘Mainstreamingmadrasa’,TheNews,12August2015.PervezHoodbhoy,‘Mathinourmadrasshs?’,Dawn,18July2015.MuhammadAmirRana, ‘Mapping theMadrasaMindset:PoliticalAttitudesofPakistaniMadaris’,Pakistan InstituteofPeaceStudies,January–March2009.MuhammadAmirRana,AtoZofJehadiOrganizations inPakistan,Urduedition,2002;Englishedition, translatedbySabaAnsari,Lahore:MashalBooks,2007.‘Reportsaysover35,000madrassasoperatinginPakistan’,PakistanToday,31July2015.HasanMansoor,‘Sindhidentifies53seminarieswith“militantleanings”’,Dawn,13March2016.AzamKhan,‘Madrassareforms:PunjabshutonlytwosuspectedMadrassasseminaries’,TheExpressTribune,18January2016.‘Declaringothersectsinfidelstoinvitegovernmentaction’,TheNews,8September2015.MirzaKhurramShahzad,‘CountingPakistan’smadrassas’,Dawn,13January2014.AmirWasimandBaqirSajjadSyed,‘Saudimoneywillbescrutinised:FO’,Dawn,11February,2015.‘It’sdifficulttotracefundtransactionstoseminaries,saysNisar’,Dawn,7January2015.IftikharA.Khan,‘Only23seminariesreceivingforeignfunding:minister’,Dawn,31January2015.IftikharA.Khan,‘PolicesuspectseminariesinPunjabalsoreceiveforeignfunding’,Dawn,5March2015.‘ThePTI’spromise’,editorialinTheNews,23June2016.‘10percentofHyderabadmadrassasbuiltillegallyonstateland’,TheExpressTribune,10April2015.InternationalCrisisGroup,‘Pakistan,Karachi’sMadrasasandViolentExtremism’,2007,p.14.InstituteofPolicyStudies,Pakistan:ReligiousEducationInstitutions,AnOverview,Islamabad:IPS,2002,pp.50–61.AliK.Chishti,‘ThemadrassanetworksofSindh’,TheFridayTimes,12–18July2013.CitedinHasanMansoor,‘ReportonstateofmadressahsinPakistanlaunched’,Dawn,31July2015.AliK.Chisti,‘Themadrassamenace’,TheFridayTimes,21–27January2011.DrAyeshaSiddiqa,‘Themadressamix:Genesisandgrowth’,Dawn,3March2015.CitedinC.ChristineFair,‘TheEnduringMadrasaMyth’,CurrentHistory,Vol.111,No.744,April2012p.135.CitedinJayshreeBajoria,‘Pakistan’sEducationSystemandLinkstoExtremism’,CouncilonForeignRelations,NewYork,7October2009.TheNationalActionPlanwas formulated as a comprehensive response to terrorism in thewake of the terrorist attack on theArmyPublicSchoolinPeshawarinwhichabout135childrenwerekilled.‘Onehandclapping’,editorial,TheExpressTribune,26February2016.SaadRasool,‘Madrassareforms’,TheNation,23November2014.MalikAsad,‘Mainstreamingmadrassas—backtothedrawingboard’,Dawn,19January2015;DaniaAhmed,‘CanfundamentalisminPakistanbetracedbacktomadrassas?’,TheExpressTribuneblogs,8July2015.AliK.Chisti,‘Themadrassamenace!,’TheFridayTimes,21–27January2011UmarCheema,‘Seminaryreforms:18-year-oldprojectstillcontinuing’,TheNews,8September2015.‘ClericswantmeetingwithPM,CMonactionagainstseminaries’,TheNews,2March2015.‘ModeratingMadrassas’,editorial,TheNation,19May2015.IftikharAlam,‘Accordonmadrassareformsreached’,TheNation,14July2016.AsimHussain,‘ReligiouspartiestoprotestAmplifierOrdinance’,TheNews,20February2015.ShahzadRaza,‘Fatwafears’,TheFridayTimes,22May2015.JaleesHazir,‘Theforgottenmadrassachildren’,TheNation,21May2015.UmarCheema,op.cit.

Terrorism

HillaryClinton,thethenUSsecretaryofstate,addressingapressconferenceinIslamabad,October2011.FareedZakaria,‘WhyPakistanKeepsExportingJihad’,Newsweek ,6May2010.InternationalCrisisGroup–‘Pakistan:TheMilitantJihadiChallenge’,AsiaReportNo.164,13March2009.Zarb-e-Azb is the name of the operation launched by the army against the TTP in North Waziristan since June 2014. Details arediscussedlaterinthechapter.SouthAsiaIntelligenceReview,Vol.14,No.42,18April2016andwww.SATP.com(accessedon21June2016).‘TimelineofdeadliestinsurgentattacksinPakistan’,TheExpressTribune,28March,2016.TheNationalActionPlanwas formulated as a comprehensive response to terrorism in thewake of the terrorist attack on theArmyPublicSchoolinPeshawarinwhichabout135childrenwerekilled.Detailsarediscussedfurtherinthechapter.‘Five-yearterrorismlossesstandatRs5,194billion,Senatetold’,TheNews,21May2016.HusainHaqqani,Pakistan:BetweenMosqueandMilitary,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2005,p.3.

10.11.12.13.

14.15.16.17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.27.

28.29.30.

31.32.33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.41.42.43.44.

45.

46.

47.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.60.

HumayunMirza,FromPlasseytoPakistan,Maryland,USA:Timespinner,1999,thirdedition,2013,pp.147–49.AhmedRashid,Taliban:MilitantIslam,OilandFundamentalisminCentralAsia,NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2000,p.130.Citedinibid.,p.129.AyeshaSiddiqa,TheNewFrontiers:Militancy&RadicalisminPunjab,Place:CentreforInternationalandStrategicAnalysis(SISA),2013.C.ChristineFair,FightingtotheEnd:ThePakistanArmy’sWayofWar,Delhi:OUP,2014,p.240.‘InMusharraf’sWords:ADayofReckoning’,TheNewYorkTimes,12January,2002.CitedinInternationalCrisisGroup‘UnfulfilledPromises:Pakistan’sFailuretoTackleExtremism’,16January2004.SuhasiniHaider,‘USaidignoresLeT,JeMrallies,Lakhvibail’,TheHindu,5January,2015.UmerFarooq.‘BusinessasUsual,’TheHerald,December2009.‘TheatreoftheMacabre’,editorial,TheNation,12March2015.‘StateresponsibleforinactionagainstJuD,JeM,saysSanaullah’,Dawn,18May2016.‘PakistanSupported,TrainedTerrorgroupstoFightinKashmir,sayPervezMusharraf’,TheIndianExpress,28October2015.FarhatTaj,‘LifeinSwatafterthepeacedeal’,TheNews,13April2009.‘Denyingpublicity’,editorialinDailyTimes,4November2015.‘MilitantsnotdangeroustoPakistanshouldnotbetargeted:Sartaj’,Dawn,18November2014.InternationalCrisisGroup,‘UnfulfilledPromises:Pakistan’sFailuretoTackleExtremism’,16January2004.AkbarS.Ahmad,‘HomecomingtoJinnah’sPakistan’,PartII,TheFridayTimes,31January–6February2014.JoshuaWhite, ‘Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and US Policy in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, Arlington VA:CenteronFaith&InternationalAffairs,2008,p.86.Ibid.AliK.Chisti,‘WhatdoesTTPwant?’,TheFridayTimes,31January2014.TariqButt,‘Suicidebombers,handlers&financersareallPakistanis:Malik’,TheNews,9September2008,citedinInternationalCrisisGroup‘Pakistan:TheMilitantJihadiChallenge’,AsiaReportNo.164,13March2009.‘RehmanMalikisrightaboutal-Qaeda’sthree-in-onechallenge’,editorial,DailyTimes,3September2008,Citedinibid.HassanAbbas,‘DefiningthePunjabiTalibanNetwork’,CTCSentinel,15April2009.‘COASvowstodismantleterroristnetwork’,TheNews,29February2016.‘TerrorismwillendinPakistaninNewYear:RaheelSharif’,TheHindu,2January2016.TahirKhan,‘Kabultrip:Haqqanithreatneutralised,IslamabadassuresWashington’,TheExpressTribune,23July2014.Seeforexample,TalatMasood,‘Pakistan’soverarchingthreatlandscape’,TheExpressTribune,10December2014.‘MastermindsandFacilitators’,editorial,TheNation,25January2016.‘Seedsofmistrust’,editorial,DailyTimes,1September2015.IsmailSheikh,‘HaqqaniNetwork,LeTsparedbyarmyinmilitaryoffensive,saysUSreport’,TheExpressTribune,21June2015.CitedinUmarCheema,‘Notmilitarybutpolice-agenciescooperationneededtofixterrorists’,TheNews,10January2015.SeeAnatolLieven,Pakistan:AHardCountry,London:PenguinBooks,2011,p.195.Ibid.C.ChristineFair,‘Lashkar-e-TayibaandthePakistaniState’,Survival,Vol.53,No.4,2011,pp.29–52.ShujaNawazattheHearingoftheMiddleEastAndSouthAsiaSubcommitteeoftheHouseForeignAffairsCommittee,11March2010,WashingtonDC.Bruce Reidel, ‘Hafiz Saeed, Pakistani Extremist with a $10 Million Price on his Head, is al-Qaeda’s Ally’, 3 April 2012,http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/04/03-saeed-bounty(accessedon6July2016).LisaCurtis,Testimonybefore theUSHouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonForeignAffairs,Subcommitteeon theMiddleEastandSouthAsia,11March2010.ArifJamal,CallforTransnationalJihad:Lashkar-e-Taiba1985-2014,NewDelhi:KautilyaBooks,2015,pp.281–82.WilsonJohn,ComingBlowback ,NewDelhi:Rupa&Co,2009,pp.101–02.Citedinibid.,p.101.HassanAbbas,‘OriginofISIS;globalimpactandpotentialfootholdinPakistan’,Policybrief,JinnahInstitute,23December2014.MujeebAhmed,‘ISISHasMasterPlanforPakistan,SecretMemoWarns’,NBCNews,10November2014.‘Loomingdanger:ArmychiefsayswillnotallowevenshadowofDa’ish’,TheExpressTribune,4October2015.‘NoDa’ishfootprintinPakistan,saysFO’,TheExpressTribune,1January2016.AfrasiabKhattak,‘Backtoprivatejihad?’TheNation,30July2016.‘MilitantsfleeingoperationsinPakistanjoinedISinAfghanistan:Mosazai’,AfghanistanTimes,13January2016.‘Over100PeoplefromPunjabhaveLeftTofightforISIS:Sanaullah’,TheNation,4January2016.IftikharKhan,‘ISisemergingasathreat,warnsIBChief’,Dawn,11February2016.‘CommanderofISKilledinKarachiEncounter’,Dawn,18March2016.‘TheISAgitation’,TheNation,4January,2016.HassanAbbas,‘OriginofISIS;globalimpactandpotentialfootholdinPakistan’,Policybrief,JinnahInstitute,23December2014.

61.62.

10

1.

2.3.4.

5.6.

7.

8.

9.10.11.12.13.14.

15.16.

17.18.19.

20.21.22.23.24.

25.

26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34.35.

‘Seedsofmistrust’,editorial,DailyTimes,1September2015.At the joint press conferencewith Pakistan foreignministerHinaRabbaniKhar in Islamabad inOctober 2011. See ‘Pak can’t keepsnakesinbackyard:US’,HindustanTimes,22October2011.

Water:RunningDry

EconomicSurveyofPakistan2013–2014,GovernmentofPakistan,p.250.Interestingly,theEconomicSurveysof2014–15and2015–16avoidedanyreferencestopercapitawateravailability.MushtaqAhmed,‘Watersaga’,TheNation,31May2016.‘WaterWars’,editorialinTheNews,17February2015.Anareaissaidtobeexperiencingwaterstresswhenitsannualwatersuppliesfallbelow1,700m3percapita.Aregionissaidtofacewaterscarcitywhensuppliesfallbelow1,000m3percapita,andthereisabsolutewaterscarcitywhensuppliesdropbelow500m3percapitaayear.ZaighamHabib,‘WaterWorries’,TheFridayTimes,24–30April2015.AshfakBokhari,‘Forgottenwaterpolicyinitiatives’,Dawn,13June2016.IRSAisthewaterregulatorcomprisingirrigationandengineeringexpertsfromallthefourprovincesandthecentresetupfollowingthe1991waterapportionmentaccordbetweentheprovinces.KhaleeqKiani,‘IRSAwarnsofwatercrisis,seeksPSDPfreeze’,Dawn,7March2015.PSDPstandsforPublicSectorDevelopmentProgramme.‘Loomingwatercrisis’,editorial,DailyTimes,12June2015.However,addressingatwo-dayinternationalconferenceon‘Regulationofhydraulicstructureforfloodmanagement’arrangedbytheGlobalWaterPartnershipinJune2013,theministerofplanningassertedthatthishadfallentoeighteendaysduelosing4.6MAFoflivestorageintheexistingreservoirsbecauseofsedimentation.‘Percapitawateravailabilityalarming:minister’,TheNews,29June2013.EconomicSurveyofPakistan2013-2014,GovernmentofPakistan,p.250.‘IstheGlassHalfEmptyorHalfFull?IssuesinManagingWaterChallengesandPolicyInstruments’,IMF,June2015,p.12.MichaelKugelman,‘Nightmarescenarios’,Dawn,29June2015.PILDAT,ConstructionofKalabaghDam,Islamabad,March2011.DrZaighamHabib,op.cit.SimiKamal,‘Pakistan’sWaterChallenges:Entitlement,Access,Efficiency,andEquity,’inMichaelKugelmanandRobertM.Hathaway(eds),RunningonEmpty:Pakistan’sWaterCrisis,WashingtonDC:WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars,2009,pp.28–44.‘TheIndusEquation’,StrategicForesightGroup,Mumbai,2011.KaiserBengali,‘WaterManagementunderConstraints:TheNeedforaParadigmShift’,inMichaelKugelmanandRobertM.Hathaway(eds),op.cit.,p.48.KhaleeqKiani,‘WaterShortageWorsensforRabiCrops’,Dawn,14October2015.‘SharingWaterResourceswithAfghanistan’,Dawn,13November2011.Abdul Laghari, Davy Vanham, andWolfgang Rauch, ‘The Indus Basin in the Framework of Current and FutureWater ResourcesManagement’,citedinDaanishMustafa,MajedAkhter,andNatalieNasrallah(eds),UnderstandingPakistan’sWater-SecurityNexus,WashingtonDC:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,2013,p.8.‘Loomingwatercrisis’,editorial,DailyTimes,12June2015.SimiKamal,opcit.SyedMohammadAli,‘IMF’sadviceforourwaterwoes’,ExpressTribune,10July2015.PILDAT,ConstructionofKalabaghDam,Islamabad,March2011.UNESCO,UNWorldWaterDevelopmentReport,NewYork:UnitedNations,2012,p.823,citedinDaanishMustafa,MajedAkhter,andNatalieNasrallah,op.cit.ShaheenAkhtar, ‘EmergingChallenges to IndusWaters Treaty: Issues ofCompliance andTrans-boundary Impacts of IndianHydro-projectsontheWesternRivers’,Focus,Vol.28,No.3,2010,citedinDaanishMustafa,MajedAkhter,andNatalieNasrallah,op.cit.AnwarIqbal,‘Waterscarcitymaythreatennationaleconomy:IMF’,Dawn,9June2015.FAO,AQUASTATdatabase,2013,citedinDaanishMustafa,MajedAkhter,andNatalieNasrallah(eds),op.cit,p.6.Ibid.SimiKamal,op.cit.‘WaterNotStoleninIndiabutWastedinPakistan:Qureshi’,Outlook ,2April2010.‘Pakistanlosingwaterresourcesduetopoorinfrastructure:experts’,PakistanToday,22March2013.MuhammadShafiqHaider,‘WhyPakistanwillsoonbecomeawaterscarcecountry’,TheExpressTribuneblogs,15August2015.SimiKamal,op.cit.FeisalKhan,‘Water,Governance,andCorruptioninPakistan’,inMichaelKugelmanandRobertM.Hathaway(eds)op.cit,p.83.‘Percapitawateravailabilityalarming:minister’,TheNews,29June2013.

36.37.38.39.40.41.42.43.44.

45.46.47.48.

49.50.51.

52.53.

54.55.56.57.58.59.60.61.62.63.64.65.66.67.

11

1.2.3.

4.

5.

6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.

JohnBriscoe,UsmanQamar,‘Pakistan’sWaterEconomyRunningDry’,TheWorldBank,2005,p.47.AhmadFrazKhan,‘WorseningIrrigationWaterProblems’,Dawn,27April2009.Citedin‘TheIndusEquation’,StrategicForesightGroup,Mumbai,2011.Dawn,27April2009,op.cit.JavedIqbal,‘RecordWaterTheftacrossPunjab’,TheNation,19January2015.Bhagwandas,‘RangersbiggestdefaulterofKWSBtankerservice’,Dawn,11May2015.MubashirHassan,‘ArmymisusingCholistanland,PunjabAssemblytold’,TheNation,6January2015.‘MinisterWarnsofLoomingWaterCrisis’,TheNation,11February2015.JamalShahid,‘Despitedireneed,governmentunwillingtofundresearch’,Dawn,4May2015;seealsoFawadYousafzai,‘MundaDamfallingpreytoredtape’,TheNation,20June2015.‘TheIndusEquation’,StrategicForesightGroup,Mumbai,2011.AminAhmed,‘FundsforwatersectorinPunjabnotadequate,saysWBreport’,Dawn,8June2016.‘TheIndusEquation’,StrategicForesightGroup,Mumbai,2011.World Bank, ‘Pakistan Country Water Resources Assistance Strategy—Water Economy: Running Dry,’ Report No. 34081-PK, 22November2005,AgricultureandRuralDevelopmentSector,SouthAsiaRegion,WorldBank,p.xi.GermanWatch,GlobalClimateRiskIndex2016,November2015.PILDAT,‘ConstructionofKalabaghDam’,Islamabad,March2011.FordetailsofWAA,see‘TheWaterAccord1991’athttp://www.pakissan.com/english/watercrisis/the.water.accord.shtml(accessedon21June2016).RamzanChandio,‘PunjabaccusedofstealingSindh’swater’,TheNation,9June2014.KhaleeqKiani,‘CentrerejectsKP’sRs120bncompensationdemandforuseofitswatersharebyotherprovinces’,Dawn,15August2015.‘Waterproblem’,editorial,TheNews,4November2015.‘SimiKamal,op.cit.,p.35.‘ArabianSeaeatingup100acresofSindhlanddaily’,TheNews,28September2015.ShaikhAbdulRasheed,‘Provisionofsafedrinkingwater:AnewchallengeforPakistan’,TheNation,13June2015.‘WaterinKarachi’sOrangitowncontaminatedwithfaecalwaste:study’,Dawn,15January2016.MichaelKugelman,‘Introduction’inMichaelKugelmanandRobertM.Hathaway(eds),op.cit.ShaikhAbdulRasheed,‘Provisionofsafedrinkingwater:AnewchallengeforPakistan’,TheNation,13June2015.‘PartneringwithPakistan’,WashingtonPost,28January2009.NadeemM.Qureshi,‘Waterscarcity:Mythorreality’,TheNation,4May2015.ArshadH.Abbasi,‘LookingathistoryforthefutureoftheCPEC’,TheNews,27June2015.‘IndusWatersTreaty’,editorial,Dawn,9March2016.ZafarBhutta,‘Clearingtheair:IndianotbehindwatershortageinPakistan’,TheExpressTribune,10July2015.IMF,‘IstheGlassHalfEmptyorHalfFull?IssuesinManagingWaterChallengesandPolicyInstruments’,June2015,p.28.National Seminar on ‘Pakistan’sWater Economy: Running Dry’, October 2008, cited in PILDAT, ‘Construction of Kalabagh Dam’,Islamabad,March2011,p.15.

Education:AnEmergency

PakistanVision2025,MinistryofPlanning,GovernmentofPakistan.PervezHoodbhoy,‘CanPakistanWork?ACountryinSearchofItself’,ForeignAffairs,November/December2004.‘Education Emergency’ is assessed to be equivalent to an estimated lost-yield to the economy on the scale of a flood every year;‘EducationEmergencyinPakistan’,Dawn,9March2011.‘Pakistan: Education ForAll, ReviewReport 2015’,Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, June 2014, in collaborationwithUNESCO.KhalidKhattak,‘Free,compulsoryeducationdreamremainselusive,despiteConstitutionalAmendmentfiveyearsback’,TheNews,20April2015.‘NationalInternalSecurityPolicy’,MinistryofInterior,GovernmentofPakistan,p.28.SalmanAli,‘Education:Wheredowestand?’,DailyTimes,27April2015.‘EducationforAll,NationalReviewReport’,MinistryofEducation,Pakistan,June,2014,pp.4–5.EconomicSurvey2014–15,MinistryofFinance,GovernmentofPakistan.KashifAbbasi,‘Moreseminariesareopeningupbutenrolmentisdeclining’,Dawn,27February2016.AlifAilaan,‘25MillionBrokenPromises:ThecrisisofPakistan’sout-of-schoolchildren’,2014.SehrishWasif,‘12.3millionchildrenoutofschool’,TheExpressTribune,30July2016.AlifAilaan,op.cit.

14.15.16.17.18.19.

20.21.22.23.24.25.

26.27.28.

29.30.31.32.33.34.

35.

36.37.38.39.40.

41.42.

43.44.45.46.47.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.

57.58.59.

AzamKhan,‘Why25millionchildrenareoutofschool’,TheExpressTribune,31August2015.‘ALostMDG’,editorial,TheNews,17August2015.Ibid.‘Educationcrisis’,editorial,Dawn,19December2015.‘Downsizingeducation’,editorial,TheExpressTribune,20December2015.‘FinancingEducationinPakistan,OpportunitiesforAction’,CountryCaseStudyfortheOsloSummitonEducationforDevelopment,6–7July2015,p.14.InternationalCrisisGroup,‘Pakistan:ReformingtheEducationSector’,7October2004,p.15.Ibid.Ibid,pp.15–16.EconomicSurveyofPakistan2015–16,p.174.MurtazaTalpur,‘HorridStateofEducationinSindh’,DailyTimes,31July2015.AileenQaiser,‘EducationforAll:DreamorReality?’,Dawn,24June2003,CitedinInternationalCrisisGroup,Pakistan:ReformingtheEducationSector,ICGAsiaReportNo.84,7October2004.‘Pakistan:EducationforAll,ReviewReport2015’,p.26.AlifAilaan,op.cit.Cited in Sophia Swire, ‘Education’, inVictoria Schofield (ed.),OldRoadsNewHighways: Fifty Years of Pakistan, Karachi:OUP,1997,p.235.KashifAbbasi,‘Moreseminariesareopeningupbutenrolmentisdeclining’,Dawn,27February2016.AminAhmed,‘Scarcityoffundsbehindcrisisineducationsector,saysreport’,Dawn,12July2015.‘EducationMoney’,editorial,Dawn,10July2016.‘Pakistan:EducationforAll,ReviewReport2015’.‘AlostMDG’,editorial,TheNews,17August2015.William Easterly, ‘The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan’, Paper for the AnalyticalNarrativesofGrowthProject,KennedySchoolofGovernment,HarvardUniversity,June2001,p.10.‘FinancingEducationinPakistan,OpportunitiesforAction’,CountryCaseStudyfortheOsloSummitonEducationforDevelopment,6–7July2015,p.12.‘EducationforAll,ReviewReport,2015’,p.17.‘FinancingEducationinPakistan,OpportunitiesforAction’,op.cit.,p.9.‘Pakistan:EducationforAll,ReviewReport2015’,p.14.AzamKhan,‘Why25millionchildrenareoutofschool’,TheExpressTribune,31August2015.A.H.Nayyar,‘InsensitivitytotheReligiousDiversityoftheNation’,inA.H.NayyarandAhmadSalim(eds),TheSubtleSubversion:TheStateofCurriculaandTextbooksinPakistan,Islamabad:SustainableDevelopmentPolicyInstitute,2004,p.11.‘Divisivecurricula’,editorial,Dawn,1April2016.CitedinUnitedStatesCommissiononInternationalReligiousFreedom,‘ConnectingtheDots:EducationandReligiousDiscriminationinPakistan.AStudyofPublicSchoolsandMadrassas’,November2011p.13.CitedinStephenCohen,TheIdeaofPakistan,NewDelhi:OUP,2004,p.171.TariqRahman,‘DenizensofAlienWorlds’,citedinHaroonMustafaJanjua,‘Curriculaofdeception’,TheNation,3January2015.UnitedStatesCommissiononInternationalReligiousFreedom,op.cit.,p.16.EconomicSurvey,2013–14,op.cit.Ibid.StephenCohen,op.cit.,p.241.‘AnotherRekoDiqinNorthWaziristan’,TheNews,4December2010.‘AimingHigher’,editorial,TheNation,3June2015.‘Plightofhighereducation’,editorial,TheNews,15June2015.‘HigherEducationWoes’,editorial,TheExpressTribune,21May2016.‘EducationforAllGlobalMonitoringReport2012’,FactSheet,October2012.‘UNreport:Pakistan’seducation50yearsbehindworld’,TheExpressTribune,7September2016.‘Pakistanamongtheleastinnovativecountriesintheworld,reportsays’,TheExpressTribune,8September2016.Pervez Hoodbhoy, ‘What are they Teaching in Pakistani Schools Today?,’ 15 April 2000, available athttp://www.shiachat.com/forum/topic/234920551-what-are-they-teaching-in-pakistani-schools-today/(accessdon8July2016).WilliamEasterly,op.cit.ZeeshanSalahuddin,‘Oldschool’,TheFridayTimes,17–23January2014.Speechon27November1947,citedinSophiaSwire,‘Education’,inVictoriaSchofield(ed.),OldRoadsNewHighways:FiftyYearsofPakistan,Karachi:OUP,1997,p.231.

12

1.

2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.

11.

12.13.14.15.16.17.18.19.

20.21.

22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34.35.36.37.

38.39.40.41.

42.

43.44.45.

Economy:StructuralWeaknesses

ShahidJavedBurki,‘IsPakistan’sPastRelevantforItsEconomicFuture?’,inCraigBaxterandCharlesH.Kennedy(eds),Pakistan:1997,NewDelhi:HarperCollinsPublishers,1998,p.18.PakistanVision2025,MinistryofPlanning,GovernmentofPakistan.AsadRizvi,‘Pakistan’sEconomicandFinancialProblems&GlobalOutlook2015’,BusinessRecorder,2January2015.KaiserBengali,‘ProposedAgendaforSustainedEconomicRevival’,Karachi:SocialPolicyandDevelopmentCentre,September2013.Ibid.Ibid.ShahbazRana,‘DevelopmentSpendingBearsBruntofDeficitReduction’,TheExpressTribune,3July2016.PakistanVision2025’MinistryofPlanning,GovernmentofPakistan.‘Numberfudgingallegations’,editorial,PakistanToday,9June2016.Privatesectorinvestmentsdeclinedfrom10.2percentofGDPin2014–15to9.8percentofGDPin2015–16signallingthattheprivatesectorwasunwillingtomakefreshinvestmentsandmodernizeexistingplants.Thepublicsectorinvestmentwentupmarginallyfrom3.7percentofGDPin2014–15to3.8percentofGDPin2015–16.AkmalHussain,‘MeetingtheChallengeofDemographicChangethroughEquitableDevelopment’inZebaA.Sathar,RabbiRoyan,andJohnBongaarts(eds),CapturingtheDemographicDividendinPakistan,Islamabad:PopulationCouncil,2013,p.70.AadilNakhoda,‘DeclineinexportsindicateseconomicemergencyinPakistan’TheExpressTribune,25July2016.StephenCohen(ed.),TheFutureofPakistan,NewDelhi:OUP,p.20.‘Gapingloophole:Overhalfofcabinetmembers,MPsdonotpayincometax’,TheExpressTribune,30July2015.‘Thecostoftax’,editorial,TheNews,11May2015.HaneenRafi,‘Pakistanadoptingaregressivetaxsystem,sayseconomist’,Dawn,17June2015.‘Thecostoftax’,editorial,TheNews,11May2015.MansoorAhmad,‘Pakistanlikelytomisstax-to-GDPtarget’,TheNews,31May2015.‘CombattingHunger:61MillionPakistanisareFoodInsecure’,TheExpressTribune,28July2015.Pakistanranksadismalseventy-sixoutof107countriesintheGlobalFoodSecurityIndex.KhawarGhumman,‘OneinthreePakistanislacksaccesstoadequatelynutritiousfood’,Dawn,22December2015.MichaelKugelman,‘EasinganEnergyCrisisThatWon’tEnd’,inMichaelKugelman(ed.),Pakistan’sInterminableEnergyCrisis:IsThereAnyWayOut?,WashingtonDC:WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars,2015,pp.2–3.Ibid.,p.19.StateBankofPakistan,AnnualReport,2013–2014,pp.39–40.ShahbazRana,‘WantonInefficiency:Powerprojectloansworth$16bleftuntouched’,TheExpressTribune,21February2015.FarrukhSaleem,‘Noreforms,noChineseinvestment’,TheNews,22April2015.KaiserBengal,op.cit.Ibid.JamalKhurshid‘TurningaBlindEye:Thetragicgapbetweenspendingandtaxcollection’,TheExpressTribune,5April2015.ZahidGishkori,‘Country’sbigwigsgetbankstowriteofftheirloans’,TheExpressTribune,24August2015.SardarSikander/QadeerTanoli,‘Inthreeyears,PML-NwaivesoffRs280bloans.’TheExpressTribune,23July2016.MuhammadYaqub,‘Afundamentallyflawedfiscalpolicy’,TheNews,6January2015.StateBankofPakistanAnnualReport,2013–14p.76.Ibid.,p.6.‘WillPakistan’seconomysurvivethematurityof$50bnindebtthisyear?’Dawn,15February2016.ShahbazRana,‘Govttinkerswithstatstohideswellingdebts’,TheExpressTribune,2February2016.ShahbazRana,‘Govt’sborrowingrecordtumbles’,TheExpressTribune,3August2016.Shahbaz Rana, ‘Foreign exchange reserves: Despite much-trumpeted level, borrowings continue’, The Express Tribune, 24 January2016.‘Thedebtburden’,editorial,TheNews,31August2015.AsadRizvi,op.cit.MuhammadYaqub,‘Mortgagingthefuture’,TheNews,11January2015.Ishrat Husain, ‘Economy of Pakistan: Past, Present and Future’, in Robert M. HathawayWilson Lee (eds), Islamization and thePakistaniEconomy,Washington,DC:WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars,2004.Akmal Hussain, ‘Pakistan’s Economy in Historical Perspective: Growth, Power and Poverty’, in Wilson John (ed.), Pakistan: TheStruggleWithin,Delhi:PearsonEducation,2009,p.73.Ibid.pp.74–75.MehtabHaider,‘Middleclassshrinksto35pcinlastsevenyears:DrPasha’,TheNews,21November2014.Measuredonthebasisoffivedimensions–education,health,watersupplyandsanitation,householdassets/amenitiesandsatisfactionto

46.

47.

48.

13

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.6.

7.

8.

9.

10.11.12.

13.14.

15.16.17.18.19.20.21.

22.

23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.

servicedelivery.ArifNaveed andNazimAli,ClusteredDeprivation: District Profile of Poverty in Pakistan, Islamabad: Sustainable DevelopmentPolicyInstitute,2012.OxfordPovertyandHumanDevelopmentInitiative,‘PakistanCountryBriefing’,MultidimensionalPovertyIndexDatabank,UniversityofOxford,June2015.AminAhmed,‘39pcofPakistanis liveinpoverty;Fata,Balochistanworsthit’,http://www.dawn.com/news/1266171 (accessedon14July2016);MubarakZebKhan,‘NewpovertylinemakesathirdofPakistanispoor’,Dawn,8April2016.

Population:ReapingtheDividend

RichardJacksonandNeilHowe,TheGrayingoftheGreatPowers:DemographyandGeopoliticsinthe21stCentury,Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS),2008,p.15.Durr-e-Nayab, ‘DemographicDividendorDemographicThreat inPakistan’, Islamabad:PakistanInstituteofDevelopmentEconomics,WorkingPapers,2006,p.5.Theterm‘totalfertilityrate’isusedtodescribethetotalnumberofchildrenanaveragewomeninapopulationislikelytohave,basedoncurrentbirthratesthroughoutherlife.Totalfertilityratesarecloselytiedtogrowthratesofthecountriesandarekeyindicatorsofthefuturepopulationgrowthrate.Totalfertilityrates(TFR)inPakistanwas3.6in2010;3.5in2011;3.4in2012;3.3in2013;3.2in2014;3.2in2015and3.1in2016accordingtotheEconomicSurvey2015–16.AnitaM.Weiss, ‘MuchAdoAboutCounting:TheConflict overHolding aCensus inPakistan’,AsianSurvey, Vol. 39,No. 4; July–August1999,pp.679–93,Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.AbrarSaeed,‘Censusputoffwithconsensus’,TheNation,1March2016.RabbiRoyanandZebaA.Sathar,‘Overview:ThePopulationofPakistanToday’,inZebaA.Sathar,RabbiRoyanandJohnBongaarts(eds),CapturingtheDemographicDividendinPakistan,Islamabad:ThePopulationCouncil,2013,p.7.Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Historical trends in Pakistan’s Demographics and Population Policy’, in Michael Kugelman and Robert M.Hathaway (eds), Reaping the Dividend, Overcoming Pakistan’s Demographic Challenges, Washington DC: Woodrow WilsonInternationalCenterforScholars,2011,pp.56–75.AsifWazir,AnneGoujonandWolfgangLutz, ‘EducationandPopulation:CloselyLinkedTrajectories forPakistan’, inZebaA.Sathar,RabbiRoyanandJohnBongaarts(eds),op.cit.,p.34.TheEconomicSurvey2015–16,takestheagegroupof15–64asthebenchmarkandnotesthat60.4percentofpopulationfallsinthisagegroup.Likewise,itholdthedependentpopulationofchildrenundertheageoffifteenas35.4percent.Burki,op.cit.PakistanVision2025,PlanningCommission,GovernmentofPakistan.Durr-e-Nayab, ‘DemographicDividendorDemographicThreat inPakistan’, Islamabad:PakistanInstituteofDevelopmentEconomics,WorkingPapers2006.Ibid.RabbiRoyanandZebaA.Sathar,‘Overview:ThePopulationofPakistanToday’,inZebaA.Sathar,RabbiRoyanandJohnBongaarts(eds),op.cit.,pp.3–12.EconomicSurvey2014–15.PervezTahir,‘Punjab:inconvenienttruths’,TheExpressTribune,29January2016.‘Punjabgovtspends3pcannuallytoserviceRs421blndebt’,TheNews,18March2016.AnsarAbbasi,‘Unemploymentratehighestin13years’,TheNews,29January2016.ShahbazRana,‘Issuescriticaltoeconomyremain“unaddressed”’,ExpressTribune,9December2015.‘Pakistan:FrameworkofEconomicGrowth’,May2011,PlanningCommission,GovernmentofPakistan,p.18.RashidAmjad,‘WhyHasPakistanNotReapedItsDemographicDividend?’,inZebaA.Sathar,RabbiRoyanandJohnBongaarts(eds),op.cit.p.50.Nadeem-ul-Haque,Presentationat InternationalFoodPolicyResearch Institute,WashingtonDC,22November2010, cited inMichaelKugelmanandRobertM.Hathaway(eds),op.cit.,p.12.RashidAmjad,op.cit.,p.47.Ibid.,p.49.Ibid.,p.48.EconomicSurvey2015–16.MinistryofFinance,GovernmentofPakistan.‘RemittancessentbyoverseasPakistanisreach$11.2b’,ExpressTribune,11February2016.ShahbazRana,‘PakistaniworkersinGulfcountriesfearjobcutsasoilpricesstayweak’,TheExpressTribune,23February2016.PakistanVision2025,PlanningCommission,GovernmentofPakistan.‘TheissueofmalnutritionofchildreninPakistan’,editorial,DailyTimes,18July2016.‘60pcPakistanisfacingfoodinsecurity’,Dawn,21November,2013.

32.33.

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36.37.38.

39.

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14

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2.

3.

4.

5.6.7.

8.9.

10.11.12.

13.14.15.16.17.

18.19.

20.21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.

29.

PakistanVision2025,PlanningCommission,GovernmentofPakistan.MoeedYusuf, ‘ASociety on the Precipice?Examining the Prospects ofYouthRadicalization in Pakistan’, inMichaelKugelman andRobertM.Hathaway(eds),op.cit.,pp.76–105.ShahidJavedBurki,op.cit.Durr-e-Nayab, ‘DemographicDividendorDemographicThreat inPakistan’, Islamabad:PakistanInstituteofDevelopmentEconomics,WorkingPapers,2006.ZebaA.Sathar,etal.,op.cit.PakistanVision2025,PlanningCommission,GovernmentofPakistan.DavidE.Bloom,Foreward,inZebaA.Sathar,RabbiRoyan,JohnBongaarts(eds),CapturingtheDemocraticDividendInPakistan,Islamabad:ThePopulationCouncil,2013,p.viii.RichardJacksonandNeilHowe,TheGrayingoftheGreatPowers:DemographyandGeopoliticsinthe21stCentury,WashingtonDC:CentreforInternationalandStrategicStudies,2008.GhaziSalahuddin,‘TimeBombTicking’,TheNews,16May2010,citedinKugelman,op.cit.,p.13.

India:TheQuestforParity

Jean-Luc Racine, ‘Pakistan and the Indian syndrome’, in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.)Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation, NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers,2002,p.196.Jamil-ud-dinAhmed(ed.),SomeRecentSpeechesandWritingsofMrJinnah, cited inPeterHardy,TheMuslimsofBritish India,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1972,p.226.GeorgeMcGhee,EnvoytotheMiddleEast:AdventuresinDiplomacy,citedinHusainHaqqani,MagnificentDelusions:Pakistan,theUnitedStatesandanEpicHistoryofMisunderstanding,NewYork:PublicAffairs,2013,p.45.USNews andWorld Reports, 15 January 1954, cited in Aparna Pande,Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy – Escaping India,LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2011,Indianreprint2014,p.48.AnwarIqbal,‘US-IndiaN-dealaffectedstrategicstability,saysPakistan’,Dawn,2June2015.HusainHaqqani,‘Pakistan’sElusiveQuestforParity’,TheHindu,2February2015.GovernmentofIndia,‘WhitePaperonJammuandKashmir,’p.85,citedinH.A.Rizvi,TheMilitaryandPoliticsofPakistan,1947-86,Lahore:ProgressivePublishers,fourthedition,1987,p.38.MohammedAyubKhan,Friends,NotMasters,London:OUP,1967,p.172.JawaharlalNehru’sSpeeches,Vol.1,September1946–May1949,Delhi:PublicationsDivision,MinistryofInformation&Broadcasting,GovernmentofIndia,pp.337–39,citedinAparnaPande,op.cit.,p.30.J.N.Dixit,India-PakistaninWarandPeace,NewDelhi:BooksToday,2002,p.304.‘InOurVitalInterest’,Outlook ,10June1999.AmaurydeRiencourt, ‘India andPakistan in theShadowofAfghanistan’,ForeignAffairs,Winter 1982/83, cited inAhmedFaruqui,RethinkingtheNationalSecurityofPakistan:ThePriceofStrategicMyopia,Farnham,England:AshgatePublishingLtd,2003,pp.43–44.MohammedAyubKhan,op.cit.,p.122.AnitaJoshua,‘PakistanisnotlikeIraqorAfghanistan,KayanitellsWashington’,TheHindu,19October2011.Z.A.Bhutto,TheMythofIndependence,London:OUP,1969,p.180.L.Ziring,PakistanattheCrosscurrentofHistory,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2004,p.131.CitedinAhmedRashid,DescentintoChaos:TheUSandtheDisasterinPakistan,Afghanistan,andCentralAsia,London:PenguinBooks,2008,p.29.F.S.Aijazuddin(ed.),TheWhiteHouseandPakistan:SecretDeclassifiedDocuments,1969–74,Oxford:OUP,2002,pp.42–43.TelegramfromtheOfficeinPakistantotheDepartmentofState,Rawalpindi,Pakistan,6September1965,FRUS25(1964-1968),citedinHusainHaqqani,op.cit.,2013,p.113.TariqFatemi,‘LookingAhead’,inStephenCohen(ed.),TheFutureofPakistan,Delhi:OUP,2011,p.116.CraigBaxter(ed.),DiariesofFieldMarshalMohammedAyubKhan,1966–72,Karachi:OUP,2007,p.506.CitedinR.Guha,IndiaafterGandhi:TheHistoryoftheWorld’sLargestDemocracy,NewYork:HarperCollins,2007,p.461.QuotedinHumayunMirza,FromPlasseytoPakistan,Maryland,USA:Timespinner,1999,thirdedition,2013,p.157.L.Ziring,op.cit.,p.103.F.S.Aijazuddin(ed.),op.cit.,p.41.L.Ziring,op.cit.p.103.ArifJamal,CallforTransnationalJihad:Lashkar-e-Taiba1985–2014,NewDelhi:KautilyaBooks,2015,pp.277–78.TheentireepisodeisnarratedinHusainHaqqani,Pakistan:BetweenMosqueandMilitary,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2005,pp.294–96.JanePerlez,DavidE.Sanger andEricSchmitt, ‘NuclearFuelMemosExposeWaryDancewithPakistan’,TheNewYorkTimes, 30

30.31.32.

33.34.

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41.

42.43.

15

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5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.

15.16.17.18.

19.

20.21.22.23.24.

November2010.HusainHaqqani,op.cit.,2005,pp.284–85.DennisKux,TheUSandPakistan1947–2000:DisenchantedAllies,WashingtonDC:WoodrowWilsonCentrePress,2001,p.360.AzeemIbrahim, ‘USAid toPakistan:USTaxpayersHaveFundedPakistaniCorruption’,Discussionpaper,BelferCentre forScienceandInternationalAffairs,HarvardKennedySchool,July2009.HusainHaqqani,‘WhyAreWeSendingThisAttackHelicoptertoPakistan?’,WallStreetJournal,19April2015.AltafGauhar ‘FourWars,OneAssumption’,cited inAhmedFaruqui,Rethinking theNationalSecurityofPakistan :ThePriceofStrategicMyopia,Aldershot,UK:AshgatePublishingLtd,2003,p.44.Brig,ShelfordBidwell,ModernWarfare:AStudyofMen,WeaponsandTheories,AllenLane,1973,citedinAhmedFaruqui,op.cit.,p.6.HusainHaqqani, op. cit., 2005, pp. 268–69;C.ChristineFair,Fighting to theEnd: ThePakistanArmy’sWay ofWar, Delhi:OUP,Indianreprint,2014,pp.161–62.HusainHaqqani,ibid.;C.ChristineFair,ibid.M.S.Venkataramani,TheAmericanRoleinPakistan1947-1958,NewDelhi:RadiantPublishers,1982,p.408.M.Ahmed,MyChief, Lahore: Longmans, Green and Company, 1960, pp. 102–03, cited in HassanAskari Rizvi,The Military andPoliticsinPakistan1947–86,Lahore:ProgressivePublishers,1986,pp.68–69.General Musharraf’s address to the nation, 12 January 2002, English translation available athttp://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/papers/2002Jan12.htm.TheRussiancityofUfawasthevenueoftheseventhBRICSsummitandalsooftheShanghaiCooperationOrganization,inJuly2015,whereprimeministersofIndiaandPakistanwerepresent.FollowingabilateralmeetingbetweenNarendraModiandNawazSharif,thetwocountriesissuedastatement.HusainHaqqani,‘Pakistan’selusivequestforparity’TheHindu,2February2015.AhmedFaruqui,op.cit.,p.5.

Afghanistan:TheQuestforDomination

CitedinArthurSwinson,TheNorth-WestFrontier,London:CorgiBooks,1969,p.404.Citedin‘Mutualdistrust:TheAf-Pakstory’,DailyTimes,13July2015.TariqAli,CanPakistanSurvive?TheDeathofaState,London:PenguinBooks,1983,p.166.‘MemorandumofaConversation,Karachi,Pakistan,8December1959,FRUS15(1958-1960)’,citedinHusainHaqqani,‘MagnificentDelusions:Pakistan,TheUnitedStatesandanEpicHistoryofMisunderstanding,NewYork:PublicAffairs,2013,p.93.Ibid.OlafCaroe,ThePathans,Karachi:OUP,1976reprint,originallypublishedin1958,p.325.‘PakistantriedthreetimestoformalizetheDurandLineduringtheTalibanRegime’,KhaamaPress,28February2016.RoedadKhan,Pakistan:ADreamGoneSour,Karachi:OUP,1997,pp.98–99.CabinetMissionPlan,16May1946.CraigBaxter(ed.),DiariesofFieldMarshalMohammedAyubKhan1966–72,Karachi:OUP,2007,p.271.K.M.Arif,WorkingWithZia,Karachi:OUP,1995,pp.306–07.Ibid.HusainHaqqani,Pakistan:BetweenMosqueandMilitary,Lahore:VanguardBooks,2005,p.177.Original interviewwithS.Harrisonpublished inLeMondeDiplomatique andquoted inCharlesG.Cogan, ‘ShawlofLead’, cited inSteveColl,GhostWars:TheSecretHistoryof theCIA,Afghanistan,andBinLaden, fromtheSoviet InvasiontoSeptember10,2001,London:PenguinBooks,2004,p.175.Ibid.,p.50.InterviewwithMaj.Gen.GhulamAhmedKhan,15May2000,citedinibid.,pp.50–51.Ibid.,p.25.The BonnAgreement, officially called the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment ofPermanent Government Institutions, was a UN-brokered agreement reached inDecember 2001 to set up a transition government inAfghanistanthatwouldpavethewayforapermanentgovernmentaftertheroutoftheTalibanbytheUSforces.HouseofCommonsForeignAffairsCommittee,GlobalSecurity:AfghanistanandPakistan,EighthReportofSession2008–09,Chapter4:Pakistan’sStrategicImportanceandRoleinRelationtoAfghanistan,para177.‘BackfromtheBrink:AStrategyforStabilizingAfghanistan-Pakistan’,AsiaSocietyTaskForce,April2009.AhmedRashid,DescentintoChaos,NewYork:Penguin,2008,p.268.WilliamDalrymple,‘ADeadlyTriangle:Afghanistan,Pakistan,andIndia’,TheBrookingsEssay,TheBrookingsInstitute,25June2013.BruceRiedel,‘TheNewHeadofPakistan’sArmyHoldstheCountry’sMostImportantJob’,TheDailyBeast,30November2013.MarkMazzettiandEricSchmitt,‘USSaysAgentsofPakistanAidAfghanTaliban’,TheNewYorkTimes,26March2009.

25.26.27.28.29.30.

31.32.33.34.35.36.37.

38.39.40.41.42.43.44.45.46.

16

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2.

3.4.

5.6.

7.

8.

9.

10.11.12.13.14.15.16.17.18.19.20.21.22.

CitedinWilliamDalrymple,op.cit.ScottBaldauf,‘India-PakistanRivalryReachesintoAfghanistan’,ChristianScienceMonitor,12September,2003.CitedinFredericGrare,‘Pakistan-AfghanistanRelationsinthePost-9/11Era’,CarnegiePapers,October2006.GaurangBatt,‘RAWIsTraining600BaluchisinAfghanistan:MushahidHussain’,citedinibid.WilliamDalrymple,op.cit.UNHCR,GlobalAppeal2015Update–Pakistan,http://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/unhcr-global-appeal-2015-update-pakistan(accessedon25July2016).‘PlightofAfghanrefugees’,editorial,Dawn,25January252016.HassanBelalZaidi,‘Oppositionaccusesgovtofalienatingsmallprovinces’,Dawn,15April2016.RahibRaza,‘Dayagainstdrugabuse:morethan8.1millionaddictsinPakistannow’,TheExpressTribune,26June2011.GibranAshraf,‘UNODCreport:Pakistanrisksbecomingdrugs-consumingcountry’,TheExpressTribune,25August2016.MudassirRaja,‘Pakistanivictims:Waronterrortollputat49,000’,TheExpressTribune,27March2013.KalbeAli,‘Budget2016-17:Warcostsreceding’Dawn,3June2016.Amraiz Khan, ‘Afghan transit trade main smuggling funnel, says LCCI report’, The Nation, 11 May 2015,http://nation.com.pk/national/11-May-2015/afghan-transit-trade-main-smuggling-funnel(accessedon25July2016).SteveColl,GhostWars,London:PenguinBooks,2004,p.238.‘Armednation’,editorial,TheNews,29March2016.AhmedRashid,Taliban:Islam,Oil,andTheNewGreatGameinCentralAsia,London:IBTauris,2000,p.184.EqbalAhmad,‘WhatAfterStrategicDepth?’,Dawn,23August1998.BaqirSajjadSyed,‘ISI,AfghanIntelligenceinLandmarkDeal’,Dawn,19May2015.IrfanHaider,‘AshrafGhanislamsPakistanoverrecentKabulattacks’,Dawn,10August2015.PamelaConstable,‘AngryAfghanleaderassailsPakistanashavenfordeadlyTalibanattacks’,WashingtonPost,10August2015.BaqirSajjadSyed,‘ConcernoverborderissuesconveyedtoUS’Dawn,03July,2016.NajamSethi,‘WelcomePresidentGhani’,TheFridayTimes,14November2014.

China:TheQuestforSuccour

Abdul Sattar, ‘Foreign Policy: Relations with the West, China and the Middle East’, in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Pakistan: Founders’Aspirations&Today’sRealities,Karachi:OUP,2001,p.370.Dawn, editorial, 26April 1963.Cited inAparnaPande,ExplainingPakistan’sForeignPolicy:Escaping India, London: Routledge,2011,Indianreprint2014,pp.120–21.‘China,Pakistansigntreatyforfriendship,cooperationandgood-neighborlyrelations,’People’sDailyonline,6April2005.‘CommonVision forDeepeningChina-PakistanStrategicCooperativePartnership in theNewEra’,MinistryofForeignAffairsof thePeople’sRepublicofChina,5July2013.SajjadMalik,‘PakistansavedChinafromembarrassmentonXinjiangviolence’,TheDailyTimes,5September2009.SiegfriedO.Wolf,‘China’sRoleinPakistan:InternationalandDomesticImplications’,inSylviaMishra(ed.),StudiesonPakistan,NewDelhi:ParagonPublishers,2014,p.131.‘Carrying Forward Generations of Friendly and Good-Neighborly Relations and Endeavoring towards a Better Tomorrow for All’,MinistryofForeignAffairsofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,2December1996.‘Building aChina-PakistanCommunity ofSharedDestiny toPursueCloserWin-WinCooperation’,Ministry of ForeignAffairs of thePeople’sRepublicofChina,21April2015.LisaCurtisandDerekScissors,‘TheLimitsofthePakistan–ChinaAlliance’,Backgrounder#2641onAsiaandthePacific,19January2012,WashingtonDC:TheHeritageFoundation.MarkMazetti,‘USAidesBelieveChinaExaminedStealthCopter’,TheNewYorkTimes,14August2001.AndrewSmall,TheChinaPakistanAxis:Asia’sNewGeopolitics,Gurgaon:RandomHouseIndia,2015,paperbackedition,p.29.LisaCurtisandDerekScissors,op.cit.;AndrewSmall,op.cit.,pp.33–35.Ibid.IbidPerlez,Jane,‘PakistanmayseekIMFcashafterrebuffbyChina’,TheNewYorkTimes,18October2008.SyedShoaibHasan,‘PakistanandtheChinesecentury’,Dawn,14December2014.FarrukhSaleem,‘Gwadar’,TheNews,31July2016.KhaleeqKiani,‘IssuesinChina’sofferforinvestment’,Dawn,17November2014.MehtabHaider,‘Govtproposes29industrialparks,21mineralzonesunderCPEC’,TheNews,26July2015.CitedinKhaleeqKiani,op.cit.AyazAmir,‘OverdoingtheCorridor’,TheNews,19January2016.MuhammadAliEhsan,‘ProtectorsoftheCPEC’,TheExpressTribune,25February2016.

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4.

5.

6.

7.8.

EjazHussainandGhulamAli,‘Pakistan–Chinaeconomicrelations’,DailyTimes,28February2015.ShahbazRana,‘EasternCPECrouteunfeasible’,TheExpressTribune,26July2015.PervezTahir,‘ThesnailintheCPEC’,TheExpressTribune,22October2015.SaleemSafi,‘CPEC:thewayforward’,TheNews,29April2016.FawadYousafzai,‘CPECwesternroute:NoCentredirectiveyettoacquireland’,TheNation,16July2016.SaleemSafi,‘Incomparabledeception’,TheNews,22March2016.ObaidAbrarKhan,‘Pakpoliticalpartiesmusthammeroutrifts:China’,TheNews,10January2016.AyazAmir,‘CPECcontroversy…army’sfailure’,TheNews,12January2016.‘CPECagreementisconfidential,ministertellsSenate’,PakistanToday,28July2016.AndleebAbbas,‘CuriouscaseoftheCPEC’,DailyTimes,17January2016.Ibid.ShahbazRana,‘WorldBankreportwarnsPakistanof“substantial”fiscalrisks’,ExpressTribune,8January2016.‘TaxingCPEC’,editorialinDawn,11March2016;ShahbazRana,‘Pakistan,Chinadividedovertaxexemptions’,TheExpressTribune,10March2016.CitedinKhulduneShahid,‘Purchasingpower’,TheFridayTimes,15–21May2015.FarrukhSaleem,‘Noreforms,noChineseinvestment’,TheNews,22April2015.MoeedYusuf,‘Corridorchallenge’,Dawn,9June2015.‘MajorCPECpowerprojectdelayed’:editorial,TheExpressTribune,19July2016.KhaleeqKiani,‘Chinesefirmbowsoutofcoal-basedpowerproject’,Dawn,18May2016.ShahbazRana,‘FiveCPECprojectsfacetheaxe’,TheExpressTribune,20July2016.ShahbazRana,‘PowerprojectunderCPECrunsaground’,TheExpressTribune,25July2016.PervezTahir,‘WhitherCPEC?’,TheExpressTribune,14January2016.‘WhoControlstheCPEC?,’editorial,TheNation,19July2016.KhawarGhumman,‘PML-NunwillingtoshareCPECcontrol?’,Dawn,18July2016.‘RoadtoCPEC’,editorial,Dawn,5February2016.DennisKux,TheUnitedStatesandPakistan,1947–2000:DisenchantedAllies,London:OUP,2001,p.163.SultanM.Khan,MemoriesandReflectionsofaPakistaniDiplomat,Oxford:TheAldenPress,1998,p.347.LatifSherwani,Pakistan,China,America,Karachi:CouncilforPakistanStudies,1980,p.213,citedinAparnaPande,op.cit.,p.125.AndrewSmall,op.cit.,p.15.LisaCurtisandDerekScissors,op.cit.AndrewSmall,op.cit.,p.65.JasonDeanand JeremyPage, ‘BeijingPoints toPakistanafterEthnicViolence’,TheWall Street Journal, 1August 2011; ‘KashgarMustNotMarTies’,www.Dawn.com/news/650312/kashgar-must-not-mar-ties,8August2011.ZhangLi, ‘ToManageConflict inSouthAsia:China’sStakes,Perceptionsand Inputs’, Institute forSecurityandDevelopmentPolicy,AsiaPaper,Stockholm,October2009,p.19.TahirAli,‘TalibangroupthreatenstoattackChineseinterests’,TheNation,17November2014.AndrewSmall,‘IntensifyingChina–PakistanTies’,NewYork:CouncilonForeignRelations,7July2010.ZahidGishkori,‘Economiccorridor:12,000-strongforcetoguardChineseworkers’,ExpressTribune,30March2015.AndrewSmall,‘China’sCautiononAfghanistan–Pakistan,’TheWashingtonQuarterly,July2010,p.86.LisaCurtisandDerekScissors,op.cit.

TheUnitedStates:TheQuestforDependence

LawrenceWright,‘TheDoubleGame:TheunintendedconsequencesofAmericanfundinginPakistan’,TheNewYorker,16May2011.Ibid.RecordofInterviewbetweenIsmayandJinnah,IOR,MountbattenPapers,MSSEURF200/191,TopSecret,9April1947,p.646;Z.H.Zaidi(ed.),JinnahPapers,FirstSeries,VolumeI,PartII,NationalArchivesofPakistan,1993,citedinShujaNawaz,CrossedSwords:Pakistan,ItsArmyandtheWarsWithin,Karachi:OUP,2008,p.93.Dawn, 18 January 1955, cited in Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947–1986, Lahore: ProgressivePublishers,1986,p.63.TheUScharged’affaires inNewDelhi(GeorgeR.Merral) to theSecretaryofStateGeorgeC.Marshall,2May1947,cited inM.S.Venkataramani,TheAmericanRoleinPakistan,1947–1958,NewDelhi:RadiantPublishers,1982,p.1.MargaretBourke-White,Halfway toFreedom:AReporton theNew India in theWordsandPhotographsofMargaretBourke-White,NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1949,firstedition,pp.92–93.Ibid.p.93.WinthropW.AldrichtotheUnderSecretaryofStateWillClayton,8October1947,citedinM.S.Venkatramani,op.cit.,p.17.

9.10.11.12.13.14.

15.

16.

17.18.

19.20.21.22.

23.24.25.26.

27.

28.29.30.31.32.33.34.

35.36.37.38.39.40.41.

42.43.44.45.46.47.

48.

49.

18

C.ChristineFair,FightingtotheEnd:ThePakistanArmy’sWayofWar,NewYork:OUP,Indianreprint2014,p.176.TariqAli,TheClashofFundamentalisms:Crusades,JihadsandModernity,NewYork:Verso,2002,p.166.GaryJ.Bass,TheBloodTelegram,Gurgaon:RandomHouseIndia,2013.F.S.Aijazuddin,TheWhiteHouseandPakistan:SecretDeclassifiedDocuments,1969-74,Oxford:OUP,2002,p.246.AndrewSmall,TheChinaPakistanAxis:Asia’sNewGeopolitics,Gurgaon:RandomHouseIndia,2015,paperbackedition,pp.11–12.CongressionalResearchService,‘DirectOvertU.S.AidAppropriationsforandMilitaryReimbursementstoPakistan,FY2002-FY2017’,preparedbytheCongressionalResearchServicefordistributiontomultiplecongressionaloffices,24February2016.‘TheUnitedStatesandPakistan:NavigatingaComplexRelationship’,writtenremarksbyHusainHaqqani,beforetheUSCommissiononInternationalReligiousFreedomhearingon30June2005.Dennis Kux, The US and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies, Washington DC,WoodrowWilson International Center forScholarsPress,2000,p.257.Ibid.Dennis Kux, ‘A Ride on the Roller Coaster: US–Pakistan Relations 1947–1997’, in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Pakistan: Founders’AspirationsandToday’sRealities,Karachi:OUP,2001,p.303.AshleyTellis,‘MarchingtoaMeltdown’,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,op-ed,NewsInternational,10September2011.JamesDao,‘TerrorAidfromPakistanConcernsSenators’,TheNewYorkTimes,13February2003.BobWoodward,Obama’sWars,NewYork:Simon&Schuster,2010,p.3.Julian E. Barnes, Matthew Rosenberg and Adman Entous, ‘US Accuses Pakistan of Militant Ties’, The Wall Street Journal, 23September2011.DavidE.Sanger,TheInheritance,London:BantamPress/TransworldPublishers,2009,p.247.Ibid.,p.253.TariqAli,op.cit.,pp.207–08.David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, New York: CrownPublishers,2012,p.113.JanePerlez,DavidE.Sanger andEricSchmitt, ‘NuclearFuelMemosExposeWaryDancewithPakistan’,TheNewYorkTimes, 30November2010.CitedinDennisKux,opcit,2000p.363.DavidE.Sanger,op.cit.,2009p.261.AshleyTellis,op.cit.StephenCohen,TheIdeaofPakistan,WashingtonDC:BrookingsInstitution,2004,p.270.DavidE.Sanger,op.cit.,2009,p.195.JanePerlez,DavidE.Sanger,andEricSchmitt,op.cit.SteveColl,GhostWars:TheSecretHistoryof theCIA,AfghanistanandBinLaden, from theSoviet Invasion toSeptember10,2001,London:PenguinBooks,2004,p.51.‘TheAidDrip’,editorial,TheNation,13August2015.LisaCurtis,‘ShouldtheUSCutOffAidtoPakistan?’,WashingtonDC:TheHeritageFoundation,5August2011.‘PakistanamissinUSDemocrats’listofallies’,TheNation,4July2016.‘Pakistanisa“very,veryvitalproblem”:DonaldTrump’,TheTimesofIndia,30March2016.‘RepublicanmanifestosaysneedtosecurePakistan’snucleararsenal’,IndianExpress,19July2016.‘Terrorists’safehavensaffectingPak-USties:Pentagon’,TheNews,19June2016.‘TheAidDrip’,editorial,TheNation,13August2015;BaqirSajjadSyed,‘CSFmaynotbepossiblebeyond2015:US’,Dawn,12August2015.‘NofundsissuedtoPakistanunderKerry-LugarBillsince2013:US’,TheExpressTribune,6January2015.ShahbazRana,‘WashingtonrulesouttradeagreementwithIslamabad’,TheExpressTribune,11March2015.VargheseK.George,‘Pak.actionagainstterroramixedstory:USgeneral’,TheHindu,2February2016.C.ChristineFair,‘HonorourFallenbyGettingRealonPakistan’,warontherocks.com,26May2015.‘StateoftheUnionAddress’,TheWhiteHouse,12January2016.‘The Obama Doctrine’ The Atlantic, April 2016, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/,(accessedon25July2016).AnwarIqbal,‘ViciouscriticismofPakistanbyUSCongresspanel’,Dawn,14July,2016;‘FriendsandFoes’:editorial,TheNation,16July2016.HusainHaqqani,MagnificentDelusions:Pakistan,theUnitedStates,andanEpicHistoryofMisunderstanding,NewYork:PublicAffairs,2013,p.2.

LookingInwards

1.

2.3.4.5.

6.

7.

8.

9.10.11.12.

13.14.

15.16.17.

18.19.

20.21.22.23.24.25.26.

27.28.29.30.31.32.33.

34.

35.36.37.

1.

MazharAliKhan,‘TheSeventhYear,August14,1954’,inPakistan:TheFirstTwelveYears,ThePakistanTimesEditorialsofMazharAliKhan,Karachi:OUP,1996,p.22.AyazAmir,‘Asocietymakinglessandlesssense’,TheNews,22February2013.MiraSethi,‘Ageofinnocence’,TheFridayTimes,9–15May2014.NargisSethi,‘Abarrenlandscape’,Dawn,2May2015.Thewriterisaformercabinetsecretary.Roedad Khan, ‘August 14, What is there to Celebrate?’, 12 August 2009. The writer is a retired federal secretary.http://www.siasat.pk/forum/showthread.php?23989-What-is-there-to-celebrate-By-Roedad-Khan,accessedon25July2016.ShahzadChaudhry,‘RightingourWrongs’,TheExpressTribune,15November2014.Thewriterisapoliticalandsecurityanalystwhoretiredasanairvice-marshalinthePakistanAirForce.SaifSamejo,‘IsitcompulsorytohateIndia,AmericaandIsrael,inordertolovePakistan?’,TheExpressTribuneblogs,30August2015.The author is a lead vocalist for The Sketches (Sufi band) and producer of ‘Lahooti Live Sessions’ that promotes art and music,especiallyindigenousartists.Ahmed Rashid, ‘The Anarchic Republic of Pakistan’, 24 August 2010, http://www.ahmedrashid.com/wp-content/archives/pakistan/articles/pdf/TheAnarchicRepublicOfPakistan.pdf,accessedon25July2016.AyazAmir,‘YourresidenceamongtheFalcons’,TheNews,3September2015.CitedinSaeedShah,‘PakistanActivistFacesMilitary’sWrath’,TheWallStreetJournal,6May2015.MirMohammadAliTalpur,‘Thestinkingwell’,DailyTimes,26July2015.BanariMengal,‘WhathavewereceivedfromthepeopleofPakistanexceptneglectandtorment?’,TheExpressTribuneblogs,5May2015.ThewriterisdaughterofpresidentoftheBalochistanNationalParty,AkhtarMengal,andastudentoflaw.I.A.Rehman,‘NoKewalramamongstus’,Dawn,21May2015.Eqbal Ahmad, ‘The Conflict Within – The Roots of Violence’, Transnational Institute, 1 December 1996,https://www.tni.org/en/archives/act/16908(accessedon25July2016).KunwarKhulduneShahid,‘HatredforHindus’,TheFridayTimes,28March2014.‘BecomingPakistan’,editorial,TheNation,23March2015.PervezHoodbhoy andZiaMian, ‘Pakistan, theArmy and theConflictWithin’, 12 July 2011, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero071211,accessedon5July2016.AliMalik,‘ReconsideringPakistan’,DailyTimes,14May2015.‘Ten Years’, editorial, The Pakistan Times, 14 August 1957, in Mazar Ali Khan, Pakistan: The First Twelve Years: Editorials ofMazharAliKhan,Karachi:OUP,1996.BabarSattar,‘Iscoerciveconsensusenough?’,Dawn,4May2015.Thewriterisalawyer.‘Ageofunreason’,editorial,Dawn,13May2015.SaadRasool,‘Un-SilencingBaluchistan’,TheNation,12April2015.ThewriterisaLahore-basedlawyer.AyazAmir,‘Asocietymakinglessandlesssense’,TheNews,22February2013.MiraSethi,‘AgeofInnocence’,TheFridayTimes,9May2014.YaqoobKhanBangash,‘Freedom’,TheExpressTribune,2May2015.ThewriterteacheshistoryatFormanChristianCollege,Lahore.Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur, ‘The Stinking Well’,Daily Times, 26 July 2015. The writer has an association with the Baloch rightsmovementgoingbacktotheearly1970s.ZahidHussain,‘Deathbystealth’,Dawn,12August2015.Thewriterisanauthorandajournalist.KunwarKhulduneShahid,‘HatredforHindus’,TheFridayTimes,28March–3April2014.PervezHoodbhoy,‘Along,sadyearafterSalmanTaseer’skilling’,TheHindu,4January2015.BabarSattar,‘Iscoerciveconsensusenough?’Dawn,4May2015.SalmanTarikKureshi,‘Lastresort’,TheFridayTimes,22–28May2015.RabiaMughal,‘AreweanationofTalibanapologists?’,TheExpressTribuneblogs,22May2015.AyeshaIjazKhan,‘ReligiousintoleranceandaninsecurePakistan’,TheExpressTribune,16May2015.ThewriterisaLondon-basedlawyer.NajamSattar, ‘Let’s stopcallingpeople “kaafir” justbecause theydon’tbelieve inour schoolof thought’,TheNationblogs, 19 July2015.NajamSattarisafreelancewriterwithaneyeforPakistan’ssocialissues.AyazAmir,‘Asocietymakinglessandlesssense’,TheNews,22February2013.‘Ageofunreason’,editorial,Dawn,13May2015.AbbasNasir,‘Afateforetold’,Dawn,22August2015.ThewriterisaformereditorofDawn.

Conclusion

Availableathttp://www.bharatdarshan.co.nz/magazine/literature/533/parda-yashpal.html(accessedon25July2016).

Index

AbbasiacanalAbbasi,Maj.Gen.ZahirulIslamAfghanistanandPakistan

AfghanCellintheForeignOfficeAfghandissidentssupportedandarmedbyPakAfghanrefugeesinPakAfghanTalibanitsassetAshrafGhani’sruleDurandLine,insecurityvis-à-visforwardpolicyinAfghanistanHamidKarzai’sruleIslamistinsurgencyinAfghanistanPakaimsforanti-IndiagovernmentinKabulSouthAsiancontextSovietsandUSlostinterest

Ahmad,LtGen.MahmudAhmad,SyedAhmadiyasAhmed,AbdulMansurAhmed,IshtiaqAkbar,M.J.Al-QaedaAli,LaikAli,NisarAli,RehmatAli,TariqAligarhCollegeAllIndiaMuslimLeague(AIML)All-IndiaMuslimEducationalConferenceAll-PartiesConferences(APCs)ArmyWelfareTrust(AWT)Asif,KhwajaAuchinleck,FieldMarshalAwamiNationalParty(ANP)Ayub,GoharAzad,MaulanaAbulKalamAzhar,MasoodAziz,K.K.Aziz,LtGen.MohammadAziz,SartajAziz,ShaukatbailoutsfromUSandChinaBajwa,AsimSaleemBalochistan,historyof

AmnestyInternational’sReportongoalbeingindependenceGwadarport,developmentofinsurgenciesinPakhtunistan

BangladeshBashir,TassaduqBeg,Gen.AslamBengalMuslimLeagueBhutto,BenazirBhutto,ZulfiqarAliBihariMuslimsBirkenheadBogra,MohammadAliBonnAgreementBritain

Indianempire,topreservetheirMuslimLeaguesupportedbyrepresentativegovernment

BritishCabinetMissionBugti,NawabAkbarKhanButler,Harcourt

Canning,LordChina-Pakistanrelations

bilateraltradeChina’sinterestinPakistan,concernsChina–PakistanTreaty

defencecooperationPakistan’sinterestinChinaaidalternativepartnertotheUSseekinglargebailouts

straininrelationsChina–PakEconomicCorridor(CPEC)

BalochistanandKhyberPakhtunkhwa(KPK)ondiscordovertheroutefinancesofissuesonlong-termbenefitsofnotransparencyportofGwadar

Churchill,Winstoncivil–militaryrelationsCongressCongress

andBritainandPakistanresignedfromtheministries

ConstitutionofPakistanEighteenthAmendmenttothe

CouncilofCommonInterests(CCI)Cunningham,SirGeorge

Dard,AbdurRahimDefenceHousingAuthority(DHA)democracyinPakistan

allegationsofriggedelections

AdeelKhanonarmyonAyubKhanonJinnahonMusharrafonPakistanTimesonpoliticiansonulemasonZiaon

DeobandiAnjumanSipha-i-Sahaba(ASS)DeobandiJamiatUlema-i-Islam(JUI)DeobandimadrasasDeobandi–ShiaconflictDirectActionDaydivideandrule,BritishpolicyofDufferin,LordDurandLineDurrani,Maj.Gen.MahmudAli

EastIndiaCompanyEastPakistan,economyofPakistan

datamanipulationdependentonexportsforeignbailoutsremittances

agriculture,shareofdevelopmentbudgetcutseconomiccrisessituationemployment

externaldebtfactorsthatwillhinderfiscaldeficitGDPgrowthratesloanwaiverspovertylevelspro-richnatureoftheGDPstructuralweaknessesintaxrevenue

educationsectorbudgetforchallengesincurriculuminschoolsGlobalMonitoringReportonideologicalandpoliticalgoals,toachievequalityofeducationuniversityrankingsinworld

employmentsituationenergysector

criticalshortagesinproblemofdistributionenergydeficithasreducedproductionunutilizedpowerprojectloans

Elahi,C.ChaudhryFazalelectionsinPakistan(1970)extremist

groupssupplysideandpullfactorsfor

tendencies

Fair,C.Christine,onPakistanFazlullah,Mullah(TTP)GandhijiGhani,AshrafGillani,Brig.GhulamGlancy,SirBertrandGokhale,GopalKrishanGovernmentofIndiaAct(1935)Hydari,SirAkbarHaq,FazlulHassan,LtGen.GulHassan,LtGen.JavedHindko-speakersHindu-Muslim

conflictunity

Hodson,H.V.,onPakistanHume,A.O.Hunter,WilliamWilsonHussain,ChaudhryShujaatHussain,DrAkmal

IndiaandPakistan1965warcreationofBangladeshKargilwarPakaccusingIndiaforwantingtoundopartitionPakandKhalistanmovementinIndianPunjabPakraiderssentintoKashmirPakusingborrowedpowerPakusingnon-stateactorsPakistan’sdesireforparity

InternationalCrisisGroup(ICG)Iqbal,MuhammadISIS(IslamicStateofIraqandSyria)inPakistan

supporttoTaliban,al-QaedaIslamizationofstate

andsectarianviolenceinarmyimpactonPakistaniidentityorunitylegalisticapproachtoIslamizationstrengthenedreligiouspartiesviewsofAyubKhanBenazirBhuttoandNawazSharifJinnahKhalidB.SaeedMusharrafZia-ul-Haq

Ittehad-i-Tanzeemat-i-Madaris-i-Deenia(ITMD)

Jamaat-i-Islami(JI)Jamaat-ud-Dawa(JuD)

Jamaat-ul-AhrarJamiatUlema-i-Hind(JUH)Janjua,LtGen.Jihadigroups

distinctionbetweengoodandbadterrorism

Jinnah,MuhammadAliandBritishandCongress

KarachiHRCPreportonviolenceinwatercrisisin

Karim,AbdulKarzai,HamidKashmirKayani,GeneralA.P.KhanSahib,DrKhan,A.Q.Khan,AghaKhan,AllahNawazKhan,AsgharKhan,AurangzebKhan,Gen.AyubKhan,Gen.AzamKhan,Gen.YahyaKhan,ImranKhan,KhanAbdulGhaffarKhan,LiaquatAliKhan,MajGen.AkbarKhan,MajGen.SherAliKhan,MohammedDaudKhan,NaurozKhan,ShahryarKhan,SyedAhmadKhan,WaliKhan,ZafarullahKhanzada,ShujaKhudaiKhidmatgarsKhyberPakhtunkhwa(KPK)

LahoreResolutionLakhvi,ZakiurRehmanlandreforms,aversiontolanguageriotsLashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)Lashkar-e-Taiba(LeT)Linlithgow,Lord

Macaulayoneducationmadrasas

builtillegallyongovernmentlandchildrenarestateresponsibilitytooconnectedtoterrorismcorecurriculuminfundingofjobopportunitiesformadrasaeducated

linkwithterroristgroupslinkwithterroristgroupsnumberofstudentsinnumberofpoliticalaffiliationsofposeseveralchallengesproductsofmadrasasblamedforkillingsreformingthemadrasasregistrationandregulationofstaterecruitsforterroristorganizationssuicideattackersfrommadrasastrainingcentresforhatredfornon-Muslims

Madani,MaulanaHusaynAhmedMaddison,AngusMalik,TafsheenmartiallawinLahore

effectsofGulHassanonMusharrafonY.Khanon

MashaikhCommitteeMaududi,SyedAbdulAlaMayo,LordMesservy,Gen.Frankmilitaryacademies,Islamiclearninginmilitaryinterventions,ICGonmilitaryleadershipmiltarycapitalusedforpersonalbenefitminoritiespunishedMinto,LadyMinto,LordMinto–MorleyReformsMirza,IskandermohajirsMontague,EdwinMountbatten,LordMughalruleMuhammadanAnglo-OrientalCollege,AligarhMusa,MuhammadMusharraf,Gen.PervezMuslim,definitionofaMuttahidaMajlis-i-Amal(MMA)MuttahidaQuamiMovement(MQM)

Naidu,SarojiniNapier,Gen.CharlesNaqvi,LtGen.(Retd)TanvirNasir,LtGen.Javed(ISI)nationalsecurityandeconomicstrengthNationalActionPlan(NAP)Nazaria-i-PakistanNazimuddin,KhwajaNehru,Jawaharlalnon-stateactors(Jihadigroups)usedbyPakistannuclearweaponsprogrammeofPakistan

andterroristgroupsasviewedby

ChinaUS

NWFP

ObjectivesResolutionoilandgas,ownershipofOsamabinLaden

PakistanarmedforcesandZia’sIslamizationbusinessinterestsofchiefswritingbookscorebeliefsofdefendsitstakeoverdominanceofexpenditureatcostofeconomicdevelopmentimportanceofGHQforvisitingforeigndignitariesinternalsecurityissuesfacedbyInter-ServicesPublicRelations(ISPR)onmilitarycourts,establishmentofAyubKhanMusharrafYahyaKhanZia-ul-Haq

officerslinkedwithHizb-ut-Tahrir(HT)praiseforprimeministerstotakefirmcontroloftheNawazSharifZardariandGilaniZulfikarAliBhutto

ShujaNawazonsufferedinsecuritytacticalnatureofactionsof

PakhtunistanPakistan,futureof

armyBalochistaneducationfoundationsofPakistangovernmenthumanrightsIndiaKarachiminoritiesreligiousextremismsectarianismterrorism

PakistanVision(2025)Pakistaniidentity

anti-IndiaposturecentralizationofpoweruseofreligionuseofUrdu

Pakistan’slegacyanddestinyshapedbyBritishstrategiesgotPakistantooeasilyimpactofPartition

MohammadAliJinnahparityroleoftheMuslimLeagueuseofIslamvaguenessofthedemandforPakistan

PakistanMuslimLeague-Nawaz(PML-N)PakistanResolutionPakistan,strategiclocationofPakistanTehrik-i-Insaf(PTI)Partition

British,roleofimpactonPakIndia’sacceptanceof

PatelPatterson,Annepolitical

classintoleranceparties

politicianspopulationofPakistan

demographicchallengesdemographicdividendoutwardmigrationoflaboururbanization

Prakasa,SriprovincialautonomyprovincialeconomicdisparitiesPunjab

bannedoutfitsinmadrasasineducationin

PunjabMuslimLeague

QuitIndiaMovementQuran

Rabbani,ProfBurhanuddinRadcliffeLineRamay,Hanifreligiousfreedom,USreportonriotingin

IndiaPakistan

Saeed,HafizSalimullah,NawabofDaccaSeraikiShafi,Mohammadsharia/shariahlawsShariacourts,Jud/LeTSharif,Gen.RaheelSharif,NawazSharif,ShahbazShastri,PrimeMinisterShiaSipha-i-MohammadiPakistan(SMP)Shias

anti-Shia-SunniconflictSikandarSindhSingh,JaswantSingh,ManmohanSodai,AsgharSoomro,AllahBakshSunnis

TablighiJamaatTaraki,NurMohammedTaseer,Salman,killedbyhisownguardTehrik-e-Taliban(TTP)terroristgroupsinPak

androleofmadrasasfinancialcostofterrorismNationalActionPlantoeliminatePakistantofight

Thanvi,MaulanaZafarAhmedTiwana,KhizrHayatKhanTwo-Nationtheory

UnitedStates(US)-Pakrelationsal-QaedaandTalibanvieweddifferentlyObama’sstatementonproblemsinriftinviewsofnomineesforthepresidencyPakistan’sperceptionaidduplicityinfinancialassistancesecurityguaranteesfromtheUSagainstIndiaviewsofnomineesforthepresidencyUSperceptionfailuretomouldPakistan’spoliciesgoalsinandforPakistanimpactof9/11incidentnuclearprogrammeofPakOsamabinLadenSovietinterventioninAfghanistan

interestinPakpolicyofappeasementreasonsforthefailureof

sanctionsonPakistanUrduUsmani,AllamaShabbirAhmad

WaterApportionateAccord(WAA)water

consumptionofcontaminationIndiablamedforitswaterwoesinter-provincialdiscordoverirrigationdependentontheIndus

shortagessupplyofurbanizationaddstoproblemswatercrisis

watermanagementclimatechangedistributionlossesgovernmentapathyinefficientusagesalinitysiltingunsustainableuseofwaterwatertheft

Waheed-uz-Zaman,ProfWarofIndependenceWavell,ViceroyWillingdon,LordWorldWarII(WWII)

Yusuf,JamMuhammadYusuf,Moeed

Zarb-e-AzbZetland,LordZia-ul-Haq

AbouttheBook

PakistanexpertandcommentatorTilakDevashertrainsaclearandobjectivegazeonthedeepermalaisethataffectsthenation,beyondthecurrentcrisesandthesensationalistheadlines.Building on several years of study andwork on the region, he examines the loomingwater crisis, theperilous state of education, the economic meltdown and the danger of an unrealized ‘demographicdividend’thathavebeeneatingintotheinnardsofPakistansinceitscreation.HealsodwellsatlengthonthePakistanmovement,wheretheseedsofmanycurrentproblemsweresown–theopportunisticuseofreligionbeingthemostlethalofthese.Withdata-drivenprecision,Devasher takesapart the flawedprescriptionsandresponsesofsuccessivegovernments,especiallyduringmilitaryrule,tothemanycriticalchallengesthecountryhasencounteredovertheyears.These,asmuchastheparticulartrajectoryofitscreationandgrowth,hecontends,havebroughtPakistantoanabysswhereitrisksmulti-organfailure–unlessthingschangedramaticallyinthenearfuture.

AbouttheAuthor

TilakDevasherhastakentowritingafterheretiredfromthecabinetsecretariat,GovernmentofIndia,asSpecialSecretaryin2014.Duringhisprofessionalcareerwiththecabinetsecretariat,hespecializedinsecurity issues pertaining to India’s neighbourhood. Post retirement, he has continued to take a keeninterest in India’s neighbourhoodwith special focus on Pakistan,Afghanistan andBangladesh.He haswritten articles for The Economic Times, The Indian Express, Vivekananda International Foundation,DailyO andCatchNews.He did his schooling fromMayoCollege,Ajmer and studiedHistory at StStephen’sCollege,Delhi at theundergraduate level andat theUniversityofDelhi at thepost-graduatelevel.

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