Pak-Afghan Relations and the Taliban

8/11/2019 Pak-Afghan Relations and the Taliban

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Pak-Afghan relationsand the Taliban Exploring new connections


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CONTENTS: 1. Introduction

2. Brief over-view of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

3. The Cold War

4. The Taliban and their era

5. Pakistan and its history that relates to the Taliban

6. Deoband, Dars-e-Nizami and the Taliban

7. Pashtunwali and Taliban

8. Putting the Jigsaw puzzle together

9. Relations post 9/11

10. Conclusion


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Introduction: This research paper explores some aspects of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in detail. The mainfocus is on the era of the Taliban and their interesting relations with Pakistan, which arehistorical, political and social. The Taliban interest me because of the current divide in our

society between the religious and the secular minded people. The study of the Taliban providesan insight into how all this drift started. One comes to know that this disparity is not new, ratherit existed in the sub-continent in the 19th century too. The Taliban phenomenon could be traced

back to the historical roots of Pakistan. This connection I venture to explore in this paper. In the first chapter, a brief overview of Pakistan-Afghan relations is given to provide the readerwith a context. It covers the relation up to the advent of Afghan Jihad. The USSR war withAfghanistan is dealt with in the second chapter. The third chapter explains with the Taliban indetail. This is the most important chapter in the paper. Thereafter, in the fourth chapter, I discussthe history of Pakistan that relates to the Taliban, spanning multiple factors that relate to theTaliban but have not been emphasized before. In the fifth chapter, which buds from the fourthchapter, the history of the Deoband seminary, its curriculum and its impact on the Taliban isdiscussed. In the sixth chapter, the influence of Pashtunwali on the Taliban is discussed. In theseventh chapter, I try to assemble the seemingly disparate elements of the previous chapters bydrawing connections between the chapters. The eighth chapter covers the post 9/11 era. I am deeply grateful to Allah almighty who made me able to work on this project. Moreover, Iam indebted to my father who offered me valuable advice, to my younger brothers who bore withmy lengthy sittings on the computer, and to my mother who shifted her schedule and householdchores in order to facilitate my work. I am grateful to my teacher Mr. Aamir Sohail who inspiredme to think differently and, of course, to my subject teacher Mr.Farooq who gave me ample

amount of time to complete my project. This was my first ever research project and thereforemight appear amateur. But I hope to learn from the mistakes(which are undoubtedly many) thatyou will point out and will continue reading and thinking and improving. Happy reading!


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Chapter 1:Brief overview of Pak-Afghan RelationsBefore 1947: The main link between the two countries is the common pashtun areas. Historically, the lands of

both countries have often come under the same empires, from Mauryans( 322 BC 185 BC),

White Huns(420-567),Ghoris,Taimuris, Lodhis, Mughals 1, and finally the Durrani Empire. Allthese empires had,at least, the area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and a major portion of Afghanistanunder their rule. Until the British captured the now Khyber pakhtunkhwa(KPK) in Pakistan in1880 2, the Durrani Empire (1747-1826) had enjoyed dominion over Indian cities as far asLahore. 3

Afghanistan remained a matter of conflict between the British India and the Russians during the19th Century due to its Geo-political importance and acted as a buffer for the tension between thetwo super powers. 4Afghanistan fought two Anglo-Afghan wars,one from 1838-42 and the secondfrom 1878-80. The former was a humiliating loss to the Britons, with just one soldier living totell the tale. 5The second proved futile for the Afghans, who had to sign the treaty ofGandamark(1879), which provided Afghans the right to contr ol their internal policies butrestricted them from contacting the outside world except the British India. It was at this point thatthe Afghan-India(before partition) relations took an important turn in history. Since then, the twostates seem inseparable. The British demarcated the Afghan-India border by a treaty signed in1893 and the areas westward of present Pakistans KPK and Balochistan were to remain with theAfghan King Amir Abdur Rehman Khan. 6 The treaty was to expire in 1993 and the areas were to

be returned to Afghans. In 1947, after the partition of India and the demise of the British, theAfghan parliament refused to accept the treaty 7and demanded reversion of the Pashtun areas in

Pakistan,even though the people of those areas had chosen to live in Pakistan. This dispute of borders has been the stigma in the Pak-Afghan relations since, with the Afghans supportingPashtun nationalism in Pakistan. According to Lord Curzon, 8frontiers are indeed the razorsedge on which hang suspended the moder n issues of war and peace, of life or death to nations.Therefore, Afghanistan was the only country in the world which opposed Pakistans entry intothe UN in September 1947 9.

1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Afghanistan 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Afghanistan 3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durrani_Empire 4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Anglo-Afghan_War 5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Anglo-Afghan_War 6http://www.afghanistans.com/information/history/durandline.htm

7http://www.afghanistans.com/Information/History/Default.htm

8http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/4_1/02_ashraf.pdf

9http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/4_1/02_ashraf.pdf


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1947-1978: Afghanistan, a landlocked country, shares a 2290 10 km border on its east with Pakistan, a countrywhich is geo-strategically as important as Afghanistan with its sea ports and transit routeconnecting central and south east Asia. Its surrounded by the resource -rich Tajikistan,Turkemanistan and Uzbekistan. Its a fairly s ymmetrically land-locked country.Pakistan, on theother hand, is also a strategically important country bordering India, Iran and China and has thenearest water port for the Central Asian States i.e. Gwadar.

The Nascent Pakistan in 1947 faced a lot of problems, those included the ones from Afghanistan.Although Pakistans foreign policy was based on the principle of Pan -Islamism 11, Afghanistan

proved to be a difficult neighbour. The afghans aimed to capitalize on the problems of the newly- born Pakistan and demand the Pashtun areas of Pakistan before the Durand Line treaty expired.In 1950, King Zahir Shah made an anti Pakistan speech at a celebration in Kabul. 12 Cross-border

infiltration of Afghan forces into the Pakistani tribal areas and their repulsion by the Pakistanisecurity forces, followed by the assassination of Pakistani Prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan in1951 by an afghan national further worsened the conditions. At the time, Afghanistan joinedranks with India to counter possible arms support for Pakistan from the US. US also deniedAfghan requests for arms in order to avoid reaction from USSR. 13When Pakistan implementedone unit system in 1955, Afghans protested and sacked the Pakistan ambassador and consulatesin Kandahar and Jalalabad were attacked, with similar reciprocation form the Pakistanis inPeshawar. In reaction to Pakistans membership of SAETO and CENTO, Russia openly joinedranks with India and Afghanistan. This deepened the gulf between the two countries. Relations

became better when the rulers of both sides paid visits to each other and US also supported the

two countries, while Russia also aided Afghanistan. The soviets infiltrated Afghanistan by building strategically important roads and infrastructure. Increased US infiltration in Pakistanfurther enhanced the tensions and pak-afghan relations came to another halt until Iran mediatedthe Tehran accords in 1963 14.Afghanistan supported Pakistan in 1965 war and the rulers of bothsides paid visits and trade was enhanced. The relations were becoming better until 1973.

In 1973, Sardar Daud deposed King Zahir shah while he was on a visit to Europe. Daud was a pro-soviet and a pro-Pakhtoonistan and proclaimed himself president. The establishment was proliferated by pro-soviet elements form the civil and army which alarmed Pakistan. Retaliating

10Pakistan Studies book,, Federal Board Printing press, 2002, pg 88

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to the backing of separatist forces in Pakistan by Daud, the Pakistani Intelligence services startedsupporting anti-Daud elements in the US. Consequently, Pakistan welcomed Afghan Islamistswith anti communist and anti Daud feelings. These dissidents were provided training and othersupports for their incursions and uprisings inside Afghanistan. Figures like Gulbaddin HekmatYar, Ahmad Shah Masood, and Burhan-ud-din Rabbani escaped to Pakistan and continuedcontrolling their armed resistance against Communists backed Daud regime from Peshawar,gaining momentum with in few years and attained a status of armed opposition to be reckonedwith. Reportedly, around 5,000 Afghan dissidents were trained by Pakistan in its secret militarycamps. 15 Daud succumbed to the resistance and started developing good relations with Pakistan.But these were short-lived, as Bhutto was overthrown by General Zia and Daud was eliminated

by the communist forces in 1978. What followed was a communist government, headed by NoorMuhammad Taraki of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which was protestedagainst widely in the country due to its communist reforms.

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Chapter 2:The Cold and The Civil War(1979-1992) The positioning of communist regime in Kabul presented a serious threat to Pakistans securityand integrity as it was perceived as a Soviet threat in all its totality. Pakistan had no other option

but either to surrender or to go for all out support to the forces resisting against the communist

regime of President Noor Mohammed Taraki. Besides, supporting and organizing resistanceforces against the Communist regime of Kabul, Pakistan had to host over 150,000 Afghanrefugees into Pakistan immediately after the Saur Revolution of April 1978.In December 1978PDPA signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. On September 16th 1979, HafizullahAmin(the prime minister) staged another coup against own government, killing Taraki, and tookover as President of Afghanistan. Moscow having found Amin less subservient invaded Kabulduring the last days of 1979,executed Amin and installed Karmal (the former deputy primeminister. as a new president. 16 The US initially did not support the Zia dictatorship, but when the soviets invaded Afghanistan,all economic and military aid sanctions were lifted in a bid to support the Afghan freedomfighters. From this point on, things have to be analysed in certain perspectives of the current researchtopic:

1. Pak-Afghan relations have never been exclusive of foreign influence. In the case of coldwar, Pakistans relation to Afghanistan was influenced by American interests.

2. The Sunni- Deobandi ideology connecting the two countries pashtun masses is also afactor to be reckoned with.

3. The common pashtun culture,or Pashtunwali, is also a big factor determining the relations between the two countries.

Post-1979, Afghanistan had become a battlefield for a war between the Capitalists and theCommunists. Pakistan. support to the resistance forces. According to Mr. Abdul Sattar, ex-Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister of Pakistan, The Soviet military intervention provoked adeep sense of alarm in Pakistan. Suddenly the buffer disappeared and if the Soviet rulersconsolidated their control in Afghanistan they could use it as springboard to reach the warmwaters of the Arabian Sea. Pakistan could not afford to acquiesce in the Soviet intervention. Butneither could it afford a confrontation with a super power. Islamabad therefore decided on themiddle course, avoiding confrontation but raising a low pitched voice of concern and protest. 17

The Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) of US supported the Afghan Mujahideen, or freedom

fighters, by funneling their aid through the Inter Services Intelligence(ISI) of Pakistan. to theMujahideen, was funneled through Pakistans ISI. The covert aid for raising, training, equippingand managing Mujahideen in to the battle field went as high as $400 million by 1984 from $60

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million annually in 1981.52 The leading recipient of this aid was Hezb-i-Islami of GulbuddinHekmatyar that proved to be the trust worthy and deserving resistance force. It was Pakistansskill-full use of intel and resources against Soviet forces that made Afghanistan a bleedingwound. 18 Moscow succumbed in the end, with stinger missiles 19 and fresh recruits from the USand Pakistan augmenting the Mujahideen. What followed were the Geneva accords, in which theUSSR accepted defeat and took to withdraw its forces till January 1989. But no framework waslaid for an interim government. Also, the soviets left their tanks and ammunition, therebycreating a black hole of civil war that ensued till 1996. On the other hand, the US, with its

primary objective fulfilled, also abandoned the Mujahideen and Afghanistan. The fighters whomthey had called soldiers of God 20 were now left helpless. Besides the clash of the titans, Pakistan was undergoing a fundamental ideological and socialchange. General Zia was a deeply religious and pan-Islamist Sunni. Besides his social andeconomic Islamization of the country, he patronized the afghan jihad. He also funded themadrassahs in Pakistan, which sent fresh recruits to Afghanistan war. Apart from the madrassahs,

the afghan mujahideen and their struggle was adulated in public, media and the literature of thosetimes. 21The mujahideen were adulated by the ulema who portrayed them as soldiers of God andtheir accounts of Miraculous help were,and still are, narrated. 22 Zia gave the shape to the current Pakistan policy of intervention in Afghanistan. During the

period from 1983 to 1996, the ISI trained almost 83,000 afghan mujahideen and providedfunding to the madrassahs set up in the afghan refugee areas. During his 10 year reign, thenumber of madrassahs grew from 1745 23 to above 20000. Maulana Yousaf Ludhianvi writesin his obituary to General Zia-ul-Haq that Zia was a leader of a stature incomparable withcontemporary global politicians. He praised him for passing of Shariah ImplementationOrdinance, for fighting USSR in Afghanistan, for his piety, and for his love of Islam. Zia was

very frank with (Deobandi) ulema. 24 Here we see the deep influence of Deobandi ulema on the policy making of General Zia.Consequently, the m otto of Faith, Piety and Jihad in the way of Allah was inculcated into thePakistan Army and the GHQ press published a large number of Islamic books which are taught tothe army officers in the Education Core. 25For example,a book explaining the works of Allama

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19http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=4042676&page=1

20http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lh2sVcuPk1Q

21 pg.193paharon ka beta written by malik ahmed sarwar,published1990,shirkat printing press and history of islam

22qari jameel sahabs waqia 23 http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=314

24shakhsiat-o-taasurat, maulan yousaf ludhianvi,june 1995, maktaba ludhianvi,page325

25Iqbals ideology,published GHQ press, 1995


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Iqbal in a specific religious context that was moulded to inspire the army officers. The armyrecruits sermon-deliverers which normally belong to the Deobandi school of thought. 26Suchmeasures made it easy for the army and ISI to support the Afghan Mujahideen and consequently,the Taliban. Besides the vested strategic interest in Afghanistan, the army personnel wereworking for a higher,nobler, and religious cause. Therefore, the army had no problem invitingArabs and other muslim fighters and training them to fight the soviets in Afghanistan. A lot of

pakistani civilians also took part in this training and took part in the Afghan Jihad. 27 The Arabfighters were mainly supported and funded by the Saudi government, which also looked toexpand its interpretation of Wahabbism. The deobandi scholars and the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islammaintain a separate identity from Wahabbism and have several religious disputes with thewahabbis. The Deobandi Ulemas agendas were more of a regional context than the pan -islamicagendas of the Arab fighters. But these subtle differences were not recognized by the PMAtrained army people who were not well versed in the Islamic sciences, Quran or Hadith, who sawIslam through the rigid-only interpretation of Iqbal, and, coincidentally, who were the masters of

a country which is an amalgam of sects, which had not recovered from the historicalrepercussions of the British Colonial rule, which was economically impoverished and which wasunder a security threat. Its obvious that in such conditions, a mere dispute of Deobandis and theWahabbis seemed trivial. So both schools of thought were funded. Zia was championed by theulema of both sides, and these ulema also revered Zia and publicly supported him. Trickling top-down, the religiosit y pervaded throughout the armys hierarchy. And thisreligiosity is being targeted today by the US as being responsible for the double -game, for thesupport of Taliban and of Al- Qaeda . US capitalized on this very passion and now its blamingthe very sentiment. The ISI has always been surrounded by mystique. No one knows how muchof the ISI belongs to which ideological faction, liberal, conservative or extremist. In fact the

arrest of Brigadier Ali Khan in June 2011 over allegation of his association with Hizb-ut-Tahrir(HT) has further clouded the issue. 28 One thing is for sure, the Porous pak-afghan border has been utilized by the Pak-Army and ISI tosend its trainees,which include Afghan refugees,Pakistanis, and other muslims who came to helptheir Afghan brothers. Russia was persistently critical of this Pakistani influence on the Afghansoil. The ISI defeated the USSR, and thats why it has been termed as one of the most dangerousintelligence agency of the world. 29 It is to be noted,however, that our central point of discussion i.e. the relation between theDeobandi School and the Pak-Afghan relations is not very visible at this point of time. We note

26 personal experience

27http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1023.htm

28http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/pakistani-army-brigadier-arrested-over-suspected-links-with-islamist-radicals-2300780.html

29http://www.dirjournal.com/info/the-worlds-best-intelligence-agencies/


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that Zia was influenced by certain Deobandi Ulema but that influence was more of an internalone, altho ugh it did morph into the foreign policy later after the Generals death as the Generalsgenerous aid of the madrassahs served the Taliban government.

The Civil War(1989-1996) The Peshawar accords did not provide any framework for an interim government that would

provide for a smooth transition from a devastated, institution-less country to a peaceful,progressive one.The Soviet invaders departed on schedule and their withdrawal wasfollowed by eight years of civil war that devastated the remains of Kabul and surrounding. Thewithdrawing Soviets left behind necessary war ammunition and equipment that enhanced staying

power of Dr. Najeeb Ullah Government in Kabul. On the other side Americans stopped flow ofarms, ammunition and equipment to the Mujaheddin thereby virtually depriving them of anycapacity to fight. The disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 triggered the collapse of NajeebUllah in April 1992 and setting up of Sibghatullah Mojadedis broad -based Interim Government.

The power sharing arrangements under Peshawar accord brokered by Pakistan failed whenProfessor Burhanuddin Rabbani, President and Ahmad Shah Masood, the defense minister,conspired to keep Gul Badin HikmatYar designated Prime Minister out of power. Pakistan didnot appreciate Masood s neutral attitude towards Pakistan, and therefore backed Hikmatyar togain the objective of strategic depth. 30 This new power game gave birth to another civil war onethnic lines. Instead of honoring the terms of Peshawar Accord Rabbani perpetuated his powerillegally by getting himself reelected as President in June 1994. Rabbanis extension of his

presidential power of the transition government that was expiring on 15th December 1994 was betrayal to Peshawar Accord. The in-fighting amongst the different Mujaheddin between 1992and 1994 brought about colossal loss of men and material that included over 45000 dead andnearly same numbers were injured.. The social anarchy, chaotic conditions and rampant mismanagement all around Afghanistan wasdepicting the country as a failed state like Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi. Pakistan accusedRabbani on his betrayal of Peshawar Accord and nurturing links with India to damage Pakistansinterests. The unprecedented love for Pakistan demonstrated during and after the Sovietoccupation vanished and Pakistani citizens in Kabul were being termed as enemy agents. Thesituation went so worst that Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was closed down in July 1994 and Pak-Afghan border was soon closed. Suddenly a new force called Taliban emerged over the ashes left

behind by the war lords in southern Afghanistan. Rabani betrayal created friction betweenIslamabad and Rabani regime and emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan provided Islamabad analternative choice to replace Rabani. 31

30http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1023.htm

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Chapter 3:The Taliban The Origins: Afghanistan was in a state of virtual disintergration just before the Taliban emerged at the end of1994. The country was divided into warlord factions and all the warlords had fought, switchedsides and fought against themselves. Rabbanis government controlled Kabul and the North Eastof the country, while Ismael khan controlled the west. The East was controlled by a Mujahideencouncil based in Jalalabad and a small southern region by Hikmetyar. 32

The Mujahideen who had had fought for the Najibullah regime and now had gone back to Quettato study in the Madrassahs or had gone back to their home. Whenever these people met, theywould discuss the problems of their people and yearn for a solution. After much discussion, theseconcerned groups chalked out an agenda which still remains the Talibans declared aims -restore

peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic characterof Afghanistan. The Taliban signalled that they were a movement for cleansing society ratherthan a party trying to grab power.All of these people were the products of the Afghan Jihad butdeeply dissatisfied with the factionalism and corruption of the Mujahideen leadership. Most ofthe Taliban had been born in Pakistani refugee camps and educated in Pakistani Deobandimadrassahs and had learnt their fighting skills from the mujahideen parties based in Pakistan.The younger Taliban were not well aware of the history and socio-political condition of theircountry. We shall later examine the effects of the Dars-e-Nizami, the curriculum of themadrassahs, on the Taliban government. The Taliban chose Mullah Omar as their leader, not

because of his political of military ability, but for his piety and firm belief in Islam. 33 Born around 1959 in a village near Kandahar to a family of poor parents, Omar tookresponsibility of his family at an early age due to his fathers death. He became the villagemullah opened a small madrassah . During the soviet invasion, he joined Khalis Hizb -e-Islamiand fought under its flag against the Najibullah regime between 1989 and 1992. There is an entire plethora of myths and stories to explain how Omar mobilized a group ofTaliban against the Kandahar warlords. The most credible story, however, is that in the spring of1994 Singesar neighbours came to tell Omar that a commander had abducted two teenage girlsand they had been raped at a military camp. Omar organized 30 talibs and freed the two girls.Similarly he rescued a boy from a warlord. And then he became a Robin Hood like figure who

32Ahmed Rashid.pg22

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asked for no credit but just asked for assistance to set up an Islamic system. 34 The Taliban vowed for support from Kabul and Rabbani promised to help the Taliban if theyopposed Hikmetyar. but the talibans closest links with Pakistan were by virtue of Maulana Fazl -ur-Rehmans JUI, the Deobandi Political party which was popular among the Pashtuns of KPKand Balochistan. More importantly, JUI was a political ally of Benazirs government, therebyhaving access to the army and the ISI, to whom he described this newly emerging force.Pakistan was tired of the failure of Hikmetyar and was looking for potential pashtun proxies.Bhutto wanted to open the trade route to central Asia and opted for an alternative route throughthe south of Afghanistan which had no war going on and which required only certain war lords to

be bribed before they agreed to open the chains. But the warlords dissented, and in October 1994they hijacked a convoy of the National logistics cell outside Kandahar. Pakistan could not use a araid by its army or a parachute drop, and therefore asked the Taliban to free the convoy, whichthey did very easily. The same evening they entered Kandahar and the commander there did notresist. The Taliban expelled him to his village.They captured dozens of tanks and six Mig-21

fighters and six transport helicopters. Although Pakistan celebrated the fall of Kandahar by their boys 35, the Taliban demonstratedtheir independence from Pakistan. They demanded that Pakistan should not cut deal with thewarlords. However, the Transport mafia was ecstatic, their business had been provided securityfor, and the first Pakistani convoy of cotton from Turkemanistan arrived in Quetta, paying5000USD to the Taliban in toll. Meanwhile, thousands of Afghan refugees studying inMadrassahs in Balochistan and KPK rushed to Afghanistan to join the Taliban, followed byPakistani volunteers from JUI Deobandi madrassas, who were inspired by the new Islamicmovement in Afghanistan. By December 1992, some 12000 Afghan and Pakistani students had

joined the Taliban in Kandahar. Meanwhile, Bhutto denied any links with the Taliban. 36

In the next three months the Taliban were to take control of 12 of Afghansitans 31 provinces,opening the roads to traffic and disarming the population. As Mullah Omar marchednorth, warlords either fled of surrendered to them.

The Advance to Kabul: In February 1995, the Taliban captured Hikmetyaars headquarters at Charasyab and faced Kabulahead. The UN mediated a dialogue between the Rabbani government and the Taliban but tehTalibans insistence that their forces dominate any new government in Kabul forced Rabbani andUN to reject their demands. The Taliban launched an offensive against Kabul and suffered a major blow in their first major

battle. It damaged their prestige, but not their determination. They then turned their attention tothe western city of Herat, but were bombed by Massouds air crafts there too.The Taliban spent the summer gaining fresh recruits from Pakistan and rebuilding their forces.

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The ISI also helped to bring about an agreement between the Taliban and General Dostum tocreate the Talibans first air power by repairing the Migs in Kandahar and starting Dostums own

bombing campaign in Herat. On September 1995,the Taliban finally captured Herat, with IsmaelKhan fleeing with his men to Iran. The Rabbani government openly accused Pakistan ofsupporting the Taliban in order to oust him. 37 Bolstered by their victories, the Taliban restarted their campaign against Kabul. Meanwhile,India started backing the Rabbani government simply because of the Pakistani support oftheTaliban.Simultaneously, Russia backed the Rabbani government because of it being moremoderate and fkexible towards the Central Asian Republics.Iran, wreaking vengeance for thealleged slaughter of Shia Hazaras, set up training camps and an air bridge from Mashad in Iran toBagram in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia stepped up arm supplies to theTaliban. Thus we witness a complex proxy war going on in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, a group of 1200 Pashtun religious leaders from throughout Afghanistan had

proclaimed Mullah Omar as Ameer-ul- momineen (Commander of the Faithful) . Mullah Omar

declared Jihad against the Rabbani government and was revered spiritually in the eyes ofPashtuns and Pakistanis alike. This gave him unprecedented political and military power. Camped outside the capital, the Taliban kept rocketing Kabul throughout 1996,whilstsimultaneously capturing more of Afghanistan,including Jalalabad. Heavy fighting followed inKabul, resulting in losses on both sides. On 26 September,1996, the Taliban entered Kabul, withMassoud fleeing north with this army. The Taliban chased him down to Panjshir valley but couldnot finish him. On 10th October 1996,Rabbani, Massoud, Dostum and the Hazara leaderKhalilifound theSupreme Council for the Defence of the Mother land to counter the Taliban. Thisalliance evaded and perturbed the Taliban till their demise in late 2001. With 75% of Afghanistan under Taliban rule, Iran, Russia and Central Asians openly announced

support for the Anti-Taliban alliance while Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sent diplomatic missionsto Kabul. In May 1997, the Taliban attacked Mazar, the last stronghold of the Northern Alliance, but theylost the battle,besides suffering heavy casualties due to poor tactics and an unfamiliarterrain 38.This was their worst ever defeat. The popular, mainstream media states that in early August 1998, after attacking the city of Mazarfor the second time, Taliban forces killed several thousand civilians and 10 Iranian diplomats andintelligence officers in the Iranian consulate. Alleged radio intercepts indicate Mullah Omar

personally approved the killings. According to National Geographic 39, the Taliban also cut off allroad connections to the Hazara areas in the winter of 1998, resulting in mass food shortages and

37ibt,pg40.

38http://middleeast.about.com/od/thisdayinmideasthistory/ig/May-22-28-in-Mideast-History/Hazara-Massacre-of-Taliban.htm

39http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpQI6HKV-ZY


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drought. The Taliban accused the international community of isolating the Afghans communitywhile the UN blamed the Taliban of arrogance and inflexibility. This aversion to Shias could berelated to the Deobandi background of Taliban. In the following crisis between Iran and theTaliban, the Iranian government amassed up to 200,000 regular troops on the Afghan-Iranian

border. 40War was eventually averted.

The Taliban and Islam: Few muslim peoples in the world follow Islam with as much regularity as the afghans. Also, thePashtun tribal culture has features that are very similar to Islamic customs. Eighty percent of the Afghans belong to the Sunni sect whereas the minorities are scatteredthroughout the country which include Shias and the Ismaelis. The Hindus, Sikhs and theBukharan Jews have left the country due to the socio-political turmoil. The mosque is the center of the social life in the cast rural population, headed by the local cleric,or mullah. He advises the local neighbourhood regarding personal and financial matters. Theclerics were educated at madrassahs, which have an evolutionary history of their own.

Interestingly, the evolution of Islamic thought in Afghanistan has certain similarities with thecorresponding evolution of Islamic thought in India. Here we observe the Islamic interpretationof the Taliban, and relate that with the conditions of their age. The concept of Jihad in Islam is an agent of change,and of reform, at a personal and a societallevel. The Taliban also appeared as a reform movement. But this movement was different thanthe reform m ovements that appeared in Afghanistan during1979 to 1994. The Talibansideological base was derived from Deoband, and it was morphed by the particular conditions oftheir age. The Taliban implemented the Shariah law as they had studied it in the books. The most importantof these were their laws concerning women. The Taliban had a Department for the Promotion ofVirtue and Prevention of Vice. They were not allowed to step outside their residence, not allowedto wear high heels, or show their faces in public, or wear ornamental clothes. Non-compliance ofthese laws resulted in punishment of the women and of their family elders. Similarly in hospitals,the male patients were not allowed treatment by female doctors and vice versa. Thus there wasenforced a strict segregation of the sexes every where. In one instance, the heads of three UNagencies in Kandahar were asked to leave the country when they protested that a female lawyerfor the UN Higher Commission for Refugees was forced to talk to Taliban Officers from behinda curtain so her face would not be visible. 41The involvement of women in the staff was a basiccause of Taliban aversion to UN. The Taxi drivers were not allowed to pick up women who wore

the fashionable Iranian Burqa.Music was banned and if a music cassette was found in a shop,the shopkeeper was imprisoned and the shop locked till the guarantee of five people. Ifanybodys beard was found shaved or cut, they would be imprisoned until their beard got

40

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bushy. Keeping pigeons, flying kites, gam bling, practicing sorcery were banned with severe penalties. British and American hairstyles were banned and photography of any kind was prohibited to prevent the spread of idolatry.Music and dancing were prohibited, in parties andin general. During prayer timings, the shops were ordered to be closed and violators would beimmediately imprisoned . The staff in all government and non-government organisations was to

pray in the mosques in the allotted time.Similarly, female education of all sorts was banned.Within three months of the capture of Kabul, the Taliban closed 63 girl schools and shut downKabul university.90%of the Afghan girls and 66% of the afghan boys were not enrolled in anysort of school by Deccember 1998. The Taliban leaders were all from the poorest, most conservative and least literate southern

pahstun provinces of Afghanistan. Mullah Omars village women had always gone around fullyveiled. Similarly the Taliban recruits-the orphans,the rootless from the war and the refugeecamps- had been bought up in a totally male society. In the madrassah environment,control overwomen and their virtual exclusion was a symbol of manhood and a reaffirmation of committment

to jihad. This was mainly due to the Pashtun culture and the economical and social conditions ofPakistan. The Taliban were a generation of muslim males who had spent much of their adult livesin complete segregation from their own communities and were a product of war culture. The line between the Shariah law and Pashtunwali has always been blurred for the pashtuns. Thisincludes disputes over ownership of land and women and murder. The Taliban decrees-whichwere influenced by pashtunwali- were not completely acceptable to other ethnic groups ofAfghanistan. As far as the government and political structure of the Taliban is concerned, the Taliban faced no

political challenges from the Pashtuns and therefore were politically quite stable with regards to alarge majority of afghans. They now had the opportunity to build a more tribal-democratic,grass-

roots organization, as they also had the legitimizing factor of Islam. But the Taliban refused toinclude representatives of non- pashtun groups. The Talibans apex decision -making body was theSupreme Shura which continued to be based in Kandahar.It had an amorphous form with asmany as 50 people,including friends and colleagues of Mullah Omar, tribal and militarycommanders, and Islamic scholars. In Kabul and Mazar and Herat were installedgovernors,mayors,police chiefs and senior administrators. The ministries were open for only 4hours a day and the locals were given scant representation in the administration which led toadministrative friction.The Taliban did not give any indication as to how and when would theyset up a more representative permanent government, whether there would be a constitution andhow political power would be divided. The Taliban generally reject the notion of political partiesand general elections. 42Islamic judges are installed across the country which provide swiftresolution of cases and gradually Islamise the laws.The afghan people were satisfied with the

justice afforded by the Taliban government. Rapes, robberies,poppy cultivation(which was a black hole for the regions economy) and corruption came to an inst ant halt because of the strict

42ahmed rashid,pg102.


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implementation of Shariah law. 43 Under the auspices of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Taliban welcomed muslim fighters fromabroad. The trend was in effect since the Afghan jihad These included Wahabbi Arabs whoseagendas were of a global,pan- Islamic nature as compared to Talibans local mission of cleansingAfghanistan. Pakistan was closely involved in introducing Bin Laden to the Taliban leaders inKandahar, because it wanted to retain the Khost training camps for Kashmiri militants, whichwere now in Talibans hands. Persuasion by Pakitsan, the Talibans better educated people, whoalso had a tinge of Pan-Islamism, and the lure financial benefits from Bin Laden,encouraged theTaliban leaders to meet with Bin Laden and hand him back the Khost camps. Osama morphedfrom a pet of the Taliban to an endeared person in the Taliban leadership. Wahabbi Arabs helpedthe Taliban offensives in the North. As his influence grew, the Taliban became more antagonisticto the US as compared to their initial days. After the bombing on the US embassies in Africa, theUS pressure on the Taliban to expel the Taliban intensified. The Taliban said that he was a guestand it was against the Afghan tradition to expel guests. The Taliban also tried to carve a deal with

the US by handing over Osama in exchange for diplomatic recognition. Lengthy dialogue between the US state department and Mullah Omar were held but to no avail. The Taliban had nochoice but to disappear Osama completely, but the issue was not resolved. This very unresolvedissue proved to be one of the most important turning points in the history of mankind. 44

43http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gWl9u3ZojrsONNK4l9tiX5TViJyA

44ahmed rashid,pg140


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Chapter 4: Pakistan and its History that relates to Taliban

The sub-continent is a multi-racial,lingual, and ethnic area with a history of diversity that dates back to thousands of year before Christ. The advent of Islam added another dimension to thisdiversity and further strengthened the link between the Indus valley and the MesopotamianValley i.e the Hindus and the Arabs. However, I examine the link between the ideology of theTaliban and the History of Pakistan.

Pakistan was a reaction to British colonialism and to Hindu Oppression, with the former dealing

a heavier blow to the muslims of the sub-continent. After the incident of 1857, muslims wereshattered socially and ideologically, with their legacy threatened by the onslaught of Westernthought and riches. To this oppression came different reactions from the Muslims which weremainly either pro-British or anti-British. The main aim of these reactions were, in essence, thesame; they weer aimed at betterment of the muslims. Pakistan was a product of these divergent,although inherently similar reactions. The two schools of thought that I am referring to and whichrelate to the Taliban are

1. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan 2. Deobandi School of thought

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan:(1817-1898):

It would be better to say that the main inspiration for Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was the Persian andUrdu Poet Mirza Ahmed Ghalib(1797-1869) who criticised Syed upon his scholarly work on Ain-e- Akbari, an abstruse,archaic document regarding Mughal emperor Akbar. Ghalib advisedSir Syed, in a strict poem, to focus on the present and leave the fantasies of the past. Ghalibextolled the British for th eir advance in Science and Technology. Ghalibs advice, therefore,catalysed the change in Sir Syed from antiquity to reform. 45 Thus we see that the thoughts of Sir Syed were, in the very beginning of their evolution, affected

by a liberal mystic poet like Ghalib. According to Zafar Sippal, Sir Syed is the counted as thefounders of modern Mutazilah. 46 He was the first one to realize the incoming onslaught ofwestern culture and responded in time. He was from the class of muslims who embraced westerneducation, something which the orthodox Ulema are still reluctant to do. At Aligarh, hecombined the west with teh east. But such adultery was prohibited by the Ulema of those days,

partly because of the atrocities laid upon the muslims by the British. Syed had no reservations

45Aamir Sohail sahab

46Montaj,


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with eating with the British, living like the British, or taking sides with the British, as long as onedoes not contravene the basics of Islam. It was this benign attitude towards the British thatopened the flux of western thought in the muslims of sub-continent. In the Muhammadaneducational conferences, many modern ideas were introduced . In the second conference,Aligarhs young Arabic teacher Muhammad Shibli presented a paper on Classical Education ofMuslims in which he referred to books that were unheard of in the realm of traditionalmadarassahs, but which nevertheless were important muslim contribution to knowledge. 47 Laterhe wrote a book on Abbasid caliph Mamoon-ur-Rashid who was highly receptive to westernknowledge. Thus came a generation of people who were well-versed in Arabic and Persian, whowere highly nostalgic muslims, but who also sent their sons to Cambridge, who pursued them tostudy English, and to work in the British government. They smoke cigars and were at ease withwomen, unlike the stereotypical shy muslim. These were the sort of people who were flexible.And they included Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Jinnah, Iqbal, Chaudhry Rehmat Ali and the wholegeneration of leaders of Pakistan.

Iqbals teacher Mir Hasan, who w as the major influence on Iqbal, was an ardent follower of SirSyed and Ghalib. He was a syed teaching in a missionary school. 48 This is the ambivalence thatPakistan ensued. Iqbal, the son of an orthodox sufi who was anti-pathetic to English, had to letIqbal learn English and Philosophy while teaching him the traditional mysticism. Allama Iqbal was the muslim ummahs most articulated and composed response to modernity. A

person who was a passionate follower of Rumi and who understand the subtleties of the Quran,the Hadith and the issues of western thought and modernity. He is the conceptual father ofPakistan and got the support of the Deobandi Ulema due to his passionate poetry. But hislectures, which are largely clouded from the Public and the Ulema, give us another view ofIqbals mind. He advocated creativity and flexibility and review of the religious thought of Islam.

He advocated a new interpretation of the Quran and of the rights of women. Most of all, headvocated Ijtihad, which the traditional ulema refrained from. Maulana Abu-al hasan Ali Nadvistates that the reconstruction lectures are in direct conflict with the thought of the Ulema. 49Iqbalsupported an oriental form of courtship, in which the girl and the boy meet under the presence of

parents and got to know each other. 50 However, Sir syed , no matter how modern, was against theliberation of women and as such wanted them to remain conservative. Iqbal was differnet in this

47Iqbal, jild 1, pg 56

48Iqbal,jild 1, pg 22

49Foreword to Iqbals thoughts

50iqbal,jild 1 pg 240


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respect. Iqbal gave a scientist trying to unveal the laws of nature the same stature as a scholardemystifying the critiques of theology. In this respect, he differed from the main stream ulema.This difference was not recognized by the Ulema when they supported Iqbal vehemently andquoted him incessantly in their sermons. In his life, Iqbal was the most flexible of the muslims. InGermany, he wrote poems on his beautiful German tutor and later reverted when Atia Faizi cameto Germany. 51This aspect of Iqbal is totally neglected in his collective image embedded in thePakistani society. Like wise, Jinnah was no bearded scholar who prayed regularly. He smoke cigar and kept

poodles. The Muslim league was presided over by Sir Agha Khan, who was the head of Ismaelis, a sect which is declared non-muslim by the mainstream ulema. The Deobandi ulemavehemently supported Jinnah and the muslim league. The anti-Pakistan Deobandi faction wasalso not a bunch of ascetic people. Rather, Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madni, one of the keyfigures of Deoband was a member of the Indian national congress. Jinnah was a person who united Maulana Ashraf Ali thanvi and the Agha Khan under one cause.

Jinnah followed the Islamic ideology of Iqbal and the Ulema followed Jinnah whilst Iqbals andUlemas concept of state varied. What followed was Pakistan, an amalg am of sects livingtogether under the banner of Islam while never actually being able to implement Islam. Thetheological friction inherent in the Ulema of all sects in Pakistan makes it difficult to reach astate-approved Islam in Pakistan. The ruling elite is mostly secular and liberal with little or noknowledge of the masses demands and the subtleties of religion. Daunted by the call by themasses for an Islamized state, the rulers gradually tried to Islamize the country, with effortsranging from the Objectives Resolution in 1949 to the the controversial Hudood ordinance in2006. Thus we see that the Deobandi Ulemas dream of attaining a Pakistan where the Shariah was

strictly implemented did not bear fruit. Though they still struggle to achieve their vision insidePakistan, their dream was transferred to Afghanistan, where the Taliban helped it materialize.

51http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQawRbjGXXo&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQawRbjGXXo&feature=relatedhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQawRbjGXXo&feature=relatedhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQawRbjGXXo&feature=relatedhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQawRbjGXXo&feature=related


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Chapter 5: Deoband, Dars-e-Nizami, and the Taliban: Deoband is an Islamic reform school opened in 1866(coincidentally, with Aligarh) aimed atalleviating the pains of Indian muslims and to preserve their religious identity. After 1857,thousands of religious scholars were killed and the endowments of seminaries were abolished. Inretaliation, some devoted men found a this madrassa in Deoband. The history of theindependence movement of India is so mixed up with the history of the Ulema and religious

personalities that it is now difficult to separate one from the other. Political decline had reducedMuslims to a state of helplessness and misery, distraction and anxiety; by the establishment ofDeoband, they received equanimity, composure and stability. 52 The main figures of Deobandappearing in the Indian politics include Maulana Mehmood-ul-Hasan, Maulana UbaidullahSindhi,Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Maulan Hussain Ahmed Madni. These leaders fought theBritish politically, with pragmatism and intelligence and resoluteness. The former two were the

patrons of the Silk letter conspiracy while the latter two were pro-Muslim league and Pro-Congress respectively. Deoband attracted students from all parts of the world. 53In the early twentieth century, theAfghan government sought co-operation with Deoband to expand its own attempt to buildmodern, state-controlled madrassas. Ulema from the Deoband madrassa visited Kabul in 1933 forKing Zahir Shahs coronation. The Afghan state also developed some deobandi madrassas whichdid not become popular. 54 Deobandi madrassas developed much faster in Pakistan, with leaders like Maulana ShabbirUsmani playing key role in the Independence movement. A religious political party, JUI, was setup by the Deobandis. JUI was hugely popular within the Pashtuns and has always ruled KPKuntil the 2008 take over by the ANP. The JUI, during the Afghan war with USSR, set uphundreds of madrassas among the Afghan refugee communities in KPK and Balochistan. In1979, there were less than 200 madrassas 55. By 1989, the exact number of seminaries was

52http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/english/aboutdarululoom/freedom_fight.htm

53http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/english/index.htm

54ahmed rashid pg 89

55http://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=madrassas%2Bin%2Bpakistan&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CC0QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ipcs.org%2Fpdf_file%2Fissue%2F2032153432IB11-SubaChandran-


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approximately above 20,000. 56 The main reason for a large number of enrollment is the prevalent poverty among the masses.But in pashtuns, the main reason is genuine love for Islam. Thus the Pashtuns and the Afghanrefugees constitute the major bulk of Madrassa student population. The Taliban were also mainlyafghan refugees who studied in the Deobandi Madrassas set up in Balochistan and KPK. Whatthey were taught and how they were taught was later to influence the Taliban government. The curriculum followed in Deoban di schools is called Dars -e- Nizami, first introduced byMullah Nizamuddin Sihalvi (d.1747) who was a scholar of some repute in Islamic jurisprudenceand philosophy in Lucknow seminary in 1867. It consists of about twenty subjects broadlydivided into two categories: al-ulum an-naqliya (the transmitted sciences), and al-ulum al-aqliya(the rational sciences). The subject areas include grammar, rhetoric, prosody, logic, philosophy,Arabic literature, dialectical theology, life of the Prophet, medicine, mathematics, polemics,Islamic law, jurisprudence, Hadith, and Tafsir (exegesis of the Quran). It is important to note thatout of the twenty subjects, only eight can be considered as solely religious. The remaining

subjects are otherwise secular and were included in Nizami curriculum both to equip the studentsfor civil service jobs and as an aid to understanding religious texts. 57These subjects can becompared to classical liberal arts curriculum, where one was taught from all disciplines. Although the curriculum can be compared to the liberal arts, most of the books taught in thiscurriculum are very old. Books used in philosophy and logic, for example, were written in thethirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Medicine is taught through an eleventh-century text that isstill considered an authentic study of human anatomy and pathology. In what we have describedas purely religious subjects, the books used date back to the seventeenth century at the latest andthe eleventh century at the earliest. Books prescribed for astronomy, mathematics, and grammarare more than five- to seven-hundred-year-old texts. The mathematics includes Euclidean

geometry and the astronomy includes the ventures of Muslim astronomers conducted almost amillennium ago. 58 The curriculum has remained more or less the same over the course of two and a half centuries.This reflects the stagnation of muslim thought in general. The curriculum has no subject on

political science and economics, which is why the Taliban could not form an effectivegovernment and decision making body. The philosophy of the west is nor studied at all andcountering arguments through methods of 11th century muslim texts is practiced, whereas the

philosphical thought has progressed by quantum leaps. In Dars-e-Nizami, there is no appreciationof change. Adherence to the salf i.e. the early muslims is emphasized and Ijtehad is considered to

be an issue of ultra geniuses and ultra pious, rendering it virtually prohibited. Obedience is

MadrassasInPak.pdf&ei=-ECuTpKbOsyqrAfxjPW2DA&usg=AFQjCNEPfwg_7s-enHvyuMBnit6ooipQTw, page 1

56http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~tzajonc/madrassas_beyondcrisis_final.pdf

57http://www.globalwebpost.com/farooqm/study_res/bangladesh/mumtaz_madrassah.pdf

58http://www.globalwebpost.com/farooqm/study_res/bangladesh/mumtaz_madrassah.pdf


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preferred over expertise. Thus it is no surprise that the Taliban banned pictures or restrainedwomen from wearing high heels and skirts. It is even no surprise that they were against the shiaHazaras. The Deobandi school of thought consider Shia as a non-muslim sect, though they do notclaim it openly in Pakistan. The overwhelming support rendered by the Deobandi Pakistanimadrassas can be viewed by a famous scholars article in Jang newspaper in response to a queryregarding the Taliban government. Jihad in the path of Allah is farz(obligatory) and the Islamic movement started in Afghanistanunder the leadership of commander of the faithful Mullah Omar is a pure Islamic movement.Their government is pure Shariah government and the people opposing it have the status ofrebels against an Islamic government. Therefore, jihad,under Mullah Omar, against kafirs andrebels is perfectly ok, rather necessary.Another proof of their government being Islamic is that allIslamic force(countries) are their allies and the non-islamic forces(countries) are against it. If oneneeds to understand the situation in Afghanistan, a small journey is required to see first-hand theIslamic values implemented over there. 59

Jamia Haqqania of Akora Khattak Nowshera has been called as Mother of the Taliban by theUS60. As of 1999, at least 8 cabinet ministers of the Taliban were graduates of Haqqania. 61 Themadrassa has also granted Mullah Omar an honorary doctorate 62. The school has sent thousandsof students to fight against the enemies of the Taiban . 63Another madrassa that has also sent a lotof its students to fight along the Taliban is Jamia Binnoria in Karachi from where several Talibanministers have studied. 64 The school draws students from around the world, as far as from USand Canada. 65 If one looks at the curriculum of these schools, one finds similarities between theTaliban government and the madrassa ideologies. The scholars of these seminaries have justrecently permitted the use of videos but still consider taking pictures as prohibited in Islam.Similarly, these scholars support the blasting of Buddha statues in Bamyan. As the Taliban put it,

they blew those statues in consultation with a lot of scholars. 66 Culture, fine arts and music aretotally unacceptable to the Deobandi scholars and this was manifested in the Taliban government.

59aap kay masaail aur un ka hal volume 10:july 2002,maktaba ludhianvi page 331

60a student in the seminary told me this on 29th August 2011.

61ahmed rashid 92

62http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darul_Uloom_Haqqania

63http://www.husainhaqqani.com/reforming/journal%20articles/1/1.htm

64ahmed rashid pg 92

65http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1996932,00.html

66www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2tiI384SP0


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It has to be emphasized that as much as the relation between the Deoband school of thought andthe Taliban is vital, so are the circumstances that relate to each entity. The sub-continent has amore pervading contact with non-Muslims, British, Hindus and Sikhs which neutralized theagressive elements, if any, from the Muslims. Afghanistan, on the other hand, is a grave yard ofempires. It had little or no contact with the outside world. Thus the same Deobandi ideas whenapplied in an Afghan environment produced different results. Who knew that the British treaty with the Afghans that restricted the Afghans to only haverelations with sub-continent would have such far-reaching impacts. That treaty strengthened the

bonds between the two countries and their people, intertwining their fates to an extent that wasunfathomable at the time.

Chapter 6:Pashtunwali and Taliban: The Talibans interpretation of theology and their faith is deeply related to Pashtunwali or thePashtun Tribal code. Often, the borders of Islam and Pashtunwali overlap and one has difficultyseparating the blurred lines. The Taliban were Pashtuns and mostly had grown up in the refugeecamps in Pakistan. Their basic education was in madrassas of the refugee camps. The teachers inthese madrassas were also pashtuns who were not experienced and well-known scholars. Pashtunwalis relationship with Islam has been a complicated one. Afghanistan first became anindependent state in 1747, through a coalition of a number of Pashtun tribes under one leader,Ahmed Shah Durrani. He did not claim legitimacy through religious means, as many Muslimrulers of the day did. Rather, his legitimacy was based on his tribal genealogical heritage and thenomination and guarantee of a Sufi leader, Sabir Shah.Though the Pashtuns were Sunni Muslimsof the Hanafi school of law, it was their Pashtun tribal code, Pashtunwali, which governed them

before all else. Second in order of allegiance was the Sharia, as interpreted through the Hanafilens(the deobandi school is also a sub-set Hanafi school). For this reason, Pashtunwali becamethe driving force behind the early Afghan state, and though the divine texts were still the ultimatesource of authority, this authority was passed on through the tribe to their leader, the King. Pashtunwali is so essential to the identity of the Pashtun that there is no distinction between

practicing Pashtunwali and being Pashtun. Furthermore, for the Pashtun there is no contradiction between being Pashtun and practicing Pashtunwali and being Muslim and adhering to Islamiclaw. Religious scholars (ulema) often see conflicts between some Pashtun customs and theSharia, but in the minds of the Pashtun majority, Pashtunwali is not seen as an enti ty separatefrom the Sharia.Even though the Sharia and Pashtunwali overlap in the Pashtun consciousness,they are seen as functioning for a different purpose. The Sharia represents Gods will forhumanity on earth and is practiced because it is a moral code whereas Pashtunwali is seen as amatter of honor, which to a Pashtun is defined by a persons integrity in upholding and practicing


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the concepts that make up Pashtunwali. 67 The concept of killing for honour is not alien for Pashtuns and they consider it a virtue, not avice. Therefore, violence as interpreted in the west is non-existent for the Pashtuns. The strictTaliban decrees, although averse to the west, were in accordance with Pashtunwali. The Pashtunwould never want an outsider to see his women, whether he is in the Taliban-ruled Afghanistanor in Pakistan. Beating a person on acquiring a western attire is not violent to the Pashtuns,neither is it abhored.. Aversion to alien cultures has a Pashtun-self respect aspect to it besides theIslamic justification. Similarly, the Islamic punishment of cutting hands, or the Taliban rule of

beating people for not praying is also not violent to the Pashtuns. Violence, as in westernconnotation, is prevalent in every Pashtun house hold. The father has an iron command over hishouse hold and beating children is considered necessary. Women are repudiated for matters ofhonour, this the Taliban decree for women is not alien for the Pashtuns. Deciding the fate ofwomen like marriages or careers is no novel concept either.Similarly, protecting Osama bin Laden was a shade of Pashtunwali that the US failed to interpret.

THe Taliban, being Pashtuns, could never compromise on hospitality. Osama was a guest of theTaliban and he also helped the Taliban in their fights. The Taliban could never abandon him.Unfortunately, they were mistaken for assisting him in war against US and this misinterpretationled to many tragic accidents. When the Taliban enforced their decrees on non-pashtuns, they retaliated naturally because of thecultural incompatibility of the decrees. This was something that the Taliban had not anticipatedand which depicts the vacuum in the progress of Islamic thought in the modern world. The Taliban, therefore, are not to be blamed for their conservativeness. It is instead the Pashtuntribal code that made them look alien to the world. As the global community becomesincreasingly aware of the complexity of human cultures, it is time we looked into Pashtunwali

more closely for a better solution of the ongoing Afghan Crisis.

67www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf


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Chapter 7

Putting the Jigsaw Puzzle together: The Taliban represent the complexity of Afghanistan and the subcontinent region at large. The

point that I wanted to prove from the previous chapters was that the Taliban were a manifestationof Deobandi Ideology which could not completely manifest itself in Pakistan due to the buffer ofmultitude of other sects present there. The Pashtunwali also played a dominant role in shapingthe rule of Taliban. Most importantly, we realize that we need progress and evolution in Islamic thought. Pakistanwas a change in muslim thought within itself. It was a poet- philosphers revertion from pan -Islamism to regional realities. Although Iqbal was influenced by Jamal-ud- din Afghanis pan -Islamism, his brain child nation was supposed to work on a regional platform and then strive fora global change. The message of Jamal-ud-din Afghani too was not the stereotypical pan-Islamic

one, but with a different tinge of modernism and flexibility. He used to follow all the four Imamsas he pleased. 68 Ijtehad today is more necessary than ever, and that is what Afghani and Iqbalembodied. The ghost of Jamal-ud-din Afghani came to Taliban in the form of Al-Qaeda, which was led by agroup of Pan-Islamists from the Arab world. The soul of Deoband came to Afghanistan in theform of Taliban and seminary students. Mullah Nizami, the founder of Dars-e-Nizami, was notaware of the future impact his work was going to have. While, the ghost of Iqbal came toAfghanistan in the form of Pakistan armys religiosity, which was fuelled by Sir Syeds tw o-nation theory and Iqbals select thoughts. Afghanistan was as much a battleground for ideologiesas it was for people.

The situation was made more complex by the ongoing proxy wars in Afghanistan. Iran, India,Pakistan, China, Central Asia, USSR and USA, all had conflicting interests in the region andcontinued to support rival factions within Afghanistan instead of negotiating for peace. One thingis for sure that peace in Afghanistan is fundamentally related to sincere involvement by Pakistan

68 jamaludin afghani book


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because the link between the two countries, i.e. the Pashtuns, runs deep. Below is a flow chart of the Taliban situation:

The chart gives a rough account of the complexity of the Taliban situation. In the chart, all theindividual bubbles are related to the Taliban government. The links connecting them show theinter-relationship between the bubbles themselves. The more links a bubble has, the morerelevant it is. For example, the bubble of minority sects is linked to bubbles of Iqbal, NorthernAlliance, Deoband and Refugees. Iqbal, Deoband and US have the maximum number of links.These links are more of a subjective nature but are a step towards quantitative study of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.


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Chapter 8: 9-11 to Present: After the 9-11 attacks, the US underestimated the importance and vitality of Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship. When general Mehmood Ahmed of ISI told US deputy secretary of

state that before demanding a clear stance from Pakistan, he has to consider that the twocountries(Pakistan and Afghanistan) have history. The secretary did not fully appreciate thecomment and replied that no, history begins today. 69 The US bombed Afghanistan and Musharraf reversed the decades old policy of supporting theAfghans. The Taliban were ousted in December 2001 and the US troops installed Karzai as theinterim president and after the 2004 elections, he became official president.

NATO and Afghan troops in recent years led many offensives against the Taliban, but provedunable to completely dislodge their presence. By 2009, a Taliban-led shadow government beganto form complete with their own version of mediation court. In 2010, U.S. President BarackObama deployed an additional 30,000 soldiers over a period of six months and proposed that hewill begin troop withdrawals by 2012. At the 2010 International Conference on Afghanistan inLondon, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said he intends to reach out to the Taliban leadership(including Mullah Omar, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). Supported by seniorU.S. officials Karzai called on the group's leadership to take part in a loya jirga meeting toinitiate peace talks. According to the Wall Street Journal, these steps have been reciprocated sofar with an intensification of bombings, assassinations and ambushes. Many Afghan groups(including the former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh and opposition leader Dr. AbdullahAbdullah) believe that Karzai's plan aims to appease the insurgents' senior leadership at the costof the democratic constitution, the democratic process and progress in the field of human rights

especially women's rights. Meanwhile, the situation in Pakistan has worsened. Increasing suicide attacks and uprisings ofmilitants who claim to be associated with the Taliban have shattered the country's system. ThePakistan army has lost two brigades(35000 soldiers) in fighting these militants in the FATAregion. The US and Karzai administration is blaming these militants of insurgency inAfghanistan which has led to increased mistrust between the two countries. The NATO-USinsurgency has shifted from Afghanistan to Pakistan wiht increasing drone strikes in NorthWaziristan on the Haqqani network which pledges allegiance to the Taliban. The most importantevent in the past decade has been the killing of Osama bin Laden who was killed in Abbottabad

by US marines who carried out the operation without even informing the Pakistan administration.

This has led to relations of increased mistrust and tension between the tr oika since. Musharrafs policy of supporting has had severe repercussions and the civilian victims of drone attacks viewPakistan state as the on responsible for the tragedy and carry out suicide attacks. Meanwhile, the Taliban still retain control of virtually more than half of Afghanistan by

69 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/armitage.html#1


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installing a shadow government of their own. The US offensive has failed and the Afghan war,coupled with the Iraq war has proved to be a black hole for its economy. The Afghan peopleyearn for the peace and law and order in the era of Taliban as the US troops and the corruptKarzai administration fail to deliver. The allied forces and the Karzai administration are forced tocarry talks with the Taliban, who seemed to have survived the decade long war. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Karzai has recently showed signs of optimism by sayingthat his country will side with the Pakistanis in the event of US invasion on Pakistani soil. 70 Once again the Tribal areas of the two countries are the focus of the war on terrorism. These veryareas form the core of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

70 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/23/hamid-karzai-us-pakistan-afghanistan


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Chapter 9: Conclusion: The Future of Afghanistan The Obama administration has announced to withdraw its troops by 2014. Till then, the Talibanseem unwilling to go away. Meanwhile, Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to dwindle to rubbles in

the war against terrorism. What is needed is immediate peace. Military coercion has failedrepeatedly for the last decade. Therefore, the US, and the west at large, need to listen intently towhat the Taliban have to say. The US will have to see the history of Afghanistan and notoverlook it as it did in 2001. Finally, the fate of Afghanistan rests in the hands of Afghan people,not in the hands of ISI, CIA or NATO. Therefore elimination of foreign involvement inAfghanistan is the most important requisite for peace in Afghanistan. The Muslims also need to catch up with the rapidly modernising world. This is the time to enddebates on the minuscule issues and define issues of identity, faith, extremism, and culture. Thereis a growing divide in the Muslim world itself i.e. the liberals and the extremists. The middle menshould play their role in harmonizing the two factions. The scholars and the media have animportant role to play in this regard. We see that the scholars were and remain one of the key rolemakers of the Afghan and Pakistani society. Thus reforms in education, both of the school andthe madrassah, will benefit the world for generations to come. One example is the influence ofDars-e-Nizami on the history of Afghanistan. Innovation, creativity and vision is needed on partof the intellectuals and policy makers of Pakistan and Afghanistan. If Afghanistan fails, it will destabilize Pakistan. Iran would remain on the periphery of the worldcommunity and its eastern borders will be insecure. The Central Asian states will not be able todeliver their energy and exports. Thus the fate of the whole region depends on the success ofAfghanistan.

Pak-Afghan Relations and the Taliban

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