Pages From The Second Front

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The Second FronT1943-1944

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk


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AcknowledgemenTS

No aspect o the history o Allied operations during theSecond World War in Europe is more controversial than the

Normandy landings. Even prior to the cessation o the greatest

confagration in the history o human warare, a passionate

debate was unleashed about the timing and execution o the

second ront, which continues to reverberate today. Historians

and scholars alike have since applied an intensely fickering

intellectual candle to the debate. This tempest o historicityinspired me to produce a succinct but powerul account o

the Allies invasion o Europe, which emphasizes the logistical

perspective rom both the Allied and German points o view.

The events o the Second World War do not dey explanation

in conventional military terms. High casualty rates were an

inevitable concomitant to the resistance o Nazism and the

deence o the Third Reich in every sense.

Many o the Allies peripheral operations during their

approach to the invasion were harbingers o darker things to

come. Remaining actively malign was part o a systematic,

though disquieting, lead-up to 6 June 1944. The beleaguered

remnants o the Allied orces let the continent our years

earlier, and returned to a war o unexampled erocity. Though

many historians deny the Allies inability to strike at the heart

o Hitlers empire at will, readers will be struck by the parallels

to be drawn between the planning o D-Day and the broader

events within the European theatre o war.

This work could not have been completed without the

assistance o a great many people who have been a pillar o

support throughout the entire process. First among those whodeserve my gratitude is Dr. Daniel Byers, whose steady guidance


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or which I am greatly appreciative. I am particularly grateul to

Drs. Scot Robertson and Per Rudling or the guidance they gave

me in navigating my way through the literature o warare and

history o the Second World War in Europe. They extended to

me their interminable knowledge and dedication to the critical

review o my research and writing.

I am also indebted to the archivists and personnel in

the various institutions where the research or this book wascarried-out. Many thanks to the University o Alberta and

to McGill University, the State o Baden-Wrttemberg, the

Library or Contemporary History in Stuttgart, the United

States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., the

National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,

Maryland, and the German Federal Military Archive in Freiburg.

I am certainly grateul to have studied alongside a supportivegroup o peers during my studies at home and abroad. I wish

to express my appreciation to Dale Youngman o PageMaster

Publication Services Inc., my riends, and to my amily or their

encouragement during my studies.

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk

2009


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Foreword

As a ormer proessor o Scotts, I am happy to write a ore-

word in support o his present book. Scott is one o those people

who are a joy to teach - he was always a very keen student, espe-

cially when it came to studying any topic related to war, military

aairs, or international relations. His passion or his subject is ob-

vious in the pages that ollow, which have grown out o a numbero years o work that draws together his various interests. The be-

ginning student in particular should fnd this book to be a useul

introduction to the various issues that inuenced Allied decision-

making regarding the June 6, 1944 invasion o Normandy.

Scott observes events rom the perspective o German as well

as Allied strategists, and provides a thorough overview o the many

specifc actors that shaped the actual preparations or D-Day onboth sides. He also pays attention not just to the traditional con-

cerns o western historians, but the implications o Germanys

ongoing war with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe or military

planners. The result is a study that intricately sets the D-Day inva-

sion into its larger context, and should be a useul addition to the

libraries o readers interested in learning more about the back-

ground to one o the greatest military events in history.

Daniel Byers, Ph.D.

Assistant Proessor o History,

Laurentian University at Georgian

College B.A. Program,

Barrie, Ontario, Canada

2009


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PreFAce

Operation Overlord was the Allies master stroke againstthe parapets o Festung Europa. What the Allies began planning in

late 1941, initially projecting to relieve pressure on the Red Army,

sought to re-establish their military presence in Europe or the

ultimate deeat o Nazi Germany. Crossing the English Channel

thereore became the precursor or Allied victory in Western

Europe. Conceptualization o this mission was not simple at any

rate and its planners aced what seemed to be illimitable obstacles

at nearly every turn.

While addressing the act that many elements were vital

or the induction o D-Day, it is necessary to make clear that the

rontier o this books analysis is controlled by the degree to which

such elements relate overall to the grand picture o Allied strategy

and deliberation over the campaign. This may seem obvious, but

in certain cases, obscure branches o the war have been observed

and recounted or the purpose o increased topic proundity, but

again, this has been done through careul restriction. Limiting my

study to select cases o the war has created what may be perceived

as naturally occurring gaps in my investigation and subsequent

polemic account.

My aim was to ocus predominantly on two aspects o mil-itary operations: those o logistics and strategy. I agree with schol-

ars that imperial notions resonated in the planning o and pre-

operations strategy o Overlord, but hold that peripheral action

undertaken by the Allies was pivotal or the orchestration o such

delicate aairs as those dealt with in the ollowing chapters. There

is always something to be gained through the decline o rather

banal reasons or superfcial pretexts why certain decisions were

made throughout history and the Second World War delivers no


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x The Second Front

yond value or what was to ollow, especially in multi-national

concerted action. On the other hand, it consumed a large portion

o the Allies timetable and delivered very little territory into Allied

hands in lieu o their struggle and the commitment o orce argu-

ably went ar beyond the return.

The availability o essential men and matriel to continue

any oensive inland unabated was the pivotal component that

dictated against the Allies capacity to invade prior to 1944 and

was uppermost in Allied minds rom the very beginning but as aharbinger o Allied inability it has oten been rejected by historians.

In examining and measuring the risks and rewards o the Allies

undertaking the Second Front in 1944, I attempt to reveal with

the best possible line o reasoning the peril o an Allied invasion in

1943. I provide a history not merely o a logistical perspective on

planning the Second Front but o the many intricate dimensions

that inuenced Allied planning during the Second World War as

a whole. That is, beyond the impediment presented by a shortage

o manpower, the overall currents o the war in Europe and the

politico-military relationships were actors that dictated the suc-

cess o Overlord.

Waging strategic war was not a new concept by the time

World War II slammed the Continent, but orchestrating coalition

warare in a way that embroiled all three major elements o the

military in a symbiotic relationship was certainly unamiliar terri-

tory or all participants in the conict - especially in an era when

military technology had developed beyond its ability to be tested in

true battle. The Allied orces were not unaware o the imbalance

o power that existed in the early years o the war, and certainly

they remained aware o their weaknesses up until the cessation ohostilities. In every way, operating in parity was the core o condi-


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xiPreface

quantitative and qualitative assessments have been made on re-

spective resource availability or the Western Allies and Germany

during both 1943 and 1944 while taking into account the evolu-

tion o the Allied and German armies over the course o the war. A

ocus has also been made on the prevailing actors that governed

the timing and location o this oray, which military scholars and

historians continue to debate today.

History, it has been observed, possesses truth that remains

hidden amid ultimate parable and oreseeable ambiguity. Giventhat persistent study within this discipline routinely turns out

more uncertainty than clarity and maybe even truth, it remains

perhaps one o the most onerous felds o work in which one could

engage. It is my sincere hope that this book reects my respect or

history as a discipline and o it, meritorious authors and historians

past and present. A great number o colleagues, riends, proessors

as well as casual acquaintances have played a role, both large and

small, in the fnal orm o my work and it is or this single reason

that wish to extend my gratitude to all o them, or the content o

this book is the product o a combined eort.

Emerging rom an article that I had begun writing during

my undergraduate career as a student o history, I had begun my

planning and research or this book while embracing my studies

in Germany. I continued its composition during the remainder

o my degree in Canada, while simultaneously attempting to pur-

sue many other interests within as well as external to academia.

Originally I conceived the idea o the original article as appropri-

ate homage to the sixtieth anniversary o D-Day and to those who

ought so adamantly whether with guns or tools, at the ront or in

the actories, on either side o Europe against the ideological ap-paratus o Nazi Germany.


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xii The Second Front

Kingdom and Canada comprised its principle participants and

while the primary Allied ormations that saw combat in Normandy

came rom these three countries, they were certainly not alone.

In the eyes o German and Allied soldiers alike, the campaign

in Normandy, like those o Italy and Arica, were represented by

the determination and spirit o the collective orces involved. It

is through this magnifcent historical representation o a united

ront that I eel it not only appropriate but absolutely necessary

to recognize that Free French, Polish, Belgians, Czechoslovakians,Greeks, Dutch and Norwegians also participated in the many bat-

tles o Normandy.

The sheer scale o operational, logistical and strategic plan-

ning that was invested into the preliminary planning while con-

currently maintaining the fght against the Axis powers in multiple

theatres o war in Europe intrigued me above all else. D-Day was

no simple operation. Likewise it was no single operation. Overlord

was part o a broad strategy, relying on the successul conclusion

o preliminary campaigns that brought courageous young men

rom the crescent bays o Morocco, through the canyons o the

Apennine spine and all the way to the retted coasts o France.

Setting aside the items that were vitally important to the

success o an amphibious invasion o France, across some rather

portentous waters o Europe, and while eeding the insatiable ap-

petite o military ronts the world over, was an issue that lingered

in mind throughout my research and as I articulated my assertions

in the ollowing pages.

It may seem peculiar that while my amily is o Ukrainian

background, I grew up learning German and French; only as o

late, have I unearthed the time and energy to tackle Ukrainianand Russian. The history o World War II, like the study o mod-


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xiiiPreface

pondering o the many discreet and indiscreet acets o the Second

World War in Europe as well as the Pacifc, yet my natural inclina-

tion was always to approach the general conict rom the Allied

point o view. Believing that no more value should be aorded to

the Allied position than should be proered to Germany and her

allies, and since war is never one-dimensional, my approach to

this subject has thus not been inuenced by anything more than

this single enlargement.

Without the co-operation within the United Nations,Overlord would certainly not have been possible. This contention

will always be genuine and sound in my mind. Nevertheless, it is

my estimation that without the sacrifces made by innumerable

men and women o diverse ethnic origin in the Soviet Union, our

Western eorts would have been utterly ruitless. Soviet strength

and ortitude against the military might o Nazi Germany reected

on the Allies; upon my own volition, I extend my gratitude to the

men and women o the ormer Soviet Republics or their inde-

structible courage and or their pivotal role in our shared victory

and esteemed reedom.

This book attempts to set out the record o the Allied plan-

ning o D-Day by providing both description and explanation o

events that orm the basis o a second ront in North-West Europe.

Although no single book could provide absolute coverage and ex-

planation o any chapter o history, my hope is that this view o

the second ront will describe the military and political encounters

that prooundly sculpted Overlord, and produce some new per-

spectives o its ormative events and the conditions that dictated

its execution and early success.

While this book attempts to cover the major acets o thisextensive military movement, it does not present a complete his-


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xiv The Second Front

various sections o this book have ultimately escaped my initial

intention or their sel-containment. I have thus set Overlord andits expedients soundly within the broader strategic ramework o

the war in Europe and slightly urther abroad. This ramework,

however, defnes no clear boundary on its own. Deciding where

to limit my analysis was difcult, since countless elements were

indicative o either Allied success or ailure, it would be nearly

impossible to ft them all into a single book.

The dominant problem in tackling this specifc topic, as isthe case with many in the history o the Second World War, is the

sheer scope o literature that has since become available. Given

this seemingly boundless abyss o accessible literature, I ound it

tricky and at times quite awkward to ascertain which issues ultim-

ately aected the planning o the Allied second ront in unique

ways. My central argument has been careully reerenced with a

diverse mixture o events rom the outset o the war in Europe.

With circumspect, I chose to include terms that are and were o

impending importance to the Combined Chies o Sta as well as

those eminent elements that plagued the echelons o OKW and

the war eort until what Generaleldmarschall Erwin Rommel

termed the longest day.

This book is divided into three parts, the frst oering anaccount o German military power and Allied strategic resource

availability through an examination o the military transition that

had taken place in Europe early in the war, the second providing

an analysis o steps that attempted to oretell the probability o

success or an invasion o Nazi-occupied Europe while ollowing

the most signifcant changes in the combatants strategic posture.

The fnal chapters o this book serve as a countdown, ollowingthrough advanced phases o D-Day preparation and address a


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xvPreface

intention was never to compile a text book per se, but rather a

work that would fnd its appeal in the hearts o those who havea passion or the feld o history, and those who wish to pursue

military history in academia or o their own leisurely accord. At

the same time however, my belie is that this book is suitable or

proessors at the University level teaching courses or directing

seminars on twentieth Century warare, World War II or War and

Society in the Modern World.

Having appreciably based my research on original docu-mentation, I spent many unsociable hours poring over German

military archives, war diaries and what seemed to me at the time

to be illimitable correspondence in English, French, German and

Dutch. But a large portion o my investigation involved secondary

works as well and provided many hours o sheer enjoyment, enter-

tainment and ulfllment. Above all, I wanted to revisit this event

sixty years past and explain the delicate nature o conception and

progression, not with a contumacious attitude or with negative re-

pose, but simply to reect and exhibit not only my interpretations

but such events as seen through the eyes o senior commanders

on the timing o this grandiose military undertaking or what it

simply was: a spectacular eat


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conTenTS

Introduction 1

Embattled Europe

Allusion o Victory 19

A Calculated Strategy 49

Trial and Error 62

Epochal Campaigns

Distant Shores 87

Girding the Initiative 102

Strategic Overtures 122

Countdown to Victory

Along the Channel 149

A Paralyzing Ordeal 158

Hitlers Vainglorious Citadel 163

Triumphant Tide 183

Appendices

Comment on Sources 212

Chronology 214

Diagrams 228

Principle Persons 229

Glossary 235Maps 241


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Winston Churchill6 June 1944

What a plan! This vast operation is undoubtedly the mostcomplicated and difcult that has ever taken place.

Adol Hitler3 November 1943

In the East, the vastness o space will permit a loss o territory without suering a mortal blow to Germanyschance or survival. Not so in the West! I the enemy heresucceeds consequences o staggering proportions will

ollow within a short time.

Joseph Stalin12 October 1942

[What place does the possibility o a second ront oc-cupy in the Soviet estimates o the current situation?] Amost important place; one might say a place o frst rate-importance.

Generaleldmarschall Erwin RommelJune 1944

Well have only one chance to stop the enemy and thatswhile hes in the water. Everything we have must be on thecoast the frst 24 hours o the invasion will be decisive.For the Allies as well as Germany, it will be the longestday.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower6 June 1944

People o Western Europe: A landing was made thismorning on the coast o France by troops o the AlliedExpeditionary Force. This landing is part o the concertedUnited Nations plan or the liberation o Europe, madein conjunction with our great Russian allies I call uponall who love reedom to stand with us. Keep your aithstaunch. Our arms are resolute. Together we shall achieve

victory.


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InTroducTIon

Sure, we want to go home. We want this war over

with. The quickest way to get it over with is to go

get the bastards who started it. The quicker they

are whipped, the quicker we can go home.

- General George S. Patton

Ill at ease on the eve o Operation Overlord, General Dwight D.

Eisenhower knew that the Allies were about to subject their ar-

mies, perhaps to an untenable situation in Normandy. Tension

among Allied leaders ran at a high pitch in the weeks beore thou-

sands o men set sail or the coast opposite England. During a

tense moment, Eisenhower stated probably no one who does nothave to bear the specifc and direct responsibility o making the

fnal decision as to what to do can understand the intensity o

these burdens.1

What Eisenhower and the Allies knew was nearly equal in

orce to that which they knew nothing about and could do de-

ceptively little to inuence. Obvious were the many thousands o

hours o eort that had been devoted to the creation o ortifed

Europe; but less overt was the notion o how events would actually

unold come H-Hour, and i Operation Bowsprit would herald the

eventual cancellation o Operation Overlord. One such compon-

ent, never acting entirely as riend or oe, was the weather. For

this was an element that no amount o planning, preparation or

prediction could aect in any degree o realism.

Within sixty years o the Allied assault into Basse Normandy,


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2 The Second Front

a great deal o military historians attention. Strategy shadowed

by the Allies is criticized in a multiplicity o ways. Chie among

these include the Allies committing to an engagement with the

Wehrmacht in North-West Europe too late, an artifcial deerral o

obligations to the Soviet Union, prolongation o the war in Europe

through the abandonment o a short-road policy or the deeat

o Germany, and an eort to leverage the Allies politico-military

posture in the post-war world. The aoresaid orm the crux o

many such diatribe.Predominantly, this discourse centers on the most acute

question: would a combined Allied invasion o North-West Europe

in 1943 have been a military success or would it have been a pre-

mature aair, devoid o necessary oensive strength that would

have ultimately materialized as a strategic ailure?

On 6 March, JCS moved to accept the argument put or-

ward by Eisenhower, making clear that they were in agreement

with his overall opinion, I the war is to be won in Europe, land

orces must be developed and trained which are capable o landing

on the continent and advancing under the support o an over-

whelming air orce.2

From this point, Stephen Ambrose added, The United States

now had a strategic solution to the problem o victory in World

War II but what the Allies had, in realistic terms, was a strategic

thought, a simple idea supported by little more than liquid courage

and confdence to which substance was lent by the United States

dormant industrial rump o the decade previous.3 The British had

accepted both organization and thought on strategy with little

reservation.

With the frst stepping stone laid, the Americans sought toconvince the British o abandoning their general plan o simply


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3Introduction

closing the ring on Germany, and to adopt the strategy that

General George C. Marshall was putting together instead.

With comparatively much weight behind the new idea,

would the course o the war deviate ar rom the vagueness o the

British route? Why was the British plan so ormless, the ensuing

raids having been undertaken in relatively small terms and in a

seemingly haphazard manner, or better yet, why was the American

plan so large and so ocused on pushing straight into Europe?

The origins o this are closely tied to American politicaloresight. The orceul nature o the U.S. plan was indicative o

American post-war interests and establishment o authority that

escaped the nation ater the First World War. The direct push

against nazim would showcase American splendour, a remark-

able exploit in the ace o world events.

Since the cessation o hostilities in Europe 8 May 1945, the

primary realization on this specifc acet o military history is that

D-Day was certainly not a sure thing. Even beore the invasion, it

was not prescribed any degree o guaranteed success. Hours prior

to droves o invasion eets setting sail rom southern England,

ears echoed in the minds o those who planned the invasion.

The risk was understood by no one person better than

General Dwight D. Eisenhower. During the night o 5 June 1944,

Eisenhower wrote out the text o the press release that he hoped he

would never have to deliver. The note read:

Our landings have ailed to gain a satisactory oothold

and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack

at this time and place was based on the best inormation

available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that

bravery and devotion to duty could do. I any blame or

ault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.4


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4 The Second Front

ing sentiment and the Second Front thus remains a point o mil-

itary controversy. In his account o the Second World War, Basil

Liddell Hart endorses the notion that any endeavour by the British

Chies o Sta to cross the Channel in 1943 would have ended in

disaster in which their estimation will hardly by questioned in

historical retrospect.5

Generals and historians have devoted little attention to the

many diverse dimensions o preparation that the Allies undertook

to prime their armies or the coming invasion o France, leavingmany to believe that D-Day represents a specifc point in history.

Indeed, the joint venture was a precise point in time in which

Allied orces attempted to punch a gap in German deences o

the Atlantic Wall; yet D-Day as an intricate component o the

war could not have existed without years o historical ramework.

For this reason, it is impossible to discuss the success or ailure

o D-Day without expanding ones basis o analysis rom days, to

months to even years leading-up to H-Hour.

When in the middle o March, the British Joint Sta Mission

in Washington, D.C., deliberated over a study that needed to be

made on specifc landing measures, a concrete pillar to that very

history was driven deep into the ground. It was not the only pillar

to be laid and it was also not the earliest. Who were the principle

persons laying these pillars, building the oundation and coming-

up with strategic ormulation? In the beginning, the plan was be-

ing laid-out by arm-chair generals.

In nmay t th Balti, Field Marshal Viscount

Montgomery wrote inconsequentially on the matter insomuch

that his ocus o several pages measures rather signifcantly in

comparison to generals, commanders and numerous ofcers othe Normandy campaign who did not remark on the subject o


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5Introduction

rather distant rom the battle-ront. His thinking and conceptual

need was also rather disconnected. Surprisingly, to an extraordin-

ary degree, this issue has not been deeply scrutinized as other as-

pects as the Second World War have.

Even as many notable historians and authors have invari-

ably established unique opinions on this issue within the histor-

ical feld, only recently have studies o Allied strategy and army

preparation fgured markedly in the feld.

David French, author o Ivaig eup: Th Bitih Amya it Ppaati th nmay campaig, 1942-44 observes

that many historians are breaking new ground in analyzing the

measures taken by the Allies to prepare their orces or Overlord.

Canadian historian J. A. English has recently made a micro-

study on the Canadian units that were prescribed to Normandy.

Carlo Deste and Roy Conyers Nesbit, who have also adopted a

greater circumerence o interpretation o American, British and

Canadian military traction toward a realistic plan or the invasion

o Europe, also depict essential, but oten over-looked dimensions

o this matter.

Contemplating the intensity o the battles o Normandy,

Stephen E. Ambrose posthumously uels the growth o inorma-

tion and insight o Overlord: drawing on the personal account o

more than 1,400 ordinary German, British, French, Canadian and

American soldiers rom it in d-day, Ju 6, 1944: Th climati

Battl Wl Wa II, he grasps the hidden nature o this trial by

battle; while John Keegan invariably remains one o the oremost

authorities on the history or warare in general. Producing books

that include battle-by-battle coverage o conict, Keegan has con-

tributed signifcantly to the historiography in modern warare andthemes in World War II and Operation Overlord is certainly no


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6 The Second Front

rested a uture adversary o the Western Alliance. Marked with

histories o hostility and even bloodshed with the West, Soviet

Russia was less amiable at nearly every step o developmental

planning.

Conventional opinion within the Soviet Union has always

ollowed Communist Party doctrine as a design or enhancing

anti-Western pose, deending the contemptuous view that the mo-

tive o the British and Americans was to acilitate blood-letting o

Soviet military strength within the Russo-German theatre o war.That the Allies lethargically prepared or an invasion whilst

truly conserving their military and economic resources to establish

post-war dominance within Europe by way o flling the subse-

quent power vacancy that at the time was expected ater the deeat

o Nazi Germany is a standpoint that mainstream opinion with-

in the U.S.S.R. had typically assumed. In ruia at Wa, Alexander

Werth recalls the general sentiments o the typical Soviet citizen as

he observed during his 1942 visits to Karelia:

[Churchill was] ...an old enemy o the Soviet Union [and

the] Soviets considered themselves lucky at the very least

that Churchill did not choose to side with Hitler.6

The majority o Soviets doubted whether there would be a

Second Front or a very long time, or at all, as long as Churchillwas in power.7 This cold sentiment remained and hampered rela-

tions between the two camps.

Werth alleges that both Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt

were eager to avoid the creation o a large ront in North-West

Europe while George F. Kennan contends in ruia a th Wt

u Li a stali that Roosevelt possessed an eagerness or

the Second Front based on the desire to placate Stalin, reconcil-

ing him to the deerment o discussing the issues o territory in


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7Introduction

Eastern Europe until the time when the fnal peace conerence

would provide an opportunity or urther engagement.8

The most signifcant attitude was brewing in the East. The

West, viewed as sitting idly by dispassionately while the Soviet

Union absorbed almost the entire impact o the German war

machine, was incapable o practicable military perormance on

a scale large enough to curb these sorts o eelings. They were

convincing the East through inaction that they were looking to

the post-war world and simply sought an upper-hand in post-warterritorial negotiations and the political carving o Europe ater

German capitulation.9

That the Western Allies were simply interested in the deteri-

oration o Soviet military power is a rather curious line o argu-

ment to espouse, particularly since the need or a multi-ront war

was ully recognized by the Allied powers. Roosevelt understood

how the process o two-ront war could and would reduce German

military strength to a point where the outcome would be simple

and obvious. So too was the basic concept and military arithmetic

appreciated by Marshall, Eisenhower and Churchill in this very

nature.

To posit that many politicians in the Soviet Union were be-

coming increasingly disapprovative o the West or the consistent

lethargy and inertia o their armies since the German invasion o

the Soviet Union would be an accurate conjecture. Indeed, many

months passed as German molestation o the Soviet Union had

taken place. Yet even during the grim summer o 1940, Britain

understood the importance o expanding the war as much as

possible despite the generality o the British strategy o basically

tightening the ring around Germany, there were necessary steps toollow and simultaneous expansion was just another mechanism.


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8 The Second Front

Building sympathy by way o the other side o the coin is a

uphill battle indeed, since ultimately casualty rates or the Soviet

Union soared in comparison to the deaths experienced in the West.

When dozens o deaths during the London Blitz were received with

shock, what sort o impact Soviet casualty rates would have on the

general public o Britain is an interesting notion to countenance.

Failure to mount a ront in ull orce outside o the

Mediterranean Theatre was not acceptable to the highest levels o

strategic command within the Allied camp according to StephenE. Ambrose in d-day: Th climati Battl Wl Wa II.10 The

act that the United States and Great Britain could have remained

militarily inert while the Soviet Union deeated the German Army

in 1943 and 1944 is a sentiment that he sharply opposed given

that ailure to ultimately mount another ront would have been

viewed by the U.S.S.R. as a blatant double-cross.11

Ambrose explains that a betrayal o the Soviet Union

through the ailure to launch a second ront might lead to a sep-

arate Nazi-Soviet treaty, or even the possibility o Red Army lib-

eration and post-war occupation o Western Europe.12 Since the

Allies were still able to think in like terms to that o the paranoid

mind o Stalin, plans were set in motion in the event that this had

occurred.

Ideals afxed with Churchills opposition to an early in-

vasion o the continent deliver a defnitive statement on Allied

plans to seek alternative routes to re-enter Nazi occupied Europe.

Wiliam R. Keylor and Jerry Bannister evoke in Th Twtith-

ctuy Wl that two considerations ultimately brought the


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9Introduction

British Prime Minister and the American President to oppose an

early landing in North-West Europe.13

The frst was borne in sensible concern: [1] insufcient

availability o landing-crat o a variety o types required or the

sae deliverance o Allied men and equipment, [2] U-Boat threat

o the North Atlantic, which was likened to the trench warare o

the First World War only at sea; [3] ortifed German divisions

along the Channel coast.14

This multi-aceted perspective incorporates elements thatare logistical, tactical and strategic in nature. They are broad, but

the main elements that dictated the success o ailure o Overlord.

With these in mind, they attempt to consider the broader picture,

elucidating to the need o avoiding the divisions o variables in the

deliberation o the busting back into Europe.

Keylor and Bannister, commenting on the spectre o British

deeat at Gallipoli in 1915, diversiy their perspective, and or this

reason, Churchill remained conscientious o the like ate o a pre-

mature, under-manned invasions carried-out by ill-equipped sol-

diers in lieu o the act that Churchill was blamed or the Gallipoli

ailure in 1915 while acting as frst lord o the Admiralty.15

Funds and supplies will be critical or the success o any

military operation regardless o the scale and the period o time

involved. In todays military world and in tomorrows as much as

the case has been in the distant past, victory cannot be bought.

Victory is or the most part, a wishul nostalgia that constantly de-

mands determination, dedication and endurance, while parading

as something rather easily attainable at times, is deceptively elu-

sive. This is the very thought that ran through Eisenhowers mind

when he visited the War Department in early 1942. Invasion wasonly the frst step in a series o balancing acts to support and con-


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10 The Second Front

stantly supply the combat units o the Allied invasion orce, as it

would eventually push its way inland rom once it had established

itsel in the lodgement area.

Roosevelt made a sensible decision in response to the prob-

lem presented to him over which theatre to commit the next sev-

eral years o orce build-up to. The scales were tipped in avour

o Operation Bolero as oppose to the trafc o American orces

to Australia. Admiral King had none-the-less ought or the U.S.

Navy to receive the attention o the President and the orces thathe could supply it with saying, important as the mounting o

[Operation] Bolero may be, the Pacifc problem is no less so, and

is certainly the more urgent it must be aced w.

Generals and commanding sta were bound to the decision

o their President and Prime Minister, but both were bound to

the will o a ar greater power, that o the general citizenry o the

United States and o Great Britain. Here, though, was an indica-

tion that choices were made in part by the general population liv-

ing in the United States. Roosevelts position was a precarious one

since the U.S. immediate enemy was made clear by a little over

200 planes in the frst week o December. This was where America

had entered the war, but to enter it in oot-dragging ashion would

have been a difcult policy to pass-by and have approved by the

American people. Thereore a decision needed be reached and

quickly. Speed was given to the decision while attention was given

to Europe but not the Pacifc.

The second consideration that saw Churchill and Roosevelt

oppose an untimely landing in North-West Europe according to

Keylor and Bannister rest in the Churchills conviction that the

North Arican coast was a ar more inviting alternative to an in-vasion o France. North Aricas coastline, or the most part, was


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11Introduction

subsequent invasion o the Italian mainland.16 Aricas coast pro-

vided a variety o attractive opportunities or Allied exploitation

but at the same time the theatre prescribed an over abundance o

obstacles that no amount o conceptual planning could mitigate.

Two predominant points o view should be adopted with

respect to Allied movement in the Western Mediterranean. First,

the invasion o North Arica served as a model or success since all

went well or Allied planners; Operation Torch was a success story

on a small scale that was thence applied to France, albeit muchlater in the war. Second, considering that experience accrued

rom military training and the experience bequeathed on an army

through actual combat is fnely demarcated, British and American

orces participating in Torch would show that home-land training

did not always accord with live combat; divisions that returned

home rom the Mediterranean theatre were composed o nothing

less than battle-hardened veterans.

Prior to the instigation o disagreement over the Allied

Second Front, fghting during the Second World War progressed,

death tolls soared as the war in the European theatre climaxed and

the largest invasion in the history o warare drew near. Eisenhower

made clear the situation that Allied soldiers would ace when they

returned to the continent in a statement that preceded the am-

phibious landings:

You [Allied coalition orces] will bring about the destruc-

tion o the German war machine, the elimination o Nazi

tyranny over the oppressed peoples o Europe, and secur-

ity or ourselves in a ree world. Your task will not be an

easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped, and

battle-hardened. He [the German soldier] will fght savage-

ly... The ree men o the world are marching together to

victory I have ull confdence in your courage devotion to


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12 The Second Front

ull victory. Good luck, and let us all beseech the blessings

o Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.

- General Dwight D. Eisenhower17

On 6 June 1944 Normandy became the most important

theatre o the Second World War. Overlord had become the Allies

principle campaign and the soldiers o the Allied coalition against

Nazi Germany ought vigorously in opening the long awaited

Second Front in Europe.18 By the end o the day, a delicate toehold

was established in Western France with 156,000 American, British

and Canadian troops, as the orerunner to an army that eventually

grew to roughly two million men.

The ew kilometres o beach that were seized on the frst day

represented the frst step in the liberation o Paris and the even-

tual Allied crossing o the Rhine. This was achieved by way o a

marvellously executed coalition operation amid littoral conditions

that was the beginning o the end o German military dominance

in Western Europe. As the end-game began, Axis leadership could

only act to postpone what appeared to be an inevitable deeat.

Operation Overlord and its expedients were the result o

meticulous deliberation and collaboration between the chie na-

tions o the Allies that were directly involved in Overlords execu-

tion: Great Britain and the United States. Through a successiveseries o German and Italian military deeats rom the turn o

1943, the Allies had the opportunity to ascend as the dominant

orce in the European and peripheral theatres. Since Germanys

colossal invasion o the Soviet Union 22 June 1941 the need o

opening another ront in Europe was stressed by Joseph Stalin in

order to siphon German units away rom the Eastern Front and

17 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 6 June 1944, embarkation speech on the mor- h d


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13Introduction

alleviate pressure that Hitlers campaign was placing on the Red

Army.

Soviet Russias alliance with the Western Allies may be char-

acterized as a precarious partnership at best and having many im-

plications on Churchill and Roosevelts decision to assume a dir-

ect strategy against Germany as well as their decision to re-enter

Europe. Deluged by sudden war, tension resounded in the politico-

military relations, ostering subsequent hostility and suspicion on

both ends o the partnership.Extreme logistical and strategic limitations impeded the

United States and Britains capacity to pursue a direct strategy

against Germany in 1943. Achievement o victory seemed possible

only through projecting a 1944 invasion o Western Europe. As a

result, 1943 was utilized as a year or peripheral drills to aid the

success o Overlord. Friction between the Western Allies and the

Soviet Union heightened as a result o this adaptation and repeat-

ed postponements o the Second Front.

Returning to Europe in 1943 presented the Allies with sub-

stantial risks in contrast to the date eected in 1944; in making an

account o the risks and rewards o creating the Second Front it is

essential to examine several main acets o the war in Europe.

From the all o France in June 1940, German military

strength steadily grew. National Socialist muscle stood at the pin-

nacle o military achievement by the early stages o Babaa.

Slowly, the German military position in the Soviet Union receded

as the war in Eastern Europe unolded and yet despite these un-

olding events, Germany retained a capacity to wage a potent o-

ensive war against both the Allies and the Soviets on two ronts

until the late summer o 1943.A cross-analysis between 1943 and 1944 German military


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14 The Second Front

posed a real threat to an Allied landing in 1943, creating the con-

fnes or the Allied oensive-deensive trade-o.

Establishment o Allied air and naval supremacy was an-

other vital actor inuencing the inception o a substantial lodge-

ment ahead regardless o when it was to commence. Air-power

potential was frmly proven at the very beginning o the war in

Europe in 1939. Likewise, the necessity o naval supremacy or

a successul amphibious manoeuvre was demonstrated beyond

reservation soon ater. The need or SHAEF to assert aerial andnaval dominance in Europe and over the area directly concerning

the point o invasion became a critical proviso in returning to the

continent.

Investigating Allied pre-ops in the European periphery pre-

liminary oensives undertaken in late 1942 through 1943 and the

beginning o 1944 illustrates how such moves acted as stepping

stones that laid oundation or Overlords eventual laurel.

In order to concentrate on the issue o the Second Front

while directly relating to Allied strategic planning, this book de-

ers the issue o partisan actions, including Balkan partisan orces

in Yugoslavia led by Josep Broz-Tito, f faai LItiu

[Maquis] activity as well as the impact o partisan orces operat-

ing behind German lines in the Soviet Union or elsewhere among

the many countries under German administration in occupied

Europe.

Attending to all levels o conict in the engagement o any

historical domain, while avoiding arbitration between intra-na-

tional dierences o attitude and perspective, is always a rather

pernicious challenge or historians. Accepting the recognition o

the complexity o nation-specifc interpretations and paying par-ticular attention to the various power relations that are involved in


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15Introduction

an integral role in the grandeur o orchestrating large-scale coali-

tion warare during the Second World War.

Map 1: Europe in 1939 Beore the StormFrom conise Historial Atlas of World War 2 by Story, R (2005`)

used by permission o Oxord University Press, Inc.


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