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Transcript of Page-1 UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA AGENDA K3 Industri Kimia 5-4-11 silabus, pembagian tugas, Intro safety...
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
AGENDA
K3 Industri KimiaK3 Industri Kimia
5-4-11 silabus, pembagian tugas, Intro safety
12-4-11 Safety at BP Tangguh (guest lecture, HSE engineer)
19-4-11 Chemical Process Safety
26-4-11 Safety Analysis
3-5-11 Ujian
Reference:
1.Safety Analysis: Principles and Practice in occupational safety, Lars Harms-Ringdahl
2.Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
TUGASTUGAS
1. Buat file pptx
No absen 1-13 masing2 bab 1-13 buku chemical process safety
Misal no absen 1: bab 1
No absen 14-20: bab 1-14 buku safety analysis (per dua bab)
Misal no absen 14: bab 1-2, no absen 15: bab 3-4
No absen 21: bab 15
Dikumpulkan dengan nama file :
No absen-nama-bab.pptx, Contoh: 1-heri-bab1.pptx
Kirim ke [email protected], paling lambat hari minggu jam 16 by email
PIN: 233FAA46
• PenilaianTugas: 20%
Absensi: 10%
Ujian: 20%
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
AGENDA
INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION
•Safety Philosophy•Personal Protective Equipment•Safety Manner (safety induction dll)•Accident, Incident (fire, explosion, third party)•Emergency response (procedure)•Investigation (internal, external, forensik, analysis)•Safety Awareness (training, manner, SOP)
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
SAFETY HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTALPOLICY STATEMENT
Kangean Energy Indonesia Limited is committed to manage the Safety, Health and Environmental (SHE). Effective SHE performance is crucial to the success of the business.
The Company goal is to avoid any accident by improving personnel behavior.
Prevention of pollution, management of natural resources for sustainability and continual improvement are vital components and key to our success.
In fulfilling this commitment, the Management will:
• Develop SHE Performance Management Standards and ensure its compliance with all relevant laws and regulations and other requirements to which oil and gas business subscribes.
• Foster open communication with employees, contractors, neighbors, public interest group and those who work with us.
• Openly and periodically report SHE performance, good and bad, evaluate and review it and promptly take necessary corrective actions accordingly.
• Recognize those who contribute to improve SHE performance
This SHE policy is in effect and become the responsibility of everyone who works for Kangean Energy Indonesia Limited to Adhere.
Keisuke InouePresident & General ManagerAugust 2008
Kangean Energy Indonesia
Kangean Energy Indonesia
Ltd.
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
PPEPPE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
P&ID IFA
How to Develop/Finalize
Process Verification Proj.Spec Discipline Comments
P&ID IFH
P&ID IFC
P&IDAs Built
Company Comments
HAZOPSIL Study, etc.
Detail Design Feedback
Vendor Data Input
Field Change Feedback
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
AGENDA
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies)HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies)
HAZOP is a systematic and highly structured study with a critical approach to examine the process and engineering intentions of the process design.
HAZOP is used to identify all possible causes of deviation from normal safe operation that could lead to any safety and fire hazard, environmental risk or operability problems.
Some of the causes may be unrealistic and so they will be rejected as not meaningful. Some of the consequences may be trivial and would be considered no further. However there may be some deviations with both causes that are conceivable and consequences that are potentially hazardous. These potential hazards are then noted for recommendations/ action.
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
The important terms used in the HAZOP studyThe important terms used in the HAZOP study
Intention: The intention defines, how the selected section/ unit is designed or expected to operate.
Guide words: These are simple words, which are used to qualify the intention in order to guide and stimulate the thinking process and so discover deviations. A list of guide words, along with the likely causes, is given below.
Deviation: These are departures from the intention, which are discovered by systematically applying the guidewords.
Causes: These are the reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation has been shown to have a conceivable or realistic cause, it can be treated as meaningful.
Consequences: They are results of deviations, should they occur.Hazards: The consequences, which can cause damage, injury or
loss.
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
AGENDA
The primary aims of HAZOPThe primary aims of HAZOP
• To identify the cause of all deviations or changes from the design intent;
• To determine all major hazard and operability problems associated with these deviations;
• To decide whether action is required to control the hazard or operability problem; and,
• To ensure that the actions decided upon are implemented and documented.
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
HAZOP GUIDE WORDS & EXAMPLE CAUSESHAZOP GUIDE WORDS & EXAMPLE CAUSES
GUIDE WORDS
PARAMETERS
PROBABLE CAUSES
NOWrong routing – blockage – incorrect slip plate – incorrectly fitted check valve – burst pipe – large leak – equipment failure (isolation valve, pump vessel, etc.) – incorrect pressure differential – isolation in error – etc.
REVERSE
Defective check valve – siphon effect – incorrect pressure differential – two way flow – emergency venting – incorrect operation – in line spare equipment – etc.
MOREIncreased pumping capacity – increased suction pressure – reduced delivery head – greater fluid density – exchanger tube leaks – restriction orifice plates deleted – cross connection of systems – control faults – control valve trim changed – running two pumps – etc.
LESSLine restrictions – filter blockage – defective pumps – fouling of vessels, valves, orifice plates – density or viscosity changes – etc.
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
HAZOP StepsHAZOP Steps
• Select and confirm the scope of a node.• Explain the general design intentions and operating conditions of the node.• Specify process parameters for node.• Select a process parameter (Flow, Pressure, etc.) and specify the design intention
relating to this parameter.• Apply a deviation (more, less, etc.) to the parameter and develop a meaningful
causes/ hazards of the deviation from the intention.• Identify all scenarios causes / hazards of the deviation from the intention.• Identify all major consequences associated with each cause without regards to
safeguards.• Specify predominate safeguards against each consequence.• Identify existing level of risk by selecting severity and probability in agreed risk
matrix (attachment-1)• Make recommendations to mitigate the consequences if the severity is
unacceptable.• Identify risk level if recommendations have been implemented, again by selecting
severity and probability in agreed risk matrix.• Repeat above steps for other guide words.• Repeat above steps for other process parameters.• Repeat above steps for all other nodes in review.• Document all recommendations agreed by the HAZOP team.
• Select and confirm the scope of a node.• Explain the general design intentions and operating conditions of the node.• Specify process parameters for node.• Select a process parameter (Flow, Pressure, etc.) and specify the design intention
relating to this parameter.• Apply a deviation (more, less, etc.) to the parameter and develop a meaningful
causes/ hazards of the deviation from the intention.• Identify all scenarios causes / hazards of the deviation from the intention.• Identify all major consequences associated with each cause without regards to
safeguards.• Specify predominate safeguards against each consequence.• Identify existing level of risk by selecting severity and probability in agreed risk
matrix (attachment-1)• Make recommendations to mitigate the consequences if the severity is
unacceptable.• Identify risk level if recommendations have been implemented, again by selecting
severity and probability in agreed risk matrix.• Repeat above steps for other guide words.• Repeat above steps for other process parameters.• Repeat above steps for all other nodes in review.• Document all recommendations agreed by the HAZOP team.
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
HAZOP StepsHAZOP Steps
• Select and confirm the scope of a node.• Explain the general design intentions and operating conditions of the node.• Specify process parameters for node.• Select a process parameter (Flow, Pressure, etc.) and specify the design intention
relating to this parameter.• Apply a deviation (more, less, etc.) to the parameter and develop a meaningful
causes/ hazards of the deviation from the intention.• Identify all scenarios causes / hazards of the deviation from the intention.• Identify all major consequences associated with each cause without regards to
safeguards.• Specify predominate safeguards against each consequence.• Identify existing level of risk by selecting severity and probability in agreed risk
matrix (attachment-1)• Make recommendations to mitigate the consequences if the severity is
unacceptable.• Identify risk level if recommendations have been implemented, again by selecting
severity and probability in agreed risk matrix.• Repeat above steps for other guide words.• Repeat above steps for other process parameters.• Repeat above steps for all other nodes in review.• Document all recommendations agreed by the HAZOP team.
• Select and confirm the scope of a node.• Explain the general design intentions and operating conditions of the node.• Specify process parameters for node.• Select a process parameter (Flow, Pressure, etc.) and specify the design intention
relating to this parameter.• Apply a deviation (more, less, etc.) to the parameter and develop a meaningful
causes/ hazards of the deviation from the intention.• Identify all scenarios causes / hazards of the deviation from the intention.• Identify all major consequences associated with each cause without regards to
safeguards.• Specify predominate safeguards against each consequence.• Identify existing level of risk by selecting severity and probability in agreed risk
matrix (attachment-1)• Make recommendations to mitigate the consequences if the severity is
unacceptable.• Identify risk level if recommendations have been implemented, again by selecting
severity and probability in agreed risk matrix.• Repeat above steps for other guide words.• Repeat above steps for other process parameters.• Repeat above steps for all other nodes in review.• Document all recommendations agreed by the HAZOP team.
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001 Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Both 2 gate valves 150# at 16” Incoming line of Gas Boot is closed. No flow to Gas Boot
Closed
Existing safeguards : PSH installed at every prod well
! Effect: No
production
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001 Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Both 2 gate valves 150# at Gas Boots’ 16” liquid outgoing line are unintentionally closed. No Flow to Wash Tank
Closed
Existing safeguard
s
! Effect : Liquid level
increase
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001 Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Production Fluid’s incoming header ruptures due to corrosion or hit by car. No flow to Gas Boot
Incoming header rupture
! Effect : No production & Oil spill
Existing safeguards : Operator regular check
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P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001 Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Two 12” gate valves at Gas Boots outgoing lines are unintentionally closed. No flow to scrubber.
Closed
Existing safeguards:
PSV installed
! Effect : Pressure in the Gas Boot increase,
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0002 Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Any of 12” gate valve on gas line to PCV V51 is unintentionally closed and at the same time the Gas Plant Compressor is down. No Flow to Flare.
Closed
Existing safeguard
s
! Effect : Pressure in Gas Boot increase
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001 Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Black out which makes all producer wells down.
Black Out
There is no fluid enters the gas boot & no production to Shipping Tank
Existing safeguards : LSL installed at all tanks, LSL and PSL are installed at Transfer Pump & Shipping Pumpand by-pass valve should not be opened
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001 Deviation : Less FlowPossible Cause : Scale at incoming line to Gas Boot.
Scale
No consequences to Pager GS. Flow bottlenecks at off-plot line.
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P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001 Deviation : More FlowPossible Cause : More well POP or New Fields going in
More well pop
* Capacity of GS is 180,000 BPD, higher than peak forecast production
at 125,000 BPD.
Consequences : Overflow in the surge Tank. Water quality decrease.
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P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001 Deviation : More FlowPossible Cause : If one of incoming valve to Gas Boot accidentally shut-in, more fluid will be flowed to second boot.
! Effects : One Gas Boot will handle more liquid. More gas would be carried under to wash tank and gas blanket scrubber. Wash Tank
pressure will increase and separation efficiency would be lowered. May blow-up the tank’s roof.
Existing safeguards : PSV installed at tank &
scrubber
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001 Deviation : More PressurePossible Cause : Gas Plant Down.
! Effects : Pressure at Gas Boot increase. Liquid level decreases. Gas may blow under
PCV V51 will set pressure at 10 psig
and let excess pressure to flare.
LCV V1/2 will regulate to set
liquid level at set point
PSV at Gas Boot.
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE
Proposed ERP outlineEMERGENCY RESPONSE
PROCEDURE (ERP)
EMERGENCY SITUATION1. Definition2. Infrastructure3. Organization4. Action5. Identification of
Hazard
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE1. ERP for Gas
Leakage2. ERP for Fire/
Explosion
INVESTIGATIONPROCEDURE1. Preparation2. Report and
Recommendation3. Analysis4. Data Collection
EMERGENCYRESPONSE AWARENESS1. Training2. Simulation3. Hazard Control
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EMERGENCY SITUATION
Definition
An unexpected or undesired extraordinary event that might endanger human being, environment and the company business.
Minor Emergency Major Emergency
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
EMERGENCY SITUATION
Emergencies situation based on type of
accident
Gas leakage EmergencyGas Leakage Emergency is an emergency that threatens
human safety and or property.
Fire or explosion EmergencyFire or Explosion Emergency is a fire explosion incident that
threatens the personnel safety and/or results in the loss of properties
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Infrastructure
Emergency Control Centre (ECC) Equipment
•ECC•Accident Investigation
•Coordination and responsibility•Information Receiving and Follow Up •Communication for Emergency Control Centre
•Maintaining Liaison •Public Education•Hospitals
EMERGENCY SITUATION
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Emergency Control Centre (ECC)
A place in company, usually in the control room, where reports and commands are centred to take control
EMERGENCY SITUATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Authority that should be
appointed to control operation:
Coordination and Responsibility
Fire Chief
Support Controller Head Office
Fire Marshall on Site
Responsibilities of the highest authorities:
• Appointing official of related function to handle such accident and/or supervise operations on site.
• Ensuring that all necessary action is taken without neglecting the safety of life and property.
• Ensuring that appropriate resource are available and adequate to deal with the accident.
• Ensuring that communication is maintained properly between the area office and emergency scene, including the completion of the accident report as soon as possible.
EMERGENCY SITUATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Information Receiving and Follow Up
Communication for Emergency Control Centre
Information • Name, address number of reporter• Time and date
• Reported location• Action taken
Receiver• Give immediate response• Report to the Fire Chief
Equipment in ECC :• Telephone • Facsimile machine.• Radio call signs and pager numbers for operational staff.
EMERGENCY SITUATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Maintaining Liaison
Public Education
Each SBU/District office must establish and maintain liaison with Fire Department, Police, and other public service officials
Each SBU/District must establish an education program for customers, the public, appropriate government organization etc about the manner they are expected to respond to a gas pipeline emergency situation.
Hospitals
Each SBU/District must prepare a list of hospitals or other medical facilities in its area
EMERGENCY SITUATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
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Equipment
• A whiteboard;• A telephone or cellular;• Communication radios;• A computer and e-mail
account;• Printer;• A camera and Handy cam
Digital;• Facsimile;• Megaphones;• Gas proof flash lights;• Tables and chairs• Fire Extinguisher.
• A wall clock;• A calendar;• Complete network
maps • A Tape recorder;• First aid boxes;• An Overhead Projector;• A typewriter;• A filling cabinet;• Administration
facilities;• A waste basket;• ECC Mobile.
In ECC
EMERGENCY SITUATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
In Accident Investigation
• Phone list• Area and city maps• Note book• Measuring tape• Tape recorder and cassette• Report form• Investigation checklist• Gas Detector• Tool kit• Preliminary witness form• Clip board with plastic cover
• Pencils and pens• Compass• Camera and its apparatus• Label• Sealable plastic bags• Small bottles, boxes• Perimeter marking tape• Danger and caution tag• Company work order• List of expert for assistance• Magnifying glass
EMERGENCY SITUATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
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Organization
objective scopeAuthorities in
ChargeTasks and Authorities
Procedure
EMERGENCY SITUATION
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Objective
• Give guidelines to personnel involved in the Emergency Organization about their functions and duties.
• Give guidelines to every authority in the Emergency Organization about his responsibilities and authorities.
• Give guidelines to the personnel involved in the Emergency Organization about the positions or locations where they should gather upon receipt emergency news or information.
EMERGENCY SITUATION
ORGANIZATION
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Procedure
Emergency pickets
Emergencysituation
some of the team members
identify the incident
ECC
report
If major emergency
Emergency OrganizationRelated centres
Emergency Response Procedure
EMERGENCY SITUATION
ORGANIZATION
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
ECC
FIRE CHIEF
DEPUTY FIRECHIEF FOR
OPERATION
EHC
DEPUTY FIRECHIEF FOR
MARKETING
DEPUTY FIRECHIEF FOR
ENGINEERING
DEPUTY FIRECHIEF FORFINANCE
DEPUTY FIRECHIEF FOR
ADMIN.
DEPUTY FIRECHIEF FORSECURITY
DEPUTY FIRECHIEF FOR
PUBLICRELATION
FIRE MARSHALL
MEDICAL TEAM• DOCTORS/NURESES• AMBULANCE/HOSPITAL• ENVT. PROT. STAFF
FIRE OFFICER• FIRE FIGHTER• NETWORK RECOVERY• SALVAGE
FIRE STATION• SUPPORTING• DOCUMENTATOR• OSH OFFICERS
SECURITY• POLICE• COMPANY/OTHER
INSTITUTION SECURITY
Organization of Emergency
EMERGENCY SITUATION
ORGANIZATION
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Identification of hazard
Identification Classification variety of Hazard
High Pressure
Load Shedding
Emergencies andPressure Reduction
Escaped Gasinside Structure
Leakage outsideStructure
Fire and
Explosion
EMERGENCY SITUATION
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Identification
Dangerous situation or
not?
Incident
Requires immediate
action or not?
Emergency procedures including the plan to control emergency situations and
the action to be taken by the employee
EMERGENCY SITUATION
IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD
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Classification
Major emergencies associated with the low pressure system caused by loss of gas supplies affecting a number of customers
Class I Emergency
An interruption or decrease in gas supply at one or more off-take stations, resulting in a serious reduction of the availability of gas to be supplied at one or more sectors.
Class II Emergency
A failure of the high-pressure system or any incident requiring an immediate interruption of a sector of the system, which may have a serious effect on gas supplies in the area
Class III Emergency
EMERGENCY SITUATION
IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD
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ACTION
Action
Repair &Restore
Evacuation
Repair:• Repairing affected facilities• Not to damage other facilities. • Make temporary or permanent repair
Restore:• Restore any service outage• Check service leakage• Carry out a final site check .• Perform the inspection in person.
• Turn off the main electrical switch • Evacuated Structure which could be effected by an explosion.• ECC must be informed • Made an arrangements for the welfare of evacuees.• Traffic and pedestrians must be kept well clear of the site.• Evacuated property must not be reoccupied until safe.
EMERGENCY SITUATION
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Emergency Response Procedure
ERP for Gas Leakage
Minor Gas Leakage
Emergency
ERP for Fire or Explosion
Major Fire or Explosion
Minor Fire or Explosion
Major Gas Leakage
Emergency
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
ERP for Gas Leakage
To effectively control a gas leakage so that it can be immediately localized or controlled, so that the lost of life, property and serious damages can be minimized.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE
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Major Gas Leakage Emergency
Picket at ECC
Emergency news
Reporter Some of membersPickets unit in
district
Fire chief
Fire marshall
Picket at station
Emergency organization
set into operation
If gas leakage can’tbe controlled
Deputy Fire chiefOther related
officer
Security Head Officer in charge
Handling thegas leakage
Ensure the safety of personnel, materials, equipments and emergency evidence
Deputy Fire chief
Minor Gas Leakage Emergency
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE
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ERP for Fire and Explosion
To effectively extinguish, localize, and control a fire or explosion so that it does not seriously affect the company’s operations.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Major Fire/ExplosionEmergency
Picket at ECC
Emergency news
Reporter Some of membersPickets unit in
district
Fire chief
Fire marshall
Picket at station
Emergency organization
set into operation
If Fire/Explosion can’tbe controlled
Deputy Fire chiefOther related
officer
Security Head Officer in charge
Handling theFire/Explosion
Ensure the safety of personnel, materials, equipments and emergency evidence
Deputy Fire chief
Minor Fire/Explosion Emergency
Outside a Station
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
SECURITY TEAM
FIRE OFFICE• FIRE FIGHTING TEAM• RESCUE & SALVAGE TEAM
• REPAIR TEAM
RING – 0EMERGENCY SCENE
DOCUMENTATION OFFICER
SAFETY STAFF
EMERGECY AUX TEAM
TRANSPORTATION (POOL)
AMBULANCE
ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION STAFF
DOCTORS ORURSES
RING – 2FIRE STATION
RESERVE TEAM
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
RING – 1EMERGENCY HANDLING
CENTERClose To Emergency Scene
FIRE MARSHALL
RADIO
RING – 2EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER
(ECC)Control Room
FIRE CHIEFOFFICER IN CHARGE
PGN STATION OR CUSTOMERS
BRANCH OFFICE
RADIOTelephone
FIRE FIGHTING TEAM
RESCUE SALVAGE TEAM
REPAIR &SERVICE TEAM
FIRE MARSHALL
RADIOBRANCH OR UNIT HEAD
OPERATION COORDINATORS OFTECHNICAL, FINANCE, ADM
SALES OFFICERS OR STAFF
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICERS
DISTRIBUTION COORDINATORSOF SALES & PUBLIC RELATION
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
Emergency Handling Operating Procedure
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
Preparation Data CollectionReport and
RecommendationAnalysis
. Make investigation team. Make hypothesis
. Records
. Supporting Document
. Witness
. Picture
. Laboratory test
. Testing
Investigation Report
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Preparation
Investigation Team
Investigation Team consist of:•Safety experts•Supervisors or Direct superiors•Related experts (operation and engineering)
Principal responsibilities of investigation team:• Conducting investigation to determine causes of accidents.• Preparing report and giving recommendation for future action.
Hypothesis: Accident Cause Analysis
• What happen ?•. What should happen?•. Is there a lack of knowledge and skills?•. Is there ay motivation disharmony?•.are there physical and mental problem?
• does the work have a procedure?•. Is there routine plan and maintenance?•. Do the existing maintenance procedures
correct?•. Is there an improper use of devices and
tools?•.is there a habit of using wrong articles or
devices?
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Data Collection
1. RecordsDescribing the employees,equipment, materials and
work environment condition
6. TestingGas pipeline network system
And facility having the incident, the meter and regulator
must be tested
5. Laboratory Test To obtain the accurate dataAbout the cause of incident,establish test to the material
used for the facilities
3. WitnessThe investigators interview
the witnesses to collectdata of the accidents
2. Supporting Documents All documents including location
Map, engineering document,Operating data and all procedure
In emergency
4. PictureThe investigator must takeas many pictures as soon
as possible after the accident
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Analysis
The steps of a Fault Tree Analysis:• Determining the topic of accident• Determining the factors contributing to the accident• Breaking down or tracing the factors into the basic causes of the accident.• Drawing the conclusion on the basis of the basic causes of the accident combined with the facts and data got from the fields.• Determining the follow up actions including the preventive measures and recurrence prevention.
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
FLOW CHART
BURN INJURY
FIRE
FUEL OXYGEN HEAT
LEAKINGFLANGES
EXTERNAL INTERNAL
MATCHESSTRIKE
AGAINTSMETAL
UNSUITABLEKEYS
STOVES MATCHESVEHICLES
The conclusion is drawn after analyzing the possible basic causes of the accident, and considering the facts and data collected from the field
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Report and Recommendation
General Manager of SBU/District
Related Director Highest Authority
in the Area
Investigator
Report Report
RecommendationSection
Conclusion Section
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AWARENESS
Training Hazard ControlSimulation
SHE TrainingLearning
Organization
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AWARENESS
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Training
• SHE Training
Emergency training is necessary to identify problem areas, develop personal skills and maintain awareness.
• LEARNING ORGANIZATION
Organizational learning involves all the problems and challenges of individual learning, since individuals are agents of the organization.
Five stages in Audit Learning model:1. Awareness2. Understanding3. Demonstration4. Implementation5. Transfer
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE
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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Simulation
Emergency Response Simulation standard aims to develop personal skills and maintain awareness of all parties involve in emergency situation so that the lost of life, property and serious damages can be minimized.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AWARENESS
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Hazard Control
Hazard control includes recognizing, evaluating, and eliminating (or mitigating) hazards that occur because of human errors and physical deficiencies within the workplace
Two system control measures:1. Administration control measures2. Engineering control measures
Additional helpful clarification:• Inspection• Training• Education• Housekeeping• Preventive maintenance • Warning equipment
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AWARENESS