Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General

Overseas Development Administration: Technical Co-operation (Manpower Aid)

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 5 November 1987

Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London E3.90 net 129

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER AID)

This report is presented to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the National Audit Act, 1983.

Gordon Downey Comptroller and Auditor General National Audit Office

2 November 1987

The Comptroller and Auditor General, Sir Gordon Downey, is the head of the National Audit Office employing some 900 staff, He, and the NAO, are totally independent of Government. He certifies the accounts of all Government departments and a wide range of other public sector bodies; and he has statutory authority to report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which departments and other bodies use their resources.

OVERSEAS DE”ELOPMEhPT ADMlNISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER AID)

Contents

Summary and conclusions

Part I: Introduction

Part 2: Management Structure and Responsibilities

Part 3: Physical and Financial Control

Part 4: The Evidence for Effectiveness

Glossary of abbreviations 18

Pages 1

5

10

13

15

Appendices

1. Top 15 recipients of technical co-operation aid in 1985 19 2. Agency expenditure by British Council 20 3, Project framework 21

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION [MANPOWER AID]

Summary and conclusions

Background 1. The National Audit Office (NAO) have examined the administration of that part of the UK overseas aid programme concerned with the manpower aid element of Technical Co-operation (TC). The aid programme is administered by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Out of a total 1985 - 86 programme costing 81,192 million, the ODA spent some 87.84 million on TC, most of it on manpower aid to some 122 countries.

2. The basic purpose of the whole aid programme is to promote sustained non-inflationary economic and social progress and the alleviation of poverty in developing countries. The ODA define the aim of TC as being to help the transfer of appropriate knowledge and skills from the UK to developing countries in order to build up their capabilities. The ODA’s rationale is that without this fostering of local skills, other forms of aid will lose their long-term value. In pursuing their objective, the ODA are constrained by the need to operate with the agreement and full co-operation of the governments being aided.

3. TC consists of:

(a] training for the citizens of developing countries;

(b) providing UK manpower to make good scarce skills and to train local personnel to occupy the relevant posts in the future; and

(c) miscellaneous expenditure not directly attributed to individual countries, which is not considered in this Report (paragraph 1.4).

4. Training is administered on behalf of the ODA by the British Council. It involves placing students either in institutions of further education or on attachment to a suitable body. Some 10,000 people were trained in 1985, and the programme cost some 854 million, excluding the British Council’s administrative costs (paragraph 1.9).

6. In the main, the personnel funded by TC consist of:

(a) technical co-operation officers (TCOs) who are employed by the ODA on contracts:

(b] supplementees, who are employees under contract to Government, statutory bodies and educational institutions in recipient countries to whom the ODA pay the difference between local and UK levels of earnings;

(c) consultants under contract to provide resources or specialist skills not available from within the ODA or the TCO group.

6. In 1985, the ODA paid for 534 TCO man years costing 828 million: 1,264 supplementee man years costing (in salary supplements) 824 million; and let 155 new consultancy contracts which, together with

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Findings and conclusions

existing contracts, cost 830 million in that year. Some 89 million was spent on minor equipment and supplies in support of these personnel (paragraph 1.11).

7. The NAO examination of TC concentrated on the training programme and the provision of manpower; focussing on the two most important economic sectors for ODA aid, namely: Education and Renewable Natural Resources (RNR), and on six of the largest recipients: India, Bangladesh, Zambia, Malawi, Kenya and Sudan. The NAO visited India and Malawi where they held discussions with staff of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), from both the Diplomatic Wing (DW) and the ODA, and the British Council, visited aid projects and met officials of the local administrations.

8. The NAO’s main findings and conclusions on the ODA’s arrangements for achieving value for money from manpower aid are:

On the allocation of aid (a) The size of the aid programme reflects Government policy. Funds are allocated in the light of bids by geographical departments at Headquarters, each concerned with a regional grouping of countries. Such bids reflect funds required to meet existing commitments for all types of aid plus amounts required to pursue new proposals and to produce an overall planning figure which properly reflects Ministers’ policy towards providing aid to the country in question, given other pressures on resources. In recent years, the ODA have strengthened their system for recording commitments to facilitate project-based forecasting [paragraphs 1.14 and 3.12). (b) The ODA develop policy country by country, in the main through a formal mechanism of Country Policy Reviews (CPR), intended to show the reasons for the size and scope of each programme. The ODA prepare CPRs for around 15 countries which regularly account for some 70 per cent of aid allocated to country programmes. In the remaining 100 and more countries, allocations are determined on the basis of Britain’s relations with and interests in the country concerned and the positive contribution which can be made to the country’s development efforts. For the most part levels of aid tend to remain stable from year to year, and projects and activities are identified on that basis and expectation. The ODA introduced CPRs in 1983 to replace much wider ranging Country Policy Papers which had been discontinued in 1980 [paragraphs 1.5 and 1.17 to 1.20).

(c) CPRs are supported by periodic detailed reviews of economic sectors. The NAO found evidence of improved sector reviews in African countries, following a finding by the ODA in 1985 that many had been insufficiently incisive and not an effective instrument for deciding priorities (paragraphs 1.21, 1.24 and 1.25). (d) In the cases of Bangladesh and India, the strategy for the RNR sector is included in the CPR. The ODA told the NAO that the RNR sector has a high priority within the Bangladesh programme and that it is monitored on a continuing basis against the strategy established in the CPR. In the case of India, neither the Indians nor the ODA have yet considered it opportune or practical to undertake an overall review of the RNR sector [paragraphs 1.22 and 1.23).

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTR4TION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER AID]

(e) The ODA take an active role in promoting general co-operation with other aid providers (paragraph 1.27).

(fJ The ODA generally achieve a satisfactory standard of appraisal, but smaller TC projects - especially involving supplementation - often lack clear, quantified objectives. Such shortcomings may be avoided in future as the ODA implement a more structured approach to appraisal but only if sufficient running cost resources can be allocated to these tasks [paragraphs 3.1. to 3.5).

On the management of the programme (g) The management of TC involves ODA staff in the UK and abroad; Diplomatic Wing staff at overseas posts; and British Council staff in the UK and in developing countries. The ODA have provided detailed guidance to the Diplomatic Service and have formal aid administration arrangements with the British Council; in addition the role of posts and the Council is specified in the context of individual projects (paragraphs 2.1 to 2.3, 2.10 to 2.12 and 2.15 to 2.18).

(h) The ODA, by giving greater powers to development divisions in Africa have generally clarified responsibilities and strengthened management in line with the principles of the Financial Management Initiative (FMI). The important programmes in India and Pakistan are still managed from Headquarters in London (paragraphs 2.4 to 2.9).

(i] The training programme which cost 860 million in 1985 -86 including administration expenses, is administered by the British Council. The ODA also use the Council in India to administer a broad range of other projects and are considering expanding its role in other countries (paragraphs 2.15 to 2.18 and 3.15).

(j] The ODA monitor the implementation of projects using written reports and site visits. The NAO found that in smaller TC projects this work suffered from a lack of clearly expressed objectives (see 8(f)], and there was little systematic monitoring of activity involving supplementees in Southern Africa. The annual reports which the ODA receive from the British Council do not contain sufficient information to allow them to monitor fulfilment of the planned training programme (paragraphs 3.6 to 3.9 and 3.11).

(k) Financial records for TC projects were good for certain countries; others were of poorer quality, but they should improve with the imminent introduction of a computerised management information system (paragraphs 3.13 and 3.14).

On the evaluation of aid (1) In 1980, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) recommended improvements to the scope and balance of the ODA’s evaluation programme and to other procedures. But the ODA concluded that, prior to 1984, they had not done enough individual evaluations required by inference to comply with the PAC recommendation, and that the evaluation system could be improved by changing the emphasis from administrative issues to project effectiveness. The lack of clearly defined project objectives makes evaluation of effectiveness difficult and therefore the ODA instituted in 1985 the new ‘Logical Framework’ approach [paragraphs 3.4, 3.5, 4.14 and 4.15).

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(m) The ODA undertake a limited amount of selective and detailed evaluation of completed TC projects. The ODA consider evaluation of small scale TC is best done outside the Evaluation Department and the NAO found that the extent of such evaluation varied as between geographical departments (paragraphs 4.16 to 4.20).

(n) The ODA are reviewing their arrangements for telling staff about the conclusions drawn from individual evaluations to determine whether they are the most effective way of meeting the need. Some recent projects, particularly those concerned with supplementation, continue to display shortcomings which had previously been identified from evaluations done between 1978 and 1985, although as the ODA point out their current staff resources cannot stretch to the detailed management of all individual supplementees [paragraphs 4.21 and 4.22).

9. It is difficult to make any realistic overall assessment of the effectiveness of TC or any other part of the ODA’s aid programme. Aid is clearly only one of a number of complex and, in some cases, unquantifiable influences at work and the current problems in a number of countries cannot be reckoned simply as a failure of aid programmes. Government in the mid-1960s and again in the mid-1970s identified the essential role of TC. However, in 1983 and 1985 the ODA undertook internal reviews of the broad effectiveness of TC which found the situation, especially in Africa, to be fundamentally unchanged. The ODA made policy and organisational changes as a result (paragraphs 1.7, 2.3 to 2.9 and 4.3 to 4.6).

10. In view of the difficulties involved in measuring the final and overall impact of TC aid, it is important that the ODA should continue to keep the effectiveness of the programme under frequent and active review; and that they should attempt to develop and adopt intermediate measures of performance for specific projects and activities. This will involve forming in advance clearer, and preferably quantified, objectives for small scale TC projects, as the ODA have already done for the larger projects; monitoring more extensively progress against these objectives; increasing the amount of selective and detailed evaluation after the event of whether objectives have been achieved; and taking appropriate action in the light of these evaluations. In the ODA’s view, these improvements may not be feasible in respect of an aid programme of the present structure within their running costs constraints.

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Part 1: Introduction

The aid programme

1.1 The basic purpose of the official aid programme (El,192 million in 1985586, including El41 million EEC attributed expenditure) is the promotion of sustainable, non-inflationary economic and social progress, and the alleviation of poverty in developing countries. Parliament has been told that while the primary purpose of aid is developmental, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) take account of political and commercial considerations in deciding how to use aid funds.

1.2 The ODA provide aid through two main channels: multilaterally, as funds to various international agencies (g.339 million in 1985 - 86) and bilaterally, mainly directly to the governments of individual countries (9712 million). Bilateral aid is made up of financial aid, mainly in the form of capital project costs (~428 million) and technical co-operation [TC) (E284 million).

1.3 Within the bilateral aid programme, TC is the main instrument for helping developing countries to overcome weaknesses in the expertise and skills of their people. The aim of TC has been defined by the ODA as being to help the transfer of appropriate knowledge and skills from the UK to developing countries in order to build up their local capabilities. The ODA, in pursuing this aim, do so entirely with the agreement and co-operation of those being aided. This obviously restricts the ODA’s freedom to implement changes in policy and to alter the ways in which they deliver the aid or their relative importance.

1.4 TC consists mainly of manpower aid to developing countries. The ODA also classify as TC certain expenditure which is not directly attributable to particular countries including research and development (~21 million), support for voluntary agencies (El0 million) and certain superannuation payments to retired civil servants of former British Colonies (~17 million). Such expenditure is not considered further in this Report.

1.5 In 1985, 15 countries received 42 per cent of all TC expenditure (see Appendix 1). The remainder was spread across 107 countries, of which 44 received less than ~250,000 and an average of E94,666 each. These smaller programmes typically consisted of a

small training effort, English language teaching and the provision of books, administered by the British Council; and of expenditure under the Heads of Mission gift scheme.

NAO examination

1.6 The NAO’s examination of TC concentrated on manpower aid to the two most important economic sectors for ODA aid, namely Education and Renewable Natural Resources (RNR), and on six of the largest recipients of aid: India, Bangladesh, Zambia, Malawi, Kenya and Sudan. The NAO visited India and Malawi where they held discussions with staff of the ODA, the FCO’s Diplomatic Wing (DW) and the British Council, visited aid projects and met officials of the local administrations.

Nature and role of technical co-operation

1.7 The fundamental role of TC in fostering the development of local skills, without which other forms of aid would lose their long-term value, has long been recognised by the ODA. In 1965, “Overseas Development: Work of the New Ministry” (Cmnd 2736) saw the shortage of professional and technical skills as a major obstacle to development: TC had a vital contribution to make and would be given the highest priority. In 1975, “More Help for the Poorest” (Cmnd 6270) described the purpose of TC as “not just the plugging of immediate manpower gaps but the building up of local capabilities”. The White Paper also stated: “The new aid policy, the more positive approach to identifying technical [co- operation) requirements, the emphasis on co- ordination and planning at activity and country level, and the rapid disappearance of situations of gross manpower dependence, all are leading to the growth of the project form in technical (co-operation)“.

1.8 Manpower aid consists, in the main, of two separate but inter-linked types of assistance:

- a training programme for developing countries; - projects and activities in developing countries aimed at increasing and improving na;ural resources and the supply of trained manpower, which may be linked to projects involving capital development.

1.9 The training programme, which is administered on behalf of the ODA by the British Council, involves

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placing students either in institutions of higher/ further education or on attachment to a suitable body. Some IO,OOO people were trained during 1986 at a cost of some ~64 million excluding British Council administrative costs.

1.10 The basic aim of training assistance is that it should contribute to the development of a student’s country within a reasonable time. Training is provided in a wide range of subjects in the economic, social and technical fields according to the needs and priorities of each country. Courses related to RNR, including the management of rural projects, are given a high priority; students of the humanities, fine arts and pure science do not normally qualify for help. Training normally takes place in the UK, or in another developing country if that is more appropriate. Courses are usually at postgraduate or equivalent level and many are specifically designed, or include special options, for overseas students. Courses usually last between three months and three years.

1.11 TC projects and activities involve the provision of expatriate manpower to make good scarce skills and to train local personnel to occupy the relevant posts in the future. The manpower falls into three groups:

- technical co-operation officers (TCOs), employed on contract by the ODA to fill advisory posts or, occasionally, to carry operational responsibility (534 man years in 1985, costing f7.8 million]: - supplementees, who are employed under contract to Government, statutory bodies and educational institutions in recipient countries to fill operational roles and to whom the ODA pay the difference between local and UK levels of salaries (1,264 man years in 1985, costing f24 million); and - consultants under contract to provide resources or specialist skills not available from within the ODA or the TCO group (155 new contracts in 1985. Total annual expenditure is f30 million).

Associated minor equipment and supplies cost some f9 million in 1985.

1.12 Historically, the main plank of manpower aid was the supplementation system. This was especially so in African countries (which currently have about 70 per cent of the total) where, unlike the Indian sub-continent, pre-independence administration and education were largely staffed by UK expatriates. Consequently, supplementees were essential to the newly independent governments, but their numbers

declined as they were replaced by trained indigenous staff. More recently, the provision of supplementees has been determined in the light of manpower reviews conducted by the ODA jointly with recipient governments. In 1972 there were scune 8,600 supplementees but the numbers fell to about 4,966 in 1977, 2,100 in 1982 and 1,300 in 1985.

1.13 The reduction in TCOs was less marked, from 1,100 in 1972 to 811 in 1982, and 685 in 1985. In Africa, the corresponding figures were 673, 310 and 297 (Figure 1).

Aid policy

1.14 The broad thrust of aid policy is decided by Ministers, on the advice of officials. Aid policy is expressed in financial terms through the allocation of aid among recipients, known as the Aid Framework.

1.15 A joint Aid Policy Department (APD), spanning the DW and the ODA provides support for Ministers and senior management on central issues of aid strategy, including policy on aid allocation to recipients and priorities in uses. The APD is also concerned with monitoring the broad balance among different forms of aid. The ODA told the NAO that geographical departments were responsible for translating broader aid policy into policy at country level.

1.16 The ODA consider that the development of policy at the detailed level occurs in the context of individual countries, each of which is treated as an entity in which capital aid and TC aid can be interdependent elements aimed at maximising developmental impact. The relative size of the two elements within individual countries may vary over time as perceived needs alter, unconstrained by the Aid Framework mechanism which operates at country level.

Country policy

1.17 The ODA develop policy towards individual countries through the medium of annual Country Policy Reviews (CPR). The ODA prepare CPRs for some 1.5 countries which regularly account for around 70 per cent of aid allocated to country programmes. For the rest (17 of which received TC aid of more than f 1 million each in 1985 and total aid from the ODA (excluding pensions) of E78 million) the ODA consider such reviews to be an inappropriate use of scarce resources. Allocations are determined on the basis of Britain’s relations with and interests in the country concerned and the positive contribution which can be made to the

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Figure 1

TCOs and Supplementees in post at 31 December

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OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION [MANPOWER AID)

country’s development efforts. For the most part levels of aid tend to remain stable from year to year, and projects and activities are identified on that basis and expectation. The ODA introduced the CPR in late 1983 to replace a system of much wider ranging Country Policy Papers which has been discontinued as a result of the 1980 Management Review.

1.18 A CPR is intended to show in a convenient form the reasons for the size and scope of the aid programme for the particular country. Typically, it covers such major issues as socio-economic features of the country; political and commercial considerations; the capacity to absorb aid: and the scope for donor co-ordination. A CPR also describes the existing programme and its achievements and proposes objectives and priorities for the future covering forms of aid and distribution between main sectors. Proposals are based on an assessment of need and take into account the views of the recipient government.

1.19 The ODA told the NAO that CPRs had been introduced in 1983 because it was judged that the value of a systematic review of policy for the larger aid recipients justified the administrative resources involved.

1.20 The NAO found that the latest CPRs for Zambia and Malawi contained thorough examinations of each country’s problems. In the case of India, no CPR was prepared in 1986. The NAO found that the one produced in January 1985 described the TC element of the programme as lacking definite structure (it covered virtually every field of development activity] but relatively effective. The CPR proposed a review of the TC programme during 1985 to determine whether, among other things, the distribution by sector remained valid. It seemed to the NAO that the CPR, in its reference to TC, did not amount to an analysis of inter-sector priorities. The ODA pointed out that the paper was not intended to do that. They considered that it made more sense to look at the overall sector balance irrespective of the balance between capital aid and TC. They also told the NAO that the size and variety of the Indian economy militated against the type of CPR common to smaller, and particularly African countries.

Sectoral aid

1.21 The ODA build up the TC component in CPRs using a series of reviews of economic sectors within a country. Because of the country by country approach to aid a sector is reviewed depending on its relative importance within a country and not on the amount of aid available. Sector reviews are significant

exercises aimed at developing an aid strategy based on a sound appreciation of conditions in sectors and of the plans of the recipient government which may be represented on the review team. The reviews:

- incorporate assessments of the manpower assistance needed to achieve defined development goals and targets; - make recommendations for the total manpower programme, including experts, consultants and training; and - identify the amount of the country aid budget which as a result could be used for TC.

1.22 The NAO found in the case of the Education sector in India that for a number of years until 1986, the ODA undertook an annual monitoring mission. The 1984 mission established priorities albeit without measurable output targets. In 1986, the ODA again reviewed Education sector policy and sub-sectoral priorities for future ODA assistance. In the case of the RNR sector, the ODA told the NAO that their strategy for the sector was included in the CPR, but that neither they nor the Indians had considered it opportune or a practical possibility to undertake an overall sector review. They also told the NAO that in such a vast sector they had to proceed by building on existing projects and encouraging the Government of India to make proposals on the basis of its current economic plan. They expected the recent appomtment of an RNR adviser to Delhi to lead to the sector being examined in greater depth [see also paragraph 2.8).

1.23 The NAO were told by the ODA that in Bangladesh the RNR sector had a high priority within the ODA’s programme and as such the strategy towards it was a central consideration of the Country Review paper, which itself took account of the Bangladesh Government’s own perceived development needs. The sector was a principal concern of the Development Division and monitored on a continuing basis by a strong cadre of advisers who develop and identify projects against the strategy established in the Country Review Paper. Because the Education sector in Bangladesh was not one of the priority sectors in the bilateral programme, it had been monitored at two yearly intervals rather than comprehensively reviewed.

1.24 In 1985, the ODA examined, among other things the quality of sector reviews in African countries in the light of the decision taken in 1983 to re-emphasise manpower aid (paragraph 4.5). The ODA found that many sector reviews had been insufficiently incisive and an ineffective instrument for deciding priorities. For example, in a major review of Kenya, sector reviews, with the exception of education, had been conducted in the context of

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the existing pattern of assistance. The ODA also found that reviews had tended to adopt a narrow staff inspection approach, in which individuals and posts were looked at without reference to their wider developmental role or the importance of, and constraints within, the relevant sectors and institutions.

1.25 The NAO found the position in Africa to be improving. A 1986 review of education in Sudan and an overall review of manpower in Zambia were both of good quality.

1.26 In recent years the ODA have increasingly considered training needs in the context of economic sector reviews. Consequently, country training programmes, which previously had stood apart from the rest of the bilateral programme, are now largely related to particular projects; and this is likely to mean that the training will be more effective. There is still a need for “free-standing” training in areas such as public administration. The NAO found that the proportion of awards in this category in the African countries they examined ranged from zero up to 31 per cent. In India and Bangladesh free-standing awards were 36 per cent and 12 per cent of the respective totals. The NAO noted that an ODA/British Council review of Bangladesh education in 1985 had

reported that the evidence collected was insufficient to enable the team to reach firm conclusions about the value of the tiaining that had so far been offered to Bangladesh. On the one hand, there was the positive value placed on their training by many of the people who had been abroad, and many of the people associated with them, as well as the general enthusiasm for the programme evinced by the Bangladesh authorities. On the other hand, there were frequent complaints from all sources that the training could not be fully utilised because of institutional contraints and high mobility. In these cases, training was therefore of potential, rather than realised, benefit.

Donor co-operation

1.27 The UK is nowthe sixth largest bilateral donor (1984 figures), although in many countries the programmes are small in proportion to total aid. The ODA take an active and often leading role in promoting co-operation among donors by participating in international forums and through less formal discussions at country level. All CPRs include a section dealing with donor co-ordination. However, a requirement for project appraisals to include a reference to other donors’ activities would ensure that such activities were fully appreciated when projects were being considered for approval.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT AlJMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER AID)

Part 2: Management Structure and Responsibilities

ODA

2.1 Managing TC involves a number of ODA Divisions, Diplomatic Ppsts in the relevant countries and the British Council in the UK and overseas. Within the ODA, the bilateral aid programme, including TC, is managed and controlled financially by a number of geographical departments and overseas development divisions, each concerned with a regional grouping of countries. Geographical departments have prime responsibility for forming general aid policy towards individual countries in accordance with broad policy guidelines (see paragraph 1.15), managing the aid programme and monitoring expenditure against Aid Framework allocations.

2.2 Development divisions, mainly staffed by advisers, are generally responsible for:

- identifying aid priorities; - providing and co-ordinating professional advice in key disciplines; and - identifying, appraising, physically monitoring and evaluating projects.

The five divisions cover respectively the Caribbean, South East Asia, East Africa, Southern Africa and the Pacific.

2.3 Geographical departments are advised on technical aspects of aid projects by specialist staff in a range of professions, most of whom are based in the UK. Others are stationed overseas at development divisions. Each division has only a few advisers [eight in the case of Southern Africa) representing the most important specialisms in the particular region. The main exception is Education in which all advisers were UK-based until 1987, when one was stationed in Southern Africa. Advisers in development divisions also liaise with local officials, monitoring progress and responding to the needs of geographical departments for information. Exceptionally, three ODA advisers dealing with India are located in the British High Commission, Delhi and operate in a manner similar to that of advisers in development divisions.

2.4 In 1984-85 the ODA undertook an Efficiency Scrutiny of the role of development divisions. The

terms of reference were narrowly drawn and took the existence of the divisions as given. The Scrutiny found that development divisions were on average 40 per cent (a total of f800,OOO at that time) more expensive than an equivalent London-based operation but that the extra cost could be justified by the enhanced quality and effectiveness of aid, and because of the shortened lines of communications to aided countries. The Scrutiny recommended capitalising further on these advantages by, among other things, giving the two development divisions in Africa additional responsibilities for manpower aid, including financial control functions which were already devolved to the Caribbean and Pacific divisions.

2.5 After discussion with the Efficiency Unit, who considered that the undoubted need for some kind of local representation should have been more precisely assessed, the ODA undertook a wider review of the justification for development divisions. This endorsed the Scrutiny findings but considered that because of the general constraints on expenditure, functions should continue to be covered from London where this would be more efficient.

2.6 The ODA accepted recommendations that development divisions in Africa should take responsibility for manpower programmes and training policy; that the respective roles and functions of Diplomatic posts, ODA Headquarters and development divisions should be clarified: and that clear lines of responsibility should be established by, for example, appointing project managers.

2.7 The ODA reviewed the cost effectiveness of the existing financial management functions of the Pacific and Caribbean development divisions in the light of the wider review’s finding that financial management required comparatively large administrative resources. The ODA concluded that in the particular circumstances of those divisions, which handled a large number of small and medium sized programmes, there would be a loss of efficiency if financial management were brought back to London. On the other hand, the ODA decided that for East Africa and Southern Africa the work could be done more economically and efficiently at Headquarters.

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2.8 The ODA also examined the case for establishing a development division for India and Pakistan in the light of the volume of aid given to those countries. The case rested on the need to improve the availability of professional advice on the spot; the cost of visits by HQ staff; and the tendency under existing arrangements for the ODA to be forced into a reactive role. On the other hand, the British High Commission staff were in a position to co- ordinate closely diplomatic, commercial and aid relations. Additional staff resources would be hard to find and it was thought that the Government of India might wish to continue to deal with only one UK body. The ODA decided not to set up a development division in Delhi, but to strengthen the professional staff by a RNR adviser.

2.9 The NAO visited the Southern African development division and assessed the work of the East Africa and South East Asia divisions by examining files and interviewing staff at Headquarters. The NAO found the prospects for the new responsibilities in Southern Africa to be encouraging. Advisers could generally respond quickly and flexibly within their broad area of expertise but there was some evidence of individuals, eg a manpower economist, being overloaded. The control over projects had recently been improved by the designation of a manager for each. The NAO noted that two staff had been saved as a direct consequence of greater delegation of work on manpower issues to the Southern Africa development division. The ODA were about to undertake a review of Headquarters’ staffing in the light of experience of the transfer of responsibility for manpower programmes and training policy to the development divisions in Africa (paragraph 2.6).

Diplomatic posts

2.10 FCO posts overseas are responsible for the day to day management of the aid programme. They are the direct point of contact with recipient governments. They receive requests for aid, advise the ODA on them and negotiate aid agreements. Some posts have a significant responsibility for personnel management

, related to aid activities and, to a varying extent, posts monitor aid activities in the field.

2.11 The ODA have provided detailed guidance to the Diplomatic Service, but this does not include specific objectives for aid work. The Efficiency Scrutiny (paragraph 2.4) found posts to be unclear as to their precise role and, in some instances, lacking in up-to-date procedural guidance. The NAO found that the posts’ role varied widely from place to place and, seemingly, from time to time as personnel changed.

2.12 The ODA told the NAO that they were discussing with the DW more formal arrangements to ensure that geographical departments are consulted during the annual exercise to set objectives for aid sections at posts as part of the DW’s annual objective- setting exercise.

2.13 The volume of aid work varies widely from post to post. The volume is sufficient to warrant only 23 full-time staff at First and Second Secretary level, some of whom are seconded ODA staff. It is unusual for there to be more than one or two, normally locally-engaged, subordinate staff concerned with aid. Staffing levels are decided by the DW in consultation with the ODA and controlled through a four-yearly cycle of inspections, supplemented by annual reviews by Heads of Mission. Starting in 1986 - 87, the ODA pay the DW the cost of full-time aid staff at posts, including local overheads, estimated to be ~4.2 million in the first year.

2.14 Diplomatic staff, who undertake tours from 18 months to three years, are given briefings in the weeks before taking up an aid posting, and, wherever possible, participate in ODA training courses. The ODA informed the NAO that they regularly discussed with the DW future arrangements for filling aid posts overseas and they were consulted about every posting where the individual would spend SO per cent or more of his time on aid matters.

British Council

2.15 The British Council administers and manages the training programme on the basis of a principal/ agent relationship (paragraph 1.9) which rests on an exchange of letters in 1972, when the work, together with the bulk of the staff, was transferred to the Council. At that time the programme handled some 4,000 students. The programme is administered in accordance with a manual which incorporates the ODA’s detailed instructions. In 1985-86 the ODA paid British Council costs and agency fees totalling E60 million.

2.16 The British Council implements the training programme in accordance with an annual specification for each country. These - known as Key Sheets - specify the number and types of student to be sought by the British Council which identifies suitable candidates and matches them to courses. The British Council arranges for students to come to the UK (or occasionally a third country), pays them a stipend and maintains contact during their stay.

2.17 The British Council also undertakes a range of other activities for the ODA which varies from

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OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER Am)

country to country. These comprise administering TC programmes, mainly in education, improving links between universities in the UK and those in developing countries, and giving advice in the field of technical education. A summary of the main services the British Council provides is at Appendix 2.

2.18 The NAO found that in India the ODA used the British Council to administer a broad range of projects and they have negotiated a formal agreement covering the provision of these services. Elsewhere. the ODA are examining a proposal to expand the British Council role as managing agent for projects in

various sectors. The NAO found the Council knowledgeable about administrative mechanisms in other countries and, in India and Southern Africa, thoroughly conversant with the projects it was monitoring. The ODA informed the NAO that when reviewing the economy of the arrangements with the British Council they placed reliance on the Council’s annual management information returns and system of staff inspection. The ODA do not believe that there is an agent which could take over the role of the Council in its entirety, but geographical desks are specifically encouraged to consider going out to tender before employing the Council on additional tasks.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMIhWIXATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER AID)

Part 3: Physical and Financial Control

Appraisal of potential projects and activities

3.1 Proposals for projects may come from the government of a recipient country, aid sections in Diplomatic posts, or from within the ODA. The first requirement is for these proposals to be appraised in the light of the ODA’s basic policies and their objectives for the particular country and economic sector.

3.2 The NAO found that appraisals generally attempted to produce:

- properly defined and quantified objectives; - identification of the necessary resources in terms of quantity, type and source; - allocation of responsibility for managing the project:

- yardsticks against which progress can be measured;

and that the standard of appraisals was improving. There were weaknesses though in the setting of clear, quantified objectives for small projects - especially those involving a single individual filling a supplemented post.

3.3 In the case of a primary schools project in Andrahra Pradesh, the NAO found objectives stated in general terms and targets expressed in terms of both inputs (schools/teachers to be aided) and the requirement to evaluate outputs (eg pupil attendance). The ODA told the NAO that this project was reaching the end of its pilot phase, which had included the establishment of an evaluation unit which monitored a series of indicators including attendance ratios.

3.4 The ODA decided in 1985 to adopt the ‘Logical Framework’ appraisal method for all types of project. This is a structured approach to relating inputs to outputs and objectives (Appendix 31, developed jointly by USAID and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The main advantages are:

- the coherence and discipline brought to project formulation and design:

- the encapsulation of a project in a concise way: and

- the establishment of a clearly defined base for monitoring and evaluation, including, wherever possible, quantified targets.

3.5 The ODA accept the need to quantify objectives wherever possible and are considering applying the ‘Logical Framework’ approach in small as well as large scale projects.

Physical monitoring

3.6 The ODA control larger projects throughout their implementation using:

- a monitoring plan involving reports by TCOs or consultants engaged on the project: and - visits by development divisions/ODA HQ/ posts/British Council staff,

3.7 The ODA ape currently reviewing these procedures. (The NAO found that the larger projects they examined had been visited at intervals and that the approach generally met monitoring needs). The recent intmduction of the ‘Logical Framework approach, if it results in objectives being more clearly stated, should in turn enhance the value of monitoring.

3.8 In India, the ODA had a project monitoring plan covering all projects over ~250,000. The project memoranda for the smaller technical co-operation projects and the PEC submissions and aid agreements for the larger projects set out monitoring arrangements and define the role of the British Council, as does the formal agreement with the Council for the management of specific TC programmes (paragraph 2.18). The ODA’s recent evaluation of bilateral project monitoring showed that, in a large majority of cases, where problems were identified by monitoring missions, clear guidelines for action were produced and followed through to ensure that action was taken.

3.9 The NAO found during their visit to the Southern African development division that adviser visits and the system of sector reviews (referred to in paragraph 1.21) provided little monitoring of individual supplementees. The Post in Lilongwe stressed that, within their limited resources, they could do little. It seemed to the NAO that the scale of expenditure on supplementation justified a higher level of monitoring and that the present level was an inadequate basis for regularly extending the long periods some supplementees spend in one post.

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O”EW3AS DE”RLOPMRNT ADMTNISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER AD)

3.10 To increase the developmental value of manpower aid, the ODA expect bodies making use of “traditional” TCOs, ie those filling isolated posts, or supplementees to allocate individuals as counterparts to be trained to fill the expatriate’s post. The NAO found these arrangements to be disliked by TCOs and supplementees. Very often, recipients of aid failed to provide a~counterpart and where they did, many individuals proved to be unsuitable or vacated the post. The newer style of TC project - for example an Integrated Rural Development project in Zambia - aims to transfer skills to groups rather than to an individual.

3.11 For each country programme, the ODA provide the British Council with a formal specification of training expenditure for the coming year (see paragraph 2.16). The ODA told the NAO that the procedures had been tightened up since a review in 1984 found such specifications to be imprecise. However, the NAO found in the six countries they examined that, although the system requires the British Council to consult the ODA before departing from the Key Sheet, the Council’s end of year reports did not give enough information for the ODA to see whether this had happened and whether the planned training programme had been achieved. The ODA told the NAO that they now require the British Council to produce detailed reports on the implementation of each Key Sheet.

Financial control

3.12 Funds are allocated among countries by Ministers as part of the annual Aid Framework exercise [see paragraph 1.14). This takes account of, among other things, bids by geographical

departments which are in turn informed by the level of known commitments, ie forecast disbursements on approved projects. Such commitments can absorb a high proportion of the funds available for a country (over 80 per cent in some instances). In recent years, the ODA have improved commitment records by developing individual project commitment and forecast disbursement records. These were converted to a computerised system in the autumn of 1986.

3.13 The NAO found that financial records for TC projects were good for certain countries but others were of poorer quality. Many sections, notably India, were able to record actual expenditure against budget for only the larger individual projects; tbe remainder being aggregated.

3.14 The ODA told the NAO that the scope of their records had been limited by delays in developing a computerised MIS. Recent development work had led to improved records and the ODA expected to have a more comprehensive MIS in 1987 - 88.

3.15 As regards expenditure on the training programme, the ODA meet British Council claims within the financial ceiling authorised by geographical departments through the Key Sheet procedure (paragraph 2.16). The Council’s fee for administering the training programme is negotiated annually when the Council provide a detailed estimate broken down by country and activity based on the level of programme expenditure forecast by the ODA’s geographical departments. The ODA told the NAO that the grant, once agreed, is kept under review and may be renegotiated if for any reason the volume of the programmes or the level of administration required should change significantly from that on which the original estimate was based.

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O"ERSEASDEVELOPMENTADMNISTRATION:TECHNKALCO-OPERATION(idAN!'OWERAID)

Part 4: The Evidence for Effectiveness

4.1 The nature of TC makes quantitative assessment into account the existing pattern of economic sector of effectiveness difficult and assessment tends to be aid they established in 1981. The ODA found: on the basis of qualitative indicators. - that the number of TC uersonnel had

4.2 The measurement of effectiveness, especially in the manpower field, raises difficult issues of identification and quantification when it addresses long-term impact. Conditions in an economic sector change over time and a single aid project or group of projects will be only one of the influences at work. Measuring short-term, more direct effects, is likely to be easier, but contributes only a preliminary indication to the assessment of real effectiveness.

4.3 A major review by the ODA in 1983 found:

- that the economic and social development of Africa in particular suffered from a continuing shortage of experienced management and technical staff; - that the ODA’s withdrawal of manpower had reached the point where it had probably undermined the viability of some institutions;

- that supplementee programmes had tended to evolve as a collection of ad hoc requests for individual costs, and that insufficient effort had

continued to decline and manpower programmes continued, in the main to reflect the inherited pattern of support;

- that there had been a general failure to clarify the role and objectives of manpower aid both at a country level and within individual sectors;

- that little had been achieved, particularly in respect of the larger programmes such as in Zambia, Kenya and Malawi, towards concentiating limited resources on priority sectors and institutions and in organising the various elements of manpower aid into projects: and

- that the manpower reviews often remained no more than staff inspections in the way in which they examined the justification for individual posts, although they had been moderately successful in, for example, strengthening the linkage between the training programme and aid personnel.

gone into relating groups of posts to broader developmental objectives: and 4.6 The ODA also found that progress towards

- that development, especially in Africa, was implementing the decisions on 1983 had been slow because:

being hindered by institutional weaknesses and failures in management which the supplementee programme in particular had not adequately addressed.

- the ODA had not established effective arrangements to ensure that those planning and managing manpower aid had regard to the new policy:

4.4 In the light of these findings, the ODA decided - that, to the extent that existing commitments

where the approach had been tried it was found to need more ODA staff time than was

permitted, priority should be given in future to available: providing manpower aid, especially to African countries. The ODA also decided that they should concentrate efforts on building the strength of institutions as the best way of improving the

- certain brought-in skills, for example financial management expertise, were in short supply; and

efficiency of those institutions and organisations - expertise in the whole field of manpower which were important to economic development. As economics needed to be more effectively means to this end, the Review identified the proper focussed on a manageable number of manpower appraisal of new and future needs: the setting of projects. objectives and timetables for their achievement: and the packaging of inputs and instruments into The ODA concluded that the basic methods of projects. The ODA endorsed all these aims. increasing the impact of manpower aid were still not

being applied in a number of countries and sectors. 4.5 In 1985 the ODA examined their progress in implementing the revised approach of 1983, taking

Commenting on the examination, the two African development divisions stated that their efforts to

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OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER AID)

implement the revised approach of 1983 had been constrained by the need to gain acceptance by recipient governments.

4.7 The NAO found there was still a considerable amount of non-project TC, mainly in the form of supplementation, for example, in Malawi. The NAO were told by the ODA that the speed at which they were able to introduce change was affected by the need to honour existing commitments: the frequent reluctance of recipient governments to accept changes: and, where governments were willing, the excessive burden of introducing reform across all sectors simultaneously.

Appraisal and monitoring

4.8 Adequate appraisal of potential projects and regular monitoring of progress against clearly defined objectives are essential prerequisites for the effective use of TC aid. In 1985 the ODA, recognising the need to improve appraisal, especially for the mass of small scale activities, financed a study which led to the introduction of the ‘Logical Framework’ method (paragraph 3.4). This should provide important improvements in the quality of appraisals, especially by focussing attention on the need to set clearly defined objectives before projects are approved.

4.9 The quality of monitoring is good but the ODA need to further extend monitoring into the difficult area of supplementation. The ODA told the NAO that they were about to carry out a further review focussing on their monitoring of TC.

4.10 The NAO found that although supplementation programmes were subject to periodic manpower reviews, the ODA’s resources did not always stretch to the management of individual supplementees. The ODA told the NAO that they were seeking to improve professional monitoring, but that their approach to managing supplementees was conditioned by their status as employees of the aided institutions rather than of the ODA, and reinforced by the lack of the considerable resources which would be needed for such management.

4.11 The stationing of TCOs and supplementees overseas leads to costs being incurred locally on, for example, personal transport, workshop equipment and consumables such as laboratory chemicals. The ODA’s policy is that departments and institutions in the aided countries should meet such costs as far as possible and appropriate. Within this general policy, senior managers may decide to support “local costs” in particular instances. The NAO found that in practice local costs were often not funded as envisaged by the ODA apparently because the assisted institutions lacked money.

4.12 The ODA base their policy on arguments of cost effectiveness; the difficulty of directly controlling local costs; and on the benefits of involving aided governments in wider considerations of determining priorities and promoting sustained development after the ODA’s withdrawal. It seemed to the NAO, however, that the lack of local spending increased the risk of the ODA’s own expenditure being ineffective. In support of this view, the NAO found lowered morale among certain personnel in Malawi, due to frustration at their reduced effectiveness.

Evaluation

4.13 The measurement of effectiveness requires evaluation of the extent to which projects have met the objectives. If effectiveness is to be increased, the conclusions drawn from evaluation should inform current work in identifying, appraising and monitoring.

4.14 In 1980 the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) recommended that the ODA should examine the scope and balance of their evaluation programme to ensure that it covered a sufficiently comprehensive sample of bilateral projects and methods to provide assurance of effectiveness. The PAC also recommended the ODA to review their procedures for drawing conclusions from evaluation studies and initiating appropriate action. The subsequent Treasury Minute outlined the ODA’s response, including revised criteria for selecting projects and programmes for evaluation, and a significant increase in the number of evaluations following a 40 per cent increase in the Estimates provision for the work (Cmnd 8413).

4.15 In 1984, an ODA Evaluation Department paper concluded that the number of evaluations was well below that which, by inference, would be required to comply with the PAC recommendation. The paper also recognised that the evaluation system could be improved by changing the emphasis in Project Completion Reports (PCR) from administrative issues to project effectiveness.

4.16 Projects are evaluated by geographical departments using a PCR which accounts for the use of ODA funds and records successes and failures in achieving objectives. The NAO found the ODA’s procedures, which had been strengthened in the light of the paper referred to in the preceding paragraph, were unclear as to the need for PCRs for smaller TC activities and the ODA subsequently emphasised this requirement. When new style PCRs were instituted in 1985 it was decided to undertake a special exercise to cover projects completed between 1980 and 1985

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OVERSEAS D!IVRLOPMRNT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION [MANPOWER AID)

retrospectively. The NAO found that in November 1986 PCRs had been completed for three-quarters of the large projects (Capital and TC) completed between 1980 end 1985. They were later told by the ODA that as the result of a special exercise all outstanding PCRs had been prepared. The ODA’s Projects and Evaluation Committee (PEC) recently endorsed a proposal to attempt a synthesis of the findings of some of the PCRs and to study ways of making them more effective as a management tool.

4.17 The ODA carry out selective and detailed evaluation of completed projects using a small Evaluation Department (ED) supported as necessary by consultants.

4.18 The ED’s work costs the ODA some E0.5 million a year. The impact of evaluation reports is increased through their being considered by PEC, who advise the Minister on major aid projects and who are also responsible for evaluation policy. In 1985-86 the ODA completed 10 studies having some TC content, mainly as a small adjunct to capital aid. Studies may examine the experience of other donors, as well as that of the ODA, but may not always be able to directly address long-term effectiveness or impact. To do so involves expensive studies of effects starting from a baseline or examining the environment with and without the project. The methodologies for both types of study are unrefined. However, less ambitious assessments can be done more efficiently when projects have clearly defined objectives. The ODA told the NAO that, even where objectives were not clearly defined, they believed that they had been successful in evaluating TC, because in all cases the objectives were either implicit in the terms of reference or could be readily postulated.

4.19 The ODA consider that where a TC project consists of a relatively small scale activity, detailed evaluation may not be the best use of the ED’s scarce resources, unless there are likely to be general lessons to be learned. ODA Office Procedure includes a precis of evaluation procedures which it is open to geographical departments and development divisions to use in such cases. However, the ED’s current programme places increased emphasis on TC projects.

4.20 The ODA have produced a number of broader evaluations, for example, ‘A study of TCOs’ (1983) which examined the problems faced by these officers. The British Council in a number of countries have attempted to trace former trainees and to assess the

relevance of their training to their current occupations.

4.21 The ODA started in 1984 to prepare evaluation summaries (EVSUMs) as an aid to the dissemination of conclusions drawn from individual evaluations. In June 1986, the PEC agreed to a survey to establish whether the mechanism was the most effective way of feeding back to staff lessons relevant to current work, which is now being carried out. The ODA told the NAO that the early findings showed positive results.

4.22 The NAO examined a number of TC projects in the light of recommendations arising from evaluations.produced in the period 1978 to 1985. The NAO found some evidence, particularly for supplementees and to a lesser extent TCOs, in all six countries they examined, of earlier shortcomings appearing in later projects:

(a) inadequate briefing, including job descriptions and information about the aided country; (b) a lack of quantified objectives and/or goals: and (c) inadequate monitoring.

The ODA told the NAO that they recognised the desirability of detailed management of all individual supplementees, but the ODA’s limited resources could not always stretch to this, and it was necessary to concentrate available resources in accordance with priorities.

4.23 The NAO attempted to compare the ODA’s use of evaluation with that of other major aid donors. The NAO experienced difficulty in establishing basic assumptions, even as to what constitutes evaluation; for example a donor may or may not include informal evaluation as distinct from the more objective exercises carried out in the ODA by the ED. Thus. a simple comparison of expenditure on evaluation is likely to be misleading.

4.24 The NAO noted a report by the US General Accounting Office in 1983 drawing attention to USAID’s strong emphasis on evaluation and its use as an integral part of their overall system. The ODA pointed out that both the coverage and the methodology of their evaluations were based on internationally accepted best practice; indeed the founding head of the ODA’s ED was Chairman of the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Expert Group on Evaluation.

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OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT AIMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER AD)

Glossary of Abbreviations

APD

CIDA

CPR

DW

ED

EVSUM

FCO

FM1

KELT

MIS

NAO

ODA

OECD

PAC

PCR

PEC

RNR

TC

TCO

USAID

Aid Policy Department

Canadian International Development Agency

Country Policy Review

Diplomatic Wing

Evaluation Department

Evaluation Summary

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Financial Management Initiative

Key English Language Teaching Scheme

Management Information System

National Audit Office

Overseas Development Administration

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Public Accounts Committee

Project Completion Report

Projects and Evaluation Committee

Renewable Natural Resources

Technical Co-operation

Technical Co-operation Officers

United States Agency for International Development

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OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER Am)

Appendix 1

Top 15 Recipients of Technical Co-operation Aid in 1985

1. India 2. Bangladesh 3. Kenya 4. Zambia 5. Sudan 6. Malawi 7. Tanzania 8. Nepal 9. Nigeria 10. Egypt 11. Indonesia 12. Zimbabwe 13. Botswana 14. Pakistan 15. Yemen Arab

Republic

783 964

1,627 659

1,822 534

1,160 1,145

134 1,135 1,164 1,448

218 759

1,769

- 2,121 5,878

302 2,904

641 -

2

- 21

2,387 -

8,838 3,181 4,880 2,833 1,488 2,406 1,791 1,357 4,794

348 1,377 1,620 1.091 1,398

4,804 5,755 1,287

190 3,003

194 1,528 1,238 -

2,473 1,400

948 118 833

2,196 16,621 878 10,778 756 10,671 250 9,810 940 7,555 141 6,179 900 6,020

1,272 5,012 31 4,961

679 4,635 667 4,608 374 4,411 133 3,947 451 3,441

790 52 493 3,104

Total for 15 countries 15,321 14,256 38,192 23,823 10,161 101,753

Note: Figures exclude pension payments

I.

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OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER AID)

Appendix 2

Agency Expenditure by the British Council on behalf of the ODA: 1985 - 86

E Million

Technical Co-operation Training Programme 52.3

Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan 6.9

Key English Language Teaching (KELT) etc 5.2 Non-ELT Appointments 1.1

Book Presentation Programme 2.3 Low Price Books Scheme 1.2 Educational Seminars 0.2

Administration 69.2

8.0

77.2

TETOC [Technical Education and Training Operations and Consultancies)

Higher Education Division

Note: Where figure can be isolated

1.0 3.0

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OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION [MANPOWER AID)

Appendix, 3

Project Framework Project title: Bangladesh Technical Education Description: To revitalise the Technical Teachers’ Training College as part of

multi donor scheme to improve quality of technical education

Period of ODA Funding From FN 1984-85 to FN 1989-90 Total ODA Funding E2.83 million Date PF Prepared/ Revised:

Wider (sector or national) objectives Development of adequate By 1990 - supply of well-trained 1. Total supply of technical manpower to trained engineers and meet needs of public and technicians will be private sector industrial brought roughly into line development and of with demand (current power, water, estimates of supply at construction, transport end of 1990 are 20,000 and communications and 59,000 respectively) sectors 2. Annual output of:

(a) graduates from polytechnics (b) graduates from engineering colleges

1. Reports from Planning Commission 2. Polytechnic and engineering college records 3. Tracer studies as guide to supply/demand situation 4. Value judgment of employers as to whether quality of technicians and engineers has improved

1. No shortage of qualified applicants for places at polytechnics and engineering colleges 2. Demand and supply forecasts realistic 3. Improved quality, particularly increased degree of practical training, will make graduates more acceptable to industry 4. Rate of transfer of teachers into the private sector will not differ markedly from current level

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OVWSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWER MD)

Project Framework continued

Provision - well-trained technical teachers for engineering colleges and polytechnics from re- organised and re-vitalised Technical Teacher lhining College

1. Annual output for (say) 4 years of up to 170 polytechnic teachers with Diploma in Technical Education 2. Annual output for [say) 4 years of up to 40

retrained engineering college staff 3. Annual output of ‘c’ teachers from short courses on special teaching methods 4. By end 1990 ‘d’ trained teachers graduated from TTTC and in post at polytechnics and ‘e’ trained teachers at engineering colleges out of total staffs of ‘f’ and ‘g’ respectively 5. To assess quality, use pass-rates eg percentage of trainees achieving x percentage or more (6. Rate of return not calculated)

1. Quarterly progress reports from TTTC 2. Quarterly review reports from World Bank’s recent mission in Bangladesh 3. ODA participation in annual reviews of project

1. After 31 July 1988 all new teachers appointed at polytechnics will be required to have Diploma in Technical Education 2. After 1 January 1986, Government of Bangladesh (GOB) to ensure that under- qualified teachers in polytechnics enrol in TTTC programmes 3. Practical attachments to be made by 31 July 1987 requirement for award of Diploma in Engineering and Diploma in Technical Education 4. Binding arrangements will be made for graduates from TTTC to return to original posts 5. Contributions fmm IDA, UNDP and GOB for equipment modernisation, physical rehabilitation, curriculum development and industrial attachments, administmtive reform and reform of system examination for polytechnics and engineering colleges are successfidly carried through

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OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION (MANPOWW AID]

Project Framework continued

outputs: i. Provision and As for Immediate 1. Counterpart staff Revitalised Technical installation of Training Objectives equipment provided by GOB Teacher Training College College completed by 1986 2. Contributions by IDA,

ii. 5 senior staff trained UNDP and GOB provided in 1985 (15 man months) on time (see box 5 above) iii. 15 teaching staff trained by 7187 (273 man months] iv. DTE courses commenced in 7186 v. Other courses commenced in ? vi. Teaching guides prepared

InpUts: (i) Quarterly reports from BC on progress of recruitment, training and Government procurement (ii) Quarterly reports from CA on equipment procurement

ODA - 2000s

1984-851965-861986-871987-881986-691989-90 Total

Capital - Equipment

Books Share of local staff

salaries and cost of consumables

1,080 1,080

150 150

40 40 30 30 30 170

1,400

TC - Senior

Adviser 13 34 67 67 21 202

5 subject Advisers 90 402 360 052

Consultants 4 10 14

288madmonths

Training 135 170 50 355

13 1,379 633 517 51 30 2,823

Note: Illustrative example prepared by ODA from historical data.

23