OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

EVALUATION REPORT Ev568

EVALUATION OF ODA'S RESPONSE TO THE 1991·1992

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DROUGHT

April 1995

Edward Clay, John 80rlon, Sanjay Dhiri Anil Das Gupta Gonzalez and Carlo Pandolfi

VOLUME 11

EVALUATION DEPARTMENT OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 94 VICTORIA STREET LONDON, SW1E SJL

Volume II

Abbreviations & Acronyms i i i

Annex 1 Mozambique Case Study 1

Annex 2 Zimbabwe Case Study 37

Annex 3 Lesotho Case Study 77

Annex 4 Terms of Reference 97

Annex 5 References 101

i

AGRITEX ATP BHC BoP BRCS CAFOD CA CADEC CARE CARITAS CC CCM CCPCCN

CENE CGIAR COE CSAD CSFP CTE DANIDA DDF DEC DESA DHA DPCCN DRIG DRSS DRTF DSM DWA ECFAD EDRMP EFF EMAD ESAP ESRT FAC FAO FAS FEWS FHI FPMU FRELIMO FSU GAA GIEWS GMB Gol GoM GoZ ICRC ICRISAT IDA IEFR

ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Extension (Zimbabwe) Aid and Trade Provision British High Commission Balance of Payments British Red Cross Society Catholic Fund for Overseas Development Christian Aid Christian Catholic Agency for Development An international confederation of NGOs An international confederation of Catholic NGOs Christian Care Christian Council of Mozambique Co-ordinating Committee for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities Mozambique) National Executive Emergency Commission (Mozambique) Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Committee of Emergency Operations (Mozambique) Central and Southern African Department Child Supplementary Feeding Programme (Zimbabwe) Technical Committee for the Emergency (Mozambique) Danish International Development Agency District Development Fund (Zimbabwe) Disasters Emergency Committee Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (United Nations) Department of Humanitarian Affairs Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities (Mozambique) Drought Relief Implementation Group Directorate of Research & Scientific Services (Zimbabwe) Drought Relief Task Force dried skim-milk powder Department of Water Affairs European Community and Food Aid Department Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation Project (IMF) Extended Fi nanci ng Faci 1 ity Emergency Aid Department Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Zimbabwe) Evaluation success Ratings Table Food Aid Convention Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Free alongside vessel Famine Early Warning System Food for the Hungry International Food Programming and Monitoring Unit of CARE Mozambique liberation Front (SADC) Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit German Agro-Action (FAO) Global Information and Early Warning System Grain Marketing Board (Zimbabwe) Government of lesotho Government of Mozambique Government of Zimbabwe International Committee of the Red Cross International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics International Development Association International Emergency Food Reserve

i i i

IFRCS IMF IRWSS nSH IlK JFS LCN LFDG LRC LSM MRCS MSF MSF-CIS NAC NANGO NCPCC NGO NOVIB ODA ODI ORAP PEM RENAMO SACU SADC SCF SIDA SSFP TC UNHCR UNICEF UNILOG USAID VWSS WA WASA WDC I1FP WHO ZYMCA

iv

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies International Monetary Fund Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation internal transport, storage and handling International Wheat Council Joint Funding Scheme Lesotho Counci 1 of NGOs Logistics and Food Distribution Group Lesotho Red Cross Life Sowing Ministries Mozambique Red Cross Society Medecins sans Frontieres M§decins sans Frontieres Celula Inter-Sec~oes information system National Action Committee (Zimbabwe) National Association of NGOs (Zimbabwe) National Civil Protection Co-ordinating Committee (Zimbabwe) non-governmental organisation The Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation Overseas Development Administration Overseas Development Institute Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (Zimbabwe) Protein-Energy Malnutrition Mozambique National Resistance Southern African Customs Union Southern Africa Development Conference (formerly SADCC) Save the Children Fund Swedish International Development Agency Schools Supplementary Feeding Programme (Zimbabwe) Technical Co-operation United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Childrens Fund United Nations Logistics Task Force United States Agency for International Development Village Water Supply and Sanitation Water Aid Water and Sewerage Authority Water Development Consultants (United Nations) World Food Programme World Health Organisation Zimbabwe Young Men's Christian Association

Evaluation of ODA's Response to the 1991-1992 Southern African Drought

Annex 1: Mozambique Case Study

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1. INTRODUCTION AND METHOD OF STUDY

1.1. Introduction

1.1.1. Mozambique was selected as one of the case-study countries for two reasons. First it received a substantial share (22%) of the bilateral assistance provided by ODA in response to the drought. Approximately £10.8m of drought­related assistance was provided during Financial Year 1992/93. Only Zimbabwe and Zambia received larger amounts - £12.3m and £11.4m respectively. Secondly, ODA chose to concentrate its bilateral food aid assistance on Mozambique and Malawi and of the two Mozambique received the larger share. In all, just over 42,000 tonnes of food commodities, principally maize, were provided in the financial year, April-March 1992/93.

1.1.2. Section 2 of this case study examines the drought and the way in which it impacted upon an economy and society already profoundly affected by the (then) ongoing conflict. Section 3 briefly describes the response to this drought by the Government of Mozambique (GoM) and the international community as this provided the context in which ODA's response was undertaken and indicated the overall response of which ODA's was just one part. Section 4 describes ODA's response in more detail than is given in the Main Report, and assesses actions in distinct types of activity or 'sector', i.e. food and logistics, water, agriculture, rehabilitation and health.

1.2. Method of Study

1.2.1. Material for the Mozambique case study was gathered in London by John Sorton and Sanjay Dhiri of ODI and in Mozambique principally by Anil Das Gupta Gonza 1 ez. The materi a 1 collated and written up by Anil Das Gupta Gonza 1 ez was subsequently edited by John Sorton with assistance from Margaret Cornell.

1.2.2. An examination of the files of the Central and Southern Africa Department (CSAD), the Emergency Aid Department (EMAD) and the European Community and Food Aid Department (ECFAD) of ODA was begun in November 1993, and interviews were also conducted with the personnel of these Departments. At an early stage it became apparent that it was difficult to distinguish between those actions by ODA that constituted a response to the drought and those that formed part of the response to the ongoing emergency. An attempt was therefore made to identify the remit of the evaluation in relation to particular actions. During interviews with ECFAD staff it was agreed that the evaluation should cover all food aid actions funded during 1992/93. During interviews with CSAD staff it was agreed that the eva 1 ua t ion shoul d cover all actions funded from the 'Drought' fundi ng line, together with those actions funded from other funding lines that showed substantial overlap with the 'Drought' actions or which could be considered to have constituted responses to the drought.

1.2.3. Fieldwork in Mozambique was undertaken between 12 January and 6 February 1994 by Anil Das Gupta Gonza 1 ez, a management consultant who had previ ous 1 y worked as the Country Representative of SCF-UK between 1984 and 1988 and who spoke fluent Portuguese. Prior to his visit a nutritionist previously employed by Medecins Sans Frontieres in Maputo, Austen Davies, collated information, principally nutritional and socio-economic surveys of the situation in the principal areas of the country where ODA assistance had been distributed. Of the 34 days of fi e 1 dwork 23 were spent in Maputo and 11 in the Provi nces. The select i on of Prov i nces and proj ects to be vi sited was based on the assumpt i on that the food aid and 'Drought'-funded actions constituted the principal actions to be evaluated and it was intended that Gaza, Sofa 1 a, Maputo and Zambezi a

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Provinces would be visited. In the event Gaza was dropped from the itinerary because of the absence of key individuals and overlap with actions undertaken by the same agencies in Maputo and Sofala and because the type of action would have yielded only limited insights.

1.2.4. During the initial meetings with Embassy and NGO staff in Maputo it became apparent that the difficulties of distinguishing between the drought responses and the ongoing emergency programme were even greater than had been envisaged in London. It was decided that, in order to judge what constituted a drought response among the non-' Drought' funded act ions, it woul d be necessa ry to gather information on all the actions funded from the 'Emergency' and 'Rome' actions (see paras 4.1.4&5 below) Section 4.1) during 1992/93 as well as all the 'Drought' actions. All agencies supported by ODA from these three funding lines were therefore vi sited, together with those in recei pt of ECFAD food aid, and also UNICEF which had received a substantial grant from 'regular' funds. Information was obtained on each of 57 separate actions, on which the volume of documentation assembled was substantial, and the analysis and write-up of the case study took considerably longer than initially planned.

1.2.5. Within the three Provinces visited priority was given to visiting those projects undertaken by agencies which had received the largest funding from ODA and those agencies which represented 'new' implementing partners for ODA in that they had not received substantial ODA funding prior to 1992. Provincial and district offices and project sites of the following agencies were visited: SCF, Action Aid and OXFAM in Zambezia; Food for the Hungry International in Sofala, and CARE in Maputo Province. In selected project areas interviews were held with groups of beneficiaries, households, and individuals to obtain their views on the impact of the drought and the assistance provided.

2. THE DROUGHT AND ITS IMPACT ON A CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRY

The severe drought of 1991/92 impacted upon a country which had been experiencing a largely confl ict-related emergency for many years. Consequently it is not possible to treat the impact of the drought in isolation from the effects of the on-going emergency. This section describes the drought's impact in that context.

2.1. The conflict in Mozambique

2.1.1. Conflict was a constant feature in Mozambique between 1964 and 1992. From 1964 to independence in 1975 it took the form of an independence struggle waged by FRELIMO against the Portuguese colonial authorities. On attaining independence the new FRELIMO Government headed by Samora Machel began supporting the Zimbabwe African National Union in its conflict with the former white regime in Rhodesia and joined other states in imposing sanctions against Rhodesia. In retaliation Rhodesian forces launched ground and air attacks on Mozambique and began supporting RENAMO - a loose grouping of Mozambicans opposed to FRELIMO's socialist programmes which included villagisation and the suppression of traditional forms of authority and rel igion. Rhodesian support for RENAMO conti nued unti 1 1979 when white rul e ended. South Afri ca then took over responsibility for providing support, which appears to have continued at least until around 1989.

2.1.2. Throughout its conflict with the government, RENAMO's strategy was to wage a rural guerrilla campaign, attacking government targets including schools and clinics and the economic infrastructure - bridges, factories and power lines were damaged or destroyed and roads and fields mined - and to terrorise civilians in government-controlled areas. Overland travel between government-held towns

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became dangerous or impossible and for extended periods many areas could be reached only by air. The government's strategy was to encourage the concentration of civilians into protected villages and areas in and around towns. Here access to land for cultivation was limited and many people became partially or wholly dependent upon relief supplies provided by the international community. As in other contexts, this strategy served to increase government control over ci vil i ans. Whil st RENAMO was res pons i b 1 e for many of the human ri ghts abuses whi ch occurred during the confl i ct, it is a 11 eged that. government forces were also guilty of such abuses (Africa Watch, 1992).

2.1.3. After several years of intermittent contact and negotiations agreement was reached in Rome on 16 July 1992 which a110wed relief agencies access to RENAMO-held areas. This partial agreement created confidence in the peace process and on 4 October a package of Peace Accords was agreed between the government and RENAMO. The Accords effectively 'opened up' RENAMO-controlled areas previously inaccessible to relief agencies, to the allocation of additional funding by donor organisations and to a certain refocusing of attention upon the development of additional programmes within former RENAMO territory. They also brought massive population movements that were sti11 continuing by mid-1994. During 1993 programmes were set in motion for the return of the 1.5 million Mozambican refugees in neighbouring countries, principally Malawi, while many of those concentrated around the towns in the former government-held areas began returning to their original home areas.

2.1.4. Estimates of the proportion of the country and population under government or RENAMO control during 1992 vary widely. International Red Cross personnel interviewed during the study suggest that approximately 30% of the area and 70% of the population were under government control. Because of the high population densities in the GoM areas, there is reason to believe that the agricultural impact of the drought may have been more intense in the GoM areas than in the RENAMO areas.

2.2. The drought and its impact

2.2.1. The 1991/92 rains were late starting and from mid-January 1992 onwards were well below the monthly mean rainfall for the country's south and central areas. The lack of functioning meteorological stations in the interior of the central and southern Provinces meant that the rainfall monitoring system was slow to detect the drought and the first signs of problems were reported by authorities at the provincial level (Johnson, 1993). In February 1992, fo11owing reports of problems in Gaza Province, a joint Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities/WFP mission was undertaken to the Province where it found that crop yields were substantially below those of previous years. By early March the Ministry of Agriculture's National Early Warning Unit was indicating that a drought was affecting the central and southern provinces and GoM issued the first official alert to the donor community. The severity of the situation was confirmed by a FAO/WFP assessment mission which visited the country in April. In May the government launched its Drought Appeal for 1992/93 at a local donor meeting chaired by the Prime Minister, asking for resources additional to those already requested at the end of 1991 as part of the ongoing National Emergency Programme.

2.2.2. National production of cereals, which averaged 551,000 tonnes during the 1987-91 period, fell to 236,000 tonnes during the 1992/93 marketing year -a fall· of almost 60%. Within the most severely affected provinces cereal production was virtually zero. Cassava production held up better in the face of the drought (see Table A1.1).

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Table ALl Mozambique: Staple Food Production 1989/90 - 1992/93

Agricultural Year (a) Maize Sorghum Rice Cassava Per capita

'000 tonnes Kg

1989/90 453 175 86 1622 156

1990/91 327 155 50 1476 132

1991/92 133 71 30 1296 98

1992/93 533 165 49 1404 135

Source: Mozambique Ministry of Commerce Note: (a) Producti on is reported regi ona 11 y by SADC Earl y

Warning System of~/~e marketing year i.e. 1991/92 production as 1992 93 (Main Report, Table 2.1)

Table A1.2 Mozambique: Proportion of 'Drought-Affected' Population By Province

Province Total Drought- Drought-Affected Population affected

population

As % of total As % of 'OOOs drought-affected provincial

population population

Sofala 746.5 343.3 17% 46

Manica 1,453.7 516 26% 36

Gaza 1,260.2 403.3 20% 32 Tete 887.5 152.1 7% 17

rnhambane 1,414.7 230.7 12% 16 Maputo 2,083.5 142.2 7% 7 Niassa 781.8 33.6 2% 4 Zambezia 3,153 122.1 6% 4

Cabo Delgado 1,352.5 21.2 1% 2 Nampula 3,098.6 35.5 2% 1 Totals 16,232 2,000 100% 12

Source: ODr estimate based on May 1992 Appeal and Provincial Population Estimates December 1992 adjusted to take account of apparent underestimate of effect of drought in Zambezia Province (see Box 1)

2.2.3. Identifying the areas affected by the drought is easier in terms of rainfall and growi ng condi ti ons than in rel ati on to human popul ati ons because of the diffi culty of distinguishing the effects of the drought from those of the conflict. Satellite imagery showing relative 'greenness' indicates that the areas most affected were much of Manica, Sofala and Gaza Provinces (see Map A.l). These results are borne out by government and UN estimates prepared as part of the May 1992 Appeal, which indicate

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that these three provinces alone accounted for almost two-thirds of the 'drought­affected' (see Table Al.2). In contrast, Maputo Province and the four northern provinces of Zambezia, Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado accounted for only 18% of those judged to be drought-affected despite their containing almost two-thirds of the country's total population.

Box 1 To What Extent Was Zambezia Province Drought-Affected?

1. For historical reasons many of the UK NGOs working in Mozambique are concentrated in the central Province of Zambezia (see Map A.1). Because of ODA's preference for using UK-based NGOs as channels for ODA assistance Zambezia received a substantial proportion of ODA's response, ie. 26% of the non-food 'drought' actions, 16% of the 1992(3 bilateral food aid and 29% of the total emergency expenditures ('drought' and 'emergency' combined). Satellite imagery and GoM and UN figures clearly indicate that Zambezia was far from being one of the worst affected provinces. A joint assessment mission by three of the principal UK NGOs working in Zambezi a (ActionAid, OXFAM, Save the Children Fund) undertaken in July 1992 found that the situation was worse than originally estimated, but there is a lack of information to support this conclusion. Similarly, none of the project proposals put to ODA by agencies working in the Province contain any clear indications of the drought's severity in the intended project areas. OXFAM cites a figure of up to 30 - 50% crop losses in Alto Molocue and Guru, and 'substantial crop failure' in Mocuba, but again there is no explanation on how the information was obtained or how representative were these losses.

2. The overall impression obtained from reviewing reports and proposals and from discussions with project staff is that some parts of the Province were entirely unaffected by the drought. Indeed, the district of lie had an above-normal harvest. The districts along the northern ridge of the province (Milange, Gurue, Alto Molocue and Namarroi) and to a lesser extent in the centre (Mocuba and Lugela) seem to have had a poor but not catastrophic year (30% crop losses), at least when compared with other parts of the country where reported crop failure was closer to 70%. Some of these districts even had modest grain surpluses, any shortfalls being more probably a result of the war than of the drought. The rice-producing coastal districts seem to have fared less well. Pebane and Maganja and Costa were probably the least affected, with the drought focusing on the southern lowland districts of Namacurra, Nicoadala, Inhassunje and Chinde. The districts most affected by the drought appear to have been the heavily populated districts of Mopeia and Morrumbala, both in the Zambezi River basin. This is consistent with the intense drought reported in districts bordering the southern banks of the Zambezi. Indeed, the Morrumbala District Health Authority had admitted to hospital nearly 400 victims of severe malnutrition 'attributable to drought' by December 1992, of whom 40 were reported to have died.

3. In conclusion, while the extent and severity of drought in Zambezia cannot be estimated with any precision, it seems that only those actions aimed at coastal districts and along the Zambezi valley can be considered to have been drought interventions. If the reports of NGOs working in these areas are correct, it would appear that here the initial GoM and UN figures probably underestimated the number of drought-affected people.

2.2.4. Available information on the impact of the drought on morbidity and mortality levels and on the coping strategies adopted by households and communities is very poor

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and often anecdotal in nature. In the rare instances where quantitative estimates were made, agencies rarely indicated how the figures were obtained. For instance, many aid agencies and government departments reported mass population movements caused by the· drought, yet very little information was found to corroborate these assertions. A study in Maputo, one of the few socio-economic surveys carried out among displaced populations, found that even though 56% of the families that had moved into Maputo had come from the more seriously drought-affected provinces of Gaza and Inhambane, less than 1% of them attributed their movement to the drought. Because of the lack of rigorous surveys it is not possible to judge the extent of famine conditions in the most drought-affected areas with any degree of accuracy.

2.2.5. Not surprisingly, information regarding the situation in the extensive RENAMO-contro 11 ed areas is also scanty and often contradi ctory. A wi del y held perception during 1992 was that conditions were probably worse here because of the virtual absence of food distribution programmes and the lack of agricultural implements. However, documentation on the situation in relation to Zambezia and Sofala suggests that conditions in RENAMO-controlled areas were probably better than in peri-urban neighbourhoods under GoM control. For instance, the first aid workers to visit RENAMO areas in these Provinces after the October 1992 Peace Accords were surprised to find little or no evidence of malnutrition and no reports of famine during the previous months. The comparative well-being may be attributed to the low population densities in these rural areas which meant that farmers had access to much more land than thejr counterparts in GoM-controlled areas, with a far greater selection of ecological niches to exploit. Traditional drought-coping mechanisms were available to these communities as there was relatively easy access to wild forage foods, game, fish, etc. Attacks on food aid convoys and depots must al so have provided an additional source of food. ,

2.2.6. The drought impacted upon an already depressed economy and a population which contained large numbers of destitute or near destitute people who were therefore particularly vulnerable. Arguably, of the countries in the region affected by the drought, Mozambique was the one most likely to experience the early development of famine conditions. The international community was, however, already providing substantial economic and humanitarian support to that proportion of the population 1 iving within the government-controlled areas, and this constituted in effect a 'safety net'. Because of the concentration of population in the areas controlled by the government, the effects of the drought may have been more severe there.

2.2.7. The drought effectively ended at the end of 1992 with satisfactory rains in most areas. The situation was also dramatically changed by the Peace Accords in October 1992. Whereas war and drought had negatively interacted during 1991/92, the cessation of hostilities and more favourable weather conditions, combined with relief measures, constituted an improved situation during 1993.

3. THE RESPONSE BY THE GOM AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

3.1. Organisation of the GoM response

3.1.1. As a result of the long-standing conflict, the GoM had developed a complex structure for managing the Emergency Programme including the response to the drought. The principal elements of the structure in 1992 were:'

This information is drawn from Fumane, 1993.

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• the Co-ordinating Committee for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities (CCPCCN), dormant for several years, was reformed in 1992. Headed by the Prime Minister, the Committee was responsible for formulating overall policy and strategy;

• the National Executive Emergency Commission (CENE), set up in 1987 and headed by the Vice Minister of Co-operation, who also served as the deputy chairman of the CCPCCN, was responsible for the programme's overall management and for ensuring ministries' co-ordination. CENE was assisted by various UN agencies and a Technical Committee for the Emergency (CTE) which provided technical monitoring of the situation;

• the Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities (DPCCN) which forms part of the Ministry of Co-operation, was created in 1980. Through its Logistics Unit, in which it is assisted by CARE and its network of Provincial and District stores, the DPCCN was involved in many aspects of the relief efforts;

• the Committee of Emergency Operations (COE) was the principal forum for donor organisations and the larger NGOs to discuss issues with GoM representatives. Parti cul ar sub-committees of the COE, such as the food sub-committee, were particularly active during 1992.

3.1.2. This evaluation did not assess this GoM structure's performance, particularly as ODA's response was channelled primarily through NGOs. Others involved in assessing the GoM's response conclude that it was slow to respond to the needs of the drought, as a result-of a combination of the inadequacies of the rainfall monitoring system and preoccupation, at the management level, with the ongoing Emergency Programme and, at the political level, with the peace negotiations (Fumane, 1993).

3.1.3. The DPCCN had difficulty in responding to the additional transport needs created by the increased di stri buti on requi rements. In the context of the donor community's desire for a greater role for the private sector in the Mozambican economy, this led to increased contracting of private sector transporters as part of tripartite agreements between WFP, DPCCN and various NGOs.

3.2. The May 1992 Appeal and the response by the international community

3.2.1. Since 1987 the GoM and the UN had jointly presented National Emergency Programme Appeals to the Consultative Group of donors meeting in Paris each December. The appeal presented in December 1991 was prepared before of the drought. Based on an urban market-dependent population of 5.9 million and a relief-dependent population of 1.8 million, it estimated total food aid needs at 977,000 tonnes. As the drought's impact became apparent during the early months of 1992 a supplementary appeal was needed. In order to conform to the Drought Emergency in Southern Afri ca appeal process an attempt was made to distinguish the 'drought-affected' population from the 'affected' category in the annual appeal, though this was recognised as a problematic and somewhat arbitrary process by many of those involved (Johnson, 1993).

3.2.2. The GoM/UN Appeal in May 1992 calculated a total requirement of US$ 457m, with three categories - food, food logistics and agricultural inputs - accounting for nearly 90% of total requirements. Total food aid imports were estimated to be 1.32 million tonnes - an increase of 340,000 tonnes over the December 1991 target. Of thi s, 0.5 mi 11 i on tonnes was intended for re 1 i ef and 0.82 mill i on tonnes for the market sector. From a coverage of around 460,000 households the Emergency Seed and Too 1 Programme was to be expanded to over 1 mi 11 ion households. Other conti nui ng special programmes, including the Rural Water Programme, Health and Nutrition Programmes, were identified as requiring additional support.

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3.2.3. SADC data i ndi cate that by the end of the drought peri od (i e. end Apri 1 1993) 94% of the food ai d requi rements for the re 1 i ef sector and 35% of those for the ma rket sector had arrived in Mozambique. Information on the proportion actually distributed by this date is unavailable.

4. OVERVIEW OF THE OOA RESPONSE

4.1. Principal components and management of OOA's response

4.1.1. ODA's response to the Mozambican drought overlapped with its ongoing emergency programme. All types of ODA emergency assistance provided during 1992/93 totalled £7.664m, in the form of cash grants from three separate funding lines managed by CSAD. These were in response to proposals by NGOs and the Red Cross for use on a variety of activities including logistics support, food procurement, agricultural rehabilitation, and health. In addition, a total of 41,630 tonnes of food aid valued at £6.49m was channelled for free distribution through NGOs. A grant of £500,000 was also made to a UNICEF water programme under a separate funding line.

4.1.2. To encourage· a more programmatic approach to the use of Mozambique's emergency funds EMAD each year delegated financial authority to the Mozambique section within CSAD. Officials in London had historically adopted a quite flexible definition of what constituted 'emergency relief', funding such activities as seed and tools provision, which in a less flexible organisation might have been regarded as rehabi 1 i tati on acti vi ti es. ODA' s 'rehabi 1 i tati on' projects tended to focus on infrastructure in urban and peri -urban areas and on sectors such as health and education, with funding managed by the Development Division in Lilongwe.

4.1.3. As part of the second tranche of funds announced at the end of April 1992, an allocation was made to the Mozambique Desk for use by agencies responding to the drought, to be administered in parallel with the 'Emergency' funds. During 1992/93 a total of £3.725m was allocated to NGOs and the Red Cross from these 'Drought' funds. In late 1992 following the October Peace Accords, ODA pledged an additional amount at a donor conference in Rome with the objective of helping Mozambican refugees in neighbouring countries to return home. These funds also were managed alongside those for the 'Emergency' and 'Drought'.

4.1.4. Thus during 1992/93 three separate funding lines allocated the following: Drought, £3.725m; Emergency, £2.018m; Rome pledges, £1.626m. In practice ODA appears to have been fl exi bl e in its management of these three fundi ng 1 i nes and di d not maintain an excessively strict separation between them. By and large proposals from NGOs and the Red Cross were judged on their merits and allocated funds from the most appropriate funding line rather than being judged first in relation to the availability of funds within any particular funding line. As noted in section 1.2, the ambiguity over precisely what constituted ODA's response to the drought presented the evaluation team with particular difficulties.

4.1.5. It was not always possible to allocate drought-related proposals to the 'Drought' funding line and several such activities were funded from both the 'Emergency' and 'Rome Pl edges' fundi ng 1 ines. Some acti viti es funded from the 'Drought' funding line appear difficult to justify as responses to the drought because they were undertaken in provinces virtually unaffected by it and where interviews with agency personnel revealed that the activity would probably have been undertaken in any case. A further complicating factor was the tendency of all agencies to state the drought as a justification in their proposals for funding.

4.1.6. ECFAD had provided food aid for each of the previous five years, including over 17,000 tonnes during 1991. The response to the drought therefore constituted an

8

increase of approximately 15,000 tonnes over what would probably have been allocated had the drought not occurred (see Table A1.3).

Table A1.3: UK Bilateral Food Aid to Mozambique Expenditure and Tonnage 1988/89 - 1992/93

Financial Year Expendi ture Calendar Year Maize £ million Tonnes

1987 19,911

1988/89 2.878 1988 9,985

1989/90 2.519 1989 6,989

1990/91 1.619 1990 10,000

1991/92 3.601 1991 17,679

1992/93 7.618 1992 27,500

Source: British Aid Statistics; WFP, INTERFAIS, Rome.

4.1.7. All the food aid provided in 1992/93 was channelled through UK NGOs and their local partner agencies, 65% of it to CARE-UK for distribution by CARE-Mozambique in its project areas. Up to June, proposals were received only from CARE-UK but following an invitation to 'bid' for resources in June 1992 proposals were received from a broader group of NGOs.

4.2. The timing of ODA's response

4.2.1. By late February 1992, on the basis of indications from other donors, the UN system, officials in post and some governments of the affected countries, ODA had determined that the southern African region was experiencing a severe drought which would require a substantial response by the international community. The outline of ODA's initial response emerged by the first week of March. This included the decision that balance-of-payments support would be concentrated on :=:mbia and Zimbabwe and that UK bilateral food aid would be targeted on those countries where the needs for emergency food aid were felt to be greatest - at that point Mozambique, where the population was already highly vulnerable, and Malawi which was hosting a substantial population of Mozambican refugees. An initial allocation of 10,000 tonnes of cereals to Mozambique and 5,000 tonnes to Malawi was agreed.

4.2.2. That ODA acted so early in relation to the information only just becoming available in Mozambique reflected its recognition of Mozambique's heightened state of vulnerability. As noted above, however, it was highly likely that Mozambique would have received a substantial allocation even without the drought. At this stage therefore a combination of the past pattern of allocations under the UK bilateral food aid programme and the imminent start of the new Financial Year provided the freedom for an early response to Mozambique's needs. Subsequently, at the end of April a second tranche of assistance for the region included a further £5m of food aid 'mainly for Mozambique'. Once the funding lines came on stream, the receipt of proposals from agencies largely determined the speed at which funds were allocated. An analysis of the times involved in the allocation process is presented in the Main Report (Section 5.3) .

4.2.3. In the confused situation where the GoM's role in overall co-ordination of NGO activity was far from clear, the precise way in which the various ODA grants fitted into the overall needs as expressed in the GoM/UN May Appeal was not clear to

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the evaluators. In particular, the difficulty in distinguishing between the response to conflict and drought-related components of the relief problem was also experienced in relation to the GoM/UN appeal. The overall issue for assessment appears to be whether ODA responded appropriately and efficiently to a continuing conflict-related national emergency which was intensified by a drought that was more intense in the southern and cent ra 1 provi nces.

4.3. Actions examined during the evaluation

4.3.1. After careful consideration the evaluators decided to focus attention on all the bilateral food aid actions and all the actions financed from 'Drought' allocations, those actions financed from 'Emergency' and 'Rome' allocations being considered in detail only where there was considerable overlap with 'Drought'-funded actions. Support for the UNICEF water programme was also included in the evaluation, even though this was funded from regular 'Rehabilitation' funds, because it formed part of ODA's overall response to the drought.

4.3.2. Table A1.4 lists all emergency and drought-related food and non-food actions during 1992/93. Those actions that were considered eligible for inclusion in the evaluation and for which sufficient information was available are shaded. Thus all ECFAD and all the 'Drought' actions were included in the study. Only one 'Emergency' action was included in the detailed evaluation (a health action by Africare) and two 'Rome' actions (seeds and tools actions which formed part of SCF's overall agricultural recovery efforts). In total, therefore. 32 individual actions were assessed in detail, basic information being collected on a further 25 actions.

Table A1.4: ODA Drought-Related Action in Mozambique during 1992/93

Actions studied in detail during the evaluation are shaded.

Agency Amount Purpose Area of Approval dafe committed Distrilmtion/Vse

DROUGHT FUNDED

British Red Cross £50,000 Emergency drought programme, Sofala, Manica, Gaza, 8 July 1992 (response to IFRC Appeal) Inhambane, Mnputo,

Tete rind Zambezia Provinces

British Red Cross £280,000 Purchase of 8 trucks and trai!ers for Gaza, Manica, Sofala, 12 November 1992 Mozumbique Red Cross Inhambane, Maputo,

Tete and Zambezia Provinces

CAFOD £338,235 Procurement and distribution of 425 Sofa la, Tete, Manica, 17 July 1992 tonnes non~cereals food Zambezia and Niassa commodities Provinces

CARE £280,243 Water programme (Drilling and Chimoio peri-urban 24 July 1992 well deepening) area, Manica Province

CARE £347,820 Provision of 10 LeyJand/DAF Gaza and Inhambane 16 june 1992 trucks for DPCCN Provinces

CARE £6,954 Additional spares for Leyland/DAF - " - February 1993 trucks

Christian Out reach £250,000 Agricultural rehabilitntion Gaza Province 2 September 1992 programme of NGO Consortium

Christian Out reach £70,560 Agricultural rehabilitation Ouza Province 23 September 1992 programme of NOG Consortium

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Agency Amount Purpose Area of Approval date cOlllmitted Distribution/Use

Christian Outreach £75,430 Agricultural rehabilitation Gaza Province 19 November 1992 programme of NOOs consortium

Concern £100,093 Purchase of truck arld monitoring Manica Province 2 September 1992 vehicles

Food for the Hungry £217,330 MulticompOllent emergency Sofa!a Province 25 April 1992 International programme

Food for the Hungry £162,850 Multicomponent emergency Sofa!a Province 2 September 1992 International programme

Food for the Hungry £31,020 Multicomponent emergency Sofala Province 9 February 1993 International programme

ICRC £250,000 Response to ICRC Mozambique Gaza, SofaIa, Manica, 15 June 1992 Appeal 1992 and Maputo Provinces

OXFAM £457,894 Seeds programme; tools Niassa and Zambezia 2 September 1992 programme: monitoring visits; Provinces

OXFAM £65,500 Provision of seeds to ICRC Sofala Province 15 December 1992 aglrehab. progmmrne

Save the Ch] Idren £315,245 Seeds and tools prognlmme Zambezia Province 15 June 1992 Fund

World Vision £77,500 Seeds and tools, Agpnks Tetc Province 13 May 1992

World Vision/Mariners £94,863 Provision of a coordination team Various ports 16 October 1992 for coastal shipping of food aid by NOOs

EMERGENCY FUNDED ActionAid £41,250 Seeds and tools Znmbezia Province 24 June 1992

Africare £77,433 Anti-diahorreal tablet distribution Belra 11 March 1993 programme

CAFOD £97,500 Seeds and tools for distribution by Maputo, Gaza and 18 February 1993 General Union of LDgistics Inhambane Provinces

CARE £100,000 Warehouses for DPCCN N<lIionwide Jall/Feb 1993

CARE £77,083 Seeds and tools distribution Nampula 21 September 1992 programme

CARE £145,500 Radio sets for DPPCN to Nationwide 12 November 1992 coordinate food aid shipments and provide info on population movements

CARE £184,000 Provision of 50,000 mnchetes/axes Nampula 21 January 1993

Christian Aid £136,771 Seeds and tools Zambezia Province 16 October 1992

Concern £79,790 Clothing for displaced Nampula Province 8 June 1992

OOM/Beira Port £11,000 Funds for spare parts to keep the Beira ? Authorities Beira corridor repair crane

operational

Vetaid £5,550 Emergency funds to cover running Inhambane Provinces 18 June 1992 costs of livestock extension programme

\Vorld Vision £128,086 Seeds and tools; agpaks Zambezi a 13 May 1992

World Vision £230,500 Agricultural recovery prognlmme Central provinces in 29 January 1993 Mozambique

World Vision £219,500 Provision of survival kits for 8000 Zambezia and Tete 18 February 1993 families

I ROME FUNDED I 11

Agency Amount Purpose Area of Approval date committed Distribution/Use

ActionAid £162,639 Seeds and too!s provision Pebane district, 4 February 1993 Zambczia

ActionAid £10,695 Emergency rural road and bridges Zambezia Province 25 Fcbru:uy 1993 rehabilitation

ActionAid £21,558 Provision of a tractor for use in Zambezia Province 15 M;:rch 1993 rUfal areas; agriculture and relief supplies

Christian Aid/CCM £326,040 Local purchase of food Zambezia 18 February 1993 commodities to help fill g<lp in deliveries

Christian Aid/CCM £282,392 Local purctwse of clothes Zambezia Province 18 February 1993

Christian Aid/CCM £56,570 Local purchase of blankets Zambezia Province 18 February 1993

Christian Aid/CCM £23,358 Local purchase of utensils fOf Zambezia Province 18 February 1993 cooking

Save the Children £257,200 Additional funds to expand seeds Zambezia Province 9 February 1993 Fund and tools progmmme to which

ODA has given £315,245 so far in 92/93

Save the Children Fund £50,300 Project to increase the transport Z<lmbezia Province 18 March 1993 network for the movement of selected needy groups to home lands

Save the Children Fund £340,000 Tools programme for the next Zambezia Province 18 March 1993 pl<lnting season Qct 93. Procurement would be this FlY.

Save the Children £36,142 Additional funds for the seeds <lnd Zambezia Province 18 March 1993 Fund tools programmes. Increase

transport costs.

REGULAR PROGRAMME FUNDED

UNICEF I £500,000 1 Emergency water supply 17 Provinces 11 June 1992

BILATERAL FOOD AID (ECTAD Mal1aged)

Channel Commodity & Total Cost Area of Distribution Distribution Period Date Approved quantity

ActionAid 3,000 tonnes yellow (Coastal Zambezia Province Nov 92 . Nay 93 Beginning July maize shipping +

ITSH £204,000)

1,100 tonnes white £0.12 Maputo, Gaza and Sept· December Sept 92 CAFOD/CARIT AS maize Inhambane 92 Mozambique Provinces

CARE 6500 tonnes yellow £O.875m MaruIO, Gaza and July. Noy 92 March 93 maize Inhambane

Provinces

CARE 10000 tonnes yellow £1.599 Maputo, Gaza, Aug ~ Nov 92 maize Inhambane

Provinces

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CARE 10,000 (shipment £2.278 (for Maputo, Gaza, Oct92·? Beginning July included 7,000 on 17,020 tonnes) Inhambane and behalf of Concern, Manica Provinces Christian Aid, Action Aid)

Christian Aid/ 2520 tonnes yellow (ITSH 840 tonnes Mapu!o Nay 92· May 93? BeginningJuJy Christian Council maize (1680 tonnes £l38,OC)Q) Province of Mozambique ? with white maize) 1680 tonnes

Zarnbezia Province

Concern 1500 tonnes yellow (lTSH £13,000) Urbnn and peri- Nay 92 . May93 BeginningJuly maize urban nreas of

Chinoio city, Munica Province

Save the Children 1650 tonnes maize £0.425m Zambezia Province Jan 93 . April 93 Beginning Oct. white and yellow 196 tonnes beans

World Vision 5,000 tonnes white £0.85101 Tete, Zombezia and Oct 92 . May 93 End June maize and 500 Nnmpula Provinces tonnes beans

5. ASSESSMENT OF ODA'S RESPONSE

5.1. Food and logistics components

5.1.1. Food and logistics activities formed the major share of ODA's response in Mozambique. At a total cost of £6.83m ODA provided 41,038 tonnes of maize, 757 tonnes of beans and 260 tonnes of other commodities using FY 1992/93 funds. As part of the drought response a further £0.73m was provided for logistics support (truck purchases and coastal shipping). In addition, 3 agencies received £0.99m for mUlti-component projects in which logistical support was a substantial element.

Food aid

5.1.2. During FY 1992/93 41,038 tonnes of maize and 592 tonnes of beans were provided at a cost of £6.49m. The bulk of this was funded from the regular ECFAD programme but 2,188 tonnes of maize and 92 tonnes of beans (costing approximately £530,000) were funded from CSAD funds transferred to ECFAD in late 1992. A further 165 tonnes of beans, 80 tonnes of vegetable oil, 70 tonnes of dried fish, 85 tonnes of milkpowder and 25 tonnes of sugar were funded from CSAD 'Drought' funds by way of a grant to CAFOD for distribution by Caritas Mozambique.

5.1.3. Of the total amount of maize provided by ODA 33,850 tonnes were imported and 7,188 tonnes were purchased in the country. All the imports were undertaken by CARE in 3 separate shipments and 26,830 tonnes were used in its on-going but expanded distribution programmes in Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane Provinces. At ECFAD's request CARE procured an additional 7,020 tonnes of maize as part of its third and largest shipment; of this 1,500 tonnes was forwarded to Concern for use in peri-urban areas of Chiomoi, Manica Province; 3,000 tonnes to Action Aid for use in Pebane District in Zambezia Province; and 2,520 tonnes to the Christian Council of Mozambi que (CCM) for use in Maputo and also in Namarroi and Gi 1 e Districts in Zambezia Province.

5.1.4. Of the 7,188 tonnes of maize purchased in the country, 5,000 tonnes was locally grown white maize purchased by World Vision for use in Nampula, Tete and Zambezia Provinces. SCF purchased 1,088 tonnes of imported yellow maize for distribution in Zambezia and CAFOD/Caritas Mozambique 1,100 tonnes of imported yellow maize for use in Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo Provinces.

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5.1.5. The 3 CARE shipments were procured through a formal tendering process monitored by ECFAD. The first shipment of 6,630 tonnes originated as a 'bid' in January 1992 for ECFAD's 'regular emergency' allocations to Mozambique from 1992/93 funds. As awareness of the drought developed in March, the 'bid' became a request for funding, to supply 10,000 tonnes of white maize. The difficulties of procuring white maize on the world market led to the purchase of 3,500 tonnes of yellow maize from commercial stores in Maputo funded from remaining 1991/92 funds, and the decision to tender for 6,500 tonnes on the international market, which resulted in a shipment from Argentina. Distribution in Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane Provinces began in July and continued until November. The total cost of the action was £875,000.

5.1.6. The second shipment of 10,200 tonnes originated as a proposal submitted the day after the Minister's announcement on 29 April that £5m would be available for food aid 'mainly for Mozambique' in response to the drought. The proposal was ~pproved in the second week of May, the shipment arrived in Maputo in mid­July and was distributed between August and November. The total cost of this acti on was £1. 6m

5.1.7. In June ECFAD invited UK NGOs operating in Mozambique to submit requests for the amount remaining from the £5m announced in April. CARE indicated that it could utilise 7-10,000 tonnes, ActionAid 3,000 tonnes, Christian Aid 2,520 tonnes and Concern 1,500 tonnes. 10,000 tonnes was approved for CARE, with the agency procuring shipment and primary transportation within Mozambique. The shipment arrived in Maputo in mid-September and distribution in Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane and Manica Provinces began in October, the cost being approximately £1.4m. The total cost of the 26,830 tonnes distributed by CARE was therefore approximately £3.875m.

5.1.8. ECFAD involvement with CARE in providing food aid to Mozambique began in 1987 when CARE shipped 5,000 tonnes of Kenyan maize which was distributed by the DPCCN. CARE's role increased from 1990 following the creation of its Food Programmi ng and Monitori ng Uni t (FPMU). From then unti 1 the 1992 drought response all ODA food aid to Mozambique was channelled through CARE and ECFAD is understood to have been highly satisfied with CARE's performance and the FPMU's comprehensive reports on individual shipments. In 1992, however, FPMU's accounting procedures broke down with a change in distribution arrangements. As a result, actual distribution of part of the second shipment and all of the third shipment could not be proven by the accounting procedures for between 9 and 20% of the commodities handled. In other words, the documentation relating to the distribution was insufficient to prove that it was not diverted.

5.1.9. Prior to the Peace Accords, CARE food was despatched first to district warehouses managed by the DPCCN and from there to the villages, for distribution to beneficiaries. End-use monitoring in the villages was undertaken by CARE of a proporti on of these DPCCN di stri buti ons. In November 1992 CARE-Mozambi que introduced a new system which involved food being despatched directly to the villages by-passing the DPCCN warehouse, the objective being to give CARE greater control over the food, thereby reducing handling losses and the potential for diversion, and increasing the system's overall capacity. By September 1993, however, a FPMU staff change resulted in a recognition that the accounting procedures were not functioning properly and that some diversion was occurring. A special internal audit was undertaken and this found that:

- there was no means of verifying the authenticity of the signatures on the waybills of those receiving the deliveries in the villages; in only 1 of the sampled dispatches had beneficiary lists been signed/marked by the beneficiaries and the person supervising the

distribution, thereby reducing the ability of the CARE monitoring teams to undertake effective end-use monitoring;

- systems were not in place to assess the reliability of reports by CARE monitoring staff.

As a result the team concluded that in 15 of the 100 sampled cases the despatches had potentially been diverted and that in 42 of the sampled cases there was inadequate evidence of proper receipt of food at the villages.

5.1.10. In responding to the special audit report the management of CARE­Mozambique pOinted to the additional workload generated by the drought response and, 'with the exception of ODA', the difficulty of obtaining sufficient resources for the FPMU to operate effectively. Recommendations by the audit team are currently being implemented by CARE-Mozambique.

5.1.11. As noted above, in June 1992 ActionAid requested 3,000 tonnes of maize for use in the agency's ongoing food distribution programme in Pebane District in Zambezia Province after a consignment of EC food aid had been fully utilised. The request made no mention of the drought, referring instead to a 'recent deterioration in the situation in Zambezia and continued uncertainty about the future'. The impact of the drought in Pebane is unclear as it lies well to the north of the area generally thought to have been severely affected and there is no way of assessing subsequent claims by the agency that the 1991-92 rains were 'well below average' in Pebane. One of the senior staff of ActionAid in Mozambique interviewed during the course of this evaluation felt that the action had not been intended as a response to the drought and that ODA had 'urged' the agency to accept the offer of food aid.

5.1.12. The maize was procured and shipped to Beira by CARE as part of its third shipment (see above) and arrived. Due to the unavailability of suitable vessels, transhipment to Pebane did not begin until the third week of November 1992 with subsequent shipments in February, April, May and October 1993. Reporting by the agency does not indicate what happened to its distribution programmes between the end of the EC consignment in August and the first distributions of the ODA consignment in December. The consignments had to be lightered ashore and during this process significant pilferage took place, losses amounting to 10.9% in the case of the first two shipments.

5.1.13. Distributions were planned jOintly with DPCCN and between December 1992 and March 1993 covered approximately 100,000 people, thereafter scaled down to around 50,000. Difficulties were experienced during the initial distributions as a result of discrepancies between the planning figures used by DPCCN and the number of beneficiaries at the distribution sites, pilferage by local officials, and the use of inaccurate issuing measures at the distribution sites. These problems were gradually overcome, particularly after the appointment of a new Food Monitor in June 1993. Why such problems had not been resolved during the agency's previous food distribution programmes is not clear.

5.1.14. At the beginning of 1992 Concern was operating in Nampula Province in the north of the country. In response to the drought the agency developed a programme to provide logistical support to German Agro-Action (GAA) in a food distribution programme using food supplied by CARE in Sussundenga District in Manica Province - one of the most severely affected provinces. A proposal for funds to purchase a Mercedes 10-tonne truck and 8-tonne trai 1 er and two 4x4 monitori ng vehi cl es and to prov; de the servi ces of a Concern mechani c and logistician for one year was submitted to ODA in mid-May. £100,093 was approved in September, us i ng 'Drought' funds.

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5.1.15. This involvement with GAA in Manica Province made Concern aware of the situation in Chomoio City. Its population of about 250-300,000 was approximately half the population in government-controlled areas of the Province. Exacerbated by the drought, social tensions in the city were high, there had been increasing anti-government activity and a nutrition survey indicated unusually high rates of acute malnutrition. Under pressure from donors, DPeCN's free distributions of food in urban areas had been phased down after 1989 and the city authorities' proposal to undertake free distributions met with resistance in Maputo but was supported by Concern and officials in post. In response to ECFAD's invitation to UK NGOs in June, Concern requested 1,500 tonnes of maize for distribution in the peri-urban areas of Chimoio. The maize was shipped to Beira and transported to Chimoio by CARE.

5.1.16. Distributions were undertaken between November 1992 and May 1993 in 10 of the 31 barrios in and around the city, providing a 10kg maize monthly ration to an average 17,200 beneficiaries. The ration included no beans or oil component, apparently because these commodities were not available. The Mercedes truck and the monitoring vehicles funded by ODA were used in the Chimoio distributions but there is no indication whether this reduced the level of support given to the GAA programme in Sussundenga District. The distributions were carefully planned and implemented without any disturbances which, given the context, was an achievement in itself. Unusually the agency used a system of master rolls and ration cards which appears to have worked well in ensuring equitable distributions and minimising theft (see below). In the light of the city's apparent needs and the success of the distributions, a more extensive programme covering more barrios would appear to have been warranted. It is not clear why the agency limited its request to only 1,500 tonnes.

5.1.17. Christian Aid (CA) on behalf of its partner agency the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM), requested 2,520 tonnes of maize at the beginning of June 1992. This amount was shipped as part of the third CARE shipment, 840 tonnes intended for use in CCM programmes in Maputo Province and 1,680 tonnes for use in Namarroi and Gile Districts in Zambezia Province. Apart from monitoring visits made by Christian Aid staff members in January and November 1993, the information available on this shipment was limited.

5.1.18. Distribution began in Maputo Province in November, having been delayed for several weeks because another agency (MSF) undertook distributions in the area originally 'allocated' to CA/CCM by the DPCCN. By April 1993 only 120 tonnes had been distributed as a result of a dispute between CARE, CCM and Manica Freight Services over the outstanding amount which appears to have been transported to the wrong area. This dispute was not resolved until January 1994 when CARE reimbursed CCM. Arrangements for the larger consignment destined for Zambezi a were altered just before the arrival of the CARE shipment in Beira. At the suggestion of the shipping agents, Christian Aid and ODA agreed to its being exchanged for an identical amount of locally grown white maize available in areas adjacent to Namarroi and Gile Districts, thereby saving on trans-shipment and road transport costs. Distributions began in October. The extent to which these two districts were affected by the drought appears questionable. In Gile the food was targeted on former RENAMO areas, as 'seeds and tools were the priority need rather than food' in the former government areas.

5.1.19. On behalf of Caritas Mozambique CAFOD received two grants for food commodities, one for £338,235 for the provision of 425 tonnes of non-cereals food aid funded from CSAD 'Drought' funds, the other for the local purchase of 1,100 tonnes of imported yellow maize at a cost of £127,000. As Caritas Germany was responsible for co-ordinating support to Caritas Mozambique's Emergency Programme

16

and providing it with procurement and logistical support, the funds provided to CAFOD were passed on to Caritas Germany. Caritas Mozambi que submitted its reports to Caritas Germany.2

5.1.20. The proposal for the non-cereals food aid was submitted at the beginning of June 1992 and approved in mid-July, with the shipment planned to arrive in Beira in November. It indicated that the distribution would be to approximately 26,000 vulnerable groups not covered by the DPCCN system in the dioceses of Beira (Sofala Province), Chimoio (Manica Province), Quelimane (Zambezi a Province), Lichinga (Niassa) and Tete, and was intended to complement the planned distribution of 2,600 tonnes of maize, blankets, soap, clothing and infant foods funded by other members of the Caritas family. The reporting available on this action was incomplete. Records provided to the evaluator by Caritas Mozambique suggest that distributions of fish and oil began in July 1992 but, given that the shipment was originally not planned to arrive until November, they may refer to another action not funded by ODA. No records were readily available regarding the beans, sugar or milk powder components of the aid.

5.1.21. Officials in post had initially expressed concern about the potential overlap between the beneficiaries of the Caritas Mozambique programmes with those of the DPCCN/NGO programmes. The available reports do not provide sufficient insight for comment on this pOint. A draft final report given to the evaluator fails to identify the type or funding source of the commodities referred to; some of the target groups and their location are identified (eg. children'S feeding centres, orphanages, hospital pati ents, etc.) but the benefi ci ari es of the district programmes of the various diocesan Caritas commissions are not identified.

5.1.22. The request for funds to procure maize locally was submitted only at the end of August and was intended to enable cereal distributions to be undertaken during September and October in the southern dioceses of Maputo, Xai-Xai (Gaza Province) and Inhambane. Distributions apparently began in mid-September and were completed by December, with an indicated 75,727 beneficiaries. Expenditure details were submitted to ECFAD in August 1993. Descriptive reports had not been provided by the time of the evaluation; therefore no comments on beneficiaries or problems encountered are possible.

5.1.23. When approving an SCF proposal to distribute seeds and tools in three districts (Milange, Morrumbala and Mopeia) in Zambezia Province in June 1992, CSAD included as a condition of its grant that 'every effort is taken to ensure that food supplies are available at the time the seed distribution is taking place'. SCF interpreted this as requiring the organisation of its own distributions of food to coincide with the seed distribution planned for September and October. In August it submitted a request for £421,500 to purchase 1,650 tonnes maize and nearl y 200 tonnes of beans in 11 e and Gurue Districts in the north of the Province. ODA did not approve the proposal until the beginning of October - the intended month of the first distribution. During November, DPCCN, World Vision and UNILOG agreed that the SCF food should be distributed in Morrumbala town where there were high rates of malnutrition rather than in the rural areas where the seed distributions were about to start. The amounts purchased were less than those indicated in the proposal; insufficient amounts of locally grown whi te mai ze were avai 1 abl e so about half the mai ze consisted of locally available imported yellow maize. The distributions began

At the beginning of 1994 the reporting arrangements were altered so that Caritas Mozambique reported directly to CAFOD for funding provided by ODA.

17

in January and continued until April 1993, covering about 25,000 people each month. The February and March distributions included some 400 soldiers in the local garrison. In February 54 tonnes of food were stolen by ex-GoM soldiers when a convoy of six trucks was hijacked.

5.1.24. On 22 June 1992 World Vision asked ECFAD for £850,000 to purchase 6,000 tonnes of white maize locally for distribution between June and December in the agency's extensive operations in Tete, Zambezia and Nampula Provinces. The agency was aware of maize surpluses in particular districts and wished to undertake local purchases as a means of injecting cash into the local economy in these areas and procuring the more popular white maize. Provisional approval was given by ECFAD on 27 July, and the contract agreed at the beginning of September. In its final form, the proposal covered the purchase of 5,000 tonnes of maize and 500 tonnes of beans. From the available documentation it appears that procurement took place through local tenders between September 1992 and March 1993 and distributions between October 1992 and May 1993.

5.1.25. Distribution was undertaken by DPCCN with most distributions being observed by World Vision monitors. 2,000 tonnes of maize was distributed in Zambezia Province, 1,000 tonnes in Tete Province (though by June 1993 actual distributions had only reached 671 tonnes due to delays in rail transport and some thefts) and 2,000 tonnes in Nampula Province. All the beans appear to have been distributed in Nampula Province. The planned monthly ration was 10.5 kg maize, 1.2 kg pulses, 0.3 kg vegetable oil and 0.1 kg salt. Reports do not indicate whether the agency was able to achieve a balanced ration in its monthly distributions. In Nampula there were dramatic fluctuations in the number of beneficiaries from a high in January 1993 of 28,150 to a low of 1,080 the following month.

Logistical support and multi-component projects

5.1.26. Four agenCies, or in some cases pairs of agencies, (Concern, CARE, World Vision/Mariners and the British Red Cross/Mozambican Red Cross Societies) received funding for logistical support activities (procurement of trucks and other vehicles and the provision of coastal shipping services). Concern's truck and vehicle purchase formed an integral part of its food aid distribution activities in and around Chimoio (see 5.1.14 above). In addition, 3 agencies (Food for the Hungry International, the ICRC and the British Red Cross/Mozambican Red Cross) undertook mUlti-component programmes which received support from ODA to a total of £991,200. 3

J

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Apart from the 3 multi-component programmes, CSAD provided a total of £1.15m. in logistical support using the three funding lines available to it during FY 1992/93. The grants to CARE and World Vision/Mariners were from 'Drought' funds and these actions are described in the text. The remaining £0.7m. from 'Emergency' and 'Rome' funds was provided for the logistieal support actions of 4 agencies (CARE, Oxfam, Action Aid and SCF). Many of these actions cannot be considered as drought-related because they were undertaken in areas of the country not affected by the drought (eg. the £300,000 provided to Oxfam for an airlift in Niassa) or because they were undertaken during 1993 and therefore fell outside the principal 'drought response' period. Nevertheless some of the 'Emergency! and 'Rome' funded actions may be considered as droughtw related in that they supported actions undertaken wholly or in part in response to the drought. For instance CARE's proposal to provide 29 radios for use by DPCCN and other agencies in drought­affected districts represented a substantial increase in communications capacity of direct benefit to the relief programme.

5.1.27. The CARE logistical support action consisted of the provlslon of 10 Leyl and/OAF trucks and associ ated spare parts to DPCCN for use in Gaza and Inhambane Provinces at a total cost of £354,774. The proposal, submitted at the end of April, was approved in mid-June and the trucks were del ivered at the beginning of October. Procurement in South Africa rather than the UK reduced the overall cost by approximately £100,000 and ensured an earlier delivery. Approval was also delayed by discussion of the most suitable location for vehicles in relation to maintenance capacity and by the ongoing discussions between donors and the GoM of the role of private sector transporters in the movement of food by DPCCN. Judging from the first quarterly report available, the vehicles were initially well utilised, travelling an average of 140 kilometres/day in both Provinces, though whereas those in Gaza appeared to transport an average of nearly 5 tonnes/day, those in Inhambane transported an average of 1.8 tonnes/day.

5.1.28. The £94,863 provided to World Vision/Mariners may be seen as a drought action overtaken by events. The proposal was conceived before the October Peace Accords when overland transport to populations along the coastal belt was either difficult or impossible and the state coastal shipping agency servicing the small ports was ineffective. The initial proposal suggested in May 1992 envisaged the purchase of a shallow draught 'mother ship' which would be able to enter some of the ports or be unloaded close to shore. It was dropped later in the year largely because of its cost and the uncertain status of Mariners both in the UK and in Mozambique. Established by two former 'cooperantes' with experience of shipping operations in Mozambique, Mariners had not achieved charitable status in the UK and was not registered as an NGO in Mozambique. Though World Vision provided an organisational cover for the fledgl ing agency, the Mozambican authorities seemed to regard it as a private company and refused permission to operate independently. A less ambitious proposal to co-ordinate coastal shipping for NGOs and UN agencies was therefore submitted to ODA in October 1992 and approved the same month. Further delays were experi enced in regi s teri ng the agency in Mozambique, and the first shipment did not occur until September 1993, 11 months after the project was approved by ODA. The substantial improvement in overland transport in the months following the Peace Accords appears to have significantly reduced the need for the services provided and before the end of 1993 only 1,300 tonnes had been shipped on behalf of 3 agencies (CARE, World Vision and Food for the Hungry International). For reasons which are unclear WFP and UNILOG did not utilise the services provided by Mariners. Since the drought it is understood that Mariners has made a useful contribution to the refugee repatriation programme and also in regard to the movement of demobilised soldiers.

5.1.29. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched an appeal (No. 32/92) in May 1992, asking for a total of £4.2m for a joint IFRC/MRCS emergency programme covering Gaza, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Maputo, Tete and Zambezia Provinces, and involving general food distribution, primary health care, water suppl ies, sanitation and nutritional rehabilitation. A CSAD proposal to provide £50,000 to the BRCS as an 'attributable contribution' for Mozambique was approved in early July and funds were transferred in the last week of July. It is not known how these funds were utilised as they entered the general programme. Considering that the IFRC/MRCS were proposing such a substantial programme in response to the drought and that CSAD was concerned at the 1 ack of UK NGOs in those prov i nces mos t severely affected by the drought, the small scale of CSAD's response is remarkable. According to a report on the appeal contributions in January 1993, most other donors contributed substantially larger amounts to the initial appeal.

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5.1.30. In mid-October the BRCS submitted a follow-up proposal which, after noting a shortfall against the original appeal of £1.17m, asked ODA for £257,000 to cover the purchase of 8 Nissan 7-tonne trucks and 8 3-tonne trailers from suppliers in Swazi1and. £280,000 (increased to cover the cost of spare parts) was approved in the second week of November, but funds were not transferred until the beginning of January 1993. Four of the trucks arrived in Mozambique in February but were impounded by Customs until June 1993 as a result of increased duties on imported vehicles which the MRCS refused to pay. Meanwhile, funds for the remaining 4 trucks were frozen. ODA was not notified of these difficulties until August 1993, at which point the BRCS asked that the remaining £134,200 should be used to procure blankets and cloth instead, as part of its Repatriation Programme. CSAD expressed its 'extreme displeasure' at the IFRC/MRCS failure to notify it of the difficulties, pointing out that the Embassy could have intervened on the MRCS's behalf to expedite the release of the trucks as it had done on behalf of other NGOs. Officials in post indicated their preference for the rema i ni ng funds to be returned for rea 11 ocat i on to another NGO but thi s appears not to have been possible under ODA accounting regulations.

5.1.31. Food for the Hungry International (FHI) received a total of £411,200 for its multi-component emergency programme in Sofa1a Province. The original request for an ODA contribution of £217,330, towards an overall budget of £912,384, submitted in February 1992 was a revision of a rough draft discussed with officials in post the previous December. It did not claim to represent a response to the drought but was rather a response to the needs of 15,500 displaced and 'affected' people in Marromeu District where the conflict had caused severe economic and social disruption. The following components were envisaged: training; water and sanitation; seed distribution and agricultural extension; food and non-food commodity distribution. Personnel and admi n is tra ti ve cos ts of the overa 11 programme accounted for over 50% of the £217,330 requested. Funding was approved in April using the newly available 'Drought' funds. As the full impact of the drought on Sofa1 a Province became apparent, the original programme was substantially expanded. In July an additional £162,850 was requested to cover the costs of monitoring the distribution (principally for 2 logistics managers and 8 monitors) of a planned 15,000 tonnes of food commodities provided by WFP in the Marromeu District and also in Buzi District over 100 miles to the south. Although a contribution to ITSH costs of food aid provided by another donor was not something that ODA would normally have agreed to finance, this component was supported by the Post and accepted by ODA because of the urgent need to distribute food re1 ief in this severely affected area. At the end of January 1993 a further £31,020 was requested to cover the costs of the effective devaluation of Sterling during 1992.

5.1.32. The programme underwent a substantial reorientation in late 1992 as a result of activities by RENAMO and indiscip1ine among government troops which resulted in an influx of displaced people into the main town and the temporary evacuation of FHI staff. Some of the health and training components of the programme were abandoned and relief efforts focused on conventional food distribution activities. Probably as a result of this disruption the quality of reporting was not high.

5.1.33. The final report submitted at the end of 1993 lacks detail, contains factual discrepancies with an earlier report to ODA, and does not indicate the share of the total programme costs met by the ODA grants. Nevertheless, it indicates that 5,820 tonnes of food were distributed between April 1992 and June 1993 to approximately 50,000 beneficiaries in each District; 43% of this was ai r1 i fted to the affected areas by Ai rServe under contract to FHI/DPCCN/WFP.

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Seed and tool distributions were undertaken in 4 districts in the Province to a total of 32,500 families, 3 tractors were purchased to assist with food distributions, and a food-for-work programme was undertaken for rehabilitating a road.

5.1.34. In early 1992 the ICRC launched an appeal for £8m for its on-going protection/tracing, medical and relief activities in RENAMO and government­controlled areas. In May a revised appeal for an additional £18.9m was launched to enable it to expand its activities in response to the drought in Gaza, Sofala, Manica and Maputo Provinces4 and also in two operational areas in Nampula Province where the conflict had prevented many people from planting crops. ODA responded by provi di ng £250,000. Between July 1992 and May 1993 the ICRC distributed 10,185 tonnes of food commodities, 1,205 tonnes of seeds and 260 tonnes of non-food relief supplies. Approximately 70% of these distributions were in Sofala and Manica Provinces. Given the expansion of ICRC's activities in the worst drought-affected Provi nces and the agency's uni que abi 1 ity to operate in areas controlled by RENAMO as well as in government-controlled areas, the modest scale of ODA's response to the ICRC appeals is surprising. Reporting by the ICRC was of a general nature and did not separately identify the use of the ODA contribution.

Assessment

5.1.35. The task of assessing such a wide range of actions within the food aid and logistics field may be approached from a number of perspectives. The criteria used here are: the appropriateness of the channels selected; the extent to which the assistance was targeted on the areas and population groups most in need; the appropriateness of the commodities provided; the accountability of the assistance provided; and the evidence of impact.

Channe 11 ing

5.1.36. All the assistance was channelled through NGOs and the Red Cross movement on the basis of requests submitted to ECFAD or CSAD. This degree of reliance by ODA upon NGOs as channels represented a trend begun in 1984 when the first UK-based NGOs (OXFAM and SCF) established programmes in Mozambique and ODA began channelling an increasing proportion of its non-food emergency aid through NGOs, in preference to official agencies whose effectiveness and accountability were considered unsatisfactory. With regard to food aid, the process was different in that for much of the 1980s ODA channelled its bilateral food aid via WFP to the Ministry of Commerce and the DPCCN, with WFP effectively providing a procurement, shi ppi ng and moni tori ng servi ce to ODA. With CARE-Mozambi que's creation of a specialised Food Monitoring and Programme Unit in 1990, ODA switched to CARE as the principal channel for its emergency food aid. Dissatisfaction with the official channels for food aid because of the level of losses, lack of accountability and slowness in deciding where the food should be sent were the principal reasons for the switch to CARE.

5.1.37. At least until November 1992, the distribution of food aid to beneficiaries at the provincial and district level was undertaken by the DPCCN; the largest truck purchase action by ODA (handled by CARE) expanded the DPCCN

In Sofala Province ICRC's relief activities covered all or parts of Nhamatanda, Buzi, Chibava, Maringue and Gorongosa Districts, in Manica Province a substantial part of Sussundenga and Macossa Districts; in Gaza Province substantial areas of Chibuto, Chigubo and Massangena Districts, and in Moputa Magude and Matutuine Districts.

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fleet, and most NGOs worked closely with the DPCCN and local authorities at the district level. Whilst ODA's substantial reliance on these distribution mechanisms by no means completely avoided GoM agencies, the use of NGOs stemmed in large part from the desire to improve the monitoring and oversight of relief distributions in which GoM agencies were involved.

5.1.38. Whilst in Zimbabwe and Lesotho it was both possible and helpful for the purpose of the assessment of performance to distinguish between 'funding NGOs' (such as Christian Aid) and 'operational NGOs' (such as SCF), this proved difficult in the case of Mozambique. Agencies such as CARE-UK, Food for the Hungry International (UK), and the BRCS form part of a larger international association or federation, and these agencies effectively passed the ODA resources on to their respective federation/country offices. In the case of CARE-UK the ODA funds were used to procure food aid from Argentina which was then distributed by CARE-Mozambique for which CARE-USA undertakes the role of lead agency. In the case of the BRCS the funds were passed on to the Geneva-based IFRC which utilised the resources in support of a joint IFRC/MRCS programme. Though both CAFOD and Christian Aid may be characterised as funding NGOs in that the funds and resources provided by ODA were used in support of relief activities implemented by Caritas Mozambique and the Christian Council of Mozambique respectively, it could be argued that the role of CAFOD was not substantively different from that of, say, FHl. A further permutation in the range of relationships between the UK-based recipient and the actual implementing agencies is provided by Christian Outreach. This agency is a member of a consortium which involves another UK-based agency, the Tear Fund, and the US-based World Relief International, which is the lead agency. A fourth agency, World Relief-Canada, subsequently joined the consortium. The management staff of the consortium includes personnel recruited by Christian Outreach.

Targeting

5.1.39. Three points need to be borne in mind when assessing the extent to which ODA assistance was focused upon those provinces most affected by the drought. First, ODA's ability to dictate the geographical area of distribution was limited. It could only react to project proposals submitted to it by NGOs. The planned areas of distribution reflected the existing or planned operational areas of the NGOs submitting the requests. Officials in Post and ODA might try to influence the planned areas of operation and in the final analysis ODA could choose not to approve a proposal. All the food aid proposals submitted to ECFAD duri ng FY 1992-93 were approved but some negoti ati on di d take pl ace over the amounts to be provided and on such matters as procurement and inter-agency co­ordination.

5.1.40. Second, whilst all agencies justified their proposed actions by reference to the drought, it was not always appa rent that address i ng drought needs was the principal objective of an action. All actions may be considered to have been a response to the needs created by the combination of drought and the conflict. Indeed, it is almost certain that, on the basis of the amounts of food aid provided in previous years, even in the absence of the drought ECFAD would have provided 10-15,000 tonnes of maiLe. Third, whilst there is general agreement that Sofala, Manica and Gaza were the provinces most affected by the drought, there is ambiguity over the extent to which other provinces were affected, particularly Zambezia where UK NGOs had a strong presence.

5.1.41. Finally, the food aid provided by ODA during FY 1992-93 constituted only about 8% of the total amount of food aid for rel ief needs provided by the international community. Information on the geographical targeting of the

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overall relief food distributions was not readily available in Maputo at the time of the evaluators' visit. It is therefore not possible to assess the extent to which needs were covered in the areas most affected by the drought, thereby allowing ODA to direct its assistance to those areas which were less affected.

5.1.42. Bearing these difficulties in mind, it is nevertheless interesting to compare the actual allocations of the 41,630 tonnes of imported and locally purchased cereals and beans provided by ODA with the GoM's own estimates of the provincial distribution of the drought-affected population (see Table A1.5). The table reveals a skewing of ODA food aid to Maputo, Zambezi a and Nampula Provinces at the expense of Sofala, Manica and Tete. Of the three provinces most affected by the drought, only Gaza received a tonnage proportionate to its share of the total population judged to be drought-affected. Manica received a disproportionately small share and Sofala received no ODA food aid at all, though it must be said that through FHI ODA did contribute to the ITSH costs associated with food aid provided by other donors. The pattern of distribution does need to be interpreted with caution, as the most severely affected areas may have been adequately supplied by other donors channelling their assistance through either the DPCCN or NGOs. In this context it should be remembered that ODA's response formed onl y a small part of the overall food aid response of the i nternat i ona 1 community. Unfortunately, neither the documentation available at the Embassy nor that provided to the evaluation team by the NGOs which received ODA food aid contains information on the adequacy of distributions in the worst-affected provinces nor on how their distribution plans related to the broader context within the province or nationally. With the exception of those of Concern none of the proposals or subsequent reports specify the degree to which the intended target population were affected by the drought.

5.1.43. Within provinces there is evidence that ODA food aid was not targeted on the worst affected Districts. For instance, ActionAid's 3,000 tonnes of yellow maize distributed in Zambezia Province went to the coastal district of Pebane, which the available evidence, though sometimes contradictory, suggests was barely affected by the drought though it was affected by the confl i ct. Similarly the 1,680 tonnes of maize distributed by CCM in Zambezia Province went to Namarroi and Gile Districts in the north of the Province, whereas the worst affected districts were in the south. CCM was not able to provide any information on the severity of the drought in the area nor the degree to which beneficiaries might be drought-affected. The documentation that was provided suggests that the target population was essentially war-affected.

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Table A1.5 Mozambique: Comparison of Provincial Allocations of ODA Food Aid with the GoM/UN Estimate of the Provincial Distribution of Drought-Affected Population

ODA A lZocotions % of Totol

tonnes % of Drought Affected

Population total

Most Affected Provinces

Sofala Nil 17 Manica 4,500 10.8 26 Gaza 7,484 18.0 20

Intermediate Affected Provinces

Inhambane 6,114 14.7 12 Tete 1,000 2.4 7

Less Affected Provinces

Maputo 12,172 29.2 7 Niassa Nil - 2 Zambezia 7,860 18.9 6 Cabo Delgado Nil - 1 Nampula 2,500 6.0 2

Total 41,630 100 100

Source: Agency reports and Table A1.2

5.1.44. The pattern of distribution in Mozambique does suggest that ODA's substantial reliance on British NGOs had the effect of reducing its ability to direct assistance to those areas and populations where assistance was most needed. CSAD and the Embassy were well aware that, apart from CARE's programmes which included areas of Gaza and Manica, most of ODA's UK-based traditional partner agencies operated programmes in Zambezia Province (OXFAM, SCF and ActionAid), Nampula (Concern) and Niassa (OXFAM), none of which could be regarded as having been severely affected by the drought. Agencies were encouraged to consider initiating drought relief programmes in Gaza, Manica and Sofala. Concern was the only traditional UK-based agency to respond by establishing a food distribution programme in the peri-urban areas of Chimoio in Sofala Province where the urban population had been swollen by large numbers of displaced persons as a result of the combined effects of the conflict and the drought. The other agencies felt unable to expand their activities to include food distribution programmes in the three provinces worst affected by the drought, opting instead to expand their activities in Zambezia Province which they considered to have been affected by the drought. 5

5.1.45. It was in this context that CSAD responded so generously to the proposals put to it by Christian Outreach and FHI in Gaza and Sofala Provinces respectively, even though it and the Embassy had misgivings about their capacity to manage 1 arge, mul ti -component programmes effecti vely. Nei ther agency had

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OXFAM responded to the suggestion by providing seeds to the ICRC for an agricultural rehabilitation programme in former RENAMO areas in Sofala Province.

received substantial support from ODA before 1992. In this context it is surprising that ODA did not respond more generously to the appeals by the ICRC and the If RC in May 1992 as both were planning large-scale relief programmes in the provinces worst affected by the drought (predominantly in RENAMO areas in the case of the ICRC). CSAD's response to these appeals was to contribute £250,000 to the ICRC appeal and, initially, £50,000 to the IFRC, though subsequently it provided £257,000 for 8 trucks for the MRC. Neither agency received food aid from ODA.

5.1.46. The information available on how beneficiaries were selected within the project areas is unfortunately limited. Invariably, proposals indicated that the most vulnerable drought- and war-affected populations would be targeted, yet in their subsequent reporting few agencies described the actual selection process. None appears to have checked thdt the mechanisms were operating effectively. Prior to the October Peace Accords most agencies operating in government­controlled areas outside the main cities relied on the DPCCN/local authority selection mechanisms, which involved beneficiary lists drawn up by village authorities, most of whom were FRELIMO party members. The principal exceptions to this approach among the agencies supported by ODA appear to have been Concern, Caritas Mozambique and the ICRC. In the peri-urban areas of Chimoio, Concern established elected supervisory committees to oversee blanket distributions covering the entire population within the selected barrios, where each household was given a ration card. In its distributions in Maputo, Inhambane and Gaza Provinces, Caritas-Mozambique relied on parish networks to identify those in need. In the evaluators' opinion such a system runs the risk of bias in favour of parishioners and of fostering suspicions about the motives for the assistance among the wider population. Because it was operating in areas controlled by RENAMO the ICRC used different selection methods; precisely how these operated is not clear from the available reports.

5.1.47. The DPCCN/local authority system appears to have suffered from two principal weaknesses -the inflexibility of the beneficiary list system and the exclusion of those living or cultivating in areas outside GoM's immediate control. Once the benefi ci ary 1 i sts had been prepared by the DPCCN/local authoriti es, it appears to have been a 1 engthy process to alter them. New arrivals or recem chegados are generally thought to hav~ been among the most vulnerable groups within the 'war and drought-affected' population, yet it could take weeks or even months for new arrivals to begin receiving food aid. A consequence was that, once added to the list, households tended to remain close to the food distribution point. This tended to reduce the amount of land available to individual households for cultivation and their ability to respond flexibly to the options open to them. In short, the inflexibility of the DPCCN distribution system may have increased the vulnerability and dependence of the affected population. Concern's system based on ration cards appeared to be much more flexible. Had such a system been more widely used it could well have allowed the target population greater mobility, thereby reducing their vulnerability and dependence on food relief.

5.1. 48. There is some evi dence to sugges t that a percepti on by the 1 oca 1 authorities within FRELIMO-controlled areas that those living outside these areas in contested or RENAMO-controlled areas were RENAMO supporters, resulted in their exclusion. Those cultivating areas beyond the immediate control of FRELIMO may therefore either have been deliberately excluded or have not put their names on the DPCCN/local authority 1 ists for fear of being prevented from returning to their fields.

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5.1.49. Having been selected, there was no guarantee that all those on the list would receive rations. Beneficiary interviews undertaken during the evaluation suggested that vulnerable groups, such as single or widowed mothers, orphans and the elderly, who comprised around 20% of the affected population, often did not receive their rations as a result of scrambles and fights taking place at poorly administered distributions. Single mothers reported they could not risk leaving their children in the melee, even if this meant not getting any share of the food. There were also frequent reports that the village authorities kept a large share of the distributed food or relief goods for their own use.

Appropriateness aJ commodities provided

5.1.50. Almost all the food aid provided by ODA was in the form of maize and most of this consisted of imported yellow maize. Two issues therefore arise: first, whether the mix of cereals and non-cereals can be considered to have been 'appropriate', and second, the appropriateness of yellow maize compared with the locally preferred white maize.

5.1.51. The UK bilateral food aid programme deliberately concentrates on the provision of cereals in fulfilment of the UK's obligations under the international Food Aid Convention (FAC). Commodities such as beans and vegetable oil cannot be counted against the FAC obligations. Established practice within ODA is that, whilst cereals are resourced from funds allocated to ECFAD, the majority of non-cereals, including legumes and high value items such as vegetable oil and milk powder, are resourced from EMAD funds. However, EMAD resources are generally insufficient to provide a more nutritionally balanced general ration distribution programme.' EMAD tends therefore to fund requests for comparatively sma 11 amounts of commod it i es, such as for use in a supp 1 ementary feedi ng programme targeted on children.

5.1.52. Multiple sourcing tends to increase the difficulties of ensuring the simultaneous availability of the three or four commodities required for a more balanced general ration, with the result that distributions may take place without one or more of these. Alternatively agencies may opt to distribute a general ration composed only of cereals, as was done in Zambia during the response to the 1991-92 drought in that country (Mukupo, 1994). Where the target population lacks access to other sources of protein, fats and micronutrients and is dependent upon relief food, the lack of these nutrients in a cereal-only ration will, over time, lead to a range of micronutrient deficiency diseases depending upon the type of cereal, and to increased risk of PEM among small children. Information on the prevalence of micronutrient deficiency diseases generally in the population and PEM among small children was not available for the areas where the ODA food aid was distributed and it is not possible to say whether ODA's concentration on the provision of cereals resulted in an increased prevalence of these conditions.

5.1.53. Had ODA attempted to provide a balanced basket of commodities without additional financial resources it would have had to reduce substantially the amount of maize provided. This raises the important question: is it preferable for food aid donors operating within fixed financial resources to provide large amounts of cereals or to provide instead smaller amounts of cereals and other

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WFP's recommended daily ration for a food aid dependent population is 400g cereals; 20g pulses; 25g oil/fat; 30g fortified cereal blend; 20g sugar and 5g salt. It should be noted that such a ration would still not supply sufficient micronutrients for a population entirely dependent upon food aid and may therefore lead to outbreaks of micronutrient deficiency diseases.

commodities capable of ensuring a nutritionally balanced ration? We are not aware of any nutritional studies which provide guidance on this. The extent to which agencies receiving maize funded by ODA were successful in obtaining vegetable oil, beans and other commodities from other donors is not clear from the reporting available. Even where non-cereal commodities were distributed it cannot be assumed that all commodities were distributed simultaneously (Austen Davies, 1994 - personal communication). At the aggregate level, the performance of food aid donors in the provision of beans and oil for relief needs was less impressive than their provision of maize. Clearly the assumption by ODA that other donors would be able to compensate for its under-provision of non-cereals is not borne out at the aggregate level.

5.1.54. Several agencies were concerned that imported yellow maize was less acceptable to the beneficiaries and that efforts should be made to provide white maize where possible. However, during 1992 there were effectively no other sources of supply for white maize outside Mozambique, and ECFAD chose to fund the importation of yellow maize. It was the desire to provide beneficiaries with white maize as well as to support local producers that led World Vision to undertake the local purchases of 5,000 tonnes of white maize. SCF and Caritas­Mozambique also undertook local purchases of maize but these involved yellow ma i ze whi ch had been imported, probably as programme food aid. CCM exchanged 1,860 tonnes of its imported yellow maize for an identical amount of locally grown white maize procured in Zambezia near to the areas of intended distribution.

Financial accauntability

5.1.55. The environment in Mozambique in 1992 made considerable demands on the financial accountability mechanisms of the agencies supported by ODA. Not only did they have to cope with landmines and, prior to the Peace Accords, attacks on agency personnel, rel ief convoys and food depots and the hijacking of rel ief commodities, but also with corruption and the particularly strong pressures upon Mozambicans to divert valuable relief resources. Inevitably, as noted in paras 5.1.8-10, a proportion of the resources funded by ODA failed to reach their intended beneficiaries. All agencies were affected in some way. Incidents of 'diversion' during the shipping and primary distribution stages were apparent to the agencies and the evaluators. Diversions occurring between the issuing depot and the intended beneficiaries were less closely monitored and, for some of the agencies, could not be determined. Apart from the Concern and Caritas programmes the DPCCN was closely involved in the final distributions and the reporting by its staff appears to have been taken at face value by many agencies even though many were openly sceptical of its level of financial accountability. Only CARE seems to have had a formal system for checking on deliveries by the DPCCN and subsequently by the private contractors it used in place of the DPCCN fleet. However, even this system did not work effectively (see 5.1.9 above).

Impact

5.1.56. There is very little information capable of demonstrating the impact of the food aid provided by ODA. The bulk of it was distributed by CARE in 3 Provinces, and there is little proof of receipt at the village level. Nutrition surveys are understood to have been undertaken on various occasions by 3 of the agencies supported by ODA, ie. World Vision in Tete Province, SCF in Zambezia Province and the IFRC/MRC in their programme area, but these cannot be used to assess the impact of ODA assistance because of the comparatively limited amounts of ODA-supported food aid provided by them and because the surveys were not timed to provide an indication of the 'before' and 'after' situation. As part of the

27

preparation for this evaluation, reports of anthropometric surveys undertaken by other agencies in areas of ODA-supported operations were assembled by a nutritionist who had previously worked in the MSF-Celula I~ter-Sec~oes information system. 7 It was, however, found that these could not be used to assess the impact of the ODA food aid because they did not relate to the precise areas where this aid was distributed, their timing did not allow a 'before' and 'after' comparison (and even where such comparisons might have been possible confounding factors did not allow the data to be interpreted in this way), and there were variations in the sample populations between successive surveys and in the methods employed. The malnutrition rates recorded by successive surveys in approximately the same areas therefore seemed to fluctuate quite dramatically for reasons whi ch were often not readi ly apparent from the reports on the surveys.

5.1.57. In the absence of reliable anthropometric data, information on the social behaviour of the recipient population can be used to indicate whether their situation broadly deteriorated, improved or remained about the same. Here again there is very little information on which to base any assessment. The NGOs supported by ODA do not appear to have undertaken regular socio-economic surveys of their recipient populations in order to monitor their status or to provide an indication of the impact of their assistance. It is remarkable that so little information is available on the impact of assistance provided by ODA and the lack suggests the need for a review of ODA's monitoring and reporting requirements.

5.1.58. In this context, it is only possible to make very general comments on the impact of ODA food aid, based on anecdotal information and impressionistic evidence. Though some areas appear to have experienced high rates of malnutrition and morbidity, it would appear that widespread famine did not occur in Mozambique during 1992-93. The massive amounts of assistance provided by the international community must have been largely responsible for this outcome and the food aid provided by ODA, which accounted for approximately 8% of the total relief maize provided, will have played a positive role in this.

5.2. Water sector components

5.2.1. ODA funded only 2 interventions in the water sector, both of which referred to the drought as a justifi cati on for the projects. The 1 argest project was phase 11 of a UNICEF Rural Water Programme in 7 provinces to which £500,000 was allocated from the Mozambique Regular Programme 'Rehabilitation' funds. This project was included in the evaluation at the evaluators' request because the proposal highl ighted the acute and serious nature of the problems caused by drought; people dying of thirst are cited as one example. The other intervention was CARE's peri-urban water project for Manica to which £280,243 was allocated from the 'Drought' funding line.

Description of the actions

5.2.2. The UNICEF proposal received by ODA in mid-April stated its overall objective as being:

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to provide, on an emergency basis, safe water suppl ies for a total of 95,000 people in the districts most affected by the drought situation through the procurement of equipment and materials for the construction of

An account of the MSF-CIS is given in Dusachoit (1994).

150 new deep boreholes over one year (starting upon arrival of the project inputs) and for the rehabilitation of existing water supply systems.

The total cost was US$9m. Only the US and Canadi an Governments' contributions exceeded the ODA's in size. Austria provided the same amount as the UK. As was apparent from the proposed schedule of activities, the project was unlikely to have any impact on the needs of severely drought-affected populations before the rainy season began in October. The ODA contribution was used to provide Dando drilling rigs produced in the UK, vehicles, handpumps and other equipment. The first handpumps were airfreighted to Mozambique from India in August and September 1992. The procurement of the Dando rigs was initially delayed as a result of ODA's Accounts Department adhering to the procedures normally used in relation to the Regular Programme, whereby payments are made on the basis of invoices rather than as an upfront funding as in the case of emergency funding. The rigs appear to have been shipped in October 1992. It is not clear when they started up. By February 1993 a progress report claimed that 500 new water sources (wells and boreholes) had been constructed in rural areas.

5.2.3. The CARE proposal was submitted in early July and approved in mid-August approxi ma te 1 y 4 weeks before the s tart of the 1992/93 rainy season. Boreho 1 e drilling, which was the main component of the project, started only on 29 December 1992. The more modest component aimed at deepening existing shallow wells could have made an impact on the availability of potable water for the drought-affected communities in and around Chiomoio. However, the proposal was submitted too late for this to be implemented in time. The main rains started the day the kit arrived in Chimoio, making it impossible to continue the proposed operation.

Assessment

5.2.4. For an activity intended to alleviate water stress in a drought-affected population, timel iness should be the principal criterion for assessment. Neither of these interventions had an impact in terms of relieving the drought-related water shortages and must therefore be considered to have been part of the longer­term efforts to improve water availability. Both actions will have had longer­term impacts in terms of improving access to water and perhaps providing the relevant communities with more reliable sources which will obviate problems during future droughts. However, the evaluators consider it inappropriate to use funds intended to relieve immediate hardship to meet such medium- and longer­term objectives.

5.3. Agricultural rehabilitation components

5.3.1. Since 1987 the UN/GoM Emergency Programme had included an Emergency Seed and Tool Programme providing seeds and tools to displaced and war- and drought­affected households in the rural areas. The May 1992 estimate of requirements for the 1992/93 crop year was for 25,900 tonnes of seeds and 3.5 mi 11 ion agricultural implements, though these were revised downwards slightly in August 1992 to 23,300 tonnes and 3.1 million tools.

5.3.2. ODA funded a total of 17 separate actions which may be categorised as agricultural rehabilitation during FY 1992/3, involving the allocation of £3.17m. 5 of these were funded from 'Drought' funds and i nvo 1 ved the all ocat i on of £1. 37m. The rema in i ng 12 were funded from 'Emergency' and 'Rome' funds and involved the allocation of £1.8m. Of the 5 'Drought'-funded actions 2 were undertaken by OXFAM and 1 each by Christian Outreach, SCF and World Vision. As

29

SCF's seeds and tools activities in Zambezia Province were funded from both 'Drought' and 'Rome' funds, 7 of the 17 actions were assessed. These 7 actions cost approximately £1.57m

Description of the actions

5.3.3. The first OXFAM action involved £457,894 to provide seeds and tools to 13,200 families in four districts (Cuamba, Mecanhelas, Maua and Nipepe) in Niassa Province and to 19,000 families in three districts (Alto Molocue, Gurue and Mocuba) in Zambezia Province. The initial proposal submitted in July 1992 consisted of a 2-page fax outlining a programme amounting to £935,926 to provide clothing as well as seeds and tools in the two provinces, to which ODA was asked to contribute £500,000. Additional information including more detailed budgets was submi tted in September. CSAD and the Embassy expressed doubts about the proposal in terms of whether the proposed Districts were seriously affected by the drought, whether the substantial funds involved might not be more effectively used in supporting relief activities in more severely affected areas of the country and the lack of co-ordination between OXFAM and ActionAid. 8

5.3.4. After further discussion with OXFAM it was agreed to proceed with the proposal, though the clothing component was excluded. The fact that the drought had not affected all the districts covered appears not to have been regarded as suffi ci ent reason to refuse fundi ng for the proposal from 'Drought' funds. It is understood that insufficient funds were available from the 'Emergency' category during the August/September period for the OXFAM proposal to be funded from what would seem to have been a more appropriate source. The initial payment to OXFAM was processed at the beginning of October, coinciding with the news of the imminent Peace Accords. The grant represented the largest single allocation from the 'Drought' funds.

5.3.5. Owing to a lack of comprehensive reporting largely due to a mine incident in early 1992 which killed an OXFAM staff member and seriously injured the OXFAM Co-ordinator in Zambezia, it was not possible to assess the Zambezia component of the OXFAM action. The evaluation team were informed by staff in Oxford that the full amount of seeds (400 tonnes of maize, beans, rice and vegetable seeds) had been distributed 'by Christmas 1992' (Nick Taylor, Emergencies Unit, OXFAM - personal communication, January, 1994). It is not clear when the tools were distributed.

5.3.6. In Niassa maize seeds were purchased locally from the Rural Extension Department of the Ministry of Agriculture. An internal (undated) report provided by OXFAM claims that all the maize seeds (119 tonnes) were 'distributed in time for the planting season and the production looks promising', but does not indicate the date by which the distributions were completed. The same report i ndi cates that the rest of the seeds (155 tonnes of beans, ri ce, peanut and vegetable seeds) which had to be procured outside the province arrived late and a proportion (unspecified) could not be distributed. The tools were airlifted to Maua and Nipepe districts, though again no dates for the distribution were given in the report provided to the evaluation team. It appears that in neither

30

An ActionAid proposal submitted in July to provide seeds and tools in Mocuba and Lugela Districts in Zambezia was initially rejected by ODA on the grounds that it duplicated OXFAM's, World Vision AgPak's programmes which had already been funded using 'Emergency' funds. It appears, however, that the same proposal, or one very similar, was approved in February 1993 using 'Romc' funds, though the lack of available documentation in Mozambique made it difficult to confirm the similarities between the two proposals.

, ,Q<

province was a survey undertaken to assess the yields obtained from the seeds and the views of the recipients about the activity. Using the budget and beneficiary information available it would appear that the total cost per family assisted was £20 in Niassa and £10 in Zambezia, the difference being largelY attributable to the cost of air transport to some of the Niassa districts.

5.3.7. The second OXFAM agricultural rehabilitation action stemmed from the agency's exploration of ways in which it could extend its operations into those provinces most severely affected by the drought. A consultant with experience of emergency operations elsewhere was given this remit and during a meeting with ICRC the idea emerged of supporting ICRC's relief activities in areas formerly controlled by RENAMO which had not been included in the earlier ICRC appeal. A request for £65,000 was submitted by OXFAM in November 1992 to distribute 150 tonnes of seeds (in family packs consisting of maize, sorghum, cowpea, squash and okra seeds) to 6,000 families in the Cheideia area of Nhamatandi District, Sofala Province. The project area was visited by a joint OXFAM/ICRC team after the proposal had been submitted to ODA. The seeds were distributed by ICRC between the end of December and mid-January 1993, which must be considered to be so late as to substantially reduce the chances of optimal yields. According to a review carried out in late 1993 of the ICRC food and agricultural rehabilitation activities in Mozambique, the OXFAM-provided seeds constituted 'a very successful programme', though there is no information on yields or the views of recipients.

5.3.8. Christian Outreach received 3 payments from 'Drought' funds totalling £395,990 for the agricultural rehabilitation programme undertaken by a consortium of 3 agencies, the 2 UK-based NGOs Christian Outreach and the Tear Fund and the US-based World Relief International, along the Limpopo Corridor in Gaza Province (Chokwe, Mabalane and Chicualacuala Districts). A fourth agency, World Relief-Canada, subsequently joined the consortium. The consortium's programme proposed in July involved 5 components - food distribution, water supply, health and nutrition, agricultural recovery and food-for-work - requiring a total of £2.77m, to which Christian Outreach would contribute £250,000 for seeds plus administrative and support personnel costs. Doubts were expressed by CSAD and officials in post about the proposed programme's ambitious scope and the lack of experience in ~1ozambique of the agencies involved. 9 However, in the absence of other UK NGO programmes in the most severely drought-affected areas, it was decided to approve the Christian Outreach request at the beginning of September. Subsequently, two further allocations were made: £70,560 for agricultural tools to accompany the seed distribution which had mistakenly not been included in the overall proposal, and a funding adjustment arising from the effective devaluation of Sterling in September 1992.

5.3.9. The order for maize, sorghum, millet, cowpea and carioca bean seed was placed with SEMOC, the parastatal seed suppl ier, in June before the overall proposal was submitted to ODA. For a period in December it appeared that SEMOC would default on its agreement. However, supplies were obtained from SEMOC in mid-January and distributions began on 21 January and continued 'along the length of the corridor' for 7 days, though it is not clear precisely when the seed packs reached all the intended recipients. 20,240 families received two types of seed depending on the local soil type, plus a hoe and a machete. The delays meant

9 An initial proposal by Christian Outreach to ODA, also submitted in July, requested £223,650 towards the transport cost of 5,000 tonnes of food aid provided by another donor and was rejected by CSAD principally because of ODA's lack of familiarity with World Relief International and the belief that all donors should be encouraged to meet the ITSH costs of their food aid.

31

that distribution took place almost 4 months after the start of the rains and this must have reduced the chances of achieving optimum yields. However, a report by the consortium in January 1993 suggested that farmers who planted earlier experienced stunted crop growth as a result of dry spells in November and December; and 'the unplanned delay in seed distribution may fortuitously result in enhanced yield'. Little additional information was available on the impact of the project as the consortium was dissolved at the end of the drought relief programme and Christian Outreach is no longer involved in the area. A member of the evaluation team attempted to visit the project area but consortium personnel familiar with the project could not be located and the visit had to be cancelled.

5.3.10. Save the Children Fund submitted a proposal in May to undertake distribution of seeds and tools to 17,500 households in 3 Districts (Mi1ange, Mope1a and Morrumba1a) in Zambezia Province at a cost of £315,245. Approval was given in mid-June for the use of 'Drought' funds on condition that 'every effort is taken to ensure that food supplies are available in districts at the time the seed distribution is taking place'. This requirement and the erratic distributions of food in the area led to the submission in August of a proposal to undertake a local purchase of food for distribution at the same time as the seed distribution, see 5.1.23 above). Implementation of the seeds and tool distribution was substantially altered as a result of the October Peace Accords and the dramatic increase in the number of potential recipients in the 3 districts. SCF responded by: reducing the amount and variety of seed given to households; obtaining 292 tonnes of additional maize seed, free of charge from MSF-France; and obtaining additional funding from ODA. Two additional proposals submitted to ODA were funded by 'Rome' funds; the first for £257,200 was received and approved in February 1993 and the second for £36,142 in March. In total therefore ODA provided SCF with £608,589 for its seeds and tools programme in the 3 districts, with £293,342 of it provided from 'Rome' funds. The final report submitted by SCF in August 1993 does not differentiate between the 'Drought' and 'Rome' funding sources and it is therefore necessary to assess the whole programme.

5.3.11. A total of 649 tonnes of maize seed, 396 tonnes of bean seed and 11,770 vegetable seed kits was distributed in two rounds during the campaign. 122 tonnes of ri ce seed were purchased but appear to have been i ncl uded in the 'maize' category in the reporting. The first round of distributions did not begin until November and continued until February. In this phase 83,600 households, 64% living in 'RENAMO areas', were each provided with 7 kg of maize and 2.6kg of bean seeds - substantially less than 9kg maize, 10kg rice and one kg each of mi 11 et, sorghum, butter bean and cowpea seeds. A second round of distributions was undertaken during March and April 1993 during which 141 tonnes of sugar bean seed and 11,770 vegetable kits were distributed among 45,265 families. The extent of the overlap between the recipients of the first and second rounds is not clear from the reporting. If it is assumed that the households benefitted from both rounds, the cost of the programme was £7.30 per household, though this would fall to £4.70 if the second-round recipients were additional to the first.

5.3.12. It was originally planned to provide 17,500 households with a hoe, machete and axe. The actual distributions were 12,000 hoes, 5,250 machetes and no axes, the principal reason for the shortfall being that of suppliers reneging on their promised deliveries. The final report does not indicate whether the suppliers broke any contractual agreements.

5.3.13. A variety of sources were used in procuring the seeds. Maize was purchased from merchants and smallholders in northern areas of Zambezia Province

32

and in Que 1 i mane city, and 60 tonnes from Ma 1 awi. Bean seeds were purchased locally and from Malawi and the vegetable kits were purchased from a company based in Swaziland and airfreighted to Quelimane.

5.3.14. The lateness of the first round of distributions must have limited the effectiveness of the programme. The original proposal did not indicate the planned distribution period, though it seems that the initial seed distributions were pl anned for September and October. No surveys appear to have been undertaken to ascess performance or the views of recipients. The final report claims that the rains were unusually late and that even the maize seeds distributed in February resulted in a crop. However, the same report notes that the rains during March and April were 'extremely poor' and this limited the impact of the second distribution.

5.3.15. In a proposal submitted at the end of April 1992 World Vision requested £77,500 from ODA to distribute 9,000 'AgPaks' in 4 districts (Changara, Maravia, Macanga and Chi uta) in Tete Province. The proposal was approved in mid-May. In addition, the agency received two further grants from ODA for agricultural rehabilitation activities: £128,086 approved in May for seeds and tool distributions in Zambezi a Province (Chinde/Luabo, Derre, Gurue and Lugela Districts) and a further £230,500 approved in January 1993 for hoe distributions in former RENAMO areas in Tete (8 districts), Zambezia (7 districts), Sofala (6 districts) and Manica (2 districts). The two additional grants were funded from 'Emergency' funds and, as they do not overlap substantially with the 'Drought'­funded action, are not assessed here.

5.3.16. This action was the most carefully designed and fully documented of those evaluated. The agency took considerable care to tailor the seed varieties in the packs to the principal agro-ecological zones in the districts. For instance, the upland AgPak contained 12 kg of Manica variety maize, 1.5 kg cowpea, 1.5 kg peanut and 0.5 kg pigeon pea, whilst the semi-arid pack contained 7 kg sorghum, 2 kg mi 11 et, 1 kg cowpea and 1. 5 kg peanut. Worl d Vi si on was the only agency to assess objectively the yields achieved by farmers. In addition, a consultant was hired to evaluate the 2 ODA-funded activities in Zambezia and Tete during March 1993.

5.3.17. The seeds for the Tete action were procured through commercial tender from reputable regional suppliers, the most competitive bid coming from National Tested Seeds, Zimbabwe, and orders were placed in May. Because of the lower than expected pri ce the number of packs was increased to 10,500. The seeds were delivered to Tete City in early September, but curiously neither the final report nor that by the consultant indicates the first and last dates of distribution. The results of crop yield assessments indicated that the mean yield was 3 tonnes/hectare for maize, 1.9 tonnes for sorghum and 1.6 tonnes for millet; these appear remarkably high for typical conditions in rural Mozambique. The final report claims that they had enabled farmers to save seeds and they 'are now expected to be largely self-sufficient for seed in the coming 1993/4 agricultural season' .

Assessment

5.3.18. Seeds and tools programmes can be assessed from a number of perspectives. Those used here are: timeliness for use in the rains following the drought period; the extent of monitoring undertaken; the appropriateness of the seeds and tools distributed; and the evidence of impact.

33

5.3.19. Only World Vision appears to have succeeded in completing its distribution of seeds by the start of the rains in October 1992. Though SCF managed to begin its 'first round' of distributions in November just after the start of the rains, these were not completed until February 1993. Beans and vegetable seeds were distributed during the 'second round' in March and April at the end of the rains. Christian Outreach began its distributions at the end of January 1993 and completed them in early February. In the case of OXFAM the reporting does not indicate the start and completion dates for the seeds distributed in Niassa Province. Distributions in Zambezia Province were understandably disrupted by the mine incident but it is understood that they were completed by Christmas. In the case of the OXFAM support to the ICRC programme in Sofala Province the seeds were distributed between the end of December and mid-January 1993.

5.3.20. Despite the apparent lateness of most of the distributions, all 4 agencies claim that farmers grew crops from the seeds distributed, though the yields achieved can be substantiated only in the case of World Vision, which was the only agency to have assessed the yields obtained by measuring the amounts harvested on 99 sampl e plots. The results of thi s assessment i ndi cated surprisingly good yields. None of the agencies appears to have undertaken formal surveys of the recipients to obtain their views on the type of seeds provided, the timing of the distribution and their satisfaction with performance. The lack of information regarding the performance of the actions by the other agencies which between them received £1.5m, is unsatisfactory. Though the conditions under which the agencies were operating were difficult, the fact that one agency was able to achieve satisfactory levels of monitoring and assessment suggests that this could be taken as a standard for other ODA supported agencies.

5.4. Health components

Description and assessment

5.4.1. ODA did not specifically indicate the health sector as a priority in its initial internal assessments which established the main components of its overall drought response, perhaps reflecting its limited involvement in the health sector in Mozambique.

5.4.2. Drought may be expected to affect a population's health negatively as a result of reduced food and deficient intake and the reduced availability of clean water for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene. On a more cl inical basis, some pathologies (acute malnutrition, dermatitis, diarrhoeal syndromes, etc.) may be directly associated, though the number of compounding factors are virtually impossible to separate. The most relevant emergency response would therefore have been the reinforcement of routine health services, with special attention to the epidemiological surveillance and control of outbreaks related to water scarcity and epidemics; the monitoring of nutritional status; and nutritional rehabilitation.

5.4.3. ODA funded only one purely health intervention during FY 1992/93,10 name 1 y a cont ri buti on of £77 ,433 from the 'Emergency' fundi ng 1 i ne to the US­based agency Africare for the supply of drugs for use in peri-urban areas of Beira, the capital of Sofala Province, principally to control outbreaks of cholera and shigella, whose incidence increased with the start of the rainy

'"

34

Other actions funded by ODA included health components, for instance the £50,000 contribution towards the IFRC/MRCS Drought Relief Programme.

season. The proposal was submitted in February 1993 and approved the following month. The drugs were procured during April and May and arrived after the peak of the outbreaks. In conjunction with local health officials it was decided to reserve half of them for possible use during the 1993/94 rainy season. At the end of 1993 CSAD approved the reallocation of £12,000 of unspent funds for use in Africare's training programmes as part of the agency's ongoing Integrated Health Water and Sanitation Project in Sofala Province.

5.4.4. Africare was the only non-UK-based NGO to receive CSAD funding during FY 1992/93. Its enquiry in February 1993 about the possibility of obtaining ODA emergency funding and the subsequent response by CSAD indicated that the two criteria that had to be fulfilled by non-UK NGOs were i) that the agency 'be best placed to provide the emergency service' and ii) that it have a UK bank account so that the furds could be payable in Sterling.

35

Evaluation of ODA's Response to the 1991-1992 Southern African Drought

Annex 2: Zimbabwe Case Study

37

1.

2.

3.

4.

INTRODUCTION

1.1

1.2

OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

METHOD OF STUDY

IMPACT OF THE DROUGHT

2.1

2.2

2.3

RAINFALL

AGRICULTURAL IMPACT

MACROECONOMIC IMPACT AND THE ESAP

THE RESPONSE

3.1

3.2

3.3

ASSESSMENTS AND RESPONSES BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

THE RESPONSE BY THE ODA

ORGANISATION OF THE RESPONSE IN ZIMBABWE

ASSESSMENT OF ODA'S RESPONSE

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SUPPORT

FOOD AND LOGISTICS

RURAL WATER SECTOR

AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION

HEALHI CARE

43

43

43

45

45

4B

48

49

49

50

53

55

55

57

67

71

74

39

Tables

Table A2.1

Table A2.2

Table A2.3

Figures

Figure A2.1

Figure A2.2a

Figure A2.2b

Figure A2.2c

Figure A2.2d

Figure A2.3

Figure A2.4

Figure A2.5

Map A2.1

Map A2.2

40

Zimbabwe: UK Bilateral Response to 1991/92 Drought Grant Allocations

Zimbabwe: ODA grants to NGOs for drought-related supplementary feeding and food logistics activities

List of Actions

Zimbabwe Rainfall 1901-1991

Rainfall in Bulawayo 1991/92 Compared with 1952-91 average

Rainfall shortfall in Binga 1991/92 Compared with 1958-91 average

Rainfall in Harare 1991/92 Compared with 1952-91 mean

Rainfall in Buffalo Range 1991/92 Compared with 1969-91 mean

Cumulative grain imports 1992-1993

Bi ki ta Emergency 11ater Programme

Christian Care: Progressive Expenditures

Zimbabwe Administrative Districts

Percentage of Normal Rainfall

51

58

76

44

47

47

47

47

58

68

69

41

46

Map A2.1 Zimbabwe Administrative Districts

ODA Funded NGO Emergency .......... :.

Activities

~ Bikita District/Water Aid

~ Ufe Sowing Ministries

[@ Christian Care

[ill] SCF Child Supplementary Feeding Project

_._------- ..

L~:

'!)~~ @ ~~4/Jt'Uf,

0 '!)~ "'~ft'Uf,

~'1

41

I !

Figure A2.1 Zilllbalme: Annual Rainfall, 1901-1991*

100

90 80 70 60

50 ,0

30

20 E 10 E '0 ~

·10 :s ~ ·20 er

·JO \ 6

. ·,0

·50

'·60

·70

·80 ·90

PRESENT DROUG11T

.100

·110 1 TIO 1 1,{,0·1 1,'50 1 1560 1 19)0 r 19'80 1 19'90) ,~<=------

1925' 19)5 '1!).15 1955 1965 19)5 19()5 1991

*Note: Annual Rainfall as deviation in 111111 frol11 1961 to 1990 (30 years) l11ean level of 662 111111.

Source: Rainfall Section. Zimbabwe Met. Dept.

requirements, and made this information available. Otherwise, information is at best fragmentary and purely qualitative.

2. IMPACT OF THE DROUGHT

2.1 Rainfall

2.1.1 The 1991/92 drought has been described as the worst in Zimbabwe in living memory and the historical rainfall data confirm that nationally it was the most serious drought for at least 70 years, with a mean average rainfall for the whole country of only 324mm, compared with a 1961-90 mean of 662mm (Figure A2.1).

2.1.2 The low rainfall in the 1991/92 growing season represented a significant decl ine in precipitation from the previous year which itself h~d been a relatively dry year. Indeed, since 1987 annual rainfall levels in Zimbabwe had been below the long-term mean levels so that hydrologically the impact of the 1991/92 drought was all the more severe. Combined with inadequate investment and poor management in the water sector, this meant that the levels of water in both natural aquifers and artificial storage systems were already extremely low before the 1991/92 drought. Consequently the drought had potentially severe implications for the generation of hydro-electric power, and urban and industrial water supplies.

2.1.3 Although most of the country experienced rainfall below 50% of the historic norm (see Map A2.2) the worst affected area was the extreme South East, where the level of rainfall was below 20% of the historic norm. Indeed, part of the South East had also been most severely affected by the preceding sequence of relatively dry years.

2.1.4 There were effectively two stages to the onset of the drought in Zimbabwe. First, the early (planting) rains which, in a normal year, begin in early November, did not arrive until December 1991 and even then were sporadic and patchy in many areas, with serious consequences for the main planting season. Then a mid-season dry spell beginning in January 1992 persisted until well into February/March when it was too late to save much of the already drought-stressed crops.

2.1.5 Comparing the 1991/92 pattern of rainfall for selected stations in Zimbabwe with the historic mean, it is clear that relatively dry agro-ecological zones (Binga, Chiredzi) were affected earlier. But even in areas such as the Midlands around the capital Harare, where the initial deficit was relatively slight, the failure of the January/February rains proved disastrous for agriculture (see Figure A2.2 a-d).

2.1.6 As regards non-agricultural impacts, power generation and industrial production were affected directly by water shortages and indirectly by the impact of a slump in agricultural production on effective demand. Consequently, Zimbabwe was confronted with both internal and external financing gaps to cover massive increases in cereal imports and measures to facilitate agricultural recovery, as well as its response to the water- and health-related effects of the drought. Moreover, these responses had to be made in the context of the wider negative consequences, including relative and absolute reductions in economic activity resulting from the drought.

45

f1ap A2.2

ZIMBABWE: PERCENTAGE OF NORMAL RAINFALL

from 1st OCTOBER 1991 to 8 am on APRIL 1992

0-20%

20 - 40%

40 - 60%

60 - 80%

Source: Zimbabwe Director of Meteorological Services

Figure A2.2: J991/2 Rainfall compared to historic norm

Bulawayo Binga

I I I I

~ 100 1 ~~~~_f~Tn~~"~~~~~~ o TIII!iTTi) 11111:1111,11,11)111'11

Jut)' Aug Sept 0:;1 I'm De-c: Ja" Feo ~ A;;< May JUt1

1000

,600 E

200

Harare

Crop Yeal

I I I I I

~ I}

6

o TTI ITTTlilillli:iilillll'i:li July AwQ Sepl OCI N<N De< JOII1 Feb M;{ A;:;l

Crop Year

-:- Average 1952-91 ---0 - 1991/92

P I I I I I I

f {

200

100

500

100

T (I I , I I I I T I I I I I I I July N.Xl SCpl Dcl No.! De<:: Jan

Crop Year

~ 1958·91 average --c - 1991/92

Buffalo Range

o iiTTTTT Tilll Jut)' AWIl Sept Oct NcN De<: Jan Feb ~ Apt ~y June

Crop Year

-6- Average -6--- 1991/92

47

2.2 Agricultural Impact

2.2.1 Cereal production in 1992/93 was only about one quarter of the levels of the late 1980s. Maize production, and even that of the more drought-resistant sorghum and mi11ets, was devastated. Other crops dependent on irrigation, for example sugar and wheat, were also severely affected, because of both limited inter-year storage capacity and below-average rainfall in the preceding years. Cotton production which supplied the local textile industry was severely reduced. Livestock, especially in the communal areas, experienced high levels of mortality and forced sales at low prices. Tobacco revenues also fell dramatically as a result of the poor quality of the crop.

2.2.2 A mere 100,000 tonnes of maize was delivered to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), which in normal years was responsible for the distribution of more than 1 million tonnes, including exports. Across the country's farming areas the impact of the drought was variable, with farmers in the communal areas experiencing the greatest, near total, loss of cereals and cotton crops, and the deaths of 1.03m cattle, 23% of the communal herd. Some of the drier agro­ecologically marginal areas, which had experienced more localised droughts in the years immediately prior to the 1991/92 drought, were threatened with near-famine conditions.

2.2.3 In a normal year Zimbabwe exports both maize and sugar. Exports arranged during 1991/92 were allowed to continue, despite the likelihood that maize stocks would fall below the food security target level of 500,000 tonnes. With domestic consumpt i on of a round 200,000 tonnes a month, Zimbabwe a 1 mos t exhaus ted its depleted stocks by April/May 1992. Eventually, imports of some 2.2 million tonnes of grain were organised during 1992/93, compared with imports in a typical year of 100,000 tonnes, mostly wheat. In a normal year imports account for approximately 4.5% of total cereals availability, but in 1992/93 this proportion was over 80%.

2.2.4 The dramatic decline in agricultural production threatened a severe problem with food entitlements in rural areas. Se1f-provisioning households had little food. Rural incomes were further affected by a decline in employment in the commercial agricultural sector. In an economy where remittances to rural-based households form an important component of disposable income, the more general economic recession intensified pressures, especially upon the poorer strata of society. The drought imp1 ied the need for major interventions to ensure the availability of basic food supplies as well as access, through direct distribution or income-generating activities, to enable people to purchase commercially.

2.3 Macroeconomic Impact and the ESAP

2.3.1 The macroeconomic consequences of the drought shock were perhaps more severe in Zimbabwe than in any other affected country. Initial assessments by the GoZ, the World Bank and the IMF indicated that the drought was likely to involve a fall in GDP of around 10% during 1992/93. The overall drought-related loss of exports was projected at US$223m in 1992/93 and US$200m in 1993/94. The negative impact on the balance of payments, including over US$300m for maize imports, was projected as US$777m (16% of GDP) in 1992/93.

2.3.2 The drought shock impacted on an economy which was in the third year of imp1 ementi ng an Economi c Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The drought seriously affected the government's ability to reduce fiscal deficits as envisaged in the ESAP. It also threatened to fuel inflation through higher food

48

prices and by forcing the government to prolong a period of high interest rates to finance its additional borrowing requirement. Efforts to cushion vulnerable groups against the adverse effects of the ESAP were also undermined. Overall, the drought shock threatened the postponement of reforms which included reducing the budget deficit, rationalising the civil service, and reducing or eliminating subsidies. This combination of considerations, including the potentially direct social impacts of the drought and the likelihood that it would postpone, if not derail, the economic reform programme, provided a powerful rationale for a major and concerted donor response.

2.3.3 Taking into account the responses by the government and the international community, the economic consequences of the drought were less intense than those initially projected on the assumption of economic policies remaining unchanged. Nevertheless, the impacts were severe. GDP declined by 7.7% during 1992/93. Agricultural sector output declined by an estimated 24%, compared with the 1980s annual growth rate of +2.6%. Manufacturing sector output fell by 10%. The current account of the balance of payments went down by over US$300m, with imports rising by US$122m and exports declining by US$220m"

2.3.4 In terms of economic impact, therefore, Zimbabwe was probably the most seriously affected country in the region, because of the drought's direct impacts on agriculture, the non-agricultural impacts through inter-sectoral linkages and the direct consequences of water shortage. During 1992/93 GDP declined by approximately 8%, bringing not only severe human hardship but also threatening to disrupt the process of economic liberalisation.

3. THE RESPONSE

3.1 Assessments and Responses by the International Community

3.1.1 The 1991/92 agricultural marketing year had been relatively poor, with cereals production only 89% of the 1986-90 average. As Zimbabwe continued to export, there were concerns, reflected in the SADC Early Warning System reports, that by the end of the marketing year stock levels would be inadequate to ensure coverage of normal operations. From November 1991 the GMB began to press for imports at least to fill the gap left by existing export commitments.

3.1.2 By December 1991, as a result of information circulated by the SADC Early Warning System (both the national-level Early Warning Units and the Regional Unit based in Harare) and through FAO's Global Information Early Warning System which had been monitoring the situation closely, it was becoming apparent that the drought was having a serious impact on production prospects. Assessments were still provisional, however, and the GIEWS report dated 10 December 1991, indicated recent widespread rains favourable to plantings in Zimbabwe." Nevertheless during January and February 1992, evidence rapidly accumulated from all sources, of a near-total failure of the maize crop and other serious negative drought impacts. A meeting of food aid donors in Brussels on 25 February, called coincidentally to consider emergency responses for the whole of Africa, reviewed evidence of the crisis, including Zimbabwe's large additional import requirements. By 6 March, when the GoZ declared an emergency, FAO was estimating that the country would require over 1 million tonnes of additional maize imports.

" Compare the assessment in World 8an\:. 1992 with that in World Bank 1993.

12 These apparently favourable rains appear to have fallen particularly in the Midlands region and Haralc, and did not benefit drier areas (compare Figures 2.2a·d),

49

3.1.3 The assessment phase was a long and drawn out process as the picture slowly emerged of a crisis of increasingly severe dimensions. The FAO/WFP assessment, completed in April, and the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs/SADC Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA) appeal (DHA/SADC, 1992), prepared for the Geneva Conference in June 1992, only served to confirm and amplify the elements of what was in terms of import requirements clearly the largest-scale food crisis in Zimbabwe and in Africa.

3.1.4 The governments, SADC neighbours and donors acted responsibly in beginning to co-ordinate their responses, if on a partial basis, prior to the DESA appeal. ODA made its initial commitments as early as 3 March 1992. The United States a 1 so put together a package of food aid and agri cultura 1 export credi ts in February and March. In April, the Worl d Bank agreed an Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation project (EDRMP) involving IDA credits of US$150m. On 4 May the European Community agreed a package of drought assistance for Africa, including Zimbabwe. In the attempt, however, to achieve better overall co­operation, the long-drawn-out assessment process may well have contributed to the eventual problems of delayed response on the part of some donors.

3.2 The ODA's Response

3.2.1 The first warnings ODA received of the gravity of the situation and the potential severity of the impact appear to have come from the officials in post in Zimbabwe. The BHC was becoming concerned at the potential severity of the drought and started warning ODA about the impending crisis in December 1991. The GMB organised 100,000 tonnes of maize imports from South Africa in December 1991, and lobbied for additional imports because it was uncertain of being able to sustain normal distribution after April/May 1992. By mid-January, although the GoZ had not yet declared an emergency, it was clear that substantial aid flows were i nevi tab 1 e and ODA began to plan its response. Perhaps because of the unprecedented scale of the drought, the fact that the area around the capital was relatively little affected until mid-January 1992 (Figure A2.2d) led to some delays in GoZ's full appreciation of the scale of the crisis.

3.2.2 On 12 February 1992 SADC's food security bulletin estimated a shortfall of 500,000 tonnes of grain. This impl ied an increase of 185,000 tonnes of grain imports in the first half of 1992 and a further 650,000 tonnes from September 1992 to mid 1993. Only on 6 March 1992, with up to 6 million people across the country facing severe food shortages, did GoZ declare a national emergency and appeal to the international community for assistance.

3.2.3 Despite the government's initial reluctance to act, the food crisis was contained. Commercial purchases combined with a bilateral agreement with the United States ensured that a pipeline of imports was put in place which prevented the country running out of maize in April/May 1992. Critical shortages during that period, however, were reflected in queues for maize at retail outlets and severe problems caused by the lack of feed in parts of the commercial livestock sector.

3.2.4 ODA had quickly recognised that Zimbabwe was confronting a major resource gap in financing extraordinary food and other agriculture-related imports. It decided that assistance with these problems should have a priority claim on the remaining bilateral development funds for 1991/92, and in 1992/93. Zimbabwe was initially to receive £2.5m for balance-of-payments support, confirmed on 3 March before the official declaration of an emergency. Two further tranches of £5m and £2.5m were announced on 29 April and 30 June 1992 respectively.

50

Table A2.1 - Zimbabwe UK Bilateral Response

Table AZ.1 - Zimbabwe: UK Bilateral Respouse W the 1991/92 Dro<q;ht Grant allocations(!)

ChanMl I: thousand % of total 1. Dlr&et to G<lvtmlTHtnt 10,000 81.7

2. Indlr&et 10 G<lv&mm&nl 2.1 via NGO

WATERAID ·500 4.1

2.2 via Intematkxlal Agencies UNICEF 210 WHO 84

294 2.4 3. Dlr&Ct 10 ~t1OMI NGO.

LSM 298 SCF 233

531 4.3 4. Indlr&Ct to Ope<atlonal NGO.

via InlomlrtJonal Pa.rtn<Irs

CAFOD/CADEC 245 C. AID/ C.CARE 310 C. AlD/ORAF 1&4 OXFAMlORAF 84 YCAAE/YMCA 45 BRCSIZRCS 30

908 7.4

TOTAL (2) 12233 100.0

Direc\llndirect to Govemment 10,7&4 NGO Programmes and Channels 1,439

Notes: ,. Excludes UK's share of EC Community Aid Emergency Food of

80 ,000 I or £2.4 mn 2. BHC, Harare also financed purchases for regional activities Including

Railway spares (£3,000) and for computers for LAC / SADC (£6,000)

Source:ODA

88.2 , 1.8

51

3.2.5 A meeting of the principal UK NGOs was called at ODA on 30 March. Reports by the NGO representatives confirmed official assessments and indicated the likelihood of substantial requests from British-based NGOs to support their relief efforts in the country. A number of international consultations were also undertaken, including those organised by the World Bank. With evidence of an increasingly serious crisis, ODA determined on a further package of measures that involved intensive consultation with officials in post on logistical constraints, food distribution arrangements, donor co-ordination and NGO activities.

Sectoral composition of the ODA response

3.2.6 The channelling and sectoral composition of ODA's response reflect a number of distinct influences. First, the decision to concentrate on balance-of­payments support reveals at least implicit judgments about the capacity of those Zimbabwean institutions that could be expected to take primary responsibility for the response to the national drought. A sequence of three tranches of balance­of-payments support, amounting to more than 80% of ODA's total response was committed between 4 March and the end of June 1992, (see Table A2.1) on an untied and grant basis. To speed disbursement, this support took the form of reimbursement of completed fuel oil import transactions.

3.2.7 Secondly, because other donors, in particular the United States, the WFP (through the support of various donors), and the EC, were thought to be responding adequately in the area of food aid, water resources were identified as an ODA pri ority. Thi s was partl y because the ODA already had a number of commitments and ongoing activities in this sector. The decision eventually resulted in support being given to the Bikita District component of the National Emergency Water Programme, funded through the British NGO Water Aid, in order to speed up the response and to ensure technical co-operation. ODA also agreed to respond to proposals from Christian Aid to support the Christian Care water sector programme, having ascertained that this was complementary to the Bikita programme. A small grant was also made to SCF to help with water provision in a Mozambican refugee camp.

3.2.8 A further area of indirect support to the government was in the health sector via the international agencies UNICEF and WHO. Again, these proposals resulted from local-level consultation between the BHC officials and in-country representatives of the agencies as well as the government.

3.2.9 Officials in post in Zimbabwe played an active role in monitoring the in­country situation. This included informal consultation with NGOs about ways in which ODA might provide additional support for their activities. Both direct grants to operational NGOs (SCF and Life Sowing Ministries (LSM)), followed in­country consultation and BHC support. Eventually two more grants were made and were closely monitored by the BHC.

3.2.10 Other grants, amounting to £908,000 (7.4% of the total assistance), were made indirectly through UK-based NGOs - CAFOD, Christian Aid, OXFAM, Y Care International and the British Red Cross Society - in response to requests on behalf of operational partners in Zimbabwe or as part of regional appeals. Although in some cases there may have been local consultation with officials in post, these grants refl ect deci si ons on the part of UK-based NGOs to request funding from ODA's Emergency Aid Department (EMAD) out of the initial allocation of £2.5m and the subsequent £3.1m set aside for grants throughout the region. The provision of direct balance-of-payments support reflected proactive decisions on ODA's part, involving desk officers and those in post in consultation with ECFAD and EMAD. In the water sector the substantial grant for the Bikita Energy

52

Water Project (£536,000) reflected a proactive stance by ODA and the Post in seeking ways in which country programme funds could best be utilised to meet the needs identified jointly by ODA and GoZ. For the remainder of the water sector and also the health sector the activities supported were initiJted by GoZ, UN agencies and NGOs. The remaining elements of the programme mostly represent initiatives by NGOs concentrated in the food and logistics sector (8.1% of total expenditure) and agricultural rehabil itation (1%).

3.2.11 Both documentation and interview evidence indicate that ODA's ordering of priorities was broadly consistent with that of the GoZ. The latter clearly attached great importance to the rapid disbursement of balance-of-payments support, whilst welcoming assistance through NGOs that concentrated their activities in the severely affected and less accessible peripheral areas of the country. That ODA and GoZ consulted closely clearly suggests that ODA was highly proactive in determining the overall response. This case study therefore offers an interesting opportunity to compare the performance of those major elements of the support which reflected ODA decisions with that of grants which essentially reflected the decisions of British NGOs and their local partners.

3.3 Organisation of the Response in Zimbabwe

3.3.1 The FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission in April 1992 estimated cereal import requirements at 1.4m tonnes. The UN-DESA appeal of June 1992 estimated that the direct threat to the 1 ivel ihood and nutritional status of those affected by the drought implied relief requirements of over 500,000 tonnes. Subsequently, in October 1992, the numbers of the rural population seeking relief exceeded 5.6 million, over half the population.

3.3.2 The effects of the drought on the supply of water for human consumption and the availability of water for industry and mining also gave the drought a critical economic dimension.

3.3.3 Although the GoZ responded initially more slowly than some others, it had begun to take steps prior to the formal declaration of an emergency on 6 March 1992 to meet the threatened shortfall in cereal suppl ies with commercial purchases as well as a food aid and expol't credit package f-Jm the United States. Once a national disaster was declared, it acted rapidly and effectively. It reactivated the National Civil Protection Co-ordinating Committee (NCPCC), involving the office of the Vice President, a committee of Ministers and a task force of provincial ministers. Task forces under the NCPCC were established to co-ordinate activities on a sector-by-sector basis. The programme made extensive use of government structures at di stri ct and provi nci al 1 evel to assess the situation in the rural areas, identify their needs and distribute relief. Zimbabwe played a pivotal role in the regional food imports operation, with the Logistics Advisory Centre based in Harare. There was impressive co-ordination with the National Railways of Zimbabwe, the GMB and the rail and port authorities in the neighbouring countries. The GMB was responsible for purchasing and distributing grain to its various depots throughout the country, including all the public sector programmes and, in practice, much of the NGO activity. Its grain importation and logistical activities had a wider significance in ensuring that normal marketing arrangements for grains were sustained by maintaining adequate supplies to the milling sector. As a result, some NGO programmes were able to function through local purchases of commodities imported under the government's emergency importation programmes.

53

3.3.4 The key relief interventions included:

.. The expansion of the rationing and food-for-work programme implemented by the Department of Social Welfare, which distributed food to identified and registered applicants. The monthly ration, initially 10kg of maize flour per recipient, was subsequently reduced to Skg because of increasing numbers registered for relief and problems of supply. This programme was supported by food aid donors as well as by the World Bank.

.. The Child Supplementary Feeding Programme (CSFP), based on 'wet' rations of prepared food distributed from village feeding points, was introduced in July 1992, with numbers increasing to over 1 million children by the end of the year. As the flow of targeted food aid increased, and with evidence of problems of school attendance, the programme was expanded to include school feeding in December 1992.

.. The Emergency Water Programme was organi sed through a National Action Committee (NAC). An emergency water plan, developed in April 1992, involved accelerating the pace of operations of this existing programme. In addition, emergency water measures were undertaken for affected urban areas.

.. The Crop Input Di stri buti on Programme. The major component of the agricultural recovery strategy was to supply 'crop packs', including seeds and fertilisers, sufficient for 1 hectare, initially to 800,000 farmers in the communal areas. Subsequently, the number was increased to 920,000, with about 904,000 ha pl anted from inputs suppl i ed through its scheme. Various smaller agricultural sector programmes, including tillage, cotton, livestock, were also undertaken.

3.3. S GoZ prepared an overall co-ordi nated response i nvol vi ng a proposed US$182.6m of food for ta rgeted free di s t ri but i on and US$26.1m of non-food assistance as part of the DESA appeal. In addition, working directly with the World Bank and the major bilateral donors, other complementary components of its overall drought response were put in place, including the large-scale programme of commercial imports of grain, the accelerated emergency water programme and the seed distribution programme. These programmes were variously supported by the World Bank and bilateral donors including members of the European Community, the Nordi c countri es and USAID. Part of thi s drought response i nvol ved the reallocation of assistance from the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme to fund drought-related imports.

3.3.6 Historically, NGOs have played a modest role in drought relief activities in Zimbabwe. The government, in liaising with NGOs and their own representative body NANGO, pragmatically assigned to them a complementary role in the overall drought relief programme which was operating quite effectively across most areas of the country. NGOs were encouraged to concentrate their activities in peripheral and often the poorest areas, where the government's capacity to deliver relief was most limited. These poor and most severely drought-affected regions of Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South and Masvingo in the South East were also areas where historically NGOs had concentrated their rural activities in communal areas. In the Zimbabwean context, support for NGO activities therefore implied assisting programmes likely to complement GoZ's activity.

3.3.7 Overall, the drought response strategy in Zimbabwe, which has been extensively reviewed by GoZ and evaluated in part by supporting international and bilateral agencies, was successful. A potential famine in the worst affected

54

areas, with associated severe distress and possible migration in search of relief, was averted. The potentially devastating economic dislocation of a major food crisis was contained. Water and energy supplies to urban and industrial sectors were somehow or other sustained, if on a more restricted basis.

3.3.8 The drought shock exposed, however, many weaknesses of the emergency response system, despite the broadly regarded success of the drought programme. Some elements of the response, were at best only partially successful. The negative economic consequences of the drought were alleviated only to a limited extent by the additional international support. The drought represented a major setback to the implementation of the ESAP as Gol was able to restore that programme to its agenda in a serious way only in 1994/95. Perhaps the overall key to such success as the drought response enjoyed was the fact that the government, supported to a considerable extent by the international community, channelled large-scale resources into food imports and both complementary and overlapping rel ief water and agricultural recovery programmes. Consequently, whatever micro-inefficiencies were involved, this massive response minimised the drought's social and economic impacts.

4. ASSESSMENT OF ODA'S RESPONSE

4.1 Balance-of-Payments Support

The resource gap

4.1.1 The drought's overall economic cost was not clear when ODA made its initial assessment in late February 1992 but additional maize imports by the government were considered likely to exceed US$250m (£150m). ODA itself, and the World Bank in providing an assessment for the donor consortium and in preparing its Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation Project (EDRMP) credit in March­April 1992, expected very large balance-of-payments costs.

4.1.2 The full scale of the drought's impact became clear much later. By late 1992 the World Bank estimated, for 1992/3 alone, US$223m loss of exports, US$554m increase in imports, and an overall increase in the balance-of-payments deficit equivalent to 16% of GDP (World Bank, 1992). For a government struggling to implement a programme of economic reform this implied a large immediate increase in its resource gap.

4.1.3 Gol concentrated in the first instance on ensuring sufficient levels of food imports, financed commercially from its own resources or as food aid, to sustain both public distribution programmes and commercial markets. In February 1992 minimum cereal import requirements were estimated at 1 million tonnes for 1992/93. The requirement was subsequently revised upwards to 1.6 million tonnes in April and finally to over 2 million tonnes. Eventually, 2.5 million tonnes of drought-related imports were organised. Approximately 1.2 million tonnes (US$160m) of cereals were imported commercially, and the balance of 1.2m tonnes (US$144m) was funded by donor assistance in the form of grants, soft loans, commercial loans and outright gifts of grain.

Financing the food import programme

4.1.4 Looking at the drought crisis and the phases of the response, it is clear that a food aid response alone would have been neither appropriate nor sufficient. But for Gol action in making large-scale commercial purchases of maize, the country and its people would have been confronted with a grave situation. Only immediate large-scale commercial purchases and those financed

55

by US credit, prevented the exhaustion of public and private commercial sector stocks between April and June 1992. Most donors, including the EC, required some time to make the additional commitments and to begin to organise food aid shipments. Food aid on a significant scale, therefore, began to arrive in Zimbabwe only during October-December 1992, 7 months after the national emergency had been declared (Figure A2.4).

ODA's response

4.1.5 ODA's financial assistance was part of wider collective action by the major donors and was, in important respects, particularly constructive and exemplary. ODA opted for a phased response, making a commitment to Zimbabwe of £2.5 million (and a similar commitment to Zambia) within 8 days of the Brussels meeti ng of 25 February 1992, in the 1 i ght of its own assessment that both countries would incur large additional food import bills if they were to prevent the crisis degenerating into near-famine conditions.

4.1.6 After internal and international assessments confirmed a food crisis of even greater proportions, two further tranches of import support were announced, bringing the total to £10 million by the end of June 1992. The initial response made in the same week that Zimbabwe dec1 ared its emergency had an important demonstration value and enabled the UK to take a constructive position in seeking wider European and international donor responses. The ODA-provided financial assistance was equivalent to some 11% of the approximately US$260m (£89m in June 1992) of commercial imports of cereals organised by GoZ in response to the drought.

4.1.7 The ODA grants were in effect additional to ba1ance-of-payments support already committed to Zimbabwe in the context of economic liberalisation measures and the ESAP, thereby minimiSing the administrative problems of authorising the grants and their disbursement. Subsequently, ODA responded with further flexibility by allowing their retrospective coverage of oil imports in order to speed up disbursement and to obviate the delays incurred in documentation for the food purchases arranged by Zimbabwe us i ng short-term (6-month) credits. In accordance with normal ODA practice, there were no counterpart fund requirements. The overall levels of public expenditure unde~ the ESAP process ~ere subject to agreement and monitoring involving the World Bank and the Consultative Group Joint Donor Review, in turn complemented by an IMF Extended Financing Facility (EFF). The attribution of additional ba1ance-of-payments support to petroleum imports raised no problems about fungibility and redirection of foreign-exchange support to unacceptable uses, as the public sector import financing costs of the drought were considerably in excess of the totality of additional donor funding.

4.1.8 Particular attention was paid to ensuring rapid disbursement on the part of both desk officers and those in post. The initial tranche of £2.5m was explicitly assigned to 1992/3 because it was recognised that GoZ procedures would preclude funding within financial year 1991/92 ending on April 4. The GoZ officials drew particular attention to the flexible and rapid procedure with respect to i nvoi ci ng, to expedite di sbursement. The three ODA grants were favourably compared with the problems of disbursement encountered with other donor funds committed during April-June 1992, including provision under the World Bank's Emergency Recovery Loan for fi nanci ng grai n imports. 13 Although other donors, for example Germany, were also able rapidly to reallocate funds

13 World Bank procedures require separate tendering for reimbursement under an Emergency Recovery loan, as in the case of normal operations.

56

provisionally committed under the ESAP, additional emergency assistance took much longer to be scheduled.

4.1.9 The Zimbabwe grants were also well managed. The provision of additional balance-of-payments support involved minimal modification to ODA's existing arrangements for support to Zimbabwe's ESAP. UK support has been sustained in relation to the ESAP following the end of the emergency. That programme has been modifi ed to take account of the impact of the drought on the economy and government finances.

4.1.10 Cost-effectiveness has two aspects. First, were the GMB commercial operations organised efficiently? Neither ODA nor the evaluators had access to information on these operations as the additional support was attributed to other imports. It was not poss i b 1 e, therefore, to compa re the commerci a 1 purchases made by the government on a bulk basis, and typically on 6-month credit terms, directly with the cost of donor food aid procurement. No major financial irregularities, however, were reported. In addition, the admittedly slower World Bank tendering procedures provided an element of external scrutiny on GMB operations.

4.1.11 Second, timeliness also enters into cost-effectiveness considerations. The imports were organised as part of the regionally co-ordinated shipping programme involving the various national railway systems and the Logistics Advisory Centre. As government commercial imports were the first to arrive to meet the critical supply gap, these were the essential imports from the point of view of potentially vulnerable groups and the economy in general (Figure A2.3).

4.1.12 On the basis of the information available to ODA in March 1992, and with the benefit of hindsight, concerning the efficiency of both ODA and other donor responses to the drought, the provision of balance-of-payments support is cons i dered to have been appropri ate, effi ci ent 1 y handl ed and cos t-effecti ve. Balance-of-payments support was, in principle, easy to organise because multi­donor arrangements to support economic liberalisation, including the monitoring of publ i c expenditure, were al ready in pl ace. The di sbursement probl ems encountered, however, particularly by the vJorld Bank, in seeking to provide additional balance-of-payments support confirm the soundness of ODA's approach of responding in a phased way and with flexibility as regards the practicalities of attribution.

4.2 Food and Logistics

4.2.1 Overall, ODA's response represented only a small part of an extremely complex relief operation involving many donors and different ways of channelling assistance in the form of food and finance. An assessment of ODA's response must therefore involve examining the effectiveness of the overall drought relief programme which ODA was, in effect, indirectly supporting with financial assistance to the government; the usefulness of the NGO element within that programme and the efficiency and effectiveness of the components supported by ODA; and finally the particular way in which they were assisted. As the overall drought rel ief programme (Tobaiwa, 1993) and major elements of international relief (Borsotti, 1993; SADC, 1993a; WFP, 1994) have already been considered separately, this assessment will concentrate on the particular components supported by ODA, and the ways in which this was undertaken. It needs, nevertheless, to be set carefully in the context of the overall programme and the interlinked actions of government and donors.

57

58

Figure A2.3,

T"Ille

-f- ••••••.•••••••...••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.

...•.....................................••••• ~

f § uoo t .. ·· ...... ·· .. ··· .... ····· .. ··· .... ·;;: /'

1000 ..................... ,;;-' L 0<:0.,'''''''' /'

/' $00 +- ........ ::....-:c .... :/

A,".2: Zilllbabwe: ODA Grants to NGOs for Drought-related ~.--.. - -"-y~ -"'---

Supplelllentary Feeding and Food Logistics Activities , ... " --_. __ .

Grantee Opera ti ona I Agency Grants -* of total (£000)

---------~,

rm C S Zimbabwe Red Cross 30 3.0 Society (via I FRC)

C AI' 0 lJ Christian Cathol ic Agency 245 24.8 for Development ( CADEC)

OX!' IIH Organisation of Rural 84 8.5 Associations for Progress (ORAP)

Christian Aid ORAP 194 19.7

scr: SCF 91 9.2

Y Core Zimbabwe YMCA 45 4.6 Illterllational

L i r C' SOvvi n9 LSM (via BHC) 296 30.0 1·1 i 11 i s I. ri es ( LS~I)

Total 985 99.8 -----,,

SOli re!': ODA .. _ .. __ .. __ .... _- -

4.2.2 ODA supported the emergency feeding programmes and linked logistical operations of seven NGOs in Zimbabwe by means of grants totalling £985,000. These included only one grant to a directly operational NGn, Save the Children Fund (UK), nine grants to UK-based NGOs to support the activities of their local partners and one grant via the British High Commission to a local NGO, Life Sowing Ministries (LSM) (see Table A2.2).

4.2.3 In addition, as 78% of the grant via Christian Aid to support Christian Care's rural emergency water programme i nvo 1 ved Food-for-Work expenditure for commodities in the most severely affected Masvingo Province, this was, in effect, largely a food relief and logistics grant.

4.2.4 These NGO activities were all part of a programme of emergency food distribution operating under agreement with the GoZ according to its ;uideljnes. Emergency food distribution involved the Ministry of Social Welfare's ration distribution combined with food-for-work activities. These were complemented in June-July 1992 by supplementary feeding programmes targeted on the under-fives in the most severely affected areas and a pilot programme for pregnant and lactating women. From December 1992, the resource situation permitted the extension of supplementary feeding to schoolchildren, initially Grades 1-3 and subsequently up to Grade 6. All supplementary feeding activities were undertaken within the guidelines of the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare which required 'community-based' and 'wet' food distribution and involved a minimum specified ration for beneficiaries.

4.2.5 The specifics of ODA's response largely reflect requests made by individual UK-based NGOs for the partial funding of components of food distribution activities being undertaken by the various voluntary agencies in conjunction with support from other sources. The requests for assistance reflected informal consultation about the level of funding available and, in the case of NGOs familiar with ODA practice, an awareness of its flexibility in terms of willingness to fund the acquisition of food and transport and other distribution costs as well as the costs of equipment acquired locally or internationally. Some of the grants - those to the British Red Cross Society and OXFAM for ORAP and one of the CAFOD grants for CADEC only involved the financing of vehicles, and vehicle purchase was a component of other grants to SCF, LSM and Y Care International. Other grants involved a combination of local purchases of food and transport and other related operational costs of feeding programmes.

4.2.6 In fact ODA, like some other bilateral donors providing financial assistance, was complementing the food aid suppl ied by other donors, either through WFP to the government Drought Relief Programme or through NGOs. The major provider of food aid indirectly via NGOs was the European Community through EuronAid and its Europe-based members.

4.2.7 The Ministry of Social Welfare's Food-for-Work and Relief programmes were intended to provide a basic monthly ration of 10kg of maize flour. However, as the numbers registering for relief increased from 1.3 million in December 1991 to over 5.6 million by October 1992 (over half the population), and there were al so pressures on the logistical system, the ration was reduced to 5kg per person. There was, in effect, no geographical targeting on the most severely affected areas. Indeed the government experi enced the utmost di ffi culty in sustaining distribution in the more remote areas with poor communications. These included areas in the Zambezi valley and the South East, where NGOs such as SCF and LSM were already active in social development and were concentrating their emergency wel fare programmes. The government sought to co-ordi nate these programmes and provide guidel ines as a way of targeting the most vulnerable

59

groups. The Christian Care food-for-work dam construction in Bikita District in Masvingo Province, and the various ORAP programmes in Matabeleland North and South which were partially supported by the ODA, were amongst the NGO activities estimated as involving distribution of food to approximately 10% of all beneficiaries of drought relief (Tobaiwa, 1993). The present evaluation of ODA's careful monitoring of the drought situation confirms that geographical targeting of NGO relief activities on the most seriously affected areas was a major factor in the scrutiny of proposals for Zimbabwe by desk and post officers.

4.2.8 The Child Supplementary Feeding Programme (CS FP) , targeted on all under­fives in villages where over 15% were found to be malnourished, and extended from December 1992 to cover primary school children (Grades 1-3, 6-8 years of age) in designated schools, was the main focus of NGO emergency feeding operations. At the peak of operations in March 1993 the CSFP involved a registered maximum of 1.1 million children at over 21,000 feeding points and in the most seriously affected provinces of Masvingo and Matabeleland South there was blanket coverage. Some 20 NGOs, including the seven assisted by ODA, implemented their own programmes in specific areas of the country and fed approximately 10% of the under-fi ves regi stered. The School Suppl ementary Feedi ng Programme (SS FP) targeted over 330,000 children in some 1,690 schools, and NGOs accounted for about 800 additional schools. All the NGO programmes supported by ODA were involved in the CS FP and most of them in the expansion into school feeding.

4.2.9 In contrast to those in neighbouring Mozambique, these programmes were intended as preventative measures in terms of child nutritional status and health, as well as supplementing the general rationing programmes in the most severely affected areas. Chronic malnutrition is widespread, especially in the poorest rural areas of Zimbabwe that were most severely affected by the drought. Patchy clinic-based anthropometric monitoring of child nutritional status indicated some deterioration in the situation from 1991 to 1992 in all provinces, but there was no evi dence of severe deteri ora t i on or of wi despread acute malnutrition. Furthermore, there was little evidence to show whether the apparent deterioration was due to reduced food intake or to other factors such as drought-rel ated health probl ems. The fact that thi s apparent trend was reversed after the CSFP and other relief measures had started cannot be interpreted as demonstrating a CS FP impac~.14

4.2.10 Quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of school feeding is lacking, but qualitative reports indicate problems of high levels of absenteeism and pupils fainting in class from hunger. These were effectively eliminated with the introduction of the programme. IS However, these very 'successes' in terms of major recovery or lack of evidence of severe deterioration in nutritional status have led a number of professional nutritionists to question whether programmes on such a scale and with such blanket coverage were strictly necessary and, therefore, appropriate and cost-effective interventions. Some problems also arose with maintaining the supply of food, particularly during November-December 1992; the non-delivery of some items, including Vitamin A capsules; and the 1 argely ineffective monitoring programme. The effectiveness of ODA-supported activities ought therefore to be considered in terms of: targeting (more seriously affected areas and groups); operational efficiency; appropriateness of specific components of ODA support; and effective monitoring and reporting.

14 Ewbank, 1993. 'The average monthly caseload of malnutrition in under fives (December.December) increased by 59% nationally from ,991·1992. However, the number of

cases dropped from June-December by 19%. This compares with the 3% increase over the same period in 1992: {p.2l

IS 'Before feeding began, absenteeism was common, which included 50% of enrolment in Masvingo Province, and up to 20 pupils were fainting from hunger each week. Both

these problems were effectively eliminated with the programme.' Ewbank, 1993, : 3,

60

Targeting

4.2.11 As discussed above, the regional targeting of NGO activities generally, and those supported by ODA, seems to have been appropriate. These activities were mostly concentrated in the very poor, worst affected areas (see Map A2.2). These al so included areas where, for specific reasons (eg communal areas along the Mozambique border in Chiredzi District), public services and facilities were poorly provided.

4.2.12 The success of targeting within severely affected areas is less clear, because of the patchy nature of monitoring and the lack of baseline data in most cases. Retrospective assessments by NGOs indicate that coverage, for example under the SSFP, was patchy and that there had been co-ordination problems, for example in Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South where ORAP and the YMCA, amongst others, were working. Positively, several of the NGOs (eg LSM, SCF) were working specifically with minority ethnic groups that might be less effective in gaining access to public programmes.

4.2.13 The effectiveness of targeting at the level of households and individuals according to age and gender cannot be assessed with any certainty. The NGOs were mostly committed to assisting particularly disadvantaged and women, children or the elderly. Local feeding arrangements for the CSFP depended heavily on organisation by the local people themselves. Qualitative evidence suggests that in most circumstances these were sensitive to the need to include disadvantaged households. There were, however, unresolved disagreements amongst social welfare and nutrition specialists about the appropriateness of 'wet feeding' or distribution only of prepared food. This practice obliged poor working mothers to take time off from 1 ivel ihood-supporting activities to travel to food distribution centres.

4.2.14 After a review of the available evidence including a number of agency evaluations, this evaluation endorses the overall conclusion on targeting as typically positive. That conclusion, however, is qualified with many reservations because of the lack of proper widespread monitoring (Ewbank, 1993; Borsotti, 1993; and Tobaiwa, 1993).

Local purchases of food

4.2.15 Five of the agencies supported by ODA - CADEC (via CAFOD), Christian Care (via Christian Aid), LSM, SCF and the Zimbabwe YMCA (via Y Care International) -explicitly used ODA grants to make local food purchases for relief distribution. ORAP (supported via OXFAM and Christian Aid) and the Zimbabwe Red Cross, (supported via the British Red Cross) were also involved in local purchases. The measures taken by the government to ensure the maintenance of food supplies for ration distribution and on the commercial market made it possible for NGOs operating regionally on a small scale to acquire maize, beans, groundnuts and oil, the constituent elements of the specified supplementary feeding ration, from the GMB and local commercial sources. The slow arrival of food aid committed through WFP for relief, and particularly via European-based NGOs from the EC, obliged the various operational NGOs to initiate relief with local purchases or by borrowing from the GMB. Relief food for free distribution via WFP began to be available only from October 1992, four months after the start of the CSFP. Food from the various European-based NGOs through EuronAid was in most cases not available before January or February 1993, ten-eleven months after the declaration of the emergency and 8-9 months after the DESA Geneva Conference. ODA and other donors which provided financial assistance to NGO relief, in combination with the GoZ which permitted borrowing from the GMB, in effect filled

61

the crucial gap in the early months by supporting NGO operations in the most seriously affected and remote areas. This was especially true of the earlier ODA grants to SCF, CAFOD and Christian Aid for Christian Care. Becallse of the slow response of most food aid donors, emergency food aid only sustained the continuation of relief operations and their expansion.

Cost-effectiveness

4.2.16 The bul k of NGO local purchases of maizemeal were made at government fixed prices. Where audited information was available on purchases of other commodities (LSM, YMCA), it indicated that financial costs were less than if ODA had funded direct imports for these operations as food aid.

4.2.17 From an economic perspective, as the government was importing on a l?rge­scale commercial basis, these purchases by NGOs for free distribution to complement government operations involved, in practice, a small level of additional foreign-exchange support to the Zimbabwean economy. The local purchases of maizemeal, the proceeds of which ultimately accrued as revenue to the GMB, also reduced the amount of government's domestic borrowing required to finance the drought relief operations. '6

4.2.18 Some exceptional purchases were made of commodities which were outside the government's list of commodities for supplementary feeding rations - dried skim-milk powder (DSM) by CADEC and meat and dried fish by LSM.

Skim-milk powder

4.2.19 CADEC had initially requested DSM from EC sources for therapeutic and supplementary feeding, but CAFOD was unable to obtain it from the Community. This DSM was intended to complement maize, pulses and oils committed through EuronAid for supplementary as well as institutional feeding, particularly in the hospitals and health centres which were the responsibility of the various Catholic dioceses.

4.2.20 The ODA grant thus illustrates both the potential efficiency and cost­effect i veness advantages of 1 oca 1 purchases as aga i ns t imported food aid, and also the need to establish clearly the appropriateness of commodities for relief activities.

4.2.21 Once the non-availability from EC sources was ascertained, the proposal reached ODA on 23 June 1992; it was immediately agreed and the first payment was made on 17 August. Local purchases from the Dairy Marketing Authority began on 12 September, with collection a week later and distribution from Harare to the dioceses before the end of September. Collections of a further 150 tonnes of DSM were made as internal transport and storage were able to be arranged. Distribution began four months before the first food imports from EC sources arrived, when CADEC was relying on a combination of borrowings and local purchases to sustain its supplementary and institutional feeding operations. The actual price, which was equivalent to £1,038 per tonne ex-warehouse in Zimbabwe, compared favourably with the EC fob ex-European port price of £1,300 (ECU 1,600) per tonne for food aid operations during 1992. Taking into account shipping costs for food aid, that implied a cost saving of at least £500 per tonne or one­third compared with imported EC food aid.

16 NGOs obtaining grants in foreign exchange received or passed on these sums converted al the official exchange rale, or, in the case of Christian Aid, a favourable aid·for·debt

ratio under Zimbabwe's exchange-control regulations. The total of local purchases in Zimbabwe probably represented close to a further additional £0.701 in foreign·exchange/local currency support to the overall Zimbabwe drought relief operation.

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4.2.22 The use of this DSM in relief operations is a less self-evidently appropriate choice of commodity. CADEC initially estimated its total DSM requirements for therapeutic and some related supplementary feeding operations at 500 tonnes. But, despite the comparatively early start in September 1992, only 82% had been utilised by the end of ~Iarch 1993. Normally, DSM, oil and sugar are used in a high energy mix in therapeutic feeding. Otherwise, there is no clinical justification for the inclusion of DSM in a supplementary feeding ration, and it was not recommended for use in either the Zimbabwe CS FP or SSFP. CADEC's own report on the distribution indicates that the DSM was used to only a very limited extent in therapeutic feeding and also extenSively in a range of institutional and supplementary feeding activities in the seven dioceses, involving over 19,000 patients and supplementary feeding (non-patients) of over 35,000 beneficiaries in all. The precise distribution varied from diocese to diocese according to the institutions under their control, and emergency, cl inical and institutional feeding priorities. The DSM provided clearly far exceeded the requirements for therap2utic feeding and was used to diversify the diet of both children and adults, including the elderly both inside and outside institutions.

4.2.23 As this grant illustrates, small quantities of DSM, especially if locally acquired, can be a valuable, cost-effective part of support for intensive therapeutic feeding. However, care must be taken to ensure that only the absolutely necessary quantities are provided, particularly as misuse (not apparently a risk in this case) in non-controlled situations can have serious nutritional and health consequences.

Elephant meat and dried fish

4.2.24 Life Sowing Ministries (LSM) is a small NGO primarily involved in technical training and based in one of the poorest and most severely drought­affected areas, Chiredzi District in Masvingo Province (see Map A2.1). This district includes communal areas affected by the war along the Mozambican border and where several dry years had preceded the near-complete rain failure in 1991/92. Initially, LSM became involved in drought relief through the informal distribution of maize to villages in these communal areas. It subsequently approached the BHC to finance purchases for relief distribution of meat which was becoming available as a result of elephant culls in the neighbouring Gonarezhou National Park, necessitated by the drought. Despite doubts about the cost­effectiveness of the use of meat in drought relief, a grant was approved because this NGO was involved in relief in a remote and war-affected location where both government and other NGO activity was severely limited.

4.2.25 Beginning with the distribution of meat to villages in the communal areas, this operation enabled hungry villagers to benefit from the elephant cull and so perhaps scored more in terms of an appropriate social response to drought than as a cost-effective supplementary feeding strategy. LSM subsequently became involved in the CSFP along Ministry of Health guidelines, initially acquiring via local purchases the standard combination of commodities for relief distribution. Local purchases of dried fish were also made early on to complement the standard ration, and were then phased out on cost-effectiveness grounds.

4.2.26 In 1992/93 the rains were again insufficient to sustain extensive cereal cultivation in the communal areas of Chiredzi District or allow recovery of large-scale sugar production, which was still devastated by the drought. A supplementary grant was made in January 1993 to expand LSM's school feeding programme to include schools on the sugar estates where there were unprecedented levels of unemployment. The grant covered transport equipment for supervision

63

and deliveries, as well as food and transport costs. The BHC was also able to facilitate access to food and finance for transport operations from the WFP for this provincially based NGO. ODA support, via a BHC-supervised grant, enabled a small NGO with little relief experience to mount an operation on a locally substantial scale, which was both cost-effective and well monitored.

Transport and logistics

4.2.27 A substantial proportion, approximately one-third, of ODA's support for food rel ief was accounted for by the internal transport, storage and handl ing (ITSH) and distribution costs of the various agencies. In most cases, ODA was only partially funding actual relief operations. Agencies' attribution of expenditure to ODA or other donor grants is therefore somewhat arbitrary, especially since in most cases they maintained only one account for all their relief operations. Transport costs variously involved hiring, running and maintenance expenditure. Grants were also made to NGOs with their own fleets of vehicles, including Christian Care via Christian Aid, LSM, SCF and, in particular, ORAP via grants to OXFAM and Christian Aid (Table A2.2).

4.2.28 ORAP's response to the drought included an attempt to expand its ongoing Food-for-Sale programme involving the subsidised distribution of locally acquired maize to family units in its project areas which were mainly concentrated in North and South Matabeleland. Free distribution to the elderly and some family units was also begun. ORAP was also involved in the transportation of food on behalf of government departments and other NGOs. It also began to support school feeding. ORAP's various activities were supported by a group of four Northern 'partner' NGOs - NOVIB, Christian Aid, OXFAM UK and OXFAM Canada. Support from a variety of sources involved purchases of equipment (see below), and the covering of the maintenance and operating costs of the transport fleet.

4.2.29 The ODA grant to Christian Aid was made primarily in support of an expanded school feeding programme, which was due to begin only in January 1993. According to ORAP's accounts for 1992, the bulk of the ODA funds provided via Christian Aid were used to transport food (33%), purchase food for distribution to family units and the elderly (29%), recondition ORAP's old vehicles (15%) and for personnel expenses (14%). The expanded level of school feeding funded by the ODA apparently began only in May 1993, when other agencies were considering the phasing down of supplementary feeding, especially in schools. The implied outcome was then that ODA funding was being used as general support for ORAP's operations, in effect to cover local transport costs of rel ief assistance provided by other donors, as well as the hiring out of transport for which ORAP was rei mbursed by the government and other NGOs. Th is case exempli fi es the problems of an NGO rapidly expanding its level and range of activities in response to an emergency, with complex overlapping assistance from a variety of sources. Unfortunately, neither the agency itself nor the supporting NGOs gave sufficient priority to strengthening the financial and monitoring aspects of the activities within an admittedly difficult programme.

Vehicles and other equipment

4.2.30 Approximately 20% of ODA support for food relief was accounted for by purchases of vehicles and other equipment for food, delivery and supervision. The performance in this area raises questions of both appropriateness and cost­effectiveness. Grants to BRCS, CADEC, and OXFAM (on behalf of ORAP) , as well as parts of grants to Y Care Internati onal, LSM and SCF, were for vehi cl es for supervision and local rel ief distribution. Nearly all NGOs considered it worthwhile to increase their own internal transport capacity rather than relying

64

on private sector contracting. The lack of private transport, the high rates for del iveries in remote areas and general unrel iabil ity were all cited as reasons for agencies acquiring or strengthening their own delivery capacity during the drought relief operations. However, these calculations appear to have been based in part on a comparison of the full cost of private hire off the main roads with only the operating costs of their own trucking operations. The fact that some donors, including the ODA, were willing to finance the purchase of equipment during the emergency was perhaps recognised as an opportunity to obtain vehicles that would also be useful subsequently in non-emergency operations. When reviewing equipment purchases retrospectively, some agency personnel indicated concern, in particular about the ability of some smaller NGOs to maintain the transport capacity they had acquired during the relief operations.

4.2.31 A comparison of agency experience suggests a mixed performance in terms of the selection of appropriate vehicles and managing equipment purchases in a cost- and time-effective way. In Zimbabwe, agencies were presented with a choice between locally assembled lOT Leyland-DAF trucks and lower-cost vehicles imported from South Africa. There is evidence that vehicles could be obtained more quickly in South Africa because the government had priority in the allocation of locally assembled vehicles. With hindsight, at least two agencies, ORAP and YMCA, indicated that vehicles imported from South Africa proved to be of smaller specifications than appropriate for their purposes. Access to vehicles originally intended for purchase from grants by CADEC via CAFOD (ODA) and CARITAS (Germany) ran into problems because Customs held up clearance for payment of duties and sales taxes, in a case that lasted until December 1992. After widespread publicity and Presidential intervention this case resulted in a change in the regulations to make it easier for NGOs to import equipment tax-free. The ODA grant to OXFAM on behalf of ORAP was made retrospectively to cover another NGO's failure to meet its commitments, but this resulted in extensive administrative problems because the original retrospective proposal was for 30% more than the actual cost." LSM, which opted for purchases of two nearly new second-hand vehicles, required BHC assistance in negotiating related excise di ffi culti es.

4.2.32 Were purchases of equipment appropriate or necessary? Agency proposals such as those made to ODA for the purchase of equipment essential for rel ief operations were difficult to assess. Understandably, ODA's response was to approve a sequence of rel ati vely small grants or to agree to grants coveri ng equipment components. ODA's flexibility in allowing untied purchases of equipment for emergencies perhaps also encouraged agencies to direct equipment requests to ODA and to seek funding for food assistance elsewhere. Were all the equipment purchases strictly necessary? The fact that relief operations continued despite the delays in purchasing and importing equipment in some cases suggests that this was not a binding constraint. Following the drought the Zimbabwe Red Cross and other societies in the region possess fleets, including very large vehicles, that have either to be disposed of or mothballed.

4.2.33 Were the specific equipment purchases appropriate or cost-effective? The range of experiences suggests that some choices were less appropriate and less cost-effective, particularly in the case of NGOs which lacked expertise in this area. Transport and equipment might have been an appropriate area for a co­ordinated technical co-operation input, for example in the Zimbabwe case, through the National Association of NGOs (NANGO), perhaps by the temporary hiring of expertise from the private sector to advise on logistics.

" The balance of £20,000 was eventually allocated 10 spares and maintenance of ORAP's existing fleet, ie further unspecific support for transport operations.

65

Financial reporting

4.2.34 This was particularly patchy. As already noted, some agencies appeared to have only one account for all relief operations or even for all their operations. The attribution of expenditure was clear when it was tied to specific commodities or equipment purchases, eg BRCS, CAFOO, or where in effect the whole operation was funded by OOA (LSM, Y Care International). Otherwise, the attribution of relief expenditure to grants from several donors was inevitably somewhat arbitrary (Christian Aid-ORAP, Christian Aid-Christian Care, OXFAM-ORAP, SCF). This does not imply any financial impropriety. Indeed, in a dynamic situation in which priorities are likely to change after the proposal has been made, or, for similar but more convincing reasons, after its approval, some flexibility in the use of funds is desirable. The grants to LSM, Y Care International (ZYMCA) and SCF are cases where agencies used that flexibility skilfully. In other cases, problems of financial control are implied in the delayed or incomplete reporting of grant use (ORAP, OXFAM, Christian Care).

Beneficiary Monitoring

4.2.35 An unsatisfactory aspect of most programmes was lack of monitoring of benefi ci ary status and, therefore, 1 ack of preci se knowl edge of impacts both duri ng and after the programme18

• Thi s was true of both the CSFP and the SSFP activities. As recently as January-February 1993 few agencies had compiled final reports on their activities, which could have included whatever quantitative or qual itative evidence could be brought together on impacts and on consequent lessons for future practice. An outstanding exception in this regard was SCF, which launched a Supplementary Child Feeding Programme in Binga District, where SCF was already well establ ished. Both benchmark and subsequent monitoring confirmed that the supplementary feeding programme, in conjunction with other drought rel ief measures, may have been successful, among a number of other factors, in preventing any significant deterioration in the nutritional status of children during the drought. '9

4.2.36 Overall, OOA's policy of providing financial assistance to support emergency food operations by covering local purchases, transport costs, additional costs of management operations as well as equipment purchases, made a modest but positive contribution to the drought relief operations in Zimbabwe. The OOA grants provided NGOs with some additional flexibil ity in responding quickly in a dynamiC situation to complement the government's operations. NGOs appear to have provided approximately 10% of the total relief, in particular targeted on remoter, poorer and more severely affected areas. OOA's support was particularly useful because of delays in the arrival of conventional emergency food aid, as well as problems encountered by NGOs in financing the internal distribution of relief food. Even where new donor funds or counterpart funds were in principle available to cover ITSH costs, agencies encountered difficulties in obtaining access to funds, delays in payment and restrictive conditions. Some questions, however, remain, concerning the appropriateness of particular actions and, with relatively weak monitoring, in ascertaining the actual impact of NGO operations.

18 An ability to monitor programme impact during the life 01 a supplementary feeding programme is particularly important. especially where general rations are less than anticipated,

so that mid·programme modifications can be effected where impact is found to be poor.

19 In fact, the monitoring was sufficiently sensitive to identify increasing numbers of children suffering wasting (weight for height) at the end of the drought. possibly due to

the increasing incidence of malaria and diarrhoeai diseases (Warndorff, 1993).

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4.2.37 ODA was partially supporting components of NGO activities, directly and indirectly, which were seen by GoZ as complementary to its main relief efforts. Most of these NGO activities appear to have been well targeted regionally on the worst affected areas. Some programmes were impressive in their organisation and efficient in their delivery. Overall, the total relief effort in Zimbabwe is cons i dered to have prevented the drought shock from creat i ng a seri ous food crlS1S, possibly with localised famine conditions. There are, however, reservations about particular components of ODA-funded activities. Some commodity purchases and vehicle acquisitions may not have been cost-effective or particularly appropriate. Another issue is whether it is appropriate for ODA assistance to be used in some cases to meet the local transport costs of food aid which should have been provided by other donors.

4.3 Rural Water Sector

4.3.1 The three ODA grants and a component of a fourth grant involving emergency water provision covered a wide range of interventions (Pandolfi, C 1994). The Bikita District programme, which was supported through Water Aid, included the direct provision of water through tankering (19% of the expenditure directly attributable to water operations), well deepening (19%), borehole flushing (1%), pump rehabilitation (4%), pipe installation (1%), and the provision of new supplies through boreholes (56%). The Christian Care project concentrated on small dam construction (78% of expenditure), well deepening (10%) and boreholes (12%). The SCF action also involved boreholes. LSM's acquisition and refurbishment of a second-hand drilling rig at a cost of some £3,000 was the only explicit water component of a grant which was not part of a nationally co­ordinated programme in Zimbabwe. Thus, measures to provide new facilities, borehol es and small dams, whi ch were 1 i kely to be undertaken under normal conditions, predominated. All these measures, with the exception of the direct provision of water, were likely to have lasting benefits, whether in a more prolonged drought or under more normal conditions, as well as being drought mit i gati on measures for the future. The appropri ateness of these measures depends on a balance of considerations, including assessment of needs, capacity to respond quickly and cost-effectiveness in terms of provision per beneficiary. ODA's response involved supporting initiatives either by GoZ or the NGOs and was therefore in no sense proactive in determining the details of these programmes.

Appropriateness: emergency measures or water improvements?

4.3.2 As a result of previous experience, it was already well understood, (as, for example, Collier et al (1992) cautioned in a review for the World Bank) that accelerating conventional rural water programmes for sinking boreholes was unlikely to improve water provision in the immediate circumstances of an emergency. This was recognised to some extent in the Bikita District programme and by other agencies, for example Africare (Mason and Leblanc, 1993) and UNICEF, which concentrated support on measures to improve supplies quickly, including well deepening and pump rehabilitation. In terms of timeliness and cost per beneficiary, the present evaluation confirms this assessment for both the Bikita programmes. Rehabi 1 i tati on and improvement measures were impl emented more quickly and were also more cost-effective as immediate emergency measures (see Figure A2.4). Interventions to provide new facilities, including boreholes and small dams, made no impact whatsoever on water availability prior to the 1992/3 rains, and both programmes continued into 1993.

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Fiy,"'e 112,4 -_._--------====--=.-=--= .. _=--==========-------- ,---,

180

160

140

120

c5 (:

'" 100 " 'C ~

• U 80

'" ~ 0

:;: 60

40

20

0

'" ~ .;;:

Bildta Emergency \Vater Programme Progression a/the Works

.....• Pump Fining Originl.l eod oftbe

WeU Deep.

Drilling

He,d works

' H=d pump Reb,b.

Borebole Flushing

....... W2ter T&nks

e- u > ~ cD ; :0. ~ § 0 '" e- u c " v ~ 0 Vl 0 Z co "- ::;: < ::;: ~ .;;: v,

lrrotltb

> v 0 v z co

_._--_._-----------------------'

4,3,.1 Tile decision to support elllergency water supply in one district by using ,In H(;O ilS " vellicle for assistance appears to have been lIIore successful, in terllls of 511<:i1 pcdonllance criteria as cOlllpletions, than sOllle other elelllents of the lilllli,dl\'.'{' Nill.ional Elllergency Hater Provision Progralllllle, For exalllple, the cVillll,'I.OI-S were inforllled that the Horld Bank progralllme (still to be terlllinated) 11iH11I1,'de little i1eadway in well drilling by the time the Bikita project had been (olllplel.ccl in SeptellliJer 1993. The I'!orld Bank-assisted measures involved the ill'llOr'Li1i.ioll of additional well-drilling equipment and were hampered by a cOlllbin.,Lion of governlllent and I'/orld Bank tendering procedures.

'1.3,4 Tile Cilristian Care programllle concentrated on small dalll construction. TilesI' .lCLivi ties were, in effect, food-for-work (some 78% of the expenditure was ,1CC()lInled for by food and transport costs) directed towards the kind of illfr",ITllcLllral investlllent which commanded a high degree of support and l'i1J'Licil'iltion by the local communities, namely improvements in water provision f',,' 11,,,,,.111, ilCj"icuitural and animal husbandry purposes in the context of a severe tilo'JrjiIl. 1llll'1clllcIILation delays, however, prevented much activity before the 11f'(J illll il10 of tile 1992/3 rainy season and structures were only completed in time tu sl.",,' 1993/4 ('aillfall (Figure A2.5).

1,:],'; Ille Cjl-Jnl to SCF in September 1993 financed the rapid sinking of six 1)()J'0111110S ill ,1 calllp for ~10zambican refugees where numbers were growing rapidly

GIJ

nut only from illllnigration but because agricultural workers of Mozambican Ilal.iollality Vlere being displaced from commercial farms affected by the drought. lliis SIlICI] I programlne, Vlhich Vias proposed, agreed and completed within a month, ilClllonstl'ates that new Vlater supplies can be provided rapidly Vlilere they have a hilJh priority and there are no complicating factors in terms of identification or si tcs or tendering arrangements. The extension of the supply of potable Vlater played an important part in preventing the spread of diarrhoeal diseases illcillliilllJ cholera, Vlhich broke out in late 1992, initially amongst the r'10zambican 1'0 rugees.

4.3.6 LSH, primarily a technical training centre, used a small part (1.6%) of its second grant to import and recondition second-hand drilling equipment Vlhich Ilad been donated. This equipment had not been utilised by early 1994. However, it Vii 11 be a useful addition to its range of operational equipment, both for training and slllall-scale drought mitigation measures. w

Cost-effectiveness

4.3.7 As the discussion of appropriateness has indicated, the question of cost­effectivelless cannot be considered in isolation from that of timing of impacts.

Figure A2.5

Christian Care - Progressive Expenditures (in ZS) 25(QK .... " --.-----.---. -*_._, ....

2000K

lOCOK

SOOK --,-

<Xt No.... Do« Jar, ftb Mu Apr MAy Juf'l ]Il] At,lg ~p

llie IJal,II1CO of ODA-funded projects was weighted towards measures that would involve Iligher costs per beneficiary, but possibly a higher long-term stream of asslJred benefits.

4.3.8 The high standard of project performance monitoring, especially for 11ikil:", and field visit information permits comparisons to be made of the relative cost-effectiveness of actions under different grants. The construction rus!:s Me IJroadly simi lar and, because of higher efficiency, Bikita in particular was cost-efricient in Vlhat it achieved .

..... .... , ... _ •• - -----------------------"" 'I'C' n! r;fi nf \::'! (.!'~:;t 1(" ~q:llpn:ellt \'Ias Inade po,s:!;!!.' beCll'JSe lSM ob(il:~ed access to WFP ITSH f~rtds for the trarlspoll of reilI'd fOGa fe' t~le SS::p a~,d CSFI' a':er

, - n;'i\ '" "',' I,~, i l'e':H 'i['I1r'lv~d.

69

4.3.9 Well deepening was identified as a highly cost-effective way of bringing rapid improvements in water supply to drought-affected populations. However, to satisfy health requirements, head works need to be completed immediately following deepening.

4.3.10 The review of these grants in Zimbabwe and complementary information on the activities of GoZ and operational NGOs, provided by a variety of donors and international NGOs, prompts the question: why were efforts concentrated on the provision of new water facilities through borehole construction? The i~mediate priority was to improve the water supplies of affected populations during the drought. To what extent were the responses related to emergency requirements and to what extent was the drought used, particularly by agencies responsible for improved water supplies, simply to accelerate or expand their conventional programmes? Rehabilitation and improvement measures, particularly well deepening and pump rehabilitation, were shown to be relatively low-cost and quick to implement in the light of the Bikita project, Africare and UNICEF experience. The fact that agencies preferred to concentrate on new facilities suggests that rural emergency water programmes are only partly organised around immediate improvements in water supply. Secondly, there is a continuing degree of unreal ism about the time that is usually required for measures to install new capacity. Thirdly, the initial lack of attention to covering the wells that had been deepened indicates a lack of concern about the health aspects of water supply on the part of agencies more concerned with crude water delivery and engineering targets."

4.3.11 Only a small part of all the measures for which ODA grants were provided, for emergency assistance in the water sector, had any impact on the water supply during the drought. The exceptions were largely concerned with water transportation. The rest of the activity and expenditure was directed towards measures which would provide new sources of water, in particular boreholes, but which, because of the time taken in implementation, were unlikely to have any impact during the drought unless this had continued through another agricultural year. Measures which were likely to achieve quite rapid results in rehabilitation and improvement of supply, in particular the deepening and repair of wells wh i ch were given pri ori ty in some other emergency programmes, eg Africare and UNICEF, were not accorded the highest priority. In considering the appropriateness and the impact of measures in the water sector, it is essential therefore to rank the types of activities envisaged, not only in terms of their respective costs, and their impacts on the affected populations, but also their respective expected response times.

4.3.12 In terms of the assessment of needs and the related targeting of priority assistance, the proposed national programme was made the basis for the appeals of April 1992. Thus ODA was able to determine that its main response should be targeted on an area of exceptional need, Bikita, and that the grant to Christian Care did not involve a duplication of activities. Because, however, of lack of specificity in the original Christian Aid submission on behalf of Christian Care, ODA's approval was delayed whilst desk and post sought to ensure that the proposal was in fact complementary to that for Bikita District.

21 Tile Africare evaluation and interviews with UNICEF personnel and those concerned with tile Bikita project all draw attention to the health risks of deepening wells and then

failing to construct proper covers to reduce the risk of pollution. The Bikita project modified its initial work plan to increase the resources committed to provision of head works.

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4.4 Agricultural Rehabilitation

Strategy

4.4.1 As early as March 1992, it was recognised that Zimbabwe faced the possibility of a continuing cereals deficit unless there was an end to drought conditions in 1992/93 and a vigorous national agricultural recovery programme was undertaken. The recovery programme and its components were justified economically in terms of the import parity price of maize, at around US$230 (£135) per tonne. Secondly, households in the more drought-prone areas faced severe recovery problems even if the 1992/93 rains were average or above normal, especially where, as in parts of Masvingo Province, there had been several years of successive drought.

4.4.2 GoZ and external donors quickly recognised the need for a major agricultural recovery programme and the World Bank's EDRMP, plus grants from DANIDA, provided partial finance for seed and fertiliser pack pro~rammes originally for 800,000 and subsequently for 920,000 small farmers. 1 The availability of sorghum and millet seed, which were more appropriate for drier, more drought-prone areas, was identified as a constraint on recovery regionally, and USAID funded a regional emergency seed production programme to supply six countries including Zimbabwe.

NGO seed imports and distribution

4.4.3 By September/October 1992, it became apparent that there would be large shortfalls in the regional seed multiplication programme, severely limiting the sorghum and millet seed available for national distribution. With AGRITEX, the Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Extension, unable to target its restricted supplies on the driest most drought-prone areas, NGOs, including SCF and OXFAM on behalf of its local partners, sought to augment the supply for the areas in which they had activities.

4.4.4 SCF proposed to augment the available supplies of sorghum and millet seed for its Binga project area. Through its close working relationship with the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union and AGRITEX, it had the additional possibility of being able to assist a distribution programme that could be rather sensitively targeted on the District's worst affected areas and on vulnerable households. SCF and other NGOs had made contact with commercial seed suppliers in South Africa for the supply of extra seed which, in terms of the data provided to the Directorate of Research and Scientific Services (DRSS), would perform satisfactorily in Zimbabwe's conditions. On the evidence available, ODA decided to support an initiative which had to be undertaken immediately. Subsequently, after consultation with the government, SCF sought to acquire additional sorghum and millet seed for urgent distribution through the AGRITEX programme in Masvingo and Manicaland Provinces.

4.4.5 On the information available and in view of the urgency of the request, ODA was probably justified at the time in concluding that these were worthwhile and feasible activities. Government sources clearly indicated a major shortfall in the availability of coarse grains for the more arid environments. A number of NGOs were involved in activities to complement government programmes, and urgent action was required in order to make seed available for the 1992/93 growing season.

11 Other agricultural rehabilitation measures included schemes for cotton inputs, livestock rescue and mechanised tillage.

71

Impact of the AGRITEX and NGO sorghum and millet supply and distribution

4.4.6 The regional sorghum and millet seed multiplication and distribution programme is one of the few aspects of the entire drought response to have been subjected to a careful impact assessment by ICRISAT (Friis-Hansen and Rohrbach, 1993). SCF participated fully in the evaluation to include seed provided under its ODA grant.

4.4.7 In the light of the massive agricultural recovery and, more importantly, the ICRISAT impact assessment, these actions do not appear to have been particularly appropriate or cost-effective. The ICRISAT evaluation demonstrates that the sorghum and millet seeds imported through South Africa by SCF and other NGOs performed less well than either local farmers' own retained seed or the improved varieties distributed under the SADC/ICRISAT programme. An important factor in the poor performance was the late arrival and distribution of the seed imported under the second OOA grant to SCF, which was jointly funded by EuronAid.

4.4.8 The ICRISAT report calls into question the common assumption that farmers do not retain seed - that farmers have no seed. In Zimbabwe at least 30% of sorghum growers and the majority of pearl millet growers had either retained traditional varieties or were able to obtain this seed from other sources within their communities. 23 Local action was probably necessary, however, to publicise the need to ensure that seed was retained and that some seed was available for sale or free distribution. This would have been a more appropriate strategy than intervention based on uncertain crash multipl ication and seed importation. In particular, because sorghum and millet distribution required far more sensitive targeting than the nationwide maize distribution, external hurriedly improvised measures involved a high risk of failure, as the problems actually encountered in implementation demonstrated.

OOA's response

4.4.9 ODA's response to SCF's two proposals was prompt. An initial request on 27 October 1992 was agreed on 20 November and payment made on 26 November. The second proposal reached EMAD on 4 December with a request for action within two hours! It was supported by the BHC and was approved and fin'nced within six days.

4.4.10 In contrast, an OXFAM proposal to finance a similar seed purchase and distribution programme for the South Eastern districts by its partner agencies was submitted on 30 October 1992, also with BHC support, but it did not receive early attention. It was decided, eventually, in March 1993 not to make a retrospective grant. OXFAM funded these actions from its own resources and there were no apparent delays in implementation due to ODA's deferred response. However, as preliminary indications were that the application would be viewed favourably, budgeting on the assumption that ODA would finance these actions proved unsatisfactory. This case appears to involve a rare lapse from the otherwise speedy EMAD response to requests for assistance by UK-based NGOs during the Southern African drought.

23 Both government and NGO programmes were based on the assumption that it was necessary to supply additional seed for aff cereal types. This may have been correct in the case

of maizc, where hybrids or composites rather than retained seed must be used every year to sustain productivity. The assumption was inappropriate, however, in the case 01 sorghum and pearl millet The typical seed requirement· 7kg per hectare for sorghum and 3kg per hectare for millet, under rainfed conditions in the dry areas 01 Zimbabwe· was within the retention capacity of mosl farmers,

72

SCF project performance

4.4.11 SCF handled aspects of its first grant particularly well (Binga): seed was distributed by mid-December 1992, through a ward-by-ward scheme to complement AGRITEX seed allocations. Seed trials and monitoring were built into the programme's organisation.

4.4.12 The second action, jointly funded by Euronaid and ODA, was undertaken as a last-minute stop-gap measure. It then encountered a series of delays: slow contracting by SCF headquarters staff; inaction by AGRITEX offices over the Christmas vacation; and problems of organising despatch in South Africa. There were further delays as a result of fumigation of the Maize Marketing Board warehouses where the grain was stored, and finally delays in distribution because of the late arrival of trucks funded under a Netherlands Government grant.

4.4.13 Seed was procured from South African sources in a seller's market situation. On the information provided, the problems of seed quality subsequently identified by ICRISAT were not apparent. A lesson for future seed procurement is that expert technical advice is required at source and needs to be built into the costing and timing of any seeds operation.

4.4.14 At the time of the project's proposal, and even implementation, the situation with respect to cereal production for 1992/93 in Zimbabwe and neighbouring countries remained uncertain. On the assumption that the area under sorghum and millet would be constrained by seed availability, importation and distribution appeared ex ante to be economically justified. The benefits were quantified in terms of $1 of imported seed saving approximately $8 in terms of grain import costs. Support by major donors for agricultural recovery measures reflected similar calculations. In retrospect, the poor performance of the SCF's imported seed and the changed economic circumstances suggest a much lower ratio of benefits. The return to surplus conditions, reduced the value of additional output to export parity prices (of around US$100-120 per tonne).

4.4.15 The benefits of the SCF and other NGO sorghum and maize distribution programmes were perhaps more socio-economic. There was a major mismatch between the seed available under the national programme and the requirements of small farmers in the less favourable agro-ecological zones. These areas involve the largest concentrations of poor small-scale farming households in communal areas, producing for their own consumption." The fact that large numbers of cultivators used the ICRISAT/SADC and imported seed indicates both a localised seed shortage and problems of access on the part of many, mostly poor, households. The SCF action, which was targeted on marginal areas and, to the extent possible, on poorer households within those areas, was thus a justifiable drought response measure.

4.4.16 The 1 esson for the future is that such programmes shoul d, wherever possible, be organised to encourage retention and redistribution, especially for vulnerable households, of seeds of more drought-resistant plant types from local sources. Imports and potentially late stop-gap measures involve high risks and are less appropriate responses. Finally, SCF should be complimented for actively co-operating with ICRISAT to ensure that its action was carefully and openly evaluated. Comparable details are lacking for other ODA grants for agricultural rehabilitation in Southern Africa, but there is evidence that many other NGOs' seed distributions were late and incomplete. There is no reason to believe that

" SCF reports for Beitbridge District reveal requests to AGR!TEX 101 6,200 sorghum and 3,400 millet packs but only 450 maize packs, where 90% of packs included only maize. The ICRISAT survey indicated that only 30% of sorghum planting requirements were satisfied from retained seed,

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the other rehabi 1 itati on acti ons actually performed any better than those in Zimbabwe which were properly evaluated.

4.5 Health Care

4.5.1 The main contributions to the publ ic health sector were the grant for essential drugs undertaken through UNICEF and the purchase of radio telephones and limited support for cholera awareness through WHO.

UNICEF grant for essenti al drugs

4.5.2 The GoZ in conjunction with WHO and UNICEF quickly identified an increased health risk resulting from the drought and the need to ensure adequate stocks of drugs for nutrition-related disorders and rehydration salts for combating cholera and other diarrhoeal diseases. The initial request to ODA for support in July 1992 resulted in the replenishment of stocks by February/March 1993, just as they were on the point of being exhausted.

4.5.3 The form of support - a grant to UNICEF to organise imports of essential drugs - represented modest additional bal ance-of-payments support tied to the health sector, thus ensuring the maintenance of supplies of drugs. The grant appears to have been managed in a cost-effective way by UNICEF, using sea freight except for high value-for-weight Vitamin A.

4.5.4 The management of this request by EMAD, the officials in post, and UNICEF country office and headquarters involved a time lag of 4 months from the GoZ's initial request to a formal proposal on 28 October 1992, and a further 4 months from proposal to payment, which was made only on 12 March 1993. The delays in the first instance were related to apparent uncertainties about the available funding within EMAD. The second source of delay involved some lack of fami 1 i ari ty at a country 1 evel wi th the normal procedures for an ODA grant to UNICEF, which involve a formal request by UNICEF headquarters and payment made to New York. In Zimbabwe, initial expectations that the grant could be handled at the country offi ce 1 evel, 1 ed to further del ay before UNICEF headquarters actually made its formal request.

4.5.5 There was a partial over-supply of oral rehydration salts to Zimbabwe. UNICEF avoided the problem of holding deteriorating stocks by redirecting them to Zambia and obtaining US$15,000 credit for subsequent imports for Zimbabwe.

WHO; purchase of radio transmitters and support for cholera prevention

4.5.6 This grant was made in response to WHO's cholera epidemic-related request for support in December 1993. Its primary objective was to improve telecommunications between health centres at provincial level.

4.5.7 The ODA response of funding, through the BHC, the local purchase of radios of identical specification to those already locally assembled and in use was highly appropriate in two respects. In an emergency the supply of additional equipment of familiar specification avoids the need for training and possible misuse. Subsequently, problems of maintenance and spare parts are minimised.

4.5.8 The response was well managed, involving close liaison between officials in post and WHO and a time lag of only 11 days, 11-22 January 1994, between the proposal and payment, after a cholera report had been received on 8 January. Subsequently, as the purchase cost was less than the initial allocation, £12,000 was allocated as a grant to WHO for the production of a cholera health awareness

74

film. The speediest provlslon of additional essential equipment in a health emergency overrides any other cost consideration, apart from the appropriateness of the equipment provided. The cholera epidemic itself was err2ctively contained by emergency measures by the Ministry of Health, supported by UNICEF and I1HO.

4.5.9 Apart from these health sector grants, the one to CAFOD for the purchase of dried skim-milk had primarily intensive (clinical) uses as part of a high energy food mix for children and other patients in diocesan hospitals and also public hospitals (see Section 4.3).

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Table A2.3 ZIMBABWE: LIST OF ACTIONS

Project Grant to Agency (Partner) Amollnt ill {UK

1. Ba I ance-o f- pa ymen ts su pport GoZ 10,000,000

2. Bikita emergency water programme Water Aid (GoZ) 536,000

3. Supplementary feeding Life Sowing Ministries via BIIC 160,000

4. School feeding/supplementary Life Sowing Ministries via BIIC 136,000 feeding/transport/emergency water supply

5. Purchase of radios/educational films WBO (Ministry of Health, GoZ) 85,000

6. Transport for food distribution British Red Cross (Zimbabwe Red Cross) 30,000

7. Transport for food distribution CAroD (CADEC) 90,500

8. Purchase and transport of dry CAFOD (CADEC) 155,400 skimmed milk powder

9. Emergency water programme Christian Aid (Christian Care) 309,577

10. Emergency food programme Christian Aid (ORAP) 194,813

11. Transport for food distribution OXFAM (ORAP) 84,000

12. Food distribution Save the Children Fund 91,000

13. Seeds purchase and distribution Save the Children Fund 48,325

14. Seeds purchase and distribution Save the Children Fund 70,000

15. Provision of 6 boreholes at the Save the Children Fund 24,000 Chambuta refugee camp

16. School Feeding Programme Y Care International (Zimbabwe National 45,000 Council of YMCAs)

17. Drugs and Micronutricnts UNICEF (Ministry of Health, OoZ) 210,010

18. Railway sparcsa BHC; Crown Agents·1 (2,500)'

TOTAL 12,269,625

Note: ' Regional activity organised by BHC, Bararo.

Source: ODA

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Evaluation of ODA's Response to the 1991-1992 Southern African Drought

Annex 3: Lesotho Case Study

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CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

1.2

OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

METHOD OF STUDY

2. THE DROUGHT AND ITS IMPACT

3. THE RESPONSE TO THE DROUGHT

3.1

3.2

3.3

RESPONSE BY GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

RESPONSE BY ODA

ORGANISATION OF THE RESPONSE

4. ASSESSMENT OF ODA'S RESPONSE

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

Tables

FOOD AND LOGISTICS COMPONENTS

RURAL WATER SECTOR COMPONENTS

AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION COMPONENT

HEALTH SECTOR COMPONENT

Table A3.1 Lesotho: List of Actions

Table A3.2 Food aid provided during 1992/93

Table A3.3 Actual amounts of food distributed by the LRC

Table A3.4 Rural Water Supplies: Assessment of Priority/High Risk Population 1991

Figures

Figure A3.1 Maseru Annual Rainfall, 1921-1992

Figure A3.2 Population served by VWSS schemes

Figure A3.3 Population at risk and population served by VWSS during the emergency

MAP A3 LESOTHO: ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS

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81

82

82

82

84

85

85

90

94

94

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85

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92

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96

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objectives and Scope

1.1.1 This case-study provides a more detailed assessment of activities supported by the ODA in lesotho than that in the Main Report. It concentrates on ODA-supported activities in the water sector and was envisaged as complementing the review of water sector projects in Zimbabwe.

1.1.2 A brief description of the drought in 1991/2 and its impact is fo1lowed by an examination of the responses by the Gol and the international communi ty and the organi sati on of those responses in lesotho pri or to an assessment of ODA-supported water-sector activities.

1. 2 Method of Study

1.2.1 The case study is based on a field study by Carlo Pandolfi, consultant water engineer, and edited by Or Edward Clay, Sanjay Dhiri and Margaret Cornell of the Overseas Development Institute.

1.2.2 Initial information on grants, the agencies concerned and their programmes was obtained from ODA files and interviews in London. The field visit by Carlo Pandolfi to lesotho, 17-22 January 1992, to review emergency water activities, involved meetings with government and grantee agencies, site inspections and analyses of primary, technical and financial infor~ation (Pandolfi, 1994). OOA-supported activities in other sectors were briefly reviewed, based only on information drawn from the monitoring and assessments by grantee, government and other agencies involved in the drought response.

1.2.3 The fieldwork took place during a period of internal disturbance in lesotho. The uncertain security situation severely hampered the effective execution of the study, in particular by restricting travel outside the capital to project sites and by limiting meetings with those responsible for the implementation of the interventions.

2. THE DROUGHT AND ITS IMPACT

2.1 This small landlocked enclave within RSA is not food self-sufficient, its imports accounting for approximately 40% of food requirements, including 50% of cereals in normal years. With the risks of food insecurity, there are difficulties in differentiating the additional problems created by a drought from the more generalised problems of continuing chronic poverty.

2.2 During 1991 lesotho had already experienced a partial crop failure as a result of unfortunately timed rains, with total cereal production declining in marketing year 1991/92 to 113,000 tonnes, only 59% of the previous five-year average (Main Report, Table 2.1). In response the Gol had appealed for emergency aid and import levels were already 13% above the previous five-year average.

2.3 In 1991/2 lesotho experienced its most severe drought for over 50 years (Figure A3.1), resulting in a fall in annual cereals production to only 41% of the average I evel. The most severely affected were the poorer sel f­provisioning, often female-headed, rural households. At a sectoral level, the impact was relatively less severe because of lesotho's already high level of import dependence. The share of imports in domestic availability of cereals increased from 67% to 77% during 1992/93. The drought also coincided with the loss of remittance income from many Basotho labourers who had been sent home from

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South African mines as a result of recession in the host economy. Again, the impact was likely to be disproportionately severe for the poorer rural households dependent on these remittance incomes.

2.4 Overall, the economic consequences of the drought were less severe in lesotho than in the larger economies to the north, and GDP apparently increased by 3% during 1993 (Collins, 1993). The drought was primarily viewed in terms of an intensification of chronic poverty and food insecurity in rural areas, with associated health and water supply problems amongst affected populations.

2.5 like other drought-affected countries, lesotho experienced more favourable rainfall during 1992/93, but agricultural production still remained some 13% below the average level of the late 1980s. With the continuing impact of the economic recession in RSA, relief programmes were extended into 1993/94.

3. THE RESPONSE TO THE DROUGHT

3.1 Response by Government and the Internat i ona 1 Community

3.1.1 As noted above, lesotho had already been affected by untimely rains during 1990/91 and the Gol had made an unsuccessful appeal for international assistance. In 1992, NGOs appear to have taken the lead in drawing attention to the scale and severity of the drought-related crisis. lesotho was included in the Drought Emergency in Southern Afri ca (DESA) appeal, but thi s was before national drought emergency arrangements involving both government and NGOs were instituted. It was not until July 1992 when the national emergency structures were in place that appeals could be made to ODA and other donors.

3.2 Response by ODA

3.2.1 The deteriorating situation in the region was discussed at a meeting called by ODA for the principal UK NGOs on 30 March 1992. Reports by the NGO representatives confirmed official assessments and indicated the likelihood of substantial requests from British-based NGOs to support their relief efforts in Southern Africa. There \vere also a numbe,' of internationa, consultations including those organised by the World Bank. With evidence of an increasingly seri ous cri si s, ODA determi ned on a further package of measures for Southern Africa involving intensive consultation with officials in post on the logistical constraints~ food distribution arrangements, donor co-ordination and NGO activities. 5

3.2.2 Along with Botswana, Swaziland and Namibia, lesotho was included in the second tranche of assistance announced by ODA on 29 April 1992. A commitment of £2.5m was made for the four countries to cover the provision of support for the activities of British NGOs and for technical assistance as required. With additional activities identified, a third tranche of assistance was announced on 30 June 1992, including a 1.5m package for UNICEF/WFP operations in the four countries.

3.2.3 The response of government and other bodies to the drought and related food-security, water and health problems occurred on a somewhat different timescale from those in the larger drought-affected SADC countries to the North. In particular, a drought appeal covering these sectors was not formalised until

25 The first package of measures announced on 3 March 1992 included £2.501 in financial aid to bolh Zambia and Zimbabwe, 10,000 tonnes of emergency food aid to Mozambiqlle

and support for the regional logistics operation being planned by WFP. It did not include any assistance to lesotho.

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June 1992 and extended by agreement with NGOs the following month. Consequently, ODA's response came out of the regional allocation made through the Emergency Aid Department (EMAD) and involved two distinct grants to Gol for an emergency water programme and the strengthening of the logistics of food distribution by means of a grant to SCF-UK. In addition, elements of ODA's response to regional appeals by the British Red Cross and UNICEF for food distribution, basic drugs and local purchases of food within the region benefited lesotho. The sectoral allocation and channelling of resources thus reflect an interaction between the proposals put to ODA and preferences at the country level for assistance in the water and food sectors.

3.2.4 Of ODA's response in Lesotho, 55% was accounted for by food aid and logistics, 28% by support for the government's Rural Emergency Water Programme, 3% for agricultural rehabilitation and 14% as indirect assistance to the health sector (Table A3.1). Direct assistance to Gol for its Rural Emergency Water Programme accounted for just under one-thi rd of grant expenditure, wi th 49% channelled indirectly via NGOs and 24% indirectly by international agencies. However, as the greater part of the NGO assistance was for technical co-operation to support the government's Emergency Food Distribution Programme, in practice virtually all ODA assistance in Lesotho was directly or indirectly targeted on national governmental programmes undertaken with international and NGO support.

3.2.5 Lesotho is an example of those smaller drought-affected countries where ODA responded to government requests for assistance, as well as providing support indirectly through British-based and international organisations. It offers an opportunity therefore to contrast the performance of a governmental programme with indirect support for national programmes through NGO and international agencies.

Table A.3.1 LESOTHO: LIST OF ODA EMERGENCY ACTIONS, 1992-1993

I Project IGrant to IAmount in £UK I 1. Emergency Rural Water Village Water Supply &

Supply Sanitation (VWSS) 385,270

2. Secondary Food Transpor-tat ion SCF-UK 473,000

3. Agricultural Officer SCF 36,500 (rehabilitation)

4. Continuation of food SCF 138,000 logistics operation

5. Vehicles in Support of Food Lesotho Red Cross (LRC) 25,000 Distribution

6. Basic Drugs Provision UNICEF 209,000

7. Local Purchase of Food WFP 120,000

TOTAL 1,386,770

SOllrce: ODA

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3.3 Organisation of the Response

3.3.1 Despite previous emergencies, there was little evidence of institutional arrangements already in place at the onset of the 1991/92 drought emergency. Gol itself appears to have been slow to respond to the crisis and NGOs played a major role in indicating the scale of the problem and seeking to establish appropriate arrangements with the government. In a period of continuing political uncertainty, government, donors and NGOs eventually agreed upon a major drought relief initiative, involving the establishment of a Drought Relief Implementation Group (DRIG), initially on an improvised basis in May 1992, shortly after a state of emergency was announced, and subsequently formalised in July. The DRIG was responsible for NGO logistics and food distribution in close collaboration with government and donors. A Drought Relief Task Force (DRTF) was also set up to co­ordinate emergency activities. A number of donors, including the European Community, the USA, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, operating within this framework, agreed to provide food aid for the relief programme through the World Food Programme, the Red Cross, and other international agencies. These activities involved approximately 20,000 tonnes of cereals (see Table A3.2). There were also some 20,000 tonnes of programme aid and a quarter of a million tonnes of commercial imports.

3.3.2 lesotho included its initial assessment of requirements in the UN-SADC appeal launched in June 1992. This initial appeal focused primarily on food needs, including estimated supplementary feeding requirements for 120,000 vulnerable people and food-for-work relief for 50,000 beneficiaries. FAO and UNICEF contributed to the initial assessment of the agricultural (US$4.4m.) and health and nutrition (US$1.3m) elements of the appeal. This assessment included no provision for in-country logistics or for the water sector. Subsequently, Gol prepared both urban and rural reI ief proposals for the water sector. The rural water proposal was submitted to ODA for support on a bilateral basis. After the DRIG became operational in August 1992, assessments of additional requirements were made, including in-country food logistics not included in the original UN­SA DC appeal. SCF-UK also submitted a proposal to ODA for financial assistance and technical co-operation for its Food logistics Unit.

3.3.3 The food and logistics component of lesotho's drought relief programme appears to have been quite well co-ordinated. It involved government, NGOs and international organisations working together through the DRIG in a complementary way, building on food-for-work programmes which had been supported for many years by the WFP and the Cathol i c ReI i ef Servi ce, suppl ementary school feedi ng programmes, assisted by SCF, and the child supplementary feeding programme supported by UNICEF and various NGOs (Shaw and Clay, 1993). The proposal for the water sector was the responsibility of the Village Water Supply and Sanitation Department (VWSS) within the Ministry of the Interior, Chieftainship Affairs and Rural Development. This programme appears to have been developed autonomously and to have proceeded independently of the DRIG's Water and Sanitation Group to a large degree.

3.3.4 The delays and problems encountered in lesotho in putting in place a coherent co-ordinated drought response programme made it initially difficult for ODA to respond on a bilateral basis. However, once arrangements appeared to be in place and proposals based on formal assessments were tabled, ODA responded quickly, with an average time lag of three weeks from receipt of proposal to approva I.

3.3.5 Overall, the potentially severe impacts of the drought on vulnerable sections of the population were well contained by the relief programme. The combination and co-ordination of efforts by the DRIG and the lesotho Council of NGOs (lCN), and the collective efforts of NGOs, together with emergency food-for-

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work programmes, all proved effecti ve. Less effecti ve aspects of the drought response seem to have been in health and nutrition, water and sanitation (funded by ODA as well as the World Bank) and agricultural recovery (SADC, 1993b).

4. ASSESSMENT OF ODA'S RESPONSE

4.1 Food and Logistics Components

4.1.1 Three salient characteristics of Lesotho's food system are important for an understanding of the impact of drought and the organisation of the drought relief programme. As already noted in (para 2.3 above), Lesotho is not self­sufficient in food, and in a normal year imports represent approximately 50% of cereals requirements. Secondly, there is considerable rural poverty, with a very high proportion of female-headed households because of male migration to South Africa. Consequently, there are long-established nutritional and social development programmes with a strong relief content, including supplementary school feeding, supplementary child feeding and a food-for-work programme. Thirdly, Lesotho is semi-arid with a highly variable rainfall and consequently drought frequently adds a dimension of acute food insecurity to a situation of endemic chronic poverty.

Table A3.2 Emergency Food aid receipts, 1992(93 (tonnes)

\lege/able DOll or Maize II'hea( Pulses Oil

ROC 4,097

WFP/EC 5,000 350

WFP/USA 5,000

WFP/Japan 3,000

Red Cross 1,01l0

EC 2,000

WFP/UK .~ 11r)

WFP(Netherinnds 500 616

WFP/Sweden 526

WFP/finland 440

Total 18,097 2,000 1,776 1,056

Distributed 15,604 882 603

Stock in usatha awaiting distribution 2,493 894 453

Forecast deliveries under WFP 4,200 Emergency Operations 5052

Source: WFP

4.1.2 The Logistics and Food Distribution Group (LFDG) within DRIG had the task of co-ordinating food emergency operations. It established the criteria to be followed in the targeting of vulnerable households, and in September 1992 the NGOs involved in food distribution proceeded with the first registration. In the

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emergency appeal it was estimated that about 200,000 people needed food assistance. The household registration estimated that 600,000 people (almost 35% of the total population) required feeding. This number was far too big for the support available and a new registration had to be carried out on a more rigorous selection basis at the beginning of 1993. The final number of people registered as vulnerable was 360,000 (about 24% of the total rural population), and approximately 190 food distribution points were established throughout the country.

4.1.3 The NGOs reported regularly to the lFDG and a lFDG monitoring team paid visits to the distribution pOints; district co-ordinators and distribution point supervisors were also appointed The DRIG reported regularly to Gol, initially on a monthly basis and later every two months. Some NGOs lacked the capacity to carry on operations and were obliged to withdraw. The lesotho Council of NGOs acted as co-ordinator of all NGOs involved in food distribution, with the exception of SCF-UK.

4.1.4 The ODA response involved a contribution to WFP's regional programme of local purchases of pulses, a contribution through the British Red Cross to the Child Supplementary Feeding Programme co-ordinated by the lesotho Red Cross, and a major grant to SCF-UK to support the management of relief food distribution and other drought-related technical co-operation.

4.1.5 The grants to WFP and the British Red Cross were contributions to regional programmes earmarked for local food purchases and vehicles respectively. WFP has been involved for more than two decades in resourcing social development/relief programmes in lesotho, and the drought response represented an expansion of these activities through relief operations. Similarly, the lesotho Red Cross played a major role in the national rel ief programme. The grant to the SCF was more distinctive in that it enabled this international NGO to play a prominent role in the relief programme's management. SCF had also been involved for over 30 years in assisting a national school feeding programme and accordingly had an institutional capacity and experience on which to base its expanded role.

4.1.6 SCF was put in charge of the secondary transportation of food from the district warehouses to the distribution pOints in the vulnerable household feeding programme. The agency concentrated its attention on the drought relief effort as deliveries in its ongoing school feeding programme for that year came to an end in September 1992, utilsing the food distribution logistical structures for the expansion of the existing programme.

4.1.7 SCF having requested financial assistance from ODA in July 1992, informal agreement was reached in August and the funds became available in October. A grant of £473,000 was provided to cover the secondary food transportation plus a further £36,500 for an agricultural officer (his main task being to assist DRIG in agricultural recovery). About £30,000 was allocated out of the £473,000 grant to purchase two 4x4 vehicles, with similar sums for the salaries of a secondary transport operat i on manager and a food storage and systems adv i ser. SCF reported to SCF headquarters in London which in turn reported to ODA.

4.1.8 It would appear that, once under way, the vulnerable household feeding operations were overall quite successful and well orchestrated. SCF-UK, in particular, managed to achieve its objectives; following the informal agreement of funding from ODA, it had become operational even before the ODA grant's disbursement. The agency did not use the entire grant in the first year of operations because less food was brought into the country than had been estimated. Nevertheless, a further grant of £138,000 was needed to carry on with the secondary transportation until September 1994.

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4.1.9 Lesotho Red Cross (LRC), along with World Vision, the Christian Council of Lesotho, Caritas, the Lesotho Council of NGOs and other NGOs, were all involved in food distribution, each agency being in charge of particular districts. ODA made a contri buti on of £25,000 to the Briti sh Red Cross for the Lesotho programme, out of a total contribution of £150,000, following a regional appeal launched by the International Federation of the Red Cross in May 1992. These funds were made available in June 1992.

4.1.10 The LRC was in charge of distribution in the 3 districts of Mokhotlong, Qacha's Nek and Thaba-Tseka. 15 distribution points were established in Mokhotlong and 13 in the other two districts. ODA funds were used for transportation running costs and for training. The LRC mobilised 30 volunteers plus one field co-ordinator, one deputy and one driver/logistics officer in each district. It trained the volunteers and, in some cases other NGOs' staff, in managing the registrations and the food distribution. A relief delegate was allocated jointly to Lesotho and Swaziland with the task of monitoring and evaluating the relief programmes in the two countries. Three out of four vehicles acquired by the LRC for the relief programme were assigned to the districts, while the fourth was used for essential services between the districts and HQ.

4.1.11 The LRC started to distribute some food in September 1992, but, for all the NGOs involved, the bulk of the operations began only after the first registration was completed, in November 1992. Operations went on until September 1993, except for the districts of Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek, Quthing, Qacha's Nek and Mokhotlong, where the emergency was expected to continue until April 1994. The final registration of vulnerable households in these districts, carried out in November 1993, amounted to 140,298 beneficiaries (39,598 of them in Qacha's Nek and Mokhotlong). Table A3.3 reports the LRC's deliveries of food commodities in the 3 districts of Mokhotlong, Qacha's Nak and Thaba-Tseka from July 1992 to July 1993.

4.1.12 All those involved in the food distribution agreed that the 600,000 people registered in November 1992 was an overestimate of needs. The figure of 360,000 people requiring feeding was reached after the second registration as a result of a stricter application of the criteria established by DRIG and of a quota system. The use, however, of a quota system in combination with the amount of food actually available may have reduced the number of beneficiaries too severely.

4.1.13 The Lesotho Council of NGOs reported some heavy attempts to manipulate or misdirect the emergency food aid for pol itical purposes, especially in the Maseru Central area where it was decided to cease operations. The LRC reported similar problems at a district level, although to a lesser extent. The quota system introduced after the first registration apparently reduced this problem drastically, but was felt by many operators to be an unfair decision.

Assessment

4.1.14 The activities of WFP and NGOs partially supported by ODA were important complementary elements in the overall government-NGO food relief effort. Local purchases of pulses were an efficient alternative to increasing the regional burden of imports and, at US$450 per tonne, were cost-effective compared with the cost at which pulses could have been imported from outside the region. The vehicles acquired under the LRC operation provided each of three districts with some distribution under its own control. The logistical role of SCF reflects the need to strengthen the government's Food Management Unit. ODA funds were used to bring in a manager for transport operations and a storage adviser,as well as vehicles to help with the supervision. The NGO operations which began after registration in October-November 1992 had been delayed because of problems in

87

working out an operational arrangement involving all parties. Relief operations continued nationwide until September 1993 and in 5 districts into 1994.

4.1.15 All the operations supported by ODA appear to have functioned relatively efficiently and to have contributed to preventing the temporary drought crisis causing severe social disruption and associated increases in morbidity and mortality. Such information as is available indicates that, despite the relief programme there was some increase in distress indicators such as child mortality and morbidity during 1992-93. The relief efforts in Lesotho appear to have been quite well organised, despite initial delays which have been widely attributed to the government's tardy response. Operations co-ordinated by NGOs appear to have functioned with reasonable efficiency. A major difficulty was that of discriminating between continuing chronic poverty and the effects of drought on poor rural households. The initial household registration included almost 35% of the population. A second more selective exercise was needed to target relief on approximately 24% of the rural population. The rel ief programme was well monitored by the DRIG, with regular reporting on activities and its decisions to continue or phase out operations seem to have been made on a realistic basis. Impacts on beneficiaries, however, are generally more difficult to assess except in terms of the indirect evidence on morbidity and mortality levels.

4.1.16 Overall, ODA's response in supporting, in a flexible way, an important component of the joi nt government-NGO programme, together wi th small grants to regional and international programmes, appears to have been prompt, cost­effective and efficient.

88

Table A3.3 Lesotho: Food distribution by the LRe

klaize PII/ses Oil

Round Ifollse/lOlds Beneficiaries MT MT '000 Lilres

Mokhotlong - Rounds 1 to 6 (September 1992 to July 1993)

1 9,445 33,222 319.5 17.0

2 8,445 31,137 237.5 11.2

3 7,576 28,594 286.6 14.4

4' 9,530 23,529 232.6 11.6 11.9

5 9,469 23,624 236.3 11.8 12.9

6 9,192 23,366 233.1 11.7 12.7

To(al 53,657 163,472 1,545,2 77.5 37.5

Qacha's Nek - Rounds 1 (05 (October 1992 (0 July 1993)

1 4,872 17,404 157.7 8.5

2 4,525 17,319 174.3 9.0 9.5

3 5,R98 22,498 249.4 12.4 12.2

4' 7,672 19,545 189.8 9.6 10.3

5 7,661 19,626 196.3 9.8 10.7

To(al 30,628 96,392 967.6 49.2 42,7

Thaba-Tseka - Rounds 1 to 6 (October 1992 to July 1993)

1 5,673 17,638 167.5 8.3

2 7,309 21,808 205.8 10.2

3 8,844 27,131 243.2 11.9 11.1

4' 6,470 19,911 200.4 9.9 10.0

5 5,279 15,646 157.1 7.6 7.5

6' 2,858 7,527 77.6 3.9 4.0

Total 36,433 109,661 1,051.5 51.7 32,6

GRAND 120,718 369,525 3,564.2 178,3 112,8 TOTAL

Source: Progress Report: DRIG's Logistics and Food Distribution Group, Situatioll Report, 1 August 1993

Notes: 1. The quota system intended to reduce the number of beneficiaries st<Hted. The Illlmbcf of hOllseholds incrcIlsed while the beneficiaries decreased bec<luse some households only registered in this round.

2. Round six was only hnlf served because of n short<lge of food.

89

4.2 Rural Water Sector Components

4.2.1 The small number of substantial financial grants made by ODA to emergency water sector activities in the Southern African region included a grant of £385,275 to lesotho as a direct response to an appeal to support the government's emergency rural programme. Several Gol agencies and parastatal organisations are involved in the water sector, including the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) in the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining, the Village Water Supply and Sanitation Department (VWSS) in the Ministry of Interior, Chieftainship Affairs and Rural Development and the Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA). The VWSS normally takes care of rural water supplies whilst the parastatal (WASA) is in charge of supplies to the main towns. The ODA grant involved the provision of financial support to the VWSS Emergency Rural Water Programme.

4.2.2 Gol put in its request on 15 June 1992, indicating an affected population of 660,000, approximately 43% of the rural population. Agreement was reached one month later and emergency works began in August 1992 and continued until the end of 1993. The implementation of this grant raises a number of important issues: first, the role of assessment in targeting assistance; second, the selection of activities; third, the importance of environmental health; and fourth, monitoring by both implementing organisation and donor.

4.2.3 The geographical targeting of ODA-supported activities appeared to bear little relation to the distribution of people at risk. Some 7 districts, including an initial estimate of 450,000 at risk, were targeted by interventions that benefited less than 5% of the supposedly affected population. These included the poorer, less accessible mountainous districts. In contrast, the remaining 4 districts, including the area around the capital, Maseru, involving some 210,000 estimated to be at risk, were targeted by measures which benefited almost 35% of those at risk. The VWSS apparently adopted a policy of responding to 'local demand', but the precise combination of factors explaining such an uneven distribution of assistance could not be clarified during the evaluation.

4.2.4 Operations were dominated by two activities, tankering and borehole construction. Rehabilitation measures were not considered nor was spring catchment, a real possibility in a mountainous terrain, undertaken. Some 58,000 people were helped by water transportation activity over a period of one year in the 4 districts accorded priority. The effectiveness of delivery is unknown in the absence of detailed monitoring information. The major intervention of 180 new boreholes, 129 of them provided with ODA funds, had a success rate of 70%. Because of its timing, however, the programme made 1 ittle impact during the actua 1 1992 drought.

4.2.5 A review of structures on a selective basis during the evaluation, combined with information from other sources including the DRIG and the VWSS, indicated that little attention was given in the Emergency Water Programme to complementary health measures. Water quality tests were not undertaken. Many structures were poorly finished and were therefore likely to increase health risks and maintenance problems. No attention was given to complementary instructions in sanitation measures for beneficiary groups.

4.2.6 Overall, the apparent lack of logic in targeting deCisions, the concentration of efforts on borehole drilling and the slow implementation raise questions about the effectiveness of the water programme and drought-related operations.

90

4.2.7 In order to speed up the operations the VWSS skipped some of the normal routines, such as the setting up of a water committee and the opening of a bank account in the villages to contribute to the maintenance of the water points. In other words, it decided not to involve the local commun;ties in the water works. The absence of local representative institutions, which are both sensitive to local needs and have knowledge of the local situation, was probably one of the main causes of the chaos that reigned over the water emergency efforts in Lesotho.

4.2.8 In Table A3.4 the rural population in 1991 is shown by district as well as the areas, population densities, and percentages of the population served by the VWSS schemes. The population is also subdivided according to lowlands, foothills, highlands and Senqu Valley. This last subdivision is important because, according to the Department of Water Affairs, the population living in the lowlands, highlands and Senqu Valley areas and not served by the VWSS were those considered most at risk for water supply, and the percentage not served by a VWSS scheme constituted the estimated population at risk.

4.2.9 The VWSS then carried out a survey by district to assess the situation regarding water supplies. The district engineers selected 25 to 30 villages per district at random and visited them (in total probably 250 to 300 villages were visited out of a total of about 8,000). This exercise took from one to two months to be completed. During the evaluation no report on this survey could be identified, and in any case the VWSS appears not to have made use of the survey.

4.2.10 The VWSS decided not to draw up any general plan, but to act in response to demand: a village could ask the district engineer for support and the district engineer, bypassing the regional engineer, would present the request to the national operations engineer in Maseru. It was not clear how long on average this process could take. It was decided to bypass the regional engineer in order to simplify procedures and save time but, in reality, this method overloaded the VWSS in Maseru and over-centralised operations. The emergency funds were all handled by the VWSS headquarters and spent on a first-come-first-served basis, with no consistency in priorities.

4.2.11 The water transportation activity, with some water initially drawn from rivers, so as to give immediate relief to parts of the population most severely hit by the drought, began in September-October 1992. It continued as long as funds were available, up to December 1993. The VWSS bought about 60 5,000- and 10,000-litre polyethylene static water tanks and installed them in Maseru, Leribe, Butha-Buthe and Thaba-Tseka districts, but it then proved difficult to find rel iable bowsers to distribute the water and many water tanks received supplies only intermittently. The South African army provided four vehicles, but it was almost impossible to hire private bowsers because there was an excessive demand for them all over the region.

4.2.12 From data made available it appeared that about 58,000 people were helped by the transportation of water for over one year. During this long stretch of time it might well have been possible to find more permanent solutions to the water supply of these villages on site, including rehabil itation of existing pumps or such improvements as well deepening.

4.2.13 The human water supply situation is still problematic in Lesotho and although another drought is likely in the near future official appreciation of the situation appears not to have improved. No assessment of the works was carried out to see if they were appropriate or correctly targeted the communities most at risk. All that is currently available in terms of documentation is a

91

list of boreholes drilled and a summary of expenditures. The progress report of DRIG's Water and Sanitation Group of 1 August 1993 highl ights some of the problems mentioned above:

Table A3.4

fJi.llric/

)3utha·!3ulhc

Lerille

[3erea

M~selll

Mafelcng

l\1ohalc's

110ck

QUlhing

Mokhotlong

Qacha's Nek

TII~ba·Tseka

Tolal

Rural Water Supply and Treatment: 10. There is a critical lack of information available with which to plan, prioritize and introduce appropriate emergency relief measures before serious problems arise. Too much of the action is reactive and retrospective. 11. It is understood that serious water shortages have caused schools to close in Qacha's Nek district.

Environmental Health 14. The typhoid outbreak at ila Khoanyane in Thaba-Tseka district has resul ted so far in the treatment of 102 patients and resul ts of sample analysis are awaited.

Lcsotho: Rural Water Supplies: Assessment of Priority nlld High Risk Population 1991

PI'0£1l1/l1 /(OIl

S<!III{U

S('I1'('(/ hy F(Jllltlills \!(/{/<!y

C<!Il.~IIS Est. V\I'SS [Jet'. CC of ESI. Pop. LVIl'low!.1 pllp. & IlighlfllJi! 1'''1'. &

]1)8f1 flOP. J')1)! 191)/ flI!P· AI't',/ Kill' DCII"il), pop. & % % s pop. & S;.

]991 %

99,060 J 11,501 57,160 " 1,767 63 46,974 58,273 6,254

42 .12 6

249,419 284,392 106,825 37 2,828 101 168,266 90,538 25,588

59 32 9

120,204 128,3,12 117,155 91 2.222 .18 87,506 40,836

68 32

181,729 195,963 116,187 59 ·L279 46 101,913 63,:183 30,666

.12 32 16

192,507 215,399 100,488 46 2,119 102 133,654 81,7-14

62 38

165,580 180,989 93,875 .11 :1,:;.,0 " 92,758 29,998 J 1 ,445 26,789

" 17 17 1.1

112,543 128,381 36,561 28 2,916 44 46,575 81,806

36 64

77,214 86,099 18,187 21 4,075 2i 86,099

100

63,326 69,724 27,382 39 20349 30 9,126 60,598

13 87

1060307 116,808 17,07:1 14 4.270 27 86,9B 29,885

74 26

1,367,619 1.517,598 690,893 45 30h'S5 50 6JI,071 364,772 J22,676 199,078

42 24 21 13

Sow·(·t': I3WA, DR1G

92

.

Dr'!'!. of

WII/a

Nfair.<

I'riflrili,.'s

26,082

122,128

7.876

54,3.'17

70,17.1

73,986

92,434

68,018

42,532

100,455

660,041

43

Assessment

4.2.14 There was no plan of intervention and the VWSS decided to leave the drought relief programme in the hands of the district engineers, acting mainly on demand. It is difficult therefore to evaluate the achievements, because there is no clear picture of needs nor the extent to which these needs were met.

4.2.15 Because of the country's geological characteristics, well deepening or digging were not considered viable propositions. Pump rehabilitation was not taken into consideration and no spring catchment was attempted. The main interventions undertaken were borehole drilling and water transportation.

4.2.16 The VWSS used contractors to carry out the drilling. The contractors were also responsible for the casing of the borehole, while the VWSS provided the siting, the supervision, the headworks and the pump installation. Casing was normally provided to the beginning of the bed rock. The headworks were of the standard type used in Lesotho: a concrete slab of about 1.5 x 1.5 m surface, with four bolts to anchor the pump. Even this basic work was carried out unsatisfactorily with, in some cases, central nuts or bolts missing, perhaps because of vandalism. As a result the pump oscillates in the hole every time it is used and quickly breaks down. The installation of one of the pumps visited was delayed from one week to one month. No water quality test was carried out.

4.2.17 Overall, R740,B72 of the ODA funds were spent on drilling activities, equivalent to £156,302.

4.2.1B Normally a collection water pOint should serve BO to 120 people, should be no more than 150m away from the village and should provide about 30 litres per person per day. Unfortunately these standards could not be achieved during the emergency and each borehole had to serve 200 or more people. A figure of 250 persons per water point was assumed by VWSS in estimating the percentage of the population benefiting from the boreholes. In normal times villagers are asked to set up a water committee and to open a bank account with a fixed amount to be used to pay for 50% of the maintenance costs. These procedures were not followed during the emergency and the VWSS will need to introduce them later. No health training was given. In general the impression was gained that at the VWSS the health aspects of the water works are not considered an important priority.

4.2.19 Figures A3.2 and A3.3 present the achievements of the emergency operation, comparing the population served with the population considered at risk in the original appeal. This evaluation must be treated as provisional because of the uncertainty of much of the data. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions:

• less than 20% of the population that might have been at risk received any relief;

• some districts such as Theba-Tseka, Mokhotlong, Quthing and Mohale's Hoek were almost completely neglected during the operations. Qacha's Nek in particular received no help despite the fact that 'serious water shortages caused schools to close', according to the DRIG's progress report of 1 August 1993, Annex C.

It is unclear why these districts were neglected, but it is certainly not because they did not need help. The food emergency programmes cons i dered them to be among the most severely hit in the whole country.

93

4.2.20 Lesotho is a country that normally experiences a long dry season, during which most of the springs and rivers in the lowlands dry up. With only 57 % of the villages covered by some intervention by the VWSS, every year some part of the country experiences some drought, and probably the main difference in years such as 1992 is the distance that a villager has to walk to reach the source of water. It is very diffi cult therefore to draw the 1 i ne between drought and non-drought situations.

4.2.21 A drought emergency is likely to recur in Lesotho, perhaps in the near future. It is, therefore, important to have a clear picture of what has been done and remains to be done, of the population most at risk and of the problems which arise during a drought in order to build up some preparedness. The VWSS response to the drought emergency was characterised by a lack of data, a lack of planning and a lack of priorities. Consequently the results of this intervention were unclear, and the situation in terms of rural water supply and the population at risk is probably still unknown today. Some of the works that were carried out will be useful in the future, in particular some high yielding boreholes have been drilled that can supply piped schemes. But the fact that water transportation continued for over a year in the same villages indicates that no alternative and more permanent measures were adopted or probably even studied.

4.3 Agricultural Rehabilitation Component

4.3.1 The SCF was also involved in providing technical support for agricultural recovery measures under its ODA grant. No deta i 1 ed assessment of thi s government programme was made available during the evaluation, and with priority being given to reviewing the water sector and food and logistics it was not possible to examine the performance of this small SCF grant component.

4.4 Health Sector Component

4.4.1 ODA did not specifically indicate the health sector as a priority in the initial internal assessments of the drought which established the main components of its overall response. Nevertheless, a number of specific components of the ODA response were expected to comprise health elements, including a grant of £209,000 largely for essential drugs. Part of the £261,000 contribution to UNICEF regional activities included provlslon for drugs, sanitation and monitoring in Lesotho. This proposal was made in December 1992, involving replenishment of drug supplies.

94

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E

E

-.:: c: Q2 -§ c: c <: ~

£:

t::t.. ....

., •

'" .... '" ~

:; t::t.. ....

ro ::J C

C

<t o I

. .•.. , .

"

UG

h':" :.

teta: :;.::: CHI·:·"::'" s:.~ ::

a:u" " . L

tU .:

9ZU

'."'

szu. " ~ .. tZ

U'

tZ&I

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:........_-<>-~=:±::::==~_:........ __

.:--._---1,:11 I-

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95

Figurt A3.2 Population Served by VWSS Scbemes

DistTku

Figu no A3.3 PopuiAoon at risk and population served by VWSS during the eme!"j;<ncy

,.

District!

Evaluation of ODA's Response to the

1991-1992 Southern African Drought

Annex 4: Tenus of Reference

97

ANNEX 4

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Southern African Drought: Evaluation

1. To review ODA's preparations, organisation and approach to the Southern African drought of 1992.

2. To consider the speed of response, both in overall terms and for individual requests.

3. To estimate the actual total cost of each of the major elements and to assess the value for money.

4. To describe the impact of each of the major elements.

5. To judge whether each of the major elements has or has not del ivered significant benefits in relation to the costs.

6. To review the appropriateness of ODA assistance provided, including the balance between financial aid, food aid and funding of NGOs and technical cooperation inputs.

7. To consider the coordination mechanisms available, how effective they were and how they affected ODA actions.

Background

It is suggested the consultant should spend 3-4 weeks on this exercise, with some assistance from an ODA (CSAD) officer. Most of the work can be done by studying files in ODA but a visit to the region should be included, possibly to cover Mozambique (as a sel f-contained programme where the drought compounded the existing emergency); Zimbabwe (as a major recipient of ODA drought funding -Harare was also a regional centre); and Lesotho (as an example of a smaller recipient with perhaps less obvious needs).

99

Evaluation of ODA's Response to the 1991-1992 Southern African Drought

Annex 5: References

101

ANNEX 5

REFERENCES

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Benson, C. and Clay E. J. 1994. 'The Impact of Drought on Sub-Saharan Economies: A Preliminary Examination', 001 Ifarking Paper 77. London: Overseas Development Institute, August.

Borsotti, M. 1993. 'Drought Rel ief Programme in Zimbabwe. Critical Considerations on its Implementation: Lessons Learnt and Future Steps.' Harare: UNDP, May.

Borton, J. et al. 1988. 'Evaluation of ODA's Provision of Emergency Aid to Africa, 1983-1986.' London: ODI, August.

Borton, J. et al. 1989. 'Evaluation of ODA Support for NGO Post-Flood Rehabilitation Activities in Bangladesh 1988-89.' London: Relief and Development Institute, April.

Collins, C. 1993. 'Famine Defeated. Southern Africa, UN Win Battle Against Drought.' Africa Recovery Briefing Paper, No. 9. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, August.

DHA/SADC, 1992. 'Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA). Consolidated UN­SADCC Appeal.' Geneva: May.

DHA/SADC, 1993. 'Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA). Consolidated UN­SADCC Appea 1. ' Reg i ona 1 Hi gh 1 i ghts and Resource Mobil i za t ion: Fi nanci a 1 Summaries'. Geneva: February.

Dusachoit, T. 1994. 'MSF-CIS (Celula Inter-Sec~oes) Mozambique: A Date Collecting System Focused on Food Security and Population Movements' Relief and Rehabilitation Network Paper 1, Overseas Development Institute, London.

Ewbank, R. 1993. 'An evaluation of the Child Supplementary Feeding Programme.' Harare: UNICEF

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/World Food Programme. 1992. Summary Report of FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions to Drought-Affected Countries of Southern Africa. Special Alert No. 227. Rome: Apri 1 .

Friis-Hansen, E. and Rohrbach, D. D. 1993. 'SADC/ICRISAT 1992 Drought Relief Emergency Production of Sorghum and Pearl Millet Seed. Impact Assessment. ICRISAT Southern and Eastern Africa Region. Working Paper, 93/01. Bulawayo: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, October.

Fumane, P. 1993. 'Mozambique: the Response to the 1992 Drought in the Context of Long Term Development Obj ect i ves ' SACC Drought Management Count ry Assessment Paper, Harare.

103

Glantz, M. H. (ed), 1987. Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Government of Mozambique/UN, 1992. 'Mozambique Emergency Programme 1993-1994: Towards Reconstruction' December, Maputo.

Government of Zimbabwe, 1993. 'A Statistical Overview of the Department of Social Welfare Drought Relief Operations, 1992-93: Masvingo Province.' Harare: Department of Social Welfare, Drought Relief Programme.

Johnson, S. 1993. 'The Role of International Agencies' Annex 5 in Fumane 1993.

Jones, S. et al. 1993. 'Evaluation/Review of the ODA-funded Relief and Rehabil itation Programmes in Bangladesh Following the Cyclone of ,'.pril 1991.' London: ODA.

Mason, J. P. and Leblanc, M. 1993. 'Evaluation of Africare Emergency Water Rel ief Regional Project: Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia.' July 16 - August 7, 1993. Draft for US Agency for International Development. Washington: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Disaster Response Division. September.

Ministry of Commerce, 1993. 'Food Supply Monitoring, Forecasting and Early Warning in Mozambique', Government of Maputo, 6 June.

Mukupo, D. 1994. 'Responding to the 1991/92 Drought in Zambia: The Programme to Prevent Malnutrition (PPM) , Relief and Rehabilitation Network Paper 2, Overseas Development Institute, London.

ODA, 1994. 'Humanitarian Assistance: Guidelines on Project Proposals and Project Reports'. London: ODA, May.

ORAP, 1992. 'An Update on the Drought Recovery Situation and a Focus on the Drought Recovery Programme'. Bulawayo: Food and Water Unit, ORAP, September.

Pandolfi, C. 1994. 'Profile of ODA-supported Emergency Water Activities in Lesotho and Zimbabwe in Response to the 1991/92 Southern African Drought.' London: ODA (mimeo).

Rundin,U. et al. 1994. 'Evaluation of Swedish Support to the Drought Operations in Southern Africa.' A study commissioned by SIDA. Stockholm, January.

SADC, 1993b. 'Report of the Regional Drought Management Workshop.' Volume 1. Workshop Proceedings. 13-16 September. Harare.

SADC, 1993a. 'Assessment of the Response to the 1991/92 Drought in the SADC Harare: SA DC Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit. Regi on. '

July.

Seshmani, V. 1993. 'The Role of the International Community in Drought Management in Zambi a. From Recent Experi ence to Future Preparedness.' Annex to Zambia Country Study prepared for SADC Regional Drought Management Workshop, Harare: 13-16 September.

Shaw, D. J. and Clay, E. J. (eds) 1993. World Food Aid. London: James Currey

104

Tiffen, M. and Mulele, M. Drought on Zambia.' London: 001.

R. 1993. 'The Environmental Impact of the 1991-2 Report for the IUCN, the World Conservation Union.

Tobaiwa, C. 1993. 'Zimbabwe: The Response to the 1992 Drought in the Context of Long-Term Development Objectives'. Paper prepared for SADC Regional Drougi1t Management Jlorksi1op, 13-16 September, Harare.

Warndorff, T. 1993. 'Nutrition Status of Young Children in Binga District during a Drought Period.' (a midterm report on anthropometric data from July to November 1992). Harare: Save the Children Fund.

World Food Programme, 1994. Terminal evaluation: Summary Report on Umbrella Operation Southern African Drought (Emergency Operation No.5052-60) CFA/37/C SCP: 12/6-B 1. Rome: February.

World Bank, 1992. 'Zimbabwe: Progress Report on Adjustment with Drought.' Prepared by the World Bank for the Zimbabwe Consultative Group Meeting. 2-3 December, 1992. Washington, DC: November.

World Bank, 1993. 'Zimbabwe: Economic Update'. Paper prepared for the Zimbabwe Consultative Group Meeting. Paris, 13-14 December, 1993. Washington, DC: November.

World Food Programme, 1994. 'Terminal Evaluation: Summary Report on Umbrella Operation on Southern African Drought.' (Emergency Operation No. 5052-60) CFA/37/C SCP: 12/6-B1. Rome: February.

105