3. Overcoming Cartesianism We have seen that Heidegger's criticism goes to the heart of Cartesianism and of the modern age, undermining their ontological basis, concept of truth, and central metaphor. But we should not regard this criticism as aimed at destroying the tradition. Rather its intent is to broaden its base. As is well known, Heidegger described his relation to the tradition by the strong terms Destruktion, Abbau, Verbindung and Uberwindung. (3) These are not the same of Hegel's Aufhebung. For Heidegger, overcoming is not a forward movement where the irrelevant is left behind and it does not contain the notion of progress. Heidegger's aim is not to destroy the tradition but to broaden it and to reinterpret its major tenets in light of what, in his view, has been left out as the tradition was formed. Heidegger's attitude to the tradition is intimately related to his view of history. Following Hegel's insights and the Nietzschean concept of 'monumental history', Heidegger regards History as the manifestation of Being through human acts. He sees the works of poets and thinkers, great works of art, literature, and philosophy, including Cartesianism, as links in the chain of History. It follows that Heidegger's aim in criticizing the tradition is not so much to show that Descartes and Cartesianism were wrong in making man the subject and sole center of meaning, but rather to restore to the tradition important elements which he believes it had forgotten. The Cartesian subject cannot be destroyed because it is a historical product and a revelation of Being. It is with this in mind that we must consider his treatment of the subject and of truth. In de-centering the subject Heidegger is not trying to destroy the idea of a foundation, as might be assumed from some postmodern developments. He does not propose a homogeneous mass without differentiation or a Dionysian flow of reality. For he does not eliminate the difference between beings themselves or between beings and Being, but rather brings it to the forefront of the ontological debate