Independent Task Force Report on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Presentation to Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Dr. Charles D. FergusonPhilip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology

July 21, 2009

Council on Foreign Relations

Outline of Presentation• Why did CFR sponsor this report?

• What did the report initially intend to do and why did this change?

• What are the major findings and recommendations of the report—many are directly relevant to the national labs?

• What are the likely future next steps for U.S. nuclear weapons policy?

• What are the remaining challenges?

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What originally motivated the report? Wall Street Journal op-ed in January

2007 signed by George Shultz, William Perry, Sam Nunn, and Henry Kissinger

They called for the vision of a nuclear weapon free world

They believed that nuclear weapons have become--for the United States--more of a liability than an asset because of: Proliferation to other statesPotential terrorist acquisition of

nuclear weapons But they still accepted a role for

nuclear deterrence.

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Report’s Original Intentions Mini-Nuclear Posture

Review to help guide incoming administration

Congress requires new administration to conduct an NPR within first year of office

Last NPR in 2001 with only parts revealed in early 2002

Many misconceptions of Bush administration NPR

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Primary Objective Urged in the Report Prevent nuclear use by any state or non-state actor Does not imply elimination of nuclear weapons Does not imply no-first-use policy But does imply reevaluation of the purposes of U.S. nuclear

weapons

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Five Pillars of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

1. Reenergizing political relationships with major nuclear-armed states with emphasis on reinvigorating arms control with Russia and revitalizing strategic dialogue with China

2. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and know-how to more states and non-state actors

3. Reaffirming and maintaining U.S. extended deterrence commitments to allies

4. Ensuring that the U.S. nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable to maintain the credibility of the U.S. arsenal

5. Implementing best security practices on nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide

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U.S.-Russia Major Recommendations Premise any new arms control agreement on

shared understanding of mutual interests Urge legally binding, verifiable follow-on

treaty to START Include in strategic dialogue: non-deployed

warheads, missile defense, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and advanced conventional weapons

Build on success of CTR and related programs (WSSX, Megatons-to-Megawatts, etc.) to form a true partnership with Russia on nuclear security projects

Reinvigorate technical cooperative projects with U.S. and Russian technical experts

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U.S.-China Major Recommendations Relationship not ripe for formal

nuclear arms control But important to renew strategic

dialogue Conduct frequent dialogue on nuclear

security Be transparent about U.S. intentions

and capabilities on missile defense. Offer an agreement on formal transparency and confidence building measures

Propose a trilateral ban (U.S.-China-Russia) on tests of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. Discuss how to expand to global ban

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Strengthening Nonproliferation Prepare high level diplomatic team

for NPT RevCon Provide for multiple levels of

assurances on nuclear fuel Freeze construction of new national

enrichment and reprocessing facilities

Set up a fuel leasing program Make the Additional Protocol a

prerequisite for obtaining nuclear supplies

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Strengthening Nonproliferation (continued) Develop and implement improved safeguards

techniques Provide adequate funding and resources for

the IAEA Correct weaknesses in the NPT that allow

easy withdrawal Ratify the CTBT and renew international

efforts for entry into force Phase out use of civilian highly enriched

uranium (HEU) Renew U.S. pledge to pursue nuclear

disarmament Call for global moratorium on fissile material

production for weapons

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Extended Deterrence Reaffirm U.S. commitment to security

assurances, including extended deterrence Consult with allies to determine their

views about the credibility of the nuclear component of extended deterrence

Keep the small U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe as long as it supports NATO political objectives and acts as a disincentive for NATO allies to build their own arsenals

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Safe, Secure, and Reliable Nuclear Arsenal Ensure stockpile stewardship program has

adequate resources Maintain a readiness to modernize or replace

the arsenal, as necessary Be transparent about any proposed changes to

the weapons complex Couple these changes to arms control and

strategic dialogue with Russia and China Conduct comprehensive cost vs. benefit

assessment of proposed complex transformation

Implement an integrated approach to the complex

Exercise the intellectual capacity of the technically talented people at the labs

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Best Security Practices Meet the president’s goal of securing all

vulnerable nuclear material by 2012 Increase transparency about the status of the

U.S. nuclear weapons inventory, e.g., publish an annual report on dismantlement activities

Dispose, as much as possible, excess fissile material into non-weapons usable forms

Share information with other nuclear-armed states about best security practices, consistent with U.S. laws

Move the IAEA’s nuclear security budget into the regular budget

Redouble efforts to bring the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material into force

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Next Steps for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy• Complete Nuclear Posture Review

(December 2009)

• Complete negotiations on START follow-on treaty (December 2009)

• Submit follow-on treaty to Senate for advice and consent (end of 2009?)

• Ask Senate to reconsider CTBT (2010?)

• Convene global nuclear security conference (March 2010)

• Convene NPT RevCon (May 2010)

• Push for more action on FMCT (ongoing, no definite deadline)

• Complete major goals of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (2012)

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Remaining Challenges• Desirability and feasibility of nuclear

disarmament

• Linkage between nuclear and conventional disarmament (Article VI of the NPT)

• Technical verification issues

• Political confidence building measures

• Geopolitical conditions that would be necessary to move seriously toward nuclear disarmament