outline of case digested

8/13/2019 outline of case digested

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United States vs Barrias

Political LawDelegation of PowerAdministrative Bodies

FACTS: Barrias is the captain of a lighter (casco or ship) named Maude operating in the Pasig River. The said Maude is

not being powered by steam engine or a similar source of adequate power. The Maude is in fact being navigated

manually by use of bamboo poles. This is in clear violation of Circular No. 397 issued by the Insular Collector of CustomsThis said circular issued by the Collector is in pursuant to Secs 5 and 8 of Act No. 1136 which empowered the Collector to

regulate those engaged in lighterage or any other similar harbor business. On the other hand, Barrias challenged the act

of the Collector with reference to Secs 19 and 311 of Act No. 355 (Phil Customs Administrative Act) as amended by Act

1235 and Act 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to

fix penalties for violation thereof, not exceeding a fine of P500.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Collector.

HELD:The SC acknowledged that the issue raised by Barrias indeed poses a serious question and the SC discussed tha

one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be

delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the

authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution

itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can

not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can i

substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to

confide this sovereign trust. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes no

only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately

upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. However, the question of undue

delegation must be passed upon because of the fact that the prosecution is sustained by the validity of the other law

cited which is sections 5 and 8 of Act No 1136. The reference to Act No 355 as amended is not material to the dispositio

of the case.


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Smart Communications vs. NTC GR 151908, 12 August 2003; First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J)

Facts:On 16 June 2000, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the

billing of telecommunications services; which includes provisions pertaining to the use and sale of pre-paid cards and

unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS). On 30 August 2000, the NTC issued a memorandum to a

CMTS operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellula

phone units. Another memorandum dated 6 October 2000 addressed to all telecommunications entities remindin

them that the validity of all prepaid cards and SIM packs sold and used on 7 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid fo

at least 2 years from the date of first use.

On 20 October 2000, Islacom and Piltel questioned the validity of the memoranda, and prayed for the issuance of a wri

of preliminary injunction. The lower court granted the issuance of the injunction. NTC moved for reconsideration, bu

was denied. NTC thereafter filed a special civil action for certiorari and probation before the Court of Appeals. Th

appellate court granted the petition and dismissed the companies complaint without prejudice to the referral of thei

grievances with the NTC. Hence, the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether a party should have exhausted administrative remedies before it filed the case in court.

Held: A party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to Court, when questioning the validity or

constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency. The principle only applies when the act o

the agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed and pertained to its rule

making or quasi-legislative power.

Issue:Whether the court or NTC has jurisdiction over the issues pertaining to the memoranda.

Held:The issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters, and thus are within the competence of a

judge in the lower court. What is required of the judge who will resolve the issue is a basic familiarity with the working

of the cellular telephone service, including pre-paid SIM and call cards (which is within the knowledge of a good

percentage of the Philippine population) and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.


3/8

Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

FACTS: Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding

ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One

such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may

import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own

and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own

requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He

claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum

products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three

existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have

their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined

crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE:Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD:The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It

violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied

that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell

and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. A

the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential o

4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and

cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend

to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions o

pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing thei

product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable

because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attracnew players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging

to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed

them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions

already being observed by the latter.


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Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533 (1988)

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

FACTS:Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint

for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the

latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Linesquestioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case

ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular,

Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such

authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to

delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the

discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a

prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test

and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the

legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard

test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the

delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into theshoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with

the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and

sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation h as

become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the

competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected

from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With

the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more

necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is

called the power of subordinate legislation.

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by filling in the details which the

Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative

regulation.


5/8

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Police PowerNot Validly Exercised

FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law

Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the

movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then

charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or hisright to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without

being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power

in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD:The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on

the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent

slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being

transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of th

police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the

law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied

the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative

authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and

militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to

the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily

taken.


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Solicitor General v. Metopolitan Manila Authority (1991)

FACTS: On July 13, 1990, the Gonong decision was promulgated wherein the Court held that confiscation of license

plates is NOT allowed to be imposed by Metro Manila Authority(MMA) under PD 1605 EXCEPT as provided for under LO

43 in case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Likewise, PD 1605 does not allow confiscation of driver'

license.

However, subsequently, a number of confiscations of driver's license and license plates were still committed by traffic

enforcers In Metro Manila. Hence, SC received several letter--complaints regarding this matter.

The accused traffic enforcers invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 and Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991 which both

authorize confiscation of driver's license and removal of license plate.

ISSUES: WON theres a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate ordinances

WON the ordinances were valid

HELD: Yes. The requisites of a valid delegation were present namely:

a. Completeness of statute making the delegationb. Presence of sufficient standard. Public convenience and welfare in this caseNo. To test the validity of such acts, apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance , namely:

a. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statuteb. It must not be unfair nor oppressivec. It must not be partial nor discriminatoryd. It must not prohibit but regulate tradee. It must not be unreasonablef. It must be general and consistent with public policyApplying Gonongs decision, measures under consideration does not pass the 1

strequisite because they are not

conforming to the existing law which was PD 1605 in this case. PD 1605 expressly prohibits removal of license

plate and confiscation of drivers license contrary to the ordinances.


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TOLEDO VS CSC 202 SCRA 507 | October 4, 1991 | J. Paras

Facts: Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and

Information Department of the Comelec on May 1986, at which time Toledo was already more than 57 years old

Toledos appointment papers and his oath of office were endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC onJune 1986 for approva

and attestation. However, no prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP

which prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into government service without prior CSC approval

was secured. Petitioner then reported for work.

Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP, and CSC Memo Circular 5 issued Resolution

No. 2066, which declared void from the beginning Toledos appointment. Petitioner appealed to CSC, which considered

him a de facto officer and his appointment voidable, and moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the presen

petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N CSRPAP provision is valid

Held: No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC, contained no provision prohibiting

appointment or reinstatement into government service of any person already 57 years old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the RevisedCivil Service Rules, which prohibits such, was purely the creation of CSC.Marcoss PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which

established a new CSC and superseded RA 2260, also provided that rules and regulations shall become effective only 30

days after publication in the OG or in any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC adopted the CSRPAP . No

provision re prohibition of appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807; prohibition was purely created by CSC.

The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the law which it was meant to implement

It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat

may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no

prohibition or restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statuteor any provision respecting age as a

factor in employmentthere was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter. The power

vested in the CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect oexecution, not to supply perceived omissions in it.

Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to Toledo of a provision

thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published as required by both RA 2260 and PD 807. The argument tha

it was a mere reiteration of existing law and circularized cannot stand as formerly discussed. Also, Toledos

separation from service was through no fault of his own. Petition granted.


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American Tobacco Company et al vs Director of Patents

Due Process

FACTS: ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office concerning the use of trade mark and trade name. ATC et a

challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark

Cases as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear inte

partes proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be

personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. These proceedings refer to the hearing o

opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of

determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation

of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. Petitioners filed their objections to the

authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because

under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes case. Said objections were overruled by the

Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel the Director of Patents to personally hear the

cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

ISSUE:Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers are within due process.

HELD:The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does no

preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency wil

be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude

him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to

him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion

finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fai

hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As

long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the

decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fai

trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actuadecision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to give the substance of a hearing

which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations mus

consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.

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