The Chicago School FireBy Chester I. Babcock, Manager and Rexford Wilson, Engineer

NFPA Fi" Remd Deparl",en!

Chi,",. T"'"M

Shortly before classes were to be dis-missed on December 1 , 1958 , fire brokeoUt at the foot of a srairway in theOur Lady of the. Angels School , Chi-cago , II1inois. Ninety pupils and threenuns at this Roman Catholic gradeschoollosr their lives when smoke , heatand fire cut off their normal means ofescape through open stairways and

. corridors. . Seventy-seven were seriouslyinjured.

Gmeful app",i..ion i, given to Chief F. W.Kempf of rhe Chicago Fice In,u,""" Pmo! , to

Chicago Fice Commi"ion" R. J. Quinn and hi,mlf, to Mr. EI"", R"ke of the Cook County In-'peerion Duceau and to orhm in rhe Chicago areafor their coopmrion and ",i"an" ,J",ing chi,invwigacion.

The School BuildingThe fire was confined to one wing of

the V-shaped 2-story brick, wood-joisted building (see diagram 1). Thenorth wing, where the fire occurredhad been built in 1910 and originallyhoused a church on the first floor andparochial school classrooms on thesecond. Aftera new church was builton adjoining property in 1949, thechurch-school huilding was convertedto a classroom building, and in 1953 itwas connected to anOther old 2-storybrick , wood-joisted building (located atthe corner of W. Iowa and N. AversSts.) by a 2-story brick , wood-joistedannex. The firsr and second stories ofrhe resulting V-shaped building were

155

The QuarterlyNational Fire Protection AssociationJanuary 1959

f-

156 QUARTERLY 01' THE NrPA - JANUARY 1959

c",."s.,.ri."Thi. photo wo. taken "0" the .,ade levellandin. in Ihe 'eo, .Iai,well el Ihe ne"h win..

The Ii,e ,'a"ed at the ba.e..ent levellandin. wh... the leu, ..en a,e 'Iandin.. The windowin the lell bad.,eund b,oke eady in Ii,e. Twe deo,way. ',e.. ba'e..ent level are ne' vi.i-ble. At !he Ii"t IIae, level the Cia.. B lire deer thai kepI Ii,e and ...eke out 01 the Ii"t"a'Y i. ..en ,'andin. aja,-

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THE CHICAGO SCHOOL FIRE 157

WINe

(H(/RCH

WEJ"T .TOWA J"TREET

Diagra.. I. Pial plan 0' "haol and adlaeent properly. Seeand .to", delail. 0' "hoolbuilding .hown. FI'e .tarled 01 ba.e..enllevel 01 "airway ..a,ked by "0".

occupied by classrooms. A -chapel wasin the basement of the north wing, andthere were three classrooms in the base-ment of the south wing.

Open interior stairways and lack

standard protection for doorways in themasonry division wall between thenorth wing and the annex made the en-tire building essentially one fire area.For further information on constructionsee "ConstruCtion Details" on page 167.

An exact count of the number of peo-ple in the school at the time of the fireis not known. Conservative estimatesplace the total at between 1200 and1300. It is known that there wete '569pupils and teachers in the north wing,of whom 329 were in the six second-story classrooms.

Origin of FireAt 2:00 P. M. most of the pupils were

in their classrooms with their teachers

receiving the final hour s instruction be-fore the scheduled 3:00 P.M. dismissal.

Sometime prior to 2:25 P.M. firebroke out in combustible material at thebottom of the rear stairway of the northwing. A pupil "sneaking a smoke" in

this stairway is one possible cause. Fol-lowing the fire a partially burned bundleof newspapers , a book of wallpapersamples , a package of old exam booksand the remains of a roll of asphalt-satUrated felt were found among othercombustible material in the debris.

DiscoveryAt 2:25 P.M. the teacher of Room 206

(see diagram 2) started two of herpupils on the normal routine of takingthe class waStebaskets down to theboiler room incinerator. They returnedat 2:30 P. M. to say that they smelled

smoke. The teacher raId her classraremain seated as she hurried to Room

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158 QUARTERLY OF THE NFPA - JANUARY 1959

Ra~ Room 2/0

CrocloS GNclo4

Room 2/1

Croci.

In",.""

Room 209

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Croclo8

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""'ecl

RoamZO7

CrJclOS~6OO.ocI "niu~cI

s,, :rn r.Dlag,a.. 2. Seeand "ory of narlh wing. F;,e .tarled at ba.e..enl level 01 .tai,way

..a,ked by "0", After th;. d;agra.. w.. d,awn one of 'he 16 Inlu,ed in Roo.. 210 died.Ca..alUe., Roo.. 210 .hould ,ead 30 dead; IS iniured.

207 to ask what she should do. Afterbeing advised of the smoke the teacherof Room 207 ran down the corridor tothe principal's o ffice in the middle of thesouth wing to alert her. The principalwas not there as she was substitutIngfor a sick teacher on the first floor. .

The Room 207 teache~ then returnedto her classroom. She and the teacher

of Room 206 decided to take their classesour of the building. The pupils inRoom 207 went our through the cloak-room and down the fire escape stairswhile those in Room 206 went down theannex stairs and outdoors. Smoke wasalready at head level in the second~ory cotridor.

Both classes were taken to the churchafter which the teacher of Room 206 ranback to the school , went to the firstfloor of the south wing and operated thefire alarm signal. The time was nowabollt'2:42 P.

Meanwhile, the school janitor wasri:turning -along W. Iowa St. to theschool building from other school prop-

erty several blocks away. At approxi-mately 2:25 P.M. he entered the aller

The 40 pupU. and Ihelr leaehe, who were IRoo.. 207 e..apeddawn Ihl. Ii" mope.

between the parish house and the schooland saw smoke in the rear, near the.stairwell. He says he ran into the boilerroom , then ran to the parish house and

--~~-_.._-~.. - --- .._. ---

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL FIRE 159

yelled to the housekeeper to call the firede~artment. He then ran back into theboiler room and started through thebuilding. According to the fire depart-ment , the housekeeper's call was itsfirst notification of the fire. This callwas received at 2:42 P. , suggestingthat she may have delayed placing thecalL The standard response to a tele-phoned alarm - one engine , one laddertruck , one rescue squad and a battalionchief - was dispatched. A unit of theChicago Fire Patrol also responded onthis alarm.

At about the same time; the fire de-partment alarm office received the firstof fifteen other telephoned alarms , noneof which came from anyone in theschool building. A passing motOriston North Avers Avenue saw smoke com-ing from around the outside door to therear stairwell of the north wing. He

stOpped his car, and since there waS nofire alarm box in sight, rushed intO asmall neighborhood grocery store justnorth of and adjacent ro the school and

asked for a telephone. On being tOldthat there was no pl/hiic telephone' hesaid

, "

I wanted to report 'a fire in theschool!" and rushed out to try to finda telephone somewhere else. The storeproprietress followed him out and wenttOward the school. She saw no commo-tion or unusual aCtivity inside but on

approaching the doorway to the rearstairway she saw a tongue of flame com-ing from over the door. She then ranback to her stOre and telephoned the firedepartment over her priM" telephone.This call was made at approximately2:43 P.M. She was rold

, "

Help is al-ready on the way." On immediatelyreturning to the. school she found chil-dren ar open second srory windqwscalling for help.

c"",.r","",View of mond .Io'y eo"ido, 01 norlh wing, looking ',a.. Ironl .tai,way landIng.

fj'e o,lginated in ,eo, ,'ai,way beyond Ihe a"h in eenle, ba,kg,ound 01 photo. 000' Roo.. 212 i. alloll lo,eg,aund.

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160 QUARTERLY OP THE NFPA - JANUARY 1959

Hot smoke and fire gases that came upthe open rear stairway and mushroomedthrough the second story cotridor of thenorth wing had been noticed by occu-pants of classrooms off the cotridor be-fore the building alarm rang.

The building fire alarm gave the firstnotification to all other occupants classrooms except those in Room 206(annex) and Room 207, as noted.

Spread of Fire

During the five or ten minutes thatthe fire burned before discovery it is sur'mised that it 4eveloped rapidly. Burn-ing was greatly intensified when thewindow in the Stairwell at basementlevel was broken by the heat , permit-ting a good supply of fresh air to enterthe fire area. Hot fire gases and smokebillowed up the chimney-like stairwelland mushroomed through the secondstory corridor at ceiling leve1. From allavailable indications there was no ac-

. tual burning in the second story at thetime second story occupants first noticedsmoke. However, the occupants of sevoral of the classrooms in the secondstory of the north wing reported that.

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TYPICAl SECOND I"'U)OR .scal.t:lA3SRDDMDt10/l! In F..,

after doors had been opened and thenquickly closed to keep out smoke a

whoosh" was heard. This noise isthought to have accompanied the igni-tion of fire gases and combustible inte-rior finish in the corridor. As heat be-gan breaking large glass transoms over

the doors , hot fire gases and flames en-tered the classrooms. Fire also entered

the shallow roof space through a venti-lation grill in the corridor ceiling.

This was the apparent situation in thesecond story of the north wing whenthe firSt piece of fire apparatus arrived.Since the major efforts of. firemen had tobe directed toward rescue during theearly stages, the fire in the second storygrew . steadily worse and eventUallyburned off about one third of the roofbefore being controlled.

EseapeOn hearing the building fire alarm

occupants of the entire first floor left thebuilding by the five available stairwaysto the street, apparently without con-

fusion and unaware of the fire.

Evacuation of the second floor of theannex and south wing was hampered bysmoke which came through an opendoor in the division wall at the second

story level. This door was closed early

in the fire , possibly by a fireman whohad entered the building to assist in

rescue, or by the janitor. While manyof the occupants of the second storyof the south wing and annex reachedthe street without difficulty, there wereinStances of panic and of rescue by ci-vilians. When some of the pupils of asecond story classroom in the southwing refused to leave , their teacher

ordered them to crawl to the stairway.

When they balked at the stairway; sherolled and pushed them down. Severalpupils in the second story of the southwing were taken down fire department.ladders. f\

Stories of the actions of the occupantsof classrooms in the second story of thenorth wi rig are not complete , but jt is

possible to reconstruct fairly reliable ac-counts of what went on in the six rooms.

. -..---..--....-~-

THE ' CHICAGO SCHOOL FIRE

Room 207

10 Room 207, at the top of the rear; stairwell (see diagram 2) the 24 fifth

grade and 16 sixth grade pupils had juSt

settled down afrer returning from' amusic lesson in another 'part of thehuilding, The door ro the corridorW"s dosed,

Chi'.g,r,"~The eloak'ao.. belween Roo... 206 and 207

.how. Ihe way eoa" Were hung In 'he ..aineo"'dor 01 Ihe norlh wing al Ihe .'arl 01 'hefI'e, Note, lhe heigh' 01 'he fI'e exllngui.her0 'he dg ht of 'he 7- II. hlgh door 10 'he fire"'ape.

Shortly after 2:30 P, M. the teacherfrom Room 206 came in and talked'briefly with the teacher of this roomtelling her of the smoke odor detectedby two of her pupils. (For additional

details see pages 157 and 158, ) A few mo-ments later she ordered her class to goour through the rear classroom door tothe fire escape. No building fire alarmwas given at this time, Escape by this

routewas temporarilydelayed howeverwhen the pupils could not open the rearclassroom door, One report says thedoor was locked , another that it wasstuck, Following instructions ahoyjumped from a window to the fire es-

161

cape. If it was the plan of the teacherto evacuate her class by this route , itwas not necessary to do so for the jani-tOr arrived at this momenr and forcedopen the Stuck or locked door, There-after all occupants of Room 207 fileddown the firc escape and to the church.No de"d; one injured'*

Roo.. 208

The 46 seventh grade pupils in Room208 firSt learned of the fire when smokepoured in under the door from the cor-ridor. Ordered into fire drill formationby their teacher, the pupils attemptedto leave via the corridor but were forced

U"'.a"uMany oecupan" ",eaped fro.. Roo.. 208 In

Ihe ...and .'ary by lu..plng '0 Ihe roof over

a ba.e..en' .tairway .hown lu" beneath fin'"ory window.. The "airway wh... fI'e.tarled I. 01 lell.

'The injuri" m'nrionod herein (tOtal, 77) aretho,e ,har requiced extend,d ho'piC21iw;on,

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QUARTERLY OF THE NFPA - JANUARY 1959

C"""T"'"~The quiek-IMnking leaeher 0' Roo.. 209, who look Ii,.. eon"al 01 , he, do.. , had ..ueh

to.do with 'he fad Ihatonly one ehlld died in Ihi. '00". Nole the vaeanl .pane. on Ihe wall.that had been ';tied with Mghly eo..bu"ible p,emd pap.,boa,d bla,kboard..

back into the room by smoke and flames,Panic gripped them as they ran for thewindows. Some jumped to the raisedroof of an outdoor basement stairway;about twenty-five managed to escapedown two shorr extension laddersraised by the assistant janitOr, IJut tendid not get out before flames flashedthrough rhe room, Nine pupil, andone teacher dead; 13 injured,

Roo.. 20.

Duringa mathematics lesson in Room209 one of the 62 pupils raised his handand reported smelling smoke. On open-

ing the door and finding the corridorfilled with smoke , the teacher slammedit shut and then went intO action as fol-lows, Eoys were ordered to pile booksat cracks around doors while the girlswere ordered to the windows, IJoyswere next told ro pile desks in front ofdoors, Cespitc these clforts smoke andheat continued tnpush intO the room"Looking across the courryard ro classrooms in the south wing the teacher-noticed that no one was aware of thefire, She starred her class chanting,

Fire! Fire! The school's on fire!" toattract attention,

"-- ~"==~,,"

-,--------- ... --. '"-

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL FIRB

About this time the Occupants ofRoom 209 heard a " whoosh" from thecorridor. Through the transom flamescould be seen roaring' along the corridorat ceiling level, The manually operatedbuilding fire alarm starred to sound,' The children remained calm and someof them received permission ro dropfrom a window ro the canopy over anOutside Stairway from the firSt floor tothe ground, Others, however, re-mained at the windows until takendown fire department ladders or untilpulled by a civilian into an adjacent

window of the annex, Seeing no otherpupils in the smoke-filled room theteacher went to the ladder

, but as shestarred downsaw a girl still in the room,This pupil died before

'being rescued,One pupil dead; nine injured,

Roo.. 210

Details of the actions of those in thisroom are incomplete. Geography, hadjUSt begun for the 56 fourth grade pupils

when smoke Was seen coming in fromunder the doors, Many were burned bynames befote they jumped, Severalbodies were found in a pile . beneathwindows. 29 pupils and one teacherdead; 15 injured.

Roo.. 211

Details. of the evacuation . of the 64eighth gradets in Room 211 are, notcomplete. Panic gripped the childrenas smoke

' poured in a slightly openedtransom, A priest yelled from theground for them to use the front stairsbut because of the smoke and hear in thecorridor, this was impossible, Some

Chi.."S". Tim"

Many of the 'ourlh g,ade" In Roo.. 210 died beneath the.. double windows. Heightaf window. above Aoor 37% Ineh...

163

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164 QUARTERLY OF THE NFFA - JANUARY 1959

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Roo.. 211, re..ole "0" Ihe ,ear "airway had a Mgh ea..alty 1i,1. Nole heavy Ii,eda..age. Roo.. 212, 0"0" 'he hall, ,uff.nod Ihe high.., nu..ber 01 ea.ualti.. but Ve'y1i"le Ii,e da..age:

jumped; some were taken down fire de-partment ladders, 24 pupils dead; 18mjured.Roo.. 212

Fifty-five fifth grade pupils werestudying geography in Room 212. Be--

cause the room seemed warm the teacherasked to have the windows opened andthen asked a boy to open the door to the

corridor, Smoke rolled into the toom.The door was shut and the teacher tOldthe pupils to stay in their seats arid pray

but as the room filled with choking hotsmoke many pupils rushed to the win-dows and jumped. Others stayed atwindows and were rescued by firemenwhile a few who Stayed' at their seatswere asphyxiated. An electric clock onthe wall of this room stOpped 'at 2:47P. M, 27 pupils and teacher dead; 21 ,injured.

Fire Department ResponseBecauseoftherepeated telephone calls.

Chicago Fire Alarm Headquarters sup-plemented the telephoned alarmre-sponse by sounding the number of thenearest street box , located one blockeast and one block south of the schoolproPerty. Sounding of this box at 2:44M. brought two ladder companies

four engine companies and two chiefofficers to supplement the ladder com-pany, engine company; rescue squadfire insurance patrol and battalion chief -that had been dispatched on the tele-phoncd alarm at 2:42 P.M. On findingchildren jumping from second storywindows , the engine company respond-ing on the telephoned alarm radioed fora box alarm immediately after arrival.This call was received simultaneously

with the striking of the box ' by the

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THE ~HlCAGO SCHOOL FIRE 165

alarm headquarters crew. At2:47P.after the battalion chief responding onthe still alarm arrived , a second alarmwas ordered. Special calls for a total often fire department ambulances were-made at 2:50 P. , 2:52 P. , and 2:55

M. At 2:57 P. M. the battalion chiefordered a fifth alarm. A special call at3:08 P.M. was made for two additionalladder companies and two additionalrescue squads , bringing the . total firefighting and rescue equipment at thescene to 22 engine companies , sevenladder companies , five rescue squads

one fire insurance patrol , three highpressure units , two water towers , ten firedepartment ambulances, seven chiefsand two commissioners. The police de-partment responded with over 70 squad-rols(patrolling stretcher-equipped panel

trucks).

Rescue

Before the first fire apparatUs arrivedmany children had already jumped fromwindows. The assistant school janitorwith thc help of a priest had obtainedtwo eXtension ladders from a nearby

. garage and had placed them against thewall beneath Room 208. . They were tooshort to .reach the window but abouttwenty-five .pupils were able to reachthem from window sills.

Several outsiders rushed into thebuilding in ~n attempt to save thosetrapped in the second story of the southwing and annex. One man checkedtheentire firSt story and found everyone out.Another is reported to have been seen

leaving the building with four childrenunder his arms and a third is said tohave guided a small group of youngsters

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Roo.. 212, IDeated larlh.., "0" .and lea" da..aged by the n,e , .u,'alned the g'eat..tnu..be, 01 ea,uaille.. Note the eong..tian 01 d..k,. The heavy ,..oke eondltian, are ;ndieatedby the do,' nolo' 01 the wal" under Ihe blaekboa,d, and by '..ake- I,ee 'pol, on the de,".

-"..

166 QUARTERLY OF THE NrPA - JANUARY 1959

down one of the stairways. These recue efforts and those of the teachers thath~ve been previously described arethought to have been all that tookplace prior to arrival of firemen.

Rescue operations by fire departmentpersonnel consisted primarily of catch-ing pupils and in throwing all availableladders up to windows as. faSt as man-

power would permit. Since Engine 85,

first in , had the recommended five mancomplement, it was possible for theofficer to divide his men. While part of

the crew laid in a 2y.-inch hose line , the

remainder used the engine s 24-foot lad-

der and roof ladder to Start rescue opera-tions on the north side of the northwing. Ladder Company 35,

first in , on

seeing children at windows of the soUthwing, started rescue operations from

that part of the building. Rescue Squad

6, .firSt in, helped ladder the building

and broke out life nets. These are thefirst of innumerable heroic and oftentragic rescue effortS by members of theChicago Fire Department and the Chi-cago Fire Insurance Patrol. Estimates

indicate that these men were respon-

sible for saving 160 lives.

While some of those who jumped didnot rquire immediate medical

atten-tion and were able to run to theirhomes , moSt of them were hurried toone or another of four surroundinghospitals in fire department ambulancesand police squadrols. Activation ofhospital disaster plans greatly facili-tated efficient handling of the victims.

Fire Extinguishment

The remaining men of Engine 85,running a hose line to the rear stairwellStarted extinguishment operations. Thesecond 'in engine ran tWO hose lines up

Wid, II'.."

Many ehild,en wm taken down ';,e depa,'..ent 'add... bela,e they we'e a,phyxiotedor bu,ned 10 death. When Ihi' pidU'. wa' taken Iho,e ,tfil In the building we'e dead. Anew type of ';,e deparl..ent appalat.. ...d expe,i..entally by theChieago Fi,e

Deparl..ent

and known a, Ihe Pil..an "gi,alle" i, ,hown in u,e.

----

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL FIRE 167

the front Stairs and. used fog nozzles inan arlempt to make the cotridor usablefor rescue. This attempt had to heabandoned , however, when the menwere forced down ,he stairway.

As engine companies arrived addi-tional hose lines were laid and the firewas soon brought under control.

Construction DetailsOne ".e A,ea

The building was one fire area due to,he open stairways and the fact thatthe masonry division wall between thenorth wing and annex had substandard

. doorway protection. There were twOwooden doors in this division wall atthe second story level. The fact that

one of these doors was closed when thefire occurred and the other was closedshortly after the fire was discovered

prevented the fire from entering the sec-ond srory of the annex from ,he secondstory of the norrh wing, The fire even-

c"",.r",""Na"ow hallway belween Roo.., 207 and

209 lookIng lowa,d annex. 000' at end ofhallway wa' do..d ,a,'y In lire. The,e wa,negligible Ii,e da..age beyond thi, dao'.Open "air fro.. ...ond to 1i,,1 lIoon 01 annexin ba,kgraund.

tually burned through these doors butby then fire department hose streams

were in operation to keep ,he flamesfrom entering the annex. A similar doorin the division wall" at rhefirst stOry

level was chained open but since the firedid not enter the first stOry this deplor-able condition was not a factor in theoutcome. .Heigh" and A"

The basement level was 4y,feet belowgrade and the first floor 6 feet abovegrade. The second stOry floor was 15feet above the first. Ceiling heightswere 9 feet in the basement, 14 feet inthe first stOry and 12 feet in the second.

Gross floor areas' of the basementfirst and second floors of the entitebuilding were approximately 12 000square feet each, - tOtal gross floor

area of the building 36 000 square feet.In the north wing each gross floor areawas 6 400 square feet, - rota! grossfloor area 19,200 square feet. The base"

ment of the north wing was occupied bythe chapel , boiler room and girls' tOiletfacilities; the first stOry contained fourclassrooms and toilers; and the secondstOry six classrooms (see diagram 2).

bit,Five interior and one exteriot stair-

ways were disttibuted as shown in dia-gram 1. From the 84-foot-long maincorridor in ,he second story of the northwing three stairways led to lower floorsand the street, one a' the rear of the COr-ridor and two at the front.

The rear stairway (where the firestarted) in ,he north wing was enclosedon all four sides at basement and firststory levels by brick walls with a finishof wood lath and laSter on wood fur-ring. At the secon story level ,he stair-way was enclosed with this same ma-terial but only on three sides. Interiorwall openings were as follows: at thebasement level wooden doors (metalsheet on one side) opened intO the rearstairway from the boiler room and from

'Gco"fioor "ea i, thetocal fioorarea within thepedrneter of the out,ide wall,.

168 QUARTERLY OF THE NrPA - JANUARY 1959

the girls' tOilet room. A Class B firedoor cut off the stairway from the firstfloor corridor. The top of the stairwayopened on a second story landing, whichin turn ope,ned into the second stOry

main corndor as shown in Diagram 2.Exterior wall openings in this Stairwel1were a 31 inch by 45 inch wood-framedplain glass window at basement levela pair of wood panel doors at the gradelevel landing, a 46 inch by 96 inch win-dow at first floor level , and a 42 inch by84 inch window at the landing betweenthe first and second floors.

The Stairs in the rear stairway wereconstructed of wood except for asphaltand rubber tile surface finish and a metalnosing on the treads. There were ' twoflights of stairs and an intermediatelanding between each floor, each stairhaving a 7- inch riser and 1Oy'-inch tread.The under surfaces of the flightS andlandings were finished with metal lath

and plaster. There were two units ofexit width' provided by this stairway(52 inches wide).

The two front stairways in the northwing were essential1y of the same con-struCtion as the rear stairway andopened on a common landing at thesecond floor level. Each of these twofront Stairways provided 2Y. unitS ofexit width (each 56 inches wide). Thecommon landing was separated from thesecond story corridor by two wood andplain glass doors which were open at thetime of the fire.

In the 2-story annex a one unit , openstairway of metal construction extended'

from the second stOry to an open corri-dor of the first story. Thirteen feet

from the bottom of these stairs and di-rectly. ahead was a flight of II steps , atthe foot of which was a landing with adoor to the sidewalk.

'A unit of "it width" d,fin,d in paragraphJOn of rh, NFPA Building Exi" Code i, 22 inch"and i, con,ide"d to be the 'pac, necmarr fo, thefm p",ag' of on, file of F",on,. Fraction, of aunir ace not couoted excepc char 12 or roo" inche,

ace counted " ~ unit.

An ourside Class C fire escape Stair(with swinging lowersection)represent-

ing ~ unit of exit width' (36 incheswide) was attached to the rear wall ofthe 2-story annex and accessible fromthe second story cotridor of the annex.

The only stairway from the secondstOry of the south wing was an openwooden flight of stairs of one unit ofexit width discharging into the openfirst floor hallway. Six and one halffeet ahead , an ll-Step stairway led toa landing with a door to the sidewalk

Inlerlo, Fini,hWalls and ceilings in the huilding

were general1y wood-lath and plaster.Ceilings of all classrooms were finishedwith combustible cellulose fiber acousti-cal tile cemented directly to the plaster.It was also cemented to the ceilings ofthe firSt story corridors of the northwing and annex. There is difference ofopinion as to whether this combustibletile was on the ceiling of the secondfloor corridor of the north wing. TheChicago Fire Department and membersof the combustible acoustical tile in-dustry say it was not, while the churchofficial in charge of the school Statesthat it was. Burned pieces of the tilewere among the debrIS in the corridoron the day following the fire.

Throughout this building there waswood interior trim in the form of doorsdoor frames, transom frames , mop andCoat hook boards. Furniture was con-structed principally of wood , and inthe secona story of the north wing therewere pressed paperboard blackboards inthe rooms and a large amount of chil-dren s clothing (it was below freezing -outside) hanging from hooks alongborh sides of the main corridor.

Plastered walls had been given several

CoatS of paint which at one location in

the north wing measured 1/48 of an inchin thickness. It is not felt that this thin

'Each 1B inche, of width of CI", C fire "cape

mi" i, counted" Y-i unit of exit width becau""eepnm and ocbet ,ubmnd"d facro",low travel.

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170 QUARTERLY OF HiB NFPA - JANUARY 1959

through the ventilation grill in thenorth wing corridor ceiling outSideRoom 208. Eventually the fire burnedup through the plaster ceiling over therear stairway.

The two wood panel doors openinginto the base of the Stairwell , one fromthe boiler room and the other from thetoilet room , were both burned off theirhinges. Although it might appear sur-prising that there was no lire damage ineither the boiler room or toilet roomthe lack of fire damage was probably be-cause of a Strong inrush of air into the

stairwell from these rooms as soon asthe doors failed.

The Class B fire door at the first floorstairwell landing was intact followingthe fire except for cracking of the 100-square-inch wired glass window in itand slight warping of the exposed metalsurface of the door. This door preventedall fire and smoke from entering the firststOry of the north wing.

The wood stairs in the stairwell wereheavily burned and the top flight hadcollapsed. MoSt of the plaster on woodlath finish of the stairwell , includingthat on the ceiling, had been destroyedbut it is interesting to note that thewood ro"of over the stairwell was notburned through.

It Need Not Have HappenedAgain it must be written that the les-

sons learned from this fire repeat lessonslearned in years gone by. Again it mustbe said that conformity to the pro-visions of the Building Exirs Codewould have prevented this disaster.Again it must be wondered how muchlonger it will be before the lessons so

tragically brought home ieJ?Catedly byschool disasters are apphed to allschools.

' The loss of life in this fire was pri-marily due to i1ladequate exit faciliti,,

as discussed in the following section onexits. This is a basic principle of lifesafety from fire. Five other weaknessesin the fire safety of the building alsomade major ' contributions to thisholocauSt.

ExitsBasically, the' adequacy of exits is

determined by proper enclosure, byprovision of at least rwo ways out re-

'The nationally mo~ni"d NFPA BuildingE,i" cod, i, the "'ndard reference on adequateexit f,ciliti", from Building'."Aft" teviewing rhi, report Fire Commi"ionerJ Quinn "ated that he di"greed with the con-

clu,ion rmhed by the NFPA invwigatO'" ,hocthe principal cau,e of 16" of life w", inadequoceexit hcili'ie,. Commi"ioner Quinn , f,elin~ that

:~~:cl:;' ~~n~:~a~~:I

~:;~r ;~;: ~fd l:~~~ ~:Ii:)::dal..m to the fi,e dep"""ent.

mote from each other , and by sufficientexit capacity so that all occupants can

leave the building promptly. In noneof these respects were the exit facilitiesof Our Lady of the Angels Schooladequate. P,ea,dinanu Building

In 1949 the City of Chicago adopted aMunicipal Code which incorporated allthe major features necessary for lifesafety from fire in buildings, includingenclosure of stairways in schools. How- ever, important provisions of this codeincluding enclosure of exitS, did notapply to the north and south wings of Our Lady of the Angels School and toother schools in existence when thiscode was adopted. In other words thesubstandard exitS in all bur the annex(built in 1953) were of preordinancevintage , hence the non-retroactive lawdid not apply. Why the annex Stairswere not enclosed to comply with thelaw is not known. "

, .

Exit Enela...e

The Building Exits Code requires thataU stairways in school buildings be eu-closed so that in case of fire theoccu-pants can escape without danger fromfire , smoke , fumes and resulting panic.The Stairways in Our Lady of the AngelsSchool were open except the two in the

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL FIRE

coating contributed materially to the

spread of. fire.

. Fire ProtectionThere was neither autOmatic sprinkler

nor a'urol1latic fire detection eljuipmentin the building.

Private fire protection consisted of

soda-acid fire extinguishers, standpipeand hose sYStems and a manually oper

atedbuilding fire alarm signal system.The tops of the 2Y:,-gallon soda-acid ex,tinguishers were eight feet above thecorridor floor (maximum recommendedheight 5feet). Two standpipes in thenorth wing were one half inch less indiameter than the 2-inch minimum rec-ommendedfor buildings of this heightand access to valves and hose racks wasdifficult because they were six feetabove the floor.

The building was equipped with amanual1y operated fire alarm sYStem de-

169

signed to sound an alarm in all parts ofthe building. The sYStem was not con-

nected to the fire deparrment. Ordinaryelectric light switches ro operate thealarm sYStem were mounted six feetahove the floor. They were not markedin any way ro indicate they were firealarm controls.

The nearest public fire alarm box wasone block east and one block south fromthe school and was not visible from anypoint on or adjacent to the school prop-erty. Hydrants were well distributedand fed by large mains

Structurol DomogeAlthough the fire infliCted severe

damage throughout the second story ofthe. north wing and burned off aboutone-third of the roof, it did not breakour of the stairwell at the first stOry andbasement levels. It is thought that the

roof damage was the result of fire ini-tially entering the shal1ow roof space

C",."S.,-Tim"

A view of Roo.. 20B 'aken fro.. a wall opening ehopped by a rmue 'quad. The roalOVer 'he roo.. h~d eollap..d. Nole heavily bur~ed eemng me In 'he deb,I,.

.._

172 QUARTERLY OF THE NFPA - JANUARY 1959

through erection of stair towers , slideescapes or fire escape stairs accessible

from individual rooms the occupants

of the second stories of these two sectionscould have reached the ground withouthaving to pass through smoke-filledcorridors and stairways.

As demonstrated by the loss of life inthe north wing, however, adequa.teexit capacity is not the only considera-

tion , or even the most important con-sideration , when evaluating the ade-quacy of exits. Of primary importanceis the enclosure of exits to assure that

the ways out of the building will be freeof smoke and heat when needed.

Two Way, au!Since there is always a possibility

that fire or smoke may p,event the useof one exit , at leaSt one alternate exitmust be provided, remote from thefirst. Eecause of the faCt that the three

stairways from the second noor corri-dor of the north win" "fOur lady ofll,c Allgel, SchlIe! were all connectedthrough the common corridor, the pu-pils in the second story classrooms hadin reality no safe way out. The 'simpleexpediency of enclosing the three stair-wells at the second story landings wouldhave corrected this situation, The re-

quirement for two exits could also havelieen met by erecting stair towers , slideescapes or fire escape stairs accessible

from individual rooms.

Spdnkl... and Ex",There is no question that if a com-

plete , properly installed and adequatelymaintained automatic sprinkler systemhad been in Our lady of the AngelsSchool the fire at the base of the stair-well would have been 'luickly extin-guisbed before smoke of any conse-quence had penetrated the upper stOry.It is , however, queStionable practice-tOrely on fire extinguishmentro the neg-lect of exits because of the possibility ofboth human and mechanical failure.Automatic sprinklers and stairway en-closures complement each other andboth should have been installed in thisschool.

In existing buildings that lack en-

closed exits and where it may be im-practical or too expensive to enclosethem , the Building Exits Code suggeststhe following substitute. The schoolbuilding can be occupied safely if bothI) it is equipped with a standard auto-matic sprinkler sYStem, and 2) if thereis a standard exit ,of sufficient capacityfrom each room so that the occupants

can escape without passing through anyCotridor which could be blocked bysmoke, heat or fire. This condition maybe met in various ways , such as provid-ing doors leading directly outside fromfirst floor rooms and by direct access tofire escape balconies "from every room onupper floors.

S..oke Venl, In "airway,In the absence of an automatic smoke

vent at the top of the stairwell wherethe fire started , all products of combus-tion from the fire in the Stairwell wereforced intO the second story corridor.The presence of a venr would have re-duced considerably the amount of smokeand hot fire gases that entered the cor-ridor. A smoke vent , however , is not asubstitute for proper stairway enclos-

ures. It should be used in conjunction

with such enclosures.

Interior Finish

It is generally recognized that ' in the jinterest of life safety in schools interiorfinish should be ' noncombusrible(c;Iass

, flame spread 0-20)* or at leaSt slowburning (Class B , name spread 20-75).The Building Exits Code, however.allows up to 10 per cent of the aggre-gate area of walls and ceilings of corri-dors and exitways to have a combustible

' '!

Class C rating (name spread 75-200).No interior finish with a higher flamespread rating is permitted. The woodtrim in the second story corridor of the

north wing ",ith a Class C flame spreadrating, represented aboufl7.5 per centof the aggregate corridor area.

'Interio, Oni,h maceriai, ace elmioed by thetunnel em method (NFPA No, 255) in whicb"bwoHenlene boned h"a eating ofOon the flame'pread ,calO and red oak lumbet a raring of loa.

~----_._------------

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL FIRE 173

As previously indicated , there is dif-ference of opinion as to whether or notthe ceiling of the second stOry corridorwas finished with combustible cellulosefiber ;lcoustical tile. A linish of thismaterial would increase by 23 pcr centthe a~gre~arc corridor area with Cl;lSSC (tile with flame retardant co;ltin~ on

exposed surface) or Class D (untrC;lteJtile). Because of ,he open stairways

and the large amount of other com-bustible material present , the results ofthis fire can be satisfactOrily explainedwithout the presence of a combustibleceiling finish.

The ceilings of a1l classrooms in thesecond story of the north wing werefinished with combustible ce1lulose fiber;lcoustical tile.

It is important ro recognize .the factthat even if this building had been offire-resistive construction the results of

Comhu,/i/)/e Cellulose Fibnt'lcousfiCar T,Ye

!'Ifl

I"I~I

I/aDr

Sea/.I.reef

TYPICAL UCOND FLOORClI/SSR4.", WINDOW

Chi""T,"."Seean d "a", landIng 01 ',ont 01 norlh w;ng. Open door 01 left wa, one 01 Iwo 01 openIng

to eo"ldo,. The'e we,e no doo" at othe, end 01 eo"idar.

---

THe CHICAGO SCHOOL FIRE 171

Chi"" T,""",looking down one 0' the Iwo f,ont "a;,way, fra..lhe ,eeond "a,y landing ollhe norlh

w;ng. Rear "airway whe,e Ii,e "arled wa, ,I..ila, In ean"rueUan.

front of the north wing. These stairswere enclosed at the second StOry level

by substandard doors which wereblocked open at the time of the fire.(See photo on Page 173.) It would havebeen fairly simple and inexpensive roenclose aU stairways properly. If thishad been done the 93 lives lost in thisfire would have been spared.

ExU eapaelly

The 9% units of exit width from thesecond stOry of this building Were suffi-cient ro permit 570 people ro reach theground in 1 mioute and 20 seconds, ac-cording ro exit capacity requirements

set forth in the Building Exits Code andelsewhere. It is conservatively esti-mated lhat there were 610 people on thesecond floor of the building when thefire occurred. A closer examination ofthe disrribution of exit capacity shows" striking contrast between the exit

provisions for the north wing as opposedro those for the rest of the building.

In the north wing, the seven exit unitswere more than adequate i11 cap~city

handle the 329 people on the secondfloor. In the annex and south wing,however , there were only 2% exit unitsavailable to accommodate the 281 peoplebelieved to be on the second floors ofthese two sections. Two-and-one-halfunits of exit width are adequate roevacuate only 150 people in I minute and20 seconds. The inability of the 2%exit units ro handle the 281 people in

the prescribed time was demonstrated

by the fact that the average time forthe evacuation of the second floor ineight exit driUs in 1958 was slightly

more than three minutes. Had addition-al exit capacity been provided to accom-modate the excessively high populationdensity in the annex and south wing

--- --,

QUARTORLY or THE NFPA - JANUARY 1959

Fire Alarms

174

this fire would have been similar becauseof the combustible materi.l,available atthe bottom of the stairway, the absence

of doors at the top of the stairway, andthe combuStible interior finish.

Detection

As again clearly demonstrared by thisfire , the fact that a building is populatedis no guarantee that a fire will be dis-covered promptly,

A complete automatic sprinkler sys-tem would have detected and, extin-guished the fire in itS incipiency, Anautomatic fire detection system installedthroughout the school would probablyhave discovered the fire before the

second story corridor became impassable.Automatic protection in itself, how-ever, is not a subStitute for properlyenclosed stairways, It is desirable sup-plementary protection.

In Case of Fire

it is a cardinal rule of life safety thatat the first indication of fire (which isusually smoke) all occupants of thebuilding and the fire department shouldbe alerted simultaneously. From thetime the teacher of Room 206 was firsttold that there was smoke in the build..'

, ing until she operated the building firealarm , it is estimated that 13mlOuteselaJ?Sed. Her actions during this vitalperiod have already been described u

nderDiscovery." They clearly, indIcate

that adequate steps had not been takenat this school to assure proper emergencyaction by the teachers In case of fire , norhad a sufficient number of building firealarm controls been ' provided.

Had the building fire alarm been rungwhen the fire was first discovered it isprobable that the second stOry corridor

of the norrhwing would still have-oeenpassable.

The alarm sYStem at this school wasnot connected to the fIre departmentalarm headquarters , and no one in theschool telephoned the fire department.

Inteda, Ala,..'

The substandard condition of themanual fire alarm sYStem in the schoolshould be nored. The alarm sendingswitches were not readily accessible tomost of the occupants of the building,they were only tWO in number and werenot distinguishable from ordinary elec-tric light switches. Had readily identi-fiable fire alarm stations been distributedthroughout the building it is likely thatat least one of the people who firstnoticed smoke would have operatedthe building alarm sYStem many minutessooner.

Exleriar Ala,..,

According to the present MunicipalCode of Chicago and the recognizedstandard for the installation of publicfire alarm boxes , all schools should

have a fire alarm box at or near the en-trance. Had a box been so located atOur Lady of the Angels School it isprobable that the first alarm would havebeen transmitted to the fire departmentby 'the passerby ' at least one or tWOminutes earlier. Furthermore , the boxalarm would have resulted in responseof a box alarm assignment on the firstnotification of the fire. This wouldhave brought three additional enginecompanies and one additional laddercompany to the scene three or fourcritical minutes earlier. '

The NFPA Building hits Code rec-ommends that any building fire alarmsystem be arranged so that when oper-ated to alert occupants of the building itwill simultaneously transmit an alarmto the fire department. Automaticsprinkler systems and automatic detec-tion systems should be arranged tooperate building and fire department'alarm systems simultaneously.

Housekeeping Following -the fire the remains of a

large amount of combuStible material

NFPA 1010,73, Standard for In'tallacion , M,inte-nan" and U" of Municipal Fire Alarm Sy"e..,.

" -+~ -" -

~~rn_'='~"(bundled newspapers , exam papers , etc.

was found among the debris at the baseof the stairwell where the fire started,The school authorities Stated that com-bustible material was not supposed to beaccumulated in this area. At the base ofand under each of the tWO front stair-wells, however , there was a woodenstOrage closet in which wooden chairsscreen panels and other combustiblematerials were srored; and a formerpupil of the school Stated that in 1957

newspapers from a paper drive werestored at the foot of the rear stairway.

Good housekeeping is thus again empha-sized as a cardinal fire safety principle.

8yContrast -

l~_Summary

The ninety-three deaths In this fire areao indictment of those in authority whohave failed to recognize their life safetyobligations in housiog children in struC-tUres which are " fire traps. Schoolsthat lack adequate . exit facilities andapproved types of autOmatic sprinkleror detection equipment, and which

possess excessive amounts of highlycombustible interior finish , subStandardfire alerting means and poor housekeep-ing conditions must be rated as " fire

traps. " School and fire authorities muSttake affirmative actions to rid their

communities nf such blights.

The Kenilworth School Fire

At 1:10 P. , December 16 , 1958 fire

broke out in the 46-year-old brickwood-joisted section of the 2-srory ele-mentary school at Kenilworth , Illinois.It originated in combustible material

stOred in a wooden closet at the base-ment level of a Stairway. Here thesimilarity between this fire and that atthe Our Lady of the Angels School ends.

On discovering the fire a school cus-todian s first inclination was to fightit but he immediately remembered theimporrance of giving the alarm. Run-ning up the Stairs he yelled ro a teacherto call the fire department while he him-self tripped the building fire alarm

system.As the 650 children marched out of

the building, the janitor retUrned to the

basement to find that the fire was beingextinguished by the two sprinklers inthe closet. None dead; none injured.

An interesting sidelight of the fire isthe fact that asa result of the ChicagodisaSter the Kenilworth School Boardhad asked the Winnetka Fire Marshalro review again the school's fire pro-tection. Kenilworrh relies on Winnetka .for irs public fire protection. Actingon one of the fire marshal's recommen-dations the school superintendent re-

vised his exit drill procedure to includedrills with one exit blocked. By coin-cidence the exit chosen to be blocked inthe latest of these exit drills was thestairway in which the fire occurred.

Although smoke made this stairwayimpassable , closed stairway doors pre-vented smoke from entering cotridors.Finding this stairway impassable , the

children reversed their exit travel and

walked through smoke-free corridors

to smoke-free stairways while the sprin-klers completed their extinguishment.

~--