Ostpolitik n the East

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Canadian International Council

Towards a new political order: German "Ostpolitik" and the East-West realignmentAuthor(s): WOLFGANG WAGNERSource: International Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, THE NEW EUROPE (WINTER 1971/1972), pp. 18-31Published by: Canadian International CouncilStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25733892.

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OSTPOLITIK AND EAST-WEST REALIGNMENT 1Q

German states could not be tolerated indefinitely. It is thus hardlysurprising that the realignment of Europe should in the first instance be a matter between Moscow and Bonn. Earlier Soviet attempts to win recognition of the existing situation by workingthrough other European states ? first Great Britain, then France ?were doomed to failure; the major bargain could only be concluded with Bonn. This situation gave the government of theFederal Republic the opportunity, through its new Ostpolitikto make the decisive contribution to fixing the new order inEurope. But just as policy shifts in Bonn were an essential precondition of agreement, so too was a considerable change in theattitude of Moscow towards western Europe. The miracle of theGerman Ostpolitik ? if there is indeed one ? is that it coincidedin timewith a new Soviet Westpolitik.

GERMAN MOTIVATIONThis coincidence is themore startling because the new Ostpolitikof the Brandt government was motivated primarily by domesticpolitical considerations. When Chancellor Willy Brandt and hisForeign Minister, Walter Scheel, inaugurated a new policy vis-avis the East immediately after the formation of their governmentlate in 1969, an evaluation of Soviet policy and of the easternEuropean situation did not play a significant role in the decision.Only an acute international crisis at this time could have preventedan initiative towards the Soviet Union and other eastern states.In power in Bonn for the first time, both parties in the coalition? the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats ? expected immediate action from their respective leaders, Brandt and Scheel,and from the new government. Accordingly, they did not ask whether the international climate was propitious or unpropitious fora settlement with the East. The feeling, which had grown up during two decades of Christian Democratic rule, that the previousrelations of the Federal Republic with its eastern neighbours constituted a chain of neglected opportunities required a change ofcourse without delay. The force of this sentiment was sufficientto thrust aside the hitherto accepted axiom that agreement with

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the East could only be sought by a government with a very broadparliamentary base. Brandt had to set course for Moscow with amajority of twelve (later of only six) seats.He undertook the task deliberately, although he realized fromthe start that success was far from certain. Politicians, like othermortals, usually have many motives for their actions. This doesnot prevent the imputation to them of even more motives thanthey actually have. In Brandt's eyes the Ostpolitik is not a meansto achieve a dominant position for the Federal Republic in Europe.It is also not to be envisaged as an instrument designed to secureWest Germany's place in the contest for the lion's share of theeastern market. It is by no means the first step on a long road thatwould lead the Federal Republic out of the western camp intoneutrality, or even into the eastern camp. Of all European socialdemocrats, it is those ofWest Germany, who, with few exceptions,have to the greatest extent made their peace with capitalism; therecan be no doubt of their democratic and western convictions. Thesame goes for the Free Democrats.Brandt's real motives cannot be explained without a glimpseat the past. In the early years of the Federal Republic all democratic politicians were agreed that itwas impossible to accept foran indefinite time the division of Germany and the separation ofthe territory east of the Oder and Neisse from which ten millionGermans had either been expelled or moved out. Every politicianwho at that time declared that the Germans must come to terms

with reality was swept away; in the elections of 1953 the Communists were eliminated and have never since returned to theBundestag. The non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic (gdr) and of the Oder-Neisse line became an unshakeablebasis ofWest German foreign policy, and remained so into the1960s. (So long as the Social Democrats battled with all theirstrength against the foreign policy of Konrad Adenauer, their chiefargument was that Adenauer did not do enough for the reunification of Germany, and that this goal was endangered by the entryinta nato and the participation in themovement toward integration in western Europe.) An essential ground for this policy was



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the anxiety that one day democratic politicians would be the targetof the same reproaches by right-wing nationalists that themen whosigned the Treaty of Versailles had endured; democracy in Germany should not once again be endangered by the charge thatdemocratic politicians had failed in the end to defend the nationalinterest. Adenauer's successors, Ludwig Erhard and Kurt GeorgKiesinger, felt themselves on sure ground as they carried on apolicy which Adenauer, disinclined towards all political doctrines,had perhaps himself abandoned earlier.Thus successive Federal governments unwearyingly resistedthe recognition of existing facts. And itwas considered the greatestsuccess of German foreign policy that in the treaties of 1954-5,which were linked with the entry of the Federal Republic intonato, the three western powers accepted for themselves the goalof a reunified Germany and supported the view that the GermanPolish border question could only be settled finally in a peacetreaty with a reunited Germany. Each divergence from this line,such as de Gaulle's support for the Oder-Neisse border, was indignantly rejected.Even thefirststepsof the Federal Republic inthe East, such as the opening of diplomatic relations with the SovietUnion in 1955 and the setting up ofWest German trade missionsin several eastern European countries (from 1963), could only betaken after quelling strong internal opposition. Increasingly inthe 1960s, however, there developed in German public opinion ?as in the public opinion of countries friendly to the Federal Republic ? the feeling that the policy of non-recognition was sterileand burdensome. A major part of the Federal Republic's development aid was used to deter African and Asian states from recognizing the gdr; West German diplomats were incessantly preoccupied

with preventing the gdr from making inroads into developingcountries and participating in international organizations. TheFederal Republic saw itself constantly reproached by the East forfollowing a revanchist and revisionist policy and thus preventingthe peaceful development of Europe. Meanwhile the construction of theWall in Berlin in 1961 had stemmed the hitherto almostunbroken mass flight to theWest; the gdr could consolidate itself



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and, with an astonishing economic advance, demonstrate a viableand powerful state structure.Willy Brandt and his friends drew from all this the conclusionthat time was working against the Federal Republic if the prevailing policy were continued. Impressed by the reports of a growingalienation of the East German population, concerned at the chicaneries of the gdr against West Berlin which threatened graduallyto undermine the confidence of Berliners in the future of their city,and encouraged by the universal Social Democratic faith that withgoodwill and reason the most difficult problems can be resolved,they moved away from this policy and charted a new course.

Through its new Ostpolitik the Federal Republic would becomea normal state, free from the burden which territorial claimsplaced on the conduct of domestic and external policies and withgood or at least ordered relations not only with its western butalso with its eastern neighbours. At the same time, through animprovement in relations with the Soviet Union and the othereastern European states, the gdr would be outflanked: if the borderbetween the two states could not be overcome in the foreseeablefuture, the gdr could at least be induced to abandon its absolutedetachment from the West (of which trade represents an exception), so that not all the links between the peoples of the two partsofGermany would be broken.soviet interestsDespite all the goodwill on the German side, the Ostpolitik wasdoomed to failure if the Soviet leadership had not resolved atpractically the same time on a new Westpolitik, a new attitudetowards western Europe. In the light of the disappointment whichhad so often followed lofty hopes for an alteration in Soviet policyduring the previous twenty-five years, the doubts among scepticsthatMoscow has really altered its course are understandable. Butin the interval several facts have signalled at least a certain changein Soviet views, above all the Soviet abstention both from defaming the Federal Republic in the interests of maintaining Soviet



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Europe while maintaining strong military forces in Europe; anditmust also seek to raise the living standard in the communistworld. It must therefore limit its objectives somewhere, and thiscould best be done in western Europe, because here it had beenproved that the use of pressure was ineffectual. Were the SovietUnion to alter its stance vis-a-vis the western European states, itwould at the same time have the opportunity of enhancing its owneconomic development through co-operation with these states (agoal pursued by the other eastern European states anyhow) andof gaining access to the most recent technology of theWest.

As, however, communist states must plan well in advance because of their clumsy planning apparatus, such a policy requiredthe elimination of the danger that co-operation with westernEurope could suddenly be disturbed again. Tensions which undercertain circumstances could be the cause of disturbances had therefore to be removed beforehand. This meant that the Soviet Unionhad to come to an agreement with the Federal Republic, and hadalso to agree to a modus vivendi for Berlin, even at the expense ofthe gdr which would have preferred, today as in the past, to cutthe lifelines ofWest Berlin.two treaties and a berlin agreement

In thisway (thoughfromdifferingmotives) theSovietUnion andthe Federal Republic moved towards a modus vivendi, but for atime it seemed doubtful that agreement on the concrete detailswas possible. The old clashes of interests continued. The SovietUnion wanted to secure from Bonn (and from western Europe)a recognition of its area of domination; this would have requiredthe Federal Republic to abandon every thought of bringing together the divided parts of Germany, and to acknowledge thisthrough a formal recognition of the gdr. But the Federal government was not able (with its slim parliamentary base) to take thisstep; nor was it prepared to do so. The German Social Democratsare no less patriots than other Germans, and they know the dangersof nationalism too well to lay themselves open to attack in such amanner. In addition the Soviet leadership, like the Federal govern



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ment, had difficulties with their allies. Moscow wanted for its partto hold the process of detente firmly in its own hands (and thuscould not allow the Federal Republic to open negotiations withPoland or the gdr, so long as Bonn was not simultaneously negotiating with Moscow), but had also to consider the leadership of thegdr, whose loyalty is, for the Soviet Union, more important thanthat of any other member of the communist camp. The FederalRepublic, for its part, had to reckon that every attempt to reachagreement with Moscow would reawaken the extremely pale butastonishingly ively hostofRapallo.To date the concrete achievements of the negotiations, whichwere opened at the beginning of 1970, consist of two treaties (thatbetween the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of 12August1970; and that between Poland and the Federal Republic of 7December 1970) and the four-power agreement over Berlin (3

September 1971). The details of these agreements are of secondaryinterest. The key element in them is the recognition of the statusquo by all the partners: the Federal Republic and the three westernpowers no longer deny the existence of the gdr, and Bonn evengoes as far as to envisage the entry of the two German states intothe United Nations. Similarly the Federal Republic has reconcileditself to the Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish frontier. Onthe other side, the Soviet Union recognizes that destruction of thespecial ties which have developed between the Federal Republicand West Berlin would end the city's chances for survival andtogether with the western powers has assumed responsibility forthe maintenance of free access from West Germany to Berlin.Neither side has abandoned anything which had not already beengiven up. It is only that the realities have received the halo oflegitimacy.All the rest is ornamental or semantic. Thus on the occasion ofthe signing of theMoscow treaty the Federal Republic addresseda letter to the Soviet government which stated that the treaty didnot conflictwith the political aim of the Federal Republic towork for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nationwill recover its unity through self-determination in freedom. The



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letter is intended to keep open the possibility of a later reunification of Germany; the Soviet Union could accept it because eversince Lenin they have developed their own concept of self-determination in freedom. On the occasion of the signing of the Polishtreaty the Federal government informed the three western powersthat the treaty did not affect the rights and responsibilities of thefour victor powers inGermany, and that itwas acting only for theFederal Republic of Germany. In other words, the provision inthe Potsdam agreement that the eventual resolution of the GermanPolish border could only follow from a peace treaty with an allGerman government was formally re-stated; Poland is? and forgood reason ? not disturbed by this.The finest flowers of the diplomatic art bedecked the Berlinagreement. As there was no agreement as to whether the instrument was to deal with all Berlin or only West Berlin, it speaksonly of the relevant area ; under this formula each side can understand what itwishes. Itwas used by the gdr toproclaim triumphantly that thewestern powers had also now recognized that East Berlinwas a part of the gdr ? something that the wording of the agreement does not say but yet which contains a substantial kernel oftruth. The Soviet Union, which as early as 1955 had assigned tothe gdr responsibility for the access routes toWest Berlin, hadin this connection to remove from that state a few aspects of itssovereignty, but itwas very inventive in puzzling out formulae toconceal this fact.the way ahead

With the two treaties and the Berlin accord barriers have beenovercome that only a short time before had been deemed insurmountable. But much remains to be done to complete the newpolitical order in Europe. First of all the Federal Republic and thegdr on the one hand, and the gdr and the Senate ofWest Berlinon the other, must agree on the concrete details of the Berlin arrangement envisaged in the four-power agreement before it canbecome effective. In the first round of negotiations the gdr hasalready sought to eliminate some of the forward steps which the



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four powers had recorded. For example, it wanted to negotiatewith the Federal government only over the access ofWest GermanstoWest Berlin, while negotiating with theWest Berlin Senate overaccess of Berliners toWest Germany ? in direct opposition to theright, clearly recognized in the four-power agreement, of theFederal Republic to represent West Berlin in its external relations.In view of the apparent Soviet interest in the achievement of aBerlin arrangement, it can be assumed that eventually East Ger

many will yield sufficiently tomake an agreement possible.Thereafter the Federal government will bring both theMoscowand the Warsaw treaties to the Bundestag for ratification. TheChristian Democratic opposition will presumably oppose thetreaties, theMoscow one with all itspower, theWarsaw one perhapsless resolutely. The government's parliamentary majority is adequate to secure ratification; but it is so narrow that the government's success cannot be beyond doubt. The Bundestag could provide an unpleasant surprise for Brandt and Brezhnev, one whoseconsequences no one seems to have contemplated, lest to contemplate might be to invoke.With the coming into force of the Berlin agreement and theratification of the two treaties theway would probably be clear forthe European security conference sought by Moscow and theeastern states for several years. In the Soviet view such a conferenceshould serve to advance further the realignment of Europe, andagreement on this goal seems to prevail between Moscow, Paris,and Bonn. The only question is whether the conceptions of bothsides are identical or merely similar. In the last few years theWarsaw Pact states have delivered to the western and neutralstates several papers in preparation for a conference. At first glancethey contain nothing other than a repetition of the worthy principles of the United Nations Charter and other international documents. But closer examination reveals several passages which aimat a recognition of the Brezhnev doctrine by all the conferenceparticipants and the destruction of the European Economic Community. It is hardly conceivable that the conference would adopteither of the eastern proposals; it is almost impossible to envisage



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that a conference with some thirty-five participants with diverseinterests would agree on resolutions which went beyond merebanalities. The single important decision that such a conferencecould make would be to create a permanent commission to worktowards concrete agreements. The predominantly bilateral cooperation between West and East could perhaps in the long runbe expanded through multilateral agreements, though it remainsan open question how far the diverse areas of conceivable co-operation are better suited tomultilateral than to bilateral co-operation.Only in one specialized but important field is the multilateralmethod preferable: in the negotiations of mutual and balancedforce reduction (mbfr) inwhich to be sure the European neutralswould again play the role of onlookers.So far as concrete treaty arrangements, rather than a generalimprovement of the political climate, are concerned the bilateralroad remains themore promising. Still to come is a treaty betweenthe Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia to annul the Munichagreement of 1938. In principle the two states have been agreedon this point ever since Chancellor Ludwig Erhard explained thatthe Federal government did not derive any territorial claims onCzechoslovakia from this agreement because it had been concludedunder pressure. But the attempts to reach a treaty have so far failed,as the Czech government requires that the agreement be declarednull and void from the beginning (ex tune). This demand seemsto accord with the historical facts that theMunich treaty led notonly to the loss of the Sudetenland but also to the destruction ofCzechoslovakia; to today's Czech leaders it therefore appears essential to erase the treaty from the pages of history so far as possible.In the view of the Federal government this demand is neverthelessunrealizable, because to accede to itwould thereby do violence tofundamental legal principles; ifone treaty can be declared null andvoid ex tune, so can others ? the conclusion of international treatiesunder pressure of greater or lesser degree is hardly an historicalrarity.The keystone of a rapprochement between West and East wouldbe a treaty between the two German states. Since Chancellor



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ostpolitik and east-west realignment 29

Brandt's twomeetings with the chairman of the Council ofMinisters of the gdr, Willi Stoph, one important obstacle to such anagreement ? Bonn's refusal to negotiate on a government level ?has been removed. But it has subsequently been shown that thereare other no less effective obstacles in the way. Since the FederalRepublic inaugurated its new Ostpolitik, the gdr has respondedwith a new policy vis-a-vis West Germany which is officially described as the policy of A bgrenzung [aword perhaps best renderedinto English by walling off,,, insulating from,,, or keeping apart? trans.]. Instead of emphasizing the common elements which stilllink the two states, the gdr places the greatest emphasis on whateveraccentuates their differences. Apparently, it is now as ever besetby the anxiety that the population of the gdr can be infected bywestern ideas. The attempts by the Federal government not onlytomaintain but also to strengthen links between the inhabitantsof the two parts of Germany come up against the resolute opposition of the communist regime. Apart from the hope that Moscowwill intervene to some extent in the interest of its relationshipwith Bonn, and that the gdr might consider that the abandonmentof the opposition to the entry of both German states into the UnitedNations was worth the price, Bonn can only resign itself to thissituation. But the Federal government expects that the East Berlinleadership cannot indefinitely remain aloof from the general trendtowards detente.risks for both sidesFor many years the situation in Europe resembled the trench warfare of the firstworld war. Both sides had dug in, neither attemptedamajor offensive, and so long as one stayed in the dug-out, and noone stuck his head out over the parapet, all were to some extentsafe. The reverse of the new, essentially friendly, developmentsin European politics is the acceptance of risks by both sides.For theWest therisk lies above all in thepossibility that thegrowing euphoria of detente may lead to a neglect of militarysecurity. The less acute the danger appears, the less politicians arcready to demand from their electorates high expenditures for arms



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and armies, especially when other costs (social security, environmental control) make pressing and ever heavier claims on budgets.For a number of years nato has had to limit the demands on itsmember-states, and an end to this process is not yet in sight. Themost consequential weakening in western defences would, however, follow from a massive withdrawal of American troops, especially if it were not balanced by a similar Soviet withdrawal.One can of course argue that the maintenance of the existing trooplevels in a period of general detente isno longer necessary. But thisassumes that the Soviet Union not only seeks temporary detente,but is resolved to pursue detente over the long run and even toabstain frommaking use of any weakness of theWest which mightresult from a reduction in the western defence effort.

Much is said about the risks to theWest involved in the newOstpolitik, less about the risks for the Soviet Union. Yet themoreitopens thedoor to co-operation between itself and western Europe,themore itmust allow other communist states to do the same. Ithas already had to renounce the bogeyman image of a revanchistGermany with which the Poles and Czechs have been intimidated.When commercial, scientific, and cultural contacts are intensified,ideas can no longer be halted at the border. The more contact, themore contagion. With its new Westpolitik, the Soviet Unionconsciously accepted the risk of increased unrest in its area ofdominance. Here lies an enigma in Soviet policy, for which thereis as yet no satisfactory explanation. By and large the risk for theSoviet Union appears greater than for theWest, even though itpossesses themeans swiftly to quell any challenge to its authority.continuing struggleThe risks on both sides indicate that the new political order inEurope will not rest on the rules of the Salvation Army but ratherwill involve a continuation of the previous struggle between Eastand West on another level. Even if there were no other cause, thecontinuing differences between the two German states, which notreaty can eliminate, would suffice tomaintain a certain degree oftension. This tension will involve less danger ofmilitary entangle



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ment than in the past, but the confrontation between a democraticand a communist Germany will increase in bitterness, now thatboth have left the trenches and are face to face in the open field.The world will experience thiswhen both sides come to enter theforum of the United Nations.

In the longer view the degree towhich both West and East succeed inorganizing theirrespectiveparts ofEurope will be of thegreatest significance for the course of this struggle. Here, throughthe development of the European Communities, theWest has, inthe economic sphere, a lead over the East, where today's comeconappears as only a pale imitation of the eec. As for political organization, western Europe has as yet accomplished little, but in theEast, behind the screen of numerous common resolutions, therealso is much disagreement. Only in the military sphere has theeastern side an advantage vis-a-vis western Europe, which has madeonly a weak start at European military co-operation, and that onlywithin nato (Eurogroup). Hence it is of the greatest importancethat in the face of the new Ostpolitik, Westpolitik, particularlythewestern policy of the Federal Republic, should not be neglected.Only when western Europe becomes amodel of peace and harmony,with all its peoples living together in prosperity and unity, canEurope face the future with confidence.

Translation done in Journal offices.

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