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Renewed Violence in Northern Nigeria

Bombings in Jos On December 24th several bombs were detonated in the city of Jos, Plateau State, in northern Nigeria (roughly 110 miles northeast of Abuja). The bombs targeted predominantly Christian com-munities within the city. Officials from the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) of Nigeria stated that at least 80 citizens were killed, and more than 190 were injured as a result of the blasts and subsequent violence (including reprisal attacks against Muslim communities). The Islamist sect known as Boko Haram is believed to have per-petrated the attacks. In recent months, the group has resurfaced, conducting attacks against police and political offi-cials across northern Nigeria. A website ostensibly attributed to the group issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attacks, which were carried out to “start avenging the atrocities committed against Muslims.” If this claim is true, then it indicates a significant shift in tac-tics. First, the perpetrators indiscrimi-nately attacked civilians as opposed to seeking out police officials or politicians. The group has typically carried out tar-geted attacks and kidnappings. Second, the perpetrators utilized bombs instead of small-arms fire. If Boko Haram is in-deed responsible, this represents an in-creased level of sophistication in their attack methods and could indicate a marked increase in the intensity of future attacks, particularly as the upcoming April federal elections approach. Although Boko Haram is regarded as an overtly religious group, its actions have focused on undermining state politicians‟ authority by launching attacks and mobi-lizing supporters to antagonize the state government (and ultimately the federal government). Prominent religious leaders from both the Muslim and Christian com-munities have accused political leaders of exploiting religious divisions in the face of the conflict for political purposes.

Some Nigerians have expressed con-cerns that politicians in Plateau State may exploit the region‟s vulnerability by fomenting further crisis in the run-up to 2011 elections. Observers believe that the main causes of instability in the re-gion are political and economic, rather than religious. The longstanding divisions between ethnic groups in the region fa-cilitate a hasty response to such machi-nations. According to the Plateau State Police Commissioner, security forces are pre-sent at churches and mosques in order to mitigate the threat of further religious violence. The federal government has also mobilized troops to the region as added protection to combat local ethnic militias. Small-Arms Fire in Maiduguri In anticipation of religious attacks during Christmas services, police placed extra security at churches in Maiduguri, Borno State, northeast Nigeria. However, the increased police presence was unsuc-cessful in deterring the attacks. On De-cember 25, several churches throughout the city were reportedly fired upon as Christians held Christmas vigil ser-vices. The culprits purportedly fired ran-dom shots in the direction of the churches while riding in small vehicles. According to Nigerian police sources, four arrests have been made in connec-tion with the attacks. The detained indi-viduals are allegedly Boko Haram mem-bers. In the wake of increased violence in the city, the military and police have instituted joint security patrols in strategic areas. Boko Haram maintains an anti-Western stance. In fact, the literal meaning of the group‟s name in the Hausa language is “Western education is sacrilege.” Boko Haram‟s most prominent attack occurred in July 2009 when members assaulted police stations across several northern

January, 2011

OSAC Global Events

Johannesburg Count ry

Counc i l Meet ing , Feb-

ruary 8 , 2011

Maputo Count ry Coun-

c i l Meet ing , Feb ruary

8 , 2011

Qu i to Count ry Counc i l

Meet ing , Feb ruary 10 ,

2011

OSAC Round tab le D i s-

cuss ion: Egyp t , Feb-

ruary 10 , 2011

Per th Count ry Counc i l

Meet ing , Feb ruary 16 ,

2011

ISMA/OSAC Reg iona l

Secur i ty Confe rence ,

March 20 , 2011

OSAC Monthly Regional News & Security Reports:

Africa

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Nigerian cities. As a result, the federal government launched a massive offensive to suppress the group. Approximately 700 people, including civilians, died during clashes between sect members and govern-ment security forces. The Nigerian Army demolished Boko Haram‟s Maiduguri headquarters, killing its leader Mohammed Yusuf. The group has slowly re-emerged since its suppression, conducting sporadic targeted attacks against policemen and political figures from motorcycles. In September, alleged Boko Haram members attacked a prison in the northern Nigerian city of Bauchi releasing over 700 prisoners, many of whom were being held for their role in the 2009 violence. Information for OSAC Constituents The apparent escalation of tactics by Boko Haram may result in a more deadly 2011 for northern Nige-ria. The present conflict is likely to be different from previous iterations because of the advanced weap-onry used. The bombings in Jos produced the largest number of casualties resulting from a single attack in the region. If Boko Haram conducted the attacks, this shift in tactics indicates a desire and capability on the group‟s part to inflict mass casualties as well as a transition from only attacking authority figures to launching attacks on civilians. While this shift is alarming, attacks will likely occur from time to time in the future. Frequent bombings of this nature are unlikely because of the sophisticated level of planning and execution required. Boko Haram has not previously had such a capability. Hundreds of Nigerians died from the country‟s persistent ethno-religious violence in 2010. The propensity for clashes between rival ethnic and religious groups will only continue to increase as Nigeria prepares for federal elec-tions slated for April 2011. OSAC constituents are reminded that Nigeria faces a plethora of chal-lenging security risks. Aside from the threat posed by Islamist groups in the northern region, Nigeria at large faces the contin-ued threat of critical crime includ-ing instances of kidnapping, armed robbery, and militant ac-tivity in the Niger Delta. OSAC constituents are advised to review all personal security plans, remain aware of surround-ings, monitor local news stations for updates, and report specific incidences of targeted violence to U.S. Embassy Abuja or U.S. Consulate General Lagos. OSAC constituents may receive updates by checking U.S. Embassy Abuja‟s website. You can also get global updates at the U.S. Department of State's, Bureau of Consular Affairs website where you can find the current Worldwide Caution, Travel Warnings, Travel Alerts, and Country Specific Information. For Further Information For additional information on the security environment in Cote d‟Ivoire or other regional security issues, contact the OSAC Coordinator for Sub-Saharan Africa.

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New Year’s Eve Bombs in Abuja Popular Shopping Area Bombed On December 31, 2010, at approximately 7:30 pm, an IED exploded at the Mammy Market within the Mogadishu Cantonment (also known as Mogadishu Barracks). The market, a popular entertainment complex in Abuja, Nigeria‟s capital city, is adjacent to a Nigerian Army installation on the outer edge of the city. At the time of the explosion, Mammy Market was reportedly very crowded with individuals engaged in New Year‟s celebrations. At least 21 people were reportedly killed and an addi-tional 30 injured in the attack. At 11:00 pm, a second explosion occurred approximately 60 meters east of the site of the initial blast. The second explosion caused no casualties, as Mammy Market had been thoroughly evacu-ated after the initial blast. Rumors of a third explosion at an Abuja church were disproven. The Mammy Market consists of many shops, storefronts, and drinking establishments fash-ioned along a cul-de-sac. The market covers two acres on the outskirts of Abuja. It serves as both a popular shopping locale and sociali-zation hub (the latter particularly at night). Mammy Market is frequented by Nigerian mili-tary personnel, local civilians, Nigerian gov-ernment personnel, and members of the diplo-matic community. Responsibility Uncertain This latest attack is the most recent in a string of bombings and targeted killings that have gripped Nigeria in recent weeks. Scores were killed in religious violence in the frequently troubled city of Jos in central Nigeria, as well as the Islamist stronghold Maiduguri in the northeast of the country. “Jomo Gbomo,” an alleged spokesperson for the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Nigeria's most prominent militant group, released a message before this New Year's Eve attack, warning of future at-tacks. However, the statement did not mention the Mogadishu Barracks or Mammy Market. The group denied any involvement in this spe-cific incident. An additional statement, re-leased amid accusations of MEND culpability, reads, “Bombings and attacks carried out by MEND are always preceded by a warning in order to prevent casualties and followed by a statement of claim.” Generally, this is true. For instance, MEND claimed responsibility for the October 1 car bombs detonated during

Independence Day celebrations in Abuja. Twelve people were killed in that attack, which was the most recent high profile attack in the capital. In that attack, MEND indeed released a warning statement addressing the location of the attack and a claim of responsibility after the attack was executed.

MEND claims to be fighting for a greater share of oil revenue for Niger Delta communities. However, MEND is a highly fragmented organi-zation with decentralized leadership. State-ments released by MEND attributed to the pseudonym “Jomo Gbomo” are often of ques-tionable veracity. These statements should be met with a measure of skepticism. The group has sought to embarrass the Nigerian govern-ment in its attacks and not necessarily cause mass casualties. In contrast, the New Year‟s Eve attack appears to have been designed to inflict mass casualties because the bombing targeted a crowded shopping area frequented by civilians. There was no warning statement, and the site of the bomb did not have any os-tensible connection to the federal government of Nigeria. In a statement published on its alleged website last week, the Islamist group known as Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the earlier Christmas Eve bombings in Jos that left at least 80 people dead and sparked violent reprisals, as well as attacks on churches in Maiduguri. Boko Haram has sought to inflict mass casual-ties in the past. However, the group has not had the capability to conduct operations as far south as Abuja. If Boko Haram had anything to do with this attack, it would represent a marked increase in the sophistication of group‟s capa-bilities and reach. Boko Haram recently changed its name follow-ing its assault on a prison in Bauchi State in September, where more than 700 inmates, be-lieved to be members of the group, were re-leased by Boko Haram operatives. The new name, “Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad,” means "People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Ji-had." This name change may reflect the desire of the group to spread Islamic law to non-Muslim regions of the country. Further, it may indicate the group‟s aim of destabilizing the state and federal governments which it views as illegitimate and emulating Western coun-tries. Information for OSAC constituents This incident and the complex factors obscur-ing an identifiable culprit are an acute reminder that Nigeria faces myriad threats to security in

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various parts of the country, not simply Abuja. Incidents such as this bombing may be spawned by a number of issues including eth-nic disputes, religious tension, and political disaffection. Crime, including instances of kid-napping, armed robbery, and militant activity in the Niger Delta, remains at critical levels in all regions of Nigeria. OSAC constituents should ensure that they have adequate personal security plans in place, monitor local news stations for updates, and report specific incidences of targeted vio-lence to U.S. Embassy Abuja or U.S. Consu-late General Lagos. OSAC constituents may receive updates by checking U.S. Embassy Abuja‟s website. Global updates are also available at the U.S. Department of State's, Bureau of Consular Affairs website where the current Worldwide Caution, Travel Warnings, Travel Alerts, and Country Specific Informa-tion are available. For further information contact OSAC‟s Re-gional Coordinator for Sub-Saharan Africa.

French Citizens Killed in Niger

Two French Citizens Killed On Friday, January 7, two French citizens were kidnapped from a restaurant in Niger‟s capital, Niamey. They were subsequently killed the next day after a failed rescue attempt. The two men were dining at Le Toulousain, a popular expatriate establishment. Around 11:00 p.m., they were seized by four armed men wearing turbans. The culprits were believed to be asso-ciated with al-Qa‟ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). According to witnesses, the men were armed with machine guns and ap-peared to deliberately target the two French-men. They were forced into a 4X4 Toyota vehi-cle parked outside of the restaurant minutes after being approached by the kidnappers. Other patrons attempted to follow the kidnap-pers and later called the authorities. These pa-trons said that the kidnappers were headed in the direction of the western Niger/Mali border. French Defense Minister Alain Juppe issued a statement acknowledging that the Nigerien Na-tional Guard and French troops launched a res-cue operation in which “the terrorists were in-tercepted at the Mali border and several of them were neutralized.” The bodies of the two abducted French men were discovered after the fighting. The kidnappers, whose faces were obscured by what appeared to be Touareg turbans, alleg-edly spoke in Arabic, French, and Hausa, ac-cording to witnesses. AQIM claimed responsi-bility for the incident in a statement released to major news outlets on January 13. This inci-dent raises concern because this is the first time that such a kidnapping has taken place in the capital city, particularly in such a public venue in the presence of many witnesses. It indicates a notable increase in AQIM‟s opera-tional range and capabilities. Previous Incidents Unfortunately, AQIM has carried out many kid-nappings in the past, some ending with hos-tages being executed. In December of 2008, two United Nation Diplomats were kidnapped approximately 60km north of Niamey by AQIM elements. The two UN Officials were released at a later date. Edwin Dyer, a British citizen, was kidnapped in January 2009 while traveling to Niger from a cultural festival in Anderambou-kane, Mali. Dyer and three other Europeans were captured by outlaws and later sold to AQIM operatives. After being held for five

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months, Dyer was executed because the British government would not release a cleric associated with AQIM who remained in British custody. In July 2010, AQIM killed 78-year-old French engineer Michel Germaneau in Mali. Germaneau was ab-ducted in northern Niger two months prior. His death was believed to be carried out as retribution for a raid on an alleged AQIM camp in Mali by French and Mauritanian forces. In September 2010, five French citizens, a Togolese citizen, and Malagasy citizen were abducted from the French uranium mining operation in Arlit, Niger. AQIM issued a statement claiming responsibility. The hostages are allegedly being held in Mali. AQIM purportedly abducted these individuals in order to put an end to what it believes is French abuse of the Sahel‟s natural resources. Information for OSAC constituents This incident is a departure from the group‟s usual area of operation in the northern regions of Sahelian countries. An attack in the capital is significant because it indicates the group‟s expansion deeper into government controlled areas. AQIM has gen-erally been able to operate with impunity in the ungoverned hinterlands of Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. The group‟s loose alignment with drug smugglers and tribal bandits, including younger generations of Nigerien and Malian Touareg, a Berber no-madic people, has facilitated an increase in kidnappings in those regions. AQIM militants have been known to pay as much as $90,000 for Western hostages taken by tribal gunmen and has previously offered a $50,000 bounty for any Westerner brought to them. However, a kidnapping in the capital city of Niger is more significant. It indicates that the group is not deterred by government security forces. In the past, hos-tages have been taken while traveling in re-mote locations. These two men were seized from inside a crowded restaurant. AQIM will likely be encouraged by the success of this operation. This could potentially spawn suc-cessive kidnappings in the capital, particu-larly because of the concentration of Western expatriates in Niamey. In the wake of this incident, the French Foreign Ministry stated, “in view of the terrorism threat on the region, no area can be considered safe any longer.” The U.S. Department of State has released Travel Warnings for Niger, Mali, and Mauritania because of the strong risk of kidnappings and stated threats against Westerners. In Niger, travel of U.S. government personnel is restricted in areas north of Niamey and all travel outside of the capital is coordinated with the Regional Security Office with final approval by the Ambassador. In Mali, the northern regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu are restricted without prior authorization, requiring written approval by the U.S. Ambassador to Mali for U.S. government personnel. For further information contact OSAC‟s Regional Coordinator for Sub-Saharan Africa.

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Ivory Coast Status Update Current Situation The political stalemate in Cote d‟Ivoire re-mains. Former President Laurent Gbagbo in-sists that he is the legitimate winner of the November runoff election, while the interna-tionally recognized winner, Alassane Ouat-tara, remains under blockade at the Golf Hotel (at the behest of Gbagbo) in the capital city, Abidjan. Gbagbo is in control of the armed forces, key levers of government, and much of the private sector, including the cocoa indus-try. Former rebels, who have controlled the north since the Ivorian civil war, remain loyal to Gbagbo. Both the United States and the European Union have leveled sanctions against Gbagbo and those close to him; how-ever, efforts to curtail his access to funds have not detracted from his hold on power. Reports of alleged human rights abuses have been frequent. Gbagbo‟s forces and Liberian mercenaries have reportedly engaged in exe-cutions, kidnappings, and torture. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHR) puts the number of deaths resulting from post-election hostilities at over 240. Ac-cording to estimates released by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 22,000 Ivorians have sought refuge in neighboring countries since the eruption of hostilities be-gan in Cote d‟Ivoire. Is an ECOWAS Invasion Likely? Recently, Prime Minister Raila Odinga of Kenya was called in as a mediator on behalf of the African Union. Odinga‟s efforts proved fruitless mainly because Gbagbo failed to lift the blockade against Ouattara, which was one of Gbagbo‟s promises to the mediator. Odinga stated, "Unless they (Gbagbo's camp) heed the call and agree to create a conducive environment for peaceful dialogue, the friends of Ivory Coast might be forced to take other meas-ures...which would require additional punish-ing economic and financial sanctions, and possibly the use of force." West African leaders from the Economic Com-munity of West African States (ECOWAS) continue to issue similar statements implying that they may soon resort to a military solution in order to end this crisis. All indications are that such action is not logistically feasible at the present time.

ECOWAS member states have launched con-sorted military interventions in the past. How-ever, they have been carried out at the behest of imperiled host governments in smaller coun-tries, like Sierra Leone and Liberia. In those countries, the governments, while engaged with rebels, maintained control over strategic posts, such as airports and harbors. This facili-tated foreign troops‟ entry and ability to take strategic positions to assist the troubled host governments. In Cote d‟Ivoire, Gbagbo controls key points of entry. His government is adamant that the crisis is an internal affair. Although neighboring countries‟ armed forces are sufficiently staffed and trained, they lack the materiel and operational capability to mount an intervention of the sort needed to invade the country and depose Gbagbo. Experts believe that it would require advanced weaponry such as sophisticated attack helicopters, satellite

tracking gear, and highly mobile forces with state-of-the-art weapons systems. Notable Flashpoints There have been reports of persistent unrest in Duekoue in eastern Cote d‟Ivoire. United Na-tions Operation in Cote d‟Ivoire (UNOCI) offi-cials corroborated reports of 14 deaths and scores injured during the first week of January. Several thousand internally displaced persons have left the region. The shooting of a Malinke woman by alleged Guere armed militia report-edly instigated the violence in an area with an established history of ethnic confrontation. Ma-linke youth retaliated by shutting down trans-portation and setting up roadblocks. Malinke are predominantly Outtara supporters, and Guere overwhelmingly back Gbagbo. Allegedly, pro-Gbagbo militia members, joined by Liberian mercenaries have attacked Malinke homes and businesses. There have been increasing reports of attacks on Nigerian expatriates and their businesses, including a daytime shooting carried out by suspected Liberian mercenaries wearing uni-forms of the New Forces rebel group. The at-tacks could be viewed as reprisals for Nigeria‟s and ECOWAS‟ calls for Gbagbo to step down.

On January 17, a pro-Gbagbo youth group fired shots at a UNOCI patrol awaiting the arrival of Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, according to UNOCI. The next day, U.S. Embassy Abid-jan reported that security in the neighborhood of Abobo in Abidjan, remained tenuous with morning reports of gunfire, although security forces no longer controlled the area. President .

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Ouattara has issued several calls for nationwide strikes, in defiance of Gbagbo‟s close hold on power and escalating violence. This has prompted fears that large scale conflict will erupt in the country. How-ever, the strikes have thus far been unable to garner prevalent Ivorian participation, having little impact on the political situation or the security environment. Info for OSAC Constituents The security environment in the country re-mains very tenuous. The potential for sponta-neous demonstrations and sporadic violence remains an ever present risk, particularly in the capital city Abidjan and the northern and western regions. U.S. government personnel traveling to western Cote d'Ivoire are often required to use security escorts provided by the U.N. A return to civil war in Cote d‟Ivoire is a valid concern. If the political situation remains at a stalemate, skirmishes between Gbagbo sup-porters and Ouattara supporters are likely to increase in frequency and intensity. The hu-manitarian situation, already dire in many parts of the country, will worsen, exacerbating the frustrations of Ivorians. Humanitarian organizations have posited that food insecurity is likely to be very severe this year especially throughout May and June, the typical “lean season.” During the Ivorian Civil War, the extensive violence that plagued Sierra Leone and Liberia never fully took hold in neighboring Cote d‟Ivoire. It saw the random eruption of sporadic pockets of violence in flashpoints, while the country remained split between government held territory in the south and New Forces territory in the north. Approximately 8,000 UNOCI troops managed a buffer zone between north and south. U.S. citizens should immediately register with U.S. Embassy Abidjan, stay current on media coverage of local events, and be aware of their surroundings at all times. Because of the increased probability of po-litical unrest and potential violence, it is especially important for U.S. citizens traveling to or residing in Cote d‟Ivoire to exercise extreme caution and defer travel during periods of political tension. For more information, please contact OSAC‟s Regional Coordinator for Sub-Saharan Africa

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Research and Information Support Center (RISC) Contact Information

Europe

Shane O’Brien

Regional Analyst

571-345-2234

O„BrienSW@state.gov

Shari-Ann Peart

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-7747

PeartSJ@state.gov

South & Central Asia

Marc Solomon

Regional Analyst

571-345-2235

SolomonMB@state.gov

Monica Ortiz

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-2225

OrtizmMR@state.gov

Brent Heminger

Senior Coordinator -

Regional Analysis

571-345-2226

HemingerBG@state.gov

Africa

Todd Woodard

Regional Analyst

571-345-2232

WoodardTM@state.gov

Valerie Schaeublin

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-7782

SchaeublinVA@state.gov

Elena Carrington

Senior Coordinator -

Outreach Programs

571-345-2228

CarringtonEA@state.gov

Near East Asia

Bill Barnes

Regional Analyst

571-345-7746

BarnesWJ@state.gov

Monica Ortiz

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-2225

OrtizmMR@state.gov

East Asia & the Pacific

Josh Richards

Regional Analyst

571-345-2233

RichardsJA@state.gov

Valerie Schaeublin

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-7782

SchaeublinVA@state.gov

Western Hemisphere

Justin Lamb

Regional Analyst

571-345-2221

LambJM@state.gov

Shari-Ann Peart

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-7747

PeartSJ@state.gov

Global Security Unit

Ryan Garvey

Coordinator, Information

Security & Cyber Threats

571-345-7748

GarveyRW@state.gov

Wes Gould

Global Security Coordinator

571-345-7794

GouldCW@state.gov

Jeremy Van Dam

Global Security Coordinator

571-345-7785

VanDamJS@state.gov

Greg Hoobler

Manager, Global

Analysis

571-345-2229

HooblerGD@state.gov

Laura Simmons

Coordinator, Major Events

571-345-7745

SimmonsLK@state.gov

Lauren D’Amore

Senior Coordinator -

Global Security

571-345-2227

D‟AmoreLE@state.gov

Jackee Schools

Chief RISC-

571-345-2219

SchoolsSJ@state.gov