ORSSA Presidential Address

Winnie Pelser, 2017

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. It is a great privilege to stand before you at the 46thORSSA Annual Conference at the Champagne Sports Resort to deliver my last presidentialaddress. I want to share a few ideas with you on Complexity, Thinking and Human Behaviourspecifically in a Military environment.

Range of Military Operations and Conflict Continuum

Decisions regarding military operations that face soldiers can be anything on the continuum ofconflict. Decisions and behaviour must always be adapted to the current situation. The broadspectrum of Defence activity can take place in a wide range of military operations from totalwar to peacekeeping. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below from the South African DefenceReview [1]. Such operations may sometimes occur concurrently, in different locations, withindifferent contexts. Military operations (operations consisting of many different and connectedparts) within the operating environment is often referred to as complex and will only becomemore complex and solutions are not trivial.

Figure 1: Spectrum of Military Operations [1]

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In addition to complex military operations, the levels at which military decision making needsto occur, range from the National Strategic Level, Military Strategic Level, Operational andTactical levels. This is illustrated in the South African Defence Review [1] Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Levels of Military Decision making [1]

Complexity defined

In order to have insight into the military decision maker’s environment, a definition for complex-ity is needed. In Latin the word complexus, signifies “entwined” or “twisted together” (Heylighen1996). The Oxford Dictionary defines something as “complex” if it is “made of (usually several)closely connected parts.” This definition does not distinguish between “simple systems” and“complex systems.” “Complexity” does not mean “difficult to understand” (although it mightbe the case that something complex is difficult to understand). The word “complex” must notbe confused with the word “complicated.” In systems theory, a system can be complicated, butnot complex. Complex systems cannot be solved. According to StackExchange [13], Complexproblems involve too many unknowns and too many interrelated factors to reduce to rules andprocesses. Norman and Kuras [6] define a Complex System as a System with the followingcharacteristics:

• Elements can change in response to imposed “pressures” from neighbouring elements.

• Have a large number of useful potential arrangements of its elements.

• Continually increases its own complexity given a steady influx of energy (raw resources).

• Characterized by the presence of independent change agents.

The environment, in which the military decision maker operates in, is complex and they arefaced with complex and complicated decisions.

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Elements that Shape Human Behaviour

The United States (US) Department of Defence (DOD), Joint Doctrine Publication, Understand-ing and Decision-making, [2] defined a conceptual framework for thinking. In this Framework,the “Ways” dimension can both complement and contrast from Divergent (thinking that exploreand create ideas) to Convergent (thinking that conclude, deduce and decide). The “Means” ofthinking contrasts Unconscious thinking (intuitive, creative) to Conscious (rational, analytic)thinking. It is important to realise that no single way of thinking is better than any other.Insight in thinking can assist to find and apply the appropriate thinking strategy to a partic-ular situation. In all situations, decision makers make better decisions using critical thinking.The Critical Thinking Community [19] define Critical Thinking as “the mode of thinking inwhich the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skilfully analysing, assess-ing, and reconstructing it. Critical thinking is self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, andself-corrective thinking. It presupposes assent to rigorous standards of excellence and mindfulcommand of their use. It entails effective communication and problem-solving abilities, as wellas a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and socio-centrism.”

Figure 3: Conceptual Framework for Thinking [2]

Daniel Kahneman [18] argues for a distinction between different modes in which people think.Kahneman distinguish between thinking that is fast (often referred to as System 1 or auto-mated thinking) and thinking that is slow (System 2, or conscious, deliberate thinking). Slowthinking involves formally weighing of options as well as utility values that is part of rationaldecision-making; it is conscious, effortful, and particularly useful for calculating and drawingconnections between concepts. The drawback of slow thinking is that it requires having enoughtime, information, and motivation to engage in slow conscious reflection.

The automatic or fast thinking, System 1, response takes just a fraction of a second, andnormally provides a gut feeling. It is closely related to what we typically think of as intuition.This kind of thinking is not rational and departs from any form of analysis. It can be the bestreaction when time is crucial, for example when you meet a lion in the bush; it is good not toapply System 2 thinking.

The ability of humans to make decisions is influenced by many aspects such as personality,lifestyle, social factors, group interaction and communication. Human behaviour depends onmany factors and this has led to the new study field of BOR. BOR studies the impact of humanbehaviour on decisions that are made in businesses and operations. The United States, JointConcept for Human Aspects of Military Operations [4] describes the elements that shape human

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behaviour as the physical, social, psychological, informational and cultural. The dynamics inthe environment will reflect these elements that shape human behaviour. Humans often perceivethese elements from past perspectives or through a “temporal lens.” The temporal lens allowsthe Joint Force to examine the listed elements over time. It enables understanding of relevantactors or decision makers and their interactions through the course of various events and underdifferent circumstances. See Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Elements that Shape Human Behaviour [4]

Lane [17] drew up a map of behavioural issues in Systems Dynamics. It illustrates the complexdynamics between the real world, mental models, formal models and content. This map proposesthe existence of a large space in which the same approach may be effectively used.

Mental Models

Content of Formal Models

Complex dynamic systems are counter-intuitive

People have simple mental models

Mental inferenceis poor

Provide a weak policy basis

Archetypes as feedback puzzles

Humans cannot extrapolate exponential growth

Insights in Urban Dynamics: ‘Notes on Complex Systems’

Short causal chains

No stocks and flows

No feedback

Exogenous explanations

Many loops hard to ‘process’

Stock/flow relationships difficult

to ‘process’Unscientific thinking

Future = Past

Pattern matching

Boundedly rational information usage

Missing, delayed, distorted

information

BehaviouralSystem Dynamics

Working with Formals Models

Encountering the World

Decision makersare not HomoEconomicus

Cognitive biases from Decision

Theory

Stock/flowdistinction

Non-linear relationships

Humans are active agents within system

Belief that FMs are not necessary

Rejection of FM output

‘Learning’ is complex

‘Process bounded rationality’

World = my MM

My intuition is enough

FM content unknown

BOT Trajectories incomprehensible

Insights culturally unacceptable

Changing mental models

Providing ‘virtual

experience’

Need to summarise

insightsArchetypes as

persuasive stories

Structure

Relationships

(Mis) perception of feedback

Experiencing the World

Influencing the World

Partial knowledgeof causal structure

Learning ≠ Action, Learning ≠ Commitment

Implementation barriers

Social realm not mensurable

Defensive routines

Figure 5: A tentative map of ‘Behavioural System Dynamics’ [17]

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Lane notes that this is experimental work; and emphasise that the area of ‘Working with FormalModels,’ relates to the idea that learning from models is a complex matter and interacts withbehavioural issues. This interaction is prevalent not only in decision making but in all stages,such as thinking about, modelling and then doing something better to understand behaviouralissues in complex dynamic systems.

This brings us to the question of how OR can assist Military Decision Makers with the problemsthey are faced with. In addition to a complex environment, the Military decision maker mustthink fast to get to a plan of action that is optimal for a particular situation, taking into accountall the elements that shape behaviour. They often do not have enough time to study and thinkof all parameters in the equation. The increased development in BOR may prove to be beneficialand important in many fields, military included.

What is Behavioural Operations Research?

According to Franco and Hamalainen [3] BOR relates to the behavioural aspects of the use ofOR in problem solving and decision support. “BOR is the study of behavioural aspects relatedto the use of operations research methods in modelling, problem solving and decision makingin practice. The purpose of BOR is to optimally use and improve operations research theories.It consists of the use of OR methods to model human behaviour in complex settings as well asthe role and impact of behavioural aspects related to the use of OR to support problem solvingand decision making.”

Wikipedia [8] defines BOR as the study of human behaviour and emotions when facing

In the course of intuitive decision making, we use mental heuristics to quickly reduce complexity.The use of these heuristics exposes us to cognitive biases.

Cognitive Bias

Blair [7] defines Cognitive Bias as “A preference or inclination, especially one that inhibitsimpartial judgment.”

Wikipedia [15] “Cognitive bias refers to the systematic pattern of deviation from norm orrationality in judgment, whereby inferences about other people and situations may be drawn inan illogical fashion. Individuals create their own “subjective social reality” from their perceptionof the input. An individual’s construction of social reality, not the objective input, may dictatetheir behaviour in the social world. Thus, cognitive biases may sometimes lead to perceptualdistortion, inaccurate judgement, illogical interpretation, or what is broadly called irrationality.”

Cherry [12] defines cognitive bias as: “A systematic error in thinking that affects the decisionsand judgments that people make. Sometimes these biases are related to memory. The way youremember an event may be biased for a number of reasons and that in turn can lead to biasedthinking and decision-making. Biases can creep in and influence the way we see and think aboutthe world.”

Examples of Biases in the Decision Analysis Process

Hamalainen, Luoma and Saarinen [14] provide examples of behavioural studies in OR:

• “Decision and Risk Analysis

– Subjectivity is explicitly taken into account.

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– Value and utility functions to describe preferences.

– Risk attitudes seeking/averse.

– Multi-criteria evaluation of alternatives and choice of criteria with subjective weight-ing.

– Research on biases and risk perceptions.

• Operations management

– Studies how people act in complex decision settings.

– Judgemental forecasting.

– The Bullwhip effect in Supply chains.

The “bullwhip” effect is a phenomenon affecting supply chains. The demand for aproduct is influenced by product ordering decisions, the effect moves upstream in thechain from the consumer toward the manufacturer, the demand becomes more andmore erratic and swings in larger and larger cycles.

• Judgement and Decision making

– Decision theory is not enough to explain human choices.

– Axioms of rationality not followed.

– Prospect theory: gains and losses seen differently (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tver-sky). [18]

– Cognitive biases.”

According to Hamalainen [5] “As soon as we start using models in practice, behavioural elementsare present.”

Examples of biases in Military Contexts

Anchoring or Focalism Bias

Montibeller and von Winterveldt [16] define Anchoring or Focalism Bias as:

“The estimation of a numerical value is based on an initial value (anchor).” Premature estimatesplay too large a role in determining final assessments.

Tversky and Kahneman [18] identified the anchoring heuristic as one in which people makeestimates by starting at an initial value that is adjusted over time to yield the final answer.

In this bias, fixation on initial information hampers adjustment with subsequent information.

Chant [9] give an example of Anchoring Bias is the deception ploy used by the British in WorldWar Two (WWII), known as the Cyprus Defence Plan that exploited the Germans’ anchoringbias. The Germans captured Crete and the British feared that the 4000 soldiers they had onCyprus would not be able to defend a German onslaught. The British implemented the CyprusDefence Plan which was intended to convince the Germans and Italians that they had one ortwo divisions with more than 20000 troops on Cyprus. They used false headquarters, barracks,military vehicles and fabricated radio communications. They distributed a false defence planwith maps and orders using double agents. They succeeded to deceive the Germans for theremaining three years of the war.

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According to Montibeller and von Winterveldt [16] de-biasing the Anchoring Bias can be achievedby:

• Avoid anchors.

• Provide multiple and counter anchors.

• Use different experts who have different anchors.

• Reframe problem to remove anchors.

Availability Bias

The Availability Bias is the tendency of individuals to rely on past occurrences or incidencesbased on how readily they can retrieve memories of the issue at hand. These past occurrencesare available for use, and are rarely the product of thoughtful deliberation, especially in atime-constrained environment under pressure. (Chen Jing Kai) [10]

In this situation the decision maker relies on knowledge that is readily available. The mostrecent and memorable information is given preference.

An example of Availability Bias is an incident that took place in Afghanistan in 2009. NorthAtlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) fuel trucks had been hijacked by Taliban forces and gotstuck at a crossing of the Kunduz River. Dozens of civilians had gathered around the trucks tosiphon free fuel from the tankers. The trucks were stationary for four hours at the river.

The NATO commander called an airstrike on the “imminent threat” caused by the capturedtrucks. The commander based his decision on a recent event where Taliban fighters detonateda tanker truck in Kandahar. Several other hijackings of tanker trucks by the Taliban took placerecently. A month before the airstrike, intelligence suggested that the Taliban was planning tooverrun a NATO camp with explosive laden trucks. All these easily retrievable events contributedto the Availability Bias that affected the commander’s assessment of the seriousness andimminence of the threat that the hijacked trucks posed, ultimately leading to this ill-fateddecision. The airstrike killed 142 people, including 100 Afghan civilians.

According to Chen Jing Kai [10] de-biasing the Availability Bias can be achieved by:

• Avoiding decisions without proper deliberation.

• Providing statistics.

• Examining facts and alternative procedures.

• In the wise words of Mao Tse-Tung: “Guard against arrogance, avoid underestimating theenemy, and be well prepared.”

Overconfidence Bias

According to Chen Jing Kai) [10] this bias causes individuals to selectively search for evidencethat supports their preconceived experience or hypotheses to believe that such evidence has adisproportionately higher probability of being true, than in reality.

An example of the Overconfidence Bias is the series of events that led to the Japanese attackon Pearl Harbour in 1941. The military leaders in Washington had a deep seated belief thatthe Japanese military were incapable of a raid on Pearl Harbour. At least two Naval War

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games, one in 1932 and another in 1936 proved that Pearl was vulnerable to such an attack.The Military leaders believed the proposition that the Japanese would not be able deliver theirbombs accurately for a successful raid. In the event, seventeen ships were damaged or lost inthe attack, of which fourteen were repaired and returned to service. (Wikipedia)

De-biasing the Overconfidence bias is difficult, but can be achieved by: [10]

• Providing more information/alternatives.

• Requesting counter arguments.

Mitigating biases

Strategies for overcoming specific biases are to deliberately shift people from intuitive thinkingto analytical thinking or analysis. This involves promoting metacognitive skills to help peoplereplace intuition, which can be effective and efficient, but much more prone to error, withdeliberate analytic processes. Rodman and McClary [11] summarise strategies for overcomingbiases below.

Table 1: Examples of Strategies for Overcoming Biases [11]

Strategy Explanation

Replace intuition withformal analytical pro-cesses

When data exists on past input to and outcome from a particulardecision-making process, decision makers may be able to constructa linear model to forecast an outcome.Research indicates that linear models produce predictions that aresuperior to those of experts.This method has only been tested in a small subset of the poten-tially relevant domains.

Take an outsider’s per-spective

Trying to remove oneself mentally from a specific situation.Has been shown to reduce decision makers’ overconfidence abouttheir knowledge.Also may be useful to ask an actual outsider for their input intoa decision.

Consider the opposite ofwhatever decision theyare about to make

Reduces errors in judgment due to several particularly robust de-cision biases: anchoring, hindsight bias, and overconfidence.Also helpful to have groups rather than individuals make decisions.

Undermine the cogni-tive mechanism that isthe source of the bias

Develop targeted cue to rely on deliberate thinking processes.Research suggests that subjects are more resistant to bias if theyare provided with evidence contrary to the actual outcome.

Promote analogical rea-soning

Used to reduce bounds on people’s awareness.People who are encouraged to see and understand the commonprinciple underlying a set of seemingly unrelated tasks subse-quently demonstrated an improved ability to discover solutionsin a different task that relied on the same underlying principle.

Joint-versus-separatedecision making

Consider and choose multiple options simultaneously rather thanaccepting or rejecting options separately.People exhibit less willpower when they weigh choices separatelyrather than jointly.

What is very important in mitigating biases is to be aware that they exist. Challenge them andbecome a better critical thinker and ultimately, a better decision maker.

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According to Rodman and McClary [11] the following will be beneficial to reduce biases:

• Use a PROCESS.

• Start with a clean slate.

• Challenge the status quo.

• Seek multiple perspectives.

• Search for more information & data.

• Play Devil’s Advocate.

• Reflect on your own views & values.

Franco and Hamalainen studied work done by Wittington and others and came up with threequestions that explain behaviour: [3]

• What guides behaviour in the process?

• Whose behaviour counts in the process?

• How behaviour is enacted in the process?

Answers to these questions can provide explanations and a holistic view of the impacts achievedfrom the application of OR processes.

The ultimate purpose of BOR is to make better use of OR by both experts and users (clients).The field of BOR includes many different study areas. Behavioural issues have been acknowl-edged and studied by particular OR communities such as decision analysis, system dynamicsand game theory. More studies are needed across the full spectrum of OR speciality areas.

Conclusion

The diversity implied by current published BOR studies should be embraced and enhanced.

Investigate OR intervention approaches, techniques and tools that guide behaviour. In order toachieve this, include communication strategies, approaches, norms and procedures.

Explore best practice methods for reducing Cognitive and Motivational Biases.

The OR discipline is not only modelling and models, but also about people. Developing practi-tioner skills with a behavioural perspective will enhance and advance the discipline of OR.

Investigate appropriate methods and application areas suitable in the Military environment toimprove good decision making.

References

[1] South African Defence Review 2015, Available: www.dod.mil.za/documents/

defencereview/defencereview2015.pdf Retrieved 2017-02-25.

[2] Joint Doctrine Publication 04 Understanding and Decision-making, Joint Doctrine Publi-cation 04 (JDP 04) (2nd Edition), December 2016.

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[3] Franco LA & Hamalainen RP, 2016 Behavioural operational research: Returning tothe roots of the OR profession, European Journal of Operational Research, Special Issueon Behavioural OR, 249(3), pp. 791–795.

[4] Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations, 19 October 2016, US Joint Chiefsof Staff.

[5] Hamalainen RP, November 2015, Behavioral Aspects in Decision Analysis Systems Anal-ysis, Laboratory Aalto University, School of Science Finland. (Howard-Raiffa-Session 13).

[6] Engineering Complex Systems, Douglas O. Norman, Michael L. Kuras, Jan 2004, TheMITRE Corporation.

[7] Williams BS, Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision Making, 2010, U.S. Army,Military Review. Available: http://instituteforstrategicclarity.org/wp-content/

uploads/2013/09/S3-Heuristics-and-Biases.pdf

[8] Behavioral operations research (BOR) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavioral_

operations_researchRetrieved2016-08-25.

[9] Chant C, Cyprus Defence Plan, 04/07/2016. Available: http://www.cmchant.com/

british-cyprus-defence-plan-wwii

[10] CPT Chen Jing Kai, The Root of Irrationality in Military Decision-Making, POINTER,Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 42(2) https://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/

pointer/documents/pdf/Vol42No2_6%20Cognitive%20Biases.pdf

[11] Rodman J & Hardy McClary R, Cognitive Biases and Decision Mak-ing: A Literature Review and Discussion of Implications for the US Army, Jan2015, Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force (HDCDTF) Mis-sion Command - Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID).http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=

rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiDkYu30f7WAhVIIcAKHYSVAlcQFggxMAE&url=http%3A%

2F%2Fusacac.army.mil%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fpublications%2FHDCDTF_

WhitePaper_Cognitive%2520Biases%2520and%2520Decision%2520Making_Final_2015_

01_09_0.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1-PCpvlLYZt8gYJykkzX4X

[12] Cherry K, How Cognitive Biases Influence How We Think and Act, Men-tal Mistakes and Errors, June 12, 2017. Available: https://www.verywell.com/

what-is-a-cognitive-bias-2794963

[13] StackExchange Available at: https://english.stackexchange.com/questions/

10459/what-is-the-difference-between-complicated-and-complexRetrieved, 23August 2017.

[14] Hamalainen RP, Luoma J & Saarinen E, 2014, On the importance of behaviouraloperations research, IFORS Stream in Behavioural OR.

[15] Cognitive Biases, Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_bias Re-trieved 2017-02-25.

[16] Montibeller G & von Winterveldt D, 2015, Cognitive and Motivational Biases inDecision and Risk Analysis, Risk Analysis, 35(7).

[17] Lane DC, Behavioural System Dynamics: A first sketch map of the territory, IFORSconference 2017. Retrieved from http://bor.aalto.fi/IFORS2017/presentations/

IFORS2017_lane.pdf [accessed 22 July 2017].

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[18] Tversky A & Kahneman D, 1974, Judgment under Uncertainty, 1974, 185.

[19] The Critical Thinking Community, Our Concept and Definition ofCritical Thinking, Available at: http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/

our-concept-of-critical-thinking/411 Retrieved, 10 August 2017.

[20] Hamalainen RP, Luoma J & Saarinen E, 2013, On the importance of behaviouraloperational research: The case of understanding and communicating about dynamic systems,European Journal of Operational Research, 228.

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