Origins of Human Cooperation an Morality

PS64CH09-Tomasello ARI 11 November 2012 8:51

Origins of HumanCooperation and MoralityMichael Tomasello and Amrisha VaishDepartment of Developmental Psychology, Max Planck Institute for EvolutionaryAnthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany; email: [email protected], [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2013. 64:231–55

First published online as a Review in Advance onJuly 12, 2012

The Annual Review of Psychology is online atpsych.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812

Copyright c! 2013 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

Keywordsaltrusim, fairness, justice, evolution

AbstractFrom an evolutionary perspective, morality is a form of cooperation.Cooperation requires individuals either to suppress their own self-interest or to equate it with that of others. We review recent researchon the origins of human morality, both phylogenetic (research withapes) and ontogenetic (research with children). For both time frameswe propose a two-step sequence: first a second-personal morality inwhich individuals are sympathetic or fair to particular others, and sec-ond an agent-neutral morality in which individuals follow and enforcegroup-wide social norms. Human morality arose evolutionarily as a setof skills and motives for cooperating with others, and the ontogeny ofthese skills and motives unfolds in part naturally and in part as a resultof sociocultural contexts and interactions.

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ContentsINTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS

OF HUMAN MORALITY . . . . . . . . 232Cooperation in Great Ape Societies . 233The Evolution of Human

Cooperation and Morality . . . . . . . 237ONTOGENETIC ORIGINS OF

HUMAN MORALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . 240Toddlers’ Second-Personal Morality 240Preschoolers’ Norm-Based Morality 245

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

INTRODUCTIONAfter centuries of philosophical speculationabout human morality, in the past half-centurypsychologists have begun to empirically inves-tigate human moral behavior and judgment. Insocial psychology, researchers have sought todetermine the factors that influence humans’prosocial behavior, cooperative interactions,and moral judgments. In the relatively new fieldof moral psychology, researchers have begun toprobe the mechanisms of moral judgment moredeeply, including cognitive and emotional fac-tors as well as underlying neurophysiologicalprocesses.

During this same half-century, develop-mental psychologists have asked the questionof origins: How do seemingly amoral humaninfants turn into actively moral children andadults? Recently, several novel lines of researchhave established that young children are muchmore moral—by at least some definitions—ata much younger age than previously thought.This research focuses on actual moral behavioras opposed to the more studied topic of moraljudgment. In addition, recent comparativeresearch has addressed the related question ofthe phylogenetic origins of human morality:How did presumably amoral prehumans turninto moral beings? Research with humans’closest living relatives, the great apes, has re-vealed both similarities and striking differencesin how individuals interact with others socially,

with particular regard to cooperation andsomething like moral behavior.

In this article, our goal is to review thesenew data from young children and great apes—primarily from the past decade or two—in anattempt to provide an up-to-date account ofthe question of the origins of human morality,both phylogenetic and ontogenetic. Withoutattempting a complete definition, in our evo-lutionary perspective, moral interactions are asubset of cooperative interactions. Arguably,the main function of morality is to regulate anindividual’s social interactions with others inthe general direction of cooperation, given thatall individuals are at least somewhat selfish.And so we may stipulate that at the very leastmoral actions must involve individuals eithersuppressing their own self-interest in favor ofthat of others (e.g., helping, sharing) or elseequating their own self-interest with that ofothers (e.g., reciprocity, justice, equity, andnorm following and enforcement).

We proceed as follows. We first look at greatape cooperation and contrast it with the co-operation of modern humans. In making thiscomparison we attempt to outline two steps inthe evolution of human cooperation that to-gether constitute something like the evolution-ary emergence of human morality. We thenlook at cooperation in human children, againin two developmental steps that, together, con-stitute something like the ontogenetic emer-gence of human morality. In both cases, thefirst step in the sequence is mutualistic collab-oration and prosocially motivated interactionswith specific other individuals, and the secondstep is the more abstract, agent-neutral, norm-based morality of individuals who live in morelarge-scale cultural worlds full of impersonaland mutually known conventions, norms, andinstitutions.

EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINSOF HUMAN MORALITYHumans are great apes, along with orangutans,gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos. Thesocial life of the great apes is highly complex.

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Individuals not only form relatively long-termsocial relationships with others, they alsounderstand the social relationships amongthird parties, for example, who is dominant towhom and who is friends with whom in thesocial group. Moreover, they recognize that theactions of individuals are driven both by theirgoals and by their perception of the situation(a kind of perception-goal psychology; Call &Tomasello 2008). This means that great apeindividuals make virtually all of their behavioraldecisions in a complex social field comprisingall the other individuals in the vicinity withtheir individual goals and perceptions, as wellas the social relationships of those individualsboth to the self and to one another.

Cooperation in Great Ape SocietiesNonhuman great ape social life is mainly aboutcompetition. Although there are differencesamong the four species, competitive disputesgenerally are resolved via one or another formof dominance (based, ultimately, on fightingability). Most obvious is individual dominance,such as when an alpha male chimpanzee takeswhatever food he wants while others take whatis left. But great apes also cooperate with alliesin order to compete with others over valued re-sources. This cooperating in order to competerequires individuals to simultaneously monitortwo or more ongoing social relationships (andthe social relationships among the third par-ties involved as well), requiring complex skillsof social cognition. But despite some skills andtendencies of cooperation, which we now docu-ment, it is important to remember that amongall species of nonhuman great apes, even the“peaceful” bonobos, the individuals who getwhat they want will almost always be the oneswho bring the most force.

With this clear recognition of the domi-nance of dominance in the social lives of nonhu-man great apes, we may now look more closelyat their cooperation, especially that of chim-panzees because they have been by far the moststudied. Proceeding with a bottom-up strategy,let us look at two sets of behaviors in nonhuman

great apes that almost everyone would agree aremorally relevant: (a) helping and sharing withothers (sometimes based on reciprocity) and(b) collaborating with others for mutual benefit.

Helping, sharing, and reciprocity. Anumber of well-controlled experiments havedemonstrated that chimpanzees will helpboth humans and other chimpanzees. First,Warneken & Tomasello (2006) found thatthree human-raised chimpanzees fetchedout-of-reach objects for humans visibly tryingto reach them. Warneken et al. (2007) foundfurther that chimpanzees will also go to someeffort to help humans, for example, climbing afew meters high to fetch something for them.In this same study, chimpanzees also helpedconspecifics. Specifically, when one individualwas trying to get through a door, subjectspulled open a latch for her—which they didnot do if the first chimpanzee was not tryingto get through the door. Moreover, Melisand colleagues (2011) found that chimpanzeeswill also release a hook to send food down aramp to a desirous conspecific, if it is clearthat they cannot get the food themselves and ifthe recipient actively signals his need. Finally,Yamamoto and colleagues (2009) observedchimpanzees giving tools to others that neededto rake in food for themselves, and more re-cently showed that chimpanzees demonstrateflexible “targeted” helping, i.e., giving thespecific tool that the conspecific needs from anarray of possible tools (Yamamoto et al. 2012).

Helping others reach their goals in theseways is fairly low cost, basically requiring onlya few extra ergs of energy. Sharing food is an-other story, as it requires relinquishing a valuedresource. Nevertheless, chimpanzees and othergreat apes do share food with others undersome circumstances. First and most obviously,mothers share food with their offspring (al-though mostly they engage in passive sharing inwhich they allow the offspring to take food fromthem, and then mostly the shells, husks, andpeelings; Ueno & Matsuzawa 2004). Second, ifthe food is not very highly valued and not easilymonopolizable (e.g., a branch full of leaves),

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then a group of apes may peaceably feed on ittogether, and occasionally there may be somemore active sharing among friends (de Waal1989). And third, if the food is very highly val-ued and somewhat monopolizable (e.g., meat),then typically subordinates and nonpossessorsbeg and harass dominants and possessors untilthey get some, again with some instances ofmore active sharing (Gilby 2006). But all ofthis food sharing is more active and reliable insituations involving some form of reciprocity.

Indeed, a variety of lines of evidence suggestthat chimpanzees help and share most readilyin the context of reciprocity. Thus, althoughthere is no reciprocity in short-term groom-ing bouts, over time, individuals who have beengroomed by one partner later groom that part-ner (as opposed to others) in return more often(Gomes et al. 2009). In an experimental setting,Melis and colleagues (2008) found that individ-uals tended to help those who had helped thempreviously (by opening a door for them, allow-ing access to food). Furthermore, de Waal &Luttrell (1988) found that captive chimpanzeessupport one another in fights reciprocally, andreciprocity can seemingly also involve differentcurrencies. For example, the most active meatsharing in the wild occurs between individualswho are coalition partners and therefore reli-ably help one another in fights in other contexts(Muller & Mitani 2005). Further, male chim-panzees sometimes share food with reproduc-tively cycling females, presumably in hopes ofsex (Hockings et al. 2007).

On the negative side—sometimes callednegative reciprocity or retaliation or revenge—if a chimpanzee in the wild attacks or stealsfood from another, he will often be attacked bythat victim in return [what de Waal & Lutrell(1988) call a revenge system]. Importantly, thegoal in these retaliations is not material rewardfor the retaliator. In an experimental setting,when one chimpanzee intentionally took theother’s food, the victim overtly expressed angerand acted to trash the stolen food before thethief could eat it—even though this did notresult in any food for the victim ( Jensen et al.2007). Importantly as well, victims did not do

this if the other chimpanzee came into posses-sion of the food accidentally (i.e., through thehuman experimenter’s efforts). The goal herethus seems to be truly to punish the other.

There is no reason to believe that these actsof helping and sharing and retaliation are any-thing other than the genuine article. Whencosts are negligible and the recipient’s need isclear, great apes help others. When costs aregreater, as with food sharing, great ape altru-ism is most active and reliable in the contextof something like reciprocity. But, as de Waal(2005) has argued, this is very likely not a “cal-culated reciprocity” in which individuals keepquantitative track of favors given and received.More likely it is a kind of “attitudinal reci-procity” in which individuals have more pos-itive affect toward those who have helped themor shared with them in the past. If you helpme in fights regularly, then I should invest inyour well-being by, for example, helping youin fights, and maybe even sharing food withyou. In general, if I depend on you for doingX, then I should do whatever I can to ensurethat you are available and capable of doing X—and you should do the same for me. Attitudinalreciprocity (I feel more affiliative toward thoseon whom I depend) can generate reciprocal pat-terns of helping and sharing—and without thethreat of defection. On the negative side, greatapes get angry at and punish those who causedthem distress. This presumably has the effectthat the punished individual will be less likely torepeat his harmful actions in the future, whichbenefits the punisher directly.

Collaboration. Chimpanzees and other greatapes collaborate with conspecifics in severaldifferent contexts. First, as in many mammalianspecies, individuals form alliances and supportone another in fights (Harcourt & de Waal1992). Whereas in many monkey species it istypically kin that support one another, amongchimpanzees it is mostly nonkin (Langergraberet al. 2011). Again as in many mammalianspecies, great ape combatants often activelyreconcile with one another after fights, pre-sumably in an attempt to repair the long-term


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relationship on which they both depend forvarious reasons (de Waal 1997).

Second, like many mammalian species, greatapes engage in various forms of group defense.Most interestingly, small groups of male chim-panzees actively patrol their border, engagingagonistically with any individuals from neigh-boring groups that they encounter (Goodall1986). Presumably, acts of group defense are areflection of individuals’ interdependence withone another as well, at the very least as a need tomaintain a certain group size but more urgentlyin protecting and facilitating the lives of thoseon whom they depend for everything from sexto grooming.

Third, and especially important in the cur-rent context, is collaboration in the acquisitionof food. Although all four great ape species for-age for food almost exclusively individually—traveling in small social parties but then procur-ing food on their own—there is one major ex-ception. In some but not all groups of chim-panzees, males hunt in small social partiesfor monkeys (although less frequently, bono-bos hunt in small parties for monkeys as well;Surbeck & Hohmann 2008). In some cases thehunt resembles a kind of helter-skelter chase inwhich multiple individuals attempt to capturethe monkey with little if any coordination. Inthe Taı Forest, however, the canopy is continu-ous and the monkeys are quite agile, so such un-coordinated chasing typically will not succeed.Here the chimpanzees must, in effect, surrounda monkey in order to capture him, requiringindividuals to in some sense coordinate withothers (Boesch & Boesch 1989). Typically allparticipants get at least some meat, but manybystanders do too (Boesch 1994).

Note that although chimpanzees are inter-dependent with one another in the hunt itself—and indeed experiments have shown that chim-panzees understand when they need the otherparticipants for success (Melis et al. 2006)—individuals do not depend on the group hunt-ing of monkeys to survive. In fact, and perhapssurprisingly, chimpanzees hunt most often formonkeys not in the dry season when fruit andvegetation are more scarce, but rather in the

rainy season when fruit and vegetation are muchmore abundant (Muller & Mitani 2005), pre-sumably because spending energy in a monkeyhunt for an uncertain return makes most sensewhen there are plenty of backup alternativesif the hunt fails. This absence of an overarch-ing interdependent “attitude” is reflected in afurther aspect of chimpanzee collaborative be-havior: In experiments, although chimpanzeesdo coordinate their actions with a partner toachieve individual goals, they do not seem in-terested in achieving joint, social goals, and iftheir partner becomes passive and unengagedduring a joint activity, they make no effort to re-engage their partner in order to continue thatactivity (Warneken et al. 2006).

The degree to which chimpanzees in thewild may actively choose collaborative partnersfor monkey hunting—a key dimension of hu-man collaborative foraging—is unclear. Meliset al. (2006) found that after a fairly smallamount of experience with one another, captivechimpanzees know which individuals are goodpartners for them—in the sense of leading tocollaborative success and the consumption of agood quantity of food—and they subsequentlychoose those partners in preference to others.They are almost certainly not attempting toactively punish bad partners by not choosingthem, but the effect is that bad partners havefewer opportunities for collaboration. If in-deed partner choice of this type happens in thewild—which is not clear, as hunting is mostlyinstigated opportunistically with little choiceof partners—then poor collaborative partnerswould suffer the loss of some opportunities.

Chimpanzees and other great apes thus col-laborate with conspecifics in various contextsfor their mutual benefit. In coalitions and al-liances and group defense, it is typically in theinterest of all individuals to participate to defeatthe opponent. As always, there are situations inwhich it might pay for individuals to lag and letothers do the work, but normally there is a di-rect benefit for all participants, with more par-ticipants increasing the probability of success.In the case of group hunting, individuals clearlyare responsive to the actions of others and know


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that they need them for success; moreover, theyseem to avoid bad partners, who suffer by notbeing chosen to participate in the collaboration,and typically everyone gets at least some meatat the end.

Great ape sociality and “morality.” Theindividuals of many social species simply stay inproximity to one another, with little active so-cial interaction beyond mating and/or fighting.Let us call this zero-order morality, as individu-als are rarely if ever inhibiting or otherwise con-trolling their self-serving motivations in def-erence to others. Chimpanzees and other greatapes—despite the importance of dominance intheir everyday interactions—are much moresocial, and so in a sense more moral, than this.

On the evolutionary level, it is viable thatin some contexts, great apes control theirself-serving motivations in deference to othersbecause they are somehow compensated forthe loss. Sometimes the act is immediately mu-tually beneficial, and sometimes there is laterreciprocity, but these may be conceptualized asindividuals investing in others on whom theyare dependent or with whom they are inter-dependent. The social situations that generatethese opportunities for reciprocally mutualisticactions derive from complex social lives inwhich many different activities—from groupdefense to foraging to intragroup conflictsover mating to grooming—are important if anindividual is to survive and thrive in the group.

On the proximate level, the empirical evi-dence would seem to suggest that great ape in-dividuals do have some proximate mechanismsthat are genuinely moral, in the sense that theindividual acts to benefit the other without anydirect anticipation or planning for any kind ofpayback. In the case of helping, and to a lesserdegree with more costly food sharing, the prox-imate mechanism may be some kind of sym-pathetic concern for those for whom one hasa positive affect based on their helping and/orsharing in the past (attitudinal reciprocity).

Great apes collaborate for mutual benefit,and it is not clear to what degree they mightcontrol their own self-serving motivations in

these collaborations. It would seem very lit-tle, except perhaps for sharing the food at theend of a group hunt (and then only to avoidfights). Certainly allies in a fight either withinthe group or against an external stranger do notattend to the needs of those allies. And sincechimpanzees’ group hunting of monkeys is notnecessary for their survival, collaboration is notan obligatory part of their lives. In these col-laborative interactions (to presage our compar-ison to humans), chimpanzees coordinate, butthey show no commitment to their partner; theyshare food, but they have no sense of equalityin doing so; they do their part, but they do nothelp their partner with its role in the collabo-ration; and they avoid bad partners, but theydo not seem to resent them or punish themactively for being a bad partner alone—all ofwhich means that individuals do not regulatetheir behavior in deference to the attitudes oftheir potential partners (there is no concern forself-reputation). One way to characterize chim-panzee collaboration is thus that individuals usetheir partner as a kind of social tool—whichthey know is necessary in the context—in or-der to get what they want. Neither partner isworried about what the other is getting out ofit or how they are being judged as a partner byeither their collaborator or any onlookers.

Overall, it is clear that great apes have gen-uine social relationships with others based onpatterns of social interactions over time. A keypattern, perhaps the key pattern, is dominance:Disputes are settled by the dominant doingjust what he wants to do, and the subordinatemust simply defer. The morality of apes’ socialinteractions—individuals inhibiting theirimmediate self-interest in favor of others—isgoverned mostly by their personal relation-ships; that is to say, individuals form prosocialrelationships with others based on a kind ofattitudinal reciprocity that develops as eachindividual helps those toward whom they haveformed a positive attitude (precisely becausethey have helped them in the past). Individuals’actions thus reward those with whom theyhave a positive relationship and fail to reward,or even punish, those with whom they have a


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negative relationship. Much human moralityis based on this kind of attitudinal reciprocityas well, especially with family. It is just thathumans have developed some other moralmotivations and mechanisms in addition.

The Evolution of Human Cooperationand MoralityEven the smallest and seemingly simplest of hu-man societies are cooperatively structured andorganized in a way that the societies of othergreat apes are not. This can be clearly seen bylooking at six key dimensions of social organi-zation, with humans in each case doing thingsmuch more cooperatively than other apes (fora fuller account, see Tomasello 2011).

The cooperative organization of humansocieties.

Subsistence. All four species of nonhumangreat apes forage basically individually. Theymay travel in small groups, but they procureand consume food on their own. The oneexception to this pattern is the group huntingof chimpanzees, in which individuals surrounda monkey and capture it in basically the samemanner as social carnivores like lions andwolves. But even this is not really a collabora-tive activity in the human sense, as evidencedby the fact that the captor of the monkeyonly shares with others under duress (Gilby2006), and no one shares more with those whoparticipated in the hunt than with those whodid not (Boesch 1994).

In contrast, humans procure the vast major-ity of their food through collaborative effortsof one type or another. Clear evidence is thefact that during their foraging, contemporaryforagers help one another by doing such thingsas cutting a trail for others to follow; makinga bridge for others to cross a river; carryinganother’s child; climbing a tree to flush a mon-key for another hunter; calling the locationof a resource for another to exploit while hehimself continues searching for somethingelse; carrying game shot by another hunter;

climbing a tree to knock down fruit for othersto gather; helping look for others’ lost arrows;and helping repair others’ broken arrows. Hill(2002) documents that the Ache foragers ofSouth America spend from about 10% to 50%of their foraging time engaged in such altruisticactivities—pretty much all of which would beunthinkable for nonhuman primates. At theend of their foraging, humans, unlike otherapes, share the spoils of their collaborationfairly, even bringing it back to some centrallocation to do so (Hill & Hurtado 1996).

Property. Great apes often respect the fact thatanother individual physically possesses someobject or piece of food, and they do not starta fight for it (Kummer & Cords 1991). Butthe human institution of property is a cooper-ative regime through and through. Individualsmay claim objects for themselves by virtue ofmutually agreed-upon norms and institutions.For example, moviegoers may simply leave asweater on their seat to claim at least tempo-rary ownership. Not only do others mostly re-spect this signal, but if they do not respect itothers will often intervene to enforce the ab-sent individual’s property rights. Similarly, interms of food, Gurven (2004) documents howwidespread the sharing and trading of foodamong humans in small-scale societies is. In as-sessing possible hypotheses to explain this pat-tern of widespread food sharing, Gurven con-cludes that it is probably multiply determined,and the big picture is not tit-for-tat reciprocitybut rather “more complicated social arrange-ments, including those whereby important so-cial support is provided only if one adheresto socially negotiated sharing norms” (p. 559).And of course in many small-scale societies alarge role is played by a special kind of prop-erty exchange, the gift (Mauss 1954), which notonly transfers property but also serves to estab-lish and cement cooperative bonds as well ascreate obligations of reciprocation.

Childcare and prosocial behavior. In all fourspecies of nonhuman great apes, mothersprovide almost 100% of the childcare for their


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child. In contrast, human mothers—both thosein traditional societies and those in more mod-ern industrialized societies—typically provideabout 50% of the childcare for their child. Hu-man fathers, grandparents, and other femalesall pitch in to help. Hrdy (2009) has in fact pro-posed that this so-called cooperative breedingmay very well have been the instigating factorleading to humans’ hypercooperativeness. Inany case, humans do seem to sacrifice them-selves for others—everything from donatingblood to donating to charity to going to warfor the group—in ways that other apes do not(Richerson & Boyd 2005; for experimentalevidence, see Warneken & Tomasello 2006).

Communication and teaching. Great apescommunicate basically to tell others what to do.In contrast, humans often communicate help-fully in order to inform others of things thatare of interest to them, the recipients of the in-formation (Tomasello 2008). Even in their veryearliest nonverbal gestures, human infants usethe pointing gesture to inform others of the lo-cation of objects they are seeking and to pointout some interesting object to others only inorder to share their excitement with anotherperson (Liszkowski et al. 2004, 2006).

Deriving from this, human adults also in-form young children of things they need toknow, for their benefit. Although great ape ju-veniles learn much from the behavior of theirparents and others, adults do not actively teachyoungsters things in the way that humans do(Hoppit et al. 2008). Csibra & Gergely (2009)speculate that human teaching is absolutelycritical to the human way of life, as childrendiscern general principles of how things workand how one behaves in their society.

Politics. Politics is about social power, and thelines of social power are relatively clear forall four great ape species, with dominance andphysical strength (including greater numberson one side) ruling the day. In contrast, hu-man forager societies are notoriously egalitar-ian. Dominance plays a much less powerful rolethan in other great ape societies, as the group

exercises a kind of cooperative power in makingsure that no individual becomes too powerful(Boehm 1999). Indeed, in human small-scalesocieties the most powerful individuals oftenobtain and retain their power not by dominat-ing resources directly in the manner of othergreat apes, but rather by demonstrating boththeir ability to control resources and their co-operative propensities by distributing resourcesgenerously to others (Mauss 1954).

In terms of enforcement, in human small-scale societies peace is kept not only by retal-iation for harms done and reconciliation afterfights, as in great apes, but also by third-partyenforcement. That is, human observers punishperpetrators who victimize others, sometimesat a cost to themselves, whereas there is nosolid evidence of such third-party punishmentin other great apes (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003,2004; Riedl et al. 2011). Third-party punish-ment may be thought of as a kind of coopera-tive enforcement of peace and well-being in thegroup and plays a critical role in the creationand maintenance of social norms in general.

Norms and institutions. In many ways, themost distinctive feature of human social organi-zation is its normative structure. Human beingsnot only have statistical expectations aboutwhat others will do—which all apes have—theyalso have normative expectations about whatothers should do. These vary across differentcultures and form a continuum from moralnorms (typically concerning harm to others)to social conventions. Thus, we all know andexpect that people in our society should dresssedately for a funeral, and so anyone who wearsa red shirt cannot plead ignorance and thus maybe thought of as flaunting our norm withoutregard for our group. We may reasonably re-spond to this flaunting with disapproval, gossip,and, in egregious cases, by social ostracism—which means that all of us must be ever vigilantabout our reputations as norm followers(leading to various impression-managementstrategies; Goffman 1959). If the glue ofprimate societies is social relationships, thesuperglue of human societies is social norms.


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The ultimate outcome of social norms inhuman groups is the creation of social insti-tutions whose existence is constituted by thecollective agreement of all group members thatthings should be done in a particular way. Insti-tutions create both joint goals and individual so-cial roles (for both persons and objects). Searle(1995) refers to the creation of these roles asthe creation of status functions because as in-dividual people and objects assume these roles,they acquire deontic powers. For example, inthe process of trade, some objects (e.g., piecesof gold, special pieces of paper) have acquired insome societies the status of money and so playa special role in the trading process. And al-though nonhuman primates have some under-standing of familial relatedness, humans assignspecial status to social roles such as “spouse”and “parent”—which everyone recognizes andwhich create certain entitlements and obliga-tions. In the case of morality, the institutions oflaw and organized religion obviously interactin important ways with humans’ natural pro-clivities for cooperation and norm following toproduce an institutional dimension to much ofhuman morality.

Summary. The ineluctable conclusion is thusthat human social interaction and organiza-tion are fundamentally cooperative in ways thatthe social interaction and organization of othergreat apes simply are not.

Two evolutionary steps: the interdepen-dence hypothesis. Tomasello and colleagues(2012) argue and present evidence that humansbecame ultracooperative in all of these manyways in two main evolutionary steps. They calltheir theory the interdependence hypothesis.

In a first step, something in the ecologychanged, which forced humans to become col-laborative foragers: Individuals had to be goodcollaborators or else starve. In collaborativeinteractions of this type, individuals developednew skills of joint intentionality and newforms of second-personal social engagement.Individuals became interdependent with oneanother, such that each individual had a direct

interest in the well-being of others as partners.Thus, during a mutualistic collaboration, if mypartner is having trouble, it is in my interest tohelp her, since performance of her role is vitalto our joint success. Moreover, if I have somesense of the future, if one of my regular partnersis having trouble at any time, I will help her sothat I will have a good partner for tomorrow.Interdependence thus breeds helping. And thefact of partner choice helps to keep everyonecooperating and helps control cheating, as allindividuals (who have the requisite cognitiveabilities) know that others are judging them fortheir cooperativeness and that their survivaldepends on others choosing them as a partner.The result is that if I monopolize all the foodat the end of the foraging instead of sharing itequitably, or if I slack off on my work duringthe foraging, others will simply exclude me thenext time. This social selection of partners ininterdependent contexts thus advantages goodcooperators. The result was what one may calla joint morality, in which individuals helpedothers with whom they were interdependent,considered those others to be equally deservingof their share of the collaborative spoils,and felt answerable to others (as others wereanswerable to them) for being a good partner.

In a second step, as modern humans facedcompetition from other groups, they scaled upthese new collaborative skills and motivationsto group life in general. With a constant threatfrom other groups, group life in general becameone big interdependent collaboration for main-taining group survival, in which each individualhad to play his or her role. In these larger cul-tural groups—typically with a tribal structurecomprising smaller bands—many interactionswere not based on personal histories of individ-uals with one another but rather on group mem-bership alone. It was thus crucial for each indi-vidual to do things the way that “we” as a groupdo them, that is, to actively conform to the waysof the group in order to coordinate with othersand display one’s group membership. This kindof group-mindedness, underlain by skills ofcollective intentionality, engendered truly im-personal, agent-neutral, objective social norms.


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Humans not only assiduously follow suchnorms themselves, but they also enforce themin an impersonal manner on all in the group, in-cluding even on themselves through feelings ofguilt and shame. The result was what one maycall a collective morality, in which individualsregulated their actions via the morally legiti-mate expectations of others and the group—morally legitimate by their own assessment—engendering what some have called normativeself-governance (Korsgaard 1996).

An argument could be made that contem-porary humans are less cooperative than weretheir forebears at either of these two previousperiods. But contemporary humans are in theprocess of adapting their cooperative skills andmotivations to novel conditions, namely, themixing together of people from different eth-nic groups into modern cities, along with theemergence of important institutions such as lawand organized religion. Our assumption is thatthe two key steps in the evolution of humancooperation, and thus morality, took place be-fore the advent of agriculture and cities, and lawand organized religion, as humans first becameobligate collaborative foragers and second cre-ated cultural groups that competed with oneanother.

ONTOGENETIC ORIGINS OFHUMAN MORALITYThe classic theoretical perspectives on the on-togeny of human cooperation and moralitywere laid out centuries ago by Hobbes andRousseau. Hobbes believed that humans werenaturally selfish and that society, including theforce of a central government, was necessaryfor people to become cooperative. Rousseau,on the other hand, believed that humans weremore naturally cooperative and that as they en-tered society as children, they were corrupted.

The reality of course is that young childrenare both selfish and cooperative. The interest-ing question here is how they become moralbeings that have concerns for the well-beingof others in the group and at the same timelook out for their own individual interests. The

difference between ontogeny and phylogeny inthis context is that young children are born intoa cultural world already full of all kinds of moralnorms and institutions. In Piaget’s (1997/1932)classic account, children’s earliest premoralityis basically respect for and conformity to thenorms and rules of adults, based on a respect forauthority. They only later come to understandhow these norms and rules essentially work asagreements among peers of equal status in acommunity.

Our contention here is that young childrenbefore about 3 years of age may not really un-derstand social norms as such. Instead, they maybe responding only to adult imperatives and notto the force of any agreements among mem-bers of their group. And so our ontogeneticaccount parallels our phylogenetic account. Intheir first step toward human morality, youngchildren collaborate with and act prosociallytoward other specific individuals. In their sec-ond step, they begin to participate in the socialnorms and institutions of their culture. Thesetwo steps—an initial second-personal moralityfollowed by a more norm-based morality—takeinfants into a full-fledged human morality.

Toddlers’ Second-Personal MoralityHuman infants begin forming social relation-ships with others during the first year of life.They also presumably have some sense of theirdependence on, if not interdependence with,other people. Although young children are ofcourse selfish in many situations, in many othersituations they subordinate their self-interestsin order to do such things as collaborate withothers, sympathize with and help others, andshare resources with others. They also evaluateothers in terms of such cooperative behaviorsand begin to help and share with others moreselectively as a result.

Collaboration and commitment. Youngchildren are surprisingly skilled collaborativeand cooperative partners. Already early in thesecond year of life, toddlers can take turns toachieve social coordination with others (e.g.,


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Eckerman et al. 1989, Eckerman & Didow1989). More relevant for our purposes, youngchildren are motivated to participate jointlyin joint activities: When a cooperative activitybreaks down (such as when the partner suddenlystops participating), 18-month-olds and 2-year-olds, and to some degree even 14-month-olds,actively try to re-engage the partner in orderto continue the joint activity rather than at-tempt to continue the activity by themselves(Warneken et al. 2006, Warneken & Tomasello2007). Strikingly, this is true even when thepartner is not needed for the child to completethe activity (Warneken et al. 2012).

Thus, children do not view their collabo-rative partner as a social tool to achieve theirown goal but rather in a truly collaborativelight. This is in contrast to chimpanzees, whichdo not show this motivation for jointness intheir collaborative behavior, as discussed above(Warneken et al. 2006). Indeed, when given afree choice of how to obtain food, chimpanzeeschoose a solo option over a collaborative one,whereas 3-year-old children more often choosethe collaborative option (Rekers et al. 2011).These findings together point to a fundamen-tal human drive to collaborate with others toachieve joint and shared goals.

Furthermore, once people have formed ajoint goal, they feel committed to it: They knowthat opting out will harm or disappoint the oth-ers, and they act in ways that prevent this. Re-cent work has revealed that even toddlers showan understanding of such commitments. For in-stance, when working jointly with a partner ona task that should result in both actors receivinga reward, 3.5-year-olds continue to work untilthe partner has received his reward even if theyhave already received their own reward earlierin the process (Hamann et al. 2012). Moreover,when 3-year-olds need to break away from ajoint commitment with a partner, they do notsimply walk away but “take leave” from theother as a way of acknowledging and askingto be excused for breaking the commitment(Grafenhain et al. 2009).

Thus, even very young children are social,collaborative, and cooperative beings who view

their collaborative and cooperative efforts as in-herently joint. Such jointness makes childreninterdependent; they need the other to achievetheir (social) goals, and they know that the otherneeds them. They thus experience collabora-tion and cooperation as committed activities.Certainly by 3 years of age, children feel re-sponsible for their joint commitments and ei-ther make an effort to honor them or “apolo-gize” for breaking them. From early on, then,children show strong signs of interdependence.

Sympathy and helping. Young children andeven infants demonstrate remarkable prosocialtendencies. By 14 to 18 months of age, theyreadily engage in instrumental helping suchas picking up an object that an adult hasaccidentally dropped or opening a cabinet doorwhen an adult cannot do so because his handsare full. They do not do these things in controlsituations that are similar but in which the adultdoes not need help; for instance, they do notpick up an object the adult has thrown downintentionally or open a door he approacheswith no intention of opening it (Warneken &Tomasello 2006, 2007). Toddlers even helpothers at some cost to themselves (Svetlovaet al. 2010). Importantly, infants’ helping isnot limited to completing others’ action goals.Thus, when 12-month-old infants see an adultsearching for an object that they know the loca-tion of, they point to direct the adult’s attentionto it (Liszkowski et al. 2006, 2008). Given thatinfants themselves do not gain anything byproviding this information, their informativepointing may be considered a prosocial act.

A common belief is that young childrenbecome prosocial as a result of encouragementand rewards from adults. However, in a recentstudy, when 20-month-old children were mate-rially rewarded for their helpful behavior, theirhelpfulness actually decreased over time oncethe reward was taken away; children who werenot rewarded at all or received only verbal praisemaintained a high level of helpfulness through-out (Warneken & Tomasello 2008). Followingthe logic of overjustification, this findingsuggests that young children’s motivation to


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help is intrinsic and not dependent on concreteextrinsic rewards, and indeed it is underminedby such rewards (Lepper et al. 1973). Rein-forcing this finding, Hepach and colleagues(2012b) found, using a physiological measureof children’s arousal, that 2-year-olds are notmotivated primarily by a need to help a personthemselves (and thus to benefit themselves viareciprocity or an improved reputation) butrather by a need just to see the person helped.

During this same early period, youngchildren also begin to provide comfort andassistance to those in emotional distress, suchas a person who is in pain after bumping herknee or is upset about her broken teddy bear(e.g., Bischof-Kohler 1991, Eisenberg & Fabes1998, Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992). The concernchildren show for a distressed individualcorrelates with and is thought to motivate theirprosocial acts toward that individual (Eisenberg& Miller 1987). Strikingly, young children’sconcern is not an automatic response to distresscues but rather a flexible and sophisticatedresponse. This has recently been shown in twoways. First, 1.5- and 2-year-old children showconcern and subsequent prosocial behaviortoward a victim of harm even if the victimexpresses no overt distress cues while beingharmed (Vaish et al. 2009). Second, 3-year-oldchildren show reduced concern and prosocialbehavior toward a crybaby, i.e., a person who isconsiderably distressed after being very mildlyinconvenienced, than toward a person who issimilarly distressed after being more seriouslyharmed (Hepach et al. 2012a; see also Leslieet al. 2006). Thus, children’s sympathetic re-sponses take into account not only the presenceor absence of distress cues from a person butalso the contextual cues surrounding the dis-tress. From early in ontogeny, then, sympathyis a multidetermined and thus reliable response(see Hoffman 2000, Vaish & Warneken 2012).

Around the same time that young childrendemonstrate these remarkable prosocial behav-iors themselves, they also show a preference forprosocial over antisocial others. Indeed, evenearly in the very first year, infants distinguishprosocial from antisocial characters and prefer

to touch prosocial characters (Hamlin &Wynn 2011, Hamlin et al. 2007, Kuhlmeieret al. 2003). These preferences soon becomeevident in children’s prosocial behaviors. Byage 2 years, for instance, toddlers help thosewho were helpful to them in previous interac-tions more than those who were not helpful,demonstrating direct reciprocity (Dunfield &Kuhlmeier 2010). Just a year later, childrenalso demonstrate indirect reciprocity: Forinstance, 3- to 4-year-old children reduce theirprosocial behavior toward an individual whocaused or intended to cause harm to anotherindividual (Kenward & Dahl 2011, Vaish et al.2010). Through such selective helping, youngchildren demonstrate their recognition ofand preference to interact and cooperate withthose who are prosocial and their avoidanceof those who are harmful or noncooperative,both toward them and toward others.

Moreover, and in line with our evolutionaryanalysis, there is evidence that children help anindividual more in a collaborative context thana noncollaborative context. In a recent study,Hamann et al. (2012) showed that 3.5-year-oldsare more likely to help a peer attain a rewardwhen they previously attained a reward by par-ticipating in a collaborative task with the peerthan when they previously attained a rewardwithout participating in a collaborative task. Onthe other hand, although chimpanzees do showsome prosocial behaviors toward humans andconspecifics (e.g., Melis et al. 2011, Warneken& Tomasello 2006), this behavior is not affectedby whether the context is a collaborative or anoncollaborative one (Greenberg et al. 2010).This is consistent with the idea that humanprosocial behavior evolved in interdependent,collaborative contexts.

Together, these findings on infants’ andtoddlers’ instrumental helping, informativepointing, concern, comforting, and selectivehelping of harmed and/or cooperative othersdemonstrate that from early on, children aretuned to others’ needs and emotional states andare motivated to act prosocially toward them.Moreover, the research shows that children’searly prosociality is the real thing in that it is


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intrinsically motivated, based in concern forothers, grounded in an interpretation of thesituation, flexible depending on interactionsand evaluations of others, and facilitated bycollaboration.

Equality and sharing. Young children’sprosocial proclivities are apparent not only intheir helping and sympathizing but also intheir sharing behaviors. Naturalistic observa-tions suggest that as early as 8 months of age,infants may show or give toys to parents, otherinfants, siblings, and strangers, even when re-sources are low (e.g., Hay 1979, Rheingoldet al. 1976). With development, sharing be-comes increasingly selective: Even 12-month-old infants make some distinctions between re-cipients of their prosocial actions, being morelikely to share objects with their peers and withtheir own mothers than with the peers’ mothers(Young & Lewis 1979).

Some experimental work on early sharingsuggests, however, that toddlers are not so will-ing to share. For instance, spontaneous shar-ing of food was not found among 18- or 25-month-old children in an experimental setting(Brownell et al. 2009). Furthermore, 3- to 4-year-olds are generally found to be selfish intheir distributions, whereas at 5 to 6 years ofage, children show a greater sense of equalityand fairness (Fehr et al. 2008, Lane & Coon1972, Rochat et al. 2009). However, these ex-perimental studies involved windfall situationsin which a child is given some resources by athird party without having to work for them andmust relinquish some resources to demonstratefairness. Such situations are removed from theevolutionary mechanisms that we believe likelyshape these phenomena in early ontogeny. Ourhypothesis is that from early in ontogeny, chil-dren’s sharing and fairness-related behaviorsshould reflect the effects of the collaborativeforaging context of early humans, in which oneshares the spoils equally among those who tookpart in the collaborative effort. We thus arguethat prior work has underestimated children’ssensitivity to equality because it has not pro-vided the relevant context.

Accordingly, recent work shows that 3-year-old children who have obtained rewards byworking collaboratively with each other divideup their spoils equitably rather than monopoliz-ing them, even when the resources could easilybe monopolized (Warneken et al. 2011). This isin stark contrast to chimpanzees, whose strongtendency to compete over the spoils of collabo-rative efforts severely limits their collaboration(Melis et al. 2006). Most strikingly, 3-year-oldchildren are also more likely to divide up theirrewards equally if they obtained the rewards byworking collaboratively than by working indi-vidually or receiving a windfall (Hamann et al.2011).

Young children not only distribute re-sources equally themselves but also distinguishequal from unequal distributions and preferequal distributors and distributions. For in-stance, Schmidt & Sommerville (2011) showedthat 15-month-old infants expect resourcesto be distributed equally among recipients.Geraci & Surian (2011) further showed thatwhen 16-month-olds see one distributorbeing fair toward a recipient (by distributingresources equally between the recipient anda second individual) and another distributorbeing unfair toward the same recipient, theyexpect the recipient to approach the equaldistributor, and in a manual choice task, theythemselves show a preference for the equaldistributor. These preferences also play outin the distribution behavior of somewhatolder children: 3.5-year-olds distribute moreresources to individuals who have previouslyshared with others than to individuals who havenot shared (Olson & Spelke 2008), althoughto our knowledge, whether children wouldgive more resources to equal than to unequaldistributors remains an unexplored question.

Over the course of development, children’sresource distribution moves beyond only equal-ity and becomes more sensitive to reciprocitynorms, relationships, and the behaviors of oth-ers. Thus, around 3 years of age, children’s shar-ing of toys with a peer increases if that peerhad previously shared toys with them, suggest-ing a sensitivity to direct reciprocity by this age


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(Levitt et al. 1985). Moreover, 3-year-olds dis-play negative emotional responses to distribu-tions in which they receive less, and indeed,even occasionally when they receive more thananother child (LoBue et al. 2011). By about4 years of age, children share (even at a cost tothemselves) with their friends more than withnonfriends or strangers (Birch & Billman 1986,Moore 2009), and by 8 years of age, childrenshare more with their in-group than their out-group members (Fehr et al. 2008).

A full-blown concept of fairness, i.e., an un-derstanding of distributive justice or the properway to divide up resources among people takinginto account multiple factors (Nisan 1984), be-gins to emerge only in the school years. In thetraditional work on the development of fairness,children are presented with hypothetical fair orunfair scenarios and are interviewed about theirresponses to the scenarios. This work has re-vealed a developmental trend such that youngchildren progress from considering largely ir-relevant characteristics of recipients such as de-sire, age, or height, to a preference for equaldivision of resources at about 5 or 6 years ofage, to a preference for reward in proportionto the input (i.e., equity) among children olderthan 6 years of age (e.g., Damon 1975, Hook& Cook 1979). Eventually, children move be-yond the equity rule to integrate both need andmerit information (see Damon 1977). By 8 yearsof age, children can vary their allocation deci-sions appropriately depending on context. Forinstance, they rely on the principle of equityin a reward-for-work context, of equality in avoting context, and of need in a charity context(Sigelman & Waitzman 1991; see also Enrightet al. 1984).

Interestingly, however, a recent studyshowed that the context of collaborationfacilitates even young children’s understandingof equity (Ng et al. 2011). In this study,children were presented with scenarios inwhich one giver gave an equal proportion ofhis resources to himself and a receiver, whereasanother giver gave himself a greater proportionthan the receiver. The scenarios differed inwhether the givers had obtained the resources

by working collaboratively with the receiveror by working individually. Even 3-year-oldsjudged the fair giver—the one who gave anequal proportion—to be nicer than the unfairgiver, but only in the collaborative context;children did not distinguish the proportionaldistributions in the individual context. Thus,in a collaborative context, which we argue ishighly relevant for resource distribution, evenpreschoolers demonstrate sophisticated intu-itions about proportional distribution, which iscentral to the full-fledged concept of fairness.

In sum, recent work has provided evidencefor a surprisingly early ontogenetic emergenceof sharing and the foundations of fairness, atleast in the sense of equality. Toddlers, andto some degree even infants, show a sense ofequality in resource distributions, in particularwhen examined in collaboration situations.Moreover, when faced with the choice ofinteracting with or distributing resourcesto others, even very young children show apreference for individuals who distribute toothers equally. In collaborative situations,they also show sensitivity to a critical aspectof fairness—equity. Thus, sharing and somefoundational aspects of fairness appear early inmoral development, especially in early collab-orative and cooperative contexts. They are animportant aspect of toddlers’ second-personalmorality and are, we argue, the seeds of thefull-fledged norm-based sense of fairness thatemerges later in development.

Summary. Evidence is mounting for a re-markably rich and multifaceted morality, inthe sense of prosociality, very early in humanontogeny. Toddlers and even infants readily en-gage in collaborative activities with others andrecognize the jointness, or interdependence,therein. They also help others in a variety ofways, even when it does not benefit them to doso, and they show a sense of equality in dividingup resources in some situations. Importantly,toddlers help others more and are more likelyto share equally with them when they arecollaborating with them, providing support forour hypothesis that it was within the context of


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collaboration or interdependence that prosocialbehavior likely emerged. Toddlers also evaluateothers in terms of their prosocial and coopera-tive behaviors and withdraw their helping andsharing from noncooperative individuals.

Still, all of these behaviors and evaluationsare, we argue, based less in a normative, agent-neutral understanding of morality that appliesto everyone equally and more in a second-personal morality based on personal relation-ships and social emotions (Darwall 2006). Thus,toddlers view others primarily from their ownindividual standpoint based on their own eval-uation of whether the others’ behavior is de-serving of sympathy or blame. This is the firststage of morality, but it is not a fully adult-like morality; the critical second stage of norm-based, agent-neutral morality is still to come.

Preschoolers’ Norm-Based MoralityToddlers certainly respond when adults en-force norms, for example, when adults tell themthings such as, “We don’t hit other children.”They thus seem to follow all kinds of socialnorms. It is not clear, though, whether theyare responding to the norm per se. They couldequally be responding simply to the adult’s in-dividual imperative utterance that they do ordo not do something at that moment. But re-sponding to the norm itself means respondingto something more general and timeless thanthat.

In adult society, social norms are mutualexpectations, indeed mutual agreements orcommitments, about the way that individualsought to behave in certain situations. Normsgo beyond the particular—they are generaland agent neutral—in at least three ways. First,social norms articulate an objective standardof behavior that is mutually known by all inthe group: In situations like this, one ought tobehave like that—and we all, including you,know this. Second, the force of the norm is notindividual opinion but rather group opinion(or perhaps some other larger entity suchas the group’s gods), based ultimately in anagreement or commitment into which each

individual enters. It is not just that I don’t likeyou doing that, but rather that it is wrong, andwe (including you) have agreed that we don’tbehave like that. Third, the norm applies toeveryone in the group (or perhaps subgroup)equally, including the self. “One” does notbehave like that in this group, and that appliesto me as well. Social norms are thus mutuallyknown group expectations and commitments,with respect to group-known standards, whichall group members are expected to respect.

Until there is more research, we may re-main agnostic about precisely how toddlers un-derstand social norms as adults enforce them,and in particular whether they understand theirgenerality and agent neutrality. However, start-ing at approximately 3 years of age, children be-gin enforcing social norms on others, and theway they do this provides strong evidence thatthey have begun to understand social norms assomething that goes beyond individuals and,importantly, beyond themselves.

Enforcement of social norms. As docu-mented above, toddlers socially evaluate otherpersons in selectively helping and sharing withthem depending on, essentially, whether theyview them as nice or mean. In addition, tod-dlers are building up knowledge of what thenorm is, statistically speaking, in many situa-tions. They thus learn and apply words suchas broken, dirty, and bad to situations that vio-late standards and are thus not “normal” (Kagan1981). But beyond avoiding mean people andnoticing statistical irregularities, children ap-proximately 3 years of age also begin to activelyintervene in situations—either physically or inacts of verbal protest—to try to set right de-viations and violations of the norm. Crucially,they do this from a third-party stance, whenthey themselves are not directly involved or af-fected by the norm violation, and they oftendo this with normative language, using genericterms that explicitly mark the generality andagent neutrality of the judgment.

For example, in a recent study (Vaish et al.2011b) children and two puppets each created adrawing or a sculpture, after which one puppet


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(the recipient) left the room. When the remain-ing puppet (the actor) then began to destroythe recipient’s creation, 3-year-olds protestedverbally against the actor’s actions. Impres-sively, approximately one-quarter of the chil-dren protested using normative language suchas “You can’t do that,” versus, for instance, im-peratives or desire-dependent language such as“I don’t want you to do that” (Searle 2001).Pilot work with 2-year-olds showed almostno protest in such situations. Rossano et al.(2011) found something very similar: 3-year-olds protested, again sometimes normatively,when one puppet threatened to take homeor throw away another puppet’s possession,whereas 2-year-olds only protested in an agent-specific manner (when the actor acted on thechildren’s possessions and thus directly causedharm to them) but not in an agent-neutral man-ner. In both of these studies, 3-year-olds wentbeyond objecting to harm done to them andapplied the moral norm against causing harmin an agent-neutral way: on behalf of someoneelse, as a disinterested enforcer, with the judg-ment marked as applying generally to all in thegroup.

Beyond protesting verbally, childrendemonstrate several other enforcement-likebehaviors during third-party moral transgres-sions. For instance, 3-year-olds who witness anactor destroying an absent recipient’s artworklater tattle to the recipient about the actor’sactions, perhaps as a way to have the transgres-sor punished (Vaish et al. 2011b). Children ofthis age also carry out restorative justice byreturning to a victim what a thief had stolen(Riedl et al. 2011). They thus intervene andrespond to third-party moral transgressionsin multiple ways that provide convergingevidence for their emerging agent-neutralmorality.

Interestingly, and perhaps even moretellingly, 3-year-old children also interveneand protest when someone violates a con-ventional norm, in which there is no harminvolved. Thus, Rakoczy and colleagues (2008)had children watch as a puppet announced thathe would now “dax,” but he then performed

a different action than the one the child hadpreviously seen an adult doing and calling“daxing.” Most children objected in some way,even though the game was a solitary activity sothat playing it incorrectly did not harm, or eveninconvenience, anyone. Again, as with moralnorms, children often used normative, genericlanguage such as “No, it does not go likethat!” Two-year-olds protested to some extentin this study, but almost always imperativelyrather than normatively. Importantly, childrenwere not just objecting to the fact that thepuppet did not perform the action he said hewould, as a subsequent study obtained the sameresults with a nonverbal indication of the gamecontext: A particular action was acceptablewhen carried out in a particular location thatmarked the appropriate context for the action,but not when it was carried out in a differentlocation that marked a different, inappropriatecontext for the action (Wyman et al. 2009).

Three-year-olds’ emerging understandingof social norms as agreements among peopleis especially clear in studies involving jointpretense. In studies by Rakoczy (2008) andWyman et al. (2009), 3-year-old children againobjected—in much the same way as in the otherstudies of moral norms and game rules—whena puppet used a wooden block as a pretendsandwich if the child and an adult had previ-ously designated that block as pretend soap(“No, one can’t eat that. It’s soap!”). When thesame block was later designated as a sandwichin a different game, then children objectedif it was used as soap. This flexible behaviorclearly demonstrates that young children can,at least in pretense contexts, understand thatthe norms constituting the game are, in a sense,agreements that can be changed.

Finally, even further evidence for youngchildren’s understanding of the basic workingsof social norms is provided by their selectiveenforcement of different types of social normsdepending on group membership. Thus,children not only distinguish moral fromconventional norms on multiple levels (see,e.g., Turiel 2006), but they also enforce thetwo distinctly. In particular, when 3-year-old


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children see a moral norm being broken by anin-group member and an out-group member(as determined by their accents), they protestequivalently. But when they see a conventionalnorm being broken by these same agents, theyprotest more against an in-group member thanan out-group member (Schmidt et al. 2011). Inthis way as well, then, 3-year-olds have a senseof the conventional nature of conventionalnorms, that is, that these norms have beendecided on by, and thus apply only to, one’sown group but that members of other groupsmay not be aware of or need not follow thesame conventions. The same is not true ofmoral norms involving harm, toward whichthey take a more universalist approach.

Together, these recent findings suggestthat, at least by 3 years of age, children do notview social norms solely in terms of authority,as Piaget assumed. Rather, they recognizethem as general, agent-neutral, mutual expec-tations that represent some kind of implicitagreement of how we ought to behave—withthe “we” conceptualized differently in the caseof moral versus conventional norms. Becausechildren’s emerging understanding of socialnorms involves such things as agent neutrality,generic language, and reference to the group, itmay be seen as reflecting their emerging skillsand motivations for collective intentionality(Tomasello et al. 2012).

Reputation, guilt, and shame. In their every-day worlds, young children are less often judg-ing and enforcing norms on others, and moreoften being judged and having norms enforcedon them. Once more, the degree to which tod-dlers do or do not understand this fact is not to-tally clear, but children certainly seem to knowthat their behavior is being normatively as-sessed, and they sometimes alter their behav-ior accordingly (self-presentational behavior).Moreover, when they transgress, they may evenjudge and punish themselves via internalized so-cial norms in acts of guilt and shame.

Research using verbal tasks has suggestedthat it is only around 8 years of age that childrenstart to engage in self-presentational behavior

(e.g., Banerjee 2002). However, two recentstudies have found evidence of such behaviorseven in preschoolers. In one recent study byPiazza and colleagues (2011), 5- to 6-year-oldswere faced with a challenging rule-basedtask while they were either “watched by aninvisible person,” watched by an adult, or wereunobserved. Children cheated significantly lesson the task when they were observed, either bythe invisible person or by the adult, than whenthey were unobserved. Engelmann et al. (2012)found similar results with peer observers andextended the findings to a prosocial condition.Specifically, they found that children stoleless from an imaginary child recipient, andtended to help that recipient more, if a peerwas observing them. Relatedly, in a differentexperimental paradigm, Haun & Tomasello(2012) found that 4-year-olds conformed totheir peers’ perceptual judgments (even whenthey knew better themselves) if they had toexpress their judgment publicly, in front ofthe peers, but not if they expressed it alone.Thus, not only do young children judge andform reputations about others’ behavior, butthey also know that they are being judged andactively try to manage those judgments.

Children in these studies anticipate beingjudged and then behave so as to increasepositive and decrease negative evaluations ofthemselves. They manage to avoid havingnorms applied to them by, in effect, pre-emptively applying the norms to themselves.But when children do transgress, even if no onesees them and so no one applies the norm, theystill quite often apply the norm to themselvesthrough guilt or shame. Thus, if they breaka toy that belongs to someone else, manypreschoolers show signs of feeling guilty orashamed (e.g., Barrett et al. 1993, Kochanskaet al. 2002, Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska 1990).These feelings may be seen as a kind of self-punishment that function to prevent individualsfrom repeating the transgression, lessening thechances of actual punishment from others inthe future. Under special conditions individualsmay also reward themselves by feeling prideat having lived up to a social norm when they


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could have gotten away with ignoring it (e.g.,they helped others at great cost to themselves),and this self-praise presumably leads to morenorm following in the future (Tangney et al.2007).

Guilt, shame, and pride are thus internal-ized versions of the kind of moral judgmentsthat humans mete out to others who violate orfollow social norms. These norm-related, self-conscious emotions thus demonstrate with spe-cial clarity that the judgment being made is notmy personal feeling about things, but ratherthe group’s. I am sanctioning myself or prais-ing myself on behalf of the group, as it were. Ipushed the child off the swing because I wantedto play on the swing, and I still like playing onit, but I also feel guilty about harming the otherchild. As a particularly strong demonstrationof group-mindedness, school-age children evenshow collective guilt, shame, and pride; that is,they feel guilt, shame, or pride if a member ofthe group with which they identify does some-thing blameworthy or praiseworthy, as if theythemselves had transgressed (Bennett & Sani2008).

Interestingly and importantly, anotherfunction of social emotions such as guilt andshame comes from their display for others.For instance, displaying guilt to others servesimportant appeasement functions, showingothers that I am already suffering, which Ihope will evoke concern and forgiveness fromthe victim and from bystanders, thus reducingthe likelihood of punishment (Keltner &Anderson 2000). Guilt displays also indicatethat the transgressor did not mean to causeharm and, more generally, that he is not thekind of person that means harm. They signalthat he intends to make amends and to behavemore appropriately in the future and that heis aware of and committed to the norms ofthe group (Castelfranchi & Poggi 1990). Aremorseful transgressor should thus be seenas self-policing, dependable, and cooperative,eliciting forgiveness, affiliation, and coopera-tion from the victim and other group members(Darby & Schlenker 1982, 1989; Goffman1967).

Indeed, there is evidence that 6-year-oldchildren blame apologetic actors less, pun-ish them less, forgive them more, and likethem better than unapologetic actors (Darby& Schlenker 1982, 1989). Children 4 to 5 yearsof age also regard situations in which an actorapologizes as better and more just than onesin which the actor is unapologetic (Irwin &Moore 1971, Wellman et al. 1979). Even inthe absence of explicit apologies, 5-year-oldsshow a preference for transgressors who dis-play guilt, and they prefer to distribute moreresources to guilt-displaying transgressors thanto unremorseful ones (Vaish et al. 2011a). Thus,preschoolers are tuned in to the social functionsthat displaying an emotion such as guilt serves.

Interestingly, not only do preschoolers pre-fer those who follow norms, but they also pre-fer those who enforce them. In a recent study(Vaish et al. 2012), 4.5- to 6-year-old childrenwatched videos of an observer responding to atransgression she witnessed by either enforcingthe norm that the transgressor had broken (e.g.,she said in a mildly angry tone, “Hey, you’vebroken [the victim’s] doll! You shouldn’t dothat. It’s not good”) or by not enforcing theviolated norm (e.g., she said in a neutral tone,“Oh, you’ve broken [the victim’s] ball. Oh well,it doesn’t matter”). Children judged that theenforcer had done the right thing, they eval-uated the nonenforcer as less good, and theypreferred the enforcer. This was despite thefact that the enforcer was actually more neg-ative and unpleasant in her behavior (since sheshowed some anger) than was the nonenforcer.

We may thus see a continuous line from tod-dlers’ social evaluations of others as either help-ful or harmful individuals to their enforcementof social norms. From very early on, they arejudging others and even being selective aboutthe target of their own cooperative behaviorsbased on those judgments (see previous sec-tion). But it is only during later preschool yearsthat children understand this process of judg-ment such that they know they are being judgedand so can do things to manage those judgments(impression management or self-presentationalbehaviors). One hypothesis is that this is made


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possible by some kind of second-order mentalreasoning of the form, “I am thinking aboutwhat you are thinking about me” (Banerjee2002). Perhaps such second-order reasoning isalso involved as they judge the judgers and findgood those who find moral transgressions bad.

Summary. During the later preschool years,then, children become truly moral agents—though of course there are still many furtherdevelopments to come. The key is that theyno longer consider and act toward individualsbased only on their own individual judgmentsof them (although they certainly continueto do that). Rather, they have in additionbegun to understand and even internalize theagent-neutral social norms of the group andto consider individuals as group members whoboth apply social norms to others and havesocial norms applied to them. And, crucially,they come to consider themselves as just oneindividual among others—nothing special inthe eyes of social norms—and even, in anastounding testament to their bifurcated senseof self, to apply the norms and accompanyingpunishment equally to themselves.

Four- and 5-year-old children thus oper-ate with an agent-neutral, norm-based moralityin which all individuals, including themselves,are equal players. Moreover, they come to self-regulate their behavior in accordance with thesenorms, so much so that older preschoolers typ-ically enter new situations not just followingnorms, but actively seeking out what thosenorms are: “What am I supposed to do here?How do I do it?” (Kalish 1998). Their sense ofself is bound up with behaving in accordancewith norms.

CONCLUSIONThere is no doubt that humans are a proso-cial and cooperative species, but it is becomingincreasingly clear that humans are not uniquein this regard. Our closest living relatives, thenonhuman great apes, are also prosocial andcooperative in several ways: Under some cir-cumstances, they help others instrumentally,

share food with others, reciprocate favors, co-ordinate efforts with others, and choose part-ners selectively based on their prior experienceswith them. The evolutionary origins of humanmorality and cooperation are thus undoubtedlyto be found in our primate cousins. Yet humansare vastly more, and distinctly, cooperative ascompared to other primates. In contrast to greatapes, human societies are much more egalitar-ian in nature, as evident, for instance, in ourchildcare practices, in which many individualshelp mothers raise children. Moreover, humansocieties are universally marked by the cooper-ative endeavors of norms and institutions thathave been mutually agreed upon by the mem-bers of the group and that govern the behaviorof those in the group.

We have argued that these unique aspects ofhuman cooperation have resulted from changesin human feeding ecology that caused humans,in a first step, to become obligate collabora-tive foragers, which created an interdependenceamong individuals unprecedented in the pri-mate order. At this point in humans’ evolution-ary history, prosocial and cooperative behav-iors were based on interpersonal interactionswith specific individuals, as they seem to be withapes. What was different was that humans be-gan to take a mutualistic rather than a purelyindividualistic approach to cooperative activitysuch that they became deeply invested in notonly their own but also their partners’ welfare—they began to care about the joint nature oftheir cooperative activities—and they began tocare about how they were perceived by othersas partners.

In a second step, the rise of intergroup com-petition gave way to a group-mindedness thatis, we argue, totally unique to humans amongprimates. At this stage, humans began to carenot only about their personal interactions andhistories with others but also about the moregeneral functioning of the group, which meantkeeping track of how individuals (includingthe self ) contributed to or detracted from thegroup’s well-being. This was the beginningof the agent-neutral, group-level, norm-basedpsychology that marks so much of human


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cooperation and morality today. We may thuspropose that although great apes are certainlyprosocial and cooperative in some ways, andearly humans extended this considerably, laterhumans cooperated in a special, agent-neutralway that is fully “moral.”

Interestingly, these two evolutionary stepsare, at least to some degree, paralleled in on-togeny. From very early on, children and per-haps even infants seem to cooperate at the in-terpersonal, or second-personal, level whereinthey collaborate with others, sympathize withthose in need, have a basic sense of equality,evaluate others’ behaviors, and engage in reci-procity. Moreover, even children’s early coop-erative tendencies are marked by the mutualis-tic or joint attitude that we argue emerged inthe first step of our evolutionary history. Thus,already in the early toddler years, the nature ofchildren’s prosocial and cooperative behaviorsis distinct from that of apes.

By 3 to 4 years of age, children beginto demonstrate the norm-based group-mindedness that also represents the secondevolutionary step in our story. Children nowfunction not only at the second-personalbut also at the agent-neutral level, and theynow view individuals (including themselves)as group members who ought to follow thegroup’s social norms. Moreover, they be-gin to enforce these norms on others and onthemselves. With these developments, childrenbegin to demonstrate the special, agent-neutral,and norm-based sort of cooperation that isconsidered to be fully moral. Thus, in both theevolutionary and the ontogenetic stories, thefirst step in the sequence is mutualistic collab-oration and prosocially motivated interactionswith specific other individuals, and the secondstep is the more abstract, agent-neutral, norm-based morality of individuals who live in morelarge-scale cultural worlds full of impersonaland mutually known conventions, norms, andinstitutions.

One question that arises is what contributesto the ontogenetic shift from a second-personalto a norm-based morality. A part of the answercertainly lies in social-cognitive development:

In order to engage in a norm-based moral-ity, children must move from seeing individ-uals and social interactions purely in interper-sonal terms to additionally seeing all individualsfrom an agent-neutral or bird’s-eye perspective(the “view from nowhere”; Nagel 1986). Theymust also develop the capacity to see themselvesas individuals just like all other individuals, toevaluate their own behavior, and to understandthat others evaluate them in the same way thatthey evaluate others. These are all quite chal-lenging developmental feats that are likely ac-complished gradually over time rather than allat once. The transition from a second-personalto a norm-based morality is thus not an abruptone, and so it is plausible that some norm-basedmorality is evident even at age 2 years, whereasin many circumstances, even adults may notdemonstrate a full-fledged norm-based moral-ity or else the two forms may conflict in a moraldilemma (e.g., should I break the law to help myfriend or relative?).

Furthermore, there are certainly enormousinfluences of culture and socialization on theemergence and development of morality inchildhood. There is, for example, evidence ofcultural and experiential influences on chil-dren’s prosocial behavior (see Eisenberg 1989,1992). For instance, although similar levelsof instrumental helping were recently foundamong 18-month-olds in Canada, India, andPeru (Callaghan et al. 2011), a study of 5-year-olds’ prosocial behavior revealed that Germanand Israeli children displayed more prosocialbehavior toward a distressed adult as com-pared to Indonesian and Malaysian children(Trommsdorff et al. 2007). Trommsdorff et al.(2007) propose that in cultures that promoteface-saving values and respect for hierarchicalrelations (such as Indonesia and Malaysia),ignoring the mishap of another person (espe-cially an authority figure) can be more valuedthan attempting to help and thereby riskingthat the other person lose face. The learningand internalization of such society-specificnorms likely takes some time, meaning thatcross-cultural differences in prosocial behaviorand in morality more generally may often


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become apparent only in the late preschoolyears. Such findings of variation across con-texts are provocative because they highlightthe ways in which culture and experiencefundamentally shape prosocial responding,and they demonstrate vividly that prosocialresponding is not a unitary process but ratheris open to a diverse set of influences. Still, wewould argue that these influences do not createthe basic prosocial and cooperative tendenciesseen in children but rather modify and shapethem.

In conclusion, from an evolutionary per-spective, cooperation (and therefore morality)is always problematic, as it requires individualsto suppress their own interests in favor of thoseof others or equate their own interests withthose of others. Cooperation can thus evolveonly in certain specific circumstances. Humanshave managed to evolve highly cooperative life-ways through participating in a variety of col-laborative activities in which they are interde-pendent. These collaborative activities are theorigins of human morality.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENTThe authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings thatmight be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

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PS64-FrontMatter ARI 15 November 2012 14:20

Annual Review ofPsychology

Volume 64, 2013 Contents

Prefatory

Shifting Gears: Seeking New Approaches for Mind/Brain MechanismsMichael S. Gazzaniga ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1

Biological Bases of Behavior

The Endocannabinoid System and the BrainRaphael Mechoulam and Linda A. Parker ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !21

Vision

SynesthesiaJamie Ward ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !49

Scene Perception, Event Perception, Object Recognition

Visual Aesthetics and Human PreferenceStephen E. Palmer, Karen B. Schloss, and Jonathan Sammartino ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !77

Attention and Performance

Detecting Consciousness: A Unique Role for NeuroimagingAdrian M. Owen ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 109

Executive FunctionsAdele Diamond ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 135

Animal Learning and Behavior

The Neuroscience of Learning: Beyond the Hebbian SynapseC.R. Gallistel and Louis D. Matzel ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 169

Evolutionary Psychology

Evolutionary Psychology: New Perspectives on Cognitionand MotivationLeda Cosmides and John Tooby ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 201

Origins of Human Cooperation and MoralityMichael Tomasello and Amrisha Vaish ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 231

vi

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Language and Communication

Gesture’s Role in Speaking, Learning, and Creating LanguageSusan Goldin-Meadow and Martha Wagner Alibali ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 257

Nonverbal and Verbal Communication

The Antecedents and Consequences of Human Behavioral MimicryTanya L. Chartrand and Jessica L. Lakin ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 285

Intergroup Relations, Stigma, Stereotyping, Prejudice, Discrimination

Sexual PrejudiceGregory M. Herek and Kevin A. McLemore ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 309

Social Neuroscience

A Cultural Neuroscience Approach to the Biosocial Natureof the Human BrainShihui Han, Georg Northoff, Kai Vogeley, Bruce E. Wexler,

Shinobu Kitayama, and Michael E.W. Varnum ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 335

Organizational Climate/Culture

Organizational Climate and CultureBenjamin Schneider, Mark G. Ehrhart, and William H. Macey ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 361

Industrial Psychology/Human Resource Management

Employee RecruitmentJames A. Breaugh ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 389

Learning and Performance in Educational Settings

Self-Regulated Learning: Beliefs, Techniques, and IllusionsRobert A. Bjork, John Dunlosky, and Nate Kornell ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 417

Teaching of Subject Matter

Student Learning: What Has Instruction Got to Do With It?Hee Seung Lee and John R. Anderson ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 445

Health Psychology

Bringing the Laboratory and Clinic to the Community: MobileTechnologies for Health Promotion and Disease PreventionRobert M. Kaplan and Arthur A. Stone ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 471

Research Methodology

Multivariate Statistical Analyses for Neuroimaging DataAnthony R. McIntosh and Bratislav Misic ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 499

Contents vii

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Social Network Analysis: Foundations and Frontiers on AdvantageRonald S. Burt, Martin Kilduff, and Stefano Tasselli ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 527

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 54–64 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 549

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 54–64 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 554

Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Psychology articles may be found athttp://psych.AnnualReviews.org/errata.shtml

viii Contents

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Origins of Human Cooperation an Morality

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