Org Safety Culture of CCFD1 - Ken Horn Capstone

7/28/2019 Org Safety Culture of CCFD1 - Ken Horn Capstone

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CCFD1 Safety Culture 1

Assessment of the Organization Safety Culture

Of

Clackamas County Fire District #1

Kenneth Horn

Portland State University

Submitted to:

Masami Nishishiba, PhD

Matthew Jones, PhD

June 8, 2010


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Abstract

The research problem was the Clackamas County Fire District # 1 had taken

significant actions to address the reduction of firefighter injuries. This effort has

included the creation of a wellness and fitness group and a full time Safety Officer;

however, there has never been an assessment of the organizational safety culture

within the Clackamas County Fire District #1 (CCFD1). Safety Culture is considered

fundamental within the fire community in regards to firefighter safety. This concept

is reflective in the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives. The Purpose of this study is

to reduce the injury rate within the Fire District. Three hypotheses were tested to

help identify safety culture related concepts. The three hypotheses included: (1) In

ClackamasFire,therearedistinct,identifiablesub-culturesthatarerelatedtosafety.

(2) FirefightersatClackamasFiretendtovalueefficiencyandeffectivenessover

safety.(3)FirefightersatClackamasFirewilltendtovalueindividualaccountability

oversafety.Descriptive research methods included a survey made available to all

members of Clackamas County Fire District #1. The results indicated a positive

safety culture within CCFD1. The results suggested there are identifiable subgroups

related to safety within the organization, firefighters, under varying situations will

tend to value efficiency and effectiveness over safety and lastly, the results did not

support that firefighters will value individual accountability over safety.


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Table 6 (48 Years of Service scores by Dimension).....36

Table 7 (915 Years of Service scores by Dimension)...36

Table 8 (16+ Years of Service scores by Dimension)....37

Table 9 (Comparison of Responses to Mean Scores, North Battalion)...39

Table 10 (Comparison of Responses to Mean Scores, South Battalion)....40

Table 11 (Total Mean Score of all Stations).41

Table 12 (Station 1 Dimension Scores)..41



Table 15 (Station 4 Dimension Score)42





Table 20 (Station 10 Dimension Scores)...43




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Table 25 (Volunteer Stations 12 & 13 Dimension Scores).44

Table 26 (Hypotheses 2 Scores).49

Table 27 (Hypotheses 3 Scores).50

Table 28 (Results of Openended Questions).....52

Table 29 (Comparison of Study Results)...56

Table 30 (H3 Mean Score Comparison).60

Figures

Figure 1 (Model of Reciprocal Determinism).16

Figure 2 (Mean Scores by Station)38

Figure 3 (Mean Scores by Division)..46

Appendixes

Appendix A (Survey Questions)..72

Appendix B (Interview Questions)...75

Appendix C (Radar Graphs of Mean Score by Division)...76


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Introduction

Clackamas County Fire District (CCFD) #1 has been making efforts to

constantly identify problems and develop solutions through organizational policy

formation to assure safety. Understanding the organizational culture and employee

responses to safety policy changes is critical for effective implementation of such

policies and procedures. It is imperative to understand how safety is valued within

the organization and how individual behavior influences the adherence to safety

policies and procedures.

The purpose of this study is to identify and define the organizational safety

culture in CCFD#1 and understand how it influences the implementation of safety

policies and procedures throughout the organization. Furthermore, the study

intends to identify the degree in which firefighters value safety while performing

their duties. The responses from a cultural safety survey administered to all Fire

District employees were used to address three research questions related to safety.

In addition, a series of interviews with employees representing a cross section of the

organization was conducted to obtain additional qualitative information to help

interpret the results of the survey. By examining both quantitative and qualitative

data, this study attempted to explicate the intricacies of the organizational culture

related to the implementation of safety policies, procedures, and practices.


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BackgroundandSignificanceoftheStudy

Each year in the United States, approximately 100 firefighters die in the line

of duty and thousands more are injured. This trend has declined since the 1970s,

yet firefighter fatalities per 100,000 fire incidents have actually been on the

increase. Since 2005, the number of firefighter fatalities has risen from 2.81 to 3.86

per 100,000 incidents in 2008, a 37% increase (U.S. Fire Administration, 2009). In

2008, the rate of injuries per 1000 fires is 25.2, up from 23.3 in 1981. (Karter, Molis,

2009) This increase is despite many advances in firefighting safety equipment,

training and early detection.

Firefighter injuries and deaths have a significant impact on organizations,

families, and the community. The price is paid with the lives of the firefighters, their

families, and the dollars and resources of the taxpayers. The actual cost is difficult to

determine since there are many variables, however the National Institute of

Standards and Technology (NIST) produced a report in 2005 attempting to put a

cost to firefighter deaths and injuries. Data for this 2005 study was not

comprehensive and many of the sources were unqualified, however the estimates

are still considered credible by the authors. The estimates were based on: costs

associated with overtime, investigations, physical fitness programs, lost time from

work, prevention related costs (NIST, 2005). According to the 2001 data, in Oregon,

the average claim for an on the job injury was $8,389.00. During the year 2009,

Clackamas County Fire District #1 had 16 cases involving firefighter injuries that

resulted in days away from work. This resulted in approximately 114 shifts


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(24hourshifts) missed from work, which also resulted in approximately

$114,000.00 in overtime, not including rollups, rehab time, investigations, and

administrative time (OSHA 300 records from CCFD1 2009).

In March of 2004, the leadership of the American Fire Service assembled in

Tampa, Florida and discussed the issue of firefighter safety, specifically, how to

prevent lineofduty deaths. As a result of this meeting, the 16 Firefighter Safety

Initiatives were developed. The goal of these initiatives was to reduce the number of

firefighter deaths by 25% within the first five years and 50% within 10 years. These

16 safety initiatives provided the fire service a blueprint for change in safety culture

and practices. The first of these initiatives was to: Define and advocate the need for

a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership,

management, supervision, accountability, and personal responsibility (Everyone

Goes Home Initiative Program, 2004).

Since the introduction of the Firefighter Safety Initiatives in 2004, Clackamas

County Fire District #1 has implemented several safety related actions that have had

significant, positive impacts on safety within the organization. In 1998, the fire

district contracted through Oregon Health & Science University for a Wellness

Coordinator. In 2005, the district budgeted for a full time Wellness Coordinator. In

2005, a temporary labor assistant was hired and in 2008, that position was made

full time. Lastly, in 2007, a full time safety officer for the district was hired. The

Safety Officer position is one of the first in the area and was considered a significant

commitment towards safety. Despite all the efforts to create safety related positions


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within the organization and introducing improvements in fire safety equipment, the

injury rate at CCFD#1s is still comparable to the national average of 25 injuries per

1000 fires. The literature emphasizes the need for organizations to assess their

culture in terms of safety and CCFD#1 has not done this. There are some anecdotes

that seem to suggest that there is a disassociation between safety related

policies/procedures and the actual practice. As the literature on organizational

culture suggest, the resistance to adopt or closely follow safety policies and

procedures may be due to how an organization and its subgroups value safety. On

the surface, CCFD#1 appears to be moving towards enhancing safety, however, at

the deeper level, CCFD#1 may need to further understand and define its culture and

how it relates to safety. Much of the reviewed literature suggests the fire service

must address the organizational culture if they are to be successful in implementing

new safety related policies and procedures. Industries such as Nuclear Power,

Chemical, and Oil and Gas operate in a highrisk environment, and they have made

some significant improvements in safety performance by utilizing the concept of

organizational culture (Pessemier, 2008). The Fire Service must look to these

industries and the science of safety in order to address safety culture and cultural

change within our own highrisk organization. Much of the research associated with

highrisk industries shows a positive relationship between the safety performance

and the safety culture of an organization.

Jones (2000) suggests that it is our deep connection to our history as a

profession that makes safety culture within the fire service so difficult to change. We

have benefited from the prestige that is closely related to the sacrifices of our fellow


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The need for the understanding and measuring of organizational safety

culture is illustrated well by the work of Williams (2007). In it, he describes the

efforts made by the University of Maryland, Center for Firefighter Safety Research

and Development to implement vigorous safety standards, policies and practices

and yet, a rise in injury rates continued. What the literature suggests is that the

University may not have had an understanding of the safety culture and therefore

may have implemented the above safety standards, polices, and practices in a way

that was not effectively accepted by the members. This may help explain why their

efforts had little impact on injury rates.

The problem of an inadequate understanding of the Safety Culture within

Clackamas County Fire District #1 may have an affect on how the organization is

able to meet the three operational objectives established by the United States Fire

Administration (U.S. Fire Administration, 2009). Those objectives include: 1)

enhancing firefighter safety and reducing the loss of life from fire by firefighters, 2)

Promote within the fire service community a comprehensive, multihazard risk

reduction plan to reduce the number of injuries and deaths to firefighters and; 3) to

address the emerging issue as identified by the Firefighter Life Safety Summit to

reduce the number of firefighter deaths by establishing a mechanism to measure

and act upon fire department safety culture.

The mission statement of Clackamas County Fire District #1 states: Tosafely

protectandpreservelifeandproperty(CCFD1, 2009). It is possible that this mission

puts firefighters at odds with two competing values, getting the job done as a


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Figure1

The psychological variables are considered the basis of culture (values,

beliefs, and attitudes towards safety). The behavioral variables are the

competencies of the individual and the patterns of action and behaviors. Situational

variables include the organizational structure, processes and systems, as well as

external variables such as the complexity, context, and nature of the work

performed. Tools, Equipment, and machines used in the task should also be included

since employees may consider them directly related to safety. (Pessemier W. ,

Developing a Safety Culture in the Fire Service, 2008). These three factors the

psychological, behavioral, and situational factors are the independent variables

that influence the dependant variable, which is safety performance.

What the theory of Reciprocal Determinism suggests is that all three factors

have an equal impact on the person and their safety performance. A person can have

an impact on their safety environment by how they implement safety practices; in

turn, the environment can have an impact on their behavior related to safety


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(IAEA) for example, defines the safety culture of an organization as the product of

individual and group values, attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behavior.

Another closely related definition is: the set of values, beliefs, traditions, norms,

attitudes and social practice set out to reduce or minimize the exposure to injuries

or dangerous conditions(Ahmad & Alistair, 2003). Lastly, Mearn, Flin, Gordon, &

Fleming (1998) define safety culture as entrenched attitudes and opinions that a

group of people share with respect to safety.

What factors constitute a highquality safety culture is up for debate. Many

organizations have attempted to define the factors that make up an excellent safety

culture. These include the Advisory Committee for Safety of Nuclear Installations

(ACSNI) and the Institution for Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH) and they both

imply that the safety depends as much on the general organizational culture as it

does specifically to safety practices. A considerable amount of the research has been

focused on overall organizational culture and the factors that contribute to it, such

as: job satisfaction, individual responsibility, management responsibility, leadership

style, communication, commitment, risk awareness, and risk taking (Cameron &

Quinn, 2006). These studies also have pertinence to the exploration of

organizational safety culture.

Some literature is careful to point out the difference between culture and

climate. Often the two are used interchangeably, yet they are by definition, different.

Climate should be thought of as reflecting attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs

whereas culture involves values, traditions, and norms (Harvey, Bolem, Cox, &


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Gregory, 2002). An organizations climate may change depending on events or

changes within the organization. For example, during union contract negotiations

the climate may modify depending on how well the process is advancing. A

significant injury to a member may also have a detectable effect on the climate of the

organization, yet neither of these events would likely have an immediate effect on

the safety culture. It is possible that over time climate will have an influence over

cultural change.

Safety Culture is more stable than safety climate and is resistant to change.

(Cooper 2001) points out that safety is a value and that values are considered as a

constant set of core beliefs held by an individual concerning how s/he should

behave over a broad range of situations (p.17). This is particularly important since

it is in the stations where many of these values are developed and passed on. Jones

(2000), suggests that the attitudes towards safety may be related to our past and the

prestige we as firefighters experience due to the sacrifices of our bothers and

sisters. The persona that this is a risky business and that injury and death are part

of the job may be considered an underlining value upheld by firefighters today. The

focus of this study is safety culture based on the measurement of the attitude and

perception of the members of Clackamas County Fire District #1.

Sub-

culture

Important to the study is the reference to groups, since the author expects to

identify subcultures within the organization. My contention is that groups within

the organization will share values of the overall organization as well as have their


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definitions related to safety culture, groups are often highlighted and the evidence

suggests that it may be more accurate to talk in terms of group culture vs.

organizational culture. Many have suggested that it is within these identified groups

that the culture related to safety is passed on and it is the attitude towards danger,

safety compliance, and proper conduct of hazardous operations that makes up that

culture (Beck, 1999;Chute, 1995;Clark, 1999;Wong, 2005). At Clackamas County

Fire District #1, the corresponding categories that form the basis of culture are:

rank, station assignment, or division. Subculture formed based on these categories

could explain differences in safety related behavior at different stations and

divisions and at different ranks within the department. Therefore, it is hypothesized

that the Clackamas Fire also has identifiable subculture that affects safety.

H1: InClackamasFire,therearedistinct,identifiablesub-culturesthatare

relatedtosafety.

Valueonefficiencyandeffectivenessoversafety

In research by Omodei, Mclennan, and Reynolds (2005,) they found that

[d]espite the general awareness of, and concern with, the effects of fatigue and

dehydration in summer fires in difficult terrain, the primary focus on getting the job

done appears to override any such concerns (p10) among the firefighters. This is

congruent with the general observation that firefighters tend to value efficiency and

effectiveness over safety. According to Cooper (2001), if safety is not clearly valued

among the firefighters, they will likely struggle with what they value more. This

dichotomy is accentuated when other behaviors are valued equally. Firefighters may


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Therefore, the third hypothesis tested in this study addresses the

relationship between individual accountability and safety.

H3: Firefighterswilltendtovalueindividualaccountabilityoversafety.

Reportedpromisingpracticesinpromotingsafetyculture

The results of similar safety promotion studies were reviewed for their

recommendations. Since none of the related studies looked specifically at the same

research questions, it is likely the recommendations might not match directly with

my conclusions. However, it is likely that there will be similarities sufficient for this

project. In two of the studies reviewed, the overall Organizational Safety Culture

was assessed and this was considered a core dimension of the study. Williams

(2006) concluded the following in his assessment of the safety culture of the Anne

Arundel County Fire Department, Maryland.

1. The leadership must send a clear message regarding the importance ofsafety.

2. Clear communication is needed to instill and enhance trust within theorganization.

3. A safety code of conduct must me established giving all the right andobligation to report safety problems and to contribute ideas related to safety

to their supervisors.

4. Enhance leadership and followership skills in all personnel.5. Enhance the marketing of Health/ Safety division of an organization.


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6. Complete an analysis of knowledge, skills, and abilities to ensure thatappropriate training is being conducted for all personnel.

7. Regular followup and the development of surveys to use on a regular basisto assess the impact of any improvement plans.

Windham (2005) had the following recommendations after studying the

organizational safety culture of the Woodlands Fire Department, Woodlands, Texas:

(a) exceptions should be communicated with regard to safety and all personnel

should be held accountable, (b) policies and practices should be examined, (c) risk

management should be examined and all personnel be held accountable to the

specifics of the risk management process, (d) the peer fitness trainer program

should continue, (e) union officials should be consulted to implement a fitness

evaluation process and, (f) work should continue to make a cultural change within

the fire department. It is important to point out that CCFD1 currently has a peer

fitness trainer program and the organization does include the union when setting

fitness standards. The above recommendations however, help validate the relevance

of the current programs. Pendergast (2007) provides twelve recommendations to

improve safety after completing a safety culture survey of the Laconia Fire

Department, Laconia, New Hampshire. These twelve recommendations included: (a)

identify problems that exist, (b) gain leadership support, (c) treat safety as a mission

and establish resources needed, (d) create ownership of health and safety

throughout all levels of the organization, (e) create control measures and establish

safety standards, (f) measure safety related performance, (g) ensure all accidents

and nearmisses are thoroughly investigated, (h) ensure attendance at safety


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Key question items that were pertinent to the presented hypothesis were

identified. This breakdown shown in Table 1 above. The study was distributed to

the population via email using an online survey tool SurveyMonkey, in which the

fire district has an account. The first email related to the study was sent out to the

study population consisting of all members of the organization. The message

explained the purpose of the survey, the anonymity of the results, and who was

performing it. Instructions were given on how to complete the survey, who should

participate in the study, and a link attached to the body of the message. Lastly, two

additional reminders were sent out.

Three dimensions were identified to help better understand and categorize

the safety culture of the organization. These three dimensions are: Organizational

Policy, Organizational leadership, and Safety Procedures. These were labeled I, II, III

on the survey form. The purpose of the three dimensions is to help understand the

overall safety culture of the organization. If there are identified areas of safety

related weaknesses within the organization, it is important to know where those

weaknesses are. Furthermore, the dimensions of Leadership and Procedure directly

relate to question used to defend the second and third hypothesis. Additionally, the

survey is broken down into the following categories: Administration, Operations,

Training, Fire Prevention, and Volunteers. The Operations group was further broken

down into seventeen stations, two of which were removed since they are volunteer

stations and not staffed full time. The last category in this section is years of service;

Safety Culture, 2002)(Jones, 2000)

H3: Fire fighters will tend to valueindividual accountability over safety

9, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 27, 35,40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48

(Pessemier B. , 2007)(Cooper, Surfacing YourSafety Culture, 2002)


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settings. The interviews were conducted by the author, and due to the sensitivity of

issues, were not audio recorded. The questions can be found in Appendix B.

Results

The results of survey data were analyzed using descriptive statistics 1such as

mean, median, and standard deviation. Data was filtered using the Survey Monkey

filtering tool to assist in aggregating the results. This was organized into the

following variables: Organizational Divisions including: (a) Operations, (b)

Administration (Logistics and Information Technology), (c) Training (wellness),

(d) Fire Prevention, and (e) the Volunteer group (Table 1).

Respondentsprofile

The Operations Division made up 75% of the responses or 119 out of 159

organizational personnel surveyed. This represents approximately 79% of the

personnel assigned to the Operations division. There are some small variations in

the number assigned to operations due to Temporary Duty Assignments (TDY).

1 It is recognized by the author, that the research could benefit from more advanceanalytical methods needed to determine significance of the results and to validatethe survey questions for reliability.


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These are generally assignments outside of the normal operations assignments such

as training officers, Public Information Officers, or EMS Officer positions.

Administration represented 10% of the respondents or 84% (16 of 19) of the

personnel assigned to Administration. The Training division represented 5% of the

respondents or 89% (8/9) of the assigned personnel, prevention represented 4.4 %

of respondents or 58% (7/12) of assigned personnel, and the volunteer rank had a

response rate of 5.7%. It should be noted that during this survey, the volunteer

program was in the middle of substantial changes and the largest volunteer recruit

academy was nearly completed. This may have lead to the limited response to the

survey by the volunteer group.

Table2ResponsesbyDivision

Division ResponsePercent ResponseCount/total

numberofpersonnelin

thedivision

Operations 74.8% 119/ 150

Administration 10.1% 16/ 19

Training 5% 8/ 9

Prevention 4.4% 7/ 12

Volunteer 5.7% 9/ 59

The following scores represent the degree of positive or negative response to

the survey questions. A score greater than 2.50 represents a positive response to

the safety related question. A score below 2.50 represents a negative response to

the safety related question. For the purpose of this study, Dimension I Safety Policy

refers to organizational polices pertaining to safety related to practices. Policies are


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generally found in the form of Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs).

Organizational Leadership refers to the decision makers of the organization; this

would include Company Officers, Chief Officers, and Program Managers. Examples of

Safety Procedures would include the use of safety equipment or practices detailed in

the Fire Rescue Protocols, a guide that describes how to mitigate incidents. The total

mean, median, and standard deviation scores representing all three surveyed

dimensions for the Divisions and are as follows: Operations had a mean score of

3.66, median score of 3.49 and standard deviation of .318. The Training division had

a mean score of 3.59, median score of 3.62 and standard deviation of .232. The Fire

Prevention Division had a mean score 3.82, median score of 3.62 and a standard

deviation of .246. Administration had a score of 3.64, median score of 3.62 and

standard deviation of .186. The volunteer group had a mean score of 3.92, median

score of 3.83 and standard deviation of .354. The volunteer rank represents the

highest combined mean score with the largest standard deviation score. (Table 3)

Table3ComparisonofscoresbyDivision(AllDimensions)

Division Mean Median StandardDeviation

Operations 3.66 3.49 .318

Training 3.59 3.62 .232

Prevention 3.82 3.79 .246

Administration 3.64 3.62 .186

Volunteers 3.92 3.83 .354


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The volunteer group had the highest combined (Organizational Policy,

Organizational Leadership, and Safety Procedures) mean score of 3.92. The Training

division scored lowest in dimension I and III with 3.8 and 3.34 respectively. The

Operations Division scored lowest in dimension II (Leadership) with a score of 3.49.

If the volunteer group is backed out, the Fire Prevention Division has the next

highest mean score of 3.82.

The years of service group is divided into the following categories: (a) zero to

three years, (b) four to eight years, (c) nine to fifteen years, and (d) 16 years or

more. For each of the year categories, the combined Dimensions score was

calculated in order to compare the safety attitudes of the years of service groups.

(Table 3). The table below shows that the 48 year group had the highest safety

perception/attitude and the 915 group had the lowest. The 915 year group also

had the highest standard deviation.

Table4ScoresbyYearsofService

Years ofService

Number ofrespondents

Mean Median StandardDeviation

03 Years 31 3.63 3.56 .127

48 Years 29 3.70 3.58 .262

915 Years 41 3.51 3.40 .291

16 +years 58 3.68 3.54 .299

The following tables show the breakdown of scores by years of service and by

dimension. This allows the reader to compare responses by dimension and shows


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how years of service changes perception within those dimensions. The zero to

threeyear group had 31 respondents and represented 20% of the total surveyed.

Table50-3YearsofServicescoresbydimension

Dimension Mean Median StandardDeviation

Policy I 3.56 3.58 .436

Leadership II 3.78 3.87 .347

Safety Procedures III 3.56 3.58 .436

The 48 year group had 29 responses or 18%, 915 years had 41 respondents or

26%, and the largest group was the 16+ years with 56 respondents or 36% of the

total group.

Table64-8YearsofService


Policy I 4.00 3.96 .198



The 16 + years had the highest Dimension I (Policy) score of 4.02 which shows that

those with the most experience within the organization and those that are likely to

be in leadership roles, feel strongly that our safety related policies are appropriate.

The 03 year group had the lowest dimension I score of 3.56, however this group

also had the highest scores in dimension II and III of 3.78 and 3.56 respectively. The


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915 year group had the lowest scores in dimension II and III of 3.29 and 3.40

respectively.

Table79-15YearsofService


Policy I 3.84 3.78 .219



The 915 year group also had the lowest total mean score of 3.51. The 48 year

group had the highest total mean score of 3.70 with the 16+ years group scoring a

3.68.

Table816+YearsofService


Policy I 4.02 3.99 .233



The reviewed literature suggests that the more years of service an employees

has or the greater their position is within the organization the greater their

perception or attitude towards safety within that organization. In this study, a

higher or more positive score would represent the elevated perception/ attitude of

safety. The results in this study show that there is not a linear progression of the

scores instead, it shows that the 48 year and 16+ groups share nearly the same


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Station 17 had the highest total mean score of 3.86 with a standard deviation of

.396. Station 15 had the lowest total mean score of 3.41 with a standard deviation of

.391. The South Battalion had the highest total mean score of 3.71; this is despite the

lowest station score from Station 15. The North Battalion had a total mean score of

3.69. Though it is difficult to determine the significance, it is noted that the North

Battalion has a significantly higher call volume. In this case, call volume was

compared to help determine if risk exposure had an effect on safety

perception/attitudes. In this case, it appears the greater the exposure to risk

(represented as call volume), the lower the safety perception/attitude score. This

suggests that subgroups may be identified by station as it relates to call volume,

risk exposure, and risk tolerance. Table 8 shows a comparison of combined mean

safety scores with call volume between stations in the North Battalion while table 9

shows the comparison in the South Battalion.

Table9ComparisonsofResponsestoMeanScores,NorthBattalion

Station NumberofAlarm MeanScore

Engine 1 2,252 3.59


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Engine 2 1,800 3.77

Engine 3/ Rescue 3 3,194 3.64

Truck 4 1,586 3.64

Engine 5 1,693 3.70

Engine 6 1,011 3.77

Engine 8 1,358 3.67

Table10ComparisonsofResponsestoMeanScores,SouthBattalion

Station NumberofAlarms MeanScore

Engine 9 889 3.75

Engine 10 625 3.83

Engine 11 488 3.69

Truck 15 1,486 3.41

Engine 16 1,811 3.70

Squad 17 816 3.86

A break down of the dimension scores shows station 6 and 2 (North

Battalion) with the highest combined score of 3.77. Station 6 also has the high score

of 4.31 in dimension I (Policy) while Station 15 has the lowest combined score of


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3,41 and the lowest Policy score of 3.81. Station 17 had the highest score in

dimension II and station 15 had the lowest score of 3.03. Station 10 had the highest

score in dimension III with 3.59 and stations 15 and 16 had the lowest scores of

3.38. The following table (Table 11) shows the total mean scores of the combined

stations for each dimension. The high score in the policy dimension shows that the

employees in the fire stations perceive Organizational Safety Policy to be at an

appropriate level. In comparison, the Safety Procedure dimension has the lowest

score. In this study, the lower the Dimension III scores suggests a higher the

tolerance for risk is accepted by the group.

Table11TotalMeanScoresofallStations

Dimension Score

Dimension I Policy 4.08

Dimension II Leadership 3.54

Dimension III Safety Procedures 3.46

The next series of tables show the breakdown of scores for each dimension in

each of the career stations. The purpose of this comparison is to show how each

station differs in their perception/ attitude towards safety as it relates to the three

dimensions. This understanding of attitudes and perceptions is important when


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Table16Station5DimensionScores


Policy I 4.06 4.00 .372



Table17Station6Dimensionscores


Policy I 4.31 4.33 .372





Policy I 4.07 4.05 .270



Table

19

Station

9

Dimension

Scores


Policy I 4.11 4.06 .323



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Dimension

Mean

Median

StandardDeviation

Policy I 4.21 4.13 .247





Policy I 3.97 4.00 .341





Policy I 3.81 3.82 .353





Policy I 4.09 4.06 .348


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Table24

Station

17

Dimension

Scores


Policy I 4.30 4.25 .328



Table25Volunteers(stations12&13)DimensionScores


Policy I 4.31 4.22 .276



Further analysis of the data can be found in appendix D through F. Each

station is represented in a radar graph showing the stations score in each of the

three dimensions. Clearly all of the stations in the Operations Division score higher

in the Policy Dimension, followed by Leadership, with the lowest scores being in the

Safety Procedural Dimension. All scores however, are well above the 2.50 mean

score for a scale of 15. This suggests that Clackamas Fire District #1 has the

perception/ attitude of a positive, overall safety culture. The above results are the


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first step in understanding the safety culture of the organization and suggest that

subgroups may be identified by Division, Battalion, and Station assignment.

Next, the questions related to the hypotheses were analyzed. The first

hypothesis stated that there would be identifiablesub-groupsrelatedtosafety

culture. Comparisons of mean combined scores to years of service shows a range

from 3.51 (915 years) to 3.70 (48 years). The 915 year range represents a

combination of Company officers, Firefighters, and Apparatus Operators assigned to

Operations division. This would also tend to exclude many of the chief officers and

current administrative staff that would tend to be represented in the 16 + year

group. The 48 year group represents mostly Firefighters and Apparatus Operators,

personnel not usually considered in leadership positions. Since rank was not

identified in this study, it would be difficult to determine if the difference in scores is

due to years of service, experience, or position within the organization. The

literature would suggest it has to do with experience (years of service) rather than

position, though some literature suggests there may be a connection between

position in an organization and safety perception. Kao, Lai, and Lee (2008)

A review of the combined mean scores by Divisions shows a notable

difference between the Volunteer group and the Operations, Training, and

Administration groups. (Figure 3)

Figure3MeanScoresbyDivision


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The Training Division has the lowest combined (all three dimensions) score of 3.59

and the Volunteer group has the highest at 3.92. A possible explanation for this

variance may lie in the relationship between personnel with a significant exposure

to the fire service culture and those operating on the fringes. Volunteers are

generally made up of those either looking for employment in the fire service or

those wanting to give back to the community. Volunteer firefighters usually have

employment outside of the fire service and have limited exposure to career

employees and their culture, and the risk associated with increased call volume.

Many of the fire Prevention personnel have some firefighting (Operational)

experience, but have not had significant exposure to the firefighter and station

culture. This also seems to be congruent with the relationship between slower

stations with higher combined mean safety perception/attitude scores, a concept to

be explored further in this paper. Regardless, there does seem to be an identifiable

difference between the Volunteer/ Prevention groups and the remaining three

divisions as identified by their higher safety perception/attitude scores. An analysis


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of the Operational scores shows notable differences related to call volume (Table 9).

Stations with higher call volumes appear to trend towards lower, combined mean

survey scores than stations with lower call volumes. In the North Battalion, Station 6

shares the highest mean score of 3.77 with station 2. The South Battalion has similar

results with its lower call volume and higher combined mean safety

perception/attitude score.

Station 15 has the second highest call volume in the South Battalion, yet it

has a significantly lower score than station 16 which has the highest call volume in

the South Battalion. Station 16 does share the lowest score in Dimension III with

station 15 however. The types of calls station 15 responds to verses station 16 and

that station 15 is a specialty rescue station could explain this discrepancy, but

further research would be required to make this determination. With this said, there

still appears to be a direct correlation between call volume and safety perception

scores.

The results suggest that safety perception/attitude is related to call volume,

which in turn is related to increased risk exposure and this exposure leads to

greater tolerance of risk. This is specifically notable in Dimension III, Safety

procedures where mean score are consistently lower. The results also show that

busier stations in the North and South Battalions have combined scores consistently

lower than slower stations in the respective Battalions. This relationship between

call volume and lower safety perception/attitude supports that the first hypothesis

holds true, that there are identifiable subgroups within the organization. The


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research also suggests that these subgroups are related to risk exposure as

demonstrated by the difference in scores by Station and Battalion. The results also

suggest that there are subgroups identified by Division. This is supported by the

significant differences in safety perception scores by Division.

The second hypothesis states thatfirefighterswillvalueefficiencyoversafety.

The first step was to review the data comparing the overall Organization to the

Operations group using the questions specific to H2 of the study (Table 2, Table 25).

A higher, more positive score shows that employees values safety more than

efficiency, whereas a lower score shows the employee values efficiency over safety.

In this study, the questions pertaining to the hypothesis were compared to one

another in order to determine what was valued more positively. The Operations

group was compared to the overall organization since it is there we find the

majority of the on line2 firefighters and where the greatest exposure to risk is

found. In question 1., we see a significant difference in scores between the overall

organization and the operations group. In question four and six, we see a similar

score difference at a lesser degree. Each indicating a value shift towards efficiency

over safety.

Table26Hypotheses2

Question Organization Operations

1.Safety equipment has the potentialto adversely affect efficiency.

3.41 2.58

2 OnLine describes career firefighters regularly assigned to fire stationsthroughout the district.


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2.Minor safety violations areacceptable if the risk is minimal.

3.05 2.90

3.Supervisors permit cutting cornersto get the job done.

3.79 3.78

4.Getting the job done efficiently ismost important.

3.14 3.19

5.The department provides adequatesafety equipment for my assignedduties.

4.09 4.06

6.Sometimes I am not given enoughtime to get my job done safely.

3.21 3.17

Meanscore 3.45 3.28

Again, we see a lower combined mean score in the group with the most

exposure to risk. The operations group is also the group most effective by safety

related policies and procedures. This along with data obtained by the interviews

suggests that firefighters do or at least sometimes do value efficiency over safety.

This concept is discussed further in the Discussion section of the report.

The third hypothesis states firefighterswillvalueindividualaccountability

oversafety. Here again, the more positive a score is, the greater the value is towards

safety, whereas lesser scores indicates a value towards individual accountability.

The results however, show similar scores between the overall organization and the

Operations group (Table 27). Several of the scores are identical and the majority are

within a few hundredths of a point. The scores show that there is a relatively high

perception of safety over individual accountability across the organization and that

the exposure to risk does not appear to have a direct impact on the perception of


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safety vs. individual accountability. This does not explain the witnessed reluctance

to intervene when safety polices and procedures are ignored, but the interview

results suggest it could be that the activity is not perceived as risky therefore, there

is little need for intervention.

Table27Hypotheses3

Question Organization Operations

I rely on my supervisor to keep me safe. 2.75 2.83

Coworkers are wiling to report safety violations,unsafe behaviors, or hazardous conditions.

3.45 3.41

Peer influences are effective at discouragingviolations of standard operating procedures or safetyrules.

3.75 3.76

I am more responsible when it comes to followingsafety procedures than my coworkers.

3.10 3.09

My supervisors closely monitor safety proceduresand correct any deviations from established safetystandards.

3.74 3.71

I can safely determine the proper level of safetyequipment needed to perform my assigned duties. 4.21 4.26

Coworkers will remind me to use proper safetyequipment.

3.33 3.32

I am adequately trained to safely conduct all myassigned duties.

4.07 4.09

I utilize my safety equipment more often than mycoworkers do.

3.02 2.98

Using proper safety equipment is primarily theindividuals' responsibility.

3.99 3.99

I am comfortable with reminding my coworkers touse safety equipment.

4.12 4.19

I am sure it is a matter of time before I am involvedin an accident.

3.39 3.35


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I understand the safety rules for my job. 4.14 4.18

The Safety of my coworkers is my responsibility. 3.97 4.09

MeanScore 3.65 3.66

The survey data collected does not appear to supportH3 in terms of

Firefighters valuing individual accountability over safety. However, the information

collected during the interviews does suggest there are some incidents where this

might hold true. For example, 23% of the interviewees stated they would violate a

safety policy or procedure in order to get the job done sooner. Furthermore, 18%

stated they would not remind a coworker for concern of being labeled a micro

manager. 14% stated they would not remind someone if the safety equipment were

considered inefficient or ineffective. Lastly, 36% stated they would feel

uncomfortable reminding a more experienced firefighter or one of higher rank to

use safety equipment. Again, most stated they would first perform a risk/benefit

analysis before making the decision and would intervene if they deemed the

circumstance highly dangerous. Further investigation into this behavior is

warranted since the willingness to intervene in a safety related incident is

paramount if a safety culture is to be positively changed.

The next results to be reviewed are the two openended questions as shown

in Table 28 below.

Table28ResultsofOpen-endedquestions.


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1.How could you improve safety within the organization?

2. How do you feel the organization could improve safety?

Section Percentage of responses

Question 1 Question 2

Improve Communications 12% 19%

Safety Culture Change 9% 10%

Improve Safety Procedures 18% 15%

Increase Training 16% 18%

Improve Safety Policies 7% 16%

Improve Safety Equipment 10% 9%Increase Enforcement 4% 2%

Improve Leadership 22% 2%

When the question is focused towards the individual, leadership is identified

as the leading response for improving safety within the organization. A closer look

at the responses shows thatleadingbyexample and taking personal ownership by

way ofSafetyprocedures is the most suggested method to improve safety. When the

focus of the questions is turned toward the organization, the shift leans to

Communicationsas the primary method to improve safety. This is generally in the

form of communicating lessons learned from past incidents and nearmiss incidents.

This transcends to the Training component since many answers made references to

both training and communication and the need to address both simultaneously. A

change in Policywas another frequent answer, either alone or with other

suggestions. The author attempted to differentiate between howfirefighters do


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something (Procedure) and what isrequired(Policy). For example, a person might

suggest changing uniform color to avoid resembling a law enforcement officer; this

would be considered a Policy change, whereas wearing safety goggles would be a

safety procedure. Some suggestions might be considered both, such as changing the

location in which equipment is carried on fire and rescue apparatus. The open

ended questions no not specifically address the research questions per se; however,

they do help to better understand why and how firefighters make safety related

decisions and what influences those decisions.

Interviewresults

To further understand and interpret the results of the survey, the author

interviewed Department personnel in small group settings. The interviews were

accomplished using four questions related to the safety culture survey and can be

found in Appendix B. The findings from the interviews help illuminate, to some

extent the whyand howemployees make safety related decisions and how

employees perceive how the organization values safety vs. performance.

Universally, employees throughout the Divisions feel the Organization places value

on both safety andperformance. That is to say, employees do not believe the

Organization considers the two mutually exclusive. When asked what conditions

would lead to a safety issue going unreported or under what conditions would an

individual violate a safety procedure or policy, the following two responses were in

the majority (23%): Risk/ Benefit analysis and perception of risk were used to

defend the omissions. That is to say, if the witness or individual felt the risk was


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small enough or the benefit great enough, the violations will likely occur. In terms of

efficiency or getting the job done in a timely manner, only 10% of the respondents

felt that a safety violation would be ignored or go unreported just to get the job

faster. However, when asked when they would violate a safety policy or procedure,

23% of the respondents said they would do so to get the job done sooner. This

appears to support the concept of individual accountability having an influence on

safety related decisionmaking, though the results are not significant to verify the

conclusion. Lastly, when asked why an individual would not remind a coworker

about using a piece of safety equipment or about a safety procedure, 36% stated

that the experience level or rank of the offender would be a significant factor. Other

responses included not wanting to nag someone over a perceived minor issue or

they thought the person knew what they were doing.

Summaryofresults

It is apparent from the results of this study that the organization has a highly

positive perception/attitude towards safety and that no dimension had a score

below the 2.50 midpoint. This is also verified by the higher scores in the

dimensions related to both organizational policy and leadership. The theory of sub

groups related to organizational safety culture appears to be valid when comparing

Divisions, Battalions, and stations. The exposure to risk appears to have a significant

impact on safety attitudes throughout the organization. The results also suggest that

employees with higher exposures to risk (higher call volumes) tend have higher

tolerances for risk or a diminished risk perception. This, then influences the


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risk/benefit analysis used by the employees to make safety related decisions. Next,

the combined data supports the theory that firefighters tend to value efficiency over

safety, at least in qualified circumstances. Lastly, the survey results did not support

the third hypothesis well enough to defend that firefighters value individual

accountability over safety, however the interview results did suggest this could be

held true when hierarchal influences are in place.

Discussion

The concept of Safety Culture is widely debated in the Safety community. The

literature, though plentiful, is fractured and somewhat controversial. There is little

agreement on the definition of Safety Culture and the concepts contained therein. In

addition, the concept of Safety Culture refers to what the literature calls a

perception of safety related dimensions. An employees perception does not mean

an organization is unsafe or that policies and procedures are not followed, it is a

reflection of the employees attitude towards the issues. For example, in the issue

related to accountability over safety, individuals may simply view the activity as

safe therefore there is no need to follow any given policy or procedure.

Alternatively, in some cases it may be how the individual views themselves and

their experience level in regards to safety. With that said, the literature is clear

about the relationship between safety culture and accident rates. The industries

researched for this study are related to the fire service as they are all considered

highrisk industries and that safety related errors have significant impacts on the

organization. Literature specific to the Fire Service is limited and what is found is


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related to safety. The results suggest that there are at least two identifiable groups,

which can be further divided into subgroups. These groups include Organizational

Divisions, Battalions, and Fire stations. Years of service did not show enough

variance in scores to warrant the conclusion that Years of Service groups are

identified as subgroups. In addition to the score similarities, the variance in score

by Years of Service appear to contradict findings from Williams (2007), Lee and

Harrison (2000), and Ciavarelli and Crowson (2004) which have findings that

suggest more experienced members of an organization tend to be more safety

conscious and have a higher perception of safety within an organization. The

Clackamas study shows more of a relationship between ranks than simple years of

service. Though the study did not specifically break down rank, the majority of

officers and chief officers within our organization have more than 15 years of

experience and the 16 plus year group did score second to the 48 year group. The

results do show a tread towards higher scores as years of experience increase, with

the exception of the 915 year group which had the lowest score. . It also has one of

the greatest standard deviation scores of .291, second to the 16+ group.

The Risk Exposure Group (Divisions & Stations) has the most notable

differences in scores. Slower stations have a tendency towards higher combined

mean scores then busier stations and the South Battalion (slower) have a higher

combined mean score than the North Battalion (busier). The Fire Prevention

Division and the Volunteer group have the highest mean scores while Operations,

Administration, and the Training Division have lower combined mean scores. One

might expect the Administration Division to have the highest score since they have


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more years of service and are further removed from the risk; however, a significant

number of administrative personnel advanced through the ranks and may still be

influenced by the Operational Culture. Volunteers and the Prevention Staff tend to

have a lesser degree of risk exposure, which might explain their higher combined

mean scores. In addition, many Volunteers have recently finished the recruit

academy and may be influenced by job related safety training. These results are

comparable with the study by Williams (2007), where the Volunteer group scored

higher than the Career group. Here again, the literature supports this, Pessemier

(2008) suggests that personnel exposed to risk on a regular basis tend to have a

higher tolerance to risk. Several answers from the openended questions show that

some firefighters feel safety can be over done and that injuries are inevitable. This

attitude might explain why groups with greater exposure to risk, tend to have lower

scores.

Next, is the discussion of the second hypothesis: firefighterswill

tend

to

value

efficiencyoversafety. Here, again we see a lower combined mean score from the

Operations group in comparison to the overall Organization (Table 26), specifically

in the dimension where safety may have an impact on the required tasks. For

example, there is a notable lower score for the question: Safetyequipmenthasthe

potentialtoadverselyaffectefficiency. Here, responses from the openended

questions help explain why this might occur. Several answers suggest that

firefighters feel they can be too safe, or that safety can get in the way of getting the

job done efficiently. This also may allude to the practice of omitting the use of

certain safety equipment in order to perform more efficiently. The impact or


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The results of this study have helped to identify areas for improvement

within the organization. Further, the results suggest that additional research is

needed to help comprehend the association between Risk Perception, Risk

Tolerance, and Accountability in terms of safety related decisionmaking. The

results of the study suggest that there is a relationship between risk exposure and

risk tolerance and an understanding of this relationship will be beneficial in further

improving the organizational safety culture. From the results of this study, the

author recommends that the following areas be addressed through the efforts of the

Safety Committee and subcommittees under the direction of the Safety Officer: (a)

Additional research in safety behavior, (b) Improved record keeping detailing injury

rates and subsequent costs associated with those injuries, (c) Sustainability of safety

related programs, (d) Wellness and Fitness, (f) and a Stake holder analysis related to

safety issue. In addition to these general areas, the following specific topics need to

be addressed: (a) The16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives, (b) Communications, (c)

Safety Culture Change, (d) Safety Procedures, (e) Training, Safety related Policies, (f)

Safety Related Equipment, (g) Enforcement, and (h) Leadership.

The first four recommendations transcend the organization and should not

be the sole responsibility of the district Safety Committee or its subcommittees.

However, the author believes these items must be addressed to ensure

sustainability of the safety program and to further change and improve the

organizational safety culture. In addition, there must be a nexus created between

the groups with the abovementioned areas of responsibility to prevent the

individual groups from working in an uncoordinated effort. For example, the Fitness


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& Wellness committee should work closely with the Safety committee and the

Equipment committee should be involved as well. All are interrelated and should

not function separate from one another in order to prevent the silo effect common

in organizations.

The first of these topics and the foundation of this study begins with the first

of the 16 Fire Fighter Life Initiatives. It is also the starting point for addressing the

remaining 15 initiatives. The first recommendation is that Clackamas Fire District

#1 formally adapt the 16 Life Safety Initiatives and through the Safety Committee

form subcommittees to specifically concentrate on all of the Life Safety Initiatives in

an inclusive, sustainable method. Secondly, Communications in regards to safety

must be enhanced. The results of the openended questions show that lessons

learned from other events need to be disseminated throughout the department.

The reviewed literature recommends that lesson Learned information be shared

throughout an organization in a formalized manner. At CCFD1, this could be

accomplished through several methods of currently established forms of

communication. These methods included using the district intranet as a method to

distribute timely information and to add links to other safety related sights such as

Billy Goldfeders [email protected] and

www.Everyonegoeshome.com web site, both dedicated to bringing close call/ near

miss stories to the forefront. Secondly, this information should be formally

communicated to company officers during drills and mandatory training events.

Informal, nonscheduled training through Battalion Chiefs would also be an effective

method to pass on information and incorporate it into the normal operating


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procedures. Lastly, regular communications from the district Safety Officer

regarding findings from injuries and nearmiss incidents within the department

must be communicated through formal channels such a training and informal

forums such as the HotSheet or the D1net.

The next recommendation presented specifically addressees the

Organizational Safety Culture of CCFD1. This study is the first step in addressing the

16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives and started with a general, Organizational

Cultural Survey in 2008, and now the current Organizational Safety Culture survey.

Understanding the organizational culture in terms of safety is paramount before any

discussion of change can occur. The results of the survey suggest that Clackamas

County Fire District #1 has a highly positive attitude in terms of safety and is

comparative to the studies by Williams (2007) and Pessemier (2008). It is

recommended that further research be completed on firefighter safety related

behavior and an indepth study on the overall safety culture of the organization

completed. This is suggested since the focus of the current study attempted to elicit

specific safety related perceptions and attitudes and did not address other safety

related dimensions pertinent to fully understanding the overall organizational

culture.

Addressing Safety Procedures is the next proposal. It is recommended that

the Safety Committee form a subcommittee to specifically address safety related

procedures within the organization. A web portal should be created to allow

suggestions and recommendations to be collected and reviewed by the committee


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throughout the meeting cycle. Feed back during this process is import and should be

considered as part of the process. Since Safety related Policy is closely related to this

subject, the portal should have a section for both. Committee members may then

need to filter submitted suggestions to and forward them to the appropriate sub

committee or Division.

Training related responses accounted for one of the highest response rates of

the openended questions at 18% for the organization and 16% for the individual

response. Often, these responses were correlated with communications in terms of

lessons learned. It is important to note that research by Lehmann, Haight, and

Michael (2009) suggest that on the job safety training may not be adequate enough

to change safety related behaviors, especially in regards to risk perception and

tolerance. Additional psychological and behavioral training may be required to

change safety related attitudes within the organization. It is also important to note,

that the Training Division had one of the lowest scores in safety perception when

compared to other divisions within the organization. Further understanding of this

response is necessary to help make needed changes when appropriate. Lastly, the

way we are trained should be reviewed. For example, time requirements are often

placed on training competencies. The literature suggests that this could possibly put

firefighters at odds with what is most important, time or safety. If time is perceived

to be valued over safety, it could have a negative affect on safety.

Safety related equipment did not have as many responses as the above

sections, however it still requires a closer look as to how the organization can


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improve the process in which safety equipment is researched and implemented

within the department. The research and literature review suggests a correlation

between safety and efficiency and should be considered when introducing new

safety equipment. For example, if safety equipment reduces the efficiency of a

procedure, it is less likely to be utilized during said procedure, particularly if the

action is of low perceived risk and consequence. Again, a common method to collect

suggestions related to safety equipment should be in place. The district intranet is

again a good avenue to collect recommendations and suggestions related to safety

equipment.

Enforcement of safety related practices had the fewest response of the open

ended questions. It is unknown if this is related to the lack of perceived need to

enforce safety polices and practices or if it related to the organizational culture.

What is suggested is the employees of the fire district believe further enforcement

methods are not required to improve safety within the organization. It should be

noted however, that one response called for greater enforcement of onscene

safety practices. Lastly, enforcement tends to have a greater impact on newer, less

senior employees and a reduced impact on more experienced employees.

Enforcement works well to initially establish the safety behavior, but it is the

organizational culture that sustains it.

Safety related to Leadership is the last of the nine identified discussion

topics. From an organizational perspective, it invoked one of the lowest responses

yet it has one of the greatest impacts on the organizational culture. However,


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employees did not feel addressing leadership issues from an organizational

perspective was necessary to directly improve safety. Additionally, the individual

perspective invoked the highest response rate of 22% of the answers. From the

responses, it was apparent that employees felt that taking individual accountability

towards safety was the most effective approach. In most cases, it was suggested that

leadingbyexamplewould be most effective and the majority of the respondents

stated they needed to do so. It is unclear if this specifically relates to the third

hypothesis in terms of individual accountability over safety, but it does show a

willingness to be responsible for the safety of others.

It is recommended that accountability for others in the organization be

instilled in all employees from initial training and throughout subsequent training

sessions. It is also a recommendation that supervisors and company officer be held

accountable for injuries that take place on their watch. It is not suggested that this

be done through the disciplinary process, but through measured performance

standards related to safety violations and accident rates. Information related to

safety would be shared throughout the district through the currently established

communication methods.

Lastly, it is recommended that the Fire District improve tracking of injuries

and the associated costs. As mentioned, the district has been proactive and

progressive in its pursuit of a safer organization and it has had a positive impact on

the organization. However, without adequate measurement tools, we have no way

of determining our effectiveness of our actions.


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In summary, I believe the presented research has offered some insight of the

overall safety culture within Clackamas Fire District #1. This project is a significant

step towards defining and advocating the need for cultural change within the

organization related to safety. The author believes that a more thorough

understanding of how firefighters value safety will allow for improved effectiveness

when introducing and implementing new safety related polices and procedures. It

also offers recommendations for improving and maintaining safety related practices

within the organization.

Further, the author encourages additional research in organization safety

culture, particularly using a survey that address not only the Organizational Culture,

but Safety Related Behaviors and Safety Management Systems. In all, Clackamas Fire

District #1 scored positive in all dimensions surveyed, Organizational Policy,

Organizational Leadership, and Safety Procedures and the author feels this is a

refection of an organization committed to the safety of its employees. This does not

mean we can neglect the future efforts to improve upon our organization. Each

injury has a related cost associated with it, both financially and emotionally and we

cannot accept injuries as part of the cost of doing business. Firefighters are heroes,

not because of their sacrifices, but because of their commitment to help and save

others in need. The purpose of this research is to better understand our

organizational safety culture and to help save the lives of those who save others.


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AppendixA

Which one of the following best describes your position?

1 Operations 2 Administration 3 Training 4 Prevention 5 Volunteer

Years of Service1 03 years


73/99


Strongly Strongly

Disagree Agree

1.The department is genuinely concerned about safety cdefg

2. Leadership provides a positive climate that promotes safe Fire/EMS

operations cdefg

3. The accident and injury rate in our department is within industry

standards.... cdefg

4. Firefighting activities are made as safe as they can be cdefg

5. The department does enough to promote safety cdefg

6. Leadership conducts adequate reviews and updates of safety standards and

operating procedures...cdefg

7. The department has a welldefined safety programcdefg

8. Leadership closely monitors proficiency standards to ensure firefighters are

qualified to function safelycdefg

9. I rely on my supervisor to keep my coworkers and me safe.................cdefg

10. Our Health/Safety Policies and Procedures are adequate to provide a safe

working environment...cdefg

11. Supervisors encourage reporting safety discrepancies without fear of negative

repercussions....cdefg

12. Safety equipment has the potential to adversely affect efficiencycdefg

13. Coworkers are willing to report safety violations, unsafe behaviors, or hazardous

conditions......cdefg

14. Peer influences are effective at discouraging violations of standard operating

procedures or safety rules...cdefg

15. Violations of safety rules are rare..cdefg

16. Minor safety violations are acceptable if the risk is minimal.cdefg

2 48 years

3 915 years

4 16 years or more

Rank1 Fire Fighter

2 Company Officer

3 Chief Officer

4 Administrative


74/99


17. I am more responsible when it comes to following safety procedures than my

coworkers..cdefg

18. My department has a reputation for safety..cdefg

19. My supervisors closely monitor safety procedures and correct any deviations

from established safety standards. cdefg

20. Supervisors permit cutting corners to get the job done...cdefg

21. I can safely determine the proper level of safety equipment needed to perform

my assigned duties...cdefg

22. I have sometimes felt too fatigued to do my job safely..cdefg

23. Getting the job done efficiently is important....cdefg

24. The lack of experienced personnel has adversely affected the safety of myjob...cdefg

25. Safety decisions are made at the proper levels, by the most qualified people in

the organization.....cdefg

26. Leadership takes the time to identify and assess risks associated with its

Fire/EMS operations...cdefg

27. Coworkers will remind me to use proper safety equipment.....cdefg

28. Operational Risk Management processes are incorporated into the decisionmaking at all levels...cdefg

29. My department would rather lose a building than unnecessarily risk my

personal safetycdefg

30. Leadership is successful in communicating its safety goals to

personne

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