Orange Reaction:What the Kremlin Learned(and What It Didn’t Learn)

from the Orange RevolutionOleg Kozlovsky

The “New Authoritarianism”:Russia and China in Comparative Perspective

Amsterdam, 2013-11-27

Russia and Ukraine in 2004

• “Managed democracy” looks firm and well-established in both countries, with the opposition, media, business, judiciary largely under government control

• Attempt to rig elections in favor of PM Viktor Yanukovich causes mass protest in Kiev’s Maidan, leading to Yanukovich’s defeat

• The Kremlin supports Yanukovich’s bid and underestimates the threat of protests until it is too late

• Orange Revolution shows vulnerability of the Russian model of authoritarianism, forces the Putin’s regime to react

Use of Propaganda• Orange Revolution is represented as Western-instigated, nationalistic,

anti-Russian, chaotic, bloody, etc.• Anti-Westernism and Anti-Americanism adopted as key propaganda

concepts: The West is trying to weaken and destroy Russia• Putin’s rule is claimed to have brought about much-needed political and

economical stability that has to be preserved at all costs• Concept of “sovereign democracy” is used to repel criticism of Russian

political system from abroad• Constant public attacks against leading opposition figures and

organizations ensure that there will be no “Russian Yuschenko” capable of winning elections

• The regime increasingly contests the opposition on the Internet by training and hiring bloggers, investing in online media, use of hackers etc.

Political Organizing

• Nashi and similar groups absorb socially active youth using many “Orange” techniques

• Both the police and pro-Kremlin youth groups are used to deny physical space to the opposition, with varying effectiveness

• Attacks are carried out against the opposition, both online and offline

Legislation and Policies

• Electoral reform: Shutting down 2/3 of political parties, banning of electoral blocs, putting remaining parties under stricter control

• Passing of “anti-extremist” laws, which allow to target both groups and individuals for a broad range of political activities

• Wider use of coercive agencies to persecute opposition and human rights activists, especially before elections

Post-2011 Perspective

• By 2011, Kremlin’s policies had discredited most political institutions – elections, the Parliament, parties, courts, etc. – and eventually eroded trust in the government

• Russian civil society was maturing despite all these measures, which became apparent in December 2011 when mass protests erupted in Moscow and other cities

• Kremlin’s contingency plan failed; Putin’s model turned out not to be immune to the “Orange virus”

• After the White Ribbon protests, the sophisticated system of “sovereign democracy” was largely replaced with a more straightforward, traditional form of authoritarianism

Oleg Kozlovskyoleg@kozlovsky.ru

@kozlovskyfacebook.com/kozlovsky

Skype: okozlovsky