Operation FARRAGUT Lessons Learned 3 May 1967

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31 May 1979 per Group-4 document marking;

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CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN RIEPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (27 Apr 67) FOR OT 3 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Operation Farragut Conducted

by Ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclcsure is a Combat After Action R~ort for

k 00 Operation Farragut. Operation Farragut was conducted by the 1st Brigade,po 101st Airborne Division during the.period 26 January through 23 March

1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure

appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current

operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl KENNETH G. WICKHAM

© .FMajor General, USA

The Adjutant General

0 oimanding General, ' US Army Combat Development Conmmand

-Coimandants

0 US Army Command and General Staff College

US Army War College

- US Army Air Defense School

* US Army Artillery and Missile School REMASDI UNCLA8837IB

US Army Armor School WE= 8IPARI[ D FROM

US Army Chemical Corps School CLA03FIED INCL4OUIS

r US Army Fngineer SchoolUS Army Military Police School

US Army Infantry School

, US Army Intelligence School

US Army Medical Field Service School

US Army Ordnance School• US Army Quartermaster School

US Army Security Agency School I'US Army Transportation School

-iUI US Army Signal Schoolv 0 US Army Special Warfare School

AR0 968 .o R US Army Civil Affairs School

4, -3

'~~~I j( 8e page 2 fo r Copies furnished)

G"xo27 CONFIDENTIAL

4



CONFIDENTIAL

Copies furnished:

Office, Secretary of Defense, ATTN: OSD (SA), Southeast Asia ForcesOffice, Chief of Staff, US Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for ForceI: Development

Research Analysis Corporation

Security OfficerLos Alamos Scientific Laboratory

Office of the Director of Defense Research

and Engineering

Deputy Chief of Staff for Military

Operations, ATTN: Joint Actions Control Office

2

CONFIDENTIALI

I



CONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT OPERATIONSAFTER ACTION REPORT

VOPERATIONFARRAGUT

Ist BRIGADE

101st

AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS

WARRIORS

COINIIDENTIAL

Incl I

- -i~ --



CONFIDENJTIALUWART4T O 'E ARMY

HEAUARTMS IST HIOADE 101ST A-RB0R1M DIVISION

APn 96347

AVBD-C

SUBJWET Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAUT (MkCV/RCS/J3/32)

TRUt Oommanding General

I Field Force Vietnam,.APO 96350

TOs Commanding GeneralTO"US litary Assistance Comands Vietnam

! ATT., J343

PO 96222

1. (U) Name of Operation Operation FAMAOT.

2. (u) Dates of Operations 260800H January 1967 through 23 March

1967. (Phse Is 26 January F7-16 February; Phase I:t 17-28 February 67;Phase Il 1-8 March 671 Phan. IV: 9-23 March 67).

3. (U) locations MW TH1AN, NIM THN and LAM DONG Provinces.

4. (U) owmaM Headquarters let Brigade, 101st AirbrrA Division.

5. (U) Reiprting fficer: Brigadier General S.H. Matheson, Command-ing General, let Briga, llat Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization:

a. Th e task organization of the Brigade at th e initiation of

Operation FARRLhT was as shown below.

1-327 Inf We Troops

Bgr LZ Clearing Thda Ed (-)A2-17 Car (-)

2r327 Inf A/326 En(U P lat

1 plat, "/326 ngr MP Flat42 Inf Flat, Set Do g

2-502 Isf 20th Chem Dot181 MI Dot

I plat A2-17 Ca B-i, 24th PsyOp Oo(retaned to parent 1-101 Avn Seeunit control Do-2) TACP

406 RD

L-30 Arty

b. Me task organization was changed dw-LM operations against theLZ BONO P11R0Secret Base by th e addition of two CTDO Omanies (LUONG -0

3? Cow) in direct support; one company with the 2-327 Inf and two platoons

eah in direct support of 1-327 Inf and 2-502 Inf; The 1,th Troop, 8th Cavlry(ARD) operated in direct eupport of the Brigade during the last three phaseeof Operation FARRAGUT. GROUP 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEARS INTERVALS

DELASSIFID Ar 32 Yr"

CONFIDENTIAL

lao].]I



F

WH]DELJL-.4 IALAVDD-CSUBJEaT: Comnat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAaUT (MACV/

RCS/J3/32)

7. (C) Supporting forcest

a. 2/320 Arty: EMployed in a direct suprort role.

b, M/30 Artys Provided general support reinforcing fires.

c. 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided tw o airmobile companies ingeneral support. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support and

resupply missions. The 10th Aviation Battalion was augmnted with one add-

itional airmobile company during Brigade airmebile assaults on 17 Februaryand 9 March.

d. 179th and 180th Assault Support Helicopter Compayiw Providedfour flyable CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacingand resupplying artillery unite.

e. 183d Aviation Company. Provided four 0-1 aircraft for visualreconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and radio relay.

f. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airliit support for Pa y

War operations.

g. 245th Pay Ops Co: Frovided one loudspeaker and leaflet dis-

semination team in direct support.

h. 7th USAF: Flew 52 tactical fighter missions totaling 125 sorties.Fifty of these sorties were immediate requests which were processed throughthe Air Force Tactical Air Request Net with an average reaction time of 25minutes. In addition, 15 Combat Sky Spot rissions (30 sorties), 6 flareship(AC-47) sorties, 78 reconnaissance sorties, 102 Psychological Warfare sortiesand 189 transport sorties were flown in upport of the Brigade. EighteenB-52 sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. FAC's flow 322 sorties inforwad air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions.

i. 35th Engineer Group: Provided general engineer support.

J. 54th Signal Battalion- Provided general support.

k. 498th Me d Det: Provided responsive, rapid, evacuation supportto the Brigade throughout the opnration.

1. Det A-237, 5th SF Group and LUONG SON CIDO Camp: Provided two

CIDO companies in direct support of Brigade operations in the LE HONGRONOSecret Base area.

a. 46th RF Company (HOA DA): Operated in direct support of theBrigade by securing ls t Dog CmdFSP vicinity S NONAO.

n, Zth Troop, 8th Car (ARVN): Operated in direct support of theBrigade by providing convoy escort and security along National Route 1between FRAN TE? and PRAO RANG.

o. 2d Battalion, With Infantry (ARW): Operated in close mutualcoordination and cooperation with the Brigade in operations .against cecretBase 7 ad Secret Base 35.

8. (U) Intellizence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Missions Readquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the istBrigade, lOlst-Efrirn Division to move from vicinity KOWTRM on 21 January1967 to base camp vicinity PHAN RANG and, on 26 January to initiate opera-

tions to search out and destroy enemy units and installations in the FARRAOUTA0 with priority to Secret Bases 7 and 35 in that order. Shortly after the

2

CONFIDEN TIAL

la-d 1



CONFIDENTILNLSU ECrt O0Crbat Opera '.one After Action Reports Lperation FARRAGUT (MACV/

initiation of the operations the Brigade (_4r was withdrawn from OperationFARRAGUT and conducted Operations GATLINO I & II. Upon completion of 0ATLPM11 on 15 February 1967 the FARRADUT AO was extended and the Brigade'a missionmodified to include the conduct of search and destroy operations in areas

t adacent to National Route 1 between PHAN TR.IEr and PHAN RANG, Inclosure 2,

Operations Schematics.10. (c) co of Oprations Operation FAPRAOY2 consisted of search

and destroy operatins conducted = four distinct phases. Phase I of OperationL PARRAGUT was oriented into Secret Base 7 during the period 26 January - 16

February 1967. Following a feint by elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne),L502d Infantry toward Secret Base 35 on 26 January, the 2d Battalion (Airborne),

127th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults on 27 January to exploit a B-52strike in Secret Base 7. lo t Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conductedairmobile assaulta to the north of the B-52 strike zone and conducted searchand destr " operations to the south, while 2d Battalion (Airborne)9 502dInfantry aved overland and conducted search and destroy operations northinto Secret Base 7. Following the departure of the Brigade minus on 30 and31 January for Operation OATLINO, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantrycontinued search an d destroy operations in and adjacent to Secret Base 7

r through 16 February. During the period 17-28 February, *Phase I of OperationFAtRAG T wa s conducted in the LE HONO HONG Secret Base, lst Battalion (Air-borne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted

f thorough 'search and destroy operations in exploitation of a B-52 Strike while2d Battalion ( AirbornsX 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minusCblocked

to the NE and SW respectively. During the later stages of Phase II,t2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations

to the north, attempting to drive the ery against blocking positions mannedby elements of lst Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and Troop A, 2dSquadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry. Phase II I of Operation FARRAGUT (1-8 March67) was characterized by Brigade minus search and destroy operations againstsuspected enemy locations north of SONO MAJO hile 2d Battalion (Airborne),327th Infantry secured portions of Route 1 and conducted cordon and searchoperations against VC controlled villages and hamlets between PHAN RANG andSONG MAO. The final phase of Operation FARRAGPY was a three battalion searchand destroy operation againat Socret Base 35. Two battalions. Is t Battalion(Airborne), 327th Tnfazitry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d :nfntry, con-ducted airmobi1e assaults from SONG MAO nto Secret Base 35 end conductedsearch and destroy operations to the south and wet. 2d Battalion (Airborne),

327th Infantry moved overland along Rt ip conductet search anid destroy

operations to t east and blocked routes of agrees out of Secret Base 35 tothe west.

31. (C) Execution:

a. Operation PARRAJT was characterized by wmall unit actions and

sporadic contact with small enemy forces. Th e search and destroy tacticsutilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes,traids and the use of small unit stay behind forces. Th e terrain over whichoperations were conducted included maritainous junglev rolling hills, sandy

scrub forest, and flat, cultivated lowlands.

b. Operation FARRAGUT wa s initiated seven day after the terminationof Operation PICKETT in KONTUM Province, On 21 January 67, the Brigade beganai r and overland movement from KONTUM to PRAN RANG. Th e Brigade minus closedPHAN RANG on 22 January and on 26 January convoy eleemnte closed PRAN RANO

after m-ving overland a distance of approximately hOO mileb. OperationFARAOU commnced at 2608o0 January 1967.

a. Phase It Thu three maneuver battalions of the Brigade were

located at the Brigade Base CaOW vicinity PHAN R'.NG. At 260900H January1967, Task Force DOERTY, composed of C/2-502 InfW, 1 plat A/326 i:gr,

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CONFIDENTIAL

I l"Cl I

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iCONH1DEN -IALAM'D-CSTJECTt Combat Operations After Action Reports Operation FARRAGUT (MACV/

RCS/J3/32)

1 plat L/2-17 Cav, and C Btry, 2-320 Arty, conducted a tactical road march

to an area NW of Secret Base 35. This move was an attempt to deceive the

enemy as to the Brigade's true objective, Secret Base 7, nd surved to

position forces for the Brigade assault on D+l. To further enhance the

deception, 2d Battalion, 4Uth Regiment(ARVN) cormbneed operations SE of

PAN RANG in direct support of the Brigade and during the period 26-27January, a heavy artillery and naval gun fire preparation was placed inSecet Base 35. On 27 January 1967, following a B-52 strike, let Battalion(Airborne), 327th Infantry an d 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantryconducted airmobile assaults into the Secret Base 7 area to exploit thestrike and destroy enorW forces and installations in zone. 2d Battalion(Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an overland move from PM RANG intothe southern portion of the AO and cormenced search and destroy operationsto the NW, (Inclosure 2, Tab A) . Contact within the AGduring the period27-30 January was relatively light. On 28 January, in two brief contacts,the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry produced 4 VC KIA (BC) and 3individual weaons captured. Documents captured as a result of this en-

counter indicated that NVA orces were being used as fillers in local VCunits. On 28 January, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry die-covered a large base area believed to have been the VC Province Headquarters.

The area contained 20 huts, two hospitals, a mess hall (75-100 capacity);radio repair area, printing plant, and a large amount of food, livestockdocuments, and nedical supplies. On 30 January the 2d Battalion, 44th AVNRegiment terminated operations in direct support of the Brigade and resumednormal defensive posture from three locations south of FRAN RANG. On 30 and31 January, le t Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Air-borne), 502d Infantry extracted from the FARRATUT AD to PHAN RANG and pre-pared to initiate Operation GATING I in LAM DONGrovince, while the 2dBattalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued Operation FARPtAGT. Themovement of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry from field locations toPHANANG deserves comment In that a heliborne extraction of one infantry

battalion was accomplished during the hours of darkness. Seven separatePZ's were utilizedto extract 448 troops between 1847 hours and 2115 hourson 30 January 1967& At 311720H January 67, while conducting a tactical routereconnaissance south on Highway 1, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th.Cavalry was engaged by mortar and small arms fire resulting in I US KIA,4 US MIA, I h ton trk destroyed, 2 VC KI A (BC) and 2 SS's captured. During

the period 1-8 February,the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry c ontinuedOperation FARRAGUT, making light contact and discovering nuaerous cachesand base carp areas. On 2 February 67, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17thCavalry, reinforced by a provisional platoon of Company A, 326th EngineerBattalion (Airborne), conducted an overland move into the AO and commasencedsearch and destroy operations under OPCON of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th

Infantry. On 7 and 8 February, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantrydiscovered large caches of food, documents, and communications eouipment.On 7 February Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry terminated searchand destroy operations and returned to PRA RANG. At 080700H February

offensive operations in the FARRAGUT AO were terminated in observance of theTE truce period. Units assumed a defensive posture astride known or suspect-

ed enemy lines of comnmunications and conducted vigorous defensive recon-naissance patrolling in an attempt to minimize VC/NVA military exploitationof the TFr stand-down. During the TET stand-dwn period, which lastedthrough 120700H February 67, there were 2 VCA/VA initiated contacts in theFARRAGUT AO resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 US WIA, and 1 mauser captured. On13 February, Task Force THUNDMEBALL consisting of the 2d Battalion (Airborne),

.)27th Infantry; Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalr Battery B,2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery; an d 1 plat, Btry B, let Battalion,30th Artillery, nonducted airmobile assaults and overland moves into selectedLZ's and firing positions north of Route 1 an d onmerced search and destroyoperations south to eliminate VC/1VA domination of Route I between XAM MAI(BN6954) an. IFHA (W:5 1). The task force was supported b. lements ofCompany B, Ith Lngireer Lattalion which had the mission of repairing Route

1 to accomodate military convoys. On 16 February Task Force THNDERBALL

QC F-IE 4ITIAL

i Xl€I 1



CONFIDEN\ TtLAVM-.C

SUBJECTi Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARLAGM (MACV/

RCS/J3/32)

terminated operations S of PHAN RANG and conducted a combined airmbile andoverland move to SONG MAOBN2645) and prepared for future operations in theFARRAaUT AD,

d. Phase Ilr Th e second phase of Operation FARRAGUT began on 17February; two days after the termination of GLTLN1G II by the Brigade minusand one day after Task Force THUNDERBALL moved to SONG MAO. On 17 Februarythe Brigade initiated search and destroy operations in the western portionof the LE HONG PHONG Forest. Airmobile assaults were conducted by allbattalions at first light from PHAN THIET and SONG MAO to selected LZ's inthe AO an d following a B-52 strike at 1000 hours, all elements initiatedsearch and destroy operations and extensive patrolling to deny enemy egressout of the area. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with one DSCIDG Go blocked routes of withdrawal to the S3, while Ist Battalion (Air-borne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry each with2 DS CID platoons conducted search and destroy operations to the SE. 2dBattalion, 7th Cavalry minus, supported by 1 DS ARVN Co and I DS RF compaiv,screened Wvof the Brigade's AO and the Brigade% origawdo cavalry troopcoreened the road network north of the LE HOVO PHONG, (Inclosure 2, Ta b B).The airmobile assault phase of the operation wa s conducted prior to and inconjunction with the B-52 strike. All elements of the blocking force andassault elements from le t Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d

Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were in position prior to the B-52strike and the airmobile assault continued during the B-52 strike. Con-currsnt with the assault on the LE HONG PHONG, engineer elements supportedby 4th Troop, 8th ARVN Cavalry began repairs and r-op~ning of Route Ifrom PH A THIET to SDNG MAD. The operation during the period 17-22 Februarywas charaoterized by .nmiroue, but lipht contact and frequent encounter withmines, booby traps, snipers and harassing fire. During this period the letBattalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502dInfantry discovered numerous base camps and fortified positions ranging insize from 17-100 bunkers. On 22 February, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus,rterminated their screening mission SW of the Brigade AO. The 2d Battalion(Airborne), 502d Infantry terminated operations in the western portion ofthe LE HONG PHONG and extracted to SONG MAD and the 1s t and 2d Battalions('Arborne), 327th Infantry repositioned forces in order to conduct searchand destroy operations against the eastern portion of the LE HONG PHONG.On 23 February the Brigade began operations in the eastern portion of theLE HONG PHONK -th the let Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and I DSCIDo company blocking routes of withdrawal to the N and Wand the 2dBattalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with 1 Ci O company DS conductingsearch and destroy operations to the N. Contact during the period 23-2?February consisted of harassing fire and unwmrous small unit engagements.Several large campsites and food caches were discovered and destroyed orevacuated. The anew continued attempts without success to interdict conveytraffic on Route 1. On 24 February, in response to'a request for assistancefrom LAM DONG Province, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry and CBattery, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery conducted airmbileassaults from SONG MAO to selected LZ's west of DI LINH and began searchand destroy operations to locate and destroy an estimated VC battalion whichhad ambushed local ARVN forces. On 25 February elements of 2d Battalion(Airborne), 502d Infantry contacted 4 VC resulting in 3 VC KI A (BC), I VOCand 3 individual weapons captured. acting on intelligence received fromthe captured VC, one company conducted an airmobile assault to L'e SW ofDI LINH to block enamy routes of withdrawal. Th e company contacted anestimated 2 company force just prior to dark resulting in 1 us KIA, 8 usWIA, 9 VC KIA (BC) and 5 individual weapons captured. The enemy brokecontact at dark and TA C

ai r and artillery were utilized throughout the nightin an effort to block enemy routes of egress. On 27 February the Brigadeterminated operations in the LE HONG PONG Forest and DI LIM are& andextracted to SONG MAO to conduct maintenance and prepare for future opera-

tions in the FARRAGUT AO.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDEN -It4-LAVBD-C

SUBJEOTi Conbat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT (MACV/rs/J3/32)

e. Phase II I Th e third phase of Operation FARRAO was character-ized bi the Brigade

ts continued use of land LOC's, tho conduct of several

cordon and earcn operations in the SONG IaO - TIll ?HONG area, and the conductof

search and destroy operations in the area north of SONG MAO. An FSP wasestablished at SO'!G MAO by elements of the le t Logistical Conmand and theBrigade provided security forthe beach unloading site vicinity HOI TA N (M3737).On I March, reacting to intelligence indicating from one to two VC companieswer occupying hamlets N of TU Y PHONG, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327thInfantry, on two hours notice, executed an airmobile assault into LZ's vic.inity TUY TI!04 CHAN and TUY TINH VIET (BN4608). Elements of two companies,assisted by the Sector Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon and 2 PFcompanies, completed a cordon and search of the hamlets. Results of theoperation were 6 VC KIA and 4 SA captured. The battalion wa s extractedto SONG MAO n 2 March. On 3 March 67, the Lh5th RF compary ieplacedBrigade elements securing th- beach unloading site vicinity HOI TAN. At0305oOH Mar 67, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted anight airmobile raid under flare illumination to cordon and search thevillage of VIUH PO A (BN5651). The village had been a center of V ta xcollection on Route I between PIHAN THIET and PHA1 rQ . Th e raid achievedcomplete surprise as evidenced by the effectivv sealing of the of thehamlet prior to detection by the local population. While no ez.erV contactswere made as a result of the operation, significant results were achieveein the fields of intelligence and civic action. As a direct result of thisoperation, the entire populace of VIIH HO A (over 500) elected to leave thehamlet and return to Tni control by relocating at TU Y PHCWG. At 030730HMarch .7 the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion(Airborne), 502d infantry conducted airmobile assaults into LZ's north ofSD110 MAO and began search and destroy operations to the south an d north re-spectively, (Inclosure 2, Tab C). No significant enemy contact was madeand on 6 March both battalions were extracted to SONG MAO. The 2d Battalion(Airborne), 327th Infantry continued to secure National Route 1 while TroopA, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, supported by Lth Troop, 8th Cavalry(ARVN) provided convoy security and escort for logistic convoys between PHAN

IAOnd SCNG MAO.

f. Phase I7: The fourth phase of Operation FARRAGUT was directedinto Secret Base 35 and was initiated or, 8 March with the clandestine over-land infiltration of four Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Teams into the NWportion of the objective area to conduct ambush and surveillance operationsalong enemy LOC's between Secret Base 7 and Secret Base 35 . At 090700H March67 the Brigade initiated

search and destroy operations against Secret Base35. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry executed an early morningairmobile raid with one company and the reconnaissance platoon to cordonand search the hanlet of SONG HAI (EN8262). National Police assisted inthe search, segregation and screening of inhabitants upon completion of thecordon. The is t Battalion (Airborne), 327th Irfantry condUcted airmobileassaults from SONG MAO to four LZ's in the northern portion of Secret Base35 and began search and destroy operations south on multiple axis. The 2dBattalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry moved overland from TUY PHNN)G into thewestern portion of the objective area and conducted search and destroy opera-tions to the cast with two companies. One company continued to secureNational Route 1. Th e 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry minus con-ducted an airmobile assault into the southeast portion of Secret Base 35and began search and destroy operations to the west. At 091200H March 67elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were relieved oftheir mission at SONG HAI by elements of the 2d Battalion, 44th Regiment(ARVN) which moved overland on Provincial Route h07, (Inclosure 2, Tab D).These elements rejoined the battalion minus in the AO and by 1305 hoursthe airmobile mnve was complete. On 10 March the Brigade Main CoumandPost and trains began mncvenent overland from SONG MAO to PH.AN RANG. Operationsin the Secret Base 35 area were characterized by light and scattered contacts

6

CONFIDE NT1AL



SON FIDEN-ALAVBD-CSUBJC Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGt7 (MACV/

RCS/J3/32)

and attempts by the VC to harass traffic on Routes 1 and 407 through the use

rof mines. On 13 March 17 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry rein-

forced with one battery of artillery and one platoon of engineers terminated

operations in Secret Base 35 and commenced overlani movement to TU Y BOA.

The battalion closed TUYHOA and became OPCON to Task Force IVY at 141601H

March 67. On 13 March the 4th Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN), terminated opera-

tions in support of the Brigade. This umit was responsible for the Brigade's

duccessful utilization of land LOC's during the final stages of Operaion

FARRAOUT. VC contact was established by the Ist Battalion (Airborne), 327th

Infantry on 13 and lh March in a series of caves in the northern portion of

the AO and resulted in 9 VC KIA(BC) and 6 SA captured. On 15 March, the 2d

Battalion (Airborno), 502d Infantry minus, conducted an airmobile and over-

land ,ove to an area just south of Secret Base 7 and began search and destroy

operation*. One ompany of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry con-

tinuad operations in the NE portion of Secret Basc 35 until 18 March when it

rejoined the battalion. On 16 March the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Lifantry

Kdiscovered a large campsite and contacted an estimated 6 VC resulting in I US

WIA, 5 VC KIA (BC), I VCC and 4 Sk captured. The 2d Battalion, 44th Regiment

(ARVN) terminated oparations north of Secret Base 35 in support of the Brigade

on 16 March. During the conduct of operations in Secret Base 35, Troop A,

2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, reinforced by the Brigade Security

Platoon established and maintained TO's on Route I to Mnitor movement of

civilian traffic and gather intelligence on VC tax collection efforts. The

troop conducted daily road clearing and screening operations on Rcutes I and407. On 22 March the le t Battalion (Airborns), 327th Infantry terminated

operations in Secret Base 35 and conducted an verland move to PIUSfRANG tobegin preparation for future combat operations. At 221225H March F7 elements

of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile raid

against the deserted hamlet of VRIH HOA resulting in the capture of'2 ARVN

deserters and h detainees. On 23 March the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502dInfantry terminated operations in the FARRAOUT AO and conducted an airmobile

and overland move to the Brigade base camp at PH A RANG. Operation FARRAGUT

terminated 232400H March 1967.

12. (C) Results:

a. The le t Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished itsmission of cond,cting search and destroy operations to locate and destroy

VC/NVA forces in the FARRAGUT AO .

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the

operations 115 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 10 VC/NVA KIA (EST), 2 NVAC, 18 VCC, I

rallier, 139 detainees (28 classified civil defendants), 80 indi '.dualweapons, 80.4 tons of rice, 6.6 tons of corn 17 radios, 2 generators, and

miscellaneous amunition, medical and adminitrative supplies.

c. Friendly losses during the oDeration were: 15 US-KIA, 11 4 USWIA, 5 MY W IA (supporting forces); 3 M-151 ton trks, 1 M-60, 2 M-79 an d

I AN/HRC-25 destroyed, 1 2 ton tr l damaged.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 3, Personnel andA-W nistration.

b. Logistice, See Inclorire 4, Logistics.

~c. Civic Action, See Inclosure 6, CivUl Affairs.

, 14. (C) =Special Equipment and Techniques,

a. The succesful execution of an illminated airmobile raid byone battalion minus, emphasizes the value of this tactic in achieving mm -2rise as well as the desirability of all aviation units achieving this

CONFIDE W-IAL



CONKIDEN :IALAV'8D-C

SUBJECTs Combat Operationr After Action Repcrts Operation FAMAGUT (MOV/

RCS/J3/39)

capability. In planning nM d executing the night airmobile assaults, Several

techniques. were developed which are worthy of note.

(1) The PZ was organized by 10th Aviation Battalion path-

finders who -placed lamps at each touchdown point. This facilitated both

the movement of trocps a~d aircraft on thi. PZ.

(2) The f-.rst flare wa s ign'ited on order of the mission comaends

as the first flight was on short final into the LZ. Continuous illumination

w&s then utilized to ficilitate the landing of aircraft, to assist ground

troops in movement, aii to aid in the observation of the target area.

(3) The Ji r corridor into the objective area was planned so

that critical azimuth changes were made above friendly installations on the

ground. Fire arrws (fire pots placed in the shape of an arrow) ignited

at these friendly poe tions assisted aircraft navigation.

b. Repetiti.ve patrolling over the same area in varying patterns

uncovered numerous c~ches an4 cmnp areas sometims only meters away from

earlier dis coveries.

e. During Operation FARRAOT ai r warning messages were broadcast

by 2d Battalion (Ai:?borne), 320th Artillery utilizing an AiV Force sur-

vival kit radio, AN/0RC-lO. Broadcasting ai r warning messages inthis

manner permitted pilots to continually monitor ground unit comand nets.

d. The 24 Battalion (Airborne), 3^,h Artillery made extensive use

of the organic coUnter-rortar radar, ANiMQ-4A, during Operation FARRAT.

The radar was uti:.ized with varying degrees of success in computing mxrvey

coordinates by:

(1) Tracking a low charge, high angle round.

(2) Tracking a balloon floating above the point at which

survey coordinates are desired.

(3) Track.ng a beer can dropped from an H-l to the point

at which surveyed coordinates are desired.

15 . (c) Commanders Analysis:

a. Leosons Learneds

(1) Inability to fire accurately at fleeting targets that

appear in a hasty engagment continues, to be a sukject for continuous

training.-

42) All individuals detained by the brigade should be evacuated

through brigade chanels. Immediate release of detainees to GVN authorities

often precludes the collection and dissemination of intelligence of .immediate

tactical sigdfticance.

(3) In lucrative areas, it is desirable to re-enter the area

using varylng patterns in order to fully exloit or develop the situation.

(4) Detailed arrangements must be made to insure ARVN and CIM

troops operating in direct support of US troops are properly equipped and

supplied to rema'n in the AO for the duration of an operation.

(5) The conduct of illuminated airmobile orerations is tactically

feasible and greatly enhances the brigade's capability to surprise the enemy.

(6) Night airmebile operations require detailed planning and

CONFIDENTI AL



tt

*AVE-C ,ONFIDEHIAL_S C ombt Orations After Action Report, Operaton FAMRAOUT (MAVl

thorough reonlnaidsame.

(7) Civic Action activities, in addition to their oontribution

to Revolutionary Development Prograis, provide an excelIent souroe of in-

telligence,

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Operation FARRAOUT was characterized by extensive use of

the available road network to position and resupply brigade mansuver elements.

The Brigade plans to continue makizg maxiu use of land LOC's mhenever feible,

(2) Th e hth Troop, 8th Cavalry (AR ) supported the Brigade

*duriog the overland movw from PHN THI to WNG MAO, during operations in

the 0N AO area, an d during the-overland mowve from 3ONG MAO to PHAN RANG.

The troop displayed agressivenoss, initiative, and a high degree of pro-

feesional coupetence, and contributed materiall to the brigade's sucesful

utilization of land 10's.

(3) Th e comand relationship between the Brigade and U3SS/CIDO

units in the FARRAGUT AD wa s not clearly defined at the initiation of opera-

tions. This situation led to misunderstanding, created problems in coordina-tion of efforts, and prohibited -xms utilization of al l available re-

souroes. This problem has since been resolved.

o. Reomndationst

(1) That during the assault phase of operations requiring ex-

ploitation of B-52 strikes or when a tactical advantage can be gained by

placing ma.mz* troops on the ground as rapidly as possible, the Brigade's

normal aviation support of two light aimbile oopaiee be supplemented by

at least one additional light airmbile compro.

(2) That su-rival type mirrors and strobe lights (Light Marker,

Distress) be issued to units in quantity for we in signallin aircraft an d

mar" n o.

9 Inclosures H. ATH3SC1-Intelligence iiundiar Genral, MA

2-Operation Schematics OsmWandng3-?ezonl and Adminsdtration

4-L~itioa5-Comimictione6-Mvil Affairs

7-fuy War

DISTROMOI s

1 - Assistant hWaf of Staff for' Pbres Dveloqm t,Dept of the Arew, Wahngton, VC 20310

3 - CO , XAC7 (ATT, MAC J3h3)1-O, MACT(AT MACJ2)2 - DO, USART

I - 00, USARV (ATYM, AVC Hstorical Division)5 - coo I FRET2 - co, 101st n Div, t Cwlbsen, K'

nma]OL DIIWTICNI0 (1 per staff section)

10 -83

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIALbUMpr 1. (U~taleoega) to Combat Operations AfterWoti pt9,

Opsetion 7LAM60

1. (C) Torzli. Tho aa of operation onasisted of flat low-land usad for cultivation eandy bordering on the south hinm Sea; sandyscrub forests of the LZ MONDWIIO and rugged forested sauv~ains In thenortiern ana western portions or the am or oatil1 toe speee wing-itation in the lowlan along Mw #1i xrid*d good obsertion and fields

of fire, but poow cover and, concealment. In the us wisins, the heavy

forest raffaodd good cover and conocealet, but paobqervallnt and fieldsof fire. The main aveuls of aproab ws alog Rwy11 (M). Tb. tkydrog_raft of the aea had no effect on -ilitory operations.

2. (U) Ytb: The period of the operation fell Into the drr see-son for NS.i Thian and Di laThu Provinces. Rain scured on an averageof lops than one dAW a nonth vith no effect on air or ground operations.Winds wore slightly in eoes of predicted speeds, but there were no "that were anfavor ble for lowlevv flyig. The lack of min during thisperiod creates a drastic shortage of water v1h remlto in a major re-suppl proble. Genrally, the veather is *=e*lert for the conduct of mil-tI-7 operations

3.(C) InILWA.i~A

a. T entr oe~rat was conducted against losal VC orces

and throubarobof he rearesulted In no significant contact.Light, scattered oontacts, involving no -are than squad else on forces,occured almost on a daily basis. Te eam ade frequent use of minesand booby traps along road# and trail. in the 0, and eaploysd @vipers to

slow doen and barlass friendly forces.

b. In 89 7, tbe 1 Provincal a6quarters (2401), ad 274th I.Compc sustained suofient casualties to dLsrupt r'.d waken the en 'sinfluence and control over people. Th e ammy as in this eisa were found4estroyedi large quntities of documenta, training m-tarialo, medical srp-plies, radio parts, and aisosllanous equipment wire eaptured.

c. In S3 35 the 270th LWCampaW was aontacted and It s baseox destroyed. Te 6C D strtot Headquarters and a sall PW ca p was alsofound and destroyed. The h3alet of Son Ec i has bean, and will continueto be strongbold for the VCoperating in SB 35. Tbo 270t LY G~az, hasboon intgrte vt YVA up to 50 po~ove .. sr NVrA so1lers came In tin infltration groups and wre used to bolster local fo e ompanies In

Kinh ?basn Province.This is the first re.rted incide.t of M. being

integrated l..ocal V unite.

d. VC ax collection points between Phah Han and fan Thiet wrefrequently disrupted t souise ralds. Several tag eoleotors wae appe-

e . .L thoChar h of al othe oilhoan paalo l tdto pgo-

dTbo I'rav oae W facg enis fo e dn the area r of an t iseable betheu b o Contact du th e weri todo opttec inea s

t a. The Llo n 7ores t has in t e asti bor ua aMa.~a far battalion aim* units. The tcra% ont an a oqq szl of small o~mpeoamploto with ammoneation bwfer&and tr-enches, .nd trln are".

theony watr supl bein a fev lo a ve*116 Yor 'tM eason#t to doe.n+-ful tbas lag Pow units An 1 be fo d in th i am dut te 67 seaons.

S. The e a"e losin conol of the or~an- opulationtboghu

Thus =%l, .Ti fact is susatiated br the ,,tlo-Aant Lacr.sse tAthe miabor of Ra 0czh's du i the period of US operation in the a.u

ODURMD AT 3 MR MVMWhLS

CONFIDENTIALI I,



CONF: D- NTIALInolosure I (intelligence) to Cambat Operatlons After Action Report,Operation FAMCUT Ccont'd)

(1) 8,204 trcasmissions were .-onitored on the FM nets durne

the period 29 Jan - 23 Mar 1967.

(2) 226 tr-namiusions t1rough the "Strike" switchboard were

monitored dtring the period 28 Jan - 23 Mar 1967.

(3) Communlations security during all phases of the o',rations

wa s quite good with only ona transmission security violation being r ad andreported. This violation was the disclosure of classified 11ane and oper-

ations.

a. Re d Haze: It has become apparent that during the dry seasonwhen the local inhabitants are burning their fields, the effectiveness

of Red Hase is further decreased. Rather than attaching Importance tolarge sitings which are indicative of brush fires, the small sitings of less

than ten fires are of greater significance. ALUreported fires must

be chocked by visual reconnaissance.

b. Photography: Aerial photograp'y was re-dily avail-ble -ndtrail, LZ and DZ studies prepared of those areas whieh covered in the or-

iginul plonlng. However, when the Brigade began moving out of preplan-ned area, aerial photographic sunport wa s not able to keep up. xperience

shows that it req'Jires a lead time of approximately seven days to obtainthe photography, and the intelligence derived fro. the photography, fo r any

sizable area. Th e problem seems to be the availability of Air Force photo-

eson airoraft. F ture plaws call for an aerial Surveillance and TargetAcquisition flatoon, with Mohawk aircraft, to be stationod out of MA Trang

under IFV control, The avail bility of this unit should alleviate the

problem by reducing time following submission of requests.

c. Z: It should be re-amphasized that due to the coplicatedclassification systa of det-inees, the low intellignoce level of detainees,and 1-rge areas of operations, all possible capture data aho: ld be placed

on capture tags to nclud coordinates of cnture, date-time group, unitof capture, circumstances surrounding c3pture, and a description of all

,eafnk and documents captured with the individual.

d. Al individw-ls detaiued by the brigade should be evacuatedthrough channels. Th e recent experience of evacuation detainees througb

local channels points out that local Vietnamese do not use the samo clamwsification syatem as we do, do not have the sane intelligence interests,

and do not have a systam fo r the expeditious diseination of tactical in-fornation. It is also ncessary that In operations vith the Vietnamese agreat deal of specific coordination is necessary. It must be determined

beforehand where detainees are to be kept and interrogated, where piek-up points, screening points, and LZ's are to be located; and exactly whatphysical sets are to be follood by all detaifd personnel.

e. Th e VC have a defirite radio monitoring capability andhave, on several occasions, attempted to enter ou PH Dets. Tlhb makesit mnndat.ry fo r radio operators to be familiar with the use of authen-

ication tables an d be able to challenge suspect stations.

f. When entering a new operational area, all possible intelligence

agenciea must be screened fo r Information, and personnel who are familiarwith the AC, In the past, sources of InformIton (PW's, Hoi Cbanl's)have not cone to light until the operation had started. Although thesesources were available and could have provided Invaluable informationprior to the conenciment dr the operation.

g. When operating against local force VC, the longer a unit remains

in the area the better the chances are of finding the en . Although

searoh must be made to detect hiding places, cache, and base areas. Rvent-ually the VC will leave their hiding places to gain food and water, or dueto general restlessness.

C r -,IFIDENTIAL



I

CONRDENTILLInolosure 1 (Intelligence) to Canbat Operations After Action Report,Operation F.LGAOUT (cont'd)

b. Intelligon.e leads must be reacted on immediately to obtain

the beat result vhen fightir guerrillt.-. Delays in reacting to intel-ligence will find the oneV gone from the area and the target no longer

lucrative. It must be anticipated that many reports and sightings of enae

activity will not pen out; however, sone are bound to bring results.

i. Dring the dry soason the ene= will not occupy the highest

griand, but will move his camps to Iace more accessible to ! water supply.Ambushes can be very aucceasftal in and around potential sources of ater.

5. (U) 7ho following is a breakout of the en weapons and material

losses during Operation FARRAGUT,

a. Weapons Captured:

Mauser Rifle 17M4-1Carbine 23

SIS 2

US Shotgun 3.45 Cal Pistol 2Springfield .30-06 2Thompson SM 6

6Cot Naant 3?PSH 3

French SM 3M.-I Rifle

M AL So

Cleynore, ED10 2Clymore, HD3 2

4P Mines B

M-79 Rounds ?Hand Grenades 51

Blasting Cape 10

c. Otor:

Transistor Radios 15Volt Meter 1

0h Meter Iadito/Roeiver 1

CM Key2TM-? Ceaerator 1

1 3/4 H.P. Generator 1FRC-10 Han Set ISewin Machines

Microscope 1

Miuograph Machine 1Ty-pewriters 67ypevriter Ribbon 395

Tab At Order of Battle

1-3

C.ON-IHD E NTIIA

'I



CONFIDE N IALTa b A ( o of lattle) to Inoloture I, (bn*mlipsaos) te raoot tworationo

1. () V0 NVAInitial Order of Battle

a. NVA nits

(1) At the beginning of Operation FA"LI.W T the 324th Cog?24th NVABn (possibly of the 9th Hr7 VA Div) vas believed to be located

in NKih Thuan Province. Nnarus reports indicated its location as invicltity of Rn 6274, operating close to SSBhT BASS 7 (Bn 5574). One reportIndicated it s operational area as being in the northern position of rinh

Thuan Province and probably using SECRET BASE 22 (RP 80 6) as it s oenterof activity. It s mission was believed to include preparation fo r ei dconduct of amortar assault on the Phan Pang Air Force Base amnlex inearly 67.

(2) No other NVAunite were believed to be located within thearea o f operation. Soe of the local VCunits (specifioally the 270th VCXI C) was believed to have an undetermined amount of NVApersonnel as cadre.

b. V Units

N(I)h Thumanrovinae

(a) Th e following VCIF units were confirmed as oper-ating in the Ninh Uhan Province area with the most recent center of or-eration. as indicated:

270th VCL Co 7568112 VLF Co BN816714m*1trt 3 557X415th Co M 9785X420th Co BN 9785Z425th Co fl 6374

X43OhCo0 EK "Z435th Co 8197914-40th Co Dli4884X415th Co EN "808

(b) Th e following VCLXunit. were belivad to be locatedin the Ninh Thuan Provinoe area with operational areas undertoldDed

SC274 VC Co

hC285 VCLI Co

(c) Sucret Base Areas were believed to be establishedin the following vicinities with the most protracted activitic reportedin Secret Base 7 aM 35:

7 3 57419 9 792

22 BN SOD625 BN 4M43 EX 7559

(2) Binh 7ruan Province

(a) The following VCIF units were believd to be operating

1-A-i

CONFIDENTIAL

- -



CONAiDENTIALTab A (Order of Rattle) to Inclosure I (Ttallirenceo to Combet e57tiond

Aftep Acit oneRorte. Oceration PARRkGUT (cont-d)

in Binh Thuan Province with possible locations indicated as foilovus

840 VC n Unlocated602 VCBP AN 7305489 VC00 E 0221

490 VCCo 91 1420

430 VCo AN7427

440 VC Go N 1530450 VC Co AN9314460 VCCo Unlocated48W VC Co finlocated481 VCCn Unlocated

(b) A VC Mobile force Bn, identification unknown, was

reported numerous times c -rating in the vicinity of AN 9421. The unit

we s reported to have a strength of 600 to 700 personnel and an assortent

of weapons to include 60=i Mortars.

2. (C) Order of Battle Findings and Sumary in the Operatic Area.

a. Nimh Thuan Province

(1) In late Jan 67 elements of the Brigade searched and de-stroyed the area described as Secret Da e 7, Only small, isolated contact

was made and as a result an insignificant amount of intelligence was ga-

thered. The presence of small installations and facilities as well anagricultural and built up areas confirmed the assumption that the enes

(most probably Provincial VC Hq) extensively used the area as a staging area

Rest Area, and control center. It was not established that contact with

the enmy units listed in lb (1) (a) and (b) was made; however, the VC A

were most probably members of the 1401 VCProvincial Rq s and/or it s sub-

ordinate units. As a result of captured material, which inoluded typewriters

a reproduction machine, printed propaganda leaflets, directives, routers,etc., it -was established that the X401 Provincial Hqs wa s located and operating

within the imediate vicinity of BN 5574.

(2) The deployment of elements of the brigade In SB 35 (ON

7559) on 9 March 67 initially did not produce a significant amount of con-

tact. The search and screening of Son ra i (EV 8362) resulted in approx-

bmately 30 detainees, believed to be local VC infrastructure, which estab-

lishes the fact that the hamlet was controlled by VCunite in SB 35. Dur-

ing the search mission, contact with these elements wa s extremely light

indicating that the enemy wa s successfully conducting concealment and escapeand evaaion tactics. The possibility of erfiltration into SB 7 (EN 5574),

however, appeared remote in light friendly deployment of troops in the

operational area west of Ey #1. The discovery of numerous small basecamps, some fortification, individuals with various caches, and well usedtrails indicated that SB 35 wa s extensivaly used by small VCforces.

b. Binh Thuan Province

The Brigade deployment into inh huan Pxvino. produced an

insignificant amount of intal.genoo primarily due to lack of contact

with eneW combat forces. All available evidence pointed to a possible enexfiltration from the operational Area approximately 72 hours prior to

friendly insertion.

0. Conclusion

(1) The enemy forces in Binh Thuan Province, particularl7 the8.Dth VLF Co and the 490th VCLF Cc, appear to have" been well trained and

organized as evidenced by their successful conduction of concealmentand escape and evasion tactics in the area of operation during Fe b 67.

I-A-2

CONFiDE \'ILLi p "



OO DF-IDV L_Tab At((rder df "MUt) o e1 .0~ah~a~ oCma~rtoa~

The 840th VCLF Dn rc..ains in the northern portion of Binh Tbuan Provinceand can be expected to conduct haresment type operations along Hwy #1in the ?uy Phong Area (BN 5342) in the coming months. The 490th VCLF Ccalso remains in the Tuy Phong Ara operating as a stable but fleable VClocal Force and will continue to Interdict Huy #1 in Vinh Hoa Village Vithtax collections, terroism and propaganda.

(2) Te Ninh Thuan Provincial Forces remain intact and oper-ational vithin the Province. SE 22, 19 and 25 have been undisturbed byfriendly forces. The search and destroy operations in SD 7 and SB 35 have

probably preempted the NVA/VC plans to appear, prepare for, and conduct

a nortar attack on Phan Rang AFD complex. Th e 274th and 113th VCLF Co'srcrain operational in SB 7 area. Due to the destruction of certain instal-ationes/facilitee and the discovery and confiscation of a great amount of

ensi materials In SD 7, the 14 1 VC Prov Kqs will have to recuperate andreorganize before they can reach maind- operational efficiency. The 270thVCL F Co and the 112th VCLP Co appear to ha e exftiated Sr 35 but nrobtb y'eft smail scattered groups concealed within the -rea. Son thi Ramlet(N A362) remaine.under VC control. "ith thA exoertion of the NV, persomelassigned to the VCT2 uits, there are no WV, in the southern portion ofof NIM Thuan Province.

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(ON 1ID /NT1IL



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SaUGM&~



CONHDENTIALLnlcsure 3 (Personnel and A tnietratio to Combat O~eration3 After Actief

Repot, OparationFR RZU

a. Begining of Operation F-aRAGUT.(1) The Brigade personnel atrengths at the begi-ming of Operatan

hRRAGUT were as follows49Authorized Augmented (XI)

Aeigned4876roent fa r ODuty4534

PARRAJJ Ao343

Bass - Phan Rang 3443C.TLIG AO (vieoa Loc (I Feb - 15 Fe b 67)) 1773

ot Present for Duty42

('2) The assigned strength was 108% of the augmented authorized strength,

The Present fr duty strength %a 101A of the augent, authorigs. stregt..

(3) Of the not Present for duty strength; 6 were hospitalized 10ere itransit, 128 wre an TU/3D status, 76 an leave, 19 in conf wntAWOL.Vb. Conclusion at Operation FMAGU.

(1) The Brade personnelstrengths at the €oluaon f OperataPeAGRoT were as folloa

eAuthorizedAugmented e( e) 4490 ined

to 509tesent for fu .08

TV 1r AO7ot Preent for DuC e 282) The assigned strengrth .As W); o the augmnted authorijad snt h.he Pr'esent for duty strwe~th wa s 109% of the Au~pwnted authorizd strength.

0) Of Vhe not Waesent for duty strength; 13 mom hospitalized, 1.1ere intransit, 34. wee on MY//D status, 10/+ on leave, 19 in coofensmntand 4 AWOL

(4) Th. 46th AM Postal Unit, attaohad to the Briade, reasned at personnal preset for duty of 11 authorized throughout the operation.

*This figure includes the Brigade Headquarters and the logistical eeents of the units that we participating in Operation FAMAMT but werovidin their normal suppr-t, in this partic-lar caLse tam the Base aw

enitdmn assigned of 1 offcer Ad 4 enlisted man authetized wnm attachedo Heaquarter# and Headqu-tara C€upaw lo t Brigade, 101st Aiborne DiImAI

dung this opationa. Relacemante received during the ope~raticin wre assigned to subordinate

Units as follows:

2/ Z o7 75 2/32D 5 ?1227 4 153 Spt Bn 2 121/502 2 171 Separate Comanies 2 1422.L (C) CASUALS,

CONFDE NIAL



CONFIDENTIALa. CaSuatieS for the oer t were a folowas

T IA

2/3 Z7 6 22/502 2 32/30 2eth av 2 3

326th SW 2 6 C B e .9 .6

TOTAL 25 114

b. Total casualties to data:

372 17

a. The Red Cross ReareaticgI Unit oont~nd its visits to forrd unitsduing the operation.

b, Bear, soa ad Iitd sensitive iteMs wre provided to the unitsn the farird Area during the opratim.

a. During te opeatiAn, continued .hatia M s placed on Acura of--eoel rectds by4-ffordfng Personnel the opPcrt Aty to personally reviewtheir Military 201 Files.

b. Classes on AdmAnistratian and postal operatce i beld for al l unteduring the operatin.

5.(c) L

a. Patite treated:

(Ij WIA114

(2) won Hostile Injury225

(3) Diaseae643

(4) Returne to Duty310

(5) Evacuat to Hospital562

(6) Resin±n in Holding

10(7) Total Potiont Treated

b. -V eMUtaljn Personnel oategorized by wmurWU

(2) Jeld

(2) Chest5

(3) Abda,

i(4) U.mwz ,Utamties211()Lower acrzte

U12

3.2

CONFIDE.NTi, 1



CONFIDENT 1AL1nartles~e A~ (Lor~etigs) to Atfar Action !&wrt, Operation PU W

1. (C) OFC1A W&...WW IgO

a. Ceneral

Operation FARRAGUT was noteworthy for the extensive road

Cnnvcy activity, in comparison with other recent operations. Major convoy

eff. rts occured from Phan Rang to Sors Mao, Phan Thiet to Song Mao, andSor.g Yo to Phan Rang. In addition tiallor convoys operated between Phan

T2.Jt rd Luang Son almost daily while the irigade headquarters wa s at

Ph-' t , .1. A number of deficiencies in ewrroy operation became apparent,I. The' ir-iuded failure to maintain prescribed vehicle interval, speeding,&-J failure to report crossing of check points.

The operation differed also in that it was logistically

supported, in large measure, direct from Phan Rang base camp. Duringthe initial and f na stages of the operation, the Forwrd Support Ele-

men ( l..rtvated and it s functions were aseused by the Support

Bttllioi, . l.".: ,,n feasible due to the. proxitiy of the base camp andthe are3 of optrLtions, During such periods, some difficulty wa s experi-enced in the duplication of logistical requiremnts. 1tat is requirementefo r the same itm wwe placed upon logistical personnel from several sources.ThiU sometimos resulted in confusion and duplicated issues.

b. Support Battalion. hen neccesary, Support Battalion establish-ad an FSE consisting of Cowpary D, 326th Meidical Battalion, arid admiastra-

tive, maintenance, ammunition, supply, transportation, and comm. nd andcontrol elements. The FSE provided re nsivc support to committed unitrfrom successive locations at Phan Thict and Song M~o. A For-ward ,Supply

Point (FSP) was opened for a short time at Luong Son due to the relativelylarge size of the area of operations.

c. Oupporting Forces:

(1) USASC, C Ranh Ba y provided overall logistical support.

It also established separato forward support areas (FSA at Phan Thietand Song Mao. These installations provided the Brigade with the Bulk of

Class I, III, liA, and V supplies and were co-located with the FSE.

(2) Phan Rang Sub Area Command, USASC, Cam Ranh Bay providedtransportation assests. Of particular importance the 329th Transporta-

tion Company (Lt Trk) provided the bulk of transportation required toexcute major convoys,

(3) lOth Combat Aviation Battalion helicopters provided

logistical as well as tactical support.

(4) USAF 07A C-130, nnd C-123 aircraft transported most oTthe Brig de routine resupply of Class II and IV equipment from Phan Rang

base camp.

2. (C) J4AVIRIhL n&NV&RVICES.

a. rupply.

(1) Class I supplies were received in sufficient quantity,and no major shortages were experienced. Some difficulty was initially

encountered.with resupply of ice and ice cream. However, the proxtmity

of Phan Rang made it possible to fly in ice and ice crepe on a daily basis

aboard C7A aircraft. A total of 330.2 short tons of Class I were issued,

(2) Class II and IV supplice continued to be flown directlyto the torward area aboard USAF fixed wing aircraft. A total of 142.2short tongs of Class I and IV supplies wre issued during the operation.

4-1

CONF IDE NT IAL



CONFIDENTIALInclosure 4 (Logistics) to Aftcr Action Report, Operatlon FARM(.JT

(3) Class III. Th e large extent of road sonvoy activityinflated consumption of mO'J.S end DF2 fuel to a level above the averagefor previous operations. Th e Brigades organic and attached vehicles con-eused 526,2 short tons of Clas!s II I products throughout Operation FRRAGU .

(4) Class V. Although no major engageents occured during

the operation, ammunition issue accounted for 559.8 short tons. Thisent're eount wa s not expended, and Brigade units completed the opera-tic, with full basic loads.

(5) Water.

The resupply of water provided eace difficulty whilethe Origade was located in the ?han Thiet area. Th e dry season prevent-ed units from utilizing the many intermittent streams in the area ofoperations. As a result water came primarily from a small rusber ofcentral sources. The plactic, 3 gallon capacity, free drop container again

proved its worth. Although this item has attained a high degree of as-ceptence Ad ue, stocks are limited, Consequently every effort mustbe made to recover and re-use these containers.

b. Maintenance. The following maintenance problems presentedthe greatest degree of difficultv during the operation:

(1) The H-138/U handset continues as a so~u.. of difficultyin signal maintenance. Pending issue of an improved rer'.acement item,field expedient measure and frequent replacement

provided the only solu-tions.

(2) Vehicle engines, particularly for the 3/4 ton truck,failed at an increasing rate. This was due to excessive heating andadvanced engine life.

(3) Generators experienced a high rate of failure due to theexessive heat, humidity and breakdowns in viocosity of the oil used. ArunmIng limit of 15 hours was established in order to insure adecouate

lubrication.

(4) Strear sembers uner the rear 2 _ ton truck cab andvehicle bad begsa to' fail- This dam be attributed to constant operationover poor roads while carrying heavy loads.

(5) Starlight scopep are failing at an increasing rate. Theprimary difficulties are caused by the damage to iobs and rubber covers.

Each scope must be evacuated to Sacramento for repair at an estimated

cost of approx:imaty $2500.00.

(6) Small arms revwaled signs of extensive weer and samecorrosion. This is natural since these weapons have been in almostconstant use.

(7) Lack of repair parts for signal an d engineer equipment

created unrecessary deadline periods. Primary examples included handset

cables and genr.ator engines.

(8) The fUllowing is a suzmary of maintenance activitiesand job orders during the operation:

Aurtosotiw 102 93 9Amment 240 5Int ument 87 82 5signal 5C6 1405 101Engineer 65 47 18

4-2

., ~~C qR,"tI)D N "laCCNFDET.A

Ii



ICONFIDENTIAL1noiosure 4 (Logistlc) to After Action Fport, Operation FA1MGJT

0. Other Services,(1) Crayea Regstration, quartermaster ~nundry and bathaer'vcee were provided in the SA eupport at Phan T it Saersonnel and equipnt drawn*fyg U. SC, C_ R Bay. Awing the periodshen the Brigade operated directly from base

cap, the Phan Rang Sub Areaommand provided these services.3. (U) SLM4ARf, Operation PARAGUT presented no major logistiosl

problems. The logist ical system remained fully capable of uportingactical operations. Some Shortcaminp were noted in the operation of

vehicle convoys, hoiavwr these retain relatively,minor in scope.

C(U) NCDUSToSA.a. The p.mosent logistical system and support concepts have proven

valid and should be continued,

in the conduct of road convoys.

C DEC~nFI~nTIA



/i~~~ F DTIAL..Inclosure 5 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Report, Opemation Y2AMUaT

1. (U) HISSICi: The 1st FASCP, 501st Signal and the Communications Platoon,

%,\ HHC1st Brigade 101st Abn Div had the joint mission of providing signal support for

the Brigade.

2. (C) OPERATIONS

a. ONERALt The Ist FASP, 5012t Signal and the Comxmnication Platoon,

HWfCet Brigade 101st Abn Div provided signal support during Operation FARRAGUT by

establishing the Brigade Command Post and Cormncations Systems at Song Mao andPhan Rang.

b. VHF Section provided circuits at Phan Rang from the Bde CP to MACV,

10lst AvO Section and 10th Avn Hn.

o. Communication Center Section terminated two secure teletype circuits at

Song Kao. At Phan Rang the 278th Signal Copany Commnication Center terminated

three secure teletype circuits Brigade Coesnication Center personnel augente-the 278th Signal Company Commun.cation Center in support of the Brigade.

d. Switchboard/Wire Section established the Brigade CP at Song Mao ter-

uinating 86 circuits and installed approximately 40 miles of wire. At Phan Rangthe 278th Signal Co operated the switchboard and terminated the ci.L-cits for the

brigade. The owitchboard/wire section augimented the 278th Signal Co personnel.

Itice. Th Radio Soction provided FM radio stations at Song Ma o and Phan Ra .

Atcmatic retransmission and relay stations were employed at R1 677547. The MARS

Station was estabished to provide phone patch service to USA.

f. AMRadio Section operated secure radio teletype circuits between Song

Mao and Than Rang. A secure teletype circuit between Phan Rang and Thy Hoa was

established in support of the 2/327 with TF Ivy.

g. Mairtenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for the

Brigade [fHC nd attachments.

h. Field Forces Signal Support; Det h, 54th Signal Dn continued to pro-

vide circuits into the in-country system, secure radio teletype between fFFORCEV,Brigade Forward and Brigade RAr and a single sideband phone patch net paralleling

the ra~lin t~ltype not.

CONHFII0EN TIAL



4

0MNFW'. ,NTIALIncloemre 5 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operation After Action Report

Operation F.'J,'.G1JT

1. During Operation Farragut civil affairs activities were conducted

in Phan Thiet and Song Rao of Binh Thuan Province and at Phan Rang in lNinh

Thuan Province. In al l areas liaison wa s Immediately effected with theGV1officials, their US counterparts and representatives of the civilian

Lagencies. In conjunction with local officials price lists were establishedi and1 distributed, fair wages were determined and labor was procured for the

Brigade. In less populated more remote areas there is a tendency forlaborers to demand higher wages as was the case in the Song Mao area.Initially a dally wage of 150$I per day wa s demnded even though a wage

of 8O$V per day wa s fair an d adenuate for the area. However as soon as1 it was learned the Brigade would no t exceed SOiVII, the local labor forceagreed to work at that price. Th e Song Mao ares wa s also unique in that

it oitained three different ethnic groups living in close proximity to cne

another, Vietnamese, Nungs of Chinese decent and Lhontagnards. Although

the Brigade droir labor from al l of these groups on a daily basis, no problemswere en~ountored. Although Phan Rang is a relatively prosperous area andthe US Government srploW hundreds of local workers on a pormaent baei,the br igde had no trouble obtaining daily hires for 90$VN per day. Thepractice of allcwirng the units to procure their ou Labor rather than

operating a central hire point continued to prove more efficient waenoperating in the Phan Rang area. During Oper:.tion Farragut over 200

Montagnards were resettled in secure areas, 30 innocent civilians werereturned to their homes and th e VC village of Vinh Hoa in Binh ThuanProvince, (approxim.-toly 600 people) wa s reecttled in a OV controlled

re . At the conclusion of the VC villagef V o nh hC gof Song Hai in hNirhThuan had moved back to M control in the Phan Rn

area. The Brigade provided 3 tons of food stuffs and 2 tons of captured

rice to help feed the refugecs from Vinh Hoa and 5 tons of ca-tured rice

for the families from Song Hal.

2. As the Brigade operated in three different areas during OperationFarragut, civic action efforts were aimed at high impact short duration

projects attempting to integrate GVNofficials and forces iftnever possible.Significant activities during the operation were as follews:

a. Joint USA/J sick calls were conducted in n1 3 areas treatingmore than ZM p'.tients.

b. Extensive work was conducted on Highway One between Phan Thiet

and Song Ka o resulting ia the repair of 2 culverts, 5 bypasses and 27 auts.

c. A running w'ter syntem ws installed in the Notre D.,,e Orphnne

at Phzn Thiet. Th e brigade provided the materials and the local PublicWorks Dept inst, led the system. Prior to installing the sstem, water

had to be drawn from a well and carried to the orphanage. With the newsystem water ca.n no w be drawn from any of 13 taps located throughout the

orphanage.

d. Two captured VC sewing =chines were repaired nnd presented to

the Girls Club nt the An Phouc District high school in Ninh Thuan.

e. More than 100 students in the Phan Rang area were given scholar-ships for at least ne year by trooners of the brigade stationed at Phan Rang.

f. Large quantities of food, clothing, soap, scrap lumber end

various cr.Aured co dities were distributed to refugees and needy hamlets.

3. Lessons Learnedid

a. Several p-ickages of gifts were sent by an orgazeation inthe States to a mmber of the brigade for distribuzion to needy Vietnamesechildren, Most of the ite were gift wrapped and an attempt wca made todistribute them in this form. This proved extremely difficult as m of

the items were not suitable for the ages of the children receiving them.Regardloos of fancy gift wrapping all prxcanea must be opened and examined

prior to distribution.

b. When the brigade enters a now area the local labor force

CONFIDENTIAL,..e1



CONFID FN_ IA[will ofton dcm-mc w.-s much higher th n the norm-l scae. These high wage

demarsyv must not be me t and when the l bor force learns that they wontt

be met, they will work for the normal scale.

c. Mile in the Song '-.o irea it wr.s learned that US,D had provided

the means rnd a-dvised local farmers to grow an onion crop. This was done

and an asple crop w-s grown. However there wa s no local market for that

amount of onions and no mean. to get the crop to a distant mArket. Production

of a cash crop of this nature should not be encouraged unless there is a

market readily available to turn the produce into cash.

d. As a result of inadequate storage facilities in Phan Rang for

S5 supplies, food items stored there spoiled and had to be disposed of.

Steps .re being taken to provide a permanent 65 storage facility in PhanRang.

e. Until recently new tags for daily hire laborers were made on

a daily basis. This method proved difficult and time consuming. Laminated

tags were procured -xd are now used. These tngs are issued and taken updaily and can be used in "my area the brigade operites in.

6-2

CONFIDENTIAL

~%1P



C , ,1 ID7 F I- LInclosure 7 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operatios Alter Action Report,

Operation FARAGUT

1. Psychological Objoctive,

a* To induce VC, VC sympathizers and GVNsupporters living in VC con-

trolled areas to avail themselves of the OVN Chieu Hoi Prograo.

b. To encourage the populace "on the fence" to join th e GO as opposed

to the VC.

c. To strenghten the will to resist the VC and increase the morale of

the pro-O= populace.

2. Concept of Operations

a. Phase Is During this phase of the operation emphasis was placed on

conducting Psychological Warfare. The majority of leaflet and loudspeaker missions

were conducted in th e AO. After all target areas in th e AO had been covered

missions were conducted over populated ureas outside the AO* These missions

concentrated on target areas immediately adjacent to th e AO which were known to beVC or have strong VC sympathies. Al l mission during this phase were daylightmissions onducted from USAF U-10 aircraft.

b. Phase II and III During this phase of the operation emphasis wasshifted from Psychological Warfare to Psychological Operations. The priority*targets were the populated areas. Emphasie was placed on missions over VCcontrolledand contested villages. Three leaflets and three tapes were secured from th eProvince Chief, rep' oduced, and distr ibuted throughout the Province. Two C417

loudspeaker missiorA, each 2 hours in duration, were conducted over the populatedareas each night. Daily U-10 leaflet missions covered th e populated areas also.Operations within the AO included a mass leaflet drop designed to saturate th eentire area at the outset of the Combat Operation. oudspeaker and leaflet missionswere conducted in the AO as th e tactical operation umcovered likely targets.

co Phase It During the last phase of th e operation emphasis was againplaced on conducting missions in the populated areas. Two leaflets and threetapes from th e Province Chief were obtained, reproduced and disseminated. 1Poster and 1 tape were requested by Brigade Psy Op s and were distribited. Nightloudeapak-m missions continued as in Phaia IIcIII. A mass leaflet drop was con-ducted to saturate the AO (SB-35) and daily leaflot and loudspeaker missions ware

Conducted against l ikely targets discovered as a result of tactical operations.

3. Oerations conductedt

a. Nissionst 102 missions- covering 172 target areas were conducted.

Target areas ranged in size from several huts to areas as large as 216 sq . ko.

b. Leaflets: 6 different leaflets were used totalling 11,897,000

dropped. National Safe Conduct Passes were dropped on each leaflet mission. (SeTab A, Leaflet list).

c. lTudspeakert A total broadcast tine of 154.5 hours was logged. These

consisted oft

(1) Aerial

(a ) De (Ive), 8.5 hours.

(b) Da y (tape) r 28 hours.

(e ) High (tqnt). 101 hors.

(2) Mound (day, live), 14 hours.

(3) Sea (right, tape), 3 houra.

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CONFIDENTIAL

iV



Inc1osure 7 (Psychological Operations) to Oombat Operations After Action Report,9f Operation FAR T

coeqled uith the dumoreiiing effeoto of combat operations oreate a high measureI of peranum ivenes and credibility.

d. The helicopter makes an ideal Psy Ops aircraft. Its use on leafletmissions allows pinpoint accuracy since leaflets can be distributed at very lowlevels. Loudspeaker broadcasts similar4y can be pinpointed and the effects ofhigh wiis, on clarity, minimized.

I .

F

f

I

I7-3



Il- I',,I /

Ta b A (Leaflet List) to Isalone 7 (Psyehological Operations) to 0Oobat Operation y.After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT

Duning Operation FARMAUT the following leaflets were uxeds

1. NSCP 33. 245W-123-67

2. SP-331 34. 24_I4124-67

3. SP-766 35 . 24N.-337-67

4. SP-769 36. 2b5f,-142.67

5. P-782 37. 24 =,158-67

6. SP-868 38.2

4s-16

1-6

7

7. SP-.9%41 39. 2h4 -163-67

8. SP-42 4O. 245W-190-67

9. sP-947 41. 245m-..67

10. SP-951L 42. 16-67

1. SP-954 43 . 172-66

12. SP-957 d44. 31-66

13 . sP-958 45. P0-

24 . SP-11i 46, - ,ring ewdon

15. SP-12341

16. SP-1389

"-7. P-.1431

18 . SP-1539

19. SP-1619

20. SP4-1716

21. SP.4755

22. SP-16-67

23 . 245N-61-67

24. 245N-63-67

25 . 2 -109-67

26. 249-113-67

27 . 24- .--67

28 .24I5W-17-67

29. 24I-218-67

30. 24 .19.67

31. 24%,.a.2O-67

32. 245X-22-67

A-7-1

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFID I,,TI[\ L

Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Comhat Operation After Action Report, Operation9 FAMAGUT

1. Mission: 2d Battalion (Airborne) 320th Artillery supports litBrigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery "B". let Battalion (Towed), 30thArtillery provides general support to the le t 3rigade, 101st AirborneDivision.

2. Summary of Operationt

a. In the conduct of Operation FARRA0UT the same techni4uss offire support coordination and artillery employment which have provensuccessful in previous operations were utilized. Favorible terrain andthe concept of operation of the maneuver elements allowed extensive emp0y-ment of radar throughout phases II, III, end IV . Battalion FlC was utlli-sod throughout the operation, centrally located, as the contr611ing FDC.

b. An additional forward 6e e requirement wa s imposed by theattachment of a forward observer party to the 2/44 ARVN during the conductof Phase IV. This exceeded the organic forward observer capability of the

battalion, and was fulfilled by utilizing personnel with associated traln-

ing and experience from within the battalion.

c. Naval gunfire provided reinforcing fires to the brigade

during phases III and IV of FARRAGUT. Liaison was maintained at thebrigade level as velles periodic radio commnications between the suppor-ting ships and battalicn F1.

d. B/l/30 was frequently split into two platoons, each platooncollocated with a battery of 105mm howitsers, throughout the operation.

Several fire mission ware conducted, adjusting with the 105's and masingthe fires of both the 105's and 155's in effect. Flexibility was obtainedby shifting the fires of one element (usually the lO'a) on to possibleescape routes while, the other maintained suppressing fires on the anemy.

e. The amount of H a-d I fires was increased durng this oper-ation. These fires are effectively utilized todsceive the enemr.' as to theobjective ofthamaneuver elements and to deny the emem use of criticalterrain, roads, bridges, fords, campeites, etc. Likell- H and I targetscan be obtained from the maraver elements relaying through their forwardobservers.

f. Air warning messages are now being broadcast over the "0uard"UHfrequency by the fire direction center, using an ai r force survival

t kit radio. Tests thus fa r have been g7enerally favorable, althot the

radio's range seems to be extremely limited. 3roadcating air warningmessages in this manner is convenient for the pilots since the UHF"Ouardm frequency is monitored by them at all times. A search is beingmade for a more powerful, portable UHF radio.

g. A schedule of fires conducted at the beginning of PhaseIV was terminated about halfway through due to the flight paths ofhelicopters, lifting in the maneuver elements, crossing the gun-targetline. Strict adhe-ence to the propored flight corridor by the pilotswould hAve enabled

the sohedule of fires to be competed.

3. Execution:

a. Phase Is

(1) At 270700 Jaiuary, A/2-320th displaced to 58882. Unit

closed at 1020 hours. Direct Support of 1-327th Infantry.

at (2) At 310730 January,-A/2-320th displaced to BW74T87b. Unitclosed at 1010 hours. General supprt of lst Brigade.

8-1

CONFIDENTIAL

£ SI _



CONDFN -TIALInclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat 0teratons After Action Report, Operation

FARRAOUT

i (3) At 271000 January, B/2-320th displaced to 3512768. Unit

closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-327t, Infantry.

(4) At 311115 January, B/2-320th displaosd to EN615695. Unitk closed at .1646 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infaetry.

(5) At 051730 February, B/2-320th displqoed to E3665690. Unitclosed at 1330 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infa4try.

(6) At 0(4;- February, B/2-320th displaced to 669688. Unitclosed at 1420 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry. 4

(7) it 150630 February, B/2-320th displaced to 8N692%7h. Unitclosed at 160D hours. Direct support of 2-327t Imf-vtZy.

(8) At 270700 January, C/2-320tb displaet to 3W702598. Unitclosed at 1715 hours. Direct support of 2-502e Infa;try.

(9) At 28100D January, C/2-320th displaced to EN667688. UnitI closed at 1815 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Tufamtry,

(10) At 30.830 January, C/2-320th dia7:.aced 1,o IPbU874. Unitf closed at 310200 hours. Oaeral support let Brigjie.

(11) At 271320 January, B-30th dis laced to B3667688. Unitclosed at 1757 hours. General support reinforcin the fires of C/2-320th.

(12) At 300900 January, B/1-30th dis laced to BN7la87. Unitclosedt 2100 hours. General support rsimforcin# the fires of 1st Brigade.

Ib. Phase Ils

(1) At 170645 February, A/2-320th d~splaced to HN 16252. Unitclosed at IM5 bows. Direct support of 1-327th lafantry.

(2) At 230700 February, A/2-32Ot di.splaoed to 94125384. Unitclosed at 3-100 hours. irect support of 1-327th rafntry.

(3) At 281400 February, A/2-320th d4splaced to 31266456. Unitclosed at 1800 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Tfantry.

() At 170500 Febzuary, /2-320th dUlplaced to 3ft253i8. Unitclosed at 0830 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Tfantry.

I(5) At 230600 February, B/2-320th d4Bplszsd to EM2350jh. UnitJ closed at 1100 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

1(6)t 250600 February, B/2-32th d1splaced to A812817. Unit

closed at 0900 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(7) At 280630 February, B/2-320th displaced to W26&i5

6. Unit

closed at 1320 hours. Direct support of 2-32M Infantry.

(8) At 170730 February, C/2-320th displaced to A962316. Unitclosed at 1730 hourv. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(9) At 180600 February, C/2-320th displaced to W2121j06. Unitclosed at 1800 hours. Direct sipport of 2-502d W .amtry.

(10) At 190700 February, C/2-320th displaced to M2 125o4. Unit

closed at 1630 hours. Direct support of 2-502 Infantry.

(2-) At 281330 February, 0/2-320th displaced to ON2661s%6. unitclosed at 2000 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

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I lr -,,E T Li



COTSN 11) LNT IALIn lowure 8 (Artillery) to Oombat Operations After Action Report, Operation

FAmJWUT

q (12) At 170715 Febrarys BA1-3t displaced to W762316. Unit[ closed at 1730 hours. General support reinforcing the fires of C/2-320th.

(13) At 2814lO February, BA-3Oth displaced to W?66L56. Unitclosed at 2020 hours. General support of the le t Brigade.

S. Fase Ilt

(1) At 030700 March, A/2-320th displaced to E"187666. Unit

closed at 1000 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.I .(2) At 060615 March, A/2-320th displaced to EH266456. U it

closed at 1035 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry.

(3) At 010630 March, W2-32th displaced to 1,23339. Unitclosed at WO0hours'. irect support of 2-327th Infantry.

(4) At 020730 March, B/2-320th displaced to 3518420. Unit

closed at 1500 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(5) At 030700 March, B/2-320th displaced to 359h521. Unit

closed at 1615 hours. Tkirect support of 2-327th Infantry.

(6) At 030500 March, C/2-320th displaced to I205528. Unit


U (7) At 060630 March, C/2-320th displaced to EN266456. Unit

closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-502d I"fantry.

(8) At 030600 March, B/1-3Otb displaced to EN594521. Unit

closed at 1615 hours. 0eaeral support reinforcing the fires of B/2-320th.

d. phase IV :

(1) At 090600 M, A/2-320th displaced to 3786667. Unit

closed at 1500 hours. Direct support of 1-32?th Infantry.

(2) At 220700 March, A/2-32Oth displaced to W1744869. Unit

closed at 1715 hours. General support le t Brigade.

k3) At 090500 March, 2-320th displaced to E1703597. Unit

c3omed at 1745 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(4) At 150700 March, B/2-320th displaced to B686682. Unitclosed at n52 hours. Direct support of 2/502d Infantry.

(5) At 230900 March, B/2-320th displaced to q1h77869. Unit

closed at 1250 hours. General suqport of le t vrigade.

(6) At 080800 March, C/2-320th displaced to W15419. Unit


(7) At 121300 Mard, c/2-320th displaced to 207441,869. Unit

closed at 2130 hours. Direct support 2-327th Infantry.

(8) At 220700 March, B/1-30th displaced to E634526. Unitclosed at 1000 hours. General support reinforcineg the fires of B/2-320th.

(9) At 230900 March, 9/1-30th displaced to 31714869. Unitcloeed at ]2h5 houre. General support of le t Brigade.

4. Reslts:

a. 12 VC (nB Arty).

8-3

CONFIDENTIAL

I _ .. ....



CON-! "1NT /.- LITclosuro 8 (Artillery) to Oombat Operations After Action Report, OperationFA I UCOT

b. 4OVO (KB Arty) (EST).

5. Administrative matteros H/A

6. Special equipment and techniquest Th e radar was extenslvely emloyed

during phases 1II11 ad IV of VARRAGUT in the following mawras

a. Registrations were conducted, both center of impact and highbrst.

b. Survey coordinates were computed for C batterx bV the rackingof a low charge high angle round tired by C battery, by radar.

c. Further tes in computing survey coordinates fo r a given location

Vere oonducted by the rajar section as follows!

(1) Tracking a banlon floating above the point at which surveyedooordinates were desired,

(2) TrackUig an H-13 hovering above the point at which surveyulcoordinates are desired.

(3) Tracking a beer can dropped from an H-13 onto the point at

which surveyed coordina.s are desired.

7. Coomander's AnaL ys: That the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, Battery

272 ls t Battulion 30th Artillery, and tactical ai r oontinue to provide adequatefire support.

Temts conducted with the portable HF radio in broadcasting air warning

messages hav' been more satisfactory than methods emloyed In past operations.

A more powerful portable UH F radio, once obtained, should eliminate the problmof adequate aircraft warning Juring the conduct of fire missions. Tests con-ducted with the radio hiv indicated may areas of possible employment in acounterinsurgency enwLronmnt.

8. Recovmendations: That four (4) C1-47's be provided this brigadeat al l times and that V i aviation compm assigned to Soport continue to

provide a Unison officor.

&44



CWHDLNIAL

Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation

1. Th e most si%;ificant Engineer activity in Operation FARRAOT wa s the

opening and use of land lines of communication. During the initial phase of

the operation, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry moved into the Secret

Base 7 area using Rt I and Rt 406. The later stages of the operations were

characterizod by daily usage of Rt 1 in the area in which the Brigade was

operating. The displacement of the Brigade base from PRAM HIET to SONGMAO

ar~d from SONG MAO o FRAN RANG was accomlished by road.

2. The let Brigade, 101st Airborne Division received general Engineer

support from elements of the 35th Engineer oroup. Company 9, lhth EngineerL Battalion provided support in the PHAN RANG area, specifically repairing 8

kilometers of Rt 406

in late January, assisting in the opening of Rt 1 from

PM R ANG to SONG MAO n 15 and 16 February, and in opening Rt 407 to SONGHAl in mid March. 2d Platoon, Company A, lth Engineer Battalion providedsupport in preparing the Brigade base area at PHANHIET and in opening Rt 1from F N THIET to SONG 1AO on 17 and 18 February. Co pany B, 87th EngIneer

Battalion constructed the airfield at SONG MAO, prepared the Brigade basearea At SONO MAO,provided bulldozers for construction of access roads intothe LE HONG PHONGorest, and installed a bypass on Rt 1 on 4 March. Thesupport rendered by each of these units was responsive and timely in everyincident.

3. Throughout the operation Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion providedLZ clearing and demolition teams to the committed Infantry Battalions. Minesweeping teams working with A Troop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalryand with the MYPlatoon conducted daily sweeps on 't 1 from 18 February

through the nd of the operation, The company provided a provisional platoon,reorganized as Infantry, to secure Battery 3, 1-30 Artillery, from 3 through*

11 February. With equipment support from the 35th Engineer Group, Oompany A,

326th Engineer Battalion opened Rt 1 from PHAN THIET to SONG MAO, repairing27 cuts and installing 3 bypasses. Eesant of the compaw constructed approx-imately 25 kilometers of access roads ".htohe LE HONG PHONGorest and dest-

royed two bunker complexes totalling more than 1O bunkers.

L. The types of m es encountered in Operation FARRAODTere the CObon.a emplaced on trails and along Rt I between FRAN TMET and SONG MAO,

& comand detonated Claymore type mine used on Rt I north of TUT PRONG, andelectr ically detonated road minos emplaced on Rt I north of PHAN INIET# Those

electrically detonated ines used a firing mechanism made of tw o flattened

sections of tin caT h eldponrlmatly 1/8 inch apart by split wooden pag.7heee metal sections were wired into the firing "aetom and pressing the

sctions together completed the circuit and fired the mine. This siMle butaffective mechaim was used as a pressure device or fo r command detonation.

5. Drinking water was a distinct problem in the coastal rgions arou.nd

and north of PHA TRIET. The only water soure found near PRAN THIST that

would support the Brigade water point was the city reservoir. During the

dry months of February and March this water has a strong, musty taste thatis extremely unpleasant and even effects foods prepared with water. Saltwas used to contaminate wells used by ti'a VCon the edge of the LE HONG PRONGForest.

6. There were no unusual Engineer problems encountered in OperationFARRAM. The requirement fo r careful road sweeping and the efficiency ofroads as a means for moving supplies were again demonstrated.

CONFIDENrIAL

Operation FARRAGUT Lessons Learned 3 May 1967

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Transcript of Operation FARRAGUT Lessons Learned 3 May 1967