On the Relevance of Bildung for Democracy

Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2003

© 2003 Philosophy of Education Society of AustralasiaPublished by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

Blackwell Publishing LtdOxford, UKEPATEducational Philosophy and Theory0013-1857© 2003 Philosophy of Education Society of AustralasiaApril 20033521000Original ArticleOn the Relevance of Bildung for DemocracyWalter Bauer

On the Relevance of

Bildung

for Democracy

W

B

Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg

In his essay ‘Demokratie und Bildung: Über die Zukunft eines Problems’, JürgenOelkers claims that the relationship between

Bildung

and democracy has at bestbeen of marginal interest in the history of German pedagogy (see Oelkers, 2000a).This, he continues, also holds true for the major part of international progressiveeducation

1

(

Reformpädagogik

). According to Oelkers, notions of

Bildung

in Germanpedagogy had been dominant which understood

Bildung

rather as an ‘inward’occurrence and as self-formation or which had sought reference to social realityvia a nationalistically burdened humanism and a state-oriented theory of educa-tion and

Bildung

. This explains why the discourse on

Bildung

in Germany wasnot perceived as apolitical, even when dealing with notions of inwardness and‘self-cultivation’.

2

The history of German pedagogy is thus not such a rich source on the relation-ship between

Bildung

and democracy. This holds true for both views on

Bildung

that are predominant in the history of education in the nineteenth century:

Bildung

as ‘inner’ self-formation, and

Bildung

as the acquisition of a comprehensive know-ledge based on an institutionalised canon of cultural traditions transmitted throughthe educational system.

This short sketch, however, neglects the fact that the subject-centred view of

Bildung

as—aesthetically tinted—inwardness (

Innerlichkeit

) is already a watered downversion of the ‘classic’ view on

Bildung

, resulting retrospectively from its decline:the debate on

Bildung

in the mid eighteenth century was initially a reaction to thechallenge posed by the changing relationship between the individual and culturein the face of conflicting socio-cultural developments and social alienation experi-ences.

Bildung

was here conceptualised in its core as a creative reconstruction andtransformation of cultural and social experiences (see Peukert, 1998; Lövlie, 2002).This critical impetus, which was directed toward a change of social structuresas well as a search for new forms of possible self–world relationships, was lost in thecourse of the social and political conflicts during the nineteenth century and turnedthe initial meaning of the term

Bildung

into its (affirmative) opposite (see Peukert,1998, p. 18).

At the end of the 1950s Theodor W. Adorno put it bluntly when he describedthis outcome as ‘socialised semi-formation’ (

sozialisierte Halbbildung

) (Adorno,1972, p. 93). He concluded that the failure of the bourgeois emancipation had,especially in Germany, resulted in an understanding of

Bildung

and culture which

212

Walter Bauer

© 2003 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia

had lost its connection to social contexts. The less social circumstances could keepthe promise of

Bildung

, the more

Bildung

would become self-sufficient, edifying andbereft of purpose (see Adorno, 1972, pp. 97–98). If

Bildung

was reduced to thesubjective appropriation of such intellectualised cultural assets or commodities itwould betray its core of humanity. According to Adorno, the purpose of theseassets ‘can not be separated from the arrangement of human affairs’ (Adorno,1972, p. 95).

My main thesis is thus that a continued analysis of the relationship between

Bildung

and democracy only makes sense when referring back to the ‘classic’ inten-tion of understanding

Bildung

as creative, critical and transformative processeswhich change the relationship of self and world in conjunction with a changingsocial and material environment. This is not possible however within the historicalframework of a dualistic and foundationalist subject-object philosophy, which(besides a multitude of social and political aspects) has led to the two distinct andrather distorted notions of

Bildung

prevalent in the nineteenth century. The idea of

Bildung

and ‘democracy’ has to be conceived interdependently.Inherent in the notion of democracy is the idea that citizens should not simply

endure their historical life-situation and take it as unchangeable fate but participatein a self-determined and comprehensive way in shaping their situation, and thatthey can acquire the necessary skills via processes of learning and

Bildung

(seePeukert, 2000, p. 507). Under pluralistic and changing social circumstances,

Bildung

as a transformation of self- and world-relations can however not be under-stood any more as referring to a fixed goal, i.e. teleologically. Every notion of

Bildung

that is based on a description of anthropological fundamentals, determin-ing ‘man’ on the basis of a certain ‘human nature’ and laying down universalconcepts of learning and education, must be considered questionable in terms ofdemocracy, since it does not account for the plurality and dynamic of life projectsand relations (see Oelkers, 2000b, pp. 288–289). This holds true for the social andpolitical conditions as well. Democratic societies are constantly involved in ongoingsocial debates and negotiations, which are not aimed at establishing final truthsbut, principally, at determining revisable knowledge and practical hypotheses toovercome problems of action and their consequences.

These thoughts are characteristic for the motives of John Dewey’s pragmatistphilosophy. Dewey, like no other theorist, was dedicated to the study of the relation-ship between democracy and education.

3

In what follows I will trace this relation-ship in Dewey’s work from two perspectives both focusing on the notion of

Bildung

and its relation to democracy. This implies referring to central conceptual aspectswithin his theory of subjectivity on the one side and his theory of learning on theother, that prove relevant for a democratic notion of

Bildung

.In the first part I will look at Dewey’s understanding of

subjectivity

. Here we finda conceptual framework that enables us to conceive of

Bildung

as creative andemerging processes of transformation (

kreativ-emergente Transformationsvorgänge

) ofthe subject, in which the basic attitude of one’s self–world relation is changed.What is important is that these transformations are open and subject to contingen-cies. They can not be intentionally produced by the subject nor can they be socially

On the Relevance of

Bildung

for Democracy

213


(pedagogically) constructed. Such an understanding of

Bildung

corresponds wellwith the idea of democratic societies as open, contingent and learning ‘projects’.Dewey does not explicitly deal with the question of how processes of

Bildung

areconcretely socially mediated. Despite this limitation, his transformative notion of

Bildung

can nevertheless be of benefit for empirical analyses of processes of educa-tion. I will attempt to demonstrate this in an excursion into the field of biographicresearch in education (

erziehungswissenschaftliche Biographieforschung

).In part 2 I will look at the relationship between

Bildung

(as a transformativeprocess) and democracy in such a way that the social dimension of processes of

Bildung

becomes apparent. If the constitution of subjectivity is understood basicallyas a process of interaction between the emerging self and the (social) world, thenprocesses of

Bildung

are dependent upon the reactions and opinions of the socialenvironment. How this can be understood has been developed systematically byG. H. Mead. Dewey’s rather programmatically stated link between the constitutionof the subject and democracy can be put into more concrete terms with the help ofMead. Of central importance in this is the idea of social

recognition

(

Anerkennung

)in psychological and ethical terms. This idea has found its entrance into researchin education via its reception in the sociological discourse on ‘identity formation’(‘

Identitätsbildung

’). Not only does this discourse show close links to the topic of

Bildung

but also, and foremost, it arises out of pragmatist theories in social psychologyand sociology.

The second perspective is elaborated in part 3. It focuses on the theory oflearning and deals with the relationship between

Bildung

and knowledge acquisi-tion. Central here are processes of learning which end up changing certain parts ofthe learner’s self–world relation by a reflective, creative—i.e. intelligent—re-adaptationof the organism and its natural and social environment. Generally we are notdealing here with the generation of new factual knowledge but with changes oforientational knowledge (

Orientierungswissen

), which lead to new self–world per-spectives. It can be shown here that the relationship between

Bildung

, knowledgeand democracy has been developed by Dewey himself after he performed a majorshift of focus in his theory of learning to the pragmatist position of Peirce, whichhighlights the discursive and public character of knowledge.

1.

Bildung

as Creative and Emergent Process of Transformation

Understandably, the German term

Bildung

does not appear systematically inDewey’s work but sporadically and in the context of historical excursions.

4

Dewey’sconcept of ‘adjustment’ is useful for understanding

Bildung

in terms of a trans-formation of self and world.

5

There are two distinctive ways in which Dewey uses theterm. Interestingly, the more ‘substantial’ use that is relevant for

Bildung

is to befound not in his writings on pedagogy but in his theory of aesthetics and religion.

The

basic

distinction that characterises the relationship between organism andenvironment in terms of adaptation is, however, to be found in his writings onpedagogy (for example in

Democracy and Education

). Either the organism here changesto attain a (provisional) equilibrium with the environment: this is accommodation.

214

Walter Bauer


Or the organism induces changes in the environment: this is termed adjustment.(See Dewey, 1985a, pp. 359–361, 364–366; Dewey, 1985b, pp. 51–53.) The conceptof adaptation is used as a generic term to include both aspects. ‘Adaptation, in fine,is quite as much adaptation

of

the environment to our own activities as of ouractivities

to

the environment’ (Dewey, 1985b, p. 52).With the term adjustment, Dewey emphasises the active part of the organism. The

issue here is the control over the means to shape the environment in order to attaincertain goals. This is tied to growth (1985a, p. 365). Accordingly, accommodationis the more passive aspect in the establishment of an equilibrium between theorganism and its environment. It can be understood as a process of habituation inwhich there is minimal reaction and change to the environment, i.e. one in whichthe environment becomes familiar. This process, however, presupposes a shift inthe subject that implies learning new cognitive, perceptive and action schemes.

6

In order to arrive at an understanding of the second variation in meaning of theterm ‘adjustment’, as it is introduced in

A Common Faith

, it is important to notethat the term here ‘changes sides’ and is assigned the meaning of accommodation.Dewey first distinguishes between religion and religious experience (Dewey,1989b, pp. 1–58). After that he introduces the religious aspect of experience as aquality that does not necessarily occupy a distinct sphere of experience but whichcan be a part of any experience. ‘It denotes attitudes that may be taken towardevery object and every proposed end or ideal’ (ibid., p. 8). Religious experience isthus an epiphenomenon. It is not the reason for its emergence that is important,but its effectiveness in terms of a better adjustment to life (see ibid., p. 11).

Initially Dewey refers to the distinction already mentioned: ‘accommodation …affects

particular

modes of conduct, not of the entire self ’ (ibid., p. 12, his emphasis).This process is to be understood as largely passive. Dewey sees adaptation as theactive variant of this process: ‘we modify conditions so that they will be accom-modated to our wants and purposes’ (ibid.). Apart from these two, however, thereare transformative processes on the part of the subject, which do not refer tocertain aspects, but are crucial to its attitude towards self and world as a whole.These processes come now under the term ‘adjustment’. ‘But there are changes inourselves in relation to the world in which we live that are much more inclusiveand deep seated. They relate … to our being in its entirety’ (ibid.). These trans-formations, which are marked by stability, are not tied to a particular act of willor a decision, but are ‘changes

of

will’ in terms of the totality of our being ratherthan changes ‘

in

will’. (ibid., p. 13, his emphasis). Such a change is identified byDewey as religious attitude. Its religious quality is closely tied to

imagination

. Inthis sense, imagination, the harmonisation of the self and its interconnectednesswith the universe have to be seen as closely knit.

The idea of a whole, whether of the whole personal being or of the world,is an imaginative, not a literal, idea.… Neither observation, thought, norpractical activity can attain that complete unification of the self which iscalled a whole. The

whole

self is an ideal, an imaginative projection. (ibid.,p. 14, his emphasis)

On the Relevance of

Bildung

for Democracy

215


This imagination of unity is not a process over which the individual has intentionalpower in the sense of bringing it about. And there is no privileged affinity toreligious contents, on the contrary, this attitude can be ‘displayed in art, scienceand good citizenship’ (ibid., p. 17).

Important to the theory of

Bildung

is the transformative dynamic of the self- andworld relation, which also plays a central part in Dewey’s notion of aestheticexperience. Generally this dynamic can be found where the interactions withthe environment lead to a unified and self-sufficient experience (in the sense of‘having

an

experience’). (See Dewey, 1989c, p. 42.) This experience is based on adynamic organisation of its different facets by giving form or expression. Thisprocess is particularly relevant for productive and receptive aesthetic experiences.Dewey describes the artist’s work like any other genuine process of experience: itputs in motion an experience ‘that does not know where it is going’ (ibid., p. 66).

At the same time, this process connects old and new experiences in the sense ofa ‘recreation’ (ibid.). This event shows clearly traits of an emergent process, newideas mature subconsciously before they find expression in creative production (seeibid., p. 79). This process cannot be controlled intentionally; ‘finally something isborn almost in spite of conscious personality, and certainly not because of itsdeliberate will’ (ibid.). Such a tentative and explorative action, Dewey emphasises,holds also for ‘thinkers’ and ‘scientists’ (ibid.).

As mentioned above, Dewey deals with this issue primarily from the point ofview of the individual. Processes of social interaction that could for instanceprompt transformation and social reactions toward processes of

Bildung

are notlooked at. Before I turn to this issue, I would like to show how Dewey’s conceptioncan nevertheless be productive by briefly focusing on empirical research on pro-cesses of Bildung in educational science. In part 2 I will then develop a systematiclink between Bildung as transformative process and democracy, drawing on centralissues in G. H. Mead’s theory of the constitution of subjectivity.

Excursus: The Concept of Transformation as a Bildungstheoretical Category in an Empirical-Pragmatist Perspective

Outside of philosophy John Dewey’s and George Herbert Mead’s pragmatism wasof decisive influence in the sociology of the Chicago School and its symbolicinteractionism. Anselm Strauss, in particular, pointed in his later work to thepragmatist influences which had not received appropriate attention (see alsoStrauss, 1993, pp. 2–16, 47–57). The German sociologist Fritz Schütze picked up onthis tradition and has developed his concept of sociological biographic research incontinuation of Glaser and Strauss’s ‘grounded theory’ (1969) since the 1980s (seeSchütze, 1981, 1983, 1999). Winfried Marotzki has introduced the concept oftransformation for the empirical examination of biographic processes in the fieldof educational research on Bildung. His empirical examinations and his theory ofBildung based thereon centre on the ‘establishment, maintenance and change ofworld- and self-references’ (Marotzki, 1999, p. 58; see also Marotzki, 1990). Arnd-Michael Nohl in his recently published analyses of biographical narrations, focusing

216 Walter Bauer


on biographical transformations as processes of Bildung, refers explicitly to Dewey’sand Mead’s pragmatist theories (see Nohl, 2001, 2003).7

This tradition in social psychology and sociology has been of benefit to pedagogicaltheories and research on Bildung in two ways: firstly it contributed to an under-standing of human development that views transformations of biography (biographyunderstood as identity in its chronological dimension) not as a progressive develop-ment toward a certain goal or as a life-long variation of central character traitsformed at an early age, but as an ‘open-ended, tentative, exploratory, hypothetical,problematical, devious, changeable, and only partly unified character of humancourses of action’ (Strauss, 1997, p. 93). Secondly, it has demonstrated the indis-pensable importance of ‘biographical work’, namely the fact that different experiencesand occurrences throughout one’s life history have to be worked on to appropriatethem as meaningful in the construction of identity. Biographic transformations areprincipally open, contingent processes. This view does not contradict the fact thatbiographical work means constructing new sense-making frames for self- andworld-interpretations that cause a ‘subjective feeling of continuity’ by which‘otherwise discordant events can be reconciled and related’ (Strauss, 1997, p. 148).

This motive of ‘coherence formation’ (Zusammenhangsbildung), which can alreadybe found in Dewey’s work, is thus from an empirical perspective not as antiquatedas some postmodern theorists in sociology and psychology imply in their insistenceon questioning modern notions of subjectivity, inventing terms such as ‘patchworkidentity’ or ‘shattered self ’ as an alternative model of subjectivity.8 The latter arecriticised by Straub, who claims that postmodern ‘armchair psychology’ (Straub,2000, p. 167) is largely devoid of empirical research. Where this research is carriedout, he claims, it can easily be connected with older approaches of identity theory.

Qualitative-empirical research on Bildung is largely based on descriptive researchmethods and descriptive theories. This in my view constitutes its limitation, whenfocusing on the possibilities and perspectives of a democratic notion of Bildung. Anapproach that is oriented more toward philosophy of education allows methodo-logically an inclusion of the discussion on which forms of Bildungs-processes aredesirable and which are not. This, however, can not be arrived at deductivelythrough norms any longer but only in negotiation with empirical research and itsfindings. This in my opinion is one of the basic elements in Dewey’s pragmaticphilosophy as an explorative and ‘subjunctive’ way of thinking that aims to shednew light on existing conditions in order to improve them. Dewey exemplifies thiskind of (melioristic) thinking in Democracy and Education (1985b) with the help ofhis concepts of society and community. In order to improve social circumstances,we need criteria of value judgement and a sense of direction. For Dewey, idealshave to be practical in order to be sensible; i.e. they have to issue from theconditions at hand. The ‘third way’ between a utopian idealism and a sober realismis ‘to extract the desirable traits of forms of community life which actually exist,and employ them to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement’(1985b, pp. 88–89). Similarly the philosophical debate on the future of Bildungshould include ideas on what Bildung ought to be and criticise current use, movingon a path between normative and descriptive approaches.

On the Relevance of Bildung for Democracy 217


2. Bildung as Identity Transformation and Recognition

It has to be stated that Dewey neglected the intersubjective context especially in hisearly work. This is also mentioned by Robert Westbrook (2000) in a text on the relation-ship between democracy and scientific research in Dewey’s (and Putnam’s) work:‘Even though Dewey constantly talked about the primacy of the social, he had littleto say in terms of what is generally known as social theory’ (Westbrook, 2000, p. 355).

According to Westbrook, this is particularly true for central texts such as HumanNature and Conduct (1922) which is subtitled An Introduction to Social Psychology.He claims that G. H. Mead is a far more useful author in terms of an elaboratedsocial psychology. Mead himself had been critical of Dewey’s Human Nature andConduct as is evident in his review of the book, which was not published at thetime. (See also Mead, 1987, pp. 347–354) Mead was particularly irritated by Dewey’sfocus on mimetic processes to explain an intersubjective genesis of identity.9 Meadhad systematically developed the genesis and structure of identity formation withhis concept of role-taking, which is exemplified in children’s development from the‘play’ to the ‘game’ phase. (See also Mead, 1980, 1987.)10

The term ‘identity’ has many affinities with the term Bildung. Partly because ofthis, it had replaced the term Bildung between the 1970s and the 1990s in Germaneducational science. This has to be seen in the context of a turn from the humansciences to the social sciences in the field of research and theory formation ineducation. Predominant in the theoretical understanding of identity was the recep-tion of Mead’s theory in the context of symbolic interactionism. Another reasonwhy the term Bildung had largely been replaced by ‘identity’ in this period is itshistorical burden that came under attack by critical and postmodern theorists.11

When understanding identity as intersubjective construction, the social contextsthat an individual is situated in are highly relevant. They find their social expres-sions in social categories such as status, class, gender, ethnicity etc. As long as theassigned social identities were taken for granted and accepted by the individual,the associated social recognition of personal identity did not pose a significantproblem. In the processes of modernisation and individuation this has changed.

The historical roots of this topic of recognition in social philosophy are to befound in Hegel’s early work in his idea of a ‘struggle for recognition’. The Germanphilosopher Axel Honneth, starting with the fragmentary and rather speculativenotions of the young Hegel, has elaborated this topic based on Mead’s theory ofthe intersubjective constitution of the subject, giving this idea on recognition a turnthat enables empirical reconstructions.

In Mead’s theory of identity, the topic of recognition is located in the ‘Me’ as theinteriorised ‘concrete’ and ‘generalised other’. Mead talks about a relationship ofreciprocal recognition: ‘It is this identity, that can be sustained in the community, thatis recognised insofar in the community, as it recognises the others’ (Mead, 1980, p. 240).

Honneth distinguishes between three forms of recognition (see Honneth, 1992,p. 211): 1) On the level of primary relationships recognition is transmitted in theform of emotional care. This is seen as contributing to the establishment of selfconfidence. 2) A second form of recognition is that in which subjects are reciprocally

218 Walter Bauer


respected for having certain rights. This Honneth sees as the basis for self respect.The third form refers to a socially transmitted esteem of a person, based on solid-arity. The latter refers to the competence and qualities of a person. This form ofrecognition is about honour, dignity and social prestige.12

In the course of the pluralisation and increasing dynamic in social relationships,recognition has become a problem, since traditional forms of social cohesion aredissolving. Hence individuals are increasingly urged to engage actively in socialcontexts in order to gain recognition. This holds true for the area of primaryrelationships as well as forms of social cohesion based on solidarity. In both areas,the recognition of significant others (within the family, partnership, the socialgroup etc.) has to be gained. Recognition is also relevant within the public domainthat is based on legal consent. The question of recognition is of general signific-ance. It is particularly relevant, however, when transformations of one’s identity,i.e. processes of Bildung, take place. It is important that the new understanding ofself and world, which becomes a ‘Me’ in Mead’s sense, is ratified, that is, recog-nised by others (see Bauer, 2002). The same can be said in regard to associationsand groups in the public sphere. In a pluralistic society they are faced with the taskof claiming legal recognition and social respect in their struggle for recognition aspart of their ‘identity politics’, especially when they are treated as marginalisedminorities. From the perspective of a theory of democracy, Dewey would no doubtagree with Sheyla Benhabib, who claims:

In entering the public sphere every new social, cultural or political group pre-sents itself to the other members of the society, redefining at the same timeits identity. This process of self-presentation and articulation in the public isstill the only means of developing civil imagination. (Benhabib, 1997, p. 40)13

The notion of Bildung as a relationship between self and world and its transforma-tion on the one hand, and the issue of recognition on the other, show the socialconstruction of the subject as a central focal point. For Dewey, the degree of freeexchange on an individual and a collective level was the measure of an open anddemocratic society (see Dewey, 1988, pp. 328–382). This holds true for the recip-rocal recognition of common as well as differing interests and needs and is alsorelevant for the role of interaction and communication. An open society simplifiesthe change of individual and social habits of thinking and acting, ‘its continuousreadjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse’(Dewey, 1985b, p. 92).

The link between Dewey’s rather programmatically tied psychological and polit-ical texts can be strengthened by Mead’s more thoroughly worked-through inter-subjective focus on subject constitution, in order for the issue of Bildung anddemocracy to receive adequate recognition.

3. Bildung as Reflective Thinking

The school-oriented reception of Dewey in Germany has come to accept the factthat neither the notion of ‘learning by doing’, nor an emphasis on the self-activity



(Selbsttätigkeit) of students as such does justice to Dewey’s theory. To the contrary:Dewey’s central concern is reflective thinking and action, in order to solve prob-lematic situations through inquiry and to achieve an adaptation between the subjectin action and his or her environment.14 Dewey claims that there is a continuitybetween problem solving in daily life and that in scientific inquiry. Both start fromindeterminate situations and arrive at determinate ones. This implies that there isno principle but only a gradual distinction between learning situations at schoolsand scientific inquiries. According to Dewey, finding a solution in a problematicsituation requires an endowment of meaning and purpose to the objective or pro-cessual aspects of the situation. It is important, he claims, that these differentaspects are understood in their references to and in their functional relation-ships with each other. (See also Dewey, 1989a, pp. 225–226.) Learning is thusunderstood as coherence formation (Zusammenhangsbildung). It requires seeingthings and occurrences not in isolation from each other, but within the contextsand references in which they appear.

To Dewey there is no doubt that pupils should practise forms of reflective think-ing extensively right from the start. Such thinking would lead to an increased senseof control and a more aware interaction with the world. It would be of benefit notjust on the part of the learner but also to enrich reality by providing it with newmeaning.

According to Dewey the basic structure of reflective thinking entails the followingfeatures of a ‘situation’: ‘(1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental diffi-culty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, hunting, inquiringto find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity’(1989a, p. 121). Dewey describes inference as the core of intelligent thinking.Inference describes the tension between that which we already know or is given ina situation and that which is not yet known, which is mere potential. Inference isthus a ‘jump from the known into the unknown’ (ibid., p. 191).15 The generationof ‘ideas’ (in the sense of ‘suggestions’, possible ‘solutions’) bridges this gap andthus plays a decisive part in arriving at new knowledge (see ibid., p. 197).

Prawat has recently developed the hypothesis that Dewey’s pedagogical thinkingwas marked by a decisive turn around 1915 from a learner-centred and activity-based perspective to a more reflection- and discipline-based perspective (seePrawat, 1999, 2000). This turn in his thinking has also changed the understandingof knowledge-production and -validation. This, Prawat claims, can be shown whencomparing the two versions of How We Think, of 1910 and 1933. According toPrawat this shift is linked with a change of direction toward Peirce’s pragmatismwhile at the same time turning away from James’s understanding of pragmatism.The latter’s focus on the individual subject had made it increasingly difficult forDewey to conceptualise the interconnectedness between the individual and thesocial.

From my own bildungstheoretical perspective, three elements are of particularimportance: firstly, the generation of new knowledge (as a contribution to thesolution of the ‘classic learning-paradox’) is not thought of any more within themode of an inductive or deductive reasoning but in the mode of abduction as a

220 Walter Bauer


process that emphasises the generation of ideas in the sense of tentative designs.While deduction shows that something is necessary and induction that somethingreally works, abduction merely shows that something can be the case. Abductionis a process that operates via metaphorisation (Metaphorisierung) and implies thatnew meanings are generated and fused with old ones. What is known is linked towhat is not known.

Secondly: the group or community plays a decisive part in the generation of newknowledge and its inclusion into the stock of knowledge already at hand. The groupor community makes the final (in principle revisable) decision about the validity ofideas. These are generated by the imagination of the individual, but in order to gainapproval, they have to connect in new and sensible ways with knowledge alreadyin existence and have to endure the process of social negotiation. This processentails the three functions of the sign: iconic similarity, indexical interaction andsymbolic universality, which are central to Peirce’s semiotic theory.

In a sense, the index is the nexus that connects three ‘worlds’ of meaning:the imaginative, intensely individual world that gives rise to the idea andhints at some general meaning; the experiential world that provides thereality check; and the social world that vets the idea and makes sure thatit is adequately expressed in words. (Prawat, 2000, p. 818)

The third aspect refers to the enhanced role of the conceptual penetration of thesubject matter. In his later work Dewey highlights the importance of new experi-ences more specifically. For Dewey, only those experiences (in everyday life and inschool) are educative (bildend ) that have undergone a transformation mentally.

But at every stage of development, each lesson, in order to be educative,should lead up to a certain amount of conceptualizing of impressions andideas. Without this conceptualizing or intellectualizing, nothing is gainedthat can be carried over to the better understanding of new experiences.… This intellectualization is the deposit of an idea that is both definite andgeneral. (Dewey, 1989a, p. 239, his emphasis)

In the school context this means that the role of the teacher and that of the groupchanges. The initial emphasis on activity has to be revised in favour of the concen-tration on intellectual and shared processes of dealing with subject matter. ‘A livelygive-and-take of ideas, experiences, information between members of the classshould be the chief reliance’ (ibid., p. 329). Rogers (2002) also draws attention tothe importance of a common reflection: ‘The community serves as a testing groundfor an individual’s understanding as it moves from the realm of the personal to thepublic’ (p. 857). This highlights the fact that knowledge is public,16 and that thevalidation of knowledge occurs publicly in negotiation with the members of acommunity.17

By turning to Peirce, Dewey managed to put the relationship between the indi-vidual and society in such a manner that their interdependence within a frameworkof a theory of learning becomes plausible. This holds true for his specific pedago-gical perspective of the topic of learning and Bildung as well as for his theory on



democracy. ‘When the activities of mind set out from customary beliefs and striveto effect transformations of them which will in turn win general conviction, thereis no opposition between the individual and the social’ (Dewey, 1985b, p. 306). Deweyestablished the connection to a democratic way of life with his reorientationtowards a social-constructivist understanding of knowledge acquisition. It is thetask of the learning community to develop and test ideas for verifiable hypotheses.New ideas become a part of the knowledge system when they are confirmed byconjoint behaviour.

Both approaches to the relationship between Bildung and democracy can thus besummarised as follows: posing Bildung as the transformation of the person’s self–world relation, and the connected question of social recognition, highlights themoral-practical side of human existence. The approach that focuses on transformativelearning is thus more oriented towards a theoretical, i.e. epistemological, position-ing towards the world. In pragmatist thinking, however, the human being-in-the-world is chiefly a practical affair of ‘doing and undergoing’, and the epistemologicalreference to the world has to be tied back to it. The generation of knowledge is notan end in itself but a means to improve the conditions of human life.

4. A Sceptical Outlook

Under the heading ‘Dewey in Germany—a Misunderstanding’ (Oelkers, 1993),Oelkers published an epilogue in the reprint to the German edition of Democracyand Education (Dewey, 1993).18 Here he rightfully points to the minimal and ratherdistorted reception of Dewey’s work in the field of pedagogy in Germany. It isstriking to note that if there are references made at all to Dewey’s work, the contextof pragmatist philosophy is largely ignored. ‘Pragmatism as a philosophy has notshown any effects in education’ (Oelkers, 1993, p. 491). For Oelkers, what is newin Dewey’s take on pedagogy is neither his emphasis on child-centred educationnor his practical suggestions such as the ‘project method’ (which has roots datingback further), but his revolution of pedagogic theory. Oelkers claims that Deweywas the first person to develop a non-teleological (ateleologisch) theory of Bildung(Oelkers, 1993, p. 495). My intention here has been to elaborate relevant traits ofthis theory. Such a concept corresponds with an understanding of democracy asan open and contingent project. One of the main reasons for the historical mis-understanding of Dewey’s intentions by German pedagogues especially in thefirst half of the twentieth century results from their unwillingness and inability tounderstand ‘Erziehung’ and Bildung as a democratic task.

Meanwhile the situation in the German pedagogic scientific community haschanged. Due in part to the general renaissance of pragmatism, and also becausesome important texts of Dewey’s have just recently been translated, the receptionof his work has increased and the underlying philosophical context receives moreand more attention.19

Nevertheless, there is little reason to be too optimistic that this reception willleave significant traces in the ongoing discussions on educational theory, educa-tional policy-making and the future shape of the education system. At present there

222 Walter Bauer


are reasons to fear that a theory that highlights the relationship between education,Bildung and democracy in the face of global problems and challenges, will beoverridden by one that focuses on neo-liberal models of privatisation and com-modification of education and Bildung.20 Bildung is again in the process of turninginto an individual asset. Defined economically, this individual asset is designed toprovide lifelong fitness for globalised labour markets and global competition.

As early as the 1920s and 1930s, proponents of the German Kulturpädagogikharshly criticised this utilitarian thinking (‘Nützlichkeitsdenken’). Eduard Sprangercalled such views ‘kitchen- and handicraft-utilitarianism’ (quoted from Oelkers,1993, p. 491) (‘Küchen- und Handwerksutilitarismus’). This was their verdict forpragmatist philosophy and pedagogy. Especially Dewey and James were rejected asalleged proponents of an ‘American Ideology’ that reduced thinking and acting totechnical instrumentality. The German pedagogues had picked the wrong opponentwith their critique. Currently German administrators and policy-makers believethat we can learn from those trends in the United States and other countries thatare oriented toward neo-liberalism in order to reform a system of education that isin a critical state. Again it is an issue of finding allies and again the search partiesare heading in the wrong direction. Dewey’s philosophy of education (‘Bildungs- undErziehungsphilosophie’) offers a far more suitable basis for reforms in the educationsystem, since his approach does not see processes of democratisation and growthas opposites but as conditional upon each other.21

Notes

1. ‘In Europe, at least, reform in education has never perceived itself as being under anyobligation to democracy’ (Oelkers, 2000a, p. 334).

2. Notions of Bildung which centred on the relationship of Bildung, the public andDemocracy, such as for example the concept of ‘liberal education’, central in thediscourse on education in the English-speaking world in the eighteenth and nine-teenth century or the concept of instruction publique in France, are largely missing inthe history of the German debate on Bildung. (See also Rhyn, 1999; Hofer, 1999;Oelkers, 1999.) Central to these concepts were the development and legitimationof a public school system, a curricular canon and aspects of a general education(Allgemeinbildung). According to H. Rhyn (1999, p. 25) the theory behind the conceptof ‘liberal education’ was, however, of limited influence on European pedagogy, besidesits contribution toward the development of a modern school system in the eighteenthcentury.

3. ‘Education’ as viewed here contains both the German concepts of Erziehung andBildung.

4. See also Dewey, 1985a, pp. 405–406. I am quoting Dewey based on the CollectedWorks, edited as ‘The Early Works’, ‘The Middle Works’ and ‘The Later Works’.

5. I am indebted to A.-M. Nohl (see Nohl, 2001), who emphasises the systematic andempirical relevance of this concept for the study of biographic transformations asprocesses of Bildung.

6. This is why the characterisation of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ is not a happy one, especiallyfrom a pedagogical angle. After all, institutionalised education and learning is in thefirst place a process in which new patterns of thinking and acting are supposed to beestablished in the individual. This requires an active and changing subject, even if theinitiatives are coming from the outside (from teachers etc.). The distinction becomes



more plausible in the context of Dewey’s critique of the usual praxis at schools, whichfosters an affirmative adaptation rather than intelligent action and experimentation. Itcan be said that the traditional school understands the pupil in the first place as anaccommodating subject, while the teacher is doing most of the adjusting in terms of thedidactic preparation of the subject matter.

7. Nohl (2001) presents a detailed description of this history of reception.8. The idea of a ‘plural self ’ can already be found in Mead: ‘We split ourselves up into the

most diverse identities when talking to our acquaintances … There are diverse identities,that correspond to the differing social reactions’ (Mead, 1980, pp. 184–185). In thisinteractionist tradition, however, the problem of the ‘interplay’, of the relation of thevarious social roles or identity parts, remains on the agenda.

9. I will use the term ‘identity’ (Identität) rather than ‘self ’ in what follows, since this hasbecome accepted in the German reception of Mead and its associated sociologicalapproaches.

10. In her biography of her father, Jane M. Dewey points to Mead’s strong influence, dueto their long association. ‘Mead had also developed an original theory of the psychical as thestate occurring when previously established relations of organism and environmentbreak down and new relations have not yet been built up; and, through inclusion ofthe relations of human beings with one another, a theory of the origin and nature ofselves. Dewey did not attempt a development of these special ideas, but he took themover from Mead and made them a part of his subsequent philosophy, so that, from thenineties on, the influence of Mead ranked with that of James’ (Dewey, 1989d, p. 26, heremphasis). Nevertheless, it has to be said that it would have been helpful for Dewey’sapproach if he had taken on Mead’s intersubjective position more consistently.

11. Today theories of identity as a substitute for Bildung are less dominating in education.There are, however, ongoing debates and empirical research in sociology and socialpsychology. (See also Keupp et al., 1999.)

12. The corresponding forms of a refusal of recognition are: physical and psychologicalviolence, deprivation of rights, exclusion, degradation and insult.

13. On the democratic potential of the new media (especially the internet), see also Bauer2000.

14. Dewey gives the most general definition of ‘inquiry’ in his Logic: ‘Inquiry is thecontrolled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is sodeterminate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements ofthe original situation into a unified whole’ (1991, p. 108).

15. ‘In every case of reflective activity, a person finds himself confronted with a given,present situation from which he has to arrive at, or conclude to, something else that isnot present. This process of arriving at an idea of what is absent on the basis of whatis at hand is inference’ (Dewey, 1989a, p. 190, his emphasis).

16. ‘… current philosophy held that ideas and knowledge were functions of a mind orconsciousness which originated in individuals by means of isolated contact with objects.But in fact, knowledge is a function of association and communication; it dependsupon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned’(Dewey, 1988, p. 334).

17. This is why Peirce in his more science-oriented approach poses the ‘scientificcommunity’ as a central factor in the process of scientific inquiry.

18. The first German edition was published in 1930 (Breslau), the second in 1949. Fromthe 1960s Demokratie und Erziehung was out of print for about 30 years.

19. A recent overview is provided for example by Lehmann-Rommel (2001).20. The rather bad results of German pupils in the large-scale comparative school studies

(PISA being the last of these) will no doubt enhance this trend.21. Many thanks to Claudia Lemke for the translation. Original quotations in German have

also been translated by her.

224 Walter Bauer


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On the Relevance of Bildung for Democracy

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